Academic literature on the topic 'Coenesthesis'

Background: the elaboration of problems of clinical psychiatry in Russia had already begun in the end of the XVIII — beginning of the XIX centuries by professors of internal medicine and of other branches of medical academic institutions, and from the thirties years of XIX century gradually moved to the hands of the doctors who were specialized in psychiatry (V.F. Sabler, A.I. Gerzog, I.F. Rjul, I.P. Malinovskiy and others).The aim was to analyze the history of the formation of scientific concepts in Russian psychiatry in comparison with the relevant German and French psychiatric concepts at that time.Method: narrative review.Conclusion: the author of the first domestic textbook of psychiatry “Diseases of the soul” (1834) was Professor of department of surgery and mental diseases of Kharkov’s University P.A. Butkovskiy. Creating his textbook P.A. Butkovskiy grounded on the textbook of one of the founders of german “school of psychics” J.Ch. Heinroth (1818) and took as a basis of classification of mental diseases Heinroth’s systematics. The forms of mental diseases according to P.A. Butkovskiy and J.Ch. Heinroth were distinguished by two principal signs: predomination of affection of the one among three areas of psyche: imagination, intellect and volition, and due to the changes in its functions: amplification or weakening. Wherein P.A. Butkovskiy connected with the affection of the brain only the group of “paranoiс” diseases (general paranoia, ecnoia, paraphrosyne, moria) and acquired stupidity (anoia) that were explained by exaggeration or weakening of the brain functioning respectively. P.A. Butkovskiy also introduced in Russian psychiatry the notion of “dynamics” and “psychosomatic” that were borrowed from J.Ch. Heinroth, and the concept of “general feeling” (coenesthesis) of J. Reil. The forms of mental disorders distinguished by J.Ch. Heinroth represented the next progressive step in the differentiation of syndrome pictures of mental diseases (but not in psychiatric nosology as the author considered), and the fact that P.A. Butkovskiy, the author of the first Russian Textbook on Psychiatry, created the similar systematics on the same principles, contributed to the building of mutual understanding between national psychiatric schools that were in the process of being formed.

Near the end of the episode “The First Day” of Dana Terrace’s The Owl House, the series’s protagonist, Luz, receives permission to study every subject. Having overthrown her magic school’s traditional one-track system, Luz confesses, “Maybe it’s crazy but I wish I could study a little bit of everything.” At this wish, Luz finds herself suspended in space; magic adorns her in motley-colored garments, indicative of her intended multitrack pursuits, against an abstract backdrop of blue, purple, and pink: unmistakably, at least for this bisexual viewer, the color of the bisexual flag. Even before Terrace confirmed the character’s bisexuality, I suspect many bisexual viewers already knew. My knowledge was excitement; I felt an intense energy that responded simultaneously to what I witnessed on screen and within myself. Later I thought of coenesthesia, “the potential and perception of one’s whole sensorial being” (Carnal Thoughts 67), and how this scene’s coenesthesia collides with Luz’s realizing herself in terms of her multifaceted potential. Given that “we extend space differently based on how we are orientated in the world” (“Questions” 207), I seek to explore how this scene posits bisexuality as multi-directional and interdisciplinary. Furthermore, I seek to examine how, from my perspective as a twenty-some-year-old bisexual viewer who wishes she had this show years ago, this scene also speaks to bisexual temporal orientations. How can we read this scene, and ourselves, in relation to the history of bisexuality, traditionally located “in the past or future, but never in the present tense” (Angelides 194)?

Abstract The term “coenesthesia” was introduced at the end of the 18th century by the German physiologist Johann Christian Reil to designate the general perception of the living body through the nerves disseminated in it. Over the course of the 19th century, this notion circulated widely not only in Germany, but also in France, where it was developed in particular by Théodule Ribot. However, a good sixty years before Ribot, Maine de Biran had already employed the notion of “coenesthesia” to indicate the “immediate feeling of existence”, which he distinguishes from the apperception of the self in relation to the body. What Biran emphasizes, in his philosophical appropriation of “coenesthesia”, is the impersonal and mostly unconscious nature of this feeling, which nevertheless never leaves us and plays a key role in the shaping of our personal and conscious life, unnoticeably influencing the course of our ideas, our character, and the emotional tone of our perception of the world. The purpose of this article is to study Biran’s philosophical use of the notion of “coenesthesia” in the last phase of his philosophical reflection (1823–1824) in relation to the emergence of the problem of the unconscious.

Ce travail de thèse entend montrer que le concept de corps-propre, tel qu'il apparaît dans les années 1940, s'inscrit dans une longue histoire de la métaphysique au XIXe siècle. Plus précisément, dans les années 1940, la phénoménologie développe un concept de corps propre, qui est un possible parmi plusieurs autres. Cette diversité de concepts possibles de corps propre traduit diverses orientations métaphysiques (animistes, spiritualistes et vitalistes). La place du corps se révèle alors être centrale dans les débats métaphysiques à partir de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, lesquels se nouent entre les philosophes et les scientifiques, les médecins et les psychiatres. A cet égard, nous repartons du courant spiritualiste français, lequel assume une perspective métaphysique forte, qui nous permettra d'interroger la manière dont se construit un champ de débat dans la France de la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle jusqu'au début du XXe siècle. Ce travail répond à trois enjeux méthodologiques : Il permet de montrer l'importance des questionnements métaphysiques dans l'articulation des différentes disciplines (philosophie, médecine, aliénisme), mais aussi à l'intérieur du champ philosophique. Cette perspective, permet d'essayer de thématiser une histoire de la discussion entre philosophie et science, dans une perspective inspirée de Canguilhem. Ce travail permet de montrer l'importance des relectures de la métaphysique classique dans les débats autour du corps-propre, notamment en thématisant l'articulation problématique de plusieurs figures. En interrogeant l'articulation de la métaphysique classique (Malebranche, Spinoza, ou Leibniz) avec d'autres figures métaphysiques, en particulier celle de Maine de Biran, on montre le rôle des figures dans la construction d'un débat transdisciplinaire. Enfin, ce travail permet de s'interroger sur la pluralité des concepts possibles de corps, et sur les enjeux de leur réminiscence par le travail historique. Il s'agit moins en effet de tracer une genèse linéaire du concept de corps-propre, que de s'interroger sur la fécondité métaphysique de ces concepts et les raisons de leur occultation. Bien plus encore, c'est l'effet-retour sur des auteurs ou catégories historiographiques que ce travail permet de relire sous une nouvelle perspective, qui nous semble important. En effet on montrera qu'il est possible de réintégrer la phénoménologie dans une histoire de la métaphysique et d'interroger les résurgences du spiritualisme dans la philosophie contemporaine, mais aussi de redéfinir le spiritualisme depuis ses interactions avec les sciences positives. À cette fin, on proposera d'étudier dans une première partie les débats métaphysiques internes au courant spiritualiste, avant de s'interroger sur l'articulation entre métaphysique et clinique à la charnière du XXe siècle, pour envisager dans un troisième moment l'apparition d'une pluralité de métaphysiques possibles dans les années 1930, solidaires d'une redécouverte de la philosophie biranienne
The aim of this thesis is to show that the concept of the self-body, as it emerged in the 1940s, is part of a long history of metaphysics in the 19th century. More precisely, the concept of self-body developped by phenomenology is one possible concept among several others. This diversity of possible concepts of the self-body reflects various metaphysical orientations (animist, spiritualist and vitalist). From the second half of the 19th century onwards, the place of the body was central to metaphysical debates between philosophers and scientists, doctors and psychiatrists. In this respect, we take as our starting point the French spiritualist movement, which assumes a strong metaphysical perspective, enabling us to examine the way in which a field of debate is constructed in France from the second half of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century. This work meets three methodological challenges: It shows the importance of metaphysical questioning in the articulation of different disciplines (philosophy, medicine, alienism), but also within the philosophical field. From this perspective, we can attempt to thematize a history of discussion between philosophy and science, from a perspective inspired by Canguilhem. This work shows the importance of rereadings of classical metaphysics in debates on the body as a subject, notably by thematizing the problematic articulation of several figures. By questioning the articulation of classical metaphysics (Malebranche, Spinoza or Leibniz) with other metaphysical figures, in particular Maine de Biran, we show the role of figures in the construction of a transdisciplinary debate. Finally, this work allows us to examine the plurality of possible concepts of the body, and the issues involved in recalling them through historical work. It's not so much a question of tracing a linear genesis of the concept of the body as it is of questioning the metaphysical fecundity of these concepts. It enables a return effect on authors and historiographical categories in order to re-read them from a new perspective. We will show that it is possible to reintegrate phenomenology into a history of metaphysics and to question the resurgence of spiritualism in contemporary philosophy, but also to redefine spiritualism from its interactions with the positive sciences. To this end, the first part of the paper examines the metaphysical debates within the spiritualist movement, before looking at the articulation between metaphysics and clinic at the turn of the 20th century. The third part considers the emergence of a plurality of possible metaphysics in the 1930s, linked to a rediscovery of Biranian philosophy