Academic literature on the topic 'Compromise settlements; Peace; Military'
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Journal articles on the topic "Compromise settlements; Peace; Military"
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Prete, Roy A. "French Military War Aims, 1914–1916." Historical Journal 28, no. 4 (December 1985): 887–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x00005112.
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In his recent book, French war aims against Germany, 1914–1919, David Stevenson comes to the heart of the problem relative to the diplomatic prolongation of World War I. ‘No Government’, he asserts, ‘was willing to jettison its war aims in the interest of a compromise peace, or to place itself at the enemy's mercy while a chance of victory remained’. His work is to be applauded, therefore, for he has given us the first succinct and judicious account of the course of official French war aims from 1916 to 1919, enlarging upon a topic heretofore treated in scholarly articles. Using the wealth of archival documentation now available, and the private papers of numerous participants, Stevenson has made a major and much-needed contribution to our knowledge of the subject by tracing the relationship between official war aims policy, peace diplomacy and the diplomatic impact of allied policy on French war aims from their inception to the Versailles settlement.
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Minasyan, Sergey. "The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the context of South Caucasus regional security issues: An Armenian perspective†." Nationalities Papers 45, no. 1 (January 2017): 131–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1237938.
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For more than a quarter-century, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been one of the most important factors influencing the political map of the South Caucasus. On 12 May 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan signed a cease-fire agreement that ended military operations in the conflict zone and has been observed until recently. Negotiations for a peaceful settlement have been underway within the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Minsk Group co-chaired by the USA, Russia, and France since 1992, but society and the elite in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan remain largely unprepared for compromise. Considering the settlement process a zero-sum game, they have generally accused one another of escalating the conflict and of a lack of willingness to restore peace. Other countries and international organizations involved in the negotiations do not share a vision of the future and frequently pursue their own interests. Accordingly, the Karabakh conflict could remain unresolved for decades more. The aim of the paper is a general assessment of the current stage and dynamic of this conflict and the impact of new trends and old obstacles on the prospects for further settlement.
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Caplan, Richard, and Anke Hoeffler. "Why peace endures: an analysis of post-conflict stabilisation." European Journal of International Security 2, no. 2 (March 22, 2017): 133–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/eis.2017.2.
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AbstractThis article is concerned with explaining why peace endures in countries that have experienced a civil armed conflict. We use a mixed methods approach by evaluating six case studies (Burundi, East Timor, El Salvador, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone) and survival analysis that allows us to consider 205 peace episodes since 1990. We find that it is difficult to explain why peace endures using statistical analysis but there is some indication that conflict termination is important in post-conflict stabilisation: negotiated settlements are more likely to break down than military victories. We also consider the impact of UN peacekeeping operations on the duration of peace but find little evidence of their contribution. However, in situations where UN peacekeeping operations are deployed in support of negotiated settlements they do seem to contribute to peace stabilisation.
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Ross, Nicholas. "A Representative Peace? Opposition Political Parties in Peace Negotiations." International Negotiation 24, no. 1 (March 7, 2019): 7–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718069-24011179.
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Abstract This article presents four case studies in which peace was negotiated between governments and political opposition parties, and in which major armed groups involved in the conflict were excluded from some or all of the negotiations. The inclusion of opposition political parties and exclusion of some armed actors in these cases derived from the desire of mediators and some of the parties to foreground political concerns (at the expense of military considerations). Opposition political parties were able to play a role in bringing armed groups into peace settlements under some conditions, although strong international pressure and support helped to create the preconditions for this role. This evidence suggests a challenge to arguments that major armed groups must be included in peace negotiations if they are to abide by the resulting peace settlement.
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Fabbe, Kristin, Chad Hazlett, and Tolga Sınmazdemir. "A persuasive peace: Syrian refugees’ attitudes towards compromise and civil war termination." Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 1 (January 2019): 103–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343318814114.
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Civilians who have fled violent conflict and settled in neighboring countries are integral to processes of civil war termination. Contingent on their attitudes, they can either back peaceful settlements or support warring groups and continued fighting. Attitudes toward peaceful settlement are expected to be especially obdurate for civilians who have been exposed to violence. In a survey of 1,120 Syrian refugees in Turkey conducted in 2016, we use experiments to examine attitudes towards two critical phases of conflict termination – a ceasefire and a peace agreement. We examine the rigidity/flexibility of refugees’ attitudes to see if subtle changes in how wartime losses are framed or in who endorses a peace process can shift willingness to compromise with the incumbent Assad regime. Our results show, first, that refugees are far more likely to agree to a ceasefire proposed by a civilian as opposed to one proposed by armed actors from either the Syrian government or the opposition. Second, simply describing the refugee community’s wartime experience as suffering rather than sacrifice substantially increases willingness to compromise with the regime to bring about peace. This effect remains strong among those who experienced greater violence. Together, these results show that even among a highly pro-opposition population that has experienced severe violence, willingness to settle and make peace are remarkably flexible and dependent upon these cues.
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Schub, Robert. "When Prospective Leader Turnover Promotes Peace." International Studies Quarterly 64, no. 3 (May 26, 2020): 510–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa027.
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Abstract Scholars typically associate leader turnover with a high risk of military conflict. This article shows that under some conditions, a higher likelihood of leader turnover in the future fosters peace today. When states take costly peaceful measures (e.g., arming to deter adversaries), the range of settlements preferable to war shrinks and the risk of conflict rises. If peace costs are onerous, potential leader turnover in adversaries promotes peace by introducing uncertainty about the future need for and costs of deterrent measures. When locked in a costly peace with minimal chance of leader turnover in the adversary, states attack. When locked in that same costly peace but with high prospects for leader turnover, states endure an unfavorable peace today given the potential for a favorable one tomorrow. Asymmetric consequences of future shifts in peace costs ensure the relationship holds even if costs do not change in expectation and could rise. Quantitative analyses of the prospects for future leader turnover, military spending, and war initiation among rivals accord with the hypothesized relationships. In theory and practice, expectations of leadership volatility make it prudent to exercise peaceful forbearance.
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DE WAART, PAUL J. I. M. "Israel's Settlement-Policy Stumbling-Block in the Middle East Peace Process." Leiden Journal of International Law 20, no. 4 (December 2007): 825–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156507004475.
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According to Israel's Guide to the Mideast Peace Process, charges regarding the illegality of Israeli settlements in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) have no foundation in international law. Peace efforts between Israel and Palestine will have no chance of success as long as Israel uses its prolonged military occupation to promote and protect its annexation-in-disguise of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. John Dugard has passed on this hard truth consistently as Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the OPT. The international community should take the same hard line towards the Guide as it has done towards the Hamas Charter. If it wants to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, it should not allow Israel to bend the truth any more in respect of the legality of the Israeli settlements in the OPT as Hamas has done in respect of the illegality of Israel.
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McDonald, Patrick J. "Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace." International Organization 69, no. 3 (2015): 557–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818315000120.
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AbstractThis paper blends recent research on hierarchy and democratization to examine the theoretical and empirical costs of treating regime type exogenously in the literature most identified with studying its impact on international politics. It argues that the apparent peace among democratic states that emerges in the aftermath of World War I is not caused by domestic institutional attributes normally associated with democracy. Instead, this peace is an artifact of historically specific great power settlements. These settlements shape subsequent aggregate patterns of military conflict by altering the organizational configuration of the system in three critical ways—by creating new states, by altering hierarchical orders, and by influencing regime type in states. These claims are defended with a series of tests that show first how the statistical relationship between democracy and peace has exhibited substantial variation across great power orders; second, that this statistical relationship breaks down with theoretically motivated research design changes; and third, that great powers foster peace and similar regime types within their hierarchical orders. In short, the relationship between democracy and peace is spurious. The international political order is still built and managed by great powers.
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Cil, Deniz, and Alyssa K. Prorok. "Selling Out or Standing Firm? Explaining the Design of Civil War Peace Agreements." International Studies Quarterly 64, no. 2 (March 2, 2020): 329–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa010.
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Abstract When do rebel leaders “sell out” their constituents in the terms of peace by signing agreements that benefit group elites over the rebel constituency, and when do they instead “stand firm,” pushing for settlement terms that benefit the public they claim to represent? This article examines variation in the design of civil war settlement agreements. It argues that constituents, fighters, and rebel elites have different preferences over the terms of peace, and that rebel leaders will push for settlements that reflect the preferences of whichever audience they are most reliant on and accountable to. In particular, leaders of groups that are more civilian-reliant for their military and political power are more likely to sign agreements that favor broad benefits for civilian constituents, while leaders who do not depend on civilian support for their political and military power will sign agreements with fewer public benefits. We test this argument using original data on the design of all final peace agreements reached between 1989 and 2009, and several proxies for the group's level of reliance on civilian supporters. Using a variety of statistical tests and accounting for nonrandom selection into peace agreements, we find strong support for our hypothesis.
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Solar, Carlos. "Chile’s Peacekeeping and the Post-UN Intervention Scenario in Haiti." International Studies 56, no. 4 (July 9, 2019): 272–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020881719857395.
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The defence and foreign policy communities in the Global South should learn from the lessons of security governance that followed the 13-year United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). To better inform the academic and policy debate, this article extrapolates ideas from the case study of Chile, one of the ‘big four’ Latin American peacekeeping providers in Haiti, along with Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The article examines Chile’s finished compromise with the MINUSTAH in order to shed light on conflict intervention strategies and its peace operations in Colombia and the Central African Republic. It argues that military policies for peace intervention purposes should undergo a critical reassessment in light of the state steering away from the past use of long-term brute force. Today’s changing security environment favours a set of different human security policies that have become more prevalent for peacekeeping policymaking. Engaging in scenarios of war and peace thus demands a more focused, experienced and tactical use of military and diplomatic resources than governments in the developing countries currently possess.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Compromise settlements; Peace; Military"
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Preston, Matthew. "Rhodesia, Lebanon and civil war termination." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.368655.
Full textBooks on the topic "Compromise settlements; Peace; Military"
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Stahn, Carsten, and Jens Iverson, eds. Just Peace After Conflict. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823285.001.0001.
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The interplay between peace and justice plays an important role in almost any contemporary conflict. Peace and conflict studies have generally devoted more attention to conflict than to peace. Peace is often described in adjectives, such as negative/positive peace, liberal peace or democratic peace. But what elements make a peace just? Just war theory, peacebuilding, or transitional justice provide different perspectives on the dialectic relation between peace and justice and the methods of establishing peace after conflict. Experiences such as the Colombian peace process show that peace is increasingly judicialized. This volume analyses some of the situational, normative, and relational elements of peace in processes of transition. It explores six core themes: conceptual approaches towards just peace, macro-principles, the nexus to security and stability, protection of persons and public goods, rule of law and economic reform and accountability. It engages with understudied issues, such as the pros and cons of robust UN mandates, the link between environment protection and indigenous peoples, the treatment of illegal settlements, the feasibility of vetting practices or the protection labour rights in post-conflict economies. It argues that just peace requires only not negotiation, agreement and compromise (e.g., moderation), but contextual understandings of law, multiple dimensions of justice and strategies of prevention. It complements the two earlier volumes on the legal contours of jus post bellum, namely Just Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations (2014) and Environmental Protection and Transitions from Conflict to Peace: Clarifying Norms, Principles and Practices (2017).
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Slater, Jerome. Mythologies Without End. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190459086.001.0001.
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Every nation has narratives or stories it tells itself about its history but which typically contain factually false or misleading mythologies that often result in devastating consequences for itself and for others. In the case of Israel and its indispensable ally, the United States, the central mythology is “the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity,” as the Israeli diplomat Abba Eban famously said in a 1973 statement that has been widely quoted ever since. However, the historical truth is very nearly the converse: it is Israel and the United States that have repeatedly lost or deliberately dismissed many opportunities to reach fair compromise settlements of the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. The book reexamines the entire history of the conflict from its onset at the end of World War I through today. Part I begins with a reconsideration of Zionism and then examines the origins and early years of the Arab-Israeli state conflict. One chapter is devoted to the question of what accounts for the nearly unconditional US support of Israel throughout the entire conflict. Part II focuses on war and peace in the Arab-Israeli state conflict from 1948 through today, arguing that all the major wars—in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973—could and should have been avoided. This section also includes an examination of the Cold War and its impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Part III covers the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 1917 through today, and examines the prospects for a two-state or other settlement of the conflict.
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Ali, Kamran Asdar. Afterword II. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190656546.003.0013.
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The second afterword to the book by Kamran Asdar Ali returns us to the city, and to the lives of Karachi’s working women and working classes. He draws on women’s poems, diaries, and memoirs to capture some more ephemeral qualities of everyday living and dying. These contrast with the violent suppression of an underclass of trade unionists and labor activists by a coalition of the state, military courts and industrialists, since the fifties. Given the long, progressive erosion of peace in Karachi how, he asks, might we imagine a therapeutic process of social, economic and cultural healing? Through an image of citizens “at work” creating citywide networks and connections, we are offered finally some possibilities of dreaming. Namely, through increased understandings, not of conflict, but also of each other’s intimate everyday lives, the dream emerges of a new political space or public where even intractable disagreements can be managed through gestures of kindness, compromise, and fresh vocabularies of how to carry on and get by.
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Williams, Philip J., and J. Mark Ruhl. Demilitarization after Central American Civil Wars. University of Illinois Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/illinois/9780252037894.003.0010.
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This chapter considers how the armed forces declined in power throughout Latin America in the early 1990s, but the processes of demilitarization in El Salvador and Guatemala were unique. While demilitarization followed civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, these are the only two cases in Latin America in which the United Nations played a major role in brokering negotiated settlements to end the armed conflicts and in monitoring peace agreements that set in motion processes of demilitarization. In both countries political opposition to continued military domination, including armed insurgencies, was a constant feature from the 1960s onward. Moreover, economic elites who traditionally looked to the military to protect their business interests increasingly expressed concern about the liability of supporting a large, well-equipped military without a mission.
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Markwick, Roger D., and Nicholas Doumanis. The Nationalization of the Masses. Edited by Nicholas Doumanis. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199695669.013.21.
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Europe was a continent of nation states by the mid-twentieth century. But it was not always thus. The patchwork quilt of nation states and the nationalism that coloured them in were forged by massive social and political shifts that had been gathering momentum since the late nineteenth century. Viewing nations and nationalism as constructs of modern, global capitalism, often legitimated by national mythologies old and new, this chapter surveys the forces at work: from above and below, from centre and periphery. The First World War raised nationalism to white heat, and as multi-ethnic empires faltered, myriad subaltern nationalisms erupted, demanding ‘self-determination’, the watchword of the post-war peace settlements. But the war also unleashed internationalist class challenges to belligerent nationalism, culminating in the 1917 Russian Revolution. Thereafter, European nationalism assumed its most truculent guise: fascism and military dictatorships warring against class in the name of ethnic, national, and biological purity.
Book chapters on the topic "Compromise settlements; Peace; Military"
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Slater, Jerome. "From War to War, 1956–67." In Mythologies Without End, 125–46. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190459086.003.0009.
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Despite the Israeli myths, the 1967 war was not “a war of no choice.” Before the war, Israeli political and military hawks hoped to use another war to seize the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Israel deliberately provoked Syria into war. Egypt was forced by its alliance with Syria to come to its assistance, but did not intend to start a war with Israel. U.S and Israeli intelligence knew this and anticipated that Israel would easily defeat Egypt, even if the Egyptians attacked first. Though strongly pro-Israel, Lyndon Johnson did not want the U.S. to be drawn into the war. Therefore, the Israeli military attack on Egypt in June 1967 was not forced on Israel. During the war Israel seized the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. After the war Israel decided to keep its conquests and to ignore signals from the Arab states for compromise peace settlements.
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Slater, Jerome. "Lost Opportunities for Peace, 1949–56." In Mythologies Without End, 93–109. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190459086.003.0007.
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One of the most enduring but erroneous Israeli myths that has also been accepted by the outside world is the view that until recently most of the Arab states as well as the Palestinians refused to recognize the existence of Israel, rejected all compromise, and sought its destruction. By contrast, it is said, Israel has always been ready and willing to negotiate peace settlements; remember Abba Eban’s famous epigram, “The Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” In fact, the historical record demonstrates that Israel has been primarily responsible for the many lost opportunities for peace from 1947 through the present. At one time or another, all the important Arab states and the most important Palestinian leaders have been ready to agree to compromise settlements of all the central issues: the legitimate territory and boundaries of Israel, a Palestinian state, the status of Jerusalem, and the refugee issue.
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Slater, Jerome. "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1917–88." In Mythologies Without End, 211–18. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190459086.003.0014.
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The early history of the Zionist-Israeli conflict, from 1917 to the 1980s, is discussed. The early Zionist leaders recognized that the Palestinians had understandable reasons to resist Zionism but concluded that the need for a Jewish state outweighed the Palestinian case, leaving the Zionists no choice but to militarily defeat the Palestinians by the “iron wall” strategy. The Peel Commission and UN partition plans are explored, accepted by the Zionists only tactically until they were strong enough to expel most Palestinians from the land allotted to a Jewish state, so as to create an 80 percent Jewish majority. The rise of the PLO under Yasser Arafat is examined, along with its gradual transformation from an extremist terrorist group to its acceptance in 1988 and ever since as a proponent of a two-state compromise peace settlement. Israel’s refusal to reach such a settlement, especially before and after the 1948 and 1967 wars, is discussed.
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Ó Dochartaigh, Niall. "Conclusion." In Deniable Contact, 266–77. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192894762.003.0012.
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The Conclusion considers why it took so long to negotiate an end to the Northern Ireland conflict, examining the role of internal divisions and leadership, emphasizing the importance of strategic action, and suggesting a more agential approach to understanding peace settlements. It outlines how back-channel negotiation allowed two key parties to the Northern Ireland conflict to coordinate their actions, and to assist each other in resolving strategic dilemmas and in overcoming intra-party resistance to compromise when direct contact and open meetings were impossible. It sets out how an analysis of the conflict through the lens of negotiation can enhance understanding of the factors that make for peace agreements.
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Appleby, David J., and Andrew Hopper. "Conclusion." In Battle-scarred, 230–33. Manchester University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9781526124807.003.0013.
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The conclusion summarises the achievements of the volume’s chapters, and how they provide a powerful reminder that the consequences and human costs of war do not end with treaties and peace settlements, but linger for generations afterwards. It stresses the scale of the numbers injured and the increased importance of medical personnel as a result of the wars. It points the way to forthcoming research that will be done on pension records, and reflects that the seventeenth century still has much to teach us today about the provision of medical care and military welfare.
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Woods, Michael E. "Manifest Destinies." In Arguing until Doomsday, 75–110. University of North Carolina Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469656397.003.0004.
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The U.S.-Mexican War propelled Stephen Douglas and Jefferson Davis to the pinnacles of power but triggered a new round of sectional conflict that shook the Democratic Party to its core. Davis’s celebrated military service won him a seat in the U.S. Senate, where he fought to protect slaveholders’ property rights throughout the nation’s massive new western domain. Douglas joined him in the Senate as the self-appointed spokesman for a vast western constituency stretching from the Great Lakes to the Pacific Ocean. As they attempted to govern the Mexican Cession and the Oregon Territory, Davis and Douglas grappled with portentous questions about democracy, property rights, and the Union. Douglas embraced popular sovereignty as a means to preserve white men’s self-government, but Davis denounced it as a cloaked free soil doctrine and demanded positive federal protection for property in human beings. Their conflict escalated until Douglas helped broker the Compromise of 1850. Douglas hailed the compromise as a permanent basis for sectional peace, while Davis’s dogged resistance to the measure briefly upended his career.
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Watkins, John. "Diplomatic Pathos." In Cultures of Diplomacy and Literary Writing in the Early Modern World, 69–84. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198835691.003.0004.
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Chapter 4 explores the cultural resonances of the sixteenth-century realization that the greatest diplomatic achievements, even treaties ending a half-century of war between major powers, are vulnerable to ongoing historical experience. A conflict between extravagant hope that lasting peace might be achieved—expressed in the wake of peace settlements—and disillusioning experience—found in dispatches, speeches, legal treatises, and literary works by diplomats—repeatedly manifested itself in a pathos, sometime even a despair, that haunted diplomatic culture throughout the early modern period. The chapter traces the wider dissemination of this diplomatic pathos in works by the legal theorist Alberico Gentili and the Elizabethan writer-diplomat Sir Philip Sidney. The two men were closely enough associated that their understandings and critiques of the law of nations probably developed through mutual dialogue. Sidney was at least as interested in abstract questions of legal and diplomatic principle as he was in contemporary politics. In the Arcadia, his fantasy Mediterranean turns out to be a laboratory for experimenting with legal and strategic problems, with his two heroes, Pyrocles and Musidorus, providing military and diplomatic solutions. Nevertheless, the endpoint of both Gentili’s and Sidney’s anatomies of the emergent international system was Protestant despair over the possibility of lasting diplomatic achievements in a fallen world.