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Journal articles on the topic 'Conditional truth'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 20 February 2023

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1

Herburger, Elena. "Conditional perfection: the truth and the whole truth." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 25 (May 14, 2016): 615. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v25i0.3079.

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Conditional Perfection is argued to arise when a sentence is silently conjoined with an exhaustivized version of the same string. The proposed account, the 'whole truth theory', is argued to not only capture Conditional Perfection but to also extend to upper-bounding inferences and exhaustive answers. A crucial piece of the analysis is the independently supported claim that bare conditionals are ambiguous between universal and existential readings.

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2

Oberauer, Klaus, Sonja M. Geiger, Katrin Fischer, and Andrea Weidenfeld. "Two meanings of “if”? Individual differences in the interpretation of conditionals." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 60, no. 6 (June 2007): 790–819. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470210600822449.

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This work investigates the nature of two distinct response patterns in a probabilistic truth table evaluation task, in which people estimate the probability of a conditional on the basis of frequencies of the truth table cases. The conditional-probability pattern reflects an interpretation of conditionals as expressing a conditional probability. The conjunctive pattern suggests that some people treat conditionals as conjunctions, in line with a prediction of the mental-model theory. Experiments 1 and 2 rule out two alternative explanations of the conjunctive pattern. It does not arise from people believing that at least one case matching the conjunction of antecedent and consequent must exist for a conditional to be true, and it does not arise from people adding the converse to the given conditional. Experiment 3 establishes that people's response patterns in the probabilistic truth table task are very consistent across different conditionals, and that the two response patterns generalize to conditionals with negated antecedents and consequents. Individual differences in rating the probability of a conditional were loosely correlated with corresponding response patterns in a classical truth table evaluation task, but there was little association with people's evaluation of deductive inferences from conditionals as premises. A theoretical framework is proposed that integrates elements from the conditional-probability view with the theory of mental models.

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3

Wang, Moyun, and Xinyun Yao. "The contrast effect in reading general conditionals." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 71, no. 12 (January 1, 2018): 2497–505. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1747021817746154.

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To adjudicate between deterministic and probabilistic accounts of the meaning of conditionals, we examined the influence of context on the reading of general conditionals. Context was varied with the contrast context, where participants judged uncertain conditionals after certain conditionals, and the control context, where participants judged only uncertain conditionals. Experiment 1 had participants to judge whether a set of truth table cases was possible for the conditional. Experiment 2 had participants to judge whether the conditional was true for a set of truth table cases. The findings are as follows. Possibility and truth judgments showed a similar response pattern. The reading of general conditionals varied with conditional contexts. The predominant reading was deterministic in the contrast context but was probabilistic in the control context. Conditional contexts yielded a significant contrast effect. Meanwhile, conditional probability P( q| p) made a smaller difference to the acceptance rate in the contrast context than in the control context. The overall pattern is beyond both the deterministic and probabilistic accounts. Alternatively, we propose a dynamic-threshold account for the relative reading of general conditionals.

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4

Bezuidenhout, Anne. "Truth–Conditional Pragmatics." Noûs 36, s16 (October 2002): 105–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.5.

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5

Clapp, Lenny. "Indexical Color Predicates: Truth Conditional Semantics vs. Truth Conditional Pragmatics." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42, no. 2 (June 2012): 71–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2012.0009.

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Truth conditional semantics is the project of ‘determining a way of assigning truth conditions to sentences based on A) the extension of their constituents and B) their syntactic mode of combination’ (Rothschild and Segal, 2009). This research program has been subject to objections that take the form of underdetermination arguments, an influential instance of which is presented by Travis: … consider the words ‘The leaf is green,’ speaking of a given leaf, and its condition at a given time, used so as to mean what they do mean in English. How many distinct things might be said in words with all that true of them? Many.… Suppose a Japanese maple leaf, turned brown, was painted green for a decoration. In sorting leaves by colour, one might truly call this one green. In describing leaves to help identify their species, it might, for all the paint, be false to call it that.

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6

Goldstein, Simon. "A Theory of Conditional Assertion." Journal of Philosophy 116, no. 6 (2019): 293–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2019116620.

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According to one tradition, uttering an indicative conditional involves performing a special sort of speech act: a conditional assertion. We introduce a formal framework that models this speech act. Using this framework, we show that any theory of conditional assertion validates several inferences in the logic of conditionals, including the False Antecedent inference (that not A implies if A, then C). Next, we determine the space of truth-conditional semantics for conditionals consistent with conditional assertion. The truth value of any such conditional is settled whenever the antecedent is false, and whenever the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Then, we consider the space of dynamic meanings consistent with the theory of conditional assertion. We develop a new family of dynamic conditional-assertion operators that combine a traditional test operator with an update operation.

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7

FIELD, HARTRY. "INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS, RESTRICTED QUANTIFICATION, AND NAIVE TRUTH." Review of Symbolic Logic 9, no. 1 (October 19, 2015): 181–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020315000301.

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AbstractThis paper extends Kripke’s theory of truth to a language with a variably strict conditional operator, of the kind that Stalnaker and others have used to represent ordinary indicative conditionals of English. It then shows how to combine this with a different and independently motivated conditional operator, to get a substantial logic of restricted quantification within naive truth theory.

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8

Ohm, Eyvind, and Valerie A. Thompson. "Conditional probability and pragmatic conditionals: Dissociating truth and effectiveness." Thinking & Reasoning 12, no. 3 (August 2006): 257–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546780500172490.

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9

Champollion, Lucas, Ivano Ciardelli, and Linmin Zhang. "Breaking de Morgan's law in counterfactual antecedents." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 26 (October 15, 2016): 304. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v26i0.3800.

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The main goal of this paper is to investigate the relation between the meaning of a sentence and its truth conditions. We report on a comprehension experiment on counterfactual conditionals, based on a context in which a light is controlled by two switches. Our main finding is that the truth-conditionally equivalent clauses (i) switch A or switch B is down and (ii) switch A and switch B are not both up make different semantic contributions when embedded in a conditional antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that (i) and (ii) differ in meaning, which implies that the meaning of a sentential clause cannot be identified with its truth conditions. We show that our data have a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: in a conditional antecedent, (i) introduces two distinct assumptions, while (ii) introduces only one. Independently of the complications stemming from disjunctive antecedents, our results also challenge analyses of counterfactuals in terms of minimal change from the actual state of affairs: we show that such analyses cannot account for our findings, regardless of what changes are considered minimal.

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10

SAKAI, TOMOHIRO. "Truth-Conditional Pragmatics." ENGLISH LINGUISTICS 31, no. 1 (2014): 365–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.9793/elsj.31.1_365.

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11

Kaufmann, Stefan. "Conditional Truth and Future Reference." Journal of Semantics 22, no. 3 (May 3, 2005): 231–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffh025.

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12

Goodwin, Geoffrey P., and P. N. Johnson-Laird. "The Truth of Conditional Assertions." Cognitive Science 42, no. 8 (August 30, 2018): 2502–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12666.

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13

Napoletano, Toby. "How important are truth-conditions for truth-conditional semantics?" Linguistics and Philosophy 42, no. 6 (April 10, 2019): 541–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-019-09261-y.

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14

Horisk, Claire. "THE EXPRESSIVE ROLE OF TRUTH IN TRUTH-CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS." Philosophical Quarterly 57, no. 229 (October 2007): 535–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.496.x.

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15

Elder, Chi-Hé. "Metalinguistic conditionals and the role of explicit content." Linguistics 57, no. 6 (November 18, 2019): 1337–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ling-2019-0029.

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Abstract This paper aims to bridge the relationship between metalinguistic if you like as a non-propositional discourse marker and its conditional counterparts. This paper claims that metalinguistic if you like is polysemous between a hedge that denotes the speaker’s reduced commitment to some aspect of the main clause, and an optional yet potential conditional reading that interlocutors can legitimately draw on in interaction which is brought about due to the ‘if p, q’ sentence form. That is, although the metalinguistic reading is most likely obtained automatically by default, it also carries an available conditional reading that is akin to other metalinguistic conditional clauses such as if you see what I mean. Next, a semantic representation of metalinguistic if you like is developed that takes on board a characterization of conditionality that departs from lexico-grammatical conventions, such that conditionals of the form ‘if p, q’ no longer bear a one-to-one correspondence with “conditional” truth conditions. Employing a radical contextualist semantic framework in which the unit of truth-conditional analysis is not constrained to the sentence form, utterances employing metalinguistic if you like are given a semantic representation such that the if-clause does not contribute propositional content, yet they also maintain their status as conditionals as the sentence form gives rise to a potential conditional secondary meaning.

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16

Chatti, Saloua. "The Semantics and Pragmatics of the Conditional in al-Fārābī’s and Avicenna’s Theories." Studia Humana 6, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 5–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sh-2017-0002.

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Abstract In this paper, I examine al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's conceptions of the conditional. I show that there are significant differences between the two frames, despite their closeness. Al-Fārābī distinguishes between an accidental conditional and two “essential” conditionals. The accidental conditional can occur only once and pragmatically involves succession. In the first “essential” conditional, the consequent follows regularly the antecedent; pragmatically it involves likeliness. The second “essential” conditional can be either complete or incomplete. Semantically the former means “if and only if”; pragmatically it means “necessarily if and only if”. The latter is expressed by ‘if, then’ and means entailment; pragmatically, it involves necessity and the inclusion of the antecedent into the consequent. As to Avicenna, he rejects explicitly al-Fārābī’s complete conditional and distinguishes between the luzūm (real implication) and what he calls ittifāq. He quantifies over situations (or times) to express the various conditionals. The two universals AC and EC are expressed by “In all situations, if…, then…”, while the two particulars IC and OC are expressed by “In some situations, if…, then..”. This gives them a modal connotation, and makes the universals close to strict implications. Pragmatically, AC presupposes the truth of the antecedent, but there is no such presupposition in EC, while what is presupposed in both IC and OC is a (possible) conjunction. Despite these differences, in both systems, the conditional is not truth functional, unlike the Stoic conditional.

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17

GASKIN, RICHARD. "Middle knowledge, fatalism and comparative similarity of worlds." Religious Studies 34, no. 2 (May 1998): 189–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412598004338.

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The doctrine of Middle Knowledge presupposes that conditionals of freedom (statements of the form ‘If A were circumstances C, he would perform X’) can be true. Such conditions are, where true, not true in virtue of the truth of any categorical proposition. Nor can their truth be modelled in terms of comparative similarity of possible worlds, because the structure of possible worlds is a necessary one, whereas the connection between antecedent and consequent of a conditional of freedom is a contingent one. Lewis and Stalmaker are committed to ‘conditional fatalism’, the view that things only would go a certain way if they would have to go that way. Although commitment to conditional fatalism does not itself import a commitment to fatalism, it is hard to find a separate motivation for it.

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18

Brogaard, B. "Truth-Conditional Pragmatics * By FRANCOIS RECANATI." Analysis 72, no. 4 (August 9, 2012): 846–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans094.

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19

ASHER, N. "Truth Conditional Discourse Semantics for Parentheticals." Journal of Semantics 17, no. 1 (February 1, 2000): 31–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/17.1.31.

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20

Lewis, K. "Truth-Conditional Pragmatics, by Francois Recanati." Mind 123, no. 492 (October 1, 2014): 1234–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzu149.

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21

Hall, Alison. "Semantic Compositionality and Truth-Conditional Content." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 109, no. 1pt3 (October 2009): 353–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00274.x.

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22

Callaway, Howard G. "Semantic competence and truth-conditional semantics." Erkenntnis 28, no. 1 (January 1988): 3–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00204422.

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23

Wang, Moyun, and Xinyun Yao. "The dual reading of general conditionals: The influence of abstract versus concrete contexts." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 71, no. 4 (January 1, 2018): 859–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2017.1281321.

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A current main issue on conditionals is whether the meaning of general conditionals (e.g., If a card is red, then it is round) is deterministic (exceptionless) or probabilistic (exception-tolerating). In order to resolve the issue, two experiments examined the influence of conditional contexts (with vs. without frequency information of truth table cases) on the reading of general conditionals. Experiment 1 examined the direct reading of general conditionals in the possibility judgment task. Experiment 2 examined the indirect reading of general conditionals in the truth judgment task. It was found that both the direct and indirect reading of general conditionals exhibited the duality: the predominant deterministic semantic reading of conditionals without frequency information, and the predominant probabilistic pragmatic reading of conditionals with frequency information. The context of general conditionals determined the predominant reading of general conditionals. There were obvious individual differences in reading general conditionals with frequency information. The meaning of general conditionals is relative, depending on conditional contexts. The reading of general conditionals is flexible and complex so that no simple deterministic and probabilistic accounts are able to explain it. The present findings are beyond the extant deterministic and probabilistic accounts of conditionals.

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24

Sano, Katsuhiko, and Yurie Hara. "Conditional independence and biscuit conditional questions in Dynamic Semantics." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 24 (April 5, 2015): 84. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v24i0.2417.

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<p>Biscuit conditionals such as ‘If you are thirsty, there’s beer in the fridge.’ are felt different from canonical conditionals ‘If it’s raining, the fireworks will be cancelled.’ in that the consequent seems to be entailed regardless of the truth/falsity of the antecedent. Franke (2009) argues that the “feeling of the consequent entailment” in biscuit conditionals is due to the conditional independence between the antecedent and consequent; thus a uniform semantics for canonical and biscuit conditionals can be maintained. A question arises as to whether it is possible to derive the same consequent entailment in the framework of dynamic semantics.<br />Furthermore, there are some instances of biscuit conditional questions such as ‘If I get thirsty, is there anything in the fridge?’ This paper provides a dynamic and non-symmetric version of the independence condition, a d-independence condition which correctly derives the consequent entailment in both declaratives and interrogatives.</p>

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25

Gomes, Gilberto. "Negation of Conditionals in Natural Language and Thought." Logical Investigations 27, no. 1 (May 27, 2021): 46–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-1472-2021-27-1-46-63.

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External negation of conditionals occurs in sentences beginning with ‘It is not true that if’ or similar phrases, and it is not rare in natural language. A conditional may also be denied by another with the same antecedent and opposite consequent. Most often, when the denied conditional is implicative, the denying one is concessive, and vice versa. Here I argue that, in natural language pragmatics, ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’ entails ‘$\sim$(if $A, B$)’, but ‘$\sim$(if $A, B$)’ does not entail ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’. ‘If $A, B$’ and ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’ deny each other, but are contraries, not contradictories. Truth conditions that are relevant in human reasoning and discourse often depend not only on semantic but also on pragmatic factors. Examples are provided showing that sentences having the forms ‘$\sim$(if $A, B$)’ and ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’ may have diﬀerent pragmatic truth conditions. The principle of Conditional Excluded Middle, therefore, does not apply to natural language use of conditionals. Three squares of opposition provide a representation the aforementioned relations.

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26

Karimullah, Kamran. "ALFARABI ON CONDITIONALS." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 24, no. 2 (August 5, 2014): 211–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957423914000022.

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AbstractI examine the theory of conditional propositions (qaḍāyā šarṭiyya muttaṣila) and conditional syllogisms (qiyāsāt šarṭiyya) in the logical works of Alfarabi (d. 950). I contextualize Alfarabi's logical doctrines related to conditional reasoning against the backdrop of the context-theory of logic, which was developed by Aristotle's ancient commentators. I show that Alfarabi thought that conditional propositions have truth-conditions. I provide conjectural truth-conditions for conditional propositions, and conjectural validity-conditions for connective conditional syllogisms. These truth-conditions and validity-conditions are shown to be sensitive to the pragmatic conditions in which conditional propositions and arguments are deployed. I end by suggesting that Alfarabi's logical pragmatism is a consequence of his adoption of the late antique context-theory of logic rather than a result of his developing Aristotle's formal syllogistic theory adumbrated in thePrior Analytics.

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27

Gardiner, Mark Q. "Why Truth Matters for the Study of Religion: A Defense of a Truth-Conditional Semantics." Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 30, no. 4-5 (October 10, 2018): 402–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341426.

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AbstractTruth-conditional semantics holds that the meaning of a linguistic expression is a function of the conditions under which it would be true. This seems to require limiting meaningfulness to linguistic phenomena for which the question of truth or falsity is relevant. Criticisms have been raised that there are vast swatches of meaningful language that are simply not truth-related, with religion representing a particularly rich and prevalent source. I argue that if the concept of truth as used in a truth-conditional semantics is understood in ways other than correspondence to fact, there are suitable reformulations of a truth-conditional semantics that may be appropriate for understanding religion. I further argue that these reformulations offer considerable methodological advantages to the scholar of religion.

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28

García-Carpintero, Manuel. "Homophonic Prejudices." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 40, no. 120 (January 8, 2008): 67–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2008.999.

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I critically discuss some aspects of Mark Sainsbury’s Reference without Referents, from an otherwise sympathetic viewpoint. My objections focus on the adequacy of the truth-conditional framework that Sainsbury presupposes. I argue that, as semantic theories, truth-conditional accounts are both too ambitious, and too austere to be fully explanatory, and that both problems have consequences for anaccount of reference.The latter problem has to do with the difficulties to capture in a truth-conditional framework the descriptive contribution of indexicals and, in my view, proper names. The former has to do with the non-semantic contribution of context to the determination of truth-conditions in general and reference in particular.

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29

Bacon, Andrew. "A New Conditional for Naive Truth Theory." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54, no. 1 (2013): 87–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00294527-1731407.

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30

Ogihara, Toshiyuki. "Tense and aspect in truth-conditional semantics." Lingua 117, no. 2 (February 2007): 392–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lingua.2005.01.002.

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31

Horisk, Claire. "The Surprise Argument for Truth-Conditional Semantics." ProtoSociology 21 (2005): 20–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/protosociology2005212.

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32

LEITGEB, HANNES. "A PROBABILISTIC SEMANTICS FOR COUNTERFACTUALS. PART A." Review of Symbolic Logic 5, no. 1 (November 17, 2011): 26–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020311000153.

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This is part A of a paper in which we defend a semantics for counterfactuals which is probabilistic in the sense that the truth condition for counterfactuals refers to a probability measure. Because of its probabilistic nature, it allows a counterfactual ‘if A then B’ to be true even in the presence of relevant ‘A and not B’-worlds, as long such exceptions are not too widely spread. The semantics is made precise and studied in different versions which are related to each other by representation theorems. Despite its probabilistic nature, we show that the semantics and the resulting system of logic may be regarded as a naturalistically vindicated variant of David Lewis’ truth-conditional semantics and logic of counterfactuals. At the same time, the semantics overlaps in various ways with the non-truth-conditional suppositional theory for conditionals that derives from Ernest Adams’ work. We argue that counterfactuals have two kinds of pragmatic meanings and come attached with two types of degrees of acceptability or belief, one being suppositional, the other one being truth based as determined by our probabilistic semantics; these degrees could not always coincide due to a new triviality result for counterfactuals, and they should not be identified in the light of their different interpretation and pragmatic purpose. However, for plain assertability the difference between them does not matter. Hence, if the suppositional theory of counterfactuals is formulated with sufficient care, our truth-conditional theory of counterfactuals is consistent with it. The results of our investigation are used to assess a claim considered by Hawthorne and Hájek, that is, the thesis that most ordinary counterfactuals are false.

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33

LEITGEB, HANNES. "A PROBABILISTIC SEMANTICS FOR COUNTERFACTUALS. PART B." Review of Symbolic Logic 5, no. 1 (November 17, 2011): 85–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020311000165.

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AbstractThis is part B of a paper in which we defend a semantics for counterfactuals which is probabilistic in the sense that the truth condition for counterfactuals refers to a probability measure. Because of its probabilistic nature, it allows a counterfactual ‘if A then B’ to be true even in the presence of relevant ‘A and not B’-worlds, as long such exceptions are not too widely spread. The semantics is made precise and studied in different versions which are related to each other by representation theorems. Despite its probabilistic nature, we show that the semantics and the resulting system of logic may be regarded as a naturalistically vindicated variant of David Lewis’ truth-conditional semantics and logic of counterfactuals. At the same time, the semantics overlaps in various ways with the non-truth-conditional suppositional theory for conditionals that derives from Ernest Adams’ work. We argue that counterfactuals have two kinds of pragmatic meanings and come attached with two types of degrees of acceptability or belief, one being suppositional, the other one being truth based as determined by our probabilistic semantics; these degrees could not always coincide due to a new triviality result for counterfactuals, and they should not be identified in the light of their different interpretation and pragmatic purpose. However, for plain assertability the difference between them does not matter. Hence, if the suppositional theory of counterfactuals is formulated with sufficient care, our truth-conditional theory of counterfactuals is consistent with it. The results of our investigation are used to assess a claim considered by Hawthorne and Hájek, that is, the thesis that most ordinary counterfactuals are false.

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34

Cehan, Nadina. "The ‘Drama-Queen’ and Other Conditionals in Real Discourse." Linguaculture 9, no. 1 (June 15, 2018): 99–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.47743/lincu-2018-1-0116.

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The formal approach to conditionals, treating them in a decontextualized manner, has been the most developed. The present paper shows how problematic this approach can be when conditionals are studied in context. One large class of conditionals could be termed ‘interactional’, and includes formulaic if-clauses of politeness, conditionals which soften the message, speech-act conditionals emphasizing the relevance of some information given beforehand, and paratactic conditionals making promises or issuing threats. It is to this eclectic class that the ‘drama queen’ conditional is added. Recently discovered, this conditional does not deal with either truth or hypotheticality, but with the human emotions of the people who face their reality and compare it with their own past. Not unlike the conditionals that relay the message “It’s absurd!”, the ‘drama queen’ conditionals convey the message “It’s unimaginable!”.

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35

Nickel, Bernhard. "Saying and doing: The role of semantics in the use of generic sentences." Canadian Journal of Linguistics/Revue canadienne de linguistique 57, no. 2 (July 2012): 289–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008413100004783.

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AbstractThis article discusses semantic theories of generic sentences that seek to tie their meaning closely to their use, rather than giving more traditional truth-conditional semantic treatments. It focuses on McConnell-Ginet’s recent work and defends truth-conditional approaches combined with a traditional semantics-pragmatics distinction.

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36

Mandelkern, Matthew. "A Counterexample to Modus Ponenses." Journal of Philosophy 117, no. 6 (2020): 315–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2020117619.

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McGee (1985) argued that modus ponens was invalid for the natural language conditional ‘If…then…’. Many subsequent responses have argued that, while McGee’s examples show that modus ponens fails to preserve truth, they do not show that modus ponens fails to preserve rational full acceptance, and thus modus ponens may still be valid in the latter informational sense. I show that when we turn our attention from indicative conditionals (the focus of most of the literature to date) to subjunctive conditionals, we find that modus ponens does not preserve either truth or rational full acceptance, and thus is not valid in either sense. In concluding I briefly consider how we can account for these facts.

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37

Miller, David. "Reconditioning the conditional [Recondicionando o condicional]." Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN) 23, no. 40 (June 24, 2016): 9–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2016v23n40id7481.

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Many authors have hoped to understand the indicative conditional construction in everyday language by means of what are usually called conditional probabilities. Other authors have hoped to make sense of conditional probabilities in terms of the absolute probabilities of conditional statements. Although all such hopes were disappointed by the triviality theorems of Lewis (1976), there have been copious subsequent attempts both to rescue CCCP (the conditional construal of conditional probability) and to extend and to intensify the arguments against it. In this paper it will be shown that triviality is avoidable if the probability function is replaced by an alternative generalization of the deducibility relation, the measure of deductive dependence of Miller and Popper (1986). It will be suggested further that this alternative way of orchestrating conditionals is nicely in harmony with the test proposed in Ramsey (1931), and also with the idea that it is not the truth value of a conditionalstatement that is of primary concern but its assertability or acceptability.

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38

WELCH, P. D. "ULTIMATE TRUTH VIS-À-VIS STABLE TRUTH." Review of Symbolic Logic 1, no. 1 (June 2008): 126–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020308080118.

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We show that the set of ultimately true sentences in Hartry Field's Revenge-immune solution model to the semantic paradoxes is recursively isomorphic to the set of stably true sentences obtained in Hans Herzberger's revision sequence starting from the null hypothesis. We further remark that this shows that a substantial subsystem of second-order number theory is needed to establish the semantic values of sentences in Field's relative consistency proof of his theory over the ground model of the standard natural numbers: \Delta _3^1-CA0 (second-order number theory with a \Delta _3^1-comprehension axiom scheme) is insufficient. We briefly consider his claim to have produced a ‘revenge-immune’ solution to the semantic paradoxes by introducing this conditional. We remark that the notion of a ‘determinately true’ operator can be introduced in other settings.

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39

Wang, Moyun, and Mingyi Zhu. "Evidence for the Jeffrey Table." Experimental Psychology 66, no. 3 (May 2019): 187–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000443.

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Abstract. Conditionals statements are a common and necessary component in natural languages. The research reported in this paper is on a fundamental question about singular conditionals. Is there an adequate account of people’s truth, falsity, and credibility (probability) judgments about these conditionals when their antecedents are false? Two experiments examined people’s quantitative credibility ratings and qualitative truth and falsity judgments for singular conditionals, if p then q, given false antecedent, not-p, cases. The results demonstrate that, when relevant knowledge about the conditional probability of q given p, P( q|p), is available to participants in not-p cases, they tend to make credibility ratings based on P( q|p), and to make “true” (or “false”) judgments at a high (or low) level of these credibility ratings. These findings favor the Jeffrey table account of these conditionals over the other existing accounts, including that of the de Finetti table.

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WELCH, P. D. "SOME OBSERVATIONS ON TRUTH HIERARCHIES." Review of Symbolic Logic 7, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020313000361.

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AbstractWe show how in the hierarchies${F_\alpha }$of Fieldian truth sets, and Herzberger’s${H_\alpha }$revision sequence starting from any hypothesis for${F_0}$(or${H_0}$) that essentially each${H_\alpha }$(or${F_\alpha }$) carries within it a history of the whole prior revision process.As applications (1) we provide a precise representation for, and a calculation of the length of, possiblepath independent determinateness hierarchiesof Field’s (2003) construction with a binary conditional operator. (2) We demonstrate the existence of generalized liar sentences, that can be considered as diagonalizing past the determinateness hierarchies definable in Field’s recent models. The ‘defectiveness’ of such diagonal sentences necessarily cannot be classified by any of the determinateness predicates of the model. They are ‘ineffable liars’. We may consider them a response to the claim of Field (2003) that ‘the conditional can be used to show that the theory is not subject to “revenge problems”.’

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Evans, Jonathan St B. T., and David E. Over. "Conditional truth: Comment on Byrne and Johnson-Laird." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14, no. 1 (January 2010): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.10.009.

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Cepollaro, Bianca, and Tristan Thommen. "What’s wrong with truth-conditional accounts of slurs." Linguistics and Philosophy 42, no. 4 (January 21, 2019): 333–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-018-9249-8.

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Rossi, Lorenzo. "Adding a Conditional to Kripke’s Theory of Truth." Journal of Philosophical Logic 45, no. 5 (February 11, 2016): 485–529. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9384-4.

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Patterson, Douglas. "Deflationism And The Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning." Philosophical Studies 124, no. 3 (June 2005): 271–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-7782-0.

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NAKAGAKI, Akira, and Tomoko ITOH. "The cognitive pregnance in conditional truth table tasks." Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Japanese Psychological Association 75 (September 15, 2011): 3AM139. http://dx.doi.org/10.4992/pacjpa.75.0_3am139.

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Asher, Nicholas. "A default, truth conditional semantics for the progressive." Linguistics and Philosophy 15, no. 5 (October 1992): 463–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00630628.

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Vatrican, Axelle. "Evidentiality and epistemic modality in the rumor/journalistic conditional in Spanish." Evidentiality and the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface 29 (December 31, 2015): 83–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/bjl.29.04vat.

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The aim of this paper is to explore the functions of the so-called rumor / journalistic conditional in Spanish. In order to do this, I will try to account for the fact that rumor conditionals are epistemic as well as evidential whereas conjecture conditionals in Spanish are epistemic but not evidential, as they convey uncertainty and do not encode the source of information. I will claim that the morphological marker -ría is a modal epistemic operator of possibility in both cases. In a rumor conditional, the epistemic operator quantifies over the illocutionary force of an embedded proposition p (enunciation / truth of the information), which means “maybe the information about p is true”. The situation p is anchored in the present or in the future. In a conjecture conditional, the modal epistemic operator quantifies over the realization of an embedded proposition p (fact), which means “maybe the realization of p is true”. The situation p is anchored in the past.

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Milne, Peter. "Indicative conditionals, conditional probabilities, and the “defective truth-table”: A request for more experiments." Thinking & Reasoning 18, no. 2 (May 2012): 196–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2012.670754.

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Quickert, K., and Steve Nicolle. "Jesus and Illocutionary Forces: Common Functions of Conditionals in the Gospels." Journal of Translation 18, no. 2 (2022): 31–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.54395/jot-6yd3x.

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In this paper we look at the various functions of conditionals in Jesus’ speech as recorded in the gospels. We will show how Jesus often uses conditionals to describe hypothetical situations, frequently as illustrations to support a teaching point. We will also look at the way in which Jesus uses conditionals to argue from a known fact to a novel proposition, often using a familiar concrete situation to illustrate a novel spiritual truth. Differences between the ways that the gospel writers use the Greek conditional constructions are also noted.

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Vincent, Nicole, and Christiane Dujet. "A Suggested Conditional Modus Ponens." International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 05, no. 01 (February 1997): 93–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218488597000087.

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In this paper, in view of some paradoxical situations encountered in applying the Modus Ponens to Inference procedures in rule-based systems, we propose a new approach to perform the generalized Modus Ponens of Zadeh. Specifically, truth evaluations of conditional fuzzy information will be defined and used in Modus Ponens, opening the way to a unified framework for the aggregation of rules.

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