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Journal articles on the topic 'Commonwealth of Australia Constitution'
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1
Lilienthal, Gary, and Nehaluddin Ahmad. "AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND APPREHENDED BIAS: SKIRTING MAGNA CARTA PROTECTIONS?" Denning Law Journal 27 (November 16, 2015): 146–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5750/dlj.v27i0.1104.
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The significance of this paper is in discussion of the wholesale obliteration of religious and other rights among Australian Aboriginal people, constituting a subspecies of continuing genocide. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia states its directive on religion as follows.‘The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.’This constitutional section prohibits the making of laws, as stated, but does not prohibit administrative action imposing religious procedures. Neither does it prohibit official administrative action to restrain the free exercise of religion in Australia.
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Saunders, Cheryl. "Australian Federalism and the Role of the Governor-General." International Journal of Legal Information 28, no. 2 (2000): 407–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0731126500009185.
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Australia is both a federation and a constitutional monarchy. The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, which made the Australian Constitution law, refers to the establishment of the federation “under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.” In fact, however, since 1973, the appropriate style of the monarch in relation to Australia has been “Queen of Australia.” And ever since federation, the monarch has been represented in Australia by a Governor-General, who progressively has acquired a more significant role, in parallel with the acquisition of Australian independence.
3
Kelly, Danial. "Natural Resources Law in Australia: Principles and Practices." Jambe Law Journal 1, no. 2 (July 12, 2019): 155–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.22437/jlj.1.2.155-176.
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What is the jurisprudential approach taken to Natural Resources Law in Australia? The ultimate source of law in Australia is Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act however the Constitution does not specifically include an environment or natural resources power and the Commonwealth government can only make laws under the heads of power provided by the Constitution. This paper considers how natural resources law has developed as environmental protection law, especially the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act. Also discussed is the approach taken by the Northern Territory of Australia in relation to natural resources law. The discussion unearths the developing jurisprudence in Australian natural resources law that seems to increasingly favour environmental protection over human development.
4
Bond, Catherine. "Tobacco Plain Packaging in Australia: JT International v Commonwealth and Beyond." QUT Law Review 17, no. 2 (November 24, 2017): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/qutlr.v17i2.702.
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For as long as plain packaging legislation had been floated as an option for tobacco products, tobacco companies had threatened legal action against such a regime. Those threats became action when, two tobacco companies separately commenced litigation in the High Court of Australia claiming that the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) breached section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution. Yet, the Act survived that challenge and remains in force to this day. This article reviews the introduction of the Act and subsequent challenge, and closely analyses the judgments comprising the decision in JT International v Commonwealth. It then examines how plain packaging has operated in practice, including enforcement of the regime and unexpected legal issues arising from its application. This article concludes with a reflection on what the Commonwealth’s victory regarding plain packaging means for constitutional intellectual property issues more generally.
5
Gray, Anthony. "The Protection of Voting Equality in Australia." Federal Law Review 44, no. 3 (September 2016): 557–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x1604400309.
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This paper argues that the High Court should accept that the Commonwealth Constitution embraces the concept of voter equality, such that systems of malapportionment may be liable to constitutional challenge. Specifically, it argues that ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution create a system of representative government and representative democracy which require that elections be free and fair, and that a malapportionment could potentially interfere with the system of representative democracy which the Constitution requires. Recent case law reinforces notions of equality in ss 7 and 24, which can be applied in the context of voter equality.
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Selway, Justice B. M. "The Constitutional Role of the Queen of Australia." Common Law World Review 32, no. 3 (July 2003): 248–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/147377950303200302.
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When the Australian federation came into existence in 1901 the same King ruled throughout the British Empire. The Crown was indivisible. The Australian Commonwealth Constitution reflected that political and legal reality. That reality has undergone considerable change in the last century. The Empire no longer exists, although some of the former dominions and colonies remain monarchies. The Queen is now monarch of 15 separate and independent nations, including Australia. In so far as Australia is concerned, these developments raise a number of practical and constitutional issues. These issues relate both to the relationship of the Australian monarchy with those other monarchies which share the same Queen and to the role of the Australian monarch within the Australian federation. Some of those issues are explored in this paper.
7
Rasnic, Carol Daugherty. "The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia." International Journal of Constitutional Law 14, no. 4 (October 2016): 1038–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/mow067.
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Hume, David, Andrew Lynch, and George Williams. "Heresy in the High Court? Federalism as a Constraint on Commonwealth Power." Federal Law Review 41, no. 1 (March 2013): 71–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.22145/flr.41.1.3.
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Williams v Commonwealth of Australia is a landmark decision of the High Court on the scope of federal executive power in s 61 of the Constitution. The decision is also important for the interpretive methodology adopted by the Court. Notably, each judge based their understanding of s 61 upon federal readings of the Constitution. This methodology raises fresh questions about how the Constitution is to be interpreted, and whether Williams marks a break from orthodox understandings of that task. This article assesses the significance of Williams for constitutional interpretation in Australia, and whether it lays the foundation for a more robust protection of state interests by the High Court.
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Jones, Timothy H. "Freedom of Political Communication in Australia." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 45, no. 2 (April 1996): 392–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589300059042.
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In three important decisions,1 handed down on the same day in October 1994, the Australian High Court continued its exploration of the implied constitutional guarantee of freedom of political communication. Two years previously, in the judgments in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v. Wills2 and Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth,3 a majority of the High Court had distilled an implication of freedom of political communication from the provisions and structure of the Australian Constitution.4 This was not an implication of freedom of expression generally, since it was derived from the concept of representative government which the majority considered to be enshrined in the Constitution: “not all speech can claim the protection of the constitutional implication of freedom … identified in order to ensure the efficacious working of representative democracy and government”.5 The extent of this implied constitutional guarantee was left rather unclear, since a number of different views were expressed. As Justice Toohey has now explained,6 there were two possibilities. The first was a more limited “implied freedom on the part of the people of the Commonwealth to communicate information, opinions and ideas relating to the system of representative government”. The second was a rather more expansive “freedom to communicate in relation to public affairs and political matters generally”. In the recent trilogy of cases a majority of the High Court was prepared to endorse the second of these alternatives.7 In Cunliffe v. The Commonwealth Chief Justice Mason concluded that it would be too restrictive to limit the implied freedom to “communications for the purposes of the political processes in a representative democracy”.8
10
Cassidy, Julie. "Hollow Avowals of Human Rights Protection - Time for an Australian Federal Bill of Rights?" Deakin Law Review 13, no. 2 (December 1, 2008): 131. http://dx.doi.org/10.21153/dlr2008vol13no2art162.
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<p>Unlike the constitutions of many nations, such as the United States of America and the Republic of South Africa, the constitutions of the Australian States and Territories and the Commonwealth Constitution Act 1901 (UK) contain no bill of rights. Australia is the only western democracy without a federal bill of rights. The debate regarding the need for a bill of rights necessitates an understanding of what human rights the people of Australia already enjoy. If sufficient protection can be found in existing sources, does Australia really need a federal bill of rights? Opponents of a bill of rights state that we have sufficient protection from arbitrary government intervention in our personal affairs and thus a bill of rights is<br />unnecessary. There are a number of potential sources of human rights in Australia that might provide the suggested existing protection, including the common law, specific domestic legislation, international law and constitutional law. Each of these sources of human rights has, however,<br />important limitations. The focus of this article is on the inadequacy of the Australian constitutions as a source of purported protection. This in turn suggests that an alternative source of rights is needed – a federal bill of rights? In the course of this analysis the author makes suggestions for<br />reform; specifically how a federal bill of rights may address the paucity of constitutional protection.</p>
11
Gageler, Stephen. "James Bryce and the Australian Constitution." Federal Law Review 43, no. 2 (June 2015): 177–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.22145/flr.43.2.1.
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James Bryce was a contemporary of Albert Venn Dicey. Bryce published in 1888 The American Commonwealth. Its detailed description of the practical operation of the United States Constitution was influential in the framing of the Australian Constitution in the 1890s. The project of this article is to shed light on that influence. The article compares and contrasts the views of Bryce and of Dicey; Bryce's views, unlike those of Dicey, having been largely unexplored in contemporary analyses of our constitutional development. It examines the importance of Bryce's views on two particular constitutional mechanisms – responsible government and judicial review – to the development of our constitutional structure. The ongoing theoretical implications of The American Commonwealth for Australian constitutional law remain to be pondered.
12
Voytovich, E. A. "Constitutional and legal bases for the formation of the Senate of the Australian Commonwealth." Journal of Law and Administration 16, no. 1 (April 11, 2020): 36–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2073-8420-2020-1-54-36-41.
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Introduction. The article is devoted to the organizational and legal issues of formation of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Australia. The author analyses the foundations of the constitutional regulation of the formation of the Senate. Now there are no works exploring in detail the manner the Senate of the Australian Commonwealth is formed.Materials and Methods. To create the article, the author used the works of Australian scholars in the field of constitutional law, as well as a number of legal acts regulating the issues addressed in the article. The methodology of the study was based on general scientific and private scientific methods of cognition (the dialectical method, methods of analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction, comparative legal and historical legal methods).Research Results. The author has considered specific characteristics of the Senate and in particular the constitutional norm establishing the system where senators are elected directly by the people of each entity of the Australian Commonwealth. The author also analyses the formation of the electoral system applied to formation of the Senate of the Australian Commonwealth.Discussion and conclusions. In this article, the author draws attention to the stability and invariability of the foundations of Senate legal regulation, established by the Constitution of the Australian Union, approved by the British Parliament and signed by the British monarch. The author pays attention to the peculiarities of the formation of the Australian legislature.
13
M Sakr, Johnny, and Augusto Zimmermann. "Judicial Activism and Constitutional (Mis) Interpretation." University of Queensland Law Journal 40, no. 1 (March 26, 2021): 119–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.38127/uqlj.v40i1.5643.
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In this article, the authors explore the concept of judicial activism and its application in the Australian domestic cases of Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth and Love v Commonwealth, and in the US case of Obergefell v Hodges. The article highlights the devastating effects of judicial activism on legal interpretation, arguing that such activism compromises the doctrine of separation of powers and affects the realisation of the rule of law, resulting in a method ofinterpretation that incorporates personal biases and political opinion, thus ignoring the original intent of the framers of the Australian Constitution. Moreover, the article highlights that implementing a federal Bill of Rights might further exacerbate these ongoing problems concerning judicial activism in Australia.
14
Holloway, Ian. "Sir Francis Forbes and the Earliest Australian Public Law Cases." Law and History Review 22, no. 2 (2004): 209–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4141646.
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There is, among many students of Australian law, a tendency to regard the establishment of constitutional government in Australia in positivistic terms: as a result of the passage of the New South Wales Act in 1823, or of the Australian Courts Act in 1828, or of the Australian Constitution Acts of 1842 and 1850, or even of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act in 1900. This is understandable, for, as Sir Victor Windeyer once put it, there was in the foundation of European society on these islands no element whatever of a social contract. Rather, the move to populate the Australian territories was a consequence entirely of a prospectively looking determination made by the government in London. And, as Windeyer went on to note, the formal establishment of local government was effected by ceremonies that were by their very essence positivistic in nature. On 26 January 1788, there was first a formal ceremony in which the Union flag was raised and a salute fired. Then, on 7 February, the whole population of the colony was assembled and the royal letters patent were read, which formally instructed Captain Phillip to go about the duty of creating a penal establishment.
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Guy, Scott, and Barbara Ann Hocking. "Why Military Matters: Re Colonel Arid; Ex parte Alpert and the 'Service Connection' Test versus the 'Service Status' Test: Competing Approaches to the Triggering of the Defence Power." Deakin Law Review 13, no. 2 (December 1, 2008): 177. http://dx.doi.org/10.21153/dlr2008vol13no2art163.
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<p>With political changes afoot in both Australia and the United States, it is timely to review military regimes and remind ourselves how greatly they matter. Section 51(vi) of the Constitution authorises the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate with respect to: ‘The naval and military defence of<br />the Commonwealth and of the several States and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth…’ One of the concerns in relation to s 51(vi) has been whether this provision supports the establishment of military tribunals and, further, whether these tribunals can<br />be regarded as exercising judicial power of the Commonwealth and thus be regarded as properly constituted courts for the purposes of Ch III of the Australian Constitution. The High Court’s 2004 decision in Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte Alpert has established that military tribunals and, more generally, the military discipline system will be regarded as constitutionally<br />valid and a properly constituted court for the purposes of Ch III provided that it is applied to conduct which can be regarded as ‘service connected’ or invoked for the purposes of enforcing and maintaining discipline among the defence forces. This article examines the decision in Aird’s Case and the associated ‘service connection’ test as a basis for supporting the constitutional validity of the military tribunal system. The concluding section of the article develops some further observations on the newly created Australian Military Court.</p>
16
Kirby CMG, Michael J. "THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - A CENTENARY REFLECTION." Denning Law Journal 16, no. 1 (November 23, 2012): 45–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5750/dlj.v16i1.300.
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In October 2003 in Melbourne, the High Court of Australia celebrated the centenary of its first sitting. According to the Australian Constitution, it is the “Federal Supreme Court” of the Australian Commonwealth.1 Although the Constitution envisaged the establishment of the High Court, the first sitting of the new court did not take place until a statute had provided for the court and the appointment of its first Justices. They took their seats in a ceremony held in the Banco Court in the Supreme Court of Victoria on 6 October 1903. Exactly a century later, the present Justices assembled in the same courtroom for a sitting to mark the first century of the Court.
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Ng, Yee-Fui. "Political Constitutionalism: Individual Responsibility and Collective Restraint." Federal Law Review 48, no. 4 (September 10, 2020): 455–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x20955100.
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Australia’s Constitution has been shaped by a blend of legal and political constitutionalism; yet there is limited attention given to political mechanisms of control in Australia. With the recent developments in the United Kingdom and the turmoil of Brexit that shifted the balance between legal and political constitutionalism, it is timely to examine how political constitutionalism has evolved in Australia. This article argues that Australian political constitutionalism is distinct from the United Kingdom as it is shaped not by internal conflict about the nature of the constitution but rather by the significant evolutionary development of fundamental institutions. In particular, it is argued that there are three critical junctures for political constitutionalism in Australia: the foundations of the Commonwealth, the formation of disciplined political parties and the rise of oversight bodies. It is contended that Australia may be reaching a new critical juncture due to the fragmentation of responsible government from privatisation and outsourcing and the rise of ministerial advisers.
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Burton, Lisa. "Why These Three? the Significance of the Selection of Remedies in Section 75(V) of the Australian Constitution." Federal Law Review 42, no. 2 (June 2014): 253–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.22145/flr.42.2.2.
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Section 75(v) of the Australian Constitution gives the High Court original jurisdiction to hear ‘all matters … in which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.’ This is said to guarantee the Court's ability to ensure that officers of the Commonwealth act within the law. Yet the s 75(v) jurisdiction is clearly limited. The Court is not authorised to hear all matters in which it is alleged that an officer of the Commonwealth has acted unlawfully; it is only given jurisdiction to hear matters in which a (somewhat surprising) selection of remedies are sought. This is confusing in itself, and it has caused broader confusion about the purpose and scope of this important constitutional provision. This article examines the historical ambit of the judicial review remedies and evidence from the Constitutional Convention Debates in order to determine why s 75(v) only gives the High Court jurisdiction to hear matters in which mandamus, prohibition and injunction are sought, and the significance of this for judicial review under the Australian Constitution.
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Stephenson, Peta. "Fertile Ground for Federalism? Internal Security, the States and Section 119 of the Constitution." Federal Law Review 43, no. 2 (June 2015): 289–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.22145/flr.43.2.5.
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Section 119 of the Australian Constitution confers a duty on the Commonwealth to protect the states against invasion. It also directs the Commonwealth to protect the states against domestic violence when an application is made by a state government. This article contends that there are compelling reasons to construe this second limb of s 119 as a federal constraint on the power of the Commonwealth to call out the military domestically. This interpretation of s 119 is consistent with the plain meaning and constitutional context of the provision and it coheres well with the High Court's revival of interpretive federalism.
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Olivier, Eliot. "Proroguing the Parliament of Australia: The Effect on the Senate and the Conventions that Constrain the Prerogative Power." Federal Law Review 40, no. 1 (March 2012): 69–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.22145/flr.40.1.3.
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Political controversies in New South Wales and Canada recently have focused public attention on the constitutional practice of proroguing parliament. They have also shone a light on two lingering areas of uncertainty that surround its operation under the Commonwealth Constitution. This article seeks to clarify these two muddy areas of the law concerning prorogation. The first is the effect of prorogation on the Senate and its committees. Since Federation, the Senate has purported to authorise its committees to continue to function notwithstanding a prorogation of the Parliament. However, it is argued that this practice is unsupported by the provisions of the Constitution and the Senate has no such power. Second, the article examines the operation of the conventions that constrain the Governor-General's power to prorogue. Prorogation generally is exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister. However, this article contends that where a Prime Minister seeks to prorogue Parliament to avoid a vote of no confidence, the Governor-General will have a discretion to reject the advice. It may also be open to the Governor-General to reject an advice to prorogue where the purpose is to avoid scrutiny of a fundamental constitutional illegality. In Australia, the uncertainties that surround prorogation, coupled with the now precarious political landscape in Canberra, create the very real possibility of a prorogation crisis at the Commonwealth level. This article provides a response to these uncertainties. In doing so it offers a solution to how a prorogation crisis can be resolved, whilst maintaining the fine balance of power in our constitutional system.
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McConvill, James, and Darryl Smith. "Interpretation and Cooperative Federalism: Bond v R from a Constitutional Perspective." Federal Law Review 29, no. 1 (March 2001): 75–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x0102900104.
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[C]o-operative federalism is not a constitutional term. It is a political slogan, not a criterion of constitutional validity or power. … Where constitutional power does not exist, no cry of co-operative federalism can supply it. If the object lies outside the reach or the effect of what a State or the Common-wealth can constitutionally do, the subject matter is beyond the reach of the legislature. 1 1 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 (‘Re Wakim’) at 556 per McHugh J. See also McHugh J's pertinent comment in McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140 at 231-32: “After the decision of this Court in the Engineers' Case, the Court had consistently held, prior to Nationwide News and Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth, that it is not legitimate to construe the Constitution by reference to political principles or theories that are not anchored in the text of the Constitution or are not necessary implications from its structure” (emphasis added). For a discussion of the High Court's alternative “flexible” approach to constitutional interpretation, refer to J McConvill “The United Kingdom is a Foreign Power- Sue v Hill” (2000) 4(2) Deakin L R 151.
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Gageler, Stephen. "Sir Robert Garran: Medio Tutissimus Ibis." Federal Law Review 46, no. 1 (March 2018): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.22145/flr.46.1.1.
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Sir Robert Randolph Garran (10 February 1867-11 January 1957) played a unique role in the early development of the Commonwealth. As Secretary to the Drafting Committee of the Australasian Federal Convention of 1897 and 1898, he was intimately involved in the process by which the Australian Constitution was produced. As Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department from 1901 to 1932, he was responsible for drafting foundational Commonwealth legislation and he played a key part in establishing coherent interpretations of the Constitution in advice to successive Federal Governments. Three aspects of Garran's life and work are explored in this article: the popular movement which established the process by which the Constitution was negotiated, drafted, and submitted to referenda for approval; Garran's tenure and legacy as Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department; and Garran's views on federalism and constitutional law.
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WILLIAMS, GEORGE. "THE CONSTITUTION AND A NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REGIME." Deakin Law Review 10, no. 2 (July 1, 2005): 498. http://dx.doi.org/10.21153/dlr2005vol10no2art289.
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<div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span>[</span><span>The federal Government is proposing to bring about a single national scheme for the regulation of industrial relations in Australia. This will raise a number of important constitutional questions that may need to be resolved by the High Court. These questions as examined in this article are: could a single national law for the regulation of industrial relations be passed under a head of Commonwealth power (in particular, under the Commonwealth's powers over corporations, interstate trade and commerce or external affairs); even such a law could so be enacted, would it nevertheless be struck down due to an express or implied constitutional limitation; and to what extent could the law override the State laws that already govern much of the field?</span><span>] </span></p></div></div></div>
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Fleay, Jesse John, and Barry Judd. "The Uluru statement." International Journal of Critical Indigenous Studies 12, no. 1 (January 24, 2019): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/ijcis.v12i1.532.
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From every State and Territory of Australia, including the islands of the Torres Strait over 200 delegates gathered at the 2017 First Nations National Constitutional Convention in Uluru, which has stood on Anangu Pitjantjatjara country in the Northern Territory since time immemorial, to discuss the issue of constitutional recognition. Delegates agreed that tokenistic recognition would not be enough, and that recognition bearing legal substance must stand, with the possibility to make multiple treaties between Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders and the Commonwealth Government of Australia. In this paper, we look at the roadmap beyond such a potential change. We make the case for a redistributive approach to capital, and propose key outcomes for social reconstruction, should a voice to parliament, a Makarrata[1] Commission and multiple treaties be enabled through a successful referendum. We conclude that an alteration of the Commonwealth Constitution (Cth) is the preliminary overture of a suite of changes: the constitutional change itself is not the end of the road, but simply the beginning of years of legal change, which seeks provide a socio-economic future for Australia’s First Peoples, and the oldest continuing cultures in the world. Constitutional change seeks to transform the discourse about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander relations with the Australian state from one centred on distributive justice to one that is primarily informed by retributive justice. This paper concerns the future generations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children, and their right to labour in a market that honours their cultural contributions to humanity at large.
[1] Yolŋu ceremony for coming together after a struggle.
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Morris, Caroline. "Book Review: The Constitution of Independence." Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 36, no. 3 (October 1, 2005): 669. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v36i3.5612.
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This article is a book review of Peter C Oliver The Constitution of Independence: The Development of Constitutional Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) (367 + xx pages). The book is a contribution to the area of domestic constitutional law of the Commonwealth. Oliver addresses the question: are the former colonies of Britain ever truly independent, or is that independence illusory? He also asks how such colonies seek to understand and explain their constitutional history. Morris argues that the book had a great deal of potential but has been left unrealised. As a legal historiography, the book does not always satisfactorily explain how people involved in creating that legal history (or in analysing it since) understand it. As an exercise in constitutional theory, the book merely suggests that there is nothing much to choose between theories as a matter of logic. The book also suffers from very dense prose and a number of distracting metaphors for the process of constitutional independence. Morris ultimately concludes that the book fails to provide useful insight into New Zealand's constitutional theory.
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Manin, Iaroslav. "Legal regime of subsoil use in Australia." Административное и муниципальное право, no. 2 (February 2021): 54–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0595.2021.2.34270.
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The subject of this research is the Australian federal and regional normative legal acts that regulate subsoil use. The object is public relations in the sphere of land turnover, subsurface and natural resource management in the Commonwealth of Australia. The author describes the system and structure of normative legal regulation, as well as subsoil use in Australia. The work contains a list of sources of the Australian natural resources law; analysis of their content is carried out. Special attention is given to the legal regime of exploitation of subsoil resources of the continental shelf of the Commonwealth of Australia, licensing of subsoil use, the role of British monarchy in exercising the right of ownership of land by its subjects, and the authority for subsoil management. The scientific novelty of this article consists in the disclosure of legal regime of subsoil use in the Commonwealth of Australia in the context of amendments to Australian natural resources legislation, constitutional and administrative reforms. This work reflects the economic interest of the Russian Federation and domestic organizations of the fuel and energy complex in the Oceania Region, which defines its relevance. The presented materials can be used within the framework of comparative jurisprudence, lawmaking, for educational and other purposes. The author concludes on the preservation of public legal regime of subsoil use in Australia, namely with regards to turnover of licenses and shares therein.
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Lee, David. "Labor, the External Affairs Power and the Rights of Aborigines." Labour History 120, no. 1 (May 1, 2021): 49–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/jlh.2021.4.
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The Australian Constitution gave the Commonwealth not a “treaty power” but a vague power over “external affairs,” the precise meaning of which was elusive for most of the twentieth century. From the 1930s, Labor judges and politicians such as H. V. Evatt saw its potential to extend Commonwealth power by legislating international agreements throughout Australia. The non-Labor parties rejected the idea of using the “external affairs” power to legislate in areas formerly the responsibility of the states but the federal Labor Party continued in the Evatt tradition. After significant uncertainties, the Whitlam government used the external affairs power to pass the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, the first significant human rights legislation in the country, which in turn had a profound effect on the law of the land in the country by making the second Mabo Case possible.
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Hartford Davis, Sebastian Howard. "The Legal Personality of the Commonwealth of Australia." Federal Law Review 47, no. 1 (February 8, 2019): 3–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x18816236.
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The article analyses legal materials concerning the legal personality of the Commonwealth of Australia under domestic law. It argues that the Commonwealth as legal person has an existence, as a unit of the legal system, which is conceptually distinct from the Commonwealth of Australia as a nation, and the Commonwealth as federal government of that nation. Current idioms (eg ‘polity’ and ‘body politic’) have a tendency to confuse these distinctions. The article suggests, as a more appropriate way to denote the Commonwealth as legal person, the term ‘constitutional person’.
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Harris, Bede Xavier, and Elizabeth Pearl Harris. "Interfering Busybody or Public-Minded Citizen? The Actio Popularis as a Model for Reform of the Rules of Standing in Constitutional Cases in Australia." Journal of Politics and Law 11, no. 1 (February 25, 2018): 62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v11n1p62.
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The interpretation given by the courts to the word ‘matter’ in sections 75 and 76 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, and the restrictive approach taken by the courts to what amounts to a sufficient interest in a matter, have led to the consequence that only litigants who can demonstrate a personal interest can bring an action to challenge a breach of the Constitution. This provides insufficient protection for constitutionalism because it means that the enforcement of the Constitution is contingent on there being a self-interested applicant who will bring an action – and, conversely, creates the risk that breaches of the Constitution will be allowed to stand in cases where those who do have standing find it in their political interests to refrain from taking action. With its focus on personal interest, the current approach excludes the altruistic applicant and runs counter to the theory that all citizens have a right to ensure that the Constitution is complied with. This paper examines the way in which the actio popularis of Roman law served the ideal of the engaged citizen by enabling citizens to initiate legal action to enforce public duties, and how modern equivalents of the actio in a number of jurisdictions achieve the same purpose. The paper draws on John Rawls’ theory of justice in arguing for reform of the law on standing in Australia so as to confer open standing in constitutional cases.
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Malagodi, Mara, Luke McDonagh, and Thomas Poole. "New Dominion constitutionalism at the twilight of the British Empire: An introduction." International Journal of Constitutional Law 17, no. 4 (October 2019): 1166–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz082.
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Abstract This introduction to the symposium on New Dominion constitutionalism sketches the legal configuration of New Dominion status and the intellectual context from which it emerged. Dominionhood originally represented a halfway house between colonial dependence and postcolonial independence, as developed in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. By contrast, New Dominion constitutionalism refers to the transitional constitutional form developed after World War I in Ireland (1922–1937)—the “Bridge Dominion”—and the post-World War II “New” Dominions of India (1947–1950), Pakistan (1947–1956), and Ceylon (later Sri Lanka, 1948–1972). New Dominion constitutionalism represents the first model designed to manage political transitions on a global scale. Both transitional and transnational, New Dominion constitutions served as a provisional frame of government and the juridical basis for the independent constitution. Although the notion of Dominion fell into disuse, it reemerged as the concept of Commonwealth Realm through which the majority of the remaining British colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean acquired independence.
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Ludeke, J. T. "The External Affairs Power: Another Province for Law and Order?" Journal of Industrial Relations 35, no. 3 (September 1993): 453–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002218569303500306.
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Although there was some surprise when the prime minister announced that the government would legislate to give effect to certain conventions of the International Labour Organisation, the way has been open to take this initiative for many years. The possibility of relying on the external affairs power in the Constitution to invoke the conventions, and thereby regulate labour conditions, was first canvassed in the High Court in 1936. Since 1982, there has been a series of cases involving Common wealth legislation founded on conventions to which Australia is party and it is now well established that the external affairs power will support domestic legislation giving effect to Australia's international commitments. To date, Commonwealth legislative initiatives have been in such areas as prohibiting racial discrimination and the protection of world heritage properties, but the reasoning which has been applied by the High Court is equally relevant to legislation providing for regulation of labour conditions. Commonwealth legislation in this field has meant an erosion of state responsibility and the cumulative effect of such legislation raises questions about the disturbance of the federal balance established by the Constitution.
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Timo, Nils. "Future directions for workplace bargaining and aged care under a post 2005 Howard government." Australian Health Review 29, no. 3 (2005): 274. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/ah050274.
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ON THE 1ST OF JULY 2005, the Howard Government took control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate and substantial reform of the nation?s industrial relations framework is likely to proceed. In order to understand the implications of the proposed industrial relations (IR) reform agenda on aged care, it is necessary to briefly revisit the past. Historically, the ability of the Commonwealth Parliament to regulate industrial relations was construed in the context of Section 51 (xxxv) of the Australian Constitution Act 1900 (Cwlth) that enabled the Commonwealth to make laws concerning ?conciliation and arbitration and the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one state?. Since 1904, the Commonwealth, with the states following shortly thereafter, established a regime of industrial tribunals responsible for third party independent conciliation and arbitration, overseeing a system of legally binding industrial awards covering wages and employment conditions. This system, in the words of one of its chief architects, Justice Higgins, ? . . . would substitute for the rude and barbarous processes of strike and lock-out?1 (page 2). By 1991, Australian wages policy gradually shifted from centralised arbitration, elevating workplace agreements to the status of government policy on both sides of politics.2 This process accelerated labour market deregulation, shifting industrial relations and human resource issues to the enterprise level.3 The shift towards workplace agreements post 1990?s was underpinned by a bold reinterpretation of Section 51 (xx) of the Constitution Act that enabled the Commonwealth to regulate the affairs of ?trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth?, thus, by definition, including regulating employee relations of corporations. The use by the Commonwealth of these powers has extended the jurisdiction of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) to include the making and approving of certified agreements made by constitutional corporations or in settlement of an industrial dispute. Other types of employers such as sole traders, churches and charities, partnerships and unincorporated associations remained covered by state industrial jurisdictions. (On these powers of the Commonwealth, see State of
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Blackham, Alysia, and George Williams. "The Appointment of Ministers from outside of Parliament." Federal Law Review 40, no. 2 (June 2012): 253–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.22145/flr.40.2.6.
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Members of the executive in Australia and other Westminster nations are traditionally appointed only from the ranks of parliamentarians, ostensibly to protect the principle of responsible government. However, there is a growing international trend in nations such as the United Kingdom for the appointment of ministers from outside of Parliament. This article examines the extent to which Australia's constitutional system can accommodate unelected members of a Commonwealth, State or Territory executive. This question is analysed from the perspective of the principle of responsible government and the text of Australia's various constitutional documents. The article also reviews existing practice in comparative jurisdictions and Australian law and practice in order to determine the form that such appointments might take.
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Saunders, Benjamin B. "Responsible Government, Statutory Authorities and the Australian Constitution." Federal Law Review 48, no. 1 (November 28, 2019): 4–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x19890445.
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This article examines the compatibility of extra-departmental executive agencies, a defining feature of the modern regulatory state, with responsible government, one of the architectonic principles of the Australian Constitution. Some scholars have argued that a constitutional implication derived from responsible government should be drawn limiting the types of entities that may be established by the Commonwealth and imposing requirements relating to the relationship that must exist between ministers and entities within their portfolio. This article argues that the view that independent statutory agencies are a derogation from the principles of responsible government rests on a misunderstanding of responsible government. Responsible government is an inherently evolutionary system: as incorporated into the Australian Constitution, responsible government was intended to be flexible and non-prescriptive, allowing for change in the governmental arrangements considered necessary from time to time. Independent statutory agencies should not be seen as a challenge to the true principles of responsible government but a legitimate evolution in governance arrangements, which the Constitution deliberately left open.
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Reid, P. C. "RECENT CHANGES TO AUSTRALIA'S OFFSHORE PETROLEUM REGIME." APPEA Journal 26, no. 1 (1986): 102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/aj85011.
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Australia's offshore petroleum legislation is the product of a constitutional compromise enshrined in the Offshore Constitutional Settlement of 1979 between the Commonwealth and the States. Whilst it is current Federal Australian Labor Party policy to dismantle the Offshore Constitutional Settlement and re-assert exclusive Commonwealth jurisdiction from the low-water mark seawards, the Hawke Labor Government has been reluctant to implement this particular policy.A practical consequence of the Offshore Constitutional Settlement for the industry is that many offshore titles are now being split into two separate titles — one under State legislation within the three-mile territorial sea and the other under Commonwealth legislation for the Adjacent Area beyond the territorial sea. The Commonwealth proposal to introduce cash bonus bidding for highly prospective offshore exploration permits after being defeated in the Senate in the first half of 1985 was subsequently passed in November 1985.An APEA proposal for the introduction of a new form of title under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act (PSLA) to protect currently non-commercial reserves has been adopted by legislation.Following the cash bidding debate the Commonwealth Minister has proposed a new set of guidelines for the award of offshore permits which will contain both a fixed dry-hole commitment plus a discretionary program in the event of technical encouragement.The paper concludes with some recommendations for establishing a more secure and certain system of title under the PSLA and to minimize the current administrative delays being experienced by industry. Finally it urges that the current level of consultation between Government and industry on matters of interest arising under the PSLA should be allowed to continue.
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Young, D., R. Brockett, and J. Smart. "AUSTRALIA—SOVEREIGN RISK AND THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY." APPEA Journal 45, no. 1 (2005): 191. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/aj04017.
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Australia has rejoiced in its reputation for having low sovereign risk and corresponding rating, for decades. This reputation was bruised in the first decade after the High Court introduced Native Title into Australian law by the legislative response of the then Government, but has since recovered, and enjoys the world’s lowest country risk rating, and shares the worlds best sovereign risk rating with the USA. A number of government precipitated occurrences in recent times, however, raise the question: for how long can this continue?This paper tracks the long history of occasional broken resource commitments—for both petroleum and mining interests—by governments at both State and Federal level, and the policies which have driven these breaches. It also discusses the notorious recent cancellation of a resource lease by the Queensland Government, first by purporting to cancel the bauxite lease and, after legal action had commenced, by a special Act of Parliament to repeal a State Agreement Act. This has raised concerns in boardrooms around the world of the security of assets held in Australia on a retention, or care and maintenance basis.The paper also looks at the cancellation of the offshore prospecting rights held by WMC, with no compensation. This was a result of the concept that rights extinguished by the Commonwealth, with no gain to the Commonwealth or any other party do not constitute an acquisition of property, thereby denying access to the constitutional guarantee of ’just terms’ supposedly enshrined in the Australian Constitution where an acquisition has occurred.Some other examples are the prohibition on exploration in Queensland national parks last November. This cost some companies with existing tenures a lot of money as exploration permits were granted, but then permission to do seismic exploration refused (Victoria). Several losses of rights occurred as a result of the new Queensland Petroleum and Other Acts Amendment Act after investments have been made.Changes in fiscal policy can also impact on project viability, and some instances of this are considered.This paper also explores ways these risks can be minimised, and how and when compensation might be recovered.
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Harris, Bede. "Do the Queensland Regulations Governing the Refund of Motor Vehicle Registration Fees Breach s 92 of the Commonwealth Constitution?" Journal of Politics and Law 12, no. 4 (November 28, 2019): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v12n4p8.
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The federal system in Australia imposes inconvenience on people. One of these inconveniences arises from the fact that each State and Territory has its own vehicle registration regime. In contrast to other States in Australia, purchasers of vehicles from outside Queensland suffer from a particular burden in that they are denied a refund of the unexpired portion of vehicle registration fees. In this article it is argued that that denial is unlawful both as a matter of the interpretation of the applicable Regulations and because it infringes s 92 of the Commonwealth Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of protectionist burdens on interstate trade and commerce.
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Keyzer, Patrick. "How section 90 of the Constitution makes cannabis law reform less likely in Australia." Alternative Law Journal 45, no. 4 (August 12, 2020): 247–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1037969x20948288.
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Cannabis law reform is unlikely in Australia because section 90 of the Constitution gives the exclusive power to tax goods to the Commonwealth, yet it is the states and territories that have the power to decriminalise use. What incentive does a state have to decriminalise cannabis if they cannot tax it? This article summarises the High Court’s s 90 jurisprudence. It also briefly explores the question of whether the states or territories could impose a levy on cannabis as a ‘fee for services rendered’ in the event that a user accesses state health services for cannabis-related health conditions.
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Gerangelos, Peter. "The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia: Section 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution, ‘nationhood’ and the Future of the Prerogative." Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 12, no. 1 (September 28, 2012): 97–131. http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/147293412803188838.
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Beck, Luke. "The Case against Improper Purpose as the Touchstone for Invalidity under Section 116 of the Australian Constitution." Federal Law Review 44, no. 3 (September 2016): 505–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x1604400307.
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Section 116 of the Australian Constitution limits the ability of the Commonwealth to legislate in respect of religion. It provides: ‘The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.’ The limited case law on s 116 holds that the word ‘for’ means ‘for the purpose of’ such that improper legislative purpose is the test for invalidity rather than a consideration of whether an impugned law has the effect of doing one of the things prohibited by s 116. This article argues that the ‘for the purpose of’ interpretation is misconceived and therefore that the improper purpose test is wrong.
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MENSAH, KWADWO BOATENG. "DISCRETION, NOLLE PROSEQUI AND THE 1992 GHANAIAN CONSTITUTION." Journal of African Law 50, no. 1 (April 2006): 47–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021855306000052.
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Section 54 of Ghana's Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), gives the Attorney-General discretion to enter a nolle prosequi in the course of a criminal trial. According to the orthodox view, this discretionary power is not subject to judicial review. The orthodox view raises a number of very important questions. First, is it really the case that the power to enter a nolle prosequi is not subject to judicial review? Secondly, if this is the case, how is the Attorney-General accountable for the manner in which he exercises his discretion and how is it possible to ensure that he acts fairly when he enters a nolle prosequi? This article challenges the orthodox theory and advocates a theory based on legal accountability. The proposed theory is founded on the view that accountability and fairness—which are central constituents of good governance—will be enhanced if the discretion to enter a nolle prosequi is subject to legal control. The paper goes on to show that the legal accountability theory is supported by article 296 of the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution and that it also conforms to practices found in other Commonwealth jurisdictions such as England, Canada, Fiji and Australia.
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Harris, Bede. "Does the Commonwealth Electoral Act Satisfy the Requirement That Representatives Be ‘Directly Chosen’ by the People?" Journal of Politics and Law 9, no. 4 (May 29, 2016): 78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v9n4p78.
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<p>The electoral system embodied in the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) is notable for its startling unfairness to voters who support minor parties. This article argues that the disparity between voter preferences and the allocation of seats in the House of Representatives means that the electoral system cannot be said to provide for the election of members ‘directly chosen by the people’, as required by s 24 of the Constitution, and is therefore open to challenge. Although challenges to the electoral system in Attorney General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth and McGinty v Western Australia were unsuccessful, dicta by majorities in both cases support the argument that at some point – albeit unstated by the courts in those cases - an electoral system will be so unrepresentative as not to be consistent with s 24. Subsequent decisions in Roach v Electoral Commissioner and Rowe v Electoral Commissioner, to the effect that franchise laws must be appropriate and adapted to the system of representative government, also provide grounds for a constitutional challenge to the current electoral system. The article ends with a discussion of the criteria to be used to determine what system would be consistent with direct representation of the people, and argues that the Single Transferrable Vote system satisfies the requirements of accurate reflection of voter sentiment and provision to voters of identifiable local representatives.</p>
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Brown, A. J., and Paul Kildea. "The Referendum that Wasn't: Constitutional Recognition of Local Government and the Australian Federal Reform Dilemma." Federal Law Review 44, no. 1 (March 2016): 143–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x1604400106.
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In 2010, the Commonwealth government proposed Australia's third attempt to give federal constitutional recognition to local government. In 2013, the government secured the passage through Parliament of a Constitution Alteration but, due to political events, and amid much controversy, the proposed amendment was not put to the people. This paper examines the merits and prospects for success of the proposed reform, with an eye to lessons for the future of local government's place in the federal system. It argues that the legal and constitutional cases for the alteration were strong, but limited, and poorly contextualised, theorised and articulated. We use public opinion evidence to conclude that had it proceeded, the referendum result would probably have been a third failure. These lessons are important for ongoing debate over sub-constitutional and constitutional reform to Australian intergovernmental relations, including questions of federal financial redistribution at the core of the proposal. Overall, the events of 2013 reinforce arguments that reforms to the position of local government, while important, should only be pursued as part of a holistic package of federal reform and renovation; and that more robust deliberative processes and principles must be adhered to before again attempting any constitutional reform.
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Latypov, B. N. "HISTORY OF THE FORMATION AUSTRALIAN ENCYCLOPAEDIA." Vestnik Bryanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 02, no. 06 (June 28, 2021): 83–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.22281/2413-9912-2021-05-02-83-90.
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This article is about the history of the origin and the period of preparation of the Australian encyclopaedia at the beginning of the XX century. The study based on various sources are attempt to explore the many years of experience of Australian encyclopedists in creating Australian encyclopaedia. During the study it was analyzed data of preparation the first and second editions. Under review of the first edition it was shown the editors job of Arthur Wilberforce Jose and Herbert James Carter. This study explored the experience of encyclopaedia and it was revealed that compilers of encyclopaedia paid special consideration to the choice criteria of biographies and dominating value were Australian origin, and also compilers showed that the Australian nation to be seen as being closely bound to nature. As a result of the conducted research it was shown the main sections of encyclopaedia, number of author’s articles and illustrations. Here are some examples of interesting articles about «drama», «pigs», «music», and «bread», which reflects the essence of the people of Australia. It was studied the labor activity of the second edition encyclopaedia’s editor in chief, Alec Chisholm, also revealed and reviewed the article «aborigines» which was widely acclaimed as the best ever published on the second edition. It is concluded that the formation of the Australian encyclopaedia associated with the emergence of statehood in the Commonwealth of Australia. The birth of a nation and the adoption of the Constitution led to the idea of creating a national Australian encyclopaedia.
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Cole, D. A. "ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REGIMES—PETROLEUM OPERATIONS IN AUSTRALIA'S OFFSHORE AREAS." APPEA Journal 35, no. 1 (1995): 813. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/aj94058.
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Increasing petroleum activity in Australia's offshore areas is heightening industry, government and community awareness of the potential impact of these operations on marine ecosystems and coastal environments.The Offshore Constitutional Settlement of the late 1970s has resolved the issue of allocation of governmental rights and powers over the resources of the sea and the seabed. However, the application of environmental laws to those areas remains largely untested. A complex web of legislation—State, Territory and Commonwealth—may apply to proposed and on-going petroleum activities.The Commonwealth Government has substantial power to intervene to protect environmentally sensitive areas whether they are within areas of the sea over which that government or the states or the Northern Territory have primary jurisdiction. Despite the recent Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, substantial ultimate power resides with the Commonwealth to protect the environment, particularly through the use of the external affairs power. The politically fluid nature of environmental management in offshore areas adds an important dimension to the commercial risk assessment process for the petroleum industry.
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Tappere, Chris. "New States in Australia: The Nature and Extent of Commonwealth Power under Section 121 of the Constitution." Federal Law Review 17, no. 4 (December 1987): 223–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x8701700402.
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Beck, Luke. "Higgins' Argument for Section 116 of the Constitution." Federal Law Review 41, no. 3 (September 2013): 393–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.22145/flr.41.3.1.
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The argument that led to the inclusion of s 116 of the Constitution, a provision that provides a limited guarantee of religious freedom in Australia, has not been properly understood. The standard account of the argument presented by the proponent of the clause, Henry Bournes Higgins, holds that it was included to ensure that no inferential power to legislate with respect to religion could be drawn from the religious words of the constitutional preamble. This article argues that the standard account of Higgins' argument is wrong and that the substance of Higgins' concern was a realisation that the Commonwealth's enumerated powers were wide enough to authorise legislation dealing with religion.
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Nettheim, Garth. "Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples." Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 1, no. 2 (September 16, 2009): 129–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v1i2.1045.
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The paper begins by noting the low level of reference to Indigenous Australians in the Commonwealth Constitution at the start of Federation, and goes on to discuss the limits to what was achieved by the 1967 amendments. The situation represents a marked contrast with the USA and Canada in terms of treaties and constitutional recognition.
In Australia, particularly during the period of the ‘Reconciliation’ process in the 1990s, important steps were taken by Indigenous Australians to identify items of ‘unfinished business’ in a ‘Statement of Indigenous Rights’. But there has been limited progress to meet these aspirations. And Australian law still lacks a tradition of recognition of human rights generally, let alone Indigenous rights.
International law, too, largely lacked recognition of human rights, generally prior to the adoption in 1945 of the Charter of the United Nations. The brief references in the Charter were subsequently developed in a range of declarations and of treaties. These applied to people generally, with scant reference to Indigenous peoples. But, since the 1970s, there has been growing international recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples under existing declarations and treaties. Since the 1990s, in particular, the UN system has established
specific mechanisms for addressing such issues. On 13 September 2007, the General Assembly finally adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
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Gussen, Benjamen Franklen. "Recommendations on the Optimal Constitutional Recognition of the First Nations in Australia." Deakin Law Review 24 (August 30, 2019): 213–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.21153/dlr2019vol24no1art875.
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This note extends my previous analysis of the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (‘First Nations’) by providing guidance on the optimal approach for this recognition. The guidance is founded on the concepts of efficiency and equity. An optimal recognition is defined as one that achieves both objectives simultaneously. Efficiency flows from a dynamic recognition that changes over time relatively easily, as exemplified by a treaty-based approach. The equity criterion has, as a proxy, legal pluralism, whereby constitutional recognition enlivens ‘Indigenous jurisprudence’ through mechanisms such as self-governance. The proposal is to combine efficiency and equity by guaranteeing the collective rights of Indigenous Australians in accordance with universally recognised principles and norms of international law, such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (for which the Commonwealth of Australia announced its support in 2009). This in turn is likely to guide a treaty-based approach to the relationship between the Commonwealth and First Nations that can evolve towards legal pluralism.
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Ireland-Piper, Danielle, and Jonathan Crowe. "Whistleblowing, National Security and the Constitutional Freedom of Political Communication." Federal Law Review 46, no. 3 (September 2018): 341–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x1804600301.
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Whistleblowers promote the values of responsible government and the rule of law by drawing attention to criminal or other forms of wrongdoing in publicly accountable organisations. This article explores the relationship between whistleblowing, national security and the implied freedom of political communication under the Australian Constitution. Legislation such as the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (‘ Crimes Act’), the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (‘ ASIO Act’) and the Australian Border Force Act 2015 (Cth) (‘ Border Force Act’) makes it an offence to reveal certain types of information obtained as a Commonwealth officer. The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) (‘ PIDA’) offers limited protection to whistleblowers in the Commonwealth public sector, but this protection does not extend to information relating to intelligence operations. We argue that blanket criminalisation of unauthorised disclosure by Commonwealth officers or contractors under s 70 of the Crimes Act, along with similar prohibitions in s 35P of the ASIO Act and s 42 of the Border Force Act, offend the implied freedom of political communication by failing to strike an adequate balance between national security and organisational secrecy, on the one hand, and public debate and discussion, on the other. The courts should read down these laws to protect disclosures that hold significant public interest for discussion and debate over government policy or the performance of government officials.