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Journal articles on the topic 'Command of troops'
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1
Bulhakov, Andrii. "Development of recommendations regarding the composition of forces and equipment for topogeodesic support of the troops of the operational command." Technology audit and production reserves 4, no. 2(66) (August 22, 2022): 29–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.15587/2706-5448.2022.262792.
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The object of the research is the forces and devices of topographic support of the operational command troops. The work highlights the recommendations regarding the composition of the forces and devices of topographical support of the operational command troops. The analysis of the nature of the armed struggle of the last decades shows a sharp increase in the need of the troops (forces) for information provision, in particular in the provision of topogeodesic information (geospatial information) of the armed forces, the timeliness and reliability of which affects the course and results of military operations. One of the types of geospatial data that is needed by the military both in peacetime and in a special period are topographic maps, they are the main source of information about the terrain and the objects on it. Nowadays, the state of topographic information on most nomenclature sheets of topographic maps of the territory of Ukraine does not meet the modern requirements of the troops. The successful implementation of the task of updating topographical information is facilitated by the use of the most acceptable and economically justified composition of forces and devices of topographical support of troops. However, the experience of geodetic support during the operational training of troops (forces), the operation of the United Forces in the east of the country and the large-scale armed aggression by the Russian Federation showed that the currently available forces and devices of geodetic support of the troops are not capable of fulfilling the entire scope of the assigned tasks This especially applies to operational commands. Therefore, in order to successfully carry out changes in the system of topographic support regarding the necessary composition of forces and devices of this support, appropriate scientific researches were conducted. This, in turn, will provide an opportunity to improve existing methods and develop recommendations regarding the necessary composition of forces and devices of topographic support for the troops of the operational command. The mentioned recommendations will make it possible to justify the composition of the forces and devices of topographical support of the troops of the operational command by the persons planning the operations of the groups of troops (forces).
2
A.N. KLYUSHIN. "Troops (Forces) Command and Control Disorganization Theory." Military Thought 26, no. 004 (December 31, 2017): 42–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.21557/mth.50290438.
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Szkołuda, Dariusz, and Mariusz Sikora. "Military command process in tactical operations." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 203, no. 1 (March 15, 2022): 141–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0015.8032.
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In the literature, one can find various approaches to the process of commanding troops at the tactical level. It concerns doctrines developed in both the Polish Armed Forces and NATO. These processes differ in phases and stages implemented by command authorities and in tasks they perform and methods used, for example, in the decision-making process. Based on modern theories of managing hierarchical organizations such as the armed forces, the authors of this article propose their solutions to standardize the process of command of troops at the tactical level, from battalion upwards. The process should follow four phases: planning, organizing, controlling, evaluating. In contrast to the command process functioning in NATO, there is no execution phase, which, in the authors’ opinion, refers to the stage (sequence) of actions and not to the command function. Hence, in the command process used by NATO, we deal both with command functions and military operation stages.
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Lee, Jeong-yeol, Jang-kwon Moon, and Sang-joon Kim. "The comparison of combat function priorities in future manned/unmanned infantry troops." Journal of Advances in Military Studies 4, no. 1 (April 30, 2021): 19–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.37944/jams.v4i1.95.
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This study was conducted to present the development plans for the future manned/unmanned infantry troops in order to respond to the changes in advanced science and technology along with the winds of the fourth industrial revolution an to prepare for future war changes. Above all, key elements by combat performance function of future mixed infantry troops could be identified and implications could be derived by comparing priorities by element using Analytical Hierarchy Process(AHP). In particular, a survey of current military policy departments, educators, field personnel, and indirectly related officers whose group consists of 190 (rank range: from the first lieutenant to lieutenant colonel, age range: from 20 to 40) out of 250 regard of effectiveness was conducted to identify which areas should be developed first for each combat function (command control, information, maneuver, fire, protection, operation sustainability support). In the formation of a mixed infantry troop, command control was able to identify battlefield information, reinforce information on battlefield visibility, strengthen maneuvering forces, strike strategic targets, share enemy attack situations, and maintain operations.
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Radziwiłłowicz, Dariusz. "Żołnierze 5 Dywizji Strzelców Polskich w bolszewickiej niewoli i ich repatriacja." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 8, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 23–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.3601.
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The formation of Polish armed troops began in summer 1918, during the battles between troops of the Czechoslovak Corps (Radziwiłłowicz 2010, 107–126), “white” Russians and Bolsheviks in the Volga region and in Siberia. Earlier that year, small Polish troops began to form spontaneously, taking their names from the towns of formation; therefore, those were, among others, Omsk, Irkuck, Semipalatynsk “legions”. In October 1918, due to a Bolshevik offensive, Polish forces were stationed in Novonikolayevsk (now Novosibirsk) on the Ob river. A division with three rifle regiments, a light artillery regiment and a lancer regiment was formed in 1918 and 1919. The newly-formed troops made up a tactical unit which drew on the tradition of the 5th Polish Rifle Division of the 2nd Polish Corps, with the same number and name (Radziwiłłowicz 2009). More ambitious organisational plans were developed for a supra-division command structure: the Polish Army Command in Eastern Russia and Siberia. From the end of November 1919 to early January 1920, over a distance of nearly a thousand kilometres, troops of the 5th Polish Rifle Division divided into 57 echelons and evacuated by the decrepit Trans-Siberian Railway as the rearguard of the allied forces, through the area of a civil war, among the hostile population of Siberia. The capitulation of the 5th Polish Rifle Division at the Klukviennaya station came as a surprise, not only to its command. The behaviour of the Czechoslovak commanders blocking the railroad, when troops of the Soviet 5th Army and Bolshevik guerrillas attacked the stretched Polish echelons, was regarded as deliberate and aimed at the liquidation of the Polish division. The commander of the Polish division, Colonel Kazimierz Rumsza with a group of his followers, as well as over a thousand officers and privates, who had no illusions that Bolsheviks would observe certain wartime and moral standards adopted by both parties of the conflict, avoided Bolshevik captivity and its cruelty. This group made their way to Harbin in Manchuria, from where a small number of Polish troops were evacuated by sea to Poland (Radziwiłłowicz 2015). The remainder of the division, after surviving the hell of Soviet POW and labour camps, returned to Poland in 1921 and 1922 by repatriation transports. About 4 thousand soldiers of the 5th Polish Rifle Division did not survive the hardships of the camps and the cruelty of the Cheka.
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Jarno, Witold. "Zadania i rozwój wojsk operacyjnych Sił Zbrojnych Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej w pierwszych 15 latach funkcjonowania Układu Warszawskiego." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 13, no. 2 (January 8, 2023): 217–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.8460.
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The article describes the organizational changes and modernization of the operational troops of the Armed Forces of the Polish People's Republic in the first 15 years of the existence of the Warsaw Pact. In the structure of the Polish Army, the aforementioned troops constituted the most important component intended for military operations at the operational level as part of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. During the war, the operational troops were to create a higher operational union (the Polish Front), which was to include three Land Force Armies, the Air Force Army and operational forces of the Navy. The units of the first throw were constantly in combat readiness, thanks to which they could start combat operations almost immediately, in accordance with the operational plans of the Warsaw Pact Command. The changing and growing requirements of the battlefield forced the command of the Polish Army to modernize the structure and equipment of opera-tional troops. These issues are described based on literature and archival documents.
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Terent’ev, Vyacheslav O. "The Interaction Between the Soviet and the British Troops in Austria in the Spring of 1945." Vestnik of Northern (Arctic) Federal University. Series Humanitarian and Social Sciences, no. 5 (October 10, 2020): 46–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.37482/2227-6564-v048.
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This article is part of the series of the author’s works covering the interaction between the Soviet and the British troops in the spring of 1945. For the first time in historiography, a comprehensive reconstruction of the meeting of these troops in Austria on 9–13 May 1945 is undertaken on the basis of original documents from Russian and British archives, quite a few of which have never been analysed or even mentioned before. The final stage of the liberation of Austria has been rather misrepresented in Soviet historiography. In particular, the Soviet troops were thought to have met the American troops on the Linz–Gaflenz–Klagenfurt line in late April – early May. However, the archival documents indicate that it was the British troops the Red Army met in Austria, and that as late as May 9–13. What is more, Klagenfurt was never reached by the Soviet units, as the British division headquarters were dislocated there. In Austria, the interaction lines had not been clearly determined due to Churchill’s efforts; at the same time, a crisis was brewing there between the British contingent and the Yugoslavs and the Bulgarians. The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Tolbukhin pushed the meeting line planned by the British prime minister far west. The actions of Tolbukhin’s units and their assistance to the Bulgarian and the Yugoslavian troops substantially weakened the British positions in the future political dialogue and practically wrecked Churchill’s plans for strengthening the British influence on the Balkans. Further, this paper depicts and analyses the activities of the Soviet headquarters and military units aimed to make their way forward into the area of the “opposing ally” – Great Britain. In addition, the role of the Soviet command in settling the British-Bulgarian military confrontation is noted.
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Naumov, E. O. "Self-Supply of Food for the Red Army on the Eastern Front in the Second Half of 1918." Modern History of Russia 10, no. 3 (2020): 595–608. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2020.303.
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This article discusses how the Eastern Front’s Red Army solved the problem of food provision through self-supply, which was carried out by soldiers and the regimental command using requisitions and purchasing products from the local population. The emergence of this method was due to the inability of the front and army command to fully provide troops with provisions, as a result of which the leadership was forced to partially impose this task on the local regimental command, which often treated the organization of procurement and fight against soldier robbery rather carelessly. Nevertheless, food quality for the Red Army improved, as evidenced by the decrease in the number of marauding fighters. This was also facilitated by army command measures to improve the level of soldier discipline. In the article much attention is paid to the evolution of the population’s attitude to the procurement activity of soldiers and the regimental command. Despite the fact that initially the peasants rather negatively perceived the presence of the Red Army in the countryside, subsequently residents of villages began to show greater interest in cooperating with the troops, providing them with food, both on a voluntary and a monetary basis. This policy was favored by the army command, aimed at regulating procurement operations and maintaining good neighborly relations with the local population. Moreover, other means of obtaining food are listed, such as capturing enemy storage facilities at stations and in cities.
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GIELATA, Jacek. "LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN MILITARY ORGANISATION." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 160, no. 2 (April 1, 2011): 356–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0002.3019.
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The ongoing professionalization of the Polish Armed Forces as well as the completion of tasks abroad necessitate redefinition of the current process of troops commanding and training, particularly at the lowest tactical level. The decentralisation of command processes, the saturation of the battlefield with state-of-the-art assets supporting command processes and “personal contact” between a superior and his/her subordinate require full decision-making and an ability to select the right tools to lead in a particular situation. This is the only way to ensure that tasks are carried out at a high level, efficiently and according to the objectives set. Looking into the future, a commander needs to be provided with a certain degree of freedom while feeling the responsibility he/she is shouldering. Specification of these conditions in conjunction with appropriate cohesive education and practical training at all command levels will increase its creativity and allow a military organisation to smoothly respond to new challenges and threats.
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Masri, Hairul, Suprayitno Suprayitno, and Ratna Ratna. "War Strategy Done by Gayo and Alas People Against Dutch Colonial (1901-1912)." Budapest International Research and Critics Institute (BIRCI-Journal) : Humanities and Social Sciences 1, no. 2 (July 24, 2018): 25–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.33258/birci.v1i2.10.
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The arrival of Dutch troops with marsose troops into the Gayo and Alas areas while attempting to crush local fighters led to wars in the area. By fomenting the spirit of war sabil, the fighters with local residents made war against the Dutch as a form of jihad against the unbelievers in order to maintain the area and belief of Islam is embraced. In the face of Dutch troops, the fighters in the Gayo and Alas region used several strategies, among which were the implantation of the Sabil War Ideology, warfare, and guerrilla warfare. Through the implementation of the strategy, the fighters are able to provide fierce resistance and can survive for a long time against the attack of Dutch troops. The Gayo and Alas people's resistance has begun to dwindle since some of the leaders of the fight have been killed and captured by Dutch troops. This led to a decline in resistance because it was no longer well organized as the combatants lost their command.
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Chentsov, A. S. "Factors of activity of the troops of NKVD of the USSR during the East Prussian strategic offensive operation." Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity 8, no. 2 (2023): 59–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-2-59-65.
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The article discusses the factors influencing the activities of the troops of NKVD of the USSR, providing protection for the rear of the army in the period of the East Prussian strategic offensive operation. Sources are introduced into scientific circulation, which made it possible to identify two groups of factors that influenced the activities of the troops of NKVD of the USSR. The first is external. These include the peculiarities of the situation on the territory of East Prussia. The second is internal. They include changes in the command and control system and the structure of the troops, as well as new tasks, the implementation of which was entrusted to the troops of NKVD of the USSR. The author comes to the conclusion that taking into account these factors is the basis for identifying the features of the operational activities of the troops of NKVD of the USSR during the East Prussian strategic offensive operation.
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Kilichenkov, Aleksei A. "“The Drivers Will Then Step On Their Starters.” Problems of Training the Red Army Armored Forces in Late 1930s." Herald of an archivist, no. 2 (2019): 494–504. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-0101-2019-2-494-504.
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Drawing on the yet unknown to researchers documents from the fonds of the Russian State Military Archive, the author assesses the qualification of the designated and cadre personnel of the Red Army tank troops in late 1930s. The peculiarity of documents involved is that they are reports of the NKVD special departments, which in addition to their direct duties informed the national command authority of the real circumstances in the armed forces. At this, the attention of special departments was focused on the shortcomings and disqualification of the units and formations command. The article examines reports of the special department for the Leningrad Military District, which informed the national military authority of the virtual disruption of the tank reserve commanders training and of failures in the maneuvers of regular units. The events of September 1939, associated with the campaign in Eastern Poland, demonstrated true levels of the Red Army combat efficiency. This was especially the case of designated personnel and equipment mobilization and of reserve soldiers and commanders qualification. Analysis of the reports on the armored troops’ field activity reveals acute problems of command and control over the armed forces interactions with the national economic enterprises in the process of mobilization. The mobilization dragged on. The troops received useless tractors, automobiles and supporting means, and ill-trained personnel, and thus the effectiveness of units and formations was thwarted. These flaws in aggregate sprang from the Red Army command underestimating the complexity of mobilization and training of both reserve and cadre personnel of the Army units and formations. However, reporting documents on the performance in Poland showed optimism and gave assurances in the Army power to execute any order, which could but confuse the Soviet leaders’ assessment of war preparedness.
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GERMAN, R. E. "THE FIGHT AGAINST EPIDEMICS AS A FACTOR IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN THE CAUCASUS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY." JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION 12, no. 1 (2023): 178–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2225-8272-2023-12-178-190.
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The purpose of the article is to consider the pro-cess of fighting against epidemics as one of the strategies for extending the power of the Russian Empire to the territory of the Caucasus. Epidemic diseases played an important role in the complex of factors that prevented the development of the Caucasus by the Russian Empire. During the de-velopment of the territory of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, Russian troops had to resist not only the unfriendly local population, but also ma-laria (“fever”), due to which the mortality rate in the garrisons of Russian fortifications on the Black Sea was very high. The author determined that the degree of in-cidence of epidemics in the troops was directly related to how seriously the epidemic factor was taken by the military leaders who commanded these troops and how the command was able to organize the implementation of a set of measures to counter the epidemic. The fight against epidem-ics is considered in the context of a complex of factors that contributed to their spread - ongoing hostilities and redeployment of troops, hot cli-mate, lack of water, lengthy communications, lack of qualified medical personnel, non-compliance with sanitation and hygiene measures in units and subunits of Russian troops in the Caucasus. The factors that contributed to reducing the severity of the epidemic situation in the region are shown - the use of new drugs, quarantine cordon service, increased requirements for sanitation and hygiene in the troops, the involvement of qualified military doctors, and the practical use of the results of their research.
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Eichelmann, Pavel, and Ludekˇ Lukáš. "Introduction of the Network Centric Warfare concept to Czech Armed Forces." Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, no. 4 (December 30, 2004): 53–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.26636/jtit.2004.4.265.
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One of the features determining the strength of troops is command and control. The quality of command and control is determined by the quality of the command and control systems (C2S). The Czech Armed Forces are developing tactical command and control systems (TC2S) for the Ground and Air Forces. The TC2S were a little bit separately developed. Now, we want to use the benefit of shared situation awareness. The concept of Network Centric Warfare is a solution of this problem. The integration of both TC2S`s is its main objective. To apply this concept, separate C2S`s of different units are integrated into one logical system, into one joint C2S. Thus it is possible to create the common operation picture for all units of the task force.
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Mekhamadiev, Evgenii A. "Caesar Constantius Gallus (351–354 AD) and His Military Policy at the Near East Provinces of the Late Roman Empire." Античная древность и средние века 48 (2020): 39–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/adsv.2020.48.003.
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The paper addresses the military-administrative activities of Constantius Gallus, a nephew of Emperor Constantius II (337–361), who administered the Late Roman Empire’s eastern provinces from 351 to 354 on behalf of Constantius II, holding the title of caesar. Constantius Gallus’ military policies in the east has been studied against the background of Greek and Latin sources along with the Talmudic texts written in Hebrew (in translations into modern Western European languages). This paper is aimed at the analysis of the main directions of Constantius Gallus’ military policy and his reform of the command structure of the troops stationed in the Roman provinces in the Near East in the period in question. This study allowed the author to clarify Constantius Gallus’ contribution to the general development of the Late Roman military organization in the eastern provinces of the Empire. The author has researched Constantius Gallus’ military polices by three topics: the struggle against the Persians in Syria and Mesopotamia; the military campaign against the rebellious Jews in Palestine; and the struggle against the Arab invaders into Arabia Petraea in 353. The research of these issues allows the author to conclude that, in his works, Constantius Gallus followed the separation of powers principle: he did not command the troops, neither he personally conducted military operations or interfered into the course of combat operations. He followed a simpler task of creating the mechanisms providing coordinated relations between commanders of expeditionary and frontier troops, coordinating joint actions of the commanders, and keeping conditions for effective collaboration of different kinds of troops.
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Mikulka, Zdeněk, Ivana Nekvapilová, and Roman Pospíšil. "Competence to the Leadership and It’s Concept in the Army of Czech Republic." International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 23, no. 1 (June 20, 2017): 205–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2017-0033.
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AbstractThe performance of commanding roles in non-standard situations and cooperation within NATO troops showed the need for the development of leadership skills among the commanders of the Army of the Czech Republic at all levels of command. The competence to lead people hasn't been yet systematically developed and explored in the Czech Army. It lacks not only a precise definition for the role of commander but also specifications for each level of command. The aim of this article is to inform about the initial approach to the concept of competence to lead people in the Czech Army, to generate the structure of given competence and a description of its sub-skills for the position of team and platoon from the available theoretical sources. To compare the theoretical model with the results of the research among selected military professionals, which will permit to more accurately identify, for the military experience, necessary elements of competence. The results will be usable for following internal differentiation of the researched competence for other levels of command. This article was written as a part of the project Development of social competencies of the military leader.
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Posadskiy, Anton Viktorovich. "Features of military construction in the White South(on the example of the Troops of the Novorossia Regionof the Armed Forces of the South of Russia)." Российская история, no. 2 (April 15, 2023): 146–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s2949124x23020116.
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The article examines the practice of military construction within the Armed Forces of the South of Russia - in the troops of the Novorossiysk region of General N.N. Shilling in the second half of 1919 - early 1920. The characteristic of the Novorossiysk region from the point of view of the composition of the population is given. An outline of attempts to deploy large infantry formations based on the personnel of the old Russian army is proposed. The conclusion is made about the reasons for the failures of these efforts. The behavior of the population of Novorossiya and partly of the Right-Bank Ukraine was assessed and it was concluded that the main available resources of the white command were military corporations and a number of national minorities, primarily colonists. In the absence of active support of the white power from the majority of the Russian-Ukrainian population, the white command could not create stable and numerous formations, although the white troops showed good results practically until the end of the struggle.
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Orishev, Aleksandr, Viktor Magomedkhanov, Azer Mamedov, Vadim Kortunov, and Dmitry Kotusov. "The Red Army in Iran: between Iranian nationalism and Kurdish separatism (1941—1946)." OOO "Zhurnal "Voprosy Istorii" 2022, no. 2-2 (February 1, 2022): 30–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.31166/voprosyistorii202202statyi48.
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The artic1e is devoted to the events of the Second Wor1d War in Iran, when the troops of the Anti-Hit1er Coa1ition were brought into the country in order to organize mi1itary supp1ies under 1end-1ease. The purpose of the artic1e is to show the ro1e of the Soviet command in the sett1ement of conflicts that arose between the Persians and the Kurds during the stay of the Red Army in Iran. The authors show Iranian Kurdistan as a unique contact zone in which, with the mediation of the Soviet mi1itary administration, intercu1tura1 communication was estab1ished between the Persians (the titu1ar nation in Iran) and the Kurds (a nationa1 minority). The activity of the Soviet mi1itary command is shown as a factor in the frontier deve1opment of Iranian Kurdistan during the Second Wor1d War. It is proved that the stay of the Red Army so1diers on the territory of Iran cannot be ca11ed an occupation either by the norms of internationa1 1aw or by the nature of the behavior of the Soviet troops.
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Lysenkov, Sergei. "The headquarters of the Supreme command and its role in the unblocking of Leningrad (1941–1944)." Vestnik of the St. Petersburg University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia 2020, no. 1 (April 8, 2020): 24–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.35750/2071-8284-2020-1-24-29.
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Abstract: The subject of the study is information gleaned from documents of the military command, other materials of the great Patriotic war period, revealing the actions of the Supreme command Headquarters and the military Council of the Leningrad front to unblock Leningrad. The chronological order shows the combat actions of the red army troops who defended the city from September 8, 1941 to January 27, 1944 under the conditions of a military blockade. The reasons and consequences of unsuccessful attempts to break the blockade are analyzed, indicating the combat losses of our troops. It shows the strategic importance of the battle of Leningrad in securing a fundamental turning point in the war of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. The article uses the method of dialectical materialism, which allowed the author to explore the events and facts associated with the liberation of Leningrad from the Nazi blockade, in their development, relationship and interdependence. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that the author considers the combat actions of the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to unblock Leningrad not in the context of the traditional coverage of the breakthrough of the blockade in 1943. and the complete liberation of the city in 1944, and speaks of four more attempts, the first of which was made immediately after the establishment of the blockade in September 1941. unfortunately, none of them reached the goal set by the Stavka, but each attempt created the necessary conditions for success in operations «Iskra» and «Neva-2».
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Venkov, Andrey. "Don Cossacks and the Battle of Rassevat on September 4, 1809." Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija, no. 5 (December 2020): 185–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2020.5.15.
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Introduction. The Russian-Turkish war of 1806–1812 was the longest military conflict between Russia and Turkey. In the hope to force the Turks to peace, Russian troops crossed the Danube several times and fought for key fortresses on its banks. One of the battles on the right Bank of the Danube in 1809 was won practically by the Don Cossacks alone. In this battle Russian troops were led by such famous military leaders as Bagration, Miloradovich, Platov. After this battle Miloradovich and Platov were promoted to “full generals” (general in chief). Methods and materials. This battle is also interesting because the state archive of Rostov region has a very detailed collection of documents about it. Of all the documents relating to this war, the greatest number refers to the battle of September 4, 1809, because after it Don ataman Platov received his highest rank. The purpose of this study is to identify reasons for such an unusual victory. Analysis and results. The author investigates the course of the battle in detail using archival materials. The study shows that Russian forces were twice as superior to Turkish ones; during the battle, the command made a number of mistakes, which did not allow to completely surround the Turkish troops. High awards received by the command for this battle did not quite correspond to the level of success. The Russian commanders had friends at court and this partly affected the awards.
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Komzolova, Anna. "PROBLEMS OF THE RUSSIAN STRATEGY IN THE CRIMEAN WAR 1853-1856." Istoriya: Informatsionno-analiticheskii Zhurnal, no. 4 (2022): 73–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/rhist/2022.04.05.
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The review examines the studies of modern Russian historians devoted to the strategy of the Russian command during the Crimean War. The authors analyze various aspects of this topic related to the strategic planning in various theaters of the war operation. In particular they discuss plans of the Russian command of the defense of the Baltic Sea coast from the landing of English and French troops, of the blockade of the Turkish fortress Kars in the 1855 Caucasian campaign. Also negative assessments of the role of A.S. Menshikov in the defense of Sevastopol are subject to revision.
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Bolt, Valentina S. "Problems of Supply of Suvorov’s Army in the Campaign of 1799." Izvestia of the Ural federal university. Series 2. Humanities and Arts 25, no. 3 (2023): 164–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/izv2.2023.25.3.048.
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This article examines the problems of providing the united Russian-Austrian army under the command of A. V. Suvorov, which acted in 1799 in the Italian and Swiss theatres of war. By agreeing with Russia on the formation of a united contingent, the Austrian government assumed obligations to fully supply it during the entire period of hostilities. The extant testimonies of the participants of the campaign make it possible to analyse certain aspects of the supply of allied troops during the war. No significant supply problems were recorded at the Italian theatre during the entire campaign. Even though Suvorov was commander-in-chief of the entire Russian-Austrian forces, the quartermaster services were subordinate to Hofkriegsrat, the Austrian military department. For this reason, the Austrian officials were entirely in charge of food procurement. The main difficulty was frequent delays in deliveries, which, with the general discoordination of the actions of the Russian and Austrian commands, periodically had a negative impact on the military operations. When the army marched from Italy to Switzerland through mountains unsuitable for moving large wagons, the food problem became especially acute. The delivery of provisions to the locations of the troops became impossible, the supplies taken with them were transported on the backs of pack animals, mules, and horses, which moved with great difficulty along mountain trails and often fell off the mountains with their loads. The salvation was in the few settlements, whose inhabitants supplied the hungry and tired soldiers with cheese and potatoes.
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Lapay, Denis S. "The Special Corps of Railway Troops’ command and control staff training in the Moscow Military Railway School (1932–1941)." Tambov University Review. Series: Humanities, no. 190 (2021): 191–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.20310/1810-0201-2021-26-190-191-199.
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The study is devoted to the Moscow Military Railway School activities in the command and control staff qualifying for the Special Corps of Railway Troops during its existence from 1932 to 1941. The relevance of the research is due to the lack of the issues of construction and training studies of the Special Railway Corps military personnel and the little studied aspects of command and control staff training in the Moscow Military Railway School during the period of Russian historiography. Factor analysis of justification of Railway School foundation historical necessity is carried out. We reveal the main activities of the military authorities, management and teaching staff of the school to train specialists for the Railway troops of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. The experience of deploying the material and training base of the military school within a limited time frame is analyzed. The specificities of the school’s variable staffing system are also noted. The background for the school establishment discontinuing is analyzed, and the conclusion is drawn that this reorganization in March 1941 on the eve of the Great Patriotic War is unjustified, as well as the need to restore historical memory of the school.
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SPÂNU, Alin. "The Soviet Black Sea Fleet (1943) – Organisation, Dispersal, Command –." Romanian Military Thinking 2022, no. 4 (December 2022): 324–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2022.4.19.
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"In 1943, the Soviet fleet in the Black Sea was clearly superior to its opponents (Germans, Italians, Romanians, Bulgarians), but there were no major naval confrontations in this theatre of war. In most confrontations, starting in 1941, the Soviet naval forces suffered losses and were forced to retreat. The Romanian intelligence services had data on the organisation of the Soviet fleet, the dispersal, the commanders, the naval constructions and the ways of action. At the end of 1943, when the Red Army was on the offensive and had begun the landing in Crimea, the Romanian-German naval forces started an operation to supply the defenders, and later, in 1944, an evacuation of their own troops. Despite the vulnerabilities, the Soviet fleet did not attack decisively, so the withdrawal by sea was relatively organised and saved more than 120,000 soldiers and civilians."
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Afanasenko, Vladimir, and Maksim Medvedev. "Military and Political Decisions of the Supreme Command of the USSR and Germany on the Eve of the Battle of Stalingrad (June – July 1942)." Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija, no. 1 (March 2023): 94–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2023.1.9.
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Introduction. 2022 marks the 80th anniversary of the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad, which became a turning point not only of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders and their allies, but of the entire World War II of 1939–1945. The Battle of Stalingrad covered the territories of modern Voronezh, Rostov, Volgograd regions and the Republic of Kalmykia. The military and political decisions of the supreme command of the USSR and Germany on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad in June – July 1942 became the starting point in the future battle. Methods and materials.The study used problem-chronological, comparative-historical, and statistical methods. The study of the materials was based on the principles of historicism and objectivity. During the analysis of documents from domestic archives, memoirs, statistical information, a significant amount of material was processed; the problems of the prehistory of the Battle of Stalingrad in domestic and foreign historiography were studied. Analysis. As a result of the study conducted by the authors, various directives, orders of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the Soviet troops in the Stalingrad direction, as well as the enemy’s planning mechanism for the seizure of Stalingrad territory were analyzed. Results. It has been established that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, even before the start of hostilities in the Stalingrad direction, took measures to concentrate strategic reserves, create defensive lines, and reorganize the management of front-line troops. The authors’ contribution. V.A. Afanasenko proposed the idea and concept of the article, determined the chronology of the beginning of the preparatory actions preceding the Battle of Stalingrad. M.V. Medvedev analyzed the work of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the preparation and use of combat reserves in battles within the great bend of the Don, carried out a scientific revision of the article.
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Tsybulko, Alexey Alexandrovich, and Alexander Nikolaevich Dakhin. "Modeling of Formation of Readiness of Cadets of Military Institutions of the Troops of the National Guard of the Russian Federation for Command Activity." Siberian Pedagogical Journal, no. 6 (December 27, 2021): 101–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.15293/1813-4718.2106.11.
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Problem and Aim. The article considers the problem of modeling such a pedagogical phenomenon as the cadet’s readiness for command activity. The military professional experience of the future officer was formalized and the correlation of “readiness” with the traditional competence of the military man was validated. The essential components of the modeling process of the cadet’s readiness for command activity are established, the criteria for the effectiveness of such modeling are determined. The purpose of the article is establish the essential components of the process of modeling the readiness of the cadet for command activity, determine the criteria for the effectiveness of such modeling. Methodology. Research methods: comparative analysis of military-vocational training technologies, highlighting the essential intentions of the cognitive plan in them, followed by designing a criteria base for the effectiveness of using such technologies in the formation of cadets’ readiness for command activities. The article considers the problem of modeling such a pedagogical phenomenon as the cadet’s readiness for command activity. The military professional experience of the future officer was formalized and the correlation of “readiness” with the traditional competence of the military man was validated. The essential components of the modeling process of the cadet’s readiness for command activity are established, the criteria for the effectiveness of such modeling are determined.
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Литвиновський, С., С. Попов, С. Поляшов, С. Бабюк, and В. Нагорнюк. "ПЛАНУВАННЯ ТИЛОВОГО ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННЯ ВІЙСЬКОВИХ ЧАСТИН (ПІДРОЗДІЛІВ) ПРИ ПІДГОТОВКИ І ВЕДЕННЯ БОЙОВИХ ДІЙ ЗА СТАНДАРТНИМИ ОПЕРАЦІЙНИМИ ПРОЦЕДУРАМИ НАТО." Collection of scientific works of Odesa Military Academy, no. 19 (June 30, 2023): 161–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.37129/2313-7509.2023.19.161-171.
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The article provides a variant of the order and content of the work of the rear management bodies for planning the rear support of military bases (sundivisions) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the preparation and conduct of hostilities according to NATO standard operating procedures and their further use in the practical activities of the rear management bodies of military bases (sundivisions) and making changes and additions to the Temporary Combat Statute of the mechanized troops of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Part 1 (Brigade) of the Provisional Combat Statute of the Tank Troops of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Part 1 (Brigade), of the Combat Statute "Logistics of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine", of the Combat Statute "Logistics Operations of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine", methodological (training) manuals and methodological recommendations of the Rear of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The materials of this article should be used by officers of the rear of the tactical chain of command during individual training of officers, collective training of headquarters, sundivisions, and the military base as a whole in the system of combat training (during combat recovery activities) with the aim of increasing individual, combat (special) capabilities military bases (sundivisions) regarding joint performance of tasks with military bases (sundivisions) of NATO member states and the gradual transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to NATO standards. The procedure and content of the work of the rear management bodies for planning the rear supply of a military base (sundivision) during the preparation and conduct of hostilities according to NATO standard operating procedures, developed on the basis of three guiding documents: the Temporary Combat Statute of the Mechanized Troops of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Part 1 (Brigade); Combat charter "Logistics of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine" [5] of the tactical publication Procedure "Works of the commander and staff of the tactical control unit for battle planning (combat operations) according to NATO standard operating procedures." Keywords: military decision-making process; planning of rear (rear services) support; mode of operation, methods of operation, rear control bodies; rear command post; rear supply plan.
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Oleshchenko, O., O. Iokhov, and S. Bielai. "MODEL OF INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL SUPPLY OF THE MILITARY COMMAND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DURING LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS." Scientific journal of the National Academy of National Guard "Honor and Law" 2, no. 81 (2022): 36–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.33405/2078-7480/2022/2/81/263761.
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Modern management during law enforcement actions is characterized by periodic changes in the conditions for obtaining information, short terms for its processing, and the vagueness of its formal description. The need to reduce the time cycle of management leads to the strengthening of the role of complex automation of receiving, processing and visualization of information flows. Thus, in the scientific work, the issue of the synthesis of the structures of combat systems is considered, but for a separate type of troops. The works are devoted to the consideration of the basic concepts of the construction of troops (forces) and the criteria for the creation of combat groups. However, these works practically do not contain sufficient theoretical justifications for the composition and structure of the information support system of the military command during law enforcement operations. The purpose of the article is to improve the model of information and analytical support of the functional structure of the military command management system during law enforcement actions, which ensures taking into account the conditions of receiving, processing and visualization of information flows during an emergency and significant factors that affect the achievement of the goal of law enforcement actions. The developed model of information and analytical provision of the structure of the military command management system for the performance of tasks in the emergency area allows to ensure the requirements regarding the capabilities of the military command management system and its effectiveness, which will contribute to the high-quality performance of the assigned tasks in the emergency area. In the article, an improved model of information and analytical support of the military command management system during actions to protect law and order in the area of a state of emergency is developed, which, unlike those known on the basis of the axiomatic foundations of the theory of complex systems, performs an analysis of the structural and functional components of the military command management system depending on the tasks and functions of law enforcement forces and allows taking into account the interrelationship of indicators and factors of emergency conditions when analyzing the state of information support of military command management processes. The directions of further scientific investigations will be aimed at researching the issue of substantiation of the system of information and analytical support of the security forces of the security and defense sector of Ukraine under the conditions of the legal regime of martial law.
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Hundert, Zbigniew. "Structure of the cavalry group of the Crown Standard-Bearer Mikołaj Hieronim Sieniawski, stationed in Moldavia after the battle of Khotyn (Chocim) in 1673." Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et studia 30 (December 1, 2023): 109–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/bp.2023.30.7.
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On 10 and 11 November 1673 Commonwealth’s armies crushed Ottoman forces at the battle of Khotyn. Victory open new theatre of the operations against High Porte: towards river Danube and on the Polish territories lost in 1672 (Podolia with Kamianets-Podilskyi and Right-bank Ukraine). Polish and Lithuanian troops were very weary after the campaign, what’s more death of King Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki led to interregnum. Polish command decided to set up the system of border defence, to protect country until the election of new monarch, which should later lead to the new offensive. As such cavalry detachments were spread out in Podolia and Moldavia, while corps under command of Mikołaj Hieronim Sieniawski, Crown Standard-bearer was sent to occupy the latter country. Previous research mentioned that this group had between 6000 and 8000 soldiers. Thanks to document from National Library in Warsaw, we can now identify much more detailed organisation of Sieniawski’s force. He had 48 pancerni banners and two light horse banners, in total 5206 horses. Despite capturing Iași, capitol of Moldavia, Sieniawski’s troops were forced on 17 January 1674 to retreat to Poland, under pressure from the fresh Tatar attack. Despite of the withdrawal from Moldavia, border defence system was still functional and Commonwealth managed fairly quickly to elect new king.
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Șandru, Florin. "Alexandru Valahu (Volohov) (1909-1967)." ARHIVELE TOTALITARISMULUI 31, no. 3-4 (February 13, 2024): 246–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.61232/at.2023.3-4.18.
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Born in Bessarabia, Alexandru Volohov changed his name to Alexandru Valahu, forging his identity papers after 23 August 1944. He worked as a clerk at the Social Insurance House in Ismail from 1930 to 1932. From 1932 to 1934 he did his military service. At the same time, he carried out intense anti-communist activity, having been recruited as an informer by the Grand Headquarters to provide information on persons suspected of communist activities. In 1934 he was employed by the Ismail police as a public guard at the Law Office. In 1935 he shot a communist who was trying to escape from the security forces. He resigned from the police in 1937. Sentenced in 1948 to 3 years in prison for fraud at the Electric Company. After his release, he took a job as a translator of documents from Russian into Romanian at the Chemical Troops Command. On 7 January 1958, he was arrested and sentenced to 20 years' hard labour for anti-labour activities. He was released in July 1964. Having links with military representatives of several factories and plants working for the Chemical Troops Command, the security decided to recruit him as an unqualified informer. He submiteed several intelligence reports with no operative importance.
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DOĞAN, Muhammed Emin, and Burak Muhammet GÖKLER. "Grave Stones in the Naval Museum Command." Selçuk Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, no. 47 (June 15, 2022): 173–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.21497/sefad.1128575.
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Gravestones, which are one of the important reflections of Turkish-Islamic art, are a part of cultural heritage and provide information about the periods they belonged to with their forms, text contents, ornaments and headgear. Each information obtained reveals the burial tradition, culture, style, writing character and interaction of that period. The 16 grave heads that are the subject of the study and exhibited in the Istanbul Naval Museum Command today were evaluated. First of all, after giving a brief information about the history of the museum, which was founded in 1897 during the reign of II. Abdulhamid and which was the most important Naval Museum in Anatolia, the tombstones in the museum inventory were examined. It was observed that 12 of the gravestones belonged to janissaries, and the stones were completed with a headgear of “börk”, “dardağan” and “serdengeçti”. In addition, the symbols of the troops to which the janissaries belong were also identified. One of the other 4 tombstones has a turmeric cone used by those from Has Oda or Enderun, while three do not have a title. In the last part, the gravestones and their symbols were evaluated and compared with similar examples in Anatolia and their place in gravestones was tried to be revealed.
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Lupi, Natalia. "Report by the Enquiry Commission on the Behaviour of Italian Peace-keeping troops in Somalia." Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 1 (December 1998): 375–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s138913590000026x.
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Following the collapse of Somalia into a state of general anarchy after the fall of Siad Barre's regime, the UN Security Council, on 24 April 1992, adopted Resolution 751 with which, under the direction of the Secretary-General, it created the UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia) mission. The duty of UNOSOM was to supervise both the ceasefire between the fighting factions and the distribution of humanitarian aid.When the situation worsened, the Security Council adopted Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorizing the creation of UNITAF (Unified Task Force) under the command of the United States. UNITAF's mandate was to create a safe environment for humanitarian aid and for reconstruction. With Resolution 814 of 16 March 1993, the Security Council entrusted the UN Secretary-General with the command of operation UNOSOM II, which took over from the international task force directed by the United States and concluded its mandate in 1994.
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Shopina, I. M. "Legal status of the Commander of the National Guard of Ukraine: historical and legal aspects." Uzhhorod National University Herald. Series: Law 1, no. 77 (June 27, 2023): 47–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2307-3322.2023.77.1.7.
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The article establishes that the legal status of the Commander of the National Guard of Ukraine is a combination of his rights, duties, guarantees of activity, responsibility and peculiarities of relations with other structural elements of the security and defense sector determined by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. The content of the legal status of the Commander is due to the fact that the National Guard of Ukraine, first of all, is a military formation. The constituent elements of the legal status under study are the elements inherent in the heads of military command and control bodies.
The development of legislation regulating the legal status of the Commander of the National Guard of Ukraine can be divided into four stages: a) the period of laying the foundations for the functioning of military formations and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine, when the search for an optimal model for the distribution of powers between various state institutions was carried out (1991-1994); b) the period of clarifying the competence, structure and subordination of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and destruction of the National Guard of Ukraine (1995-2000); c) the period of opposition and legal conflicts related to the attempts of the highest political forces of the state to increase their influence on the National Guard of Ukraine and its Commander, which ended with the Revolution of Dignity and the disbandment of the internal troops (2001-2013); d) the period of restoration of the National Guard of Ukraine and the addition of the legal status of its commander with guarantees of activity inherent in the rule of law state and preventive mechanisms (2014 – etc.).An analysis of the legislation governing the legal status of the Commander of the National Guard of Ukraine allows us to identify the following pattern: the dominance of individual totalitarian tendencies in government contributes to the conciseness of the legal norms that determine the competence of this official. The development of democratic relations contributes to the specification of the rights and obligations of the Commander of the National Guard of Ukraine, the guarantees of his activities, the specifics of relations with the President of Ukraine, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other officials, as well as the establishment of legislative safeguards for the usurpation of power and the continuity of military command.
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Bradley, Martha M., and Aniel de Beer. "“All Necessary and Reasonable Measures” – The Bemba Case and the Threshold for Command Responsibility." International Criminal Law Review 20, no. 2 (April 23, 2020): 163–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718123-02002004.
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On 21 March 2016 Trial Chamber iii of the International Criminal Court unanimously convicted the former Vice-President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, on the basis of the doctrine of command responsibility for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by troops under his command in the Central African Republic from 2002 to 2003. On 8 June 2018 however, the Appeals Chamber reversed the judgment and acquitted Bemba of all charges. The Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that Bemba failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent and repress crimes committed by his subordinates as contemplated in Article 28(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute. This article evaluates the meaning of “all necessary and reasonable measures” in the context of command responsibility and considers whether Bemba met this threshold in order to avoid incurring criminal responsibility under Article 28(a)(ii).
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Zadunaiskyi, Vadym. "Stratagems of the Ukrainian and Russian troops in the battles for Kharkiv (February 24 - May 14, 2022)." Skhid 5, no. 1 (June 30, 2023): 9–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.21847/2411-3093.2023.5(1).281033.
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Strategies, or military tricks, are a component of military art. They also play an important role in the modern Russian-Ukrainian war. Among the Ukrainian regions, one of the key ones is the Kharkiv region with a powerful administrative center – the city of Kharkiv. Therefore, in February-May 2022, heavy battles took place around Kharkiv. Then the Defense Forces of Ukraine successfully used 8 stratagems, which helped to defeat the Russian invaders and liberate a large area of the Kharkiv Region. Russian troops also tried to use 8 stratagems, but most of them were ineffective. The reason for this was the successful actions of the Ukrainian troops, including the ability to simultaneously use several stratagems, and the miscalculations of the Russian command. It overestimated the potential of Russian troops and underestimated the combat capability of the Defense Forces of Ukraine. During the the stratagems revealing, the author's approach to the definition and analysis of military tricks was used, which was tested in previous studies. The article states that the successful use of the stratagems by Ukrainian troops in 2022 may be a consequence of preserving the heritage of the Ukrainian Cossacks and their descendants. The ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to successfully use military tricks in the battles for Kharkiv confirmed the high level of their military art.
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Liaskovych, Tetiana. "Formation and activity of the Polish Republic military structures supplying the UPR’s divisions (April – October 1920)." Wschód Europy. Studia humanistyczno-społeczne 8, no. 2 (March 30, 2023): 35–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/we.2022.8.2.35-46.
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The article is devoted to the little-known aspect of cooperation of the Polish and Ukrainian People Republics. In particular, it addresses the supplies to combat divisions of UPR Army in accordance with the military convention of April 24, 1920. The provision was enabled by the formation and activity of the special military Polish institutions in the Right Bank Ukraine. It deals with the command of the stages of the Polish Troops in Ukraine, Polish military representatives in the UPR government, section “U”, Ukrainian representatives of the 6th Army of the Polish Troops. Their task was to deliver the necessary supplies to the military divisions of the UPR. Special attention was paid to their work performance, which had a general positive effect on the military activity of the Ukrainian divisions in their counteracting the Red Army till the autumn 1920.
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Ekanayake, Charuka, and Susan Harris Rimmer. "Applying Effective Control to the Conduct of UN Forces." International Organizations Law Review 15, no. 1 (May 1, 2018): 9–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15723747-01501002.
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Responsibility is a notion that is central to all legal systems. Its operation in international law, however, has been complicated by (inter alia) the complexity of the operative rules, as well as the intricate factual dynamics on which it is called upon to operate. Such complications often create confusion, mistrust and even accountability gaps in important areas. This article deals with one such area: responsibility for the conduct of United Nations (‘UN’) troops. It commences with an analysis of the notion of responsibility in international law before elaborating the factual dynamics underpinning the relevant legal discussion comprised, inter alia, of the troop contribution frameworks, command and control structures, and the execution of UN orders. The article will then proceed to its core issue: how responsibility for acts directly perpetrated by UN forces (in contrast to other forms of responsibility pertaining to, for instance, aiding and assisting or directing the acts of another) should be apportioned.
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Florya, Boris. "The relationships between the Moscow government and the Cossack Hetmanate and the deportation of population (“zgon”) from the Middle Dnepr region in the spring of 1679." Slavic Almanac 2023, no. 1-2 (2023): 34–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2073-5731.2023.1-2.1.02.
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After battles of Chigirin in 1677–1678 were finished, the Russian government and the Hetman Ivan Samojlovich were expecting a new massive Ottoman invasion, mainly aimed at Kiev. Therefore, the population of the Right-Bank Middle Dnepr region was deported to the Left-Bank Ukraine to make supply and accommodation difficult for the Ottoman army. Those events were studied in details by Nikolaj Kostomarov, based on archival sources. He stated, that Hetman Ivan Samojlovich organized the deportation by an order from Moscow. However, a new study of archival documents, especially those not used by Kostomarov, reveals that it was Samojlovich who initiated the deportation (“zgon”), sending to the Right-Bank Ukraine troops under the command of his son, Semen Samojlovich. The Tsar’s letter to approve this decision had not yet been received in Baturin (the Hetman’s residence) at that point. The Moscow government supported the action taken by Samojlovich and sent a Russian troop under the command of voivode Grigorij Kosagov to take part in the operation. The deportation was completed quickly because the local population did not resist and, moreover, was ready to move. People of the Right-Bank Ukraine did not want to recognize the Ottoman authority, as the previous attacks of the Ottoman army were accompanied by total devastation of cities and massive killings.
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Pięciak, Krzysztof. "Polacy – oficerowie austro-węgierskich oddziałów szturmowych i Szkoła Szturmowa Dowództwa Okręgu Generalnego Kraków jako próba recepcji ich doświadczeń w Wojsku Polskim." Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy 25, no. 1 (2024): 50–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.32089/wbh.phw.2024.1(287).0002.
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Assault troops (Stormtroops) were formed during the First World War to break the stalemate of positional warfare. The text discusses the organization of these units in the Austro-Hungarian Army, the training process, and the biographies of the Polish officers serving in them. The paper also discusses the attempts made by the Command of the General District Cracow (Dowództwo Okręgu Generalnego Kraków) to introduce and adopt WW1 assault tactics into the Polish Army at its Assault School (1918–1919).
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Kondratenko, Sergei Yu. "THE DEFENSE OF TULA AS A FACTOR OF THE VICTORY IN THE BATTLE OF MOSCOW." History and Archives, no. 1 (2022): 12–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2658-6541-2022-1-12-25.
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The article considers the hostilities in the Tula direction in October – November 1941 in the general context of the Moscow battle. Planning an operation to seize Moscow, the German command assigned the main role in the offensive to tank armies, which were supposed to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops on the strategic flanks, to encircle the Soviet capital. In the southern Tula direction the 2nd Panzer Army advanced, striving to occupy an important industrial center – Tula at a go. Having broken through the defenses of the Soviet 50th Army, the enemy reached Tula at the end of October. All attempts to take the city by storm have failed, and the enemy decided to change the plan of action, which was finally thwarted by a counterattack by the troops of the Bryansk Front. In the second half of November 1941, the German command made a last attempt to take Moscow. The general concept of the operation remained the same – the encirclement of the city by tank armies. The 2nd Panzer Army was used to some tactical success in the Tula direction, but all attempts to develop it into an operational one were stopped by the Soviet troops.Thus, the successful defense of Tula became one of the factors in the disruption of the German plan to capture Moscow and prepared the conditions for the Red Army to launch a counteroffensive.
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CIORBEA, Valentin, and Dan-Dragoș SICHIGEA. "August 1944 la Constanța: cazul contraamiralului Horia Macellariu." Gândirea Militară Românească 2021, no. 4 (November 2021): 288–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/gmr.2021.4.17.
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This paper focuses on the role of the Romanian Royal Navy and of the personality of the most capable commander of its maritime forces during the campaign in the East, in the 23 August 1944 decisive moments – Rear Admiral Horia Macellariu. In the context of the country’s exit from the alliance with Germany and of the political-military changes, and under the impact of the proclamation issued by King Mihai I, in Constanța, the problem for the commanders of the Royal Navy was very sensitive: the detachment from the RomanianGerman mixed command. The situation was characterised by uncertainties, the ships of the Maritime Naval Force being interspersed with many more German ships, which had a superior artillery equipment. Rear Admiral Horia Macellariu, the Commander of the Navy and directly responsible for the fate of the crews, was also under the Commander of the 9th Infantry Division. His orders, from the General Staff and the Naval Staff, to disarm or force the German troops to withdraw Southward, in Bulgaria, required special tact and diplomacy. The excellent working relationship between Rear Admiral Macellariu and German Admiral Helmuth Brinkmann helped to avoid a bloody confrontation, which could prove disastrous for the port and the city of Constanța After the withdrawal of the Germans, appointed Superior Commander of the Dobruja territory, Rear Admiral Horia Macellariu had the ungrateful task of receiving the Soviet troops, whose generals and admirals considered the Romanian Armed Forces defeated and treated them as such. A series of pressures followed, doubled by insults and hostile attitude on the part of the Soviet occupant, culminating in the forcible takeover of Royal Navy ships on 5 September 1944.
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CIORBEA, Valentin, and Dan-Dragoș SICHIGEA. "August 1944 in Constanța. The Case of Rear Admiral Horia Macellariu." Romanian Military Thinking 2021, no. 4 (November 2021): 288–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2021.4.17.
Full textAbstract:
This paper focuses on the role of the Romanian Royal Navy and of the personality of the most capable commander of its maritime forces during the campaign in the East, in the 23 August 1944 decisive moments – Rear Admiral Horia Macellariu. In the context of the country’s exit from the alliance with Germany and of the political-military changes, and under the impact of the proclamation issued by King Mihai I, in Constanța, the problem for the commanders of the Royal Navy was very sensitive: the detachment from the RomanianGerman mixed command. The situation was characterised by uncertainties, the ships of the Maritime Naval Force being interspersed with many more German ships, which had a superior artillery equipment. Rear Admiral Horia Macellariu, the Commander of the Navy and directly responsible for the fate of the crews, was also under the Commander of the 9th Infantry Division. His orders, from the General Staff and the Naval Staff, to disarm or force the German troops to withdraw Southward, in Bulgaria, required special tact and diplomacy. The excellent working relationship between Rear Admiral Macellariu and German Admiral Helmuth Brinkmann helped to avoid a bloody confrontation, which could prove disastrous for the port and the city of Constanța After the withdrawal of the Germans, appointed Superior Commander of the Dobruja territory, Rear Admiral Horia Macellariu had the ungrateful task of receiving the Soviet troops, whose generals and admirals considered the Romanian Armed Forces defeated and treated them as such. A series of pressures followed, doubled by insults and hostile attitude on the part of the Soviet occupant, culminating in the forcible takeover of Royal Navy ships on 5 September 1944.
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Sayadyan, Hamik, and Ashot Gevorgyan. "A geographic and urban planning view of military administrative divisions." Multidisciplinary Reviews 6, no. 3 (August 15, 2023): 2023022. http://dx.doi.org/10.31893/multirev.2023022.
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The following issues are discussed in this article: military-geographic regionalization questions, the relationship between the Earth's surface and the geographic sphere, two main types of divisions - physio-geographic territorial and economic-territorial divisions, the administrative-territorial division of different states, and the problem of complex physical-geographical zoning differentiation objectively through the existing natural-territorial complex of different ranks and varying degrees of complexity. By examining the military-administrative divisions of the US and Russian Federation, both past and present, it is concluded that these divisions are based on geographic-territorial considerations, encompassing continents, states, and interior administrative area boundaries. These divisions facilitate the optimal command and control of troops. The joint staff of the armed forces, responsible for strategic territorial division into different commands, considers and analyzes various components of the geographical background during the initial phase of combat operations, providing strategic advantages for regional commands in the theatre of military operations. This approach forms the basis for the efficient utilization of different types of forces.
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Ajrapetov, Oleg. "Mobilization 1876 - 1877: The first experience of Imperial Russia." Vojno-istorijski glasnik, no. 2 (2023): 55–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/vig2302055a.
Full textAbstract:
After the defeat of the Serbian army on October 29, 1876, near Djunis, Emperor Alexander II, after much hesitation, decided to begin mobilizing the Russian army in order to force the Ottoman Empire to conclude an armistice with Serbia. Mobilization caught the army in a period of unfinished transformations. In 1874, universal conscription was introduced, in the same year the Empire's armory factories began producing Berdana rifles, their rearmament in 1877 was not completed. During the first mobilization of the mass army, all this affected the condition and combat capability of the troops. A particularly important and difficult problem was the condition of the railways, besides, the Russian command did not yet have the experience of transferring, concentrating, or supplying such a significant mass of troops by rail. All this had an impact on the war plans and the conduct of military operations beyond the Danube.
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Airapetov, Oleg R. "Mobilization of 1876–1877. The first experience of Imperial Russia." Российская история, no. 2 (December 15, 2024): 90–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s2949124x24020102.
Full textAbstract:
After the defeat of the Serbian army on October 29, 1876, near Junis, Emperor Alexander II, after much hesitation, decided to begin mobilizing the Russian army in order to force the Ottoman Empire to conclude an armistice with Serbia. Mobilization caught the army in a period of unfinished transformations. In 1874, universal conscription was introduced, in the same year the Empire's armory factories began producing Berdana rifles, their rearmament in 1877 was not completed. During the first mobilization of the mass army, all this affected the condition and combat capability of the troops. A particularly important and difficult problem was the condition of the railways, besides, the Russian command did not yet have the experience of transferring, concentrating, or supplying such a significant mass of troops by rail. All this had an impact on the war plans and the conduct of military operations beyond the Danube.
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Gnido, Sergey V. "Defense of the Volga River delta in September–November 1919." Izvestiya of Saratov University. History. International Relations 24, no. 2 (June 21, 2024): 255–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1819-4907-2024-24-2-255-263.
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This article explores a little-studied subject of the civil war in the Astrakhan region. The purpose of the research was to study the combat operations of the 11th Army compounds, which made up the defense of the Volga River delta in the fall of 1919. The Volga River delta defense area, which included the western (Yashkul and Kizlyar directions) and eastern (Dzhambay direction) battle areas, was created on August 24, 1919. In the Dzhambay direction up to the middle of November 1919 the task of active defense of its area was set, which was replaced by the order to eliminate the enemy. In the Kizlyar direction the red troops were assigned the task of stopping the advance of the white troops with their subsequent destruction. In September-November 1919, all the tasks assigned to the command of the Volga River delta defense area were successfully accomplished.
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Landelle, Marc. "À propos de la création des magistri militum par Constantin Ier." Revue des Études Anciennes 118, no. 2 (2016): 493–509. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rea.2016.6781.
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This paper offers a reexamination of Constantine’s creation of the magistri militum : having increased the prefects’ numbers, the emperor transferred their military powers (management of troops, discipline and eventually effective command) to the magistri militum. He intended not to strip the prefects of power, but to relieve them, in a difficult context (campaigns on the Danube, numerous federates to incorporate to the army, growing complexity of units denomination). Consistent evidences allow to narrow the chronological range of this change, around 328 AD.
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Maliutina, O. K., and K. Z. Maliutin. "The tragedy of the South-Western Front: Kyiv disaster of 1941." Bulletin of Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs 99, no. 4 (December 21, 2022): 58–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.32631/v.2022.4.05.
Full textAbstract:
One of the most terrible and difficult to understand pages of the Second World War history is the death of the Red Army South-Western Front in the second half of September 1941. An attempt has been made to answer the question why the largest group of Soviet troops (the South-Western Front), not inferior to Army Group “South” in number and having a complete advantage in tanks, aviation and artillery, was defeated in defensive battles and encircled. The largest was the “cauldron” near Kyiv. The Red Army suffered gigantic losses: 665,000 soldiers and officers, the entire material and technical base of the front ended up in the Kiev “cauldron”. After the defeat near Kyiv, the way to Eastern Ukraine, Azov and Donbas was open. Scientific analysis of the events and understanding of the causes of the Kyiv disaster of 1941, their generalized, comprehensive assessment are relevant for the study of modern military history.
There were many reasons for the tragedy of the South-Western Front. Among the main ones, the following have been highlighted: incorrect assessment of Germany’s strategic priorities at the initial stage of the war; unpreparedness for a defensive war on one’s own territory; the advantage of the enemy in the tactics of fighting; lack of coordination of actions between military branches; loss of command of troops at all levels, from the General Staff to corps and division commanders; wrong personnel policy, as a result of which unprofessional persons who met the “main” criterion, such as personal loyalty to Stalin, came to the leadership of the Red Army; gross mistakes of the command, incompetence and voluntarism in setting tasks on the part of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (the highest military leadership of the country), etc.
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Butov, Sergey V., and Oleg A. Bykov. "SNIPER MOVEMENT OF THE NKVD TROOPS OF THE USSR OF THE LENINGRAD FRONT DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR." LEGAL ORDER: History, Theory, Practice 38, no. 3 (November 17, 2023): 8–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.47475/2311-696x-2023-38-3-8-12.
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The article discusses the formation and development of the sniper movement in the troops of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR of the Leningrad Front during the Great Patriotic War, as well as its role in the destruction of the enemy and the deblockade of Leningrad. The requirements of regulatory documents for the professional qualities of a Soviet sniper are indicated, compliance with which allows a well-aimed shooter to complete the assigned tasks for their intended purpose. The order of actions of a sniper at the front is revealed, as well as accounting for the combat achievements of a sniper in destroying enemy manpower. Service and combat documents aimed at moral and material stimulation of the development of the sniper movement in the troops of the NKVD of the USSR of the Leningrad Front are analyzed. The authors show the importance of rallies and combat training to the front in the training of snipers of the NKVD troops. The article also notes the effectiveness of the extermination of the enemy during such internships, provides a review of the Red Army command on the combat activities of NKVD snipers at the front. Based on the historical facts of the successful use of snipers by the NKVD troops of the Leningrad Front, the authors come to the conclusion about the significant role of the sniper movement in the destruction of enemy manpower near Leningrad and the breakthrough of the blockade of the hero city.
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Mariam, Cucu, and Yanti Suryanti. "TECHNIQUES USED IN TRANSLATING MORAL AND RELIGION VALUES IN THE RAINBOW TROOPS." Pedagogia: Jurnal Ilmiah Pendidikan 13, no. 1 (July 30, 2021): 12–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.55215/pedagogia.v13i1.3624.
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The aims of this research is to find out the techniques that are used in translating the moral and religion values in literary text. The data of this research are taken from Laskar Pelangi and its translation The Rainbow Troops written by Andrea Hirata. The method used is content analysis with qualitative approach. The result of the research is that the moral values that are mostly found are hardworking and love; the religion values are loving Allah by doing all His command; and the techniques that are mostly used are free translation, substitution and omission. Although there are several sentences and content are omitted, the meaning and the values are still delivered completely to the readers.