Academic literature on the topic 'CONCETTI SORTALI'

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Journal articles on the topic "CONCETTI SORTALI"

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Mackie, Penelope. "Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties." Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 176 (July 1994): 311. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219612.

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Baillie, James. "Identity, Survival, and Sortal Concepts." Philosophical Quarterly 40, no. 159 (April 1990): 183. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219810.

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WIGGINS, DAVID. "Sortal Concepts: A Reply To Xu." Mind & Language 12, no. 3-4 (May 4, 2007): 413–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00081.x.

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Wiggins, David. "Sortal Concepts: A Reply To Xu." Mind and Language 12, no. 3&4 (September 1997): 413–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00055.

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Xu, Fei. "Sortal concepts, object individuation, and language." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11, no. 9 (September 2007): 400–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.08.002.

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Noonan, H. "Moderate Monism, Sortal Concepts, and Relative Identity." Monist 96, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 101–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist20139616.

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Suzuki, Ikuro. "The Paradox of Coincidence and Sortal Concepts." Kagaku tetsugaku 41, no. 1 (2008): 15–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.41.1_15.

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Rhemtulla, Mijke, and Fei Xu. "Postscript: Sortal concepts are fundamental for tracing identity." Psychological Review 114, no. 4 (2007): 1095. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.114.4.1095.

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Kim, Joongol. "The sortal resemblance problem." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44, no. 3-4 (August 2014): 407–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.959359.

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Is it possible to characterize the sortal essence of Fs for a sortal concept F solely in terms of a criterion of identity C for F? That is, can the question ‘What sort of thing are Fs?’ be answered by saying that Fs are essentially those things whose identity can be assessed in terms of C? This paper presents a case study supporting a negative answer to these questions by critically examining the neo-Fregean suggestion that cardinal numbers can be fully characterized as those things whose identity can be assessed in terms of one-one correspondence between concepts.
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Leonard, Nick, and Lance J. Rips. "Identifying and counting objects: The role of sortal concepts." Cognition 145 (December 2015): 89–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.003.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "CONCETTI SORTALI"

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Melin, Roger. "Persons : their identity and individuation." Doctoral thesis, Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, 1998. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-85031.

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This study is about the nature of persons and personal identity. It belongs to a tradition that maintains that in order to understand what it is to be a person we must clarify what personal identity consists in. In this pursuit, I differentiate between the problems (i) How do persons persist? and (ii) What facts, if any, does personal identity consist in? Concerning the first question, I argue that persons persist three-dimensionally (the endurance view), and not four-dimensionally (the perdurarne view), on the ground that objects must always fall under some substance sortal concept S (the sortal dependency of individuation), and that the concept person entails that objects falling under it are three-dimensional. Concerning the second question, I differentiate between Criterianists, who maintain that it is possible to specify a non-circular and informative criterion for personal identity, and Non-Criterianists, who deny that such a specification is possible. I argue against Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they are either (i) circular, (ii) violate the intrinsicality of identity or (iii) do not adequately represent what we are essentially. I further criticise three Psychological Non-Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they wrongly assume that 'person' refers to mental entities. Instead I formulate the Revised Animal Attribute View where person is understood as a basic sortal concept which picks out a biological sort of enduring animals. In this, I claim that the real essence of a person is determined by the real essence of the kind of animal he is, without thereby denying that persons have a real essence as persons.
digitalisering@umu
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Books on the topic "CONCETTI SORTALI"

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Kinds of being: A study of individuation, identity, and the logic of sortal terms. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1989.

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J, Lowe E. More kinds of being: A further study of individuation, identity, and the logic of sortal terms. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

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J, Lowe E. More kinds of being: A further study of individuation, identity, and the logic of sortal terms. 2nd ed. Chichester, U.K: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

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Rapp, Christof. Identität, Persistenz und Substantialität: Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von sortalen Termen und Aristotelischer Substanz. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1995.

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J, Lowe E. More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms. Wiley & Sons, Limited, John, 2010.

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J, Lowe E. More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms. Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John, 2011.

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Lowe, E. J. More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms. Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John, 2009.

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Lowe, E. J. More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms. Wiley-Blackwell, 2015.

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Massimi, Michela. Perspectival Realism. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197555620.001.0001.

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What does it mean to be a realist about science if one takes seriously the view that scientific knowledge is always perspectival, namely historically and culturally situated? In Perspectival Realism, Michela Massimi articulates an original answer to this question. The result is a philosophical view that goes under the name of ‘perspectival realism’ and it offers a new lens for thinking about scientific knowledge, realism, and pluralism in science. Perspectival Realism begins with an exploration of how epistemic communities often resort to several models and a plurality of practices in some areas of inquiry, drawing on examples from nuclear physics, climate science, and developmental psychology. Taking this plurality in science as a starting point, Massimi explains the perspectival nature of scientific representation, the role of scientific models as inferential blueprints, and the variety of realism that naturally accompanies such a view. Perspectival realism is realism about phenomena (rather than about theories or unobservable entities). The result of this novel view is a portrait of scientific knowledge as a collaborative inquiry, where the reliability of science is made possible by a plurality of historically and culturally situated scientific perspectives. Along the way, Massimi offers insights into the nature of scientific modelling, scientific knowledge qua modal knowledge, data-to-phenomena inferences, and natural kinds as sortal concepts. Perspectival realism offers a realist view that takes the multicultural roots of science seriously and couples it with cosmopolitan duties about how one ought to think about scientific knowledge and the distribution of benefits gained from scientific advancements.
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Book chapters on the topic "CONCETTI SORTALI"

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Rickheit, M. "Sortal information in lexical concepts." In Text Understanding in LILOG, 143–52. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-54594-8_58.

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Rips, Lance J., and Nick Leonard. "Does the Identity of an Object Depend on Its Category?" In Metaphysics and Cognitive Science, 287–313. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190639679.003.0012.

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Some prominent cognitive theories have adopted an intriguing idea from metaphysics: The conditions of identity and individuation of objects come from the meaning of sortal nouns—count nouns, such as “dog” or “cup.” According to this sortalist theory, Rover’s identity over time and his distinctness from Fido depend on the meaning of “dog.” This chapter first describes the sortalist view in metaphysics (section 11.1) and then traces the ways in which cognitive psychologists have adapted and modified this theory in an attempt to explain empirical data—people’s judgments about the nature of objects (section 11.2). Sections 11.3 and 11.4 then examine some recent work in philosophy and psychology, arguing that these findings raise two related, but distinct, worries for sortalism as a psychological theory (which is here called psychosortalism). Finally, section 11.5 assesses whether any of the original metaphysics can survive within the best cognitive theories of object concepts.
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Mackie, Penelope. "Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties I: Substance Sortals and Essential Sortals." In How Things Might Have Been, 118–30. Oxford University Press, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199272204.003.0007.

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"SORTALS." In Metaphysics: The Key Concepts, 251. Routledge, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203835258-35.

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Wiggins, David. "Sortal Concepts." In Continuants, 201–10. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716624.003.0011.

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Miletic, Marko, and Murat Sariyar. "The Sortal Concept in the Context of Biomedical Record Linkage." In Studies in Health Technology and Informatics. IOS Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/shti220720.

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Biomedical Record Linkage is especially designed for linking data of patients in different data repositories. An important question in this context is whether singling-out is sufficient for identifying a patient, and if not, what is in general required for identification. To provide hints for an answer, we will extend previous works on the concept of identity and extend the sortal concept, stemming from analytical philosophy and upper-level ontologies. A sortal is a concept that is associated with an identity criterion. For example, the concept “set” has the identity criterion “having the same members”. Based on a description of a record linkage setting, we operationalize the sortal concept by providing a distinction between the digital representation of a person (d-sortal) and the person in flesh (b-sortal).
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Mackie, Penelope. "Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties II: Sortal Concepts and Principles of Individuation." In How Things Might Have Been, 131–49. Oxford University Press, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199272204.003.0008.

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"Sortals and Kinds: An Appreciation of John Macnamara." In Language, Logic, and Concepts. The MIT Press, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4118.003.0016.

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Massimi, Michela. "Sorting phenomena into kinds." In Perspectival Realism, 273–303. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197555620.003.0012.

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This chapter fills in the details of the broadly inferentialist view of kinds introduced in Chapter 8. Namely, what holds together open-ended groupings of historically identified phenomena? To answer this question, the anti-foundationalist Neurathian strategy has to steer a clear path between two main philosophical views: essentialism and conventionalism. Section 9.1 lays the ground for the Neurathian strategy. Section 9.2 articulates some of the reasons for doing away with ‘deep essentialism’ about natural kinds. Section 9.3 starts from historicist criticisms of scientific realism and elaborates the particular brand of contingentism about kinds that I advocate here. Section 9.4 spells out the positive proposal of sorting phenomena into kinds. It sees natural kinds as sortal concepts, taking loosely inspiration from the way in which Spinoza originally envisaged the notion of a ‘sortal’. It reviews some of the recent literature in experimental philosophy and developmental psychology to elucidate how natural kinds qua sortal concepts can help us make sense of a wealth of studies concerning children’s acquisition of natural kind concepts. Section 9.5 answers the question of what holds open-ended groupings of phenomena together.
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Xu, Fei. "Count Nouns, Sortal Concepts, and the Nature of Early Words." In Kinds, Things, and Stuff, 191–206. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382891.003.0010.

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Conference papers on the topic "CONCETTI SORTALI"

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Carrara, Massimiliano, and Pierdaniele Giaretta. "Identity criteria and sortal concepts." In the international conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/505168.505191.

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Decandia, Lidia. "Rimettere in moto e lavorare il tempo per prendersi cura dei territori contemporanei." In International Conference Virtual City and Territory. Roma: Centre de Política de Sòl i Valoracions, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.5821/ctv.7976.

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Il saggio intende problematizzare e argomentare l’idea che le sopravvivenze del passato presenti nei territori contemporanei non debbano essere trattate come immagini e simulacri di un tempo che non è più, ma piuttosto come dei sintomi, dei segnali, degli inciampi di tempo che possono aiutarci a comprendere e ad avere cura del nostro presente. Un presente che non è una terra desolata e priva di qualità, ma piuttosto un mare che contiene abissi, grovigli vortici in cui si mescolano diverse temporalità. In questo senso il passato, contenuto nel territorio, può essere inteso come una sorta di grande inconscio con cui fare i conti per avviare un lavoro di smontaggio, attraverso cui sciogliere quei grovigli che bloccano il nostro presente, ma anche come un lavoro di scavo che potrebbe aiutarci a portare alla luce perle inabissate, liberare energie sepolte, profezie di futuro dimenticate che potrebbero contribuire a ripensare il nostro presente. E' partendo da questo presupposto che si vuole introdurre il tema della cura. L’idea attorno a cui si intende lavorare è quella di esplorare questo concetto partendo dal presupposto che sia proprio attraverso questo lavoro complesso di erosione e di scavo in profondità che occorra ripartire per stabilire relazioni profonde e significanti con il territorio. Un territorio che non può più essere inteso come una superficie a cui sovrapporre qualsiasi contenuto, ma piuttosto semmai come un “campo di energie” che contiene placente d’ombra, latenze, memorie che entrano in collisione col presente.
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