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Journal articles on the topic 'Common pool resource'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 10 March 2023

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1

Brudney, Jeffrey L., and Lucas C. P. M. Meijs. "Our Common Commons: Policies for Sustaining Volunteer Energy." Nonprofit Policy Forum 4, no. 1 (May 10, 2013): 29–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/npf-2012-0004.

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AbstractBrudney and Meijs (2009) conceive of volunteer energy as a social resource that constitutes the basis for (organizationally based) volunteering. They show that volunteer energy can be compared to a human-made, renewable resource that can be grown and recycled – but likewise one that is subject to misuse and misappropriation that can imperil the vitality of the resource. They explain that to a certain extent, volunteer energy is a common pool resource with free access for all volunteer-involving organizations, especially given the trend that people are less committed to one organization. As a consequence, volunteer-involving organizations must be collectively interested in making more volunteer energy available, now and in the future. As with other resources, sustaining the volunteer resource is becoming an issue. Thus, the need arises to develop an approach to the collective challenge of governing the volunteer energy commons. To this challenge we apply the design principles of Elinor Ostrom (1990) for robust governance of the common pool resource.

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Ward, Peter, Andrei Lankov, and Jiyoung Kim. "Common-Pool Resource Depletion and Dictatorship." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 55, no. 1 (March 1, 2022): 183–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/j.postcomstud.2022.55.1.183.

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This article seeks to explain the dynamics of resource depletion in North Korea’s fishery. We utilize insights from the common-pool resource (CPR) literature and show how theories from comparative politics that explain why states sometimes do not formalize property rights but prefer their informal exercise can be fruitfully applied to North Korea’s fishery. Utilizing a process tracing methodology, we demonstrate that the North Korean state possesses the necessary capacity to limit resource depletion, but has largely failed to do so. We argue that broad access to the commons maintains relations of enmeshed dependence between the dictator and those utilizing the fishery, balancing regime social control concerns with the party-state’s need for revenue. Further, in recent times, foreign actors have been allowed into the sector, providing a lucrative source of revenue without creating issues for internal control. We consider the alternative explanation that the North Korean state lacks the capacity to prevent CPR depletion, but demonstrate its implausibility given the preponderance of available evidence, not least the response of the regime in Pyongyang to the COVID-19 pandemic, where it has demonstrated considerable capacity to control the country’s fishing fleet.

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Johnson, Matthew William, Esther Han Beol Jang, Frankie O'Rourke, Rachel Ye, and Kurtis Heimerl. "Network Capacity as Common Pool Resource." Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 5, CSCW1 (April 13, 2021): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3449135.

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4

Fischer, Maria-Elisabeth, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Abdolkarim Sadrieh. "An intergenerational common pool resource experiment." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 48, no. 2 (September 2004): 811–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2003.12.002.

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5

Carpenter, Stanley R. "Sustainability and Common-Pool Resources Alternatives to Tragedy." Society for Philosophy and Technology Quarterly Electronic Journal 3, no. 4 (1998): 170–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/techne19983420.

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The paradox that individually rational actions collectively can lead to irrational outcomes is exemplified in human appropriation of a class of goods known as "common-pool resources" ("CPR"): natural or humanly created resource systems which are large enough to make it costly to exclude potential beneficiaries. Appropriations of common-pool resources for private use tend toward abusive practices that lead to the loss of the resource in question: the tragedy of the commons. Prescriptions for escape from tragedy have involved two institutions, each applied largely in isolation from the other: private markets (the "hidden hand") and government coercion (Leviathan). Yet examples exist of local institutions that have utilized mixtures of public and private practices and have survived for hundreds of years.Two problems further exacerbate efforts to avoid the tragic nature of common- pool resource use. One, given the current level of knowledge, the role of the resource is not recognized for what it is. It is, thus, in a fundamental, epistemological sense invisible. Two, if the resource is recognized, it may not be considered scarce, thus placing it outside the scrutiny of economic theory. Both types of error are addressed by the emerging field of ecological economics.This paper discusses common pool resources, locates the ambiguities that make their identification difficult, and argues that avoidance of a CPR loss is inadequately addressed by sharply separated market and state institutions. When the resource is recognized for what it is, a common-pool good, which is subject to overexploitation, it may be possible to identify creative combinations of public and private institutions that can combine to save that resource. Disparate examples of self-organized enterprises, public/private utilities, and "green" taxes, to name a few, provide empirical content for developing theories of self-organized collective action.

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6

GARDNER, ROY, ELINOR OSTROM, and JAMES M. WALKER. "The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems." Rationality and Society 2, no. 3 (July 1990): 335–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463190002003005.

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7

De Geest, Lawrence R., John K. Stranlund, and John M. Spraggon. "Deterring poaching of a common pool resource." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 141 (September 2017): 254–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.006.

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8

Sadowski, Jathan, Susan G. Spierre, Evan Selinger, Thomas P. Seager, Elizabeth A. Adams, and Andrew Berardy. "Intergroup Cooperation in Common Pool Resource Dilemmas." Science and Engineering Ethics 21, no. 5 (August 1, 2014): 1197–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11948-014-9575-3.

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9

Freeman, Matthew A., and Christopher M. Anderson. "Competitive Lobbying over Common Pool Resource Regulations." Ecological Economics 134 (April 2017): 123–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.12.031.

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10

McCarthy, Nancy, Elisabeth Sadoulet, and Alain de Janvry. "Common Pool Resource Appropriation under Costly Cooperation." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 42, no. 3 (November 2001): 297–309. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1164.

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11

Poggioli, Nicholas. "Extending the Resource-based View Beyond Private Resources to Common-pool Resources." Academy of Management Proceedings 2018, no. 1 (August 2018): 18222. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2018.18222abstract.

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12

Rickels, Wilfried, Jonas Dovern, and Martin Quaas. "Beyond fisheries: Common-pool resource problems in oceanic resources and services." Global Environmental Change 40 (September 2016): 37–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.06.013.

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13

Mao, Xuechen, and Anmin Li. "Unconscious priming shares a common resource pool with the manipulation subsystem." PeerJ 10 (April 19, 2022): e13312. http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj.13312.

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Background Working memory can be subdivided into two relatively independent subordinate systems, the maintenance subsystem and the manipulation subsystem. Although the two subsystems are quite heterogeneous, research thus far has not adequately distinguished the resource pools of the two subsystems. Additionally, previous research on the relationship between working memory and unconscious priming is paradoxical. Different subsystems leading to different effects on unconscious priming might be the reason for the paradoxical research. Therefore, the current article aimed to distinguish the resource pools among two working-memory subsystems and to investigate the relationship between the two subsystems and unconscious priming. Methods To address these issues, a maintenance dual-task and a manipulation dual-task program were developed. Each participant had to separately perform the two dual tasks in a balanced order. In each dual task, participants first completed a masked priming task accompanied by working-memory load. As a control, participants completed a prime identification test to confirm that the processing of the masked prime was at the unconscious level. The maintenance dual task comprised sandwich masking trials accompanied by Sternberg trials, while the manipulation dual task comprised sandwich masking trials accompanied by N-back trials. Results The results of the prime identification test indicated that the participants could not consciously perceive the masked prime of both dual tasks. The results of the working-memory task of both dual tasks indicated that the load manipulation was successful for both dual tasks. Most importantly, the results of the masking task of both dual tasks showed that an increase in working-memory load decreased the magnitude of unconscious priming in the manipulation dual task, whereas an increase in working-memory load did not decrease unconscious priming in the maintenance dual task. These observations demonstrate that the manipulation subsystem, rather than the maintenance subsystem, interferes with unconscious priming. Together with previous research, we propose a two-pool attention resource model to explain the modulation of working memory on unconscious priming by dissociating the executive resource pool of the manipulation system from the retention resource pool of the maintenance system. Thus, the current work confirms and extends the extant literature about the dependence of unconscious processing on attention resources by suggesting that unconscious priming shares a common resource pool with the manipulation subsystem.

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14

Hall, Daniel M., and Marcella M. Bonanomi. "Governing Collaborative Project Delivery as a Common-Pool Resource Scenario." Project Management Journal 52, no. 3 (January 18, 2021): 250–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/8756972820982442.

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When collaborative project delivery models such as integrated project delivery (IPD) combine project resources, share decision-making rights, and distribute risk-and-reward among participants, the project can be conceptualized as a common-pool resource scenario. Multiple project appropriators have contractual rights to withdraw units from the shared resource system (i.e., the project budget). This theorization suggests project managers avoid the tragedy of the project by crafting effective self-governance structures in the face of pluralism. Using IPD as an example, this article suggests these project governance structures reflect Ostrom’s design principles for the successful governance of long-enduring common-pool resource scenarios.

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15

Moritz, Mark, Roy Behnke, Christine M. Beitl, Rebecca Bliege Bird, Rafael Morais Chiaravalloti, Julia K. Clark, Stefani A. Crabtree, et al. "Emergent sustainability in open property regimes." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 51 (November 28, 2018): 12859–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1812028115.

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Current theoretical models of the commons assert that common-pool resources can only be managed sustainably with clearly defined boundaries around both communities and the resources that they use. In these theoretical models, open access inevitably leads to a tragedy of the commons. However, in many open-access systems, use of common-pool resources seems to be sustainable over the long term (i.e., current resource use does not threaten use of common-pool resources for future generations). Here, we outline the conditions that support sustainable resource use in open property regimes. We use the conceptual framework of complex adaptive systems to explain how processes within and couplings between human and natural systems can lead to the emergence of efficient, equitable, and sustainable resource use. We illustrate these dynamics in eight case studies of different social–ecological systems, including mobile pastoralism, marine and freshwater fisheries, swidden agriculture, and desert foraging. Our theoretical framework identifies eight conditions that are critical for the emergence of sustainable use of common-pool resources in open property regimes. In addition, we explain how changes in boundary conditions may push open property regimes to either common property regimes or a tragedy of the commons. Our theoretical model of emergent sustainability helps us to understand the diversity and dynamics of property regimes across a wide range of social–ecological systems and explains the enigma of open access without a tragedy. We recommend that policy interventions in such self-organizing systems should focus on managing the conditions that are critical for the emergence and persistence of sustainability.

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16

Agrawal, Arun. "Studying the commons, governing common-pool resource outcomes: Some concluding thoughts." Environmental Science & Policy 36 (February 2014): 86–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2013.08.012.

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17

Ellis, Christopher J. "Common Pool Equities: An Arbitrage Based Non-cooperative Solution to the Common Pool Resource Problem." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 42, no. 2 (September 2001): 140–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1154.

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18

Raheem, Nejem. "A common-pool resource experiment in acequia communities." International Journal of the Commons 9, no. 1 (March 16, 2015): 306. http://dx.doi.org/10.18352/ijc.491.

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19

Cárdenas, Juan, César Mantilla, and Rajiv Sethi. "Stable Sampling Equilibrium in Common Pool Resource Games." Games 6, no. 3 (August 31, 2015): 299–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g6030299.

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20

Brandt, Gunnar, Agostino Merico, Björn Vollan, and Achim Schlüter. "Human Adaptive Behavior in Common Pool Resource Systems." PLoS ONE 7, no. 12 (December 28, 2012): e52763. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0052763.

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21

Ambec, Stefan, and Carine Sebi. "The distributional impact of common‐pool resource regulations." Indian Growth and Development Review 4, no. 2 (September 27, 2011): 123–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17538251111172032.

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22

Gehrig, Stefan, Achim Schlüter, and Peter Hammerstein. "Sociocultural heterogeneity in a common pool resource dilemma." PLOS ONE 14, no. 1 (January 17, 2019): e0210561. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210561.

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23

Larkin, Kevin T. "Behavioral contingencies involved in common pool resource management." Training and Education in Professional Psychology 5, no. 4 (November 2011): 213–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0026282.

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24

Schnier, Kurt Erik. "Spatial externalities and the common-pool resource mechanism." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 70, no. 1-2 (May 2009): 402–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.004.

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25

Somasse, Gbetonmasse, Alexander Smith, and Zachary Chapman. "Characterizing Actions in a Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game." Games 9, no. 4 (December 13, 2018): 101. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9040101.

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We conducted a dynamic common pool resource experiment and found large differences among groups in the total benefits (surplus) obtained from the resource. To shed light on the factors underlying the differences, we characterized individual appropriation decisions as irresponsible, sustainable, or constructive, and defined a measure of the intensity of such actions. We then examined the relationships between group-level success and the frequency and intensity of the individual actions, finding that the average intensity of irresponsible actions was the best predictor of group success. We interpreted this as suggestive evidence that policies aimed at preserving and maximizing the benefits of renewable resources should above all else aim to reduce the intensity of irresponsible actions.

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26

Rendueles, César. "Common-Pool Resources in Rock Climbing." Sociology of Sport Journal 32, no. 4 (December 2015): 436–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/ssj.2014-0152.

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Sport climbing relies materially on the existence of routes equipped with bolts: vertical itineraries with anchors that allow climbers a safe ascent. Without bolting, sport climbing simply would not exist. In many countries, bolting is an altruistic individual activity that is usually neither organized nor regulated. Sport climbing bolting requires expensive hardware and sophisticated technical skills. However, equippers earn no money or prestige for this effort, which benefits many climbers. This paper develops a sociological approach to rock climbing bolting as a common-pool resource facing a deep crisis. In its early years, bolting was ruled by generalized reciprocity. The popularization of sport climbing quickly changed this framework. A small group of very active equippers has become net providers of public goods without compensation in economic or status terms.

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27

Penov, Ivan. "POST-SOCIALIST LABOR FORCE AS A COMMON-POOL RESOURCE." Trakia Journal of Sciences 17, Suppl.1 (2019): 352–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.15547/tjs.2019.s.01.058.

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The article is devoted to the challenges of the labour market in the post-socialist period. It discusses the issues related to the physical properties of the post-socialists labour force and the social and legal framework in which it operates. Labor traditionally is considered to be a private good in the economic literature, possessing the properties of high excludability and rivalry. We argue that in the post-socialist period, labour looks more like a common pool resource system rather than a private good. In the absence of appropriate legal and social structures, such a system is likely to operate under the conditions of open access. In the long run, this could lead to a depletion of this resource. We argue that looking at labour in the frame of common pool resource, first we can justify better the use of the traditional instruments for intervention at the labour market, and second, this could help to develop a more efficient system for preserving and development of the labour force in the long run.

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Huang, Ling, and Martin D. Smith. "The Dynamic Efficiency Costs of Common-Pool Resource Exploitation." American Economic Review 104, no. 12 (December 1, 2014): 4071–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.4071.

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We conduct the first empirical investigation of common-pool resource users' dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro level using real-world data. Fishermen's strategies in a fully dynamic game account for latent resource dynamics and other players' actions, revealing the profit structure of the fishery. We compare the fishermen's actual and socially optimal exploitation paths under a time-specific vessel allocation policy and find a sizable dynamic externality. Individual fishermen respond to other users by exerting effort above the optimal level early in the season. Congestion is costly instantaneously but is beneficial in the long run because it partially offsets dynamic inefficiencies. (JEL D24, Q21, Q22)

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Pitt, Jeremy, Dídac Busquets, and Sam Macbeth. "Distributive Justice for Self-Organised Common-Pool Resource Management." ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems 9, no. 3 (October 7, 2014): 1–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2629567.

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Sandal, Leif K., and Stein I. Steinshamn. "Dynamic Cournot-competitive harvesting of a common pool resource." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28, no. 9 (July 2004): 1781–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2003.04.003.

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31

Tatlonghari, Gerlie, and Zenaida Sumalde. "Formation of Social Capital for Common Pool Resource Management." Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development 5, no. 2 (December 15, 2008): 21–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.37801/ajad2008.5.2.2.

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A standard optimal investment model is used to analyze farmers' decision to accumulate social capital in terms of participating in collective activities for irrigation management. Several predictions borne out by the data are presented in this study. Social capital investment in small irrigation groups (1) decreases when the farmer's field is located at the downstream area where water is scarce; (2) increases when farmers have larger ricefields; (3) decreases when farmers pay the irrigation service dues; and (4) increases when the farmer belongs to a heterogeneous group which facilitates collective action when pooling resources to reduce the risks involved in rice farming. Moreover, the farmers' social capital investment in other small irrigation groups in the irrigation system 1) increases when farmers have larger rice-growing areas; 2) increases when there is a high level of trust among the farmers; but 3) declines as the opportunity cost of time increases due to coordination and participation in collective activities with farmers from other areas of the system.

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Schauf, Andrew, and Poong Oh. "Effects of uniform-allocation constraints in networked common-pool resource extraction games." Journal of Physics: Complexity 3, no. 1 (January 5, 2022): 015004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/2632-072x/ac42e0.

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Abstract Communities that share common-pool resources (CPRs) often coordinate their actions to sustain resource quality more effectively than if they were regulated by some centralized authority. Networked models of CPR extraction suggest that the flexibility of individual agents to selectively allocate extraction effort among multiple resources plays an important role in maximizing their payoffs. However, empirical evidence suggests that real-world CPR appropriators may often de-emphasize issues of allocation, for example by responding to the degradation of a single resource by reducing extraction from multiple resources, rather than by reallocating extraction effort away from the degraded resource. Here, we study the population-level consequences that emerge when individuals are constrained to apply an equal amount of extraction effort to all CPRs that are available to them within an affiliation network linking agents to resources. In systems where all resources have the same capacity, this uniform-allocation constraint leads to reduced collective wealth compared to unconstrained best-response extraction, but it can produce more egalitarian wealth distributions. The differences are more pronounced in networks that have higher degree heterogeneity among resources. In the case that the capacity of each CPR is proportional to its number of appropriators, the uniform-allocation constraint can lead to more efficient collective extraction since it serves to distribute the burden of over-extraction more evenly among the network’s CPRs. Our results reinforce the importance of adaptive allocation in self-regulation for populations who share linearly degrading CPRs; although uniform-allocation extraction habits can help to sustain higher resource quality than does unconstrained extraction, in general this does not improve collective benefits for a population in the long term.

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Harvey, Mark L., Paul A. Bell, and Andrej A. Birjulin. "Punishment and Type of Feedback in a Simulated Commons Dilemma." Psychological Reports 73, no. 2 (October 1993): 447–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1993.73.2.447.

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351 research participants in groups of three harvested resources from a slowly regenerating, shared pool in a computer-assisted game. Feedback after each round of play consisted of information about the status of the resource pool, information about the other participants' harvesting choices, or no feedback at all. Exploitation was either not punished or punished by individual or group. Analysis showed that either form of punishment improved harvests from the common resource but that feedback had no such influence.

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Freeman, Jacob, Jacopo A. Baggio, and Thomas R. Coyle. "Social and general intelligence improves collective action in a common pool resource system." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 14 (March 24, 2020): 7712–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1915824117.

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On a planet experiencing global environmental change, the governance of natural resources depends on sustained collective action by diverse populations. Engaging in such collective action can only build upon the foundation of human cognition in social–ecological settings. To help understand this foundation, we assess the effect of cognitive abilities on the management of a common pool resource. We present evidence that two functionally distinct cognitive abilities, general and social intelligence, improve the ability of groups to manage a common pool resource. Groups high in both forms of intelligence engage in more effective collective action that is also more consistent, despite social or ecological change. This result provides a foundation for integrating the effects of cognitive abilities with other dimensions of cognitive diversity to explain when groups will and will not sustainably govern natural resources.

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Saunders, Fred P. "The promise of common pool resource theory and the reality of commons projects." International Journal of the Commons 8, no. 2 (August 31, 2014): 636. http://dx.doi.org/10.18352/ijc.477.

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Duffy, Sarah, Roger Layton, and Larry Dwyer. "When the Commons call “Enough”, Does Marketing Have an Answer?" Journal of Macromarketing 37, no. 3 (June 13, 2017): 268–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0276146717710703.

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How we use, or do not use our natural resources is a question that has been debated for millennia. Still an answer remains out of reach. It is a complex issue that often involves a social dilemma known as “the tragedy of the commons”. Many common pool resources, from fish stocks, to forests, to natural tourism destinations have an associated marketing system that may place pressure on the resource. If poorly managed, the resources sustainable future is questionable. This paper explains how commons and strategic action field theory can enhance a macromarketing analysis of marketing systems that involve a common pool resource (CPR) pointing to potential responses and solutions. The unique challenges faced are discussed, particularly in the interdependent areas of: property rights, power and equitable distribution. The findings from an empirical application confirm that CPRs destabilise a marketing system. Solutions may be found in the way the issue is negotiated, how the rules are structured and the perspective from which the issue is considered.

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Sarker, Ashutosh, Claudia Baldwin, and Helen Ross. "Managing groundwater as a common-pool resource: an Australian case study." Water Policy 11, no. 5 (October 1, 2009): 598–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.2166/wp.2009.076.

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Over-appropriation and degradation of groundwater can result from lack of recognition of, and inappropriate arrangements for, managing groundwater as a common-pool resource. An irrigators group in the Lockyer Valley, South-East Queensland, Australia and the Queensland government are currently working together to address over-exploitation of groundwater through a co-management model designed to be nested within the state and national water reform framework. This paper applies Ostrom's design principles for common-pool resource governance to this proposed co-management framework to strengthen the approach.

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38

Muñoz-Arriola, Francisco, Tarik Abdel-Monem, and Alessandro Amaranto. "Common Pool Resource Management: Assessing Water Resources Planning for Hydrologically Connected Surface and Groundwater Systems." Hydrology 8, no. 1 (March 19, 2021): 51. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/hydrology8010051.

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Common pool resource (CPR) management has the potential to overcome the collective action dilemma, defined as the tendency for individual users to exploit natural resources and contribute to a tragedy of the commons. Design principles associated with effective CPR management help to ensure that arrangements work to the mutual benefit of water users. This study contributes to current research on CPR management by examining the process of implementing integrated management planning through the lens of CPR design principles. Integrated management plans facilitate the management of a complex common pool resource, ground and surface water resources having a hydrological connection. Water governance structures were evaluated through the use of participatory methods and observed records of interannual changes in rainfall, evapotranspiration, and ground water levels across the Northern High Plains. The findings, documented in statutes, field interviews and observed hydrologic variables, point to the potential for addressing large-scale collective action dilemmas, while building on the strengths of local control and participation. The feasibility of a “bottom up” system to foster groundwater resilience was evidenced by reductions in groundwater depths of 2 m in less than a decade.

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PENNINGTON, MARK. "Elinor Ostrom and the robust political economy of common-pool resources." Journal of Institutional Economics 9, no. 4 (August 28, 2013): 449–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137413000258.

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Abstract:This paper situates Elinor Ostrom's work on common-pool resource management in the tradition of ‘robust political economy’. Ostrom's analysis of bottom-up governance institutions is shown to recognise that such arrangements though imperfect are better placed to cope with bounded rationality and incentive compatibility problems in the management of smaller- and medium-scale common-pool resources. While Ostrom's work provides an analytical framework to explain the success of these arrangements, however, the paper argues that it lacks a robust account of when, if ever, top-down governance arrangements are to be preferred.

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40

De Geest, Lawrence R., and David C. Kingsley. "Inequality and Peer Punishment in a Common-Pool Resource Experiment." Strategic Behavior and the Environment 9, no. 1-2 (2021): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000099.

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41

Baerlein, Tanja, Ulan Kasymov, and Dimitrios Zikos. "Self-Governance and Sustainable Common Pool Resource Management in Kyrgyzstan." Sustainability 7, no. 1 (January 5, 2015): 496–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su7010496.

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42

Fennewald, Thomas J., and Brent Kievit-Kylar. "Integrating Climate Change Mechanics Into a Common Pool Resource Game." Simulation & Gaming 44, no. 2-3 (December 14, 2012): 427–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1046878112467618.

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43

Curran, Dara, Colm O’Riordan, and Humphrey Sorensen. "The evolution of donators in a common-pool resource problem." Artificial Intelligence Review 27, no. 4 (April 2007): 245–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10462-008-9077-2.

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44

Kimbrough, Erik O., and Alexander Vostroknutov. "The social and ecological determinants of common pool resource sustainability." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 72 (July 2015): 38–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2015.04.004.

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Rodriguez-Sickert, Carlos, Ricardo Andrés Guzmán, and Juan Camilo Cárdenas. "Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 67, no. 1 (July 2008): 215–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.004.

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Mantilla, César. "Communication networks in common-pool resource games: Field experimental evidence." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 118 (October 2015): 215–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.003.

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Agrawal, Arun, Daniel G. Brown, Gautam Rao, Rick Riolo, Derek T. Robinson, and Michael Bommarito. "Interactions between organizations and networks in common-pool resource governance." Environmental Science & Policy 25 (January 2013): 138–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2012.08.004.

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Magole, Lefatshe I. "Common pool resource management among San communities in Ngamiland, Botswana." Development Southern Africa 26, no. 4 (October 2009): 597–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03768350903181381.

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Rapoport, Amnon, and Wing Tung Au. "Bonus and Penalty in Common Pool Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 85, no. 1 (May 2001): 135–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/obhd.2000.2935.

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Budescu, David V., and Wing Tung Au. "A model of sequential effects in common pool resource dilemmas." Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 15, no. 1 (January 2002): 37–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.402.

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