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Journal articles on the topic 'Competing agents'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 30 May 2022

Last updated: 31 May 2022

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1

Agnetis, Allesandro, Pitu B. Mirchandani, Dario Pacciarelli, and Andrea Pacifici. "Scheduling Problems with Two Competing Agents." Operations Research 52, no. 2 (April 2004): 229–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0092.

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2

TESCH, THOMAS, PETER FANKHAUSER, and ARIS M. OUKSEL. "ARBITRATION PROTOCOLS FOR COMPETING SOFTWARE AGENTS." International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems 10, no. 01n02 (March 2001): 125–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021884300100028x.

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The exchange of goods and services between bargaining software agents requires new forms of brokering mechanisms which achieve consensus between conflicting parties. Such mechanisms have to be designed in a way that they give rational self-interested agents no incentives for insincere behavior. We introduce an arbiter as third party that resolves conflicting bargaining situations between the agents. To achieve non-manipulative agent behavior, we investigate three arbitration protocols that avoid different forms of manipulations and show how each trades net efficiency for robustness against manipulations. We describe the applicability of the protocols in bilateral bargaining situations and, analyze their robustness against manipulations analytically and by simulations. We compare the protocols with Nash's arbitration1 and the Groves-Clarke tax2 and characterize situations in which our protocols are superior.

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3

Plaza, Enric, Josep Llu�s Arcos, Pablo Noriega, and Carles Sierra. "Competing agents in agent-mediated institutions." Personal Technologies 2, no. 3 (September 1998): 212–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01321177.

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4

Vázquez, Alexei. "Self-organization in populations of competing agents." Physical Review E 62, no. 4 (October 1, 2000): R4497—R4500. http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/physreve.62.r4497.

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5

WANG, BING-HONG, and BAOSHENG YUAN. "EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF COMPETING BOOLEAN NETWORK AGENTS." International Journal of Modern Physics B 21, no. 23n24 (September 30, 2007): 4041–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217979207045177.

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We investigate the dynamics of network minority games on Kauffman's NK networks (Kauffman nets) and growing directed networks (GDNets). We show that the dynamics and the associated phase structure of the game depend crucially on the structure of the underlying network. The dynamics on GDNets is very stable for all values of the connection number K, in contrast to the dynamics on Kauffman's NK networks, which becomes chaotic when K > Kc = 2. For Kauffman nets with K > 3, the evolutionary scheme has no effect on the dynamics (it remains chaotic) and the performance of the MG resembles that of a random choice game (RCG).

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6

Paczuski, Maya, Kevin E. Bassler, and Álvaro Corral. "Self-Organized Networks of Competing Boolean Agents." Physical Review Letters 84, no. 14 (April 3, 2000): 3185–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/physrevlett.84.3185.

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7

Lee, Wen-Chiung, and Jen-Ya Wang. "A scheduling problem with three competing agents." Computers & Operations Research 51 (November 2014): 208–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2014.06.011.

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8

Chung, Dae-Young, and Byung-Cheon Choi. "Just-in-time Scheduling with Multiple Competing Agents." Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society 37, no. 1 (March 31, 2012): 19–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.7737/jkorms.2012.37.1.019.

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9

Hall, Victoria M., Alyssa Thornton, Elizabeth K. Miehls, Jeffery A. Bertke, and Jennifer A. Swift. "Uric Acid Crystallization Interrupted with Competing Binding Agents." Crystal Growth & Design 19, no. 12 (November 4, 2019): 7363–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/acs.cgd.9b01225.

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10

Dhar, Deepak, V. Sasidevan, and Bikas K. Chakrabarti. "Emergent cooperation amongst competing agents in minority games." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 390, no. 20 (October 2011): 3477–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2011.05.014.

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11

Wellman, M. P., S. F. Cheng, D. M. Reeves, and K. M. Lochner. "Trading agents competing: performance, progress, and market effectiveness." IEEE Intelligent Systems 18, no. 6 (November 2003): 48–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mis.2003.1249169.

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12

Asgari, Aliakbar, Kaveh Hassani, and Won-Sook Lee. "Simulating collective intelligence of bio-inspired competing agents." Expert Systems with Applications 56 (September 2016): 256–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2016.03.016.

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13

Fan, B. Q., T. C. E. Cheng, S. S. Li, and Q. Feng. "Bounded parallel-batching scheduling with two competing agents." Journal of Scheduling 16, no. 3 (April 25, 2012): 261–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10951-012-0274-0.

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14

Iaryczower, Matias, and Santiago Oliveros. "Competing for Loyalty: The Dynamics of Rallying Support." American Economic Review 107, no. 10 (October 1, 2017): 2990–3005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150755.

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We consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group. We focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially. We show that competition reduces agents' welfare with public goods, or if and only if there are positive externalities on uncommitted agents, and increases agents' welfare with public bads. We apply the model to the study of corporate takeovers, vote buying, and exclusive deals. (JEL D42, D62, D72, D82, G34, H41)

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15

YEUNG, C. H., Y. P. MA, and K. Y. MICHAEL WONG. "EPOCH LIFETIMES IN THE DYNAMICS OF A COMPETING POPULATION." International Journal of Modern Physics B 21, no. 23n24 (September 30, 2007): 4048–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217979207045189.

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We propose a dynamical model of a competing population whose agents have a tendency to balance their decisions in time. The model is applicable to financial markets in which the agents trade with finite capital, or other multiagent systems such as routers in communication networks attempting to transmit multiclass traffic in a fair way. We find an oscillatory behavior due to the segregation of agents into two groups. Each group remains winning over epochs. The aggregation of smart agents is able to explain the lifetime distribution of epochs to 8 decades of probability. The existence of the super agents further refines the lifetime distribution of short epochs.

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16

Bagarello, Fabio, Francesco Gargano, and Francesco Oliveri. "Spreading of Competing Information in a Network." Entropy 22, no. 10 (October 17, 2020): 1169. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e22101169.

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We propose a simple approach to investigate the spreading of news in a network. In more detail, we consider two different versions of a single type of information, one of which is close to the essence of the information (and we call it good news), and another of which is somehow modified from some biased agent of the system (fake news, in our language). Good and fake news move around some agents, getting the original information and returning their own version of it to other agents of the network. Our main interest is to deduce the dynamics for such spreading, and to analyze if and under which conditions good news wins against fake news. The methodology is based on the use of ladder fermionic operators, which are quite efficient in modeling dispersion effects and interactions between the agents of the system.

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17

DING, GUOSHENG, and SHIJIE SUN. "SINGLE MACHINE FAMILY SCHEDULING WITH TWO COMPETING AGENTS TO MINIMIZE MAKESPAN." Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research 28, no. 06 (December 2011): 773–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021759591100334x.

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We consider two-agent scheduling on a single machine, where there are job families and setup requirements exist between these families. Each agent's objective function is to minimize his own makespan. One of our goals is to find the optimal solution for one agent with a constraint on the other agent's makespan (constrained optimization). This problem is equivalent to the caudate Knapsack problem that we define in the paper. The other goal is to find single nondominated schedules (i.e., such that a better schedule for one of the two agents necessarily result in a worse schedule of the other agent), and to enumerate all nondominated schedules. Finally, two special cases, one with equal job processing times and the other with equal family setups are studied. We prove that the constrained optimization problems in both cases can be solved in polynomial time and that the cases have a polynomial number of nondominated schedules.

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18

Johnson, Neil F., Michael Hart, and P. M. Hui. "Crowd effects and volatility in markets with competing agents." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 269, no. 1 (July 1999): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4371(99)00073-4.

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19

Lee, Wen-Chiung, Yu-Hsiang Chung, and Jen-Ya Wang. "A parallel-machine scheduling problem with two competing agents." Engineering Optimization 49, no. 6 (September 15, 2016): 962–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0305215x.2016.1227615.

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20

Yu, Shaohua, and Zigao Wu. "A three criteria scheduling problem with two competing agents." Computers & Industrial Engineering 162 (December 2021): 107754. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2021.107754.

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21

SHARADIN, NATHANIEL. "Fairness and the Strengths of Agents’ Claims." Utilitas 28, no. 3 (January 26, 2016): 347–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820815000527.

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John Broome has proposed a theory of fairness according to which fairness requires that agents’ claims to goods be satisfied in proportion to the relative strength of those claims. In the case of competing claims for a single indivisible good, Broome argues that what fairness requires is the use of a weighted lottery as a surrogate to satisfying the competing claims: the relative chance of each claimant's winning the lottery should be set to the relative strength of each claimant's claim. In this journal, James Kirkpatrick and Nick Eastwood have objected that the use of weighted lotteries in the case of indivisible goods is unacceptable. In this article, I explain why Kirkpatrick and Eastwood's objection misses its mark.

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22

Belhaj, Mohamed, and Frédéric Deroïan. "Competing Activities in Social Networks." B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 14, no. 4 (October 1, 2014): 1431–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2013-0121.

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Abstract We consider a society in which each agent has one unit of a resource to allocate between two activities. Agents are organized in a social network, and each activity generates complementarities between neighbors. We find multiplicity of equilibrium for high intensity of interaction, and we characterize equilibria in terms of specialization and polarization. Overall, results reveal the crucial role played by network geometry. The results also suggest that the structure of the social network should be taken into account for the design of a public policy in favor of a specific activity.

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23

D'Hulst, R., and G. J. Rodgers. "Bid distributions of competing agents in simple models of auctions." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 294, no. 3-4 (May 2001): 447–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4371(01)00128-5.

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24

Li, Shi-Sheng, and Ren-Xia Chen. "Group Scheduling with Two Competing Agents on a Single Machine." Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research 31, no. 06 (December 2014): 1450043. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217595914500432.

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We consider the scheduling problem in which two agents, each with a set of jobs, compete to perform their respective jobs on a single machine under a group technology (GT) environment. The jobs of agents are classified into groups according to their production similarities in advance, all jobs of the same group are required to be processed contiguously on the machine. A sequence-independent setup time precedes the processing of each group. We propose a polynomial time solution for the problem of minimizing the maximum regular cost of one agent, subject to an upper bound on the maximum regular cost of the second agent. We also show that the problem of minimizing the total completion time of the first agent, subject to an upper bound on the maximum lateness of the second agent is strongly [Formula: see text]-hard. The case where all groups of the first agent have the same number of jobs is shown to be polynomially solvable.

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25

Cheng, Chen-Yang, Shu-Fen Li, Kuo-Ching Ying, and Yu-Hsi Liu. "Scheduling Jobs of Two Competing Agents on a Single Machine." IEEE Access 7 (2019): 98702–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2929582.

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26

Gerstl, Enrique, Baruch Mor, and Gur Mosheiov. "Scheduling with two competing agents to minimize total weighted earliness." Annals of Operations Research 253, no. 1 (September 16, 2016): 227–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2310-5.

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27

Wu, Chin-Chia, Wen-Chiung Lee, and Ming-Jhih Liou. "Single-machine scheduling with two competing agents and learning consideration." Information Sciences 251 (December 2013): 136–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2013.06.054.

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28

Choi, Byung-Cheon, Jibok Chung, and Myoung-Ju Park. "A just-in-time scheduling problem with two competing agents." Optimization Letters 14, no. 7 (October 15, 2019): 1869–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11590-019-01494-x.

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29

Freud, David, and Gur Mosheiov. "Scheduling with competing agents, total late work and job rejection." Computers & Operations Research 133 (September 2021): 105329. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2021.105329.

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30

Li, Hongjie, Zeyuan Li, and Yunqiang Yin. "Some Single-Machine Scheduling Problems with Learning Effects and Two Competing Agents." Scientific World Journal 2014 (2014): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/471016.

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This study considers a scheduling environment in which there are two agents and a set of jobs, each of which belongs to one of the two agents and its actual processing time is defined as a decreasing linear function of its starting time. Each of the two agents competes to process its respective jobs on a single machine and has its own scheduling objective to optimize. The objective is to assign the jobs so that the resulting schedule performs well with respect to the objectives of both agents. The objective functions addressed in this study include the maximum cost, the total weighted completion time, and the discounted total weighted completion time. We investigate three problems arising from different combinations of the objectives of the two agents. The computational complexity of the problems is discussed and solution algorithms where possible are presented.

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31

Johnson, N., and B. Tivnan. "Mechanistic origin of dragon-kings in a population of competing agents." European Physical Journal Special Topics 205, no. 1 (May 2012): 65–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1140/epjst/e2012-01562-x.

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32

Elbasani, Arolda, and Jelena Tošić. "Localized Islam(s): interpreting agents, competing narratives, and experiences of faith." Nationalities Papers 45, no. 4 (July 2017): 499–510. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1300792.

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This special issue investigates contemporary transformations of Islam in the post-Communist Balkans. We put forward the concept oflocalized Islamas an analytical lens that aptly captures the input of various interpreting agents, competing narratives, and choices of faith. By adopting an agent-based approach that is sensitive to relevant actors’ choices and the contexts where they operate, we explore how various groups negotiate and ultimately localize the grand Islamic tradition, depending on where they are situated along the hierarchy of power. Specifically, we outline three sets of actors and narratives related to revival of Islamic faith: (1) political elites, mainstream intellectuals, and religious hierarchies often unite in safeguarding a nation-centric understanding of religion, (2) foreign networks and missionaries make use of open channels of communication to propagate their specific interpretations and agendas, and (3) lay believers tend to choose among different offers and rally around the living dimension of religious practice. Contributions in this issue bring ample evidence of multiple actors’ strategies, related perspectives, and contingent choices of being a Muslim. Case studies include political debates on mosque construction in Athens; political narratives that underpin the construction of the museum of the father of Ataturk in Western Macedonia; politicians’ and imams’ competing interpretations of the Syrian war in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania; the emergence of practice communities that perform Muslim identity in Bulgaria; the particular codes of sharia dating in post-war Sarajevo; and veneration of saints among Muslim Roma in different urban areas in the Balkans.

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33

Juettner, Matthias, Sebastian Grabmaier, Desiree Vogeli, Wolfgang M. Rucker, and Peter Gohner. "Coupled Multiphysics Problems as Market Place for Competing Autonomous Software Agents." IEEE Transactions on Magnetics 53, no. 6 (June 2017): 1–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tmag.2017.2659228.

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34

Gerstl, Enrique, and Gur Mosheiov. "Single machine just-in-time scheduling problems with two competing agents." Naval Research Logistics (NRL) 61, no. 1 (December 3, 2013): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/nav.21562.

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35

Vicoveanu, Dragos, Sebastian Popescu, Yasunori Ohtsu, and Hiroharu Fujita. "Competing Inactivation Agents for Bacterial Spores in Radio-Frequency Oxygen Plasmas." Plasma Processes and Polymers 5, no. 4 (June 13, 2008): 350–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ppap.200700146.

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36

Gerstl, Enrique, and Gur Mosheiov. "Scheduling problems with two competing agents to minimized weighted earliness–tardiness." Computers & Operations Research 40, no. 1 (January 2013): 109–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2012.05.019.

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37

Selim, Kamal S., Ahmed E. Okasha, and Fatma R. Farag. "Measuring the role of two competing groups of informed agents in opinion formation." SIMULATION 95, no. 8 (October 2018): 753–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0037549718800583.

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For politicians, to promote intended messages to different groups of individuals, they could employ strategic individuals called “informed agents.” The aim of this article is to explore and measure the impact of two competing groups of informed agents on opinion dynamics within a society exposed to two extreme opinions. Thus, an agent-based model is developed as an extension to the bounded confidence model by assuming the existence of two groups of informed agents. The impact of these agents with respect to their social characteristics, such as, their size in the society, how tolerant they are, their self-weight and attitudes about others’ opinions is explored. Different assumptions about the initial opinion distributions and their effect are also investigated. Due to the difficulty of observing a real society, social simulation experiments are constructed based on artificial societies.The simulations conducted resulted in some interesting findings. With no dominating group of the two informed agents, the society will be ended up concentrated around a moderate position. On the other hand, with significant difference between the two group sizes, the larger group will polarize the population towards its opinion. However, this conclusion will not apply if the population is skewed towards the other opinion. In such case, the larger group will only succeed to turn some of the society to be more moderate. In a society skewed towards extreme opinion, dominant informed agents adopting the other extreme will not be able to shift the society towards their opinion. Finally, in radical societies informed agents could turn most of the society to be extremists.

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38

Major, Susan. "Railway Excursion Agents in Britain, 1840–60." Journal of Transport History 36, no. 1 (June 2015): 22–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.7227/tjth.36.1.3.

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Using a range of contemporary press evidence, now searchable online, this article offers new perspectives on the British railway excursion agent in the period 1840–60. It argues that competing forces which were specific to localities shaped the potential for working-class leisure mobility offered by these agents, who might be regarded as social entrepreneurs. The role of Thomas Cook has been re-interpreted, using a case study of excursion agent Henry Marcus.

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39

Harbring, Christine, and Gabriele K. Lünser. "On the Competition of Asymmetric Agents." German Economic Review 9, no. 3 (August 1, 2008): 373–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2008.00438.x.

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Abstract Rank-order tournaments are usually implemented in organizations to provide incentives for eliciting employees’ effort and/or to identify the agent with the higher ability, for example in promotion tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by experimentally analyzing a ceteris paribus variation of the prize spread - being the major design feature of tournaments - in a symmetric and an asymmetric setting. We find that effort significantly increases with the prize spread as predicted by standard theory. However, only for sufficiently large prize spreads weak players competing against strong players strain themselves all the more and sorting of agents is feasible.

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40

Kareev, Yaakov, and Judith Avrahami. "Choosing Between Adaptive Agents." Psychological Science 18, no. 7 (July 2007): 636–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01951.x.

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Even with ample time and opportunity to use extensive data, people often make do with small samples, which increases their risk of making the wrong decision. A theoretical analysis indicates, however, that when the decision involves continually selecting among competing, adaptive agents who are eager to be selected, an error-prone evaluation may be beneficial to the decision maker. In this case, the chance of an error can motivate competitors to exert greater effort, improving their level of performance—which is the prime concern of the decision maker. This theoretical argument was tested empirically by comparing the effects of two levels of scrutiny of performance. Results show that minimal scrutiny can indeed lead to better performance than full scrutiny, and that the effect is conditional on a bridgeable difference between the competitors. We conclude by pointing out that small-sample-based, error-prone decisions may also maintain competition and diversity in the environment.

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41

Yin, Yunqiang, Shuenn-Ren Cheng, T. C. E. Cheng, Du-Juan Wang, and Chin-Chia Wu. "Just-in-time scheduling with two competing agents on unrelated parallel machines." Omega 63 (September 2016): 41–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2015.09.010.

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42

Ahmadizar, Fardin, and Jafar Eteghadipour. "Single-machine earliness–tardiness scheduling with two competing agents and idle time." Engineering Optimization 49, no. 3 (June 16, 2016): 499–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0305215x.2016.1190353.

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43

Oron, Daniel, Dvir Shabtay, and George Steiner. "Single machine scheduling with two competing agents and equal job processing times." European Journal of Operational Research 244, no. 1 (July 2015): 86–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.01.003.

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44

Koulamas, Christos. "A note on scheduling problems with competing agents and earliness minimization objectives." European Journal of Operational Research 245, no. 3 (September 2015): 875–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.04.006.

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45

Mor, Baruch, and Gur Mosheiov. "Single machine batch scheduling with two competing agents to minimize total flowtime." European Journal of Operational Research 215, no. 3 (December 2011): 524–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.06.037.

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46

Gerstl, Enrique, and Gur Mosheiov. "Minmax weighted earliness-tardiness with identical processing times and two competing agents." Computers & Industrial Engineering 107 (May 2017): 171–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2017.03.011.

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47

Agnetis, Alessandro, Gianluca de Pascale, and Dario Pacciarelli. "A Lagrangian approach to single-machine scheduling problems with two competing agents." Journal of Scheduling 12, no. 4 (January 29, 2009): 401–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10951-008-0098-0.

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48

Chen, Rubing, Zhichao Geng, Lingfa Lu, Jinjiang Yuan, and Yuan Zhang. "Pareto-scheduling of two competing agents with their own equal processing times." European Journal of Operational Research 301, no. 2 (September 2022): 414–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.10.064.

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49

Engberg, David. "International Recruitment: Oversight and Standards." International Higher Education, no. 73 (March 17, 2015): 6–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.6017/ihe.2013.73.6117.

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U.S. institutions are increasingly using paid agents to recruit international students. This article examines competing perspectives regarding this practice, reviews one organization's efforts to provide quality assurance and oversight of international agents, and argues that institutions need to develop their own policies and practices before initiating any agency relationships.

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50

Quartz, Steven R. "Distinguishing between the computational and dynamical hypotheses: What difference makes the difference?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21, no. 5 (October 1998): 649–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x98471735.

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Van Gelder seeks to distinguish between the computational and the dynamical hypotheses primarily on the basis of ontic criteria – the kind of systems cognitive agents really are. I suggest that this meets with mixed success. By shifting to epistemic criteria – what kind of explanations we require to understand cognitive agents – I suggest there is an easier and more intuitive way to distinguish between these two competing views of cognitive agents.

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