Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Compensation'

Compensation to executives is a complex and continuous topic that attracts media, academia, legislators, and not least the public. Due to the surprisingly under-examined research  topic in Sweden and inconclusive results in prior research, this paper seeks to establish how compensation committees affect CEO compensation in light of the principal-agent theory and through uni-, bi-, and multivariate analyses. Our sample consists of approximately 200 companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm between 2013 and 2015. We find that CEO compensation is higher in companies with compensation committees compared to companies without, contradicting principal-agent theory. The findings suggest that companies might install compensation committees to legitimize higher CEO compensation, or due to social and legal pressures related to their company size. Further, the results indicate that companies with a compensation committee have a positive and stronger relationship between performance and CEO compensation than companies without, supporting principal-agent theory. Nevertheless, due to low explanatory power of pay-for-performance, there are other potential explanations for CEO compensation, such as power and compensation structure.

Opération par nature collective, la compensation multilatérale provient de la volonté d'une multitude de personnes de liquider globalement ce qu'elles se doivent par le seul versement d'un solde. Ce caractère collectif lui confère toute sa singularité. Il impose le recours à une technique spécifique - le compte - qui permet d'affecter l'actif de chacun au réglement de tous les soldes. C'est pourquoi la compensation multilatérale engendre un risque de défaillance en chaîne. En matière bancaire et financière, ce risque systémique a conduit le législateur à instituer un cadre exceptionnel destiné à maîtriser le risque de défaillance et à neutraliser toute procédure qui pourrait entraver le dénouement. En dehors dse domaines bancaires et de la finance de marché, les participants peuvent exploiter tout l'arsenal du droit commun pour doter l'opération d'une efficacité comparable.

Le présent essai de typologie a pour objectif une systématisation de l'usage de la compensation en tant qu'instrument du droit de l'environnement. La compensation revêt en effet des formes multiples : compensation indemnitaire, compensation réglementaire, les marchés de compensation et les paiements pour services environnementaux. Chacune de ces formes revêt des fonctions différentes, dont celles d'indemniser, de réparer, de compenser, de rationaliser, d'inciter et de gratifier. L'organisation de ces différents types représente une sophistication de l'usage de la compensation, dans une volonté de l'adapter à la protection de l'environnement, par le biais des principes et règles d'additionnalité, équité et proportionnalité. La thèse témoigne également d'une recherche croissante d'efficacité de la norme environnementale, à partir de l'utilisation complémentaire des outils de marché, en complément des outils juridiques classiques. À cet égard, les compensations indemnitaires et réglementaires relèvent d'une approche classique du droit, tandis que les marchés de compensation et les paiements pour services environnementaux ressortent d'une approche novatrice, intégrant une protection écosystémique de la nature dans la norme environnementale. Cependant, plusieurs limites à l'efficacité juridique de cet instrument sont identifiées. La compensation, sous ses différentes formes, se présente comme un outil de gestion pour équilibrer les gains et les pertes en matière économique, environnementale et sociale autour d'un enjeu environnemental
This typology aims to systematize the use of compensation as a tool of environmental law . The compensation takes effect in multiple forms: damages compensation, regulatory compensation, compensation's markets and payments for environmental services. Each of these forms has different functions, including those to compensate, repair, to encourage and to reward. The organization of these types is quite unique as a sophisticate use of compensatory logic, adapting to the environmental, through the principles and rules on the no net loss principle, fairness and proportionality of the compensation measure in relation to what it compensate. It is also shown how the environmental standard has been improved with regard to the legal effectiveness of environmental law, from the complementary use of market tools, together with the more traditional legal tools. In this regard, compensation for environmental damages, and regulatory compensation are seen in a classical approach, while compensation's market and payments for environmental services belong to an innovative approach that integrates ecosystem conservation in the environmental standard. However, several limitations to the legal effectiveness of this instrument are identified. Compensation, in its various forms, is as a management tool to balance the gains and losses in economic, environmental and social around an environmental issue

When a property is in need to get access to a facility with a certain purpose – e.g. an access road to the property – the Swedish legislation states that it under some certain conditions is possible to establish the facility compulsory on another property. When a compulsory acquisition occur the legislation also states that the owner of the property that surrender land for the facility shall get compensated for the intrusion the facility makes on his or her property. The cardinal rule to determine the compensation level for these cases – when the Swedish Joint Facilities Act applies – is that the compensation level shall be based on the decrease in market value i.e. the damage that the facility causes on the acquired property plus an equitable share of the benefit that the facility causes for the properties that get access to the facility. These situations are in general speaking named profit sharing cases. Further states the travaux préparatoires that the distribution of the profit shall be equitable with guidance of the distribution that had occurred in a “normal” voluntary agreement between the involved parties (prop. 1991/92:127 s. 69). To be able to apply the legislators requirements of equitable and “normal” voluntary agreement in a real situation there are a number of methods that can be used to decide the compensation level. A problem with these methods is that it’s not always obvious a priori which method that should be used for a certain facility. A risk that occurs when it’s not clearly defined which method that shall be used in a certain situation is that substantially different levels of compensation can occur in different cases, even if the purpose with the facility is the same. For these cases when it’s not a priori defined which method that shall be used it’s up to the cadastral surveyor – after his or her preferences regarding what can be seen as equitable – to decide in the particular case which compensation level that best correspond to the legislators requirements of an equitable and “normal” voluntary agreement. With this said, there is an obvious risk that similar situations and cases get treated unequal from a compensation perspective according to which method the cadastral surveyor chose to apply. With respect to the problem description above, the purpose of this thesis have been to investigate how the compensation legislation in the Joint Facilities Act are applied or can be applied by the cadastral authority in joint facility procedures. The investigation was performed through a study of procedure acts from the cadastral authority.
När en fastighet har ett behov av att få tillgång till en viss typ av anläggning – t.ex. en utfartsväg från fastigheten – finns möjligheter att inrätta anläggningen tvångsvis på en annan fastighet. När tvångsvisa ianspråktaganden sker är den fastighetsägare som upplåter mark för anläggningen berättigad till ersättning. Huvudprincipen för att bestämma ersättningen i dessa fall – när anläggningslagen tillämpas – är att ersättningen dels ska bestå av marknadsvärdeminskningen som anläggningen orsakar, dels en skälig del av den värdeökning som sker hos den eller de fastigheter som får tillgång till anläggningen som inrättas. Dessa situationer brukar benämnas vinstfördelningsfall. Vidare har lagstiftaren uttalat att fördelningen av värdeökningen ska ske på ett skäligt sätt med ledning av den fördelning som hade blivit fallet vid en ”normal” frivillig överlåtelse parterna emellan (jmf. prop.1991/92:127 s. 69). För att kunna tillämpa lagstiftarens uppställda krav om skälighet och ”normal” frivillig överlåtelse i en praktisk situation finns ett antal metoder som kan tillämpas för att bestämma den totala ersättningen. Ett problem med dessa metoder är att det på förhand inte sällan är helt självklart vilken metod som har företräde framför en annan. En risk är då att väsentligt olika ersättningsbelopp utgår för anläggningar med liknande ändamål eftersom ersättningsnivåerna metoderna emellan ofta skiljer sig åt relativt mycket. För dessa mer oklara fall är det upp till förrättningslantmätaren – efter dennes preferenser gällande skälighet – att i det enskilda fallet avgöra vilken ersättningsnivå som är skälig och motsvarar en ”normal” frivillig överlåtelse. Det finns därmed en uppenbar risk att likande situationer kan behandlas olika ur ett ersättningsperspektiv beroende av vilken metod förrättningslantmätaren väljer att tillämpa. Förevarande arbete har av denna anledning undersökt hur Lantmäterimyndigheten i praktiken tillämpar ersättningslagstiftningen när anläggningar inrättas enligt anläggningslagen. Huvudsyftet med arbetet har formulerats som att undersöka hur ersättningslagstiftningen i anläggningslagen tillämpas eller kan tillämpas av LM vid anläggningsförrättningar. Undersökningen genomfördes genom att studera förrättningsakter där det fanns ett officialbeslut och/eller en officialutredning i ersättningsfrågan

This thesis consists of two studies in the area of executive compensation. The first examines the effect of boards of directors’ characteristics on the degree of compensation efficiency with respect to the use of private information. I predict and find that boards’ competence both in information acquisition and in monitoring influence the extent to which boards use private performance measures in CEO compensation. Specifically, smaller and more independent boards with their CEOs as the board chair are more efficient in exploiting private performance measures. Furthermore, the better a board balances its information role with its monitoring role, the more efficient it is in exploiting private performance measures. No asymmetry is found in rewarding and punishing CEOs based on private information. The second study investigates the mechanism to inflate the value of executive stock options after Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 403 (SOX 403), which requires that executive option grants be reported to the SEC within two business days following the grant day. As this requirement largely restricts backdating of executive option grants, I examine whether firms that previously backdated resort to alternative strategies after SOX. Using firms that were relatively free from backdating before SOX as a control group, I find that in the post-SOX period previous backdating firms exhibit a significantly larger return reversal around option grant dates, suggesting some sort of opportunistic behavior is still going on in these firms. Furthermore, I find that post-SOX option grant filings of previous backdating firms are as timely as those of the non-backdating control group, and that the large return reversals are associated with a pattern consistent with strategic timing of grants and disclosures; that is, a larger proportion of option grants are issued right after bad news (before good news) than right before bad news (after good news). These findings suggest that firms that previously backdated engage in strategic timing as an alternative mechanism to lower the grant-date stock price in the post-SOX period.

This thesis analyzes CEO compensation contracts in a principal-agent framework with moral hazard. It focuses on two issues: the form and the timing of performance-based pay. On the one hand, if CEOs are assumed to be mean-variance maximizers, I show that it is suboptimal to provide incentives with contracts which are convex in performance. This is because these contracts make the variance of pay an increasing function of the CEO's effort, which is inefficient. Sticks are more efficient than carrots, although the latter may be used in case the agent is protected by limited liability. On the other hand, if CEOs are assumed to be not only risk averse but also prudent, convex contracts and rewards may be optimal, since they protect against downside risk. A calibration of a HARA-lognormal model shows that CEO preferences which minimize the suboptimality of the typically observed contracts (relative to the optimal contract) feature decreasing absolute risk aversion, as well as low and decreasing relative risk aversion. However, when CEO pay is contingent on a lognormally distributed stock price, it is hard to rationalize the use of convex contracts for incentive provision. The thesis then examines the optimal evaluation and payment date, when the CEO's actions materialize with a lag. Information asymmetries are progressively resolved: the precision of signals that shareholders receive regarding the final outcome is increasing with time. However, the accumulation of exogenous shocks make deferred compensation noisy. The optimal timing of CEO pay, which minimizes the extent of the mispricing at the payment date, is derived. Opportunities for two types of managerial short-termism are then introduced. To ensure that the manager does not engage in short-termist and inefficient behavior, it is often optimal to reduce the power of incentives, and to postpone the evaluation and payment date.

The thesis examines the claims that may be brought against express trustees for pecuniary compensation. It contends that a difference of principle divides this conventional category in two. Some compensation claims complain that the trustee has breached one of his duties and seek to charge him with reparation for whatever ensuing loss has been suffered by the beneficial interests. These claims resemble claims for damages founded upon a tort or breach of contract. Other compensation claims overlook whatever breach there may have been and demand that the trustee account and perform the trusts, in money where this cannot be done in specie. This second type of claim resembles a claim for the specific performance of a contract, bearing in mind that specific performance may be given with compensation where the defendant cannot deliver what he has promised. The claims are cumulative subject to the principle of full satisfaction.

Vaccination aims to prevent infectious disease, and is internationally acclaimed as a major contributor to public health. Although vaccines have many benefits, there are people who claim that they or their infant children have been injured, often permanently and severely, by the powerful biological agents introduced into their bodies by vaccination. The object of this thesis is to determine whether the law in England and Wales relating to vaccine damage is in need of reform. The answer to this question is determined by a moral and legal analysis of current vaccination policy and practice. The existing literature consists primarily of medical papers discussing the possibility of vaccine damage and legal discourses concerning compensation and consent to treatment. Detailed background information comes from in-depth semi-structured interviews with a consultant epidemiologist at the Public Health Laboratory Service and three organisers of Justice Awareness Basic Support (JABS), a vaccine information and support group. The main originality of the thesis is the information provided by approximately 360 responses to each of two surveys. Parents of pre-school children were surveyed about their experiences of, and views on, current vaccination policy and practice. Members of JABS who believe their children to be vaccine-damaged provided information about the vaccines which appear to have caused harm, as well as their experiences of, and views on, the legal routes to financial redress. The findings provide evidence of a dearth of reliable medical data about vaccine safety, and of some ethically unacceptable practices associated with infant vaccination. They also reveal that, theoretically and in the view of users, legal provision for the victims of vaccine damage in England and Wales is unsatisfactory. These factors combine to indicate that the law relating to compensation for vaccine damage is in need of reform. The thesis therefore concludes with suggestions for further research and some modifications to current law and policy. There should be a statutory scheme awarding compensatory, rather than token, payments to victims. Awards should be made subject to a generous test of causation, such as that which exists in respect of the US Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. Incentive payments to GPs should be discontinued, parents should be offered choices of vaccine, and vaccine promotional literature for healthcare workers and parents should present a balanced view of all available research. Above all, it is essential that these measures be supported by large-scale, independent medical research into the nature of possible links between vaccines and damage.

Thesis advisor: Philip Strahan
Chapter 1: Executive Compensation and Aspirational Peer Benchmarking Abstract: Using a comprehensive, hand-collected dataset of explicit peer group relationships, I document that small firms engage in upward compensation benchmarking to a much greater degree than large firms do. In contrast to the prior literature studying larger firms, small firms choose aspirational peers that reflect their executives' shifting opportunity sets. For these firms, compensation benchmarking is indicative of future growth and performance, and the rate at which pay adjusts toward peer levels is sensitive to the transferability of managers' human capital. Overall, the data suggest that growing and outperforming small firms strategically use upward benchmarking to adjust pay in an effort to retain managerial talent. Chapter 2: Common Ownership and Relative Performance Evaluation Abstract: Recent research suggests that large institutional shareholders that simultaneously hold positions in naturally competing firms may influence managers to collude and reduce product market competition. This paper finds that common owners do not alter executive incentive schemes in a way that is conducive to collusion. I find that common ownership is positively related to the use of explicit relative performance evaluation (RPE), which rewards executives for outperforming their peers. Additionally, commonly held firms are more likely to benchmark RPE awards against commonly held peers. My results suggest that the managers of commonly held firms lack the financial incentives to collude with product market rivals
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018
Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management
Discipline: Finance

Mestrado em Actuarial Science
O presente trabalho apresenta uma análise às melhores estimativas de acidentes de trabalho sob o regime de Solvência II que entrou em vigor a 1 de janeiro de 2016, apresentando uma modelização das responsabilidades com base na legislação existente, principalmente a Lei n.º 98/2009. No âmbito de Solvência II, as melhores estimativas das responsabilidades de seguros não vida são calculadas separadamente em provisão para sinistros (respeitantes a sinistros ocorridos) e provisão para prémios (relativamente a sinistros futuros que são cobertos pelas responsabilidades abrangidas pelos limites dos contratos existentes). No que diz respeito a seguros vida, as melhores estimativas devem ser calculadas separadamente para cada apólice. As responsabilidades de acidentes de trabalho apresentam a particularidade de serem compostas por diferentes naturezas, o que proporciona na sua modelização a aplicação de metodologias atuariais não-vida e vida. Em Solvência II, estas responsabilidades são divididas em duas classes de negócio: acidentes de trabalho utilizando bases técnicas não semelhante a técnicas de vida (NSTV) e rendas decorrentes de contratos de seguro de natureza não vida e relacionados com responsabilidades de seguro de acidentes e doença utilizando bases técnicas semelhantes a técnicas de vida (STV). A abordagem ao tema foi realizada de forma separada tendo em consideração a desagregação da melhor estimativa em Solvência II, e as diferentes responsabilidades de acidentes de trabalho: não semelhantes e semelhantes a técnicas de vida. Devido à literatura existente para provisionamento ser bastante diversificada, o trabalho foi desenvolvido com foco nas metodologias que mais frequentemente são aplicadas no mercado segurador.
This work presents an analysis to the Workers' Compensation best estimate under the Solvency II regime that came into force in January 1st 2016, modelling the liabilities based on the applicable legislation, mainly the Law 98/2009. Within the scope of Solvency II, the best estimate of non-life liabilities are calculated separately under claims provision (concerning claims that have already happened) and premium provision (concerning future claims that are covered by the existing contractual obligations). The best estimate of life liabilities should be calculated separately for each policy. Workers' Compensation presents the particularity of being composed of different natured liabilities, which provides in its modeling the application of life and non-life actuarial methodologies. Under Solvency II, these liabilities are split into two lines of business: Workers' Compensation insurance using non similar to life techniques (NSLT) and annuities stemming from non-life insurance contracts and relating to health insurance obligations using similar to life techniques (SLT). The approach to this report was conducted separately considering the breakdown of the best estimate under Solvency II and the Workers' Compensation liabilities divided into non similar and similar to life techniques. Due to the diversification of existing literature, this work has been developed focusing on the methodologies that are most frequently applied in the insurance market.
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Résumé de la thèse Fleuristes, artisans, filiales d'un grand groupe, banquiers, intermédiaires financiers : tous ont en commun, lorsqu'ils entretiennent des relations d'affaires enchevêtrées avec leurs partenaires, de souhaiter ne régler ou ne recevoir que le solde de leurs créances et de leurs dettes. C'est évoquer la compensation dite multilatérale, objet de cette étude. On découvre alors le paradoxe par lequel une compensation opère en l'absence de réciprocité des obligations qu'il s'agit d'éteindre. Or, la compensation multilatérale ne saurait exister. Pas davantage, la combinaison de la novation et de la compensation ne rend compte des mécanismes de simplification des paiements par versement d'un solde unique. Les risques liés à une assise juridique inexacte conduisent à proposer une autre qualification de tels mécanismes. L'organisation par le droit d'une situation caractérisée par un enchevêtrement de créances et de dettes repose sur le traitement juridique de l'intérêt commun aux titulaires de ces obligations. L'originalité et la spécificité des mécanismes de simplification des paiements résultent du lien qui unit une pluralité de personnes poursuivant le même objectif. L'intérêt commun est alors satisfait soit par l'intervention d'un mandataire commun soit par le recours à l'acte conjonctif. Un régime de droit commun des mécanismes de simplification des paiements peut ainsi être proposé : il tient du respect à la fois de l'intérêt commun et des règles propres aux institutions civilistes utilisées pour le satisfaire. Toutefois, sur les marchés financiers et interbancaires, seul un régime spécifique permet d'assurer la sécurité et la rapidité d'exécution des opérations.

This master thesis deals with outlining the rationale of redesigning medical leadership compensation framework within Interior Health Authority (IH). In particular, reviews IH's organizational structure, analyses job descriptions for medical leaders, recommends improvements of communication flow across the authority and designs medical leader's compensation model.

Diese Dissertation stellt empirische Evidenz zu den Fragen der Verguetung von Fuehrungskraeften. Analyse der Daten der US-Firmen auflistet, finde ich eine umgekehrte U-foermige Beziehung zwischen Management Ownership und Unternehmensperformance, aber diese Beziehung verschwindet, wenn Unternehmensperformance von den letzten Jahr kontrolliert wird. Ich finde auch, dass die Executive Option Awards positiv auf Unternehmensperformance bezogen, während Executive Stock Awards hat keinen statistischen signifikanten Einfluss auf den Unternehmensperformance. Statistische Evidenz zeigt auch, dass die Struktur der Verguetung von Fuehrungskraeften Vertraege zu Unternehmen Eigenschaften und Executive persoenlichen Merkmalen zusammenhaengt.
This dissertation provides empirical evidence on the issues of executive compensation. Analyzing data of U.S. listing firms, I find an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm performance, but this relation vanishes when firm performance from last period is controlled. I also find that executive option awards is positively related to firm performance, while executive stock awards has no statistically significant impact on firm performance. Evidence also indicates that the structure of executive compensation contracts is related with observable and unobservable firm attributes and executive personal characteristics.

This doctoral thesis is made of three empirical research papers focused on executive compensation topics. The first chapter is a solo paper, while the second and third papers are co-authored with Antonio Parbonetti. The first chapter answers to Bushman and Smith’s (2001) call for research on compensation of executives other than CEOs. Specifically, using a sample of 586 firm-year observations over the period 2000-2009, I investigate the economic determinants and effects on shareholder value of the equity incentives given to the Chief Marketing Officer (CMO). The paper shows that, when companies invest more in marketing activities, they also give the CMO more equity incentives. I also find that CMOs’ equity incentives are positively related to shareholder value and that this positive relationship is incremental to that between CEOs’ incentives and firm value. Finally, I document that the positive impact of CMOs’ equity incentives on firm value is not limited to those firms that invest more than the industry average in marketing, suggesting a strategic role for the CMO that is not linked only to the size of the marketing budget. These findings, which help to advance our understanding of the determinants and effects of executive compensation, have considerable practical implications. Specifically, I challenge the mainstream view that the CEO’s compensation captures all first-order effects and that the consequences of the compensation structure of executives other than the CEO are negligible. In fact, I document that the Chief Marketing Officer plays a central role in delivering shareholder value when she is properly incentivized. I also show that companies do not simply rescale the CEO’s incentives when they decide how to incent the CMO, but they take a proactive role in detecting other economic determinants in order to set the appropriate level of incentives. Therefore, findings reported in the paper warn companies not to focus only on setting the CEO’s incentives, while neglecting to incent other key top executives such as the CMO. The second chapter, instead, analyzes how CEO’s equity incentives, risk incentives and career concerns drive the trade-off among earnings game strategies. Accounting literature documented that managers, in order to meet earnings targets, may engage in the numbers game by making choices among three non mutually exclusive strategies. Specifically, executives can alter reported earnings through real or accrual earnings management, and/or guide analysts’ expectations downward in an attempt of avoiding negative earnings surprises. Previous literature showed that stricter regulation (i.e. the passage of the SOX), and firm’s specific characteristics, influence the relative costliness of each earnings game strategy (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012). Nonetheless, literature fails to recognize that earnings game strategies are decided and executed by the CEO, who is going to consider, in the choice of how meeting/beating targets, also her personal costs and benefits. Using a sample of 4,471 quarterly observations, from 1,088 U.S. firms that are likely to have engaged in the earnings game over the period 2003-20010, I show that CEOs trade off the different earnings game strategies according to their personal benefits and costs. Specifically, I find that CEOs with high equity incentives and high career concerns engage less in real activity manipulations than executives with low incentives, and substitute this earnings game strategy with other alternatives. Additionally, I document that firms using real activity manipulation to meet/beat targets have lower future market performances than firms using accrual earnings management or analysts’ guidance. This result indicates that earnings game strategies that mostly rely on the alteration of real activities, impose very high costs on shareholders. CEOs appear to understand and anticipate this effect and, when their interests are aligned with those of shareholders in terms of equity incentives and career concerns, they avoid to choose real earnings management strategies. Overall, this chapter contributes to a well established research stream such as earnings management, by analyzing the trade-off among earnings game strategies from a new prospective. Finally, the last chapter focuses the attention on CEO’s compensation in the financial industry, which has attracted an increasing interest in recent years. In fact, executive compensation has been blamed of being one of the most fundamental causes of the recent credit crisis, providing CEOs with incentives to take too many big bets that turned out to be extremely costly (Solomon and Paletta, 2009). Specifically, the paper investigates the role of CEO’s equity and risk incentives in boosting securitizations in the financial industry and in motivating executives to reduce the perceived risk while betting on it. Using a sample of US financial institutions over the period 2003-2009, the paper documents that CEOs with high equity incentives have systematically engaged in securitization transactions to a larger extent than CEOs with low incentives. It also shows that CEOs with high equity and risk-related incentives engaged in risky securitization activities and used securitization for transferring risks to outside investors. Finally, the paper shows that executives incentivized on risk provided outside investors with low quality disclosure about losses recorded on securitized loans, thus contributing to increase the opacity of securitization transactions undertaken. Overall, I interpret these results as evidence that CEOs foresaw in securitizations under US GAAP an opportunity for hiding risks while bearing them and generating profits and cash flows because of the risks. In additional analyses, I document that before the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in 2007, financial institutions involved in the securitization of subprime loans largely over performed other banks in terms of market returns and earnings. On the contrary, starting from 2007 subprime securitizers have recorded worse performances than other financial institutions that were not involved in subprime securitization. This indicates that, by securitizing risky loans, CEOs were successful in boosting stock price and earnings, but the risks undertaken turned out to be extremely costly. This paper, therefore, adds to the large stream of research warning about possible side effects of equity compensation, and uncovers a determinant of securitization transactions that has been overlooked by previous literature
Il presente lavoro è costituito da tre articoli accademici, di natura empirica, focalizzati sul tema della remunerazione dei manager. Il primo capitolo è un paper a firma unica, mentre il secondo e terzo paper sono co-autorati con Antonio Parbonetti. Il primo capitolo analizza la remunerazione di manager diversi dall’amministratore delegato (CEO), come suggerito da Bushman and Smith’s (2001). In particolare, utilizzando un campione di 586 osservazioni dal 2000 al 2009, lo studio analizza le determinanti economiche e gli effetti sul valore aziendale degli incentivi azionari forniti al Direttore Marketing (Chief Marketing Officer, CMO). I risultati mostrano che, quando le aziende investono maggiormente in marketing, forniscono al CMO maggiori incentivi azionari. Inoltre, lo studio rivela che gli incentivi azionari forniti al CMO sono positivamente correlati al valore aziendale e che tale effetto è incrementale rispetto a quello dovuto agli incentivi monetari del CEO. Infine, il capitolo rivela che l’impatto positivo sul valore aziendale riconducibile agli incentivi azionari del CMO non è limitato esclusivamente alle aziende con elevati investimenti di marketing. Questo suggerisce che il CMO riveste un ruolo strategico nell’azienda che non è esclusivamente legato all’entità del budget di marketing. I risultati riportati nello studio hanno considerevoli implicazioni pratiche. In particolare, essi sono in contrapposizione con la tradizionale percezione che la remunerazione del CEO catturi tutti gli effetti rilevanti e che, quindi, sia di marginale importanza studiare la struttura di incentivazione di executive diversi dal CEO. Infatti, lo studio documenta che il CMO, quando propriamente incentivato, riveste un ruolo strategico chiave nel creare valore aziendale. Inoltre, i risultati suggeriscono che le aziende, nel determinare gli incentivi dei manager diversi dal CEO, non ridimensionano semplicemente la struttura di remunerazione dell’amministratore delegato, bensì cercano di identificare delle determinanti economiche rilevanti per definire l’appropriato livello di incentivi. Il secondo capitolo, invece, analizza come gli incentivi azionari, gli incentivi al rischio e i career concern del CEO influiscono sul trade-off tra le diverse strategie di earnings management. La letteratura di accounting ha documentato che, al fine di raggiungere determinati obiettivi di performance, i manager possono scegliere di 1) manipolare gli utili contabili utilizzando la flessibilità concessa dai principi contabili (accrual-based earnings management), 2) manipolare le decisioni di investimento dell’azienda (real earnings management), 3) abbassare le aspettative degli analisti per evitare di non raggiungere le loro stime (analysts’ expectation guidance). La letteratura ha mostrato che una regolamentazione più severa, e caratteristiche intrinseche dell’impresa, influenzano il costo delle menzionate strategie di earnings game (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012). Tuttavia, non si è prestata la dovuta attenzione al fatto che la scelta della strategia di earnings game da utilizzare viene effettuata, in ultima istanza, dal CEO dell’azienda il quale considererà nella scelta anche i propri incentivi. Utilizzando un campione di 4,471 osservazioni dal 2003 al 2010, il secondo capitolo mostra che il CEO sceglie quale strategia di earnings game utilizzare anche in funzione di costi e benefici personali. In particolare, i risultati indicano che i CEO con maggiori incentivi azionari e con più elevati career concern, utilizzano di meno le strategie di real earnings management e le sostituiscono con le altre due alternative. Inoltre, lo studio mostra che le aziende che utilizzano in misura maggiore il real earnings management registrano performance future di mercato significativamente inferiori a quelle aziende che invece utilizzano altre strategie di earnings game. Tale risultato suggerisce che quando i manager manipolano le decisioni di investimento dell’azienda, al solo fine di raggiungere alcuni target di performance, impongono alti costi agli azionisti. I manager sembrano comprendere ed anticipare questo effetto e, quando i loro interessi sono maggiormente allineati con quelli degli azionisti in termini di incentivi azionari e career concern, utilizzano in misura minore le strategie di real earnings management. In conclusione, il secondo capitolo contribuisce ad un filone di ricerca già ben sviluppato andando ad analizzare il trade-off tra le strategie di earnings game da una nuova prospettiva: quella dei manager. Infine, l’ultimo capitolo si focalizza sulla struttura di remunerazione del CEO nel settore finanziario; tematica quest’ultima particolarmente dibattuta negli ultimi anni. Infatti, la struttura di remunerazione degli executive nel settore finanziario è stata accusata di essere una delle principali cause della recente crisi finanziaria, poiché avrebbe fornito ai manager incentivi ad assumere eccessivi rischi (Solomon and Paletta, 2009). In particolare, il capitolo analizza il ruolo degli incentivi azionari e degli incentivi al rischio nel motivare i CEO ad intraprendere operazioni di cartolarizzazione dei mutui, riducendo i rischi percepiti dagli investitori esterni ma, al contempo, scommettendo su di essi. Utilizzando un campione di istituzioni finanziarie statunitensi dal 2003 al 2009, lo studio documenta che i manager con elevati incentivi azionari hanno sistematicamente cartolarizzato una quantità maggiore di mutui. I risultati indicano altresì che i manager con elevati incentivi azionari ed incentivi al rischio, sono stati maggiormente coinvolti in operazioni di cartolarizzazione di mutui subprime, utilizzando in tal modo lo strumento della cartolarizzazione per trasferire i rischi ad investitori esterni. Inoltre, lo studio documenta che i manager incentivati al rischio hanno fornito una disclosure di qualità peggiore agli investitori esterni ed hanno pertanto contribuito ad aumentare le asimmetrie informative. Nel complesso, le analisi svolte suggeriscono che i manager hanno intravisto nelle operazioni di cartolarizzazione dei mutui la possibilità di nascondere i rischi generati ed incrementare i profitti delle proprie istituzioni finanziarie. In analisi aggiuntive, il capitolo mostra che, prima del crollo del mercato dei mutui subprime avvenuto nel 2007, le istituzioni finanziare coinvolte nella cartolarizzazione dei mutui subprime hanno registrato performance significativamente superiori ai propri concorrenti. Tuttavia, una volta che la crisi finanziaria è emersa, tali istituzioni ne hanno subito le conseguenze in misura maggiore. Pertanto, i risultati suggeriscono che, grazie alla cartolarizzazione dei mutui subprime, i manager delle grandi istituzioni finanziarie statunitensi hanno avuto successo nell’incrementare i profitti delle proprie istituzioni; tuttavia ciò è avvenuto assumendo rischi eccessivamente elevati. Il capitolo, pertanto, contribuisce all’ampio dibattito in letteratura riguardo ai potenziali effetti distorsivi causati dalla struttura di remunerazione dei manager

The compensation of chief executive officers has long been an alluring and controversial topic, especially in light of the rapid rise in CEO earnings over the past several decades, which has provoked discussion on the manner in which CEOs are monetarily rewarded. Recently, university presidents have joined company CEOs in the public spotlight, as increasing levels of compensation for college presidents have also sparked scrutiny and debate. This paper examines the determinants behind CEO compensation and investigates the extent to which insights on these factors compare to the compensation determinants of chief executives at universities. Ultimately, this study finds similarities between the determinants of compensation for these two executive groups, specifically in the significance of organization size, type, and performance, as well as personal executive characteristics such as gender and tenure. The findings therefore suggest that these executives have similar job responsibilities, and the results also possess important insights and applications to relevant issues regarding executive compensation.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
With the U.S. military under intense scrutiny to cut costs, the Department of Defense must determine ways to use its limited resources more efficiently. One financial incentive ripe for change is the retention bonus. This compensation tool, used by the military to retain highly qualified individuals, could be harnessed more effectively with an auction mechanism for distribution. This thesis studies three different types of auctions, and examines which auction would be utilized best by the government as a retention tool. The three auctions analyzed were a sealed bid-discriminatory auction, a sealed bid-uniform auction and a sequential bid-uniform auction. The results of the experiment showed that discriminatory auctions fared best overall. Sealed bid-discriminatory auctions had a significant savings of 5.1% over sealed bid-uniform auctions and a 10.1% savings over sequential bid-uniform auctions.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2005.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 39-42).
My thesis examines how the lack of board-of-director independence affects the structure and disclosure of executive compensation. I find that European companies with more insiders on their boards grant their executives more incentive compensation, after controlling for the level and economic determinants of executive compensation. This effect is more pronounced in countries with less protection for outside shareholders. The companies with more insiders on their boards also disclose more transparent information about executive compensation. Overall, my evidence supports the contracting hypothesis, in which capital market investors understand potential detrimental effects of insiders and drive companies to mitigate these effects through greater incentive compensation and improved compensation disclosure. The evidence is inconsistent with the opportunism hypothesis, in which risk-averse insiders grant themselves more fixed pay and disclose less transparent information about their compensation.
by Volkan Muslu.
Ph.D.

O objetivo desse estudo é identificar as práticas de remuneração adotadas para os executivos no Brasil e medir a relação entre a performance das companhias e a remuneração desses executivos. Ao analisar a relação entre remuneração dos executivos e a performance das companhias, deveríamos observar uma relação positiva e estatisticamente (e economicamente) significante entre as duas variáveis, caso a elaboração dos contratos de remuneração dos executivos endereçassem os problemas mencionados na teoria do Agente-Principal. Foram utilizadas diversas regressões para medir a sensibilidade entre a remuneração dos executivos e a performance das companhias. Podemos observar pelos resultados que, em algumas das regressões encontramos uma relação estatisticamente significante entre a remuneração dos executivos e a performance da companhia a um nível de significância de 5 por cento, no entanto, com um significado econômico muito baixo, o que parece inconsistente com o problema do Agente-Principal.
This paper seeks to identify and describe the executive compensation practices in Brazil, and measure the relationship between company performance and executive compensation in Brazil. When analyzing the relationship between executive compensation and company performance, we should observe a positive and statistically (and economically) significant relation between the two variables, in case the compensation contracts addressed the problems involved in the Principal-Agent theory. Several regressions were used to measure the sensibility between executive compensation and company performance. In some of the regressions we found a statistically significant relation between executive compensation and company performance at a 5 percent significance level, but not economically significant, which seems to be inconsistent with the Principal-Agent theory.

In Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) systems the motion of the target can be classified in two main categories: Translational Motion and Rotational Motion. A small degree of rotational motion is required in order to generate the synthetic aperture of the ISAR systems. On the other hand, the remaining part of the target&rsquo
s motion, that is any degree of translational motion and the large degree of rotational motion, degrades ISAR image quality. Motion compensation techniques focus on eliminating the effect of the targets&rsquo
motion on the ISAR images. In this thesis, ISAR image generation is discussed using both Conventional Fourier Based and Time-Frequency Based techniques. Standard translational motion compensation steps, Range and Doppler Tracking, are examined. Cross-correlation method and Dominant Scatterer Algorithm are employed for Range and Doppler tracking purposes, respectively. Finally, Time-Frequency based motion compensation is studied and compared with the conventional techniques. All of the motion compensation steps are examined using the simulated data. Stepped frequency waveforms are used in order to generate the required data of the simulations. Not only successful results, but also worst case examinations and lack of algorithms are also discussed with the examples.

The resistor ladder (R/2R) digital-to-analogue converter (DAC) architecture is often used in high performance audio solutions due to its low-noise performance. Even high-end R/2R DACs suffer from static nonlinearity distortions. It was suspected that compensating for these nonlinearities would be possible. It was also suspected that this could improve audio quality in audio systems using R/2R DACs for digital-to-analogue (A/D) conversion. Through the use of models of the resistor ladder architecture a way of characterizing and measuring the faults in the R/2R DAC was created. A compensation algorithm was developed in order to compensate for the nonlinearities. The performance of the algorithm was simulated and an implementation of it was evaluated using an audio evaluation instrument. The results presented show that it is possible to increase linearity in R/2R DACs by compensating for static nonlinearity distortions. The increase in linearity can be quite significant and audible for the trained ear.

This study begins with a review of economic and industrial relations literature to identify changes to the workplace that will make industry more productive and competitive. It identifies the measures necessary for industry to take advantage of technological development and to make the workplace more flexible. Specifically it focuses on variable or flexible compensation plans. After identifying the key features of various forms of flexible compensation, it examines approximately 30 plans being used in British Columbia. The case studies assist in identifying the advantages and disadvantages of each type of plan, from the perspectives of the employer, the employees and the trade union. Finally it suggests steps that can be taken by government to encourage variable compensation.
Law, Peter A. Allard School of
Graduate

This study considers the determination of the ex ante pay-performance relationship. A single-period partial equilibrium model is used to show that the executive income can be expressed as a function of the firm's return expressed in dollar terms. The executive income is jointly determined by the opening firm size and current return, which function as a managerial talent proxy and self-selection mechanism respectively. Comparing to Jensen and Murphy (1990) wealth-based Pay-Performance Sensitivity (PPS), this research presents an income-based PPS. The alternative PPS not only overcomes a misleading misspecification in Jensen and Murphy (1990), but also corrects Rosen's (1992) argument for only including return in the pay performance relationship. This research finds empirically that both the opening firm size and stock return play a significant role in determining executive income. This study provides supplementary evidence to Murphy's (1986) Learning Model. However, shareholder income may not be an ideal performance measure in capturing the multi-period pay-performance relationship.

As seismic waves travel through the earth, the visco-elasticity of the earth's medium will cause energy dissipation and waveform distortion. This phenomenon is referred to as seismic absorption or attenuation. The absorptive property of a medium can be described by a quality factor Q, which determines the energy decay and a velocity dispersion relationship. Four new ideas have been developed in this thesis to deal with the estimation and application of seismic absorption. By assuming that the amplitude spectrum of a seismic wavelet may be modeled by that of a Ricker wavelet, an analytical relation has been derived to estimate a quality factor from the seismic data peak frequency variation with time. This relation plays a central role in quality factor estimation problems. To estimate interval Q for reservoir description, a method called reflectivity guided seismic attenuation analysis is proposed. This method first estimates peak frequencies at a common midpoint location, then correlates the peak frequency with sparsely-distributed reflectivities, and finally calculates Q values from the peak frequencies at the reflectivity locations. The peak frequency is estimated from the prestack CMP gather using peak frequency variation with offset analysis which is similar to amplitude variation with offset analysis in implementation. The estimated Q section has the same layer boundaries of the acoustic impedance or other layer properties. Therefore, the seismic attenuation property obtained with the guide of reflectivity is easy to interpret for the purpose of reservoir description. To overcome the instability problem of conventional inverse Q filtering, Q compensation is formulated as a least-squares (LS) inverse problem based on statistical theory. The matrix of forward modeling is composed of time-variant wavelets. The LS de-absorption is solved by an iterative non-parametric approach. To compensate for absorption in migrated seismic sections, a refocusing technique is developed using non-stationary multi-dimensional deconvolution. A numerical method is introduced to calculate the blurring function in layered media, and a least squares inverse scheme is used to remove the blurring effect in order to refocus the migrated image. This refocusing process can be used as an alternative to regular migration with absorption compensation.

A driveway is needed to get to and from a property. Sometimes there are no opportunities to locate the driveway on the own property. One possibility is to use someone else´s land for locating a driveway in exchange for compensation. The purpose of this study was to examine how the compensation is determined for both long and short driveways outside zoning by doing a case study and compare the result with the various reimbursement rules. The work also addresses the different methods of profit distribution and how they are applied in practice. The conclusion from the case study is that the average value principle is used the most because it is expected to be similar to the case in “normal voluntary agreement”, which is the purpose with the reimbursement rules. To make the reimbursement correspond with the value decrease of the waiver property, adjustments are made on the average value in different ways. The cadastral files to the case study did not match the purpose completely. Therefore, the result can be questioned, but another conclusion drawn from the case study is that in the cadastral files no one discusses about the size of the driveway. It may be that the size of the road is not considered to be a problem or that there is a well-tested method to solve this problem.
För att ta sig till och från en fastighet behövs en utfart. Det är dock inte alltid möjligt att placera utfarten på egen fastighet. Då finns möjligheten att mot ersättning nyttja annans mark för utfart. Syftet med denna uppsats var att undersöka hur ersättningen bestäms för både långa och korta utfarter utanför detaljplan genom att göra en fallstudie och jämföra resultatet med de olika ersättningsreglerna som finns. Uppsatsen berör också de olika vinstfördelningsmetoderna och hur dessa tillämpas i praktiken. Slutsatsen av fallstudien är att den vinstfördelningsmetod som används mest är genomsnittsvärdeprincipen för att den förväntas likna fallet vid ”normal frivillig överenskommelse”, som också är syftet med ersättningsreglerna. För att ersättningen ska stämma överens med marknadsvärdeminskningen på den upplåtande fastigheten justeras genomsnittsvärdet på olika sätt. Förrättningsakterna som användes till fallstudien stämde inte överens med syftet helt. Därför kan resultatet ifrågasättas, men ännu en slutsats som dragits utifrån fallstudien är att i förrättningarna är det ingen som diskuterar storleken av utfarten. Det kan vara för att vägens storlek inte anses vara ett problem eller för att det finns en väl beprövad metod för att lösa detta problem.

The purpose with this work is to investigate how much effect the value decrease following the expropriation has on the total compensation for acquisitions on expropriation grounds and the extent of acquisitions of entire properties where value decrease may have occurred. The value decrease originates from the business, which expropriation is made for. This value decrease is compensated in the influence rule in the Expropriation Act (1972:719). The reason value decrease has an impact on the total compensation is because no surcharge is given the compensation in the influence rule. While it three years ago was instituted a surcharge of 25% in the Expropriation Act (EA) for the compensation for the property's value at the acquisition date. The strongest reason for the introduction of the surcharge was to strengthen the property rights of property owners when their properties are acquired on expropriations purposes. But the difference in surcharge means that the compensation will be inconsistent, depending on whether the value decrease has occurred or not. The arising of the difference in total compensation has emerged from studies of the EA and its propositions. Furthermore, it emerges from the Environmental Code that properties acquired in its entirety as a result of environmental damage, i.e. activities that lead to damage to other properties, will also be compensated in the influence rule and thus no surcharge will be given. To investigate how many properties that have been acquired on expropriation purposes, where damage may have occurred and is compensated through the influence rule, there has been an empirical study of Trafikverket´s property acquisitions. Furthermore, Malmberget has been included in efforts to highlight the extent of land acquisition where properties may be subject to damages under the influence rule. In the empirical study, 166 properties acquired by Trafikverket in the past three years have been studied. 44 of these have been acquired for the construction of roads or railroads, whose activities may have resulted in a value decrease on the properties acquired. 122 properties were probably acquired as a result of environmental damage. Results from the study show that the influence rule might have been used in several acquisitions made in recent years and therefore had an impact on the total compensation. As the full compensation does not get the surcharge of 25%, the compensation as mentioned earlier becomes inconsistent. This does not seem reasonable when the motive behind the proposition was to strengthen the ownership. Thus, it should be the loss of the owner right that gets compensated and therefore the compensation through the influence rule also should be given the surcharge.
Syftet med detta arbete är att undersöka hur stor inverkan företagsskada kan ha på den totala ersättningen vid förvärv på expropriationsgrunder och i vilken omfattning förvärv av hela fastigheter, där företagsskada kan ha förekommit, har skett. Företagsskada är den värdeminskning en verksamhet, vilken expropriation sker för, leder till på fastighet som ska förvärvas. Denna skada ska ersättas enligt influensregeln i expropriationslagen (1972:719). Anledning till att företagsskada har påverkan på den totala ersättningen är att det inte utgår något påslag för ersättning enligt influensregeln, medan det för tre år sedan instiftades ett påslag om 25 % i expropriationslagen (ExL) för den ersättning som ska utgå för fastighetens värde vid förvärvstillfället. Det starkaste motivet till att införa detta påslag var att stärka äganderätten för fastighetsägare när deras fastigheter förvärvas på expropriationsgrunder. Skillnaden med påslaget kan leda till att ersättningen blir inkonsekvent, beroende på om företagsskada föreligger eller inte. Att det uppkommer en skillnad i den totala ersättningen har framkommit i studier av ExL och dess propositioner. Vidare framkommer det av miljöbalken att fastigheter som förvärvas i sin helhet till följd av miljöskada, d.v.s. verksamhet som leder till skada på annan fastighet, även denna ska ersättas enligt influensregeln och inte ges något påslag. För att undersöka hur många fastigheter som har förvärvats på expropriationsgrunder, där skada som ska ersättas enligt influensregeln kan ha uppkommit, har en empirisk studie av Trafikverkets fastighetsförvärv gjorts. Vidare har även Malmberget inkluderats i arbetet för att belysa omfattning av fastighetsförvärv där fastigheter kan vara utsatta för skada enligt influensregeln. I den empiriska studien har 166 fastigheter förvärvade av Trafikverket under de tre senaste åren undersökts. 44 styckena av dessa har förvärvats för att uppföra anläggning, vars verksamhet kan ha lett till företagsskada på förvärvad fastighet. 122 styckena har troligen förvärvats till följd av miljöskada. Resultatet från studien visar att influensregeln kan ha använts vid flertalet förvärv under de senaste åren och därför haft en påverkan på den totala ersättningen. I och med att ersättningen i sin helhet inte ges påslaget om 25 % blir ersättningen som tidigare nämnt inkonsekvent. Detta känns inte skäligt då det i propositionen framgår att det är äganderätten som ska stärkas. Således bör det vid förlorande av äganderätt, till följd av förvärv på expropriationsgrunder, utgå ett påslag även för ersättning som ska bestämmas enligt influensregeln.

Recently, more and more disputations about how demand response should be compensated have arisen. Moreover, the court is about to rehear the Order 745. It probably will have significant impact on the whole working system used to be built for demand response before. Nowadays, some power companies and utilities think that they will endure profits leakage while demand response resources still are compensated. In this research, knowledge of demand response, local marginal price, Order 745 and other related concept will be explained in detail in case of misunderstanding. Associated with all these knowledge, a possible compensation method will be proposed. It combines many existing compensation methods. It mainly can be divided into three parts, i.e., high load period, off-peak period and low load period. The demand response resources will be compensated appropriately through these three periods. The compensation method endeavors to be just and reasonable.

This thesis investigates three theoretical problems in executive compensation literature. They involve extension of a standard principal-agent model, incorporating taxation into the valuation of executive stock options, and the pricing of executive stock options in the presence of managerial effort. Empirical literature has long addressed the endogeneity of capital structure and executive compensation. Yet few models, which optimally determine executive compensation, explicitly introduce capital structure choice. Chapter 2 proposes a principal-agent model in which the capital structure, compensation and managerial actions are simultaneously determined. Based on our numerical results leverage has two effects on managerial actions. One is to discipline the manager and the other is to replace the incentive effect of compensation. Two such effects exist because volatility is chosen by the manager. The basic model is also extended to include debt-like compensation. Our results show that for a given leverage level, rewarding the manager with debt makes her work harder but take less risk. But debt compensation cannot limit risk neutral shareholders' risk appetite; we hence conclude that only a combination of capital and pay regulation, which restricts both risk-taking of shareholders and incentives of the manager, can significantly reduce the firm's risk. Taxation is an important consideration in the design of executive (and employee) compensation. It directly affects the firm's revenue as well as the executive's after tax income. Once the compensation is granted, taxes also affect the early exercise strategy of the components of the compensation. Chapter 3 explores the executive (and employees) compensation with tax. Specifically, we build a tax-inclusive valuation model. The new feature of the model is an addition of a tax decision, which allows the executive (and employees) to optimally sell stock to maximize after-tax terminal utility. The stock selling decision is very similar to an option exercise decision. The valuation 'model essentially has two embedded options: one option is when to exercise the stock option and the other option is when to sell the stock. This new feature allows different exercise policies for executive stock options under different tax schemes. We apply the model to the US and the UK tax system. The findings suggest that restricted stock is the preferred form of compensation in the US. In the UK, restricted stock is only preferred when the executive has low wealth. We also investigate incentives of a special tax scheme - section 83b election - which gives employees a choice to pay income tax at grant date. This voluntary election allows the executive to accelerate ta.x on restricted stock. Our results suggest that 83b election is not optimal for the manager, who would get double-taxed. And it is not optimal for the issuing firm either, as restricted stock without the election can provide higher incentives at lower cost. The value of executive stock options (ESOs) should depend on the manager's ability to influence firm value. ESOs are granted under the assumption that the executive could make the firm value increase. However, ESOs are always valued with no managerial influence. Chapter 4 examines valuation of ESOs, with the assumption that the manager can influence the firm value via her effort choice. The manager influences stock prices by exerting effort, which increases the firm's stock expected return. Effort leads to a disutility (which can be regarded as effort cost) to the risk-averse, utility-maximizing manager. In addition to the effort choice, the market asset. is also introduced to the manager's investment set. Effort increases the manager's subjective valuation as well as the cost of ESO. The standard principal-agent model is not strictly speaking consistent with general equilibrium models like CAP1vI. Managerial effort is generally not priced under these equilibrium models, because all managers are pricetakers. For this reason, we assume that CAPM does not strictly hold when effort is introduced. Our results show that the manager's value and the cost increase with the correlation, because the manager delays a value destroying early exercise. We also show that the manager's subjective value of the ESO is higher than the cost only when the manager has low wealth, low risk-aversion, and the stock has a low volatility. Under these scenarios, the manager's marginal utility is high and effort has a large impact on the manager's valuation. As a result, the value is higher than the cost. These results suggest that managers of large public firms are less likely to value their ESOs higher than the cost; while managers of small non-public firms are likely to value their ESOs far higher than their cost. The result may explain why ESO is so popular in small startup firms, where ESO is most likely to be valued higher than the cost.

碩士
國立雲林科技大學
電機工程系碩士班
93
With the rapid development of the Hi-Tech industry, the power quality is more and more important. When the electric perturbation phenomenon such as: voltage sag, voltage swell, voltage flicker ,load flicker and unbalance three-phases voltages is happen, the power system should be operated to supply users with stable and reliable electricity. The system analysis and control scheme of static synchronous compensator are presented in the thesis, When the utility system is in the normal condition, the compensator is operated to improve the power factor at the source side. When the electric perturbation phenomenon is happen, the compensator can compensate the reactive power in order to obtain the constant RMS value at the load side. In order to verify the feasibility of the control scheme proposed in this thesis, the software package MATLAB/SIMULINK is used to obtain the simulated waveforms.

碩士
國立中正大學
會計資訊與法律數位學習碩士在職專班
105
The National Securities Exchange Act the amended Provision 6 of Article 14 in November 2010 to promote the listing (cabinet) company set up the Compensation committee and to implement corporate governance, internal assessment and the compensation will be more transparent. This study explores the restraining effects of establishing a Compensation committee imposed on the remuneration of directors and whether director compensation became effectively linked to firm performance, after the Taiwanese authorities announced legislation requiring all publicly traded companies to establish a Compensation committee. This study selected Taiwan's listed and OTC companies from 2010 to 2015 as the sample and analyzed them via statistical methods, including the Pearson's correlation and Multiple Regression Analysis. The empirical results are as follows:（1）director compensation correlates negatively with setting Compensation committee, but the correlation is less significant, which means Compensation committee has little effect on the director compensation. （2）setting of Compensation committee can improve the association between director compensation and firm performance, the correlation is significant.

碩士
中國文化大學
會計學系
102
This study aims to examine the impact of compensation committee, governance style on managers’ abnormal compensation. To conduct this research, a sample consisting of listed companies trading in the Taiwan Stock Market in 2012 are used as investigated subjects and the abnormal compensation model developed by Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) is used to determine abnormal compensation. The findings indicate that abnormal management compensation is negatively associated with the ratio of committee members concurrently having professorship and professional credientials. Such a result shows that companies with higher professional qualificationns are less likely to allow their managers to have abnormal compensation. In addition, ths research finds that governace style is a moderating variable. The results demonstrate that companies adopting stewardship governance operations have less abnormal management compensation, compared to thoses with a agency governance style. Such results imply that governance styles affect the operations of the remuneration committee and that the committee under the seyle of stewardship governace gives less restrictions on their managemet compensation.

碩士
國立東華大學
會計與財務碩士學位學程
102
This study investigates the influence of corporate performance, board characteristics and compensation committee on director also examines whether the board of directors monitor executive risk-taking effectively. The data was selected from 2011 to 2012 publicly traded Taiwan companies. The findings of this study are summarized as follows: 1. Well-designed system of compensation gives incentives to the director. The firm determines directors’ compensation according to their performance, reflecting their relative performance. 2. The larger size of boards professionals introduce the more earnings management, the more difficult by the board of directors. Reduce the directors in their directors' profit incentive. 3. Higher share-holding directors would more likely to monitor any adverse behavior against the firm to avoid the reduction of the firm’s value. 4. According to the management theory, instant and optimal decisions can be better made when the chairman of the board also serves as the chief executive officer. His/her shareholding is relatively high, which reduces the desire to use the system of compensation. 5. Compared to the independent directors in family corporations, the independent directors in compensation committee in the non-family corporations perform their oversight duty better.

碩士
國立彰化師範大學
財務金融技術學系
102
The main purpose of this paper is to inspect the effect on the Compensation structure after the establishment of the mandatory of the Compensation committee. First, we investigate the influence on compensation Committee established for Disclosure of compensation. Following by a discussion with the Compensation which have been disclosured. The results show that Company has established a Compensation committee for CEO compensation disclosure and CEO pay-performance sensitivity are not significant, but in the relative performance evaluation are negative and significant.

碩士
國立高雄第一科技大學
會計資訊研究所
102
This study aims to focus on the effect of director compensation disclosure and compensation committee on the relationship between compensation and performance. Listed company in Taiwan Stock Exchange works as research subject. The results show that, when the ratio of the remuneration of all directors to net profit is positive, the effect of the change of director compensation disclosure and the setting of compensation committee on the relationship between compensation and firm performance are positive and significantly. The change of director compensation disclosure helps to enhance information transparency and the relationship between director compensation and operating conditions. Therefore disclosure as detailed as possible to bring directors comparative value and enhance the company''s performance. Setting of compensation committee, strengthens the relationship between director compensation and company performance, improves corporate performance compensation system, formulates a reasonable directors remuneration, and strengthens corporate governance to improve the company performance. However, when the member of the remuneration committee as a director or independent director, and the frequency of meetings have no significant positive effect on the relationship between directors compensation and firm performance. Probably because most of the members of the remuneration committee chaired by external experts. And the time of compensation committees set up is too short to perform its effectiveness.

碩士
中國文化大學
會計學系
104
This study is to examine the effects of independence, profession, and work involvement of compensation committees on abnormal executive compensation. To conduct this research, non-financial firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange are used as a sample, and independence is measured by the ratio of the number of independent directors relative to the total committee members, profession by the ratio of the number of members concurrently having professorship or professional credentials relative to the total committee members, work involvement by the attendance frequency and the number of meetings held by compensation committees. The results show that independence as well as profession do not individually affect abnormal executive compensation. However, the interaction variable of independence and profession is significantly associated with abnormal executive compensation, indicating that there exists the interactive effect of independence and profession on abnormal executive compensation. This study thus suggests that, in order to improve the rationality of executive compensation, independence and profession of compensation committees should be risen at the same time. In addition, the study demonstrates that the number of meetings is positively related to abnormal fixed executive compensation, showing that companies with more meetings have higher abnormal fixed executive compensation. Such a result implies that an overly high number of meetings may be caused by irrational executive reward policy.

碩士
國立高雄應用科技大學
會計系
104
Before remuneration committees are established in Taiwan’s listed companies, the boards of directors used to dominate executive compensation. However, according to Article 14-6 of Securities and Exchange Act, Taiwan’s listed companies have to appoint remuneration committees since 2011. In addition, the committees are required to not only be composed of at least three members who possess professional qualifications and independence but also convene at least twice per annum. Therefore, the appointments of remuneration committees will be beneficial of Taiwan’s listed companies to effectively connect executive compensation with personal performance of top executives, operational performance and future risks. First of all, this research examines the impacts of executive compensation on Taiwan’s listed companies appointing remuneration committees. The empirical results support the companies appointing remuneration committees significantly have more lucrative executive compensation than the ones without appointing. Secondly, there is a positive relationship between executive compensation and operational performance in the companies appointing remuneration committees compared with the ones without appointing. Finally, when members of remuneration committees include independent directors, the remuneration committees within higher percentage of independent directors will function better. Furthermore, when independent directors server as conveners, remuneration committees could propose more rational executive compensation packages, which utilize remuneration committees most.

碩士
國立中正大學
會計與資訊科技研究所
105
This study examines the relationships between compensation committee quality and directors' excess compensation. This study measures compensation committee quality using variables of compensation committee independence, compensation committee with overlapping more than three companies, the size compensation committee, professional background and overlapping audit and compensation committees. The sample is collected from Taiwan listed companies for the period of 2012 to 2014, which is excluded financial, insurance, securities and investment trust industries. The result indicated that the higher proportion of independent directors serve in compensation committee can reduce directors' excess compensation. The higher proportion of scholars serves in compensation committee can reduce directors' excess compensation. The higher proportion of overlapping membership on compensation and audit committees increases directors' excess compensation. In sum, this study finds compensation committee independence, professional background and overlapping membership on compensation and audit committees can enhance monitoring effects of compensation committee and set reasonable directors' compensation policies, and then improve the company's governance quality.

碩士
中原大學
會計研究所
105
This study focuses on the listed companies in 2015 as the object of study, to explore the effect of compensation committee’s diligence on top management’s compensation, and mainly concerned about the top management and the CEO duality’s compensation, and compensation committee’s diligence including the number of meetings and attendance rates of meetings. The results indicate that the increase in the number of meetings of the compensation Committee has failed to reduce the compensation of top management and the CEO duality. The above results may arise from the member of compensation committee failing to reach a consensus on the top manager''s compensation at the earlier meetings. Hence, it is necessary to get more meetings to reach a consensus, but even if the number of meetings increased failed to reach a consensus to develop a reasonable salary, so final failed to do their duties. As regards the attendance rate of the compensation committee, the increase in attendance rate can reduce the compensation of s top management and the CEO duality.