Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Concept of causality'

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, 2014.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 211-220).
People can learn a new concept almost perfectly from just a single example, yet machine learning algorithms typically require hundreds or thousands of examples to perform similarly. People can also use their learned concepts in richer ways than conventional machine learning systems - for action, imagination, and explanation suggesting that concepts are far more than a set of features, exemplars, or rules, the most popular forms of representation in machine learning and traditional models of concept learning. For those interested in better understanding this human ability, or in closing the gap between humans and machines, the key computational questions are the same: How do people learn new concepts from just one or a few examples? And how do people learn such abstract, rich, and flexible representations? An even greater puzzle arises by putting these two questions together: How do people learn such rich concepts from just one or a few examples? This thesis investigates concept learning as a form of Bayesian program induction, where learning involves selecting a structured procedure that best generates the examples from a category. I introduce a computational framework that utilizes the principles of compositionality, causality, and learning-to-learn to learn good programs from just one or a handful of examples of a new concept. New conceptual representations can be learned compositionally from pieces of related concepts, where the pieces reflect real part structure in the underlying causal process that generates category examples. This approach is evaluated on a number of natural concept learning tasks where humans and machines can be compared side-by-side. Chapter 2 introduces a large-scale data set of novel, simple visual concepts for studying concept learning from sparse data. People were asked to produce new examples of over 1600 novel categories, revealing consistent structure in the generative programs that people used. Initial experiments also show that this structure is useful for one-shot classification. Chapter 3 introduces the computational framework called Hierarchical Bayesian Program Learning, and Chapters 4 and 5 compare humans and machines on six tasks that cover a range of natural conceptual abilities. On a challenging one-shot classification task, the computational model achieves human-level performance while also outperforming several recent deep learning models. Visual "Turing test" experiments were used to compare humans and machines on more creative conceptual abilities, including generating new category examples, predicting latent causal structure, generating new concepts from related concepts, and freely generating new concepts. In each case, fewer than twenty-five percent of judges could reliably distinguish the human behavior from the machine behavior, showing that the model can generalize in ways similar to human performance. A range of comparisons with lesioned models and alternative modeling frameworks reveal that three key ingredients - compositionality, causality, and learning-to-learn - contribute to performance in each of the six tasks. This conclusion is further supported by the results of Chapter 6, where a computational model using only two of these three principles was evaluated on the one-shot learning of new spoken words. Learning programs with these ingredients is a promising route towards more humanlike concept learning in machines.
by Brenden M. Lake.
Ph. D.

Este trabalho versa sobre o problema do desencadeamento para a psicanálise e toma por fio condutor alguns casos freudianos. O tema sublinhado foi concebido como um ponto clínico fundamental, que remete o psicanalista tanto à questão diagnóstica quanto à investigação etiológica. Neste sentido, destacamos que o surgimento de sintomas e do surto psicótico mereceu particular atenção ao longo de nossas linhas. Verificamos que, depois de Freud, a presença de uma conversão histérica ou de um delírio paranóico logo indicava uma direção para o tratamento e também indagava a psicanálise acerca das causas precipitadoras de tais quadros. Pois bem, sobretudo nos intrigou a pesquisa sobre as dimensões causais de um desencadeamento. Para realizá-la seguimos primeiro Freud e sua complexa teoria da causalidade psíquica e depois Jacques Lacan, que, de maneira peculiar, soube destacar o inédito freudiano e postular uma noção de causalidade que designamos como própria à psicanálise e pertinente ao desencadeamento.
This work seeks to explore the question of triggering off in psychoanalytic theory by examining some Freudian cases. The theme was conceived as a key clinical aspect which poses for the psychoanalyst the questions of diagnosis and of etiological investigation. In this sense, we highlight that the emergence of symptoms and of psychotic breakdown were particularly important to this work. We verified that since Freud, either the hysterical conversion or the paranoid delirium indicated the direction of the treatment; and raised concerns about the emerging causes of these conditions. In this study the causal dimensions of triggering off was particularly intriguing. To accomplish this investigation, we first drew upon Freuds theories of the psychic causality and proceeded to the study of Jacques Lacan who in a particular manner highlighted Freudians findings and postulated a notion of causality that is central to psychoanalysis and strongly related to the idea of triggering off.

Die verschiedenen Konzepte fahrlässiger Mittäterschaft werden dargestellt und als nicht überzeugend befunden. Der Hauptteil der Arbeit analysiert nach der kursorischen Feststel-lung, dass das Analogieverbot der Figur nicht entgegensteht, konkret die Unbegründbarkeit fahrlässiger Mittäterschaft auf der Grundlage des höchstpersönlichen Schuldprinzips, das als verfassungsrechtlicher Grundsatz die Grundlage des gesamten Strafrechtssystems bildet. Die richtige Lösung bei fahrlässigem Zusammenwirken besteht in einer Vorverlagerung des Fahrlässigkeitsschuldvorwurfs unter Annahme eines psychischen Beitrags zum Erfolgseintritt. Dies entspricht sowohl dem Wesen der Fahrlässigkeitsdelikte als auch dem Schuldprinzip.
This study critically analyzes the various ideas for negligent co-perpetration and concludes that this legal idea is not convincing. The main part of this study is to analyze that negligent co-perpetration lacks justification based on the guilt principle, which is the foundation of the entire criminal justice system, although negligent co-perpetration could be established, since this does not violate the prohibition of analogy. And the desirable solution for cases of neg-ligent cooperation is concretely presented.: To advance the accusation of negligence in ac-cordance with the nature of the criminal negligence and the guilt principle. The criminal negligence is based on the single concept of perpetrator and the psychological contribution could establish the illegality of behaviour. In order to apply this solution, the illegality of neg-ligent behavior must always be proven. Then there is no need for negligent co-perpetration.

L'examen de la compatibilité entre les notions de continuité et de liberté s'avère nécessaire dans le cadre d'une recherche sur la notion de création dans la philosophie bergsonienne. L'idée de durée créatrice suggère une conception de l'être comme un arrachement continu a lui-même. On observe, chez Bergson, d'une part, une scission originelle du même en altérite (ou de l'un en multiplicité qualitative) et, d'autre part, l'altération de la réalité par l'intermédiaire d’un dédoublement opéré par l'intellect (qui correspond à sa transposition en une multiplicité quantitative). Entreprenant de définir les présupposés de la brusque apparition d'un discontinu fonctionnel (en tous points diffèrent d'un discontinu artificiel) dans la continuité du réel, on est conduit à la notion de force. La notion de création se détermine par rapport à deux types de continuité, diamétralement opposés : une continuité homogène unilinéaire, source de l'identique et du répétitif, et une continuité hétérogène profonde porteuse de discontinuités imprévisibles, perceptibles par intuition. Il convient donc d'établir une distinction entre une causalité logique ou mécanique et une causalité créatrice agissant comme une cause a-causale. Le réel en tant que devenir créateur épargne au discontinu un isolement stérile et préserve le continu d’une inéluctable nécessité. La notion de création suggère ainsi, chez Bergson, la progression du continu vers le discontinu et, à l'inverse, l'intégration du discontinu dans le continu
The examination of the compatibility between the notions of continuity and freedom proved to be necessary within the context of research into the notion of creation in the bergsonic philosophy. The idea of creative duration suggests a conception of the being as a continuous extraction of itself. In Bergson, one observes on the one hand an original scission of the same into an otherness (or of the one into a qualitative multiplicity), and, on the other hand, the alteration of reality through the medium of a division operated by the intellect (which corresponds to his transposition into a quantitative multiplicity). In undertaking to define the presuppositions of the sudden appearance of a functional discontinuity (in every aspect different from an artificial discontinuity) in the continuity of the real, we are led to the notion of force. The notion of creation is determined in relation to two types of continuity, diametrically opposed: an unilinear homogeneous continuity, source of the identical and the repetitive, and a deep heterogeneous continuity bearer of unforeseen di8scontinuities, perceptible by intuition. Therefore it is advisable to establish a distinction between a logical or mechanical causality and a creative causality acting as a no causal cause. The real as creative becoming save the discontinuous from a sterile isolation and safeguards the continuous from an ineluctable necessity. Thus, the notion of creation suggests, in Bergson’s philosophy, the progression of the continuous towards the discontinuous and, converse

Nous cherchons à établir quels seraient les nouveaux critères épistémologiques pour considérer une causalité de type fantasmatico-représentationnel, à la lumière des développements causaux de la psychopathologie du XIXème siècle. Le concept est en même temps présenté dans son articulation avec les développements actuels de la génétique contemporaine. Le concept de temporalité des processus inconscients est également appréhendé en tant que matrice indispensable à la thématisation de la causalité psychique. Sous l'originalité qui peut être découverte dans les énoncés de la théorie métapsychologique de Freud, se définissent les liens possibles que la psychanalyse peut garder avec les sciences neurocognitives actuelles
We seek to establish which would be the new epistemological criteria to consider a causality of phantasmatic representational type in the light of the causal developments of the XIXth century. The concept if shown at the same time in its articulation with current developments of contemporary genetics. The concept of temporality of the unconscious processes is likewise perceived as an indispensable matrix to the thematisation of the psychic causality. Underlying the originality to be found in the formulation of Freud's metapsychological theory appear the possible connecting links that psychoanalysis can maintain with the present neurocognitive sciences

Le propos de cette enquête est d’établir le rôle joué par l’évolution des théories de la causalité dans la naissance de la physique classique. Elle se présente comme une alternative aux interprétations de la notion moderne de cause proposées par le positivisme et l’histoire heideggerienne de la métaphysique. Dans un premier temps, nous montrons dans quelle mesure l’opérateur causal antique est différent de celui des modernes. Alors que chez ces derniers la causalité est pensée comme une relation transitive et nécessaire entre des réalités homogènes, les anciens conçoivent la causalité comme une propriété absolue, une pseudo-relation dépourvue de converse où l’effet appartient à un registre ontologique moindre. Ainsi, Platon et Aristote ont formulé les conditions d’intelligibilité du devenir, le principe de causalité et de la cause-agent, mais leur physique n’en reste pas moins formellement incompatible avec les lois de la mécanique classique, de même que la détermination est inintelligible dans l’ensemble des philosophies antiques. Enfin, nous étudions comment est apparue, chez les penseurs néo-platoniciens, puis monothéistes, l’idée d’une cause efficiente, c’est-à-dire d’un influx engendrant l’être d’une chose et qui, en tant que tel, ne se laisse penser que sous la forme d’une relation. La deuxième partie montre l’influence de la causalité comme relation dans la formation de la physique classique. Le projet mécaniste fut de reconstruire la totalité des objets du savoir sur des bases nominalistes opposées à celles de l’essentialisme ancien, la causalité efficiente fut pour cela son opérateur explicatif unique. De cette façon, le modèle du transfert a rendu possible la mathématisation du mouvement et a fait de la raison suffisante le principe d’intelligibilité universel. Nous établissons enfin que les critiques modernes de la causalité sont les conséquences de l’application de la cause efficiente aux objets de la métaphysique : Dieu, les substances et les idées.

La question de la causalité a été centrale dans les discussions qui ont accompagné l'invention des nouvelles théories physiques dans les premières décennies du XXème siècle, la Théorie de la relativité et la Mécanique quantique. Celles-ci en effet ont remis en cause soit la forme de la causalité physique telle qu'elle était conçue dans le cadre de la mécanique classique, soit même la pertinence de la causalité comme telle. Or, l'intelligibilité de la nature semblait jusque-là intrinsèquement liée à cette forme causale classique, et à plus forte raison à la causalité en soi. On estimait en effet que la causalité classique avait apporté la clarté dans une matière réputée être restée confuse chez les philosophes. Les inflexions radicales introduites par les nouvelles théories physiques conduisent donc à questionner l'intelligibilité scientifique, et dans le même mouvement la nature et la signification de la causalité telle qu'elle est comprise par la science physique. L'étude de l'œuvre de quelques-uns des fondateurs de ces théories fait ressortir que la causalité est dans cette perspective une relation idéale qui a pour fonction d'assurer l'objectivité du discours scientifique. A ce titre, elle ne saurait être tenue pour une propriété du réel, mais doit être comprise comme une catégorie herméneutique. Elle opère dans le cadre d'un discours qui se conçoit comme une mise en forme de phénomènes, et qui ne trouve de sens que par et dans la négation d'un ordre en soi de la nature
The causality became a central subject during the controversies that arose in the first three decades of the XXth century with the invention of new physical theories, the Theory of relativity and the Quantum Mechanics. This was the case because these new theories questioned the classical causality's form, and even the relevancy of causality in itself for a physical theory, when the traditional idea was that the intelligibility of nature requires absolutely such a relation. Physicists indeed thought that classical causality clarified a matter which was remained confuse within the philosophical doctrines. Hence, the radical changes brought up by the new physical theories lead to analyse scientific intelligibility, and in the same rime the nature and the signification of causality as it is understood by the physicists. The study of some of the great physicists' works, shows that physical causality is an ideal relation, the function of which is to founder the objectivity of the scientific discourse. By the way, it is impossible to consider it as a property of the world, but it must be taken for a hermeneutic category. It works inside a discourse which tries to give a form to phenomena, and which finds its meaning by denying ail nature's proper order

Le rationalisme critique de Popper est né de sa réaction contre l'épistémologie du Cercle de Vienne. Ce cercle vise à construire un langage unitaire pour la science. La philosophie doit utiliser le langage logique pour formaliser les résultats de la théorisation scientifique. Elle doit éliminer les énoncés métaphysiques, simulés et déviants, puisqu'ils ne sont pas confirmés par la scientificité. La méthode de la découverte scientifique des Viennois devient l'induction. Popper critique l'induction et la vérifiabilité en plaidant pour la déduction et la réfutabilité, critère de scientificité. La méthode de la découverte scientifique des Viennois devient l'induction. Popper critique l'induction et la vérifiabilité en plaidant pour la déduction et la réfutabilité, critère de démarcation entre science et non-science. Popper applique la réfutabilité aux sciences de la nature, aux sciences sociales, etc. Il arrive à une conception indéterministe de monde. Il critique la vision déterministe exprimée dans « tous les nuages sont des horloges » et soutient qu'il au contraire dire que « toutes les horloges sont des nuages », qui est compatible avec les théories relativistes et quantique, car cela montre la non-prétention à la certitude en science. Les chercheurs sont faillibles et ne produisent que des théories faillibles et exposées à la discussion critique dans la société ouverte, car la connaissance est sans sujet connaissant. Ceci correspond en la cosmologie de Popper à un univers irrésolu, un futur ouvert. Popper critique le déterminisme laplacien. Il est impossible aux chercheurs de prédire l'avenir : personne ne connaîtrait ce qu'il découvrira demain. La prédictibilité est impossible. Le déterminisme dénature la liberté et la créativité des hommes ; l'indéterminisme d'un dieu jouant aux dés ne fait pas place à la liberté humaine. La restauration de la liberté conduit Popper à montrer ontologiquement le rapport entre déterminisme et indéterminisme exprimé dans le propensionnisme, une approche ontologique où les propensions sont comparées aux puissances aristotéliciennes. Popper récuse la prédictibilité et opte pour la non-prédictibilité. Les partisans de la prédictibilité rejettent, à leur tour, la non-prédictibilté. Il faut une articulation désignée par symbiose inclusive, à l'instar de prédictibilté et non-prédictibilité
Popper's critical rationalism is born of his reaction against the epistemology of the Vienna Circle. This circle is to construct a unitary language for science. Philosophy must use the logical language to formalize the results of scientific theorizing. It should eliminate the metaphysical statements, simulated and deviants, since they are not confirmed by the verifiability criterion of scientific. The method of scientific discovery become s Viennese induction. Popper critical induction and verifiability advocating deduction and falsifiability, criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. Popper falsibiability applies to the natural sciences, etc. It happens to a deterministic worlview. He criticizes the deterministic view expressed in "all clocks are clouds", which is compatible with the relativistic and quantum theories, as this reflects the non-contention certainly in science. Researchers are faillible and produce only faillible and exposed to critical discussion in the open society theories, because knowledge is without knowing subject. This corresponds to Popper's cosmology an unsolved universe, an open future. Popper critical Laplacian determinism. It is impossible for researchers to predict the future, nobody would know what he will discover tomorrow. Predictability is impossible. Determinism distorts the freedom and creativity of men ; indeterminacy indeterminacy of a good playing dice is not room for human freedom. The restoration of freedom leads Popper to show the relationship between onthological determinism and indeterminism expressed in propensionism an ontological approach where propensities are compared to Aristotelian powers. Popper rejects predictability and opts for the non-predictability. There must be a designated ' symbiosis inclusive articualtion, like predictability and non predictability

Les avancées de la biologie contemporaine, posent de façon nouvelle des problèmes philosophiques anciens. Ceux des rapports entre le vivant et l'inanimé, entre le corps et l'esprit, l'erreur et la vérité, sont les plus évidents. La philosophie de Spinoza, bien que datant du 17e siècle, apporte à ces problèmes des solutions plus pertinentes que la plupart des philosophies plus récentes, développées dans les siècles qui l'ont suivie. En retour, les acquis actuels des sciences physiques et biologiques, notamment des neurosciences cognitives, permettent de porter un nouveau regard sur certaines notions propres à la philosophie de Spinoza, telles que sa «petite physique», la nature cause de soi, la notion de matière, l'essence des choses, les genres de connaissance, qui acquièrent de ce fait un surcroît d'actualité
Old philosophical problems are raised in renewed ways by advances in biology of today. Most obvious are the problems of relationship between living and non-living, mind and body, error en truth. Spinoza's philosophy, although from 17th century, offers solutions to these problems more relevant than most more recent philosophies. In return, present knowledge from physical and biological sciences, especially cognitive neurosciences, can provide a new look at some specifically Spinozist notions such as his "little physics", Nature as cause of itself, the notion of matter, the essence of a thing, kinds of knowledge, which gain all the more interest from a present day point of view

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This Master s thesis aims at translating into Portuguese Peirce s essay Causation and Force, which is part of the Conferences given by him in Cambridge in 1898, as well as to offer some theoretical elements for its reading and understanding. With this in mind, we present different manners on how the issue of causality has been considered historically, particularly Peirce s critical view concerning a one determined world. Herein we also discuss the main questions raised by Peirce regarding the deconstruction of determinism and his defense of chance as an ontological principle operating in the constitution of the reality
Esta dissertação se propõe a efetuar uma versão para o português do ensaio ―Causation and Force‖, incluído nas conferências de Peirce proferidas em Cambridge em 1898, bem como oferecer elementos teóricos para sua leitura e compreensão. Para tanto, apresentamos diferentes formas sobre como a questão da causalidade tem sido considerada historicamente, em particular a visão crítica do próprio autor acerca de um mundo determinado. Discutimos as principais questões levantadas por Peirce sobre a desconstrução do determinismo e sua defesa do acaso como princípio ontológico atuante na constituição da realidade

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This essay aims to discourse on the concept of infinite in Baruch Spinoza, taking as main theoretical reference two of his works, the Metaphysical Thoughts and The Letter 12. The objective is to show that the concept of infinite represents a key idea to Spinoza s system, where all his theses concerning immanent causality and psychophysical parallelism are based on. The research begins with a historical approach about the matter of infinite, discussed by a tradition of thinkers who preceded Spinoza, since the Greeks until Descartes in modernity. In a second moment, the analysis turns to the matter of infinite understood by Spinoza who, as he defends the idea of current infinite, ends up retaking the theory of Anaxagoras, Nicolau of Cusa and Giordano Bruno, where, according to them, God is not separated of his creatures, but keeps a relation of immanency with them. In this case, according to Spinoza, to affirm that God is infinite means saying that He comprehends all things and nothing can exist separated from Him, and moreover, being substance, God cannot be separate of his conditions (modes), what is explained by the immanency of his causality, in what cause (God) and effect (modes) occur simultaneously. The habit of separate the substance from his conditions comes from the misunderstanding between the way how the mind understands the substance through the beings of Reason (time, measure, number) and the essence of the own substance. Through the beings of Reason, the substance is composed of parts and, therefore, it is divisible; however, considering its essential aspect, it is indivisible. This explains the thesis of parallelism as well since mind and body, due to inseparability of conditions, cannot be considered independent substances, but expressions of a single and same substance, either conceived by the attribute of thinking, or conceived by the attribute of extension. According to Spinoza, the dualism proposed by his main interlocutor, Descartes, precisely appeared due to the fact of his misunderstanding concerning the real aspect of substance (indivisible attributes) with his modal aspect (divisible modes).
Esta dissertação tem o objetivo de discorrer sobre o conceito de infinito em Baruch Spinoza, tomando como referencial teórico principal duas de suas obras, Os Pensamentos Metafísicos e a Carta 12. A tarefa aqui é mostrar que o conceito de infinito representa uma ideia chave para o sistema de Spinoza, sobre o qual estão assentadas as teses da causalidade imanente e do paralelismo psicofísico. O estudo se inicia com uma abordagem histórica acerca da questão do infinito, discutido por uma tradição de pensadores que antecederam Spinoza, desde os gregos até Descartes na modernidade. Em um segundo momento, a análise se volta para questão do infinito entendido por Spinoza que, ao defender a ideia do infinito atual, acaba retomando as teorias de Anaxágoras, Nicolau de Cusa e Giordano Bruno, segundo as quais Deus não está separado de suas criaturas, mas mantém uma relação de imanência com elas. Nesse caso, para Spinoza, afirmar que Deus é infinito significa dizer que Ele abrange todas as coisas e nada pode existir separado Dele, ou melhor, sendo substância, Deus não pode ser separado de suas afecções (os modos), o que é explicado pela imanência de sua causalidade, na qual causa (Deus) e o efeito (as afecções) ocorrem conjuntamente. O hábito de separar a substância de suas afecções vem da confusão entre o modo como a mente percebe a substância através dos entes de Razão (tempo, medida, número) e a essência da própria substância. Pelos entes de Razão, a substância é composta de partes e, portanto divisível; todavia, considerando o seu aspecto essencial, ela é indivisível. Isso explica também a tese do paralelismo já que a mente e o corpo, devido à indissociabilidade das afecções, não podem ser consideradas substâncias independentes, mas expressões de uma única e mesma substância, ora concebida pelo atributo pensamento, ora concebida pelo atributo extensão. De acordo com Spinoza, o dualismo proposto pelo seu principal interlocutor, Descartes, surgiu justamente pelo fato deste confundir o aspecto real da substância (atributos indivisíveis) com seu aspecto modal (modos divisíveis).

Could it be stated that the fulfillment of the causality principle is required in order for expense deduction to be applied? And, can criteria such as reasonability and normality be considered complementary to causality in Peruvian domestic law? In the present article, the author analyzes how the causality principle is configured in our legal system, and explains the importance of its subjective and objective division. He also ends up examining the concept of necessary expenditure from, as understood in local and foreign jurisprudence.
¿La deducción de gastos está supeditada al cumplimiento del principio de causalidad? ¿Se puede afirmar la existencia de razonabilidad y normalidad como criterios complementarios al de causalidad en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico? En el presente artículo, el autor buscará analizar cómo se configura el principio de causalidad en nuestro ordenamiento, a partir de su división subjetiva y objetiva. Asimismo, se estudiará el concepto de gasto necesario a partir de la jurisprudencia nacional y extranjera.

Dans cette thèse je défends l'élimination des concepts d'attitudes propositionnelles. Dans le premier chapitre, je présente les thèses éliminativistes en philosophie de l'esprit et des sciences cognitives contemporaines. Il y a deux types d'éliminativisme: le matérialisme éliminatif et l'éliminativisme des concepts. Il est possible d'éliminer les concepts soit des théories naïves soit des théories scientifiques. L'éliminativisme à propos des concepts d'attitudes propositionnelles que je défends requière le second type d'élimination. Dans les trois chapitres suivants je donne trois arguments en faveur de cette thèse. Je commence par soutenir que la théorie interventionniste de la causalité ne fonde pas nos jugements de causalité mentale. Ensuite je montre que nos concepts d'attitudes propositionnelles ne sont pas des concepts d'espèces naturelles car ils groupent ensemble les états des différents modules d'une architecture massivement modulaire, la thèse de modularité massive faisant partie, je l'affirme, de notre meilleur programme de recherche. Finalement, mon troisième argument repose sur l’élimination du concept de contenu mental de nos théories. Dans les deux derniers chapitres de la thèse, je défends ce dernier argument. Tout d'abord, je réfute l'argument du succès selon lequel étant donné que les psychologues emploient le concept de contenu mental et ce faisant produisent de la bonne science ce concept ne devrait pas être éliminé. Ensuite je rejette une autre façon d'éliminer ce concept, celle choisie par les théoriciens de la cognition étendue. Pour cela je réfute le meilleur argument qui a été donné en faveur de cette thèse: l'argument du système
In this dissertation, I argue for the elimination of propositional attitudes concepts. In the first chapter I sketch the landscape of eliminativism in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science. There are two kinds of eliminativism: eliminative materialism and concept eliminativism. One can further distinguish between folk and science eliminativism about concepts: whereas the former says that the concept should be eliminated from our folk theories, the latter says that the concept should be eliminated form our scientific theories. The eliminativism about propositional attitudes concepts I defend is a species of the latter. In the next three chapters I put forward three arguments for this thesis. I first argue that the interventionist theory of causation cannot lend credit to our claims of mental causation. I then support the thesis by showing that propositional attitudes concepts aren't natural kind concepts because they cross-cut the states of the modules posited by the thesis of massive modularity, a thesis which, I contend, is part of our best research-program. Finally, my third argument rests on science eliminativism about the concept of mental content. In the two last chapters of the dissertation I first defend the elimination of the concept of mental content from the success argument, according to which as psychologists produce successful science while using the concept of mental content, the concept should be conserved. Then, I dismiss an alternative way of eliminating the concept, that is, the way taken by proponents of extended cognition, by refuting what I take to be the best argument for extended cognition, namely, the system argument

Cette thèse, qui s'inscrit dans la tradition méthodologique de l'épistémologie historique, porte sur l'histoire et la formation du concept de biais dans l'épidémiologie moderne. Elle montre que la fonction opératoire du concept de biais est essentiellement critique, au sens où ce concept, que les épidémiologistes opposent au cours de l'histoire aux concepts d'objectivité, de preuve et de causalité, joue un rôle décisif dans la constitution de l'épidémiologie comme science, mais aussi dans l'avènement d'une médecine scientifique. Un éclairage historique et critique est apporté à la définition actuelle du biais, conçu comme une erreur ou un écart systématique par rapport à la vérité, ainsi qu'aux différentes taxinomies des biais qui jalonnent l'histoire de ce concept, dont l'origine se situe chez les fondateurs de la statistique mathématique. Le biais apparait ainsi comme une menace aussi bien à la validité du plan d'expérience d'une étude épidémiologique qu'à la validité de l'inférence statistique et du raisonnement médical. En d'autres termes, ce sont les conséquences que la révolution probabiliste a eues sur l'épidémiologie et sur la médecine qui sont ici étudiées, et qui ont conduit les épidémiologistes et les médecins à une forme de scepticisme et même de criticisme envers leurs propres inférences, ce qui donnera naissance au mouvement de la médecine fondée sur des preuves
This PhD thesis, belonging to the tradition of historical epistemology, deals with the history and the formation of the concept of bias in epidemiology. It shows that the operational function of the concept of bias is essentially critical, in the sense that this concept, used by epidemiologists throughout history as an antonym to both objectivity, causality and evidence, is central to both the construction of epidemiology as a scientific discipline and the advent of scientific medicine. An historical and critical account is given of the actual definition of bias, conceived as a systematic error or deviation from the truth, and to the various taxonomies of bias which marked the history of this concept, whose origin goes back to the founders of mathematical statistics. Bias thus appears as a threat to the validity of the design of an epidemiological study, and to the validity of statistical inference and medical reasoning. In other words, what is studied here is the consequences of the probabilistic revolution on both epidemiology and medicine, which led epidemiologists and physicians to a kind of scepticism or even criticism about their own inferences, which would ultimately give birth to the evidence-based medicine's movement

The main purpose of this multiple case study is to investigate how high school history teachers in Sweden use historical explanations in their classroom teaching.  Specifically, the study explores how explanations are constructed in the clasroom interactions, and what thinking tools, if any, the teachers use to help students grasp central aspects of the historical explanation in question. The case study is based upon observation data from the classrooms of five Swedish high school teachers. A theoretical underpinning of this study is that historical explanations are best understood as cases of complex causality. In order to describe these cases as they are presented in the context of a classroom, a model for analysis is used which draws upon research conclusions from several fields, chiefly instructional theory (Gaea Leinhardt), theory of history (C.Behan McCullagh) and historical thinking (Peter Seixas). The study presents each teacher as a separate case in one chapter, while another chapter focuses on what different tools each teacher uses in his/her explanations. In the last empirical chapter, the teachers’ explanations are discussed in relation to how they emphasize and relate to diffent historical thinking concepts. The study shows that while explanations are intimately interconnected with causality, their use is intertwined with other historical thinking concepts. Furthermore,  teachers use a multitude of different tools when working with  explanations. While certain tools aim at reinforcing students’ thinking about causality, they may simultaneously weaken the explanation’s value for something else, such as historical empathy. Thus, the importance of planning for specific teaching objectives is emphasized by the study.
Förmågan att resonera om orsaker och konsekvenser för att därigenom förklara historiska skeenden är en central förmåga i historisk kunskap. Hur gör lärare när de arbetar med historiska förklaringar i undervisningen? Den frågan är utgångspunkten för denna studie, som bygger på klassrumsstudier av fem yrkesverksamma historielärares undervisning. Särskild vikt läggs vid att identifiera olika redskap som lärarna använder för att tydliggöra olika aspekter av förklaringar i undervisningen.  Undersökningen visar hur förklaringar i undervisningspraktiken påverkas av faktorer som kursinnehåll, elevgrupp och undervisningens målsättningar. Ett antal didaktiska redskap för att arbeta med förklaringar identifieras. Vidare visar undersökningen också hur förklaringar i undervisningspraktiken kan vara sammanflätade med andra aspekter av historisk kunskap, som historisk empati och källhantering.

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A incerteza é o principal elemento do futuro. Desde os primórdios, o homem busca métodos para estruturar essas incertezas futuras e assim poder guiar suas ações. Apenas a partir da segunda metade do século XX, porém, quando os métodos projetivos e preditivos já não eram mais capazes de explicar o futuro em um ambiente mundial cada vez mais interligado e turbulento, é que nasceram os primeiros métodos estruturados de construção de cenários. Esses métodos prospectivos visam lançar a luz sobre o futuro não para projetar um futuro único e certo, mas para visualizar uma gama de futuros possíveis e coerentes. Esse trabalho tem como objetivo propor uma nova abordagem à construção de cenários, integrando o Método de Impactos Cruzados à Análise Morfológica, utilizando o conceito de Rede Bayesianas, de fonna a reduzir a complexidade da análise sem perda de robustez. Este trabalho fará uma breve introdução histórica dos estudos do futuro, abordará os conceitos e definições de cenários e apresentará os métodos mais utilizados. Como a abordagem proposta pretende-se racionalista, será dado foco no Método de Cenários de Michel Godet e suas ferramentas mais utilizadas. Em seguida, serão apresentados os conceitos de Teoria dos Grafos, Causalidade e Redes Bayesianas. A proposta é apresentada em três etapas: 1) construção da estrutura do modelo através da Análise Estrutural, propondo a redução de um modelo inicialmente cíclico para um modelo acíclico direto; 2) utilização da Matriz de Impactos Cruzados como ferramenta de alimentação, preparação e organização dos dados de probabilidades; 3) utilização da Rede Bayesiana resultante da primeira etapa como subespaço de análise de uma Matriz Morfológica. Por último, um teste empírico é realizado para comprovar a proposta de redução do modelo cíclico em um modelo acíclico.

La recherche ainsi entamée nous a toutefois réservé des surprises de taille qui nous ont contraint à sortir de la seule sphère successorale pour élargir notre réflexion à d’autres domaines du droit civil, et à formuler ainsi une structure de thèse plus étendue et plus complexe.La thèse que nous proposons de défendre est que la saisine héréditaire n’est en réalité que l’une des déclinaisons d’un concept beaucoup plus vaste, qui traverse tout le champ du droit civil, celui de « saisine ». Nous défendrons la thèse selon laquelle ce concept transversal, méconnu de notre Code civil, se manifeste au travers de ses deux facultés principales, que nous qualifierons de saisine statique et de saisine dynamique. La saisine comprise dans sa faculté statique est précisément révélée dans notre droit par la saisine héréditaire et prend la forme d’un droit réel de posséder, dont nous proposons de démontrer l’existence et que nous mettrons à l’épreuve. L’autre faculté du concept de saisine, que nous qualifierons de saisine dynamique, consiste en la remise en cause du transfert solo consensu par la reconnaissance du caractère dual de la mécanique du transfert de propriété. Notre thèse est ici de démontrer que les droits français et belge connaissent, à l’instar du droit romain et du droit positif allemand, une mécanique de transfert duale, où l’acte translatif est distinct du contrat obligationnel. Nous démontrerons que la saisine, comprise dans sa faculté dynamique, est précisément l’acte translatif nécessaire au transfert du droit réel. Fort de ces enseignements nécessaires à sa compréhension causale, la thèse sera enfin recentrée sur son objet initial, la saisine héréditaire. Sur le fondement des analyses précitées, nous proposerons une théorie nouvelle de la saisine héréditaire, droit réel de posséder inclus dans la propriété de l’hérédité, selon laquelle le premier doit suivre la seconde, aux fins d’éviter les insécurités juridiques nombreuses générées par l’organisation de lege lata de l’institution. Nous proposerons enfin une harmonisation entre l’analyse causale de la saisine héréditaire, telle que nous l’aurons développée, et l’analyse fonctionnelle traditionnelle de l’institution.
Doctorat en Sciences juridiques
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

System dynamics modelling has been used for around 40 years to address complex, systemic, dynamic problems, those often described as wicked. But, system dynamics modelling is not an exact science and arguments about the most suitable techniques to use in which circumstances, continues. The nature of these wicked problems is investigated through a series of case studies where poor situational awareness among stakeholders was identified. This was found to be an underlying cause for management failure, suggesting need for better ways of recognising and managing wicked problem situations. Human cognition is considered both as a limitation and enabler to decision-making in wicked problem environments. Naturalistic and deliberate decision-making are reviewed. The thesis identifies the need for integration of qualitative and quantitative techniques. Case study results and a review of the literature led to identification of a set of principles of method to be applied in an integrated framework, the aim being to develop an improved way of addressing wicked problems. These principles were applied to a series of cases in an action research setting. However, organisational and political barriers were encountered. This limited the exploitation and investigation of cases to varying degrees. In response to a need identified in the literature review and the case studies, a tool is designed to facilitate analysis of multi-factorial, non-linear causality. This unique tool and its use to assist in problem conceptualisation, and as an aid to testing alternate strategies, are demonstrated. Further investigation is needed in relation to the veracity of combining causal influences using this tool and system dynamics, broadly. System dynamics modelling was found to have utility needed to support analysis of wicked problems. However, failure in a particular modelling project occurred when it was found necessary to rely on human judgement in estimating values to be input into the models. This was found to be problematic and unacceptably risky for sponsors of the modelling effort. Finally, this work has also identified that further study is required into: the use of human judgement in decision-making and the validity of system dynamics models that rely on the quantification of human judgement.

La connaissance dont peut profiter un organisme donné peut être conçue comme l'articulation fonctionnelle de sa confrontation continue à la somme des stimulations dont il est récepteur, parmi lesquelles celles des sons. L'analyse de cette connaissance a été largement placée sous celle d'un contenu informationnel indistinct. Or, il peut être distingué entre un niveau d'articulation direct ou sensori-moteur et un niveau proprement symbolique, fruit d'une observation partagée. Il s'agit d'enquêter sur le contenu informationnel spécifique dont l'accès est permis par le transfert d'inscriptions qui, si elles sont analogiques, sont néanmoins constitutives de la définition d'un certain document. L'instrument d'observation ainsi constitué, même si dérogeant à la règle de la transparence, permet une analyse distincte par un aller-retour entre l'appréciation des qualités perçues par le développement méthodique de concepts et la définition de leurs caractères physiques.

碩士
東吳大學
歷史學系
98
In Taiwan, the content of history curriculum in school has been a controversial issue for years. Though the content could be changed, the main aim of History Education was clearly to cultivate students’ historical abilities, such as treating history as a discipline and knowing how to use historical concepts to explain things historically. It has to be considered students’ study of history may be influenced by their daily thoughts thus they are unlikely to be class without any pre-occupied ideas. In order to achieve this aim so to provide an alternative teaching program, a primary tack was to realize students’ preconceptions of history. In this research, the author investigated one of the historical concepts, namely “Cause and Consequence” from 67 students who has studied in senior high school. The study was based on an opened-questionnaire which asked the students “Why 228 Event Happened?” After finishing those opened-questionnaires, analysis were made to interpret and explain the concepts of causality, ex. how students thought of “Causes”, “Trigger” and “Background Causes” etc.. The results showed most of students were accustomed to use their common sense to explain “Why It Happened?” without understanding relevant causality. The complication of causality could only be aware by few of them. Through this research, we can realize some preconceptions of students. This will be employed to encourage them to recognize historical concepts and construct their own “Cause and Consequence” .

Yes
This research provides a comprehensive delineation of the process that leads to the formation of green behavior by including the role played by media and attitude towards environment-friendly packaging, along with ecological concern and perceived consumer effectiveness. The study offers a parsimonious framework that measures the major antecedents of environmental attitude divided into inward and outward orientation. Moreover, it also measures the effects of these environmental attitudes and attitude towards green packaging on green purchase intention. A total of 308 usable questionnaires were obtained from Indian consumers and data analysis was conducted using confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling. The results show that inward environmental attitude and attitude towards green packaging play a pivotal role in shaping green purchase intention. Surprisingly, outward environmental attitude was found to be non-significant. Findings offer implications for marketing managers and public policy makers, as well as reveal fruitful avenues for further research.

The aim of the thesis is to examine both Husserl's and Kant's transcendentalism in a way that would avoid the tendency to put the main accent on Husserl, which is an approach common to almost all literature dealing with this topic so far. Since it is for the most part Husserl's own critique of Kant that inspires such ongoing underestimation of Kant in comparison to Husserl, this work focuss on the question of the legitimacy of this critique. The core of the thesis is an original interpretation of Kant's transcendental philosophy which, instead of taking for granted the phenomenological point of view, attempts to describe Kant's philosophical enterprise from its own perspective and in its own right. In its second part, the thesis provides a brief description of how Husserl, starting initially from the position of descriptive psychology, arrives at a transcendental dimension. When so put side by side, it becomes evident that the two transcendental positions are in fact very different. Husserl's critique of Kant then appears as unjustified, even though quite understandable as an attempt to draw back from certain immature motives of his own philosophy.

Tese no âmbito do curso de Doutoramento em Direito, na área das Ciências Jurídico-Criminais, apresentada à Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra.
Ao contrário da legislação anterior, o art. 26.º do Código Penal distingue entre autoria mediata e instigação, não obstante aplicando a ambas uma mesma moldura abstrata de pena. Para lá disso, o legislador nada diz: não indica nenhum critério material capaz de separar as duas figuras, nem os grupos de casos que seriam catalogados numa e noutra, tampouco quais os atributos jurídicos que devem constar do facto principal do instigado. A única diferença estabelecida na lei decorre da passagem que condiciona a punição do instigador ao início da execução do autor. A definição daqueles outros aspetos foi deixada nas mãos da doutrina e da jurisprudência, prevalecendo ainda hoje na literatura a tese de que o instigador também é um verdadeiro autor. Este entendimento e a convicção de que referida igualdade sancionatória não suscita maiores problemas de legitimação têm alimentado uma evolução dogmática onde são escassos os esforços no sentido de uma interpretação restritiva da regra da instigação, de modo a excluir da sua alçada as situações de mera influência psíquica sobre a decisão delitiva do homem-da-frente. Todavia, parece adequado contestar este cenário se regressamos à elementar ideia que faz da autonomia do ser humano o alfa e o ómega do Direito, e, em particular, do Direito Penal. Tanto mais quanto esta mesma (auto)compreensão do cidadão como sujeito livre e responsável constituiu a pedra-de-toque do projeto que esteve na base do Código Penal vigente. Se quiser ser algo mais que uma cláusula de estilo ou slogan da moda e coisa diversa de um mero limite externo ao jogo de ponderação, a tão falada dignidade da pessoa humana terá de repercutir já na própria compreensão das estruturas adscritivas que sustentam o pesado edifício da responsabilidade criminal. Especialmente ali onde o dilema da referência, um eixo crucial para qualquer Direito Penal do facto, se torna mais agudo: o terreno comparticipação no delito. Levar a autonomia do cidadão a sério implica reconhecer que a clivagem entre autoria mediata e instigação pertence a um tópico qualitativo (não quantitativo) relacionado com a diversidade das categorias lógicas e pragmáticas que suportam a separação conceptual entre autoria e participação. Assim, o presente estudo procura traduzir a gramática profunda da autonomia cidadã numa forma de idioma que pretende ir além do status quo do Direito legislado: a linguagem da teoria das normas. Com isso abre-se um horizonte analítico que devolve ao livre agir do homem-da-frente um efeito de absoluta proibição de regresso ao homem-de-trás. O resultado direto deste redimensionamento é a conclusão de que o enunciado «o instigador é autor» é analiticamente incorreto: por definição, valendo a premissa da autonomia do cidadão, o instigador não pode ser (conceptualmente) autor. O que implica a rejeição da teoria do «autor-detrás-do-autor (plenamente responsável)». Assumindo uma noção de liberdade onto-antropologicamente fundada, a dissertação chega a uma segunda conclusão não menos importante: no quadro da tradicional distribuição de hipóteses entre autoria mediata e instigação, a igualdade sancionatória não pode ser explicada pelo princípio da autonomia do ser humano, mas apenas por uma abordagem consequencialista (utilitarista) que instrumentaliza o instigado para fins que são alheios ao teor de envolvimento pessoal cristalizado no seu próprio comportamento e no facto principal. Assim, de lege ferenda, o esquema corrente seria menos desajustado se fosse introduzida, em favor do instigador, uma cláusula de atenuação especial (facultativa) da pena. De qualquer modo, esta modificação ainda não eliminaria totalmente as fricções com o princípio da autodeterminação individual. Para tanto, há ainda uma alternativa hermeneuticamente possível de lege lata, embora talvez não desejada pelo legislador histórico: atualizar a função de bloqueio do art. 29.º, enquanto genuíno e inequívoco atestado da irrelevância do juízo de culpa do homem-da-dianteira para o apuramento da responsabilidade do homem-da-retaguarda, a partir daí atualizando-se também o frágil equilíbrio na distribuição dos grupos de casos, com uma substancial redução do alcance da norma da autoria mediata e a correspondente migração de algumas situações para o âmbito da norma da instigação, esta última agora desonerada da obrigação de tematizar hipóteses que podem encontrar satisfatória resposta na figura da cumplicidade psíquica.
Unlike the previous legislation, the section 26 of the Penal Code distinguishes between perpetration-by-means and instigation, despite applying the same abstract frame of penalty to both of them. Beyond that, the legislator says nothing more: he does not indicate any material criteria to separate the two concepts, nor the groups of cases that would be classified in each of them, nor what juridical attributes should be verified in the main action performed by the instigated person. The only difference legally established is the stipulation which connects the punishment of the instigated person to the beginning of the perpetration. The setting of those aspects was left in the hands of doctrine and jurisprudence, still prevailing in the literature the thesis by which the instigator is also a principal. This understanding and the opinion that the referred sanctioning equality does not give rise to major legitimacy problems have fueled a dogmatic approach where are scarce the efforts towards a restrictive interpretation of the instigation rule, in order to exclude from its scope the situations of mere psychic influence on the criminal decision of the man-in-the-front-line. However, it seems appropriate to challenge this scenario if we return to the elementary idea that makes human autonomy the alpha and omega of Law, and, in particular, of the Criminal Law. Even more when this same (self) understanding of the citizen as a free and responsible subject was the cornerstone of the project which offered the basis for the current Penal Code. To be anything more than a style clause or slogan of fashion and something other than a mere external border for proportionality games, the principle of human dignity must have repercussions on the very understanding of the ascriptive structures which support the heavy building of the criminal liability. Especially where the dilemma of reference, a crucial issue for any Criminal Law of the fact, becomes more acute: the charge for accomplice responsibility (complicity). Taking citizens autonomy seriously implies recognizing that the contrast between perpetration-through-another and instigation is a qualitative (non-quantitative) topic related to the diversity of logical and pragmatic categories that support the conceptual distinction between primary and accessorial liability. Accordingly, this investigation tries to translate the deep grammar of citizen autonomy into a kind of language which intends to go beyond the (empirically contingent) status quo of the positive Law: the language of the theory of norms. So reappears an analytical horizon which resets in the free action of the man-in-the-front-line the ascriptive effect of an absolute prohibition of returning to the man-in-the-back-line. Therefore, arises immediately the conclusion that the statement «the instigator is a principal» is analytically incorrect: by definition, due to the citizen’s autonomy, the instigator cannot (conceptually) be a principal. Which implies the rejection of the theory of the so-called «perpetrator-behind-the-(fully-responsible)-perpetrator». Based on an onto-anthropologically based notion of freedom, this dissertation reaches a second, no less important conclusion: in the context of the currently distribution of occurrences between perpetration-by-means and instigation, the equal abstract penalty framework cannot be explained by the principle of human autonomy, but only by a consequentialist (utilitarian) approach that instrumentalizes the instigated person for purposes which are unrelated to the content of personal performance materialized in its own behavior and in the main fact of the perpetrator. Thus, de lege ferenda, the majority understanding would be less unsuitable if a special (optional) penalty mitigation clause was introduced in favor of the instigator. Anyway, this solution would not yet completely eliminate frictions with the principle of individual self-responsibility. To this goal, there is still de lege lata a hermeneutically possible alternative, although perhaps not desired by the historical legislator: to update the blocking function of section 29, while clear and authentic certificate of the irrelevance of the culpability of the man-in-the-front-line to determining the responsibility of the man-in-the-back-line, thereafter also updating the fragile set up in the distribution of groups of cases, with a substantial reduction in the field of the rule of perpetration-through-another and the corresponding transfer of some situations to the circle of the rule of instigation, now relieved of the obligation to deal with hypotheses which can find a satisfactory answer with the classification of simple abetting.