Journal articles: 'Cognitive evolution'

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Jain, Shilpa, and Nidhi Taneja. "Evolution from SDR to Cognitive Radio." Indian Journal of Applied Research 4, no. 8 (October 1, 2011): 248–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.15373/2249555x/august2014/64.

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Todd, P. M., and G. F. Miller. "How cognition shapes cognitive evolution." IEEE Expert 12, no. 4 (July 1997): 7–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/64.608166.

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Whitehouse, Harvey. "Cognitive Evolution and Religion: Cognition and Religious Evolution." Issues in Ethnology and Anthropology 3, no. 3 (December 1, 2008): 35–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.21301/eap.v3i3.2.

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This paper presents contemporary cognitive approaches to the evolution of religious beliefs. Arguments are put forward that different types of beliefs, or ‘modes of religiosity’, occur as a result of a number of evolutionary factors (biological, cultural, socio-political etc). At the same time, religions across the world retain a significant level of common and shared elements, also explained in evolutionary terms.

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Haider, Hubert. "Grammar change." Biological Evolution 3, no. 1 (August 2, 2021): 6–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/elt.00024.hai.

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Abstract Structurally, cognitive and biological evolution are highly similar. Random variation and constant but blind selection drive evolution within biology as well as within cognition. However, evolution of cognitive programs, and in particular of grammar systems, is not a subclass of biological evolution but a domain of its own. The abstract evolutionary principles, however, are akin in cognitive and biological evolution. In other words, insights gained in the biological domain can be cautiously applied to the cognitive domain. This paper claims that the cognitively encapsulated, i.e. consciously inaccessible, aspects of grammars as cognitively represented systems, that is, the procedural and structural parts of grammars, are subject to, and results of, Darwinian evolution, applying to a domain-specific cognitive program. Other, consciously accessible aspects of language do not fall under Darwinian evolutionary principles, but are mostly instances of social changes.

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Mikhyeyev, A. N. "Cognitive evolution or cognitive ontogenesis?" Visnik ukrains'kogo tovaristva genetikiv i selekcioneriv 15, no. 2 (February 28, 2018): 196–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.7124/visnyk.utgis.15.2.879.

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The article develops the idea that the human brain neuroevolution can become a universal object for the study of biological evolution. The main in neuroevolution person was the emergence of consciousness, i. e. ability to generate information about information, i.e. ability to generate information about information. Intellectual development of the individual is a process and the result of intellectual adaptation — the greater the number of layers of management hierarchy uses the individual, the higher his intellectual level. It substantiates the idea that the actual cognitive evolution of the human brain has been replaced or reduced to cognitive ontogenesis. Redundancy allows the brain to form and restructure neural networks, reflecting a particular mental experience of the individual. In the adult nervous system in process of learning the gene expression, unlike embryonic included in the behavioral mechanisms of self-functional systems, which puts morphogenesis in the brain during learning under control cognitive processes. Probably the greatest ability to epigenetic rearrangements has mirror neurons discussed above. Ultimately, there is a specialization of (secondary «cognitive» differentiation) of neurons, allowing the individual to adapt to the social mental manifestations of other people and yourself.Keywords: neuroevolution, cognitive ontogenesis, mental adaptation, mirror neurons.

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Wynn, Thomas. "Archaeology and cognitive evolution." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25, no. 3 (June 2002): 389–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x02000079.

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Archaeology can provide two bodies of information relevant to the understanding of the evolution of human cognition – the timing of developments, and the evolutionary context of these developments. The challenge is methodological. Archaeology must document attributes that have direct implications for underlying cognitive mechanisms. One example of such a cognitive archaeology is found in spatial cognition. The archaeological record documents an evolutionary sequence that begins with ape-equivalent spatial abilities 2.5 million years ago and ends with the appearance of modern abilities in the still remote past of 400,000 years ago. The timing of these developments reveals two major episodes in the evolution in spatial ability, one, 1.5 million years ago and the other, one million years later. The two episodes of development in spatial cognition had very different evolutionary contexts. The first was associated with the shift to an open country adaptive niche that occurred early in the time range of Homo erectus. The second was associated with no clear adaptive shift, though it does appear to have coincided with the invasion of more hostile environments and the appearance of systematic hunting of large mammals. Neither, however, occurred in a context of modern hunting and gathering.

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MacLean, Evan L. "Unraveling the evolution of uniquely human cognition." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 23 (June 6, 2016): 6348–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1521270113.

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A satisfactory account of human cognitive evolution will explain not only the psychological mechanisms that make our species unique, but also how, when, and why these traits evolved. To date, researchers have made substantial progress toward defining uniquely human aspects of cognition, but considerably less effort has been devoted to questions about the evolutionary processes through which these traits have arisen. In this article, I aim to link these complementary aims by synthesizing recent advances in our understanding of what makes human cognition unique, with theory and data regarding the processes of cognitive evolution. I review evidence that uniquely human cognition depends on synergism between both representational and motivational factors and is unlikely to be accounted for by changes to any singular cognitive system. I argue that, whereas no nonhuman animal possesses the full constellation of traits that define the human mind, homologies and analogies of critical aspects of human psychology can be found in diverse nonhuman taxa. I suggest that phylogenetic approaches to the study of animal cognition—which can address questions about the selective pressures and proximate mechanisms driving cognitive change—have the potential to yield important insights regarding the processes through which the human cognitive phenotype evolved.

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Mitola, Joseph. "Cognitive Radio Architecture Evolution." Proceedings of the IEEE 97, no. 4 (April 2009): 626–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/jproc.2009.2013012.

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Bednarik, Robert G. "Beads and Cognitive Evolution." Time and Mind 1, no. 3 (January 2008): 285–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.2752/175169708x329354.

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Uomini, Natalie, Joanna Fairlie, Russell D. Gray, and Michael Griesser. "Extended parenting and the evolution of cognition." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 375, no. 1803 (June 2020): 20190495. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0495.

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Traditional attempts to understand the evolution of human cognition compare humans with other primates. This research showed that relative brain size covaries with cognitive skills, while adaptations that buffer the developmental and energetic costs of large brains (e.g. allomaternal care), and ecological or social benefits of cognitive abilities, are critical for their evolution. To understand the drivers of cognitive adaptations, it is profitable to consider distant lineages with convergently evolved cognitions. Here, we examine the facilitators of cognitive evolution in corvid birds, where some species display cultural learning, with an emphasis on family life. We propose that extended parenting (protracted parent–offspring association) is pivotal in the evolution of cognition: it combines critical life-history, social and ecological conditions allowing for the development and maintenance of cognitive skillsets that confer fitness benefits to individuals. This novel hypothesis complements the extended childhood idea by considering the parents' role in juvenile development. Using phylogenetic comparative analyses, we show that corvids have larger body sizes, longer development times, extended parenting and larger relative brain sizes than other passerines. Case studies from two corvid species with different ecologies and social systems highlight the critical role of life-history features on juveniles’ cognitive development: extended parenting provides a safe haven, access to tolerant role models, reliable learning opportunities and food, resulting in higher survival. The benefits of extended juvenile learning periods, over evolutionary time, lead to selection for expanded cognitive skillsets. Similarly, in our ancestors, cooperative breeding and increased group sizes facilitated learning and teaching. Our analyses highlight the critical role of life-history, ecological and social factors that underlie both extended parenting and expanded cognitive skillsets. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals’.

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Jacques, Francois H., Brian T. Harel, Adrian J. Schembri, Chantal Paquette, Brigitte Bilodeau, Pawel Kalinowski, and Reshmi Roy. "Cognitive evolution in natalizumab-treated multiple sclerosis patients." Multiple Sclerosis Journal - Experimental, Translational and Clinical 2 (January 2016): 205521731665711. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2055217316657116.

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Background Cognitive dysfunction affects up to 65% of multiple sclerosis (MS) patients and progresses over time. Natalizumab has been shown to be superior to placebo in preserving cognition for the first two years of therapy. Objectives The objectives of this study are to understand the impact of natalizumab on cognition beyond two years of therapy and to investigate whether baseline characteristics are predictive of clinical response. Methods This is a single-center, 24-month, observational study. Sixty-three patients treated with natalizumab were assessed prior to monthly infusions using a Cogstate battery and the Symbol Digit Modalities Test (SDMT). Patient demographics were collected at baseline. A linear mixed model was conducted with duration of natalizumab therapy as a between-subjects factor (≤2 or >2 years), assessment as a within-subjects factor, and Multiple Sclerosis Severity Score (MSSS) as a covariate. Results Aside from the MSSS ( p = 0.0074), the two groups were identical. No patient showed evidence of sustained cognitive deterioration over the 24-month period. Baseline parameters including impaired cognition did not influence the trajectory of cognitive change over 24 months. Conclusions Our results suggest that natalizumab preserves cognition following four to seven years of continuous therapy. This occurs irrespective of baseline characteristics, including impaired cognition.

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Watts, Fraser. "The evolution of religious cognition." Archive for the Psychology of Religion 42, no. 1 (March 2020): 89–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0084672420909479.

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Several accounts of the evolution of religion distinguish two phases: an earlier shamanic stage and a later doctrinal stage. Similarly, several theories of human cognition distinguish two cognitive modes: a phylogenetically older system that is largely intuitive and a later, more distinctively human system that is more rational and articulate. This article suggests that cognition in the earlier stage in the evolution of religion is largely at the level of intuition, whereas the cognition of doctrine or religion is more conceptual and rational. Early religious cognition is more embodied and is more likely to carry healing benefits. The evolutionary origins of religion in humans seem to depend on developments in the cognitive architecture. It is further suggested that the cognition of early religion shows less conceptual differentiation, is characteristically participatory rather than objectifying and is less individualistic. The development of religion in recent centuries appears to show some approximate recapitulation of the stages through which religion originally evolved.

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Poonkundran, Dr Balaji. "Study on Cognitive Process of Attitude and Behavior in Management Evolution." SIJ Transactions on Industrial, Financial & Business Management 06, no. 04 (August 13, 2018): 01–08. http://dx.doi.org/10.9756/sijifbm/v6i4/0103550101.

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Gilbert, Paul. "Evolution Theory and Cognitive Therapy." Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy 16, no. 3 (September 2002): 259–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/jcop.16.3.259.52518.

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15

Hoppál, Mihály. "Shamanic and\or cognitive evolution." Documenta Praehistorica 33 (December 31, 2006): 229–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/dp.33.20.

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Many misconceptions have been associated with shamanism. Recent studies, however, show a way to reinterpret basic concepts concerning shamanism. New field data from ethnology/anthropology, and studies on cognitive evolution have provided new results to enable a reconstruction of some mechanisms which contributed to early developments in the social life and intellectual history of prehistoric people. Shamanic healing methods, simple rhythmic and motor patterns and visual/symbolic representations are the focus of this analytical paper.

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Heyes, Cecilia. "Four routes of cognitive evolution." Psychological Review 110, no. 4 (2003): 713–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.110.4.713.

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Stout, Dietrich. "The Evolution of Cognitive Control." Topics in Cognitive Science 2, no. 4 (January 27, 2010): 614–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01078.x.

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Kerr, Benjamin. "Niche Construction and Cognitive Evolution." Biological Theory 2, no. 3 (September 2007): 250–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/biot.2007.2.3.250.

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Davidson, Iain. "The archeology of cognitive evolution." Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 1, no. 2 (March 2010): 214–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcs.40.

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Гусев, Станислав Сергеевич. "THE EVOLUTION OF COGNITIVE ORIENTATIONS." Логико-философские штудии, no. 2 (September 24, 2022): 89–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.52119/lphs.2022.99.33.006.

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В статье выделяются четыре типа познавательных ориентаций, определяющих характер некоторых этапов в развитии познания. Обосновывается утверждение о том, что особенности каждого из этих этапов обуславливаются соотношением эмоциональных реакций людей на воздействия внешнего мира и рационального осмысления таких реакций. Развитие абстрактного мышления способствовало изменениям в способах оформления человеческих знаний. От наглядно образных представлений об устройстве мира познание переходило к конструированию формальных моделей, создаваемых с помощью всевозможных знаковых систем. Широкое распространение таких систем в различных сферах общественной жизни выявило ряд трудностей. Контексты создания передаваемых сообщений часто существенно отличались от контекстов их принятия и интерпретаций. Предпринятый в связи с этим анализ коммуникативных процессов обнаружил неоднородный характер структуры передаваемых сообщений. Часть их содержания прямо представлена в используемых языковых формах, а часть лишь предполагается. Ее восприятие происходит при совпадении эмоциональных состояний всех участников коммуникации. В статье обсуждается концепция «молчаливого знания» М. Полани, а также рассматриваются попытки некоторых исследователей выразить «скрытую» информацию явным образом, используя формальные языки современной логики. Но, так как сегодня одной из важнейших познавательных задач становится разработка проектов «возможного будущего», используемые формализмы должны содержательно интерпретироваться. Эффективность такой деятельности предполагает изучение различных форм взаимодействия эмоциональных и рациональных элементов психической жизни человека. The article identifies four types of cognitive orientations that determine the nature of some stages in the development of cognition. I argue that the features of each of these stages are determined by the ratio of emotional reactions of people to external world stimuli and the rational understanding of such reactions. The development of abstract thinking contributed to changes in the way human knowledge is formalized. From visually figurative ideas about the structure of the world, cognition moved on to the construction of formal models created with the help of all kinds of sign systems. The widespread use of such systems in various spheres of public life has revealed a number of difficulties. The contexts of creating transmitted messages often differed significantly from the contexts of their reception and interpretation. The analysis of communication processes undertaken in this regard reveals the heterogeneous nature of the structure of transmitted messages. Part of their content is directly presented in the linguistic forms in use, and some are only assumed. Its perception occurs when the emotional states of all communication participants coincide. The article discusses the concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ by M. Polanyi, and also examines the attempts of some researchers to express ‘hidden’ information explicitly, using the formal languages of modern logic. But since today one of the most important cognitive tasks is the development of projects for a ‘possible future’, the formalisms must be meaningfully interpreted. In order for such an enterprise to be efficient, the study of various forms of interaction between emotional and rational elements of a human mental life is required.

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Zakharov, V. V. "Evolution of cognitive deficit: mild and moderate cognitive impairments." Neurology, neuropsychiatry, Psychosomatics, no. 2 (June 12, 2012): 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.14412/2074-2711-2012-376.

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Klüver, Jürgen, Rouven Malecki, Jörn Schmidt, and Christina Stoica. "Sociocultural Evolution and Cognitive Ontogenesis: A Sociocultural-Cognitive Algorithm." Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory 9, no. 3 (October 2003): 255–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:cmot.0000026584.19223.ef.

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Miller, Sara E., Andrew W. Legan, Michael T. Henshaw, Katherine L. Ostevik, Kieran Samuk, Floria M. K. Uy, and Michael J. Sheehan. "Evolutionary dynamics of recent selection on cognitive abilities." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 6 (January 24, 2020): 3045–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918592117.

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Cognitive abilities can vary dramatically among species. The relative importance of social and ecological challenges in shaping cognitive evolution has been the subject of a long-running and recently renewed debate, but little work has sought to understand the selective dynamics underlying the evolution of cognitive abilities. Here, we investigate recent selection related to cognition in the paper wasp Polistes fuscatus—a wasp that has uniquely evolved visual individual recognition abilities. We generate high quality de novo genome assemblies and population genomic resources for multiple species of paper wasps and use a population genomic framework to interrogate the probable mode and tempo of cognitive evolution. Recent, strong, hard selective sweeps in P. fuscatus contain loci annotated with functions in long-term memory formation, mushroom body development, and visual processing, traits which have recently evolved in association with individual recognition. The homologous pathways are not under selection in closely related wasps that lack individual recognition. Indeed, the prevalence of candidate cognition loci within the strongest selective sweeps suggests that the evolution of cognitive abilities has been among the strongest selection pressures in P. fuscatus’ recent evolutionary history. Detailed analyses of selective sweeps containing candidate cognition loci reveal multiple cases of hard selective sweeps within the last few thousand years on de novo mutations, mainly in noncoding regions. These data provide unprecedented insight into some of the processes by which cognition evolves.

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Jiang, Zuoming, and Yang Sun. "Exploring the Spatial Image of Traditional Villages from the Tourists’ Hand-Drawn Sketches." Sustainability 14, no. 10 (May 14, 2022): 5977. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su14105977.

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As an important concept in cognitive psychology and behavioural geography, destination spatial image cognition has a significant impact on the quality of tourists’ experience, and on their behavioural intention. However, studies of spatial image cognition in small-scale traditional villages are limited. Therefore, the present study analyses the spatial image characteristics of four traditional villages of World Cultural Heritage sites in China through the use of tourists’ hand-drawn sketches, using a sample of 366 respondents to further explore the evolution process of cognitive map types and constituent elements with tourists’ stay days. Results indicate that the spatial cognitive map and landmarks are the main types and dominant elements of spatial image cognition, respectively. The tourists’ spatial cognitive process includes two sequences, as follows: the evolution sequence of dominant cognitive maps is “spatial + individual → spatial + individual + hybrid → spatial + individual”, while the evolution sequence of dominant cognition elements is “landmark + path + animal and plant → landmark + animal and plant + path”. This study extends the current destination spatial image cognition literature, and has substantial value for the destination in terms of developing traditional village sustainable tourism based on the tourists’ attitude, as obtained by the cognitive map method.

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Lotem, Arnon, Joseph Y. Halpern, Shimon Edelman, and Oren Kolodny. "The evolution of cognitive mechanisms in response to cultural innovations." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, no. 30 (July 24, 2017): 7915–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1620742114.

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When humans and other animals make cultural innovations, they also change their environment, thereby imposing new selective pressures that can modify their biological traits. For example, there is evidence that dairy farming by humans favored alleles for adult lactose tolerance. Similarly, the invention of cooking possibly affected the evolution of jaw and tooth morphology. However, when it comes to cognitive traits and learning mechanisms, it is much more difficult to determine whether and how their evolution was affected by culture or by their use in cultural transmission. Here we argue that, excluding very recent cultural innovations, the assumption that culture shaped the evolution of cognition is both more parsimonious and more productive than assuming the opposite. In considering how culture shapes cognition, we suggest that a process-level model of cognitive evolution is necessary and offer such a model. The model employs relatively simple coevolving mechanisms of learning and data acquisition that jointly construct a complex network of a type previously shown to be capable of supporting a range of cognitive abilities. The evolution of cognition, and thus the effect of culture on cognitive evolution, is captured through small modifications of these coevolving learning and data-acquisition mechanisms, whose coordinated action is critical for building an effective network. We use the model to show how these mechanisms are likely to evolve in response to cultural phenomena, such as language and tool-making, which are associated with major changes in data patterns and with new computational and statistical challenges.

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Fitch, W. Tecumseh, Ludwig Huber, and Thomas Bugnyar. "Social Cognition and the Evolution of Language: Constructing Cognitive Phylogenies." Neuron 65, no. 6 (March 2010): 795–814. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.011.

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Ashton, Benjamin J., Alex Thornton, and Amanda R. Ridley. "An intraspecific appraisal of the social intelligence hypothesis." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 373, no. 1756 (August 13, 2018): 20170288. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0288.

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The prevailing hypotheses for the evolution of cognition focus on either the demands associated with group living (the social intelligence hypothesis (SIH)) or ecological challenges such as finding food. Comparative studies testing these hypotheses have generated highly conflicting results; consequently, our understanding of the drivers of cognitive evolution remains limited. To understand how selection shapes cognition, research must incorporate an intraspecific approach, focusing on the causes and consequences of individual variation in cognition. Here, we review the findings of recent intraspecific cognitive research to investigate the predictions of the SIH. Extensive evidence from our own research on Australian magpies ( Cracticus tibicen dorsalis ), and a number of other taxa, suggests that individuals in larger social groups exhibit elevated cognitive performance and, in some cases, elevated reproductive fitness. Not only do these findings demonstrate how the social environment has the potential to shape cognitive evolution, but crucially, they demonstrate the importance of considering both genetic and developmental factors when attempting to explain the causes of cognitive variation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Causes and consequences of individual differences in cognitive abilities’.

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Irwin, Louis N., and Brian A. Irwin. "Place and Environment in the Ongoing Evolution of Cognitive Neuroscience." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 32, no. 10 (October 2020): 1837–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_01607.

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Cognitive science today increasingly is coming under the influence of embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive perspectives, superimposed on the more traditional cybernetic, computational assumptions of classical cognitive research. Neuroscience has contributed to a greatly enhanced understanding of brain function within the constraints of the traditional cognitive science approach, but interpretations of many of its findings can be enriched by the newer alternative perspectives. Here, we note in particular how these frameworks highlight the cognitive requirements of an animal situated within its particular environment, how the coevolution of an organism's biology and ecology shape its cognitive characteristics, and how the cognitive realm extends beyond the brain of the perceiving animal. We argue that these insights of the embodied cognition paradigm reveal the central role that “place” plays in the cognitive landscape and that cognitive scientists and philosophers alike can gain from paying heed to the importance of a concept of place. We conclude with a discussion of how this concept can be applied with respect to cognitive function, species comparisons, ecologically relevant experimental designs, and how the “hard problem” of consciousness might be approached, among its other implications.

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Reader, Simon M., Yfke Hager, and Kevin N. Laland. "The evolution of primate general and cultural intelligence." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 366, no. 1567 (April 12, 2011): 1017–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0342.

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There are consistent individual differences in human intelligence, attributable to a single ‘general intelligence’ factor, g . The evolutionary basis of g and its links to social learning and culture remain controversial. Conflicting hypotheses regard primate cognition as divided into specialized, independently evolving modules versus a single general process. To assess how processes underlying culture relate to one another and other cognitive capacities, we compiled ecologically relevant cognitive measures from multiple domains, namely reported incidences of behavioural innovation, social learning, tool use, extractive foraging and tactical deception, in 62 primate species. All exhibited strong positive associations in principal component and factor analyses, after statistically controlling for multiple potential confounds. This highly correlated composite of cognitive traits suggests social, technical and ecological abilities have coevolved in primates, indicative of an across-species general intelligence that includes elements of cultural intelligence. Our composite species-level measure of general intelligence, ‘primate g S ’, covaried with both brain volume and captive learning performance measures. Our findings question the independence of cognitive traits and do not support ‘massive modularity’ in primate cognition, nor an exclusively social model of primate intelligence. High general intelligence has independently evolved at least four times, with convergent evolution in capuchins, baboons, macaques and great apes.

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Burmeister, Sabrina S., and Yuxiang Liu. "Integrative Comparative Cognition: Can Neurobiology and Neurogenomics Inform Comparative Analyses of Cognitive Phenotype?" Integrative and Comparative Biology 60, no. 4 (August 19, 2020): 925–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icb/icaa113.

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Synopsis A long-standing question in animal behavior is what are the patterns and processes that shape the evolution of cognition? One effective way to address this question is to study cognitive abilities in a broad spectrum of animals. While comparative psychologists have traditionally focused on a narrow range of organisms, today they may work with any number of species, from frogs to birds or bees. This broader range of study species has greatly enriched our understanding of the diversity of cognitive processes among animals. Yet, this diversity has highlighted the fundamental challenge of comparing cognitive processes across animals. An analysis of the neural and molecular mechanisms of cognition may be necessary to solve this problem. The goal of our symposium was to bring together speakers studying a range of species to gain a broadly integrative perspective on cognition while at the same time considering the potentially important role of neurobiology and genomics in addressing the difficult problem of comparing cognition across species. For example, work by MaBouDi et al. indicates that neural constraints on computing power may impact the cognitive processes underlying numerical discrimination in bees. A presentation by Lara LaDage demonstrated how neurobiology can be used to better understand cognition and its evolution in reptiles while Edwards et al. identify the cerebellum as potentially important in the performance of the complex process of nest building. We see that molecular approaches highlight the contributions of the prefrontal cortex and hippocampus to cognitive phenotype across vertebrates while, at the same time, identifying the genes and cellular processes that may contribute to evolution of cognition. The potentially important role of neurogenesis and synaptic plasticity emerge clearly from such studies. Still unanswered is the question of whether molecular tools will contribute to our ability to discriminate convergent/parallel evolution from homology in the evolution of cognitive phenotype.

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Holekamp, Kay E., and Sarah Benson-Amram. "The evolution of intelligence in mammalian carnivores." Interface Focus 7, no. 3 (April 21, 2017): 20160108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsfs.2016.0108.

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Although intelligence should theoretically evolve to help animals solve specific types of problems posed by the environment, it is unclear which environmental challenges favour enhanced cognition, or how general intelligence evolves along with domain-specific cognitive abilities. The social intelligence hypothesis posits that big brains and great intelligence have evolved to cope with the labile behaviour of group mates. We have exploited the remarkable convergence in social complexity between cercopithecine primates and spotted hyaenas to test predictions of the social intelligence hypothesis in regard to both cognition and brain size. Behavioural data indicate that there has been considerable convergence between primates and hyaenas with respect to their social cognitive abilities. Moreover, compared with other hyaena species, spotted hyaenas have larger brains and expanded frontal cortex, as predicted by the social intelligence hypothesis. However, broader comparative study suggests that domain-general intelligence in carnivores probably did not evolve in response to selection pressures imposed specifically in the social domain. The cognitive buffer hypothesis, which suggests that general intelligence evolves to help animals cope with novel or changing environments, appears to offer a more robust explanation for general intelligence in carnivores than any hypothesis invoking selection pressures imposed strictly by sociality or foraging demands.

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Sloman, Aaron, and Jackie Chappell. "Computational cognitive epigenetics." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, no. 4 (August 2007): 375–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x07002336.

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AbstractJablonka & Lamb (J&L) refer only implicitly to aspects of cognitive competence that preceded both evolution of human language and language learning in children. These aspects are important for evolution and development but need to be understood using the design-stance, which the book adopts only for molecular and genetic processes, not for behavioural and symbolic processes. Design-based analyses reveal more routes from genome to behaviour than J&L seem to have considered. This both points to gaps in our understanding of evolution and epigenetic processes and may lead to possible ways of filling the gaps.

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Bräuer, Juliane, Daniel Hanus, Simone Pika, Russell Gray, and Natalie Uomini. "Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not “One Cognition”." Journal of Intelligence 8, no. 3 (July 2, 2020): 28. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence8030028.

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Using the comparative approach, researchers draw inferences about the evolution of cognition. Psychologists have postulated several hypotheses to explain why certain species are cognitively more flexible than others, and these hypotheses assume that certain cognitive skills are linked together to create a generally “smart” species. However, empirical findings suggest that several animal species are highly specialized, showing exceptional skills in single cognitive domains while performing poorly in others. Although some cognitive skills may indeed overlap, we cannot a priori assume that they do across species. We argue that the term “cognition” has often been used by applying an anthropocentric viewpoint rather than a biocentric one. As a result, researchers tend to overrate cognitive skills that are human-like and assume that certain skills cluster together in other animals as they do in our own species. In this paper, we emphasize that specific physical and social environments create selection pressures that lead to the evolution of certain cognitive adaptations. Skills such as following the pointing gesture, tool-use, perspective-taking, or the ability to cooperate evolve independently from each other as a concrete result of specific selection pressures, and thus have appeared in distantly related species. Thus, there is not “one cognition”. Our argument is founded upon traditional Darwinian thinking, which—although always at the forefront of biology—has sometimes been neglected in animal cognition research. In accordance with the biocentric approach, we advocate a broader empirical perspective as we are convinced that to better understand animal minds, comparative researchers should focus much more on questions and experiments that are ecologically valid. We should investigate nonhuman cognition for its own sake, not only in comparison to the human model.

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Lerche, Stefanie, Isabel Wurster, Benjamin Röben, Gerrit Machetanz, Milan Zimmermann, Felix Bernhard, Elke Stransky, et al. "Parkinson’s disease: evolution of cognitive impairment and CSF Aβ1–42 profiles in a prospective longitudinal study." Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry 90, no. 2 (September 25, 2018): 165–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jnnp-2018-318956.

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ObjectiveTo evaluate the evolution of cognitive impairment in relation to cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) profiles of amyloid-β (Aβ), total-Tau and phosphorylated-Tau in Parkinson’s disease (PD).MethodsProspective, longitudinal, observational study up to 10 years with follow-up every 2 years. We assessed CSF profiles in 415 patients with sporadic PD (median age 66; 63% men) and 142 healthy controls (median age 62; 43% men).ResultsPatients with PD with low CSF Aβ1–42 levels at baseline were more often cognitively impaired than patients with intermediate and high Aβ1–42 levels. Sixty-seven per cent of the patients with low Aβ1–42 levels at baseline and normal cognition developed cognitive impairment during follow-up, compared with 41% and 37% of patients having intermediate and high CSF Aβ1–42 levels. Kaplan-Meier survival curves and Cox regression revealed that patients with low CSF Aβ1–42 levels at baseline developed cognitive impairment more frequently and earlier during follow-up.ConclusionWe conclude that in patients with sporadic PD, low levels of Aβ1–42 are associated with a higher risk of developing cognitive impairment earlier in the disease process at least in a subgroup of patients.

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Buechel, Séverine D., Annika Boussard, Alexander Kotrschal, Wouter van der Bijl, and Niclas Kolm. "Brain size affects performance in a reversal-learning test." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 285, no. 1871 (January 24, 2018): 20172031. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.2031.

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It has become increasingly clear that a larger brain can confer cognitive benefits. Yet not all of the numerous aspects of cognition seem to be affected by brain size. Recent evidence suggests that some more basic forms of cognition, for instance colour vision, are not influenced by brain size. We therefore hypothesize that a larger brain is especially beneficial for distinct and gradually more complex aspects of cognition. To test this hypothesis, we assessed the performance of brain size selected female guppies ( Poecilia reticulata ) in two distinct aspects of cognition that differ in cognitive complexity. In a standard reversal-learning test we first investigated basic learning ability with a colour discrimination test, then reversed the reward contingency to specifically test for cognitive flexibility. We found that large-brained females outperformed small-brained females in the reversed-learning part of the test but not in the colour discrimination part of the test. Large-brained individuals are hence cognitively more flexible, which probably yields fitness benefits, as they may adapt more quickly to social and/or ecological cognitive challenges. Our results also suggest that a larger brain becomes especially advantageous with increasing cognitive complexity. These findings corroborate the significance of brain size for cognitive evolution.

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Thompson, Bill, Simon Kirby, and Kenny Smith. "Culture shapes the evolution of cognition." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 16 (April 4, 2016): 4530–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1523631113.

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A central debate in cognitive science concerns the nativist hypothesis, the proposal that universal features of behavior reflect a biologically determined cognitive substrate: For example, linguistic nativism proposes a domain-specific faculty of language that strongly constrains which languages can be learned. An evolutionary stance appears to provide support for linguistic nativism, because coordinated constraints on variation may facilitate communication and therefore be adaptive. However, language, like many other human behaviors, is underpinned by social learning and cultural transmission alongside biological evolution. We set out two models of these interactions, which show how culture can facilitate rapid biological adaptation yet rule out strong nativization. The amplifying effects of culture can allow weak cognitive biases to have significant population-level consequences, radically increasing the evolvability of weak, defeasible inductive biases; however, the emergence of a strong cultural universal does not imply, nor lead to, nor require, strong innate constraints. From this we must conclude, on evolutionary grounds, that the strong nativist hypothesis for language is false. More generally, because such reciprocal interactions between cultural and biological evolution are not limited to language, nativist explanations for many behaviors should be reconsidered: Evolutionary reasoning shows how we can have cognitively driven behavioral universals and yet extreme plasticity at the level of the individual—if, and only if, we account for the human capacity to transmit knowledge culturally. Wherever culture is involved, weak cognitive biases rather than strong innate constraints should be the default assumption.

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Becker, David, and Heiner Rindermann. "Cognitive Sex Differences: Evolution and History." Mankind Quarterly 58, no. 1 (2017): 83–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.46469/mq.2017.58.1.6.

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Herculano-Houzel, Suzana. "Embodied (embrained?) cognitive evolution, at last!" Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews 13 (2018): 91–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.3819/ccbr.2018.130009.

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Jacobs, Lucia F. "The Evolution of the Cognitive Map." Brain, Behavior and Evolution 62, no. 2 (2003): 128–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000072443.

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Blackburn, I. M. "The Cognitive Revolution: An Ongoing Evolution." Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy 14, no. 4 (October 1986): 274–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0141347300014889.

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The five papers which make up this special issue all reflect a feeling of guarded optimism about future applications of cognitive therapy in our clinical practice. A long way has been covered since the theoretical formulations of the early 60's, which led to the term “cognitive revolution” after Kuhn's (1962) exposé of how paradigm shifts occur in science. If there has been a revolution, it has been, on the whole, non-violent in spite of the sometimes shrill protests from the old guard. As Paul Salkovskis points out in the introductory paper, behaviour therapists have, perhaps paradoxically, been the most enthusiastic in coming to terms with the new paradigm. This coming to terms has involved experimental, theoretical and treatment studies. The areas covered have expanded steadily from depression and anxiety, to the obsessional disorders, the eating disorders, the phobias, adolescent problems and, as seen in this volume, to pain and marital conflict. Articles, books and new journals proliferate. Why should that be so?

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Barton, Robert A. "Embodied cognitive evolution and the cerebellum." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 367, no. 1599 (August 5, 2012): 2097–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2012.0112.

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Much attention has focused on the dramatic expansion of the forebrain, particularly the neocortex, as the neural substrate of cognitive evolution. However, though relatively small, the cerebellum contains about four times more neurons than the neocortex. I show that commonly used comparative measures such as neocortex ratio underestimate the contribution of the cerebellum to brain evolution. Once differences in the scaling of connectivity in neocortex and cerebellum are accounted for, a marked and general pattern of correlated evolution of the two structures is apparent. One deviation from this general pattern is a relative expansion of the cerebellum in apes and other extractive foragers. The confluence of these comparative patterns, studies of ape foraging skills and social learning, and recent evidence on the cognitive neuroscience of the cerebellum, suggest an important role for the cerebellum in the evolution of the capacity for planning, execution and understanding of complex behavioural sequences—including tool use and language. There is no clear separation between sensory–motor and cognitive specializations underpinning such skills, undermining the notion of executive control as a distinct process. Instead, I argue that cognitive evolution is most effectively understood as the elaboration of specialized systems for embodied adaptive control.

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Winkelman, Michael. "Shamanism and Cognitive Evolution (with comments)." Cambridge Archaeological Journal 12, no. 1 (April 2002): 71–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0959774302000045.

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Shamanic referents in Upper Palaeolithic cave art indicate its pivotal role in the Middle–Upper Palaeolithic transition. Etic models of shamanism derived from cross-cultural research help articulate the shamanic paradigm in cave art and explicate the role of shamanism in this transition. Shamanism is found cross-culturally in hunter-gatherer societies, constituting an ecological and psychosociobiological adaptation that reflects the ritual and cosmology of early modern humans. Shamanism played a role in cognitive and social evolution through production of analogical thought processes, visual symbolism and group-bonding rituals. Universals of shamanism are derived from innate modules, particularly the hominid ‘mimetic controller’ and music and dance. These induced altered states of consciousness, which produce physiological, cognitive, personal and social integration through integrative brain-processing. Shamanic altered states of consciousness have the cross-modal integration characteristic of the emergent features of Palaeolithic thought and facilitated adaptations to the ecological and social changes of the Upper Palaeolithic. Cross-modular integration of innate modules for inferring mental states (mind), and social relations (self/others), and understanding the natural world (classificatory schemas) produced the fundamental forms of trope (metaphor) that underlay analogical representation. These integrations also explain animism (mental and social modules applied to natural domains); totemism (natural module applied to social domain); and guardian spirit relations (natural module applied to self and mental domains).

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Zhou, Yongquan, Shaoling Zhang, Qifang Luo, and Mohamed Abdel-Baset. "CCEO: cultural cognitive evolution optimization algorithm." Soft Computing 23, no. 23 (January 30, 2019): 12561–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00500-019-03806-w.

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Autzen, Bengt. "Error management, reliability and cognitive evolution." Biology & Philosophy 32, no. 6 (September 11, 2017): 935–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-017-9583-1.

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Choi, Dongkyu, and Pat Langley. "Evolution of the Icarus Cognitive Architecture." Cognitive Systems Research 48 (May 2018): 25–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.05.005.

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Burkart, J. M., S. B. Hrdy, and C. P. Van Schaik. "Cooperative breeding and human cognitive evolution." Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews 18, no. 5 (September 2009): 175–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/evan.20222.

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Wynn, Thomas, and Frederick L. Coolidge. "Archeological insights into hominin cognitive evolution." Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews 25, no. 4 (July 2016): 200–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/evan.21496.

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Mandler, George. "Origins of the cognitive (r)evolution." Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 38, no. 4 (2002): 339–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jhbs.10066.

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Bickerton, Derek. "Language evolution without evolution." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26, no. 6 (December 2003): 669–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x03250159.

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Jackendoff's major syntactic exemplar is deeply unrepresentative of most syntactic relations and operations. His treatment of language evolution is vulnerable to Occam's Razor, hypothesizing stages of dubious independence and unexplained adaptiveness, and effectively divorcing the evolution of language from other aspects of human evolution. In particular, it ignores connections between language and the massive discontinuities in human cognitive evolution.

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Rouse, James, Laurin McDowall, Zak Mitchell, Elizabeth J. Duncan, and Amanda Bretman. "Social competition stimulates cognitive performance in a sex-specific manner." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 287, no. 1935 (September 16, 2020): 20201424. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2020.1424.

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Social interactions are thought to be a critical driver in the evolution of cognitive ability. Cooperative interactions, such as pair bonding, rather than competitive interactions have been largely implicated in the evolution of increased cognition. This is despite competition traditionally being a very strong driver of trait evolution. Males of many species track changes in their social environment and alter their reproductive strategies in response to anticipated levels of competition. We predict this to be cognitively challenging. Using a Drosophila melanogaster model, we are able to distinguish between the effects of a competitive environment versus generic social contact by exposing flies to same-sex same-species competition versus different species partners, shown to present non-competitive contacts. Males increase olfactory learning/memory and visual memory after exposure to conspecific males only, a pattern echoed by increased expression of synaptic genes and an increased need for sleep. For females, largely not affected by mating competition, the opposite pattern was seen. The results indicate that specific social contacts dependent on sex, not simply generic social stimulation, may be an important evolutionary driver for cognitive ability in fruit flies.

Journal articles on the topic 'Cognitive evolution'

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