Relevant bibliographies by topics / Computational Social Choice Theory

Academic literature on the topic 'Computational Social Choice Theory'

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Published: 6 September 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Computational Social Choice Theory"

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Nipkow, Tobias. "Social Choice Theory in HOL." Journal of Automated Reasoning 43, no. 3 (August 1, 2009): 289–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10817-009-9147-4.

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ENDRISS, ULLE. "The 1st international workshop on computational social choice." Knowledge Engineering Review 23, no. 2 (June 2008): 213–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0269888908001343.

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AbsractComputational social choice is a new discipline currently emerging at the interface of social choice theory and computer science. It is concerned with the application of computational techniques to the study of social choice mechanisms, and with the integration of social choice paradigms into computing. The first international workshop specifically dedicated to this topic took place in December 2006 in Amsterdam, attracting a mix of computer scientists, people working in artificial intelligence and multiagent systems, economists, game and social choice theorists, logicians, mathematicians, philosophers, and psychologists as participants.
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Chatterjee, Siddharth, and Arunava Sen. "Automated Reasoning in Social Choice Theory: Some Remarks." Mathematics in Computer Science 8, no. 1 (March 2014): 5–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11786-014-0177-x.

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Serrano, Roberto. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules." SIAM Review 46, no. 3 (January 2004): 377–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/s0036144503435945.

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Mikhailov, I. F. "Computational approach to social knowledge." Philosophy of Science and Technology 26, no. 2 (2021): 23–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-1-23-37.

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Social and cognitive sciences have always faced the choice: either to meet the methodologi- cal standards given by successful natural sciences or to rely on their own. Talking about the conversion of knowledge into technology, the second way did not bring great success. The first way implies two alternative opportunities: reductionism or discovery of proprietary general laws. None of these chances have been realized with any satisfactory results, too. Methodological analysis shows that, to achieve significant progress in social sciences, what is missed there is not new facts or definitions but new conceptual schemes. The reason, as the author supposes, is the nomothetic approach being applied to systems with high degree of complexity and hierarchy. If we assume that social structures and processes are built upon cognitive psychological structures and processes, the former inherit the distributed computational architecture of the latter. The paper analyzes various conceptions of computations in order to determine their relevance to the task of building computational social science. The author offers a “generic” definition of computations as a process carried out by a computational system if the latter is understood as a mechanism of some representation. According to the author, the computationalization of social science implies “naturalization” of computations. This requires a theory that would explain the mechanism of growing complexity and hierarchy of natural (in particular, social) computational systems. As a method for constructing such a science, a kind of reverse engineering is proposed, which is recreation of a computational algorithmic scheme of social tissue by the determination and recombination of “social primitives” – elementary operations of social interaction.
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Manzo, Gianluca. "Is rational choice theory still a rational choice of theory? A response to Opp." Social Science Information 52, no. 3 (August 5, 2013): 361–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0539018413488477.

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Authoritative rational choice theorists continue to argue that wide variants of rational choice theory should be regarded as the best starting-point to formulate theoretical hypotheses on the micro foundations of complex macro-level social dynamics. Building on recent writings on neo-classical rational choice theory, on behavioral economics and on cognitive psychology, the present article challenges this view and argues that: (1) neo-classical rational choice theory is an astonishingly malleable and powerful analytical device whose descriptive accuracy is nevertheless limited to a very specific class of choice settings; (2) the ‘wide’ sociological rational choice theory does not add anything original to the neo-classical framework on a conceptual level and it is also methodologically weaker; (3) at least four alternative action-oriented approaches that reject portrayal of actors as computational devices operating over probability distributions can be used to design sociological explanations that are descriptively accurate at the micro level.
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Chevaleyre, Yann, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, and Nicolas Maudet. "Preference Handling in Combinatorial Domains: From AI to Social Choice." AI Magazine 29, no. 4 (December 28, 2008): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v29i4.2201.

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In both individual and collective decision making, the space of alternatives from which the agent (or the group of agents) has to choose often has a combinatorial (or multi-attribute) structure. We give an introduction to preference handling in combinatorial domains in the context of collective decision making, and show that the considerable body of work on preference representation and elicitation that AI researchers have been working on for several years is particularly relevant. After giving an overview of languages for compact representation of preferences, we discuss problems in voting in combinatorial domains, and then focus on multiagent resource allocation and fair division. These issues belong to a larger field, known as computational social choice, that brings together ideas from AI and social choice theory, to investigate mechanisms for collective decision making from a computational point of view. We conclude by briefly describing some of the other research topics studied in computational social choice.
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Tanaka, Yasuhito. "A topological proof of Eliaz’s unified theorem of social choice theory." Applied Mathematics and Computation 176, no. 1 (May 2006): 83–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2005.09.055.

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Neath, Andrew A., Joseph E. Cavanaugh, and Adam G. Weyhaupt. "Model evaluation, discrepancy function estimation, and social choice theory." Computational Statistics 30, no. 1 (September 27, 2014): 231–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00180-014-0532-z.

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NURMI, HANNU, and JANUSZ KACPRZYK. "POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: PERSPECTIVE FROM FUZZY SYSTEMS THEORY." New Mathematics and Natural Computation 03, no. 02 (July 2007): 153–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793005707000690.

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The theory of fuzzy sets has been applied to social choice primarily in the context where one is given a set of individual fuzzy preference relations and the aim is to find a non-fuzzy choice set of winners or best alternatives. In this article, we discuss the problem of composing multi-member deliberative bodies starting again from a set of individual fuzzy preference relations. We outline methods of aggregating these relations into a measure of how well each candidate represents each voter in terms of the latter's preferences. Our main goal is to show how the considerations discussed in the context of individual non-fuzzy complete and transitive preference relations can be extended into the domain of fuzzy preference relations.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Computational Social Choice Theory"

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Brill, Markus [Verfasser], Felix [Akademischer Betreuer] Brandt, and Jérôme [Akademischer Betreuer] Lang. "Set-Valued Solution Concepts in Social Choice and Game Theory : Axiomatic and Computational Aspects / Markus Brill. Gutachter: Felix Brandt ; Jérôme Lang. Betreuer: Felix Brandt." München : Universitätsbibliothek der TU München, 2012. http://d-nb.info/1031512683/34.

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Loreggia, Andrea. "Iterative Voting, Control and Sentiment Analysis." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Padova, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3424803.

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In multi-agent systems agents often need to take a collective decision based on the preferences of individuals. A voting rule is used to decide which decision to take, mapping the agents' preferences over the possible candidate decisions into a winning decision for the collection of agents. In these kind of scenarios acting strategically can be seen in two opposite way. On one hand it may be desirable that agents do not have any incentive to act strategically. That is, to misreport their preferences in order to influence the result of the voting rule in their favor or acting on the structure of the election to change the outcome. On the other hand manipulation can be used to improve the quality of the outcome by enlarging the consensus of the winner. These two different scenarios are studied in this thesis. The first one by modeling and describing a natural form of control named ``replacement control'' and characterizing for several voting rules its computational complexity. The second scenario is studied in the form of iterative voting frameworks where individuals are allowed to change their preferences to change the outcome of the election. Computational social choice techniques can be used in very different scenarios. This work reports a first attempt to introduce the use of voting procedures in the field of sentiment analysis. In this area computer scientists extract the opinion of the community about a specific item. This opinion is extracted aggregating the opinion expressed by each individual which leaves a text in a blog or social network about the given item. We studied and proposed a new aggregation method which can improve performances of sentiment analysis, this new technique is a new variance of a well-known voting rule called Borda.
Nei sistemi multi agente spesso nasce la necessità di prendere decisioni collettive basate sulle preferenze dei singoli individui. A tal fine può essere utilizzata una regola di voto che, aggregando le preferenze dei singoli agenti, trovi una soluzione che rappresenti la collettività. In questi scenari la possibilità di agire in modo strategico può essere vista da due diversi e opposti punti di vista. Da una parte può essere desiderabile che gli agenti non abbiano alcun incentivo ad agire strategicamente, ovvero che gli agenti non abbiano incentivi a riportare in modo scorretto le proprie preferenze per influenzare il risultato dell'elezione a proprio favore, oppure che non agiscano sulla struttura del sistema elettorale stesso per cambiarne il risultato finale. D'altra parte l'azione strategica può essere utilizzata per migliorare la qualità del risultato o per incrementare il consenso del vincitore. Questi due diversi scenari sono studiati ed analizzati nella tesi. Il primo modellando e descrivendo una forma naturale di controllo chiamato "replacement control" descrivendo la complessità computazione di tale azione strategica per diverse regole di voto. Il secondo scenario è studiato nella forma dei sistemi di voto iterativi nei quali i singoli individui hanno la possibilità di cambiare le proprie preferenze al fine di influenzare il risultato dell'elezione. Le tecniche di Computational Social Choice inoltre possono essere usate in diverse situazioni. Il lavoro di tesi riporta un primo tentativo di introdurre l'uso di sistemi elettorali nel campo dell'analisi del sentimento. In questo contesto i ricercatori estraggono le opinioni della comunità riguardanti un particolare elemento di interesse. L'opinione collettiva è estratta aggregando le opinioni espresse dai singoli individui che discutono o parlano dell'elemento di interesse attraverso testi pubblicati in blog o social network. Il lavoro di tesi studia una nuova procedura di aggregazione proponendo una nuova variante di una regola di voto ben conosciuta qual è Borda. Tale nuova procedura di aggregazione migliora le performance dell'analisi del sentimento classica.
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Dennig, Francis. "On the welfare economics of climate change." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:aefca5e4-147e-428b-b7a1-176b7daa0f85.

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The three constituent chapters of this thesis tackle independent, self-contained research questions, all concerning welfare economics in general and its application to climate change policy in particular. Climate change is a policy problem for which the costs and benefits are distributed unequally across space and time, as well as one involving a high degree of uncertainty. Therefore, cost-benefit analysis of climate policy ought to be based on a welfare function that is sufficiently sophisticated to incorporate the three dimensions of aggregation: time, risk and space. Chapter 1 is an axiomatic treatment of a stylised model in which all three dimensions appear. The main result is a functional representation of the social welfare function for policy assessment in such situations. Chapter 2 is a numerical mitigation policy analysis. I modify William Nordhaus' RICE-2010 model by replacing his social welfare function with one that allows for different degrees of inequality aversion along the regional and inter-temporal dimension. I find that, holding the inter-temporal coefficient of inequality aversion fixed, performing the optimisation with a greater degree of regional inequality reduces the optimal carbon tax relative to treating the world as a single aggregate consumer. In Chapter 3 I analyse climate policy from the point of view of intergenerational transfers. I propose a system of transfers that allows future generations to compensate the current one for its mitigation effort and demonstrate the effects in an OLG model. When the marginal benefit to a - possibly distant - future generation is greater than the cost of compensating the current generation for its abatement effort, a Pareto improvement is possible by a combination of mitigation policy and transfer payments. I show that under very general assumptions the business-as-usual outcome is Pareto dominated by such policies and derive the conditions for the set of climate policies that are not dominated thus.
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Wilczynski, Anaëlle. "Interaction entre agents modélisée par un réseau social dans des problématiques de choix social computationnel Strategic Voting in a Social Context: Considerate Equilibria Object Allocation via Swaps along a Social Network Local Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problems Constrained Swap Dynamics over a Social Network in Distributed Resource Reallocation Poll-Confident Voters in Iterative Voting." Thesis, Paris Sciences et Lettres (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PSLED073.

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Le choix social repose sur l’étude de la prise de décision collective, où un ensemble d’individus doit convenir d’une solution commune en fonction des préférences de ses membres. Le problème revient à déterminer comment agréger les préférences de différents agents en une décision acceptable pour le groupe. Typiquement, les agents interagissent dans des processus de décision collective, notamment en collaborant ou en échangeant des informations. Il est communément supposé que tout agent est capable d’interagir avec n’importe quel autre. Or, cette hypothèse paraît irréaliste pour de nombreuses situations. On propose de relâcher cette hypothèse en considérant que la possibilité d’interaction est déterminée par un réseau social, représenté par un graphe sur les agents. Dans un tel contexte, on étudie deux problèmes de choix social : le vote stratégique et l’allocation de ressources. L’analyse se concentre sur deux types d’interaction : la collaboration entre les agents, et la collecte d’information. On s’intéresse à l’impact du réseau social, modélisant une possibilité de collaboration entre les agents ou une relation de visibilité, sur la résolution et les solutions de problèmes de vote et d’allocation de ressources. Nos travaux s’inscrivent dans le cadre du choix social computationnel, en utilisant pour ces questions des outils provenant de la théorie des jeux algorithmique et de la théorie de la complexité
Social choice is the study of collective decision making, where a set of agents must make a decision over a set of alternatives, according to their preferences. The question relies on how aggregating the preferences of the agents in order to end up with a decision that is commonly acceptable for the group. Typically, agents can interact by collaborating, or exchanging some information. It is usually assumed in computational social choice that every agent is able to interact with any other agent. However, this assumption looks unrealistic in many concrete situations. We propose to relax this assumption by considering that the possibility of interaction is given by a social network, represented by a graph over the agents.In this context, we study two particular problems of computational social choice: strategic voting and resource allocation of indivisible goods. The focus is on two types of interaction: collaboration and information gathering. We explore how the social network,modelingapossibilityofcollaboration or a visibility relation among the agents, can impact the resolution and the solution of voting and resource allocation problems. These questions are addressed via computational social choice by using tools from algorithmic game theory and computational complexity
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Liu, Xudong. "MODELING, LEARNING AND REASONING ABOUT PREFERENCE TREES OVER COMBINATORIAL DOMAINS." UKnowledge, 2016. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/cs_etds/43.

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In my Ph.D. dissertation, I have studied problems arising in various aspects of preferences: preference modeling, preference learning, and preference reasoning, when preferences concern outcomes ranging over combinatorial domains. Preferences is a major research component in artificial intelligence (AI) and decision theory, and is closely related to the social choice theory considered by economists and political scientists. In my dissertation, I have exploited emerging connections between preferences in AI and social choice theory. Most of my research is on qualitative preference representations that extend and combine existing formalisms such as conditional preference nets, lexicographic preference trees, answer-set optimization programs, possibilistic logic, and conditional preference networks; on learning problems that aim at discovering qualitative preference models and predictive preference information from practical data; and on preference reasoning problems centered around qualitative preference optimization and aggregation methods. Applications of my research include recommender systems, decision support tools, multi-agent systems, and Internet trading and marketing platforms.
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Riquelme, Csori Fabián. "Structural and computational aspects of simple and influence games." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/283144.

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Simple games are a fundamental class of cooperative games. They have a huge relevance in several areas of computer science, social sciences and discrete applied mathematics. The algorithmic and computational complexity aspects of simple games have been gaining notoriety in the recent years. In this thesis we review different computational problems related to properties, parameters, and solution concepts of simple games. We consider different forms of representation of simple games, regular games and weighted games, and we analyze the computational complexity required to transform a game from one representation to another. We also analyze the complexity of several open problems under different forms of representation. In this scenario, we prove that the problem of deciding whether a simple game in minimal winning form is decisive (a problem that is associated to the duality problem of hypergraphs and monotone Boolean functions) can be solved in quasi-polynomial time, and that this problem can be polynomially reduced to the same problem but restricted to regular games in shift-minimal winning form. We also prove that the problem of deciding wheter a regular game is strong in shift-minimal winning form is coNP-complete. Further, for the width, one of the parameters of simple games, we prove that for simple games in minimal winning form it can be computed in polynomial time. Regardless of the form of representation, we also analyze counting and enumeration problems for several subfamilies of these games. We also introduce influence games, which are a new approach to study simple games based on a model of spread of influence in a social network, where influence spreads according to the linear threshold model. We show that influence games capture the whole class of simple games. Moreover, we study for influence games the complexity of the problems related to parameters, properties and solution concepts considered for simple games. We consider extremal cases with respect to demand of influence, and we show that, for these subfamilies, several problems become polynomial. We finish with some applications inspired on influence games. The first set of results concerns to the definition of collective choice models. For mediation systems, several of the problems of properties mentioned above are polynomial-time solvable. For influence systems, we prove that computing the satisfaction (a measure equivalent to the Rae index and similar to the Banzhaf value) is hard unless we consider some restrictions in the model. For OLFM systems, a generalization of OLF systems (van den Brink et al. 2011, 2012) we provide an axiomatization of satisfaction. The second set of results concerns to social network analysis. We define new centrality measures of social networks that we compare on real networks with some classical centrality measures.
Los juegos simples son una clase fundamental de juegos cooperativos, que tiene una enorme relevancia en diversas áreas de ciencias de la computación, ciencias sociales y matemáticas discretas aplicadas. En los últimos años, los distintos aspectos algorítmicos y de complejidad computacional de los juegos simples ha ido ganando notoriedad. En esta tesis revisamos los distintos problemas computacionales relacionados con propiedades, parámetros y conceptos de solución de juegos simples. Primero consideramos distintas formas de representación de juegos simples, juegos regulares y juegos de mayoría ponderada, y estudiamos la complejidad computacional requerida para transformar un juego desde una representación a otra. También analizamos la complejidad de varios problemas abiertos bajo diferentes formas de representación. En este sentido, demostramos que el problema de decidir si un juego simple en forma ganadora minimal es decisivo (un problema asociado al problema de dualidad de hipergrafos y funciones booleanas monótonas) puede resolverse en tiempo cuasi-polinomial, y que este problema puede reducirse polinomialmente al mismo problema pero restringido a juegos regulares en forma ganadora shift-minimal. También demostramos que el problema de decidir si un juego regular en forma ganadora shift-minimal es fuerte (strong) es coNP-completo. Adicionalmente, para juegos simples en forma ganadora minimal demostramos que el parámetro de anchura (width) puede computarse en tiempo polinomial. Independientemente de la forma de representación, también estudiamos problemas de enumeración y conteo para varias subfamilias de juegos simples. Luego introducimos los juegos de influencia, un nuevo enfoque para estudiar juegos simples basado en un modelo de dispersión de influencia en redes sociales, donde la influencia se dispersa de acuerdo con el modelo de umbral lineal (linear threshold model). Demostramos que los juegos de influencia abarcan la totalidad de la clase de los juegos simples. Para estos juegos también estudiamos la complejidad de los problemas relacionados con parámetros, propiedades y conceptos de solución considerados para los juegos simples. Además consideramos casos extremos con respecto a la demanda de influencia, y probamos que para ciertas subfamilias, varios de estos problemas se vuelven polinomiales. Finalmente estudiamos algunas aplicaciones inspiradas en los juegos de influencia. El primer conjunto de estos resultados tiene que ver con la definición de modelos de decisión colectiva. Para sistemas de mediación, varios de los problemas de propiedades mencionados anteriormente son polinomialmente resolubles. Para los sistemas de influencia, demostramos que computar la satisfacción (una medida equivalente al índice de Rae y similar al valor de Banzhaf) es difícil a menos que consideremos algunas restricciones en el modelo. Para los sistemas OLFM, una generalización de los sistemas OLF (van den Brink et al. 2011, 2012) proporcionamos una axiomatización para la medida de satisfacción. El segundo conjunto de resultados se refiere al análisis de redes sociales, y en particular con la definición de nuevas medidas de centralidad de redes sociales, que comparamos en redes reales con otras medidas de centralidad clásicas
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GALBIATI, Marco. "Three essays on game theory and social choice." Doctoral thesis, European University Institute, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7005.

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Defence date: 30 January 2007
Examining Board: Antonio Cabrales, (Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Pascal Courty, (European University Institute); Karl Schlag, (European University Institute); Antonio Villar, (Universidad de Alicante)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
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Baigent, N. "Papers in social choice and welfare economics." Thesis, University of Essex, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371893.

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Isacsson, Marcus. "Topics in hardness of approximation and social choice theory /." Göteborg : Chalmers University of Technology, 2010. http://publications.lib.chalmers.se/cpl/record/index.xsql?pubid=120378.

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Sprumont, Yves. "Three essays in collective choice theory." Diss., Virginia Tech, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/40872.

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Books on the topic "Computational Social Choice Theory"

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Kelly, Jerry S. Social Choice Theory. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09925-4.

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Jain, Satish Kumar. Social Choice Theory. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9661-9.

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Kershaw, Rowley Charles, ed. Social choice theory. Aldershot, Hants, England: E. Elgar Pub. Ltd., 1993.

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Kershaw, Rowley Charles, ed. Public choice theory. Aldershot, Hants, England: E. Elgar Pub., 1993.

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B. Gibilisco, Michael, Annie M. Gowen, Karen E. Albert, John N. Mordeson, Mark J. Wierman, and Terry D. Clark. Fuzzy Social Choice Theory. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05176-5.

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Moulin, Herve. Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Edited by Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerome Lang, and Ariel D. Procaccia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984.

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Rothe, Jörg, Dorothea Baumeister, Claudia Lindner, and Irene Rothe. Einführung in Computational Social Choice. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8274-2571-3.

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Handbook of computational social choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

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Aizerman, M. A. Theory of choice. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995.

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T, Aleskerov F., ed. Theory of choice. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995.

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Book chapters on the topic "Computational Social Choice Theory"

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Basti, Gianfranco, Antonio Capolupo, and Giuseppe Vitiello. "The Computational Challenge of Amartya Sen’s Social Choice Theory in Formal Philosophy." In Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 87–119. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37305-4_7.

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de Jonge, Jan. "Social Choice." In Rethinking Rational Choice Theory, 90–100. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230355545_7.

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Hwang, Ching-Lai, and Ming-Jeng Lin. "Social Choice Theory." In Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 10–144. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61580-1_2.

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Barberà, Salvador. "Social Choice Theory." In Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, 1–19. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_666-1.

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Barberà, Salvador. "Social Choice Theory." In Complex Social and Behavioral Systems, 511–28. New York, NY: Springer US, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_666.

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Kelly, Jerry S. "Social Choice Rules." In Social Choice Theory, 57–79. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09925-4_7.

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Gibilisco, Michael B., Annie M. Gowen, Karen E. Albert, John N. Mordeson, Mark J. Wierman, and Terry D. Clark. "Fuzzy Social Choice." In Fuzzy Social Choice Theory, 1–9. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05176-5_1.

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Blair, Douglas H., and Robert A. Pollak. "Rationality and Social Choice." In Microeconomic Theory, 79–98. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4219-6_4.

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Kelly, Jerry S. "What is Social Choice Theory?" In Social Choice Theory, 1–3. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09925-4_1.

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Kelly, Jerry S. "Rights." In Social Choice Theory, 93–100. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09925-4_10.

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Conference papers on the topic "Computational Social Choice Theory"

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Grigoryan, Aram, and Markus Möller. "A Theory of Auditability for Allocation and Social Choice Mechanisms." In EC '23: 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597708.

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Allouche, Tahar, Bruno Escoffier, Stefano Moretti, and Meltem Öztürk. "Social Ranking Manipulability for the CP-Majority, Banzhaf and Lexicographic Excellence Solutions." In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/3.

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We investigate the issue of manipulability for social ranking rules, where the goal is to rank individuals given the ranking of coalitions formed by them and each individual prefers to reach the highest positions in the social ranking. This problem lies at the intersection of computational social choice and the algorithmic theory of power indices. Different social ranking rules have been recently proposed and studied from an axiomatic point of view. In this paper, we focus on rules representing three classical approaches in social choice theory: the marginal contribution approach, the lexicographic approach and the (ceteris paribus) majority one. We first consider some particular members of these families analysing their resistance to a malicious behaviour of individuals. Then, we analyze the computational complexity of manipulation, and complete our theoretical results with simulations in order to analyse the manipulation frequencies and to assess the effects of manipulations.
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Novaro, Arianna, Umberto Grandi, Dominique Longin, and Emiliano Lorini. "Goal-Based Collective Decisions: Axiomatics and Computational Complexity." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/65.

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We study agents expressing propositional goals over a set of binary issues to reach a collective decision. We adapt properties and rules from the literature on Social Choice Theory to our setting, providing an axiomatic characterisation of a majority rule for goal-based voting. We study the computational complexity of finding the outcome of our rules (i.e., winner determination), showing that it ranges from Nondeterministic Polynomial Time (NP) to Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PP).
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Junior, Newton Antonio Galindo, Vânia Paula de Almeida Neris, and Kamila Rios da Hora Rodrigues. "Guidelines for the Evaluation of Sustainability in Computational Solutions." In Workshop sobre Aspectos da Interação Humano-Computador na Web Social. Sociedade Brasileira de Computação (SBC), 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5753/waihcws.2018.3902.

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The current information revolution, highlighted by the constant use of smart devices, smartwatches, tablets, among others, has boosted the continuous production of hThe current information revolution, highlighted by the constant use of smart devices, smartwatches, tablets, among others, has boosted the continuous production of hardware and software, with direct operations in the environment, economy and society. What is perceived, however, is that there is no problem with issues related to sustainability in the development of these computational solutions. Inspired by GrandIHCBr's first challenge - "Future, Smart Cities and Sustainability", this paper seeks to provide guidelines that support professionals in this area, and later on the sustainability aspects of their solutions. The work started from a survey of the literature and a consultation to the Computing Community in Brazil. The results allowed to know the state of the art and the tacit knowledge in the subject. One discussion also supported the choice of a reference model that was instantiated with the participation of five system analysts and three Computing researchers. Twenty-one guidelines were formalized and read the professional of industry and the university professor, both researchers, for appreciation. The results suggest that the guidelines raised can be applied to the guiding factors of sustainability for an evaluation of computational solutions.
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Walsh, Toby. "Fair Division: The Computer Scientist’s Perspective." In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/691.

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I survey recent progress on a classic and challenging problem in social choice: the fair division of indivisible items. I discuss how a computational perspective has provided interesting insights into and understanding of how to divide items fairly and efficiently. This has involved bringing to bear tools such as those used in knowledge representation, computational complexity, approximation methods, game theory, online analysis and communication complexity.
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Faliszewski, Piotr, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Krzysztof Sornat, Stanisław Szufa, and Tomasz Wąs. "Diversity, Agreement, and Polarization in Elections." In Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-23}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/299.

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We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such measures for the other two notions are lacking. We attempt to rectify this issue by designing appropriate measures, providing means of their (approximate) computation, and arguing that they, indeed, capture diversity and polarization well. In particular, we present "maps of preference orders" that highlight relations between the votes in a given election and which help in making arguments about their nature.
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Arrighi, Emmanuel, Henning Fernau, Daniel Lokshtanov, Mateus de Oliveira Oliveira, and Petra Wolf. "Diversity in Kemeny Rank Aggregation: A Parameterized Approach." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/2.

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In its most traditional setting, the main concern of optimization theory is the search for optimal solutions for instances of a given computational problem. A recent trend of research in artificial intelligence, called solution diversity, has focused on the development of notions of optimality that may be more appropriate in settings where subjectivity is essential. The idea is that instead of aiming at the development of algorithms that output a single optimal solution, the goal is to investigate algorithms that output a small set of sufficiently good solutions that are sufficiently diverse from one another. In this way, the user has the opportunity to choose the solution that is most appropriate to the context at hand. It also displays the richness of the solution space. When combined with techniques from parameterized complexity theory, the paradigm of diversity of solutions offers a powerful algorithmic framework to address problems of practical relevance. In this work, we investigate the impact of this combination in the field of Kemeny Rank Aggregation, a well-studied class of problems lying in the intersection of order theory and social choice theory and also in the field of order theory itself. In particular, we show that KRA is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to natural parameters providing natural formalizations of the notions of diversity and of the notion of a sufficiently good solution. Our main results work both when considering the traditional setting of aggregation over linearly ordered votes, and in the more general setting where votes are partially ordered.
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Boudou, Joseph, Rachael Colley, and Umberto Grandi. "Itero: An Online Iterative Voting Application." In Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/848.

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Iterative voting allows a group of agents to take a collective decision in a dynamic fashion: a series of plurality elections are staged, making the relative scores of the candidates public after each round. Voters can thus adjust their ballots at each step until the process converges (or a maximal number of steps is reached). Research in computational social choice has shown that this method has the potential of reaching good-quality decisions while at the same time being easy to explain to voters. This paper presents our implementation of iterative voting on a voting platform accessible on the web.
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Lakhani, Foram, Dominik Peters, and Edith Elkind. "Correlating Preferences and Attributes: Nearly Single-Crossing Profiles." In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/59.

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We use social choice theory to develop correlation coefficients between ranked preferences and an ordinal attribute such as educational attainment or income level. For example, such correlations could be used to formalise statements such as "voters' preferences over parties are better explained by age than by income level". In the literature, preferences that are perfectly explained by a single-dimensional agent attribute are commonly taken to be single-crossing preferences. Thus, to quantify how well an attribute explains preferences, we can order the voters by the value of the attribute and compute how far the resulting ordered profile is from being single-crossing, for various commonly studied distance measures (Kendall tau distance, voter/alternative deletion, etc.). The goal of this paper is to evaluate the computational feasibility of this approach. To this end, we investigate the complexity of computing these distances, obtaining an essentially complete picture for the distances we consider.
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Kimelfeld, Benny, Phokion G. Kolaitis, and Julia Stoyanovich. "Computational Social Choice Meets Databases." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/44.

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We develop a novel framework that aims to create bridges between the computational social choice and the database management communities. This framework enriches the tasks currently supported in computational social choice with relational database context, thus making it possible to formulate sophisticated queries about voting rules, candidates, voters, issues, and positions. At the conceptual level, we give rigorous semantics to queries in this framework by introducing the notions of necessary answers and possible answers to queries. At the technical level, we embark on an investigation of the computational complexity of the necessary answers. In particular, we establish a number of results about the complexity of the necessary answers of conjunctive queries involving the plurality rule that contrast sharply with earlier results about the complexity of the necessary winners under the plurality rule.
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Reports on the topic "Computational Social Choice Theory"

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Brock, William, and Steven Durlauf. Discrete Choice with Social Interactions I: Theory. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w5291.

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Jia, Ruixue, and Torsten Persson. Individual vs. Social Motives in Identity Choice: Theory and Evidence from China. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26008.

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Rheinberger, Christoph, and Nicolas Treich. Catastrophe aversion: social attitudes towards common fates. Fondation pour une culture de sécurité industrielle, June 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.57071/882rpq.

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In light of climate change and other existential threats, policy commentators sometimes suggest that society should be more concerned about catastrophes. This document reflects on what is, or should be, society’s attitude toward such low-probability, high-impact events. The question underlying this analysis is how society considers (1) a major accident that leads to a large number of deaths; (2) a large number of small accidents that each kill one person, where the two situations lead to the same total number of deaths. We first explain how catastrophic risk can be conceived of as a spread in the distribution of losses, or a “more risky” distribution of risks. We then review studies from decision sciences, psychology, and behavioral economics that elicit people’s attitudes toward various social risks. This literature review finds more evidence against than in favor of catastrophe aversion. We address a number of possible behavioral explanations for these observations, then turn to social choice theory to examine how various social welfare functions handle catastrophic risk. We explain why catastrophe aversion may be in conflict with equity concerns and other-regarding preferences. Finally, we discuss current approaches to evaluate and regulate catastrophic risk, with a discussion of how it could be integrated into a benefit-cost analysis framework.
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Burstein, Jill, Geoffrey LaFlair, Antony Kunnan, and Alina von Davier. A Theoretical Assessment Ecosystem for a Digital-First Assessment - The Duolingo English Test. Duolingo, March 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.46999/kiqf4328.

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The Duolingo English Test is a groundbreaking, digital­first, computer­adaptive measure of English language proficiency for communication and use in English­medium settings. The test measures four key English language proficiency constructs: Speaking, Writing, Reading, and Listening (SWRL), and is aligned with the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) proficiency levels and descriptors. As a digital­first assessment, the test uses “human­in­the­loop AI” from end to end for test security, automated item generation, and scoring of test­taker responses. This paper presents a novel theoretical assessment ecosystem for the Duolingo English Test. It is a theoretical representation of language assessment design, measurement, and test security processes, as well as the test­taker experience factors that contribute to the test validity argument and test impact. The test validity argument is constructed with a digitally­informed chain of inferences that addresses digital affordances applied to the test. The ecosystem is composed of an integrated set of complex frameworks: (1) the Language Assessment Design Framework, (2) the Expanded Evidence­Centered Design Framework, (3) the Computational Psychometrics Framework, and (4) the Test Security Framework. Test­taker experience (TTX) is a test priority throughout the test­taking pipeline, such as low cost, anytime/anywhere, and shorter testing time. The test’s expected impact is aligned with Duolingo’s social mission to lower barriers to education access and offer a secure and delightful test experience, while providing a valid, fair, and reliable test score. The ecosystem leverages principles from assessment theory, computational psychometrics, design, data science, language assessment theory, NLP/AI, and test security.
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COMPLETE SET ROTATION-LIFTING CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY FOR FREE-FORM SURFACE ROOF STRUCTURES WITH LARGE ELEVATION DIFFERENCE. The Hong Kong Institute of Steel Construction, August 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.18057/icass2020.p.618.

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A complete set rotation-lifting construction technology for free-form surface roof structures with large elevation difference is in this paper. Six principles for this construction technology are proposed. Based on optimization theory, a digital analysis method is developed for calculating the exact solution of lying posture and rotation axis. Theoretical algorithm of multi-lifting point synchronous lifting control technology with different lifting speed and the same lifting ratio is proposed, and a control program is developed. Structural configuration of key construction stage is inspected and monitored by applying the digital system. The system compares computational analysis results with the real-time structure configuration, and the result is provided for construction control. The construction technology has been successfully applied in the Hangzhou West Railway Station project, which has good economic and social benefits.
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