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Journal articles on the topic 'Commitment device'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 9 March 2023

Last updated: 10 March 2023

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1

Möcker, Michael. "Commitment Devices." International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics 3, no. 1 (January 2014): 13–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijabe.2014010102.

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Commitment devices are regularly celebrated as an easy-to-use, budget way to dodge self-control problems. Analysis of a Bénabou and Tirole-style signaling game (2004) casts doubts on this view. Adding a commitment device to the standard model reveals difficulties: An agent relying on a commitment device to restrain his future self is less restrained in the present. Committing to do an unpleasant activity in the future leads to procrastination as the signaling effect of doing it now disappears. Therefore some agents may be better off without access to commitment devices. Policy implications are discussed.

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2

Werner, Raub, and Gideon Keren. "Hostages as a commitment device." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 21, no. 1 (May 1993): 43–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(93)90039-r.

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3

Kemnitz, Alexander. "Immigration as a commitment device." Journal of Population Economics 19, no. 2 (November 5, 2005): 299–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00148-005-0042-y.

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4

Cigno, Alessandro. "Marriage as a commitment device." Review of Economics of the Household 10, no. 2 (February 18, 2012): 193–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11150-012-9141-1.

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5

Hughes, John S., and Michael G. Williams. "Commitments and Disclosure in Oligopolies." Accounting Review 83, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 111–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2008.83.1.111.

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In this paper, we examine the welfare effects of pre-production commitments made by firms competing in oligopoly markets and disclosure of such commitments. By commitments we refer to any device that provides a strategic incentive to alter production choices. Examples include forward contracts, capital structure, research and development investment, terms of compensation, and cost allocation. If the only purpose underlying commitment is to gain a strategic advantage in product market competition, then the result with disclosure can be characterized by Stackelberg warfare. Many potential commitments have non-strategic effects, implying a trade-off when optimizing, with imperfect achievement of both strategic (deterring rival production) and non-strategic goals. However, given disclosure, we show that in the limit as the number of commitment devices becomes large, firms achieve full Stackelberg warfare and total realization of non-strategic goals. Disclosure in this context is social welfare enhancing.

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6

Baumann, Florian. "Severance Payments as a Commitment Device." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 166, no. 4 (2010): 715. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245610793524929.

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7

Khalil, Fahad, and Bruno M. Parigi. "Loan Size as a Commitment Device." International Economic Review 39, no. 1 (February 1998): 135. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2527234.

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8

Ball, Ray, A. Scott Keating, and Jerold L. Zimmerman. "Historical Cost as a Commitment Device." Maandblad Voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 74, no. 11 (November 1, 2000): 49–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/mab.74.12723.

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9

Noda, Akihiro. "Auditor choice as a commitment device." Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting 16, no. 3 (September 3, 2018): 374–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfra-05-2017-0036.

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Purpose This study aims to examine how firms choose an auditor in the presence of bilateral information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders regarding firms’ economic performance. Design/methodology/approach This study presents a one-period reporting bias game with a firm’s risk-neutral manager and investors in the capital market, in which a manager with private information chooses an auditor and reports earnings to investors who acquire their own information. The analysis focuses on the possibility that the manager engages an auditor to constrain earnings management as a commitment device to minimize reporting error cost. Findings The results show that the manager’s optimal auditor choice is determined based on investor sensitivity to the earnings report, and managerial incentives for earnings management, discounted by the uncertainty of reporting errors. The results for optimal auditor choice are counterintuitive: engaging a higher-quality auditor could seemingly be associated with aggressive earnings management. Originality/value This study advances the understanding of the theoretical basis of firms’ auditor choice in the context of market investors’ information acquisition when auditors exercise their discretion in reporting. This issue has received limited attention in the extant literature.

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10

Clementi, Gian Luca, Thomas F. Cooley, and Cheng Wang. "Stock grants as a commitment device." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 30, no. 11 (November 2006): 2191–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2005.04.009.

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11

Maniadis, Zacharias. "Campaign contributions as a commitment device." Public Choice 139, no. 3-4 (January 16, 2009): 301–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9394-2.

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12

Savani, Manu Manthri. "The Effects of a Commitment Device on Health Outcomes." International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics 7, no. 4 (October 2018): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijabe.2018100101.

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This article tests the effectiveness of commitment devices on weight loss. It can be applied as a health ‘nudge' that locks in future behaviours to achieve a desired health outcome, by staking money or reputation on achieving that goal. A field experiment randomly assigned 364 clients of an online weight loss service to either a reputational commitment device or an upfront refund on the monthly fee. The reputational commitment intervention was expected to combat time inconsistency and promote greater weight loss. Weight outcomes were measured at 12 weeks. The results showed that all experimental groups lost weight on average, but the group experiencing the reputational commitment reported end weight outcomes 1.5 kg higher than the comparison group, indicating slower weight loss (± 0.05, effect size -0.32). One possible explanation for the findings is ‘commitment overload'. The study nuances the understanding of commitment devices and how best to deploy them in health programmes including e-heath platforms.

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13

Guo, Tao, and Michael Finke. "Are Defined Contribution Plans a Commitment Device?" Journal of Financial Counseling and Planning 29, no. 2 (November 2018): 234–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/1052-3073.29.2.234.

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Many who want to save more for retirement are tripped up by short-run temptations. Yet, some can still achieve their goals by using commitment devices to limit suboptimal behavior. Defined contribution plans in the United States resemble a commitment device because they are framed as savings for the future and penalize early withdrawals. This study investigates whether defined contribution plans are particularly useful for households that value the future and exhibit self-control problems. We find that participation in defined contribution plans has a greater impact on wealth accumulation among households with hyperbolic preferences. Our results suggest that those who find it difficult to resist short-run temptation can achieve long-run goals through the use of less liquid accounts and automated savings.

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14

Berg, Erlend. "Funeral Insurance: An Inter-Generational Commitment Device?" Journal of African Economies 27, no. 3 (November 22, 2017): 321–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jae/ejx037.

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15

ESCHENBACH, FELIX, and BERNARD HOEKMAN. "Services policies in transition economies: on the EU and WTO as commitment mechanisms." World Trade Review 5, no. 3 (October 19, 2006): 415–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s147474560600293x.

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We analyze the extent to which the EU-15 and 16 transition economies used the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to commit to service sector policy reforms. GATS commitments are compared with the evolution of actual policy stances over time. While there is substantial variance across transition economies on both actual policies and GATS commitments, we find an inverse relationship between the depth of GATS commitments and the ‘quality’ of actual services policies as assessed by the private sector. In part this can be explained by the fact that the prospect of EU accession makes GATS less relevant as a commitment device for a subset of transition economies. However, for many of the non-EU accession candidates the WTO seems to be a weak commitment device. One explanation is that the small size of the markets concerned generates weak external enforcement incentives. Our findings suggest greater collective investment by WTO members in monitoring and transparency is needed to increase the benefits of WTO membership to small countries.

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16

Vranić, Edina. "Classification and evaluation of medical devices." Bosnian Journal of Basic Medical Sciences 3, no. 2 (May 20, 2003): 42–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.17305/bjbms.2003.3554.

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Medical devices and medical disposables contribute significantly to the quality and effectiveness of the health care system. It is necessary to commit scientifically sound regulatory environment that will provide consumers with the best medical care. This includes continued services to small manufacturers, readily available guidance on FDA requirements, predictable and reasonable response times on applications for marketing, and equitable enforcement. But in the public interest, this commitment to the industry must be coupled with a reciprocal commitment: that medical device firms will meet high standards in the design, manufacture, and evaluation of their products. The protections afforded our consumer, and the benefits provided the medical device industry, cannot be underestimated.

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17

Frank, Robert H. "Internal commitment and efficient habit formation." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18, no. 1 (March 1995): 127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00037663.

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AbstractRachlin's attack on the internal commitment model rests on the demonstrably false claim that self-punishment does not exist. He is correct that habits are an effective device for solving self-control problems, but his additional claim that they are the only such device makes it hard to explain how good habits develop in the first place. Someone with a self-control problem would always choose the spuriously attractive reward, which, over time, would create bad habits.

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18

Bental, Benjamin, Bruno Deffains, and Dominique Demougin. "Credibility and Monitoring: Outsourcing as a Commitment Device." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 21, no. 1 (January 18, 2012): 31–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00327.x.

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19

Prinzing, Michael. "Pathological Moralizing: Is Moral Judgment a Commitment Device?" Ethics 130, no. 2 (January 2020): 228–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/705766.

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20

Libich, Jan. "An explicit inflation target as a commitment device." Journal of Macroeconomics 30, no. 1 (March 2008): 43–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2006.11.002.

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21

Falcon, Jessica, and Daniel Conway. "Microfluidic device platform for T cell fate analysis (TECH2P.907)." Journal of Immunology 194, no. 1_Supplement (May 1, 2015): 206.17. http://dx.doi.org/10.4049/jimmunol.194.supp.206.17.

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Abstract Microfluidic systems have enormous potential as investigational devices in biomedical research, in particular immunology. Microfluidic devices can be fabricated with the precise regulation of any number of parameters including controlled surface chemistries, geometrical dimensions, signal input and output and timing. The adjustable nature of microfluidic devices makes them an ideal platform to recreate cellular microenvironments for studying cell-cell interactions, migration, antibody and cytokine production, and differentiation in vitro. Investigations with customized microfluidic devices have the potential for elucidating the mechanism behind T lymphocyte commitment to either the αβ or γδ lineage. Both types of T cells arise from immature CD4-CD8- precursors in the thymus but diverge during development. Recent publications indicate that γδ T cell receptor (TCR) works in concert with ligand to direct progenitors to the γδ fate. We propose to develop a microfluidic device in which immature T lymphocytes can migrate through a thymus-like microenvironment allowing for αβ or γδ lineage commitment. As of yet, the microfluidic device fabrication protocol has been developed and preliminary cell culture experiments with the commonly used murine stromal cell line OP9 have success. Such a device would allow for analysis of specific developmental points in T cell development.

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22

Himmler, Oliver, Robert Jäckle, and Philipp Weinschenk. "Soft Commitments, Reminders, and Academic Performance." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 11, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 114–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20170288.

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We provide first evidence that a soft commitment device enhances progress in education and, more generally, improves the completion of complex tasks—such as passing exams. In our field experiment, students can sign a nonbinding agreement and commit to staying on track for graduation. We find that those who were offered the soft commitment device are more likely to sign up for, take part in, and pass exams. A pure reminder treatment does not change behavior, which suggests that the effects are not driven by increased salience. We also show that procrastinators benefit most from the commitment device. (JEL C93, D12, D91, I23)

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23

Thameur, Necibi, and Olfa Manai Daboussi. "Exchange Rate Pass-Through as a Commitment Device under Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market." Global Journal For Research Analysis 3, no. 4 (June 15, 2012): 44–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.15373/22778160/apr2014/15.

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24

Aharon, N., S. Massar, S. Pironio, and J. Silman. "Device-independent bit commitment based on the CHSH inequality." New Journal of Physics 18, no. 2 (February 12, 2016): 025014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/18/2/025014.

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25

DEWIT, GERDA, and DERMOT LEAHY. "Tax Uniformity: A Commitment Device for Restraining Opportunistic Behavior." Journal of Public Economic Theory 17, no. 5 (September 16, 2015): 641–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12104.

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26

Hajivar, G. A. M. Hosaini, and S. S. Mortazavi. "Impact of Shunt FACTS Devices on Security Constrained Unit Commitment." International Journal of Applied Power Engineering (IJAPE) 5, no. 1 (April 1, 2016): 22. http://dx.doi.org/10.11591/ijape.v5.i1.pp22-39.

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Shunt FACTS Devices (SFD) would play an important role in maintaining security and reduce total generation cost in the economical operation of power systems. The application of this device to the AC model of securityconstrained unit commitment (SCUC) for the day ahead scheduling is presented in this paper. The proposed AC model of SCUC with SFD would include active and reactive power flow constraints which increase the network controllability at normal operation and contingency. A general SFD model is introduced for the reactive power management in SCUC which is based on the reactive power injection model (RPIM). The case studies demonstrate the effectiveness of the SFD application to SCUC with AC network constraints. Meanwhile simulation results demonstrate the combined use of these devices to SCUC have a significant impact on maintaining network security, preventing load shedding, lower total generation cost and increase using the maximum capacity of the existing transmission network.

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27

Roháč, Dalibor. "Religion as a Commitment Device: The Economics of Political Islam." Kyklos 66, no. 2 (April 11, 2013): 256–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12020.

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28

Monte, Daniel. "Reputation with one-sided monitoring: Ignorance as a commitment device." Economics Letters 144 (July 2016): 18–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.017.

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29

Miyaji, Hideaki, Yuntao Wang, Akinori Kawachi, and Atsuko Miyaji. "A Commitment Scheme with Output Locality-3 Fit for the IoT Device." Security and Communication Networks 2021 (November 29, 2021): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/2949513.

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Low output locality is a property of functions, in which every output bit depends on a small number of input bits. In IoT devices with only a fragile CPU, it is important for many IoT devices to cooperate to execute a single function. In such IoT’s collaborative work, a feature of low output locality is very useful. This is why it is desirable to reconstruct cryptographic primitives with low output locality. However, until now, commitment with a constant low output locality has been constructed by using strong randomness extractors from a nonconstant-output-locality collision-resistant hash function. In this paper, we construct a commitment scheme with output locality-3 from a constant-output-locality collision-resistant hash function for the first time. We prove the computational hiding property of our commitment by the decisional M , δ -bSVP assumption and prove the computational binding property by the M , δ -bSVP assumption, respectively. Furthermore, we prove that the M , δ -bSVP assumption can be reduced to the decisional M , δ -bSVP assumption. We also give a parameter suggestion for our commitment scheme with the 128 bit security.

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30

Hu, Luke. "Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly." B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 13, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 179–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0015.

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AbstractThis paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, publicly pledge to pay a financial reward to every contractor he has invited to bid, as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for short-listed bidders are costly. Nevertheless, it is generally optimal for the procurer to credibly implement the same restriction of the number of bidders that is optimal under full commitment.

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31

Casaburi, Lorenzo, and Rocco Macchiavello. "Demand and Supply of Infrequent Payments as a Commitment Device: Evidence from Kenya." American Economic Review 109, no. 2 (February 1, 2019): 523–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180281.

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Despite extensive evidence that preferences are often time-inconsistent, there is only scarce evidence of willingness to pay for commitment. Infrequent payments for frequently provided goods and services are a common feature of many markets and they may naturally provide commitment to save for lumpy expenses. Multiple experiments in the Kenyan dairy sector show that: (i) farmers are willing to incur sizable costs to receive infrequent payments as a commitment device, (ii) poor contract enforcement, however, limits competition among buyers in the supply of infrequent payments. We then present a model of demand and supply of infrequent payments and test its additional predictions. (JEL K12, L66, O13, O17, Q12, Q13)

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Chao, Cheng-Min, and Bor-Wen Cheng. "FACTORS INFLUENCING THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP OF HOSPITAL PROCUREMENT STAFF WITH MEDICAL DEVICE SUPPLIERS." Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 40, no. 6 (July 1, 2012): 945–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2012.40.6.945.

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We explored whether or not trust and commitment play important roles in supply chain management and can affect future relationships between hospitals and suppliers. We conducted a survey of medical supplies procurement staff at local community hospitals, regional hospitals, and medical centers in Taiwan, using a self-report survey. Structural equation modeling revealed no significant effect of the supplier's reputation or relationship tenure on trust within, and commitment to, future dealings. However, both communication and perceived benefits had positive effects on trust. In addition, trust had a significantly positive effect on the future relationship, whereas the effect of commitment was nonsignificant. The results also confirmed that trust can play an important role as a mediating variable.

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33

CALABUIG, VICENT, ANTONI CUNYAT, and GONZALO OLCINA. "BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE." International Game Theory Review 08, no. 04 (December 2006): 525–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001089.

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We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are delayed with positive probability.

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34

Wiles Higdon, Carolyn, and Katya Hill. "Five SGD Funding Rules of Commitment." Perspectives on Augmentative and Alternative Communication 24, no. 4 (September 2015): 129–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/aac24.4.129.

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This article focuses on policy documents of the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association (ASHA) that provide guidance to SLPs facing the various issues and challenges of conducting AAC evaluations that result in a speech-generating device (SGD) funding request. Five (5) SGD funding rules of commitment are proposed for speech-language pathologists (SLPs) to consider in their clinical practice regardless of the funding source (e.g., school districts, Medicare, Medicaid, major health insurers, or private pay). The rules highlight ethical conduct, advocacy, and consumer protection. SLPs having questions about SGD funding practices and requirements should contact the appropriate ASHA service staff with their questions as the primary source of information and guidance.

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35

Antikainen, Markku, Mohit Sethi, Sinisa Matetic, and Tuomas Aura. "Commitment-based device-pairing protocol with synchronized drawings and comparison metrics." Pervasive and Mobile Computing 16 (January 2015): 205–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pmcj.2014.10.006.

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36

Waldkirch, Andreas. "The ‘New Regionalism’: Integration as a Commitment Device for Developing Countries." Journal of Economic Integration 21, no. 2 (June 15, 2006): 397–425. http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/jei.2006.21.2.397.

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37

Fuest, Clemens, and Volker Meier. "Sustainable finance and climate change: Wasteful but a political commitment device?" Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 118 (March 2023): 102795. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102795.

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38

Chowdhury, Indrani Roy, and Prabal Roy Chowdhury. "Public–Private Partnerships, Commitment and X-Inefficiency." Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice 17, no. 2 (September 10, 2018): 157–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0976747918795226.

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We examine the formation of public–private partnerships (PPPs), one of the most important organisational forms to evolve over the last few decades. Given the volume of infrastructural investment required, PPPs seem essential for India's development. We unearth a role for PPP formation that is new in the literature, namely its role as a commitment device. In particular, we argue that the presence of the private firm allows a PPP to credibly commit to discontinuing the project when efficiency considerations demand so. JEL: D02, D04,D72, D73, D43

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39

Albers, Susanne, and Dennis Kraft. "On the Value of Penalties in Time-Inconsistent Planning." ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 9, no. 3 (September 30, 2021): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3456768.

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People tend to behave inconsistently over time due to an inherent present bias. As this may impair performance, social and economic settings need to be adapted accordingly. Common tools to reduce the impact of time-inconsistent behavior are penalties and prohibition. Such tools are called commitment devices. In recent work Kleinberg and Oren [6, 7] connect the design of prohibition-based commitment devices to a combinatorial problem in which edges are removed from a task graph G with n nodes. However, this problem is NP-hard to approximate within a ratio less than √n/3 [2]. To address this issue, we propose a penalty-based commitment device that does not delete edges but raises their cost. The benefits of our approach are twofold. On the conceptual side, we show that penalties are up to 1/β times more efficient than prohibition, where β ϵ (0,1] parameterizes the present bias. On the computational side, we significantly improve approximability by presenting a 2-approximation algorithm for allocating the penalties. To complement this result, we prove that optimal penalties are NP-hard to approximate within a ratio of 1.08192.

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40

Fahn, Matthias, and Hendrik Hakenes. "Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, no. 4 (November 1, 2019): 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160217.

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We show that team formation can serve as an implicit commitment device to overcome problems of self-control. If individuals have present-biased preferences, effort that is costly today but rewarded at some later point in time is too low from the perspective of an individual’s long-run self. If agents interact repeatedly and can monitor each other, a relational contract involving teamwork can help to improve performance. The mutual promise to work harder is credible because the team breaks up after an agent has not kept this promise, which leads to individual underproduction in the future, reducing future utility. (JEL D11, D71, D86, M54)

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41

Mendenhall, Slade. "Declared War and American Victory: A Search for Effective Commitment." British Journal of American Legal Studies 9, no. 2 (August 4, 2020): 261–322. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/bjals-2020-0017.

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AbstractThis Article argues that the act of formally declaring war entails a measure of explicit commitment on the part of American political actors that raises the cost of failure and motivates politicians to see engagements through to a decisive end, fulfilling the role of a contract or institutional commitment device. It argues that undeclared conflicts, lacking such a device, are more likely to end on less decisive and less favorable terms to the United States. On this basis, it explains the emergence of a decades-long trend of protracted, unsuccessful, and indecisive military engagements by the United States as having emerged from the erosion of a constitutionally established separation of powers with respect to the initiation and administration of foreign military conflicts. In defense of this theory, it uses case studies to assess the relevance of its predictions and to weigh potential objections involving selection bias and imperfect information.

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42

Berardi, Nicoletta, and Paul Seabright. "Joint Ownership of Production Projects as a Commitment Device against Interest Groups." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 176, no. 3 (2020): 572. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0027.

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43

de Hooge, Ilona E., Seger M. Breugelmans, and Marcel Zeelenberg. "Not so ugly after all: When shame acts as a commitment device." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95, no. 4 (2008): 933–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0011991.

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44

Kono, Hisaki, and Tomomi Tanaka. "Does marriage work as a savings commitment device? Experimental evidence from Vietnam." PLOS ONE 14, no. 6 (June 19, 2019): e0217646. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0217646.

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45

Hirsch, Julia, and Uwe Walz. "Financing Decisions along a Firm’s Life-cycle: Debt as a Commitment Device." European Financial Management 17, no. 5 (July 3, 2011): 898–927. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036x.2011.00618.x.

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46

Tarashev, Nikola, and Anna Zabai. "When pegging is a commitment device: Revisiting conventional wisdom about currency crises." Journal of International Economics 118 (May 2019): 233–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2019.02.001.

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47

Balafoutas, Loukas, and Tarek Jaber-Lopez. "Impunity under pressure: On the role of emotions as a commitment device." Economics Letters 168 (July 2018): 112–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.027.

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48

Rabab’ah, Ghaleb, and Ronza Abu Rumman. "Hedging in Political Discourse: Evidence from the Speeches of King Abdullah II of Jordan." Prague Journal of English Studies 4, no. 1 (July 1, 2015): 157–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pjes-2015-0009.

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Abstract This paper reports on the findings of a study that aimed to identify the linguistic items which act as hedges in the speeches of King Abdullah II of Jordan, as well as to examine the pragmatic functions of these devices. Twenty-five political speeches of King Abdullah II, randomly selected from the official website of King Abdullah (see Appendix), were analyzed adopting Salager-Meyer’s (1994) taxonomy. The study revealed that the most frequently used hedging device in King Abdullah’s speech is modal auxiliaries, and the most frequently used hedging device subcategory is the modal auxiliary “can”. The findings suggest that these hedging devices fulfil several pragmatic functions. These findings contribute to understanding that speaking a second language (Arabic, in the case of King Abdullah II) neither affects the types of hedging devices nor the functions these devices perform. Moreover, contrary to scientific discourse (e.g., medicine), the research concludes that political discourse as a non-scientific genre resorts to hedging devices to express indirectness, politeness, lack of commitment and probability.

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LI, CHUAN-MING, and TZONELIH HWANG. "TWO-WAY QUANTUM-BIT-STRING COMMITMENT." International Journal of Modern Physics B 24, no. 10 (April 20, 2010): 1245–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217979210048764.

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Due to the high cost of the qubit generating device (QGD) (the single photon source), QGD may not be available at the same time in both communicating parties (Alice and Bob) who have to execute the quantum bit string commitment (QBSC) protocol for some application environments. All the existing QBSC protocols allow one-way commitment i.e., only the party (Bob) who possesses the QGD is allowed to commit a bit string to Alice who does not have the QGD, but not the other way around. However, what happens if Alice, who does not have the QGD, is required to commit a bit string to Bob? The current QBSC protocols fail to provide a solution in this case. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to allow Alice, who is not equipped with the QGD, to commit a bit string to Bob who has the QGD. With our proposed protocol, together with previously proposed QBSC protocols, Alice and Bob can perform two-way commitment, even though Bob is the only party who is equipped with the QGD.

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Maxwell, Katelynn. "Easing Medical Device Regulatory Oversight: The FDA and Testing Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic." American Journal of Law & Medicine 47, no. 2-3 (July 2021): 291–326. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/amj.2021.18.

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The FDA already subjects most medical devices to much less stringent approval requirements than drugs and biologics, and attempts to speed up rollout during the COVID crisis have been problematic. Agency decisions, including to allow antibody test marketing without emergency use authorization or review, and the back-and-forth guidance on laboratory-developed tests, have met harsh criticism and unreliable results. Though the long-term results of these decisions are unclear, the FDA’s credibility, reliability, and commitment to safety are threatened by even further lessening medical device regulatory oversight during the coronavirus pandemic. The relaxed and fix-it-later approach to many of the FDA’s public health emergency decisions regarding medical devices reflect the ongoing criticisms of medical device regulation in general, specifically the 510(k) process and laboratory developed test regulation, offering a point of reflection towards reform. Adaptive legislation and a risk-based and evidentiary approach to premarket and postmarket review can begin to address these issues both generally and in an emergency context.

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