Books on the topic 'Conditional truth'

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1

Truth-conditional pragmatics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010.

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2

Sequeiros, Xosé Rosales. Non-truth-conditional semantics in Spanish: Conceptual and procedural meaning. München: Lincom Europa, 2007.

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3

Appiah, Anthony. Assertion and conditionals. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

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4

Iten, Corinne. Linguistic Meaning, Truth Conditions and Relevance. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230503236.

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5

Jackson, Stuart A. Connectionism and meaning: From truth conditions to weight representations. Norwood, N.J: Ablex Pub., 1996.

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6

Linguistic meaning, truth conditions and relevance: The case of concessives. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

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7

Tutashinda, Lazima. The bold truth. Sacramento, Calif: Reciprocity Publishing, 1997.

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8

Crawford, Carl J. The truth. Pittsburgh, PA: SterlingHouse Publisher, Inc., 2010.

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9

Truth and power. [North Charleston, S. C: CreateSpace], 2013.

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10

Speaking truth to power. Pretoria: Vista University, 2004.

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11

Svyantek, Daniel J., and Kevin T. Mahoney. Received wisdom, kernels of truth, and boundary conditions in organizational studies. Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age Pub., Inc., 2013.

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12

Colson, Charles W. Burden of truth: Defending truth in an age of unbelief. Wheaton, Ill: Tyndale House, 1997.

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13

M, Walker David. Truth and transparency: The federal government's financial condition and fiscal outlook. Washington, D.C: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003.

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14

Playing with truth: Language and the human condition in Pascal's Pensées. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

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15

Project, Ardoyne Commemoration, ed. Ardoyne: The untold truth. Belfast: Beyond the Pale, 2002.

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16

Russell, Craig. The socio-economic truth of Black America. Decatur, GA: Remnant Pub., 1992.

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17

The terrible truth about liberals. Atlanta, Ga: Longstreet, 1998.

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18

Field, A. N. The truth about New Zealand. Bullsbrook, W.A: Veritas Publishing, 1987.

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19

Olbermann, Keith. Truth and Consequences. New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2008.

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20

The truth about the 1980s. Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1994.

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21

Moment Of Truth. Lake Mary, Fla: Frontline, 2008.

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22

Thirumappath, Gopal. My quest for truth. United States]: Gopal Thirumappath, 2013.

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23

Unseen: The truth about India's manual scavengers. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2014.

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24

Telling truths: Storying motherhood. Bradford, Ontario: Demeter Press, 2014.

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25

Torture, truth and justice: The case of Timor-Leste. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2008.

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26

Quotation and Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.

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27

Wang, Xiaofei. Quotation and Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

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28

Wang, Xiaofei. Quotation and Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

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29

Quotation and Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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30

Wang, Xiaofei. Quotation and Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

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31

Wang, Xiaofei. Quotation and Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

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32

Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics (Modern Revivals in Philosophy). Ashgate Publishing, 1991.

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33

Conditional Tense: Memory and Vocabulary after the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Seagull Books, 2013.

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34

Azzouni, Jody. Truth and Bivalence. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190622558.003.0004.

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Some of the many ways that sentences with non-referring terms, such as “witch,” “Frodo,” and “casts spells,” are induced to have truth values are sketched. Three models are the axiomatic model, the fiction model, and the perception model. The general point is that the methods that we use to discover the truth values of sentences with referring terms can be generalized to sentences with non-referring terms. Even though truth-value inducing, in general, does not force a truth value on every sentence in a discourse, a commitment to bivalence is preserved by the use of expressions of ignorance. It’s also argued that traditional truth-conditional semantics should not be required to describe language-world relations. How adopting the coherence theory of truth for certain classes of sentences with non-referring terms avoids traditional objections to coherence views of truth is described.
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35

Williamson, Timothy. Suppose and Tell. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198860662.001.0001.

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The book argues that our use of conditionals is governed by imperfectly reliable heuristics, in the psychological sense of fast and frugal (or quick and dirty) ways of assessing them. The primary heuristic is this: to assess ‘If A, C’, suppose A and on that basis assess C; whatever attitude you take to C conditionally on A (such as acceptance, rejection, or something in between) take unconditionally to ‘If A, C’. This heuristic yields both the equation of the probability of ‘If A, C’ with the conditional probability of C on A and standard natural deduction rules for the conditional. However, these results can be shown to make the heuristic implicitly inconsistent, and so less than fully reliable. There is also a secondary heuristic: pass conditionals freely from one context to another under normal conditions for acceptance of sentences on the basis of memory and testimony. The effect of the secondary heuristic is to undermine interpretations on which ‘if’ introduces a special kind of context-sensitivity. On the interpretation which makes best sense of the two heuristics, ‘if’ is simply the truth-functional conditional. Apparent counterexamples to truth-functionality are artefacts of reliance on the primary heuristic in cases where it is unreliable. The second half of the book concerns counterfactual conditionals, as expressed with ‘if’ and ‘would’. It argues that ‘would’ is an independently meaningful modal operator for contextually restricted necessity: the meaning of counterfactuals is simply that derived compositionally from the meanings of their constituents, including ‘if’ and ‘would’, making them contextually restricted strict conditionals.
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36

Moss, Sarah. Indicative conditionals. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198792154.003.0004.

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This chapter defends a probabilistic semantics for indicative conditionals and other logical operators. This semantics is motivated in part by the observation that indicative conditionals are context sensitive, and that there are contexts in which the probability of a conditional does not match the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent. For example, there are contexts in which you believe the content of ‘it is probable that if Jill jumps from this building, she will die’ without having high conditional credence that Jill will die if she jumps. This observation is at odds with many existing non-truth-conditional semantic theories of conditionals, whereas it is explained by the semantics for conditionals defended in this chapter. The chapter concludes by diagnosing several apparent counterexamples to classically valid inference rules embedding epistemic vocabulary.
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37

Swanson, Eric. Probability in Philosophy of Language. Edited by Alan Hájek and Christopher Hitchcock. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.013.39.

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This chapter uses four historically important approaches to conditionals to help illustrate ways of thinking about the language of subjective uncertainty more broadly construed. On the first, conditionals express propositions and `if' is a truth-functional connective. Problems here motivate the second hypothesis-that a conditional expresses a proposition the probability of which equals the probability of the consequent conditional on its antecedent. Problems for this approach in turn motivate a third kind of view on which conditionals do not express propositions that are true or false. According to one such approach, `if' has a non-compositional meaning: it is used to help express conditional beliefs in a special, non-semantic way. The costs of abandoning compositionality motivate the final family of views considered, on which compositional semantic interpretation functions output non-propositional objects; therefore semanticists can and should help themselves to tools developed by formal epistemologists.
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38

Truth or dare! National Story Tellers, 2022.

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39

Carston, Robyn. Pragmatics and Semantics. Edited by Yan Huang. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199697960.013.19.

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A cognitive-scientific approach to the pragmatic interpretive ability is presented, according to which it is seen as a specific cognitive system dedicated to the interpretation of ostensive stimuli, that is, verbal utterances and other overtly communicative acts. This approach calls for a dual construal of semantics. The semantics which interfaces with the pragmatic interpretive system is not a matter of truth-conditional content, but of whatever components of meaning (lexical and syntactic) are encoded by the language system (independent of any particular use of the system by speakers in specific contexts). This linguistically provided meaning functions as evidence that guides and constrains the addressee’s pragmatic inferential processes whose goal is the recovery of the speaker’s intended meaning. Speakers communicate thoughts (explicatures and implicatures)—that is, fully propositional (truth-evaluable) entities—and it is these that are the proper domain of a truth-conditional (referential) semantics.
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40

Appiah, Anthony. Assertion and Conditionals. Cambridge University Press, 2011.

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41

Appiah, Anthony. Assertion and Conditionals. Cambridge University Press, 2008.

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42

Truth Vol. 42: Its Nature, Criteria and Conditions. Ontos Verlag, 2011.

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43

Blum, Susan D. Lies that Bind: Chinese Truth, Other Truths. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006.

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44

Lies that Bind: Chinese Truth, Other Truths. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006.

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45

Blum, Susan D. Lies That Bind: Chinese Truth, Other Truths. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2007.

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46

Pickel, Bryan, Brian Rabern, and Josh Dever. Reviving the Parameter Revolution in Semantics. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198739548.003.0005.

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Montague and Kaplan began a revolution in semantics, which promised to explain how a univocal expression could make distinct truth-conditional contributions in its various occurrences. The idea was to treat context as a parameter at which a sentence is semantically evaluated. But the revolution has stalled. One salient problem comes from recurring demonstratives: “He is tall and he is not tall”. For the sentence to be true at a context, each occurrence of the demonstrative must make a different truth-conditional contribution. But this difference cannot be accounted for by standard parameter sensitivity. Semanticists, consoled by the thought that this ambiguity would ultimately be needed anyhow to explain anaphora, have been too content to posit massive ambiguities in demonstrative pronouns. This chapter aims to revived the parameter revolution by showing how to treat demonstrative pronouns as univocal while providing an account of anaphora that doesn’t end up re-introducing the ambiguity.
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47

Krifka, Manfred. Quantification and Information Structure. Edited by Caroline Féry and Shinichiro Ishihara. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199642670.013.35.

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The chapter provides an overview of the interaction between quantification and information-structural properties, especially focus, givenness, and topic. While quantification affects truth conditions, information-structuring devices can have an effect on the interpretation of quantificational expressions. After a short introduction to the nature of quantification, the chapter covers the main areas where such effects have been identified, in particular in adverbial quantification, in generic clauses, in conditional sentences, and in sentences with nominal (or determiner) quantification, including intersective determiners and comparative determiners likemost. It reviews different theoretical proposals how this sensitivity to information-structural categories arises, in particular whether they are related to focus or givenness. It also discusses cases in which the quantifier itself is topical, given, or focused.
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48

Wedgwood, Ralph. Objective and Subjective ‘Ought’. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0006.

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This chapter offers an account of the truth conditions of sentences involving terms like ‘ought’. These truth conditions involve a function from worlds of evaluation to domains of worlds, and an ordering of the worlds in such domains. Every such ordering arises from a probability function and a value function—since it ranks worlds according to the expected value of certain propositions that are true at those worlds. With the objective ‘ought’, the probability function is the omniscient function, which assigns 1 to all truths and 0 to all falsehoods; with the subjective ‘ought’, the probability function captures the uncertainty of the relevant agent. The relevance of this account for understanding conditionals is explored, and this account is defended against objections. For present purposes, the crucial point is that any normative use of ‘ought’ is normative because of the value that is semantically involved. The fundamental normative concepts are evaluative.
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49

Iten, Corinne. Linguistic Meaning, Truth Conditions and Relevance. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

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50

Wilson, Deirdre, Kent Bach, Sam Glucksberg, Francesca Happé, François Recanati, Anne Bezuidenhout, C. Iten, and Richard Breheny. Linguistic Meaning, Truth Conditions and Relevance. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

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