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Academic literature on the topic 'Coarse correlated equilibria'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 13 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Coarse correlated equilibria"

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Ray, Indrajit, and Sonali Sen Gupta. "Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games." International Journal of Game Theory 42, no. 2 (December 6, 2012): 541–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0360-8.

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Borowski, Holly P., Jason R. Marden, and Jeff S. Shamma. "Learning to Play Efficient Coarse Correlated Equilibria." Dynamic Games and Applications 9, no. 1 (March 10, 2018): 24–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0244-z.

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Farina, Gabriele, Tommaso Bianchi, and Tuomas Sandholm. "Coarse Correlation in Extensive-Form Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, no. 02 (April 3, 2020): 1934–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5563.

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Coarse correlation models strategic interactions of rational agents complemented by a correlation device which is a mediator that can recommend behavior but not enforce it. Despite being a classical concept in the theory of normal-form games since 1978, not much is known about the merits of coarse correlation in extensive-form settings. In this paper, we consider two instantiations of the idea of coarse correlation in extensive-form games: normal-form coarse-correlated equilibrium (NFCCE), already defined in the literature, and extensive-form coarse-correlated equilibrium (EFCCE), a new solution concept that we introduce. We show that EFCCEs are a subset of NFCCEs and a superset of the related extensive-form correlated equilibria. We also show that, in n-player extensive-form games, social-welfare-maximizing EFCCEs and NFCCEs are bilinear saddle points, and give new efficient algorithms for the special case of two-player games with no chance moves. Experimentally, our proposed algorithm for NFCCE is two to four orders of magnitude faster than the prior state of the art.
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Awaya, Yu, and Vijay Krishna. "Communication and cooperation in repeated games." Theoretical Economics 14, no. 2 (2019): 513–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te3049.

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We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set ofε‐coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (ε‐CCE) of the underlying one‐shot game. The value ofεdepends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring. We then identify conditions under which there are equilibria with “cheap talk” that result in nearly efficient payoffs outside the setε‐CCE. Thus, in our model, communication is necessary for cooperation.
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Anagnostides, Ioannis, Ioannis Panageas, Gabriele Farina, and Tuomas Sandholm. "Optimistic Policy Gradient in Multi-Player Markov Games with a Single Controller: Convergence beyond the Minty Property." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38, no. 9 (March 24, 2024): 9451–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28799.

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Policy gradient methods enjoy strong practical performance in numerous tasks in reinforcement learning. Their theoretical understanding in multiagent settings, however, remains limited, especially beyond two-player competitive and potential Markov games. In this paper, we develop a new framework to characterize optimistic policy gradient methods in multi-player Markov games with a single controller. Specifically, under the further assumption that the game exhibits an equilibrium collapse, in that the marginals of coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) induce Nash equilibria (NE), we show convergence to stationary epsilon-NE in O(1/epsilon^2) iterations, where O suppresses polynomial factors in the natural parameters of the game. Such an equilibrium collapse is well-known to manifest itself in two-player zero-sum Markov games, but also occurs even in a class of multi-player Markov games with separable interactions, as established by recent work. As a result, we bypass known complexity barriers for computing stationary NE when either of our assumptions fails. Our approach relies on a natural generalization of the classical Minty property that we introduce, which we anticipate to have further applications beyond Markov games.
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Feng, Zhe, Guru Guruganesh, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, and Abhishek Sethi. "Convergence Analysis of No-Regret Bidding Algorithms in Repeated Auctions." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 6 (May 18, 2021): 5399–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16680.

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The connection between games and no-regret algorithms has been widely studied in the literature. A fundamental result is that when all players play no-regret strategies, this produces a sequence of actions whose time-average is a coarse-correlated equilibrium of the game. However, much less is known about equilibrium selection in the case that multiple equilibria exist. In this work, we study the convergence of no-regret bidding algorithms in auctions. Besides being of theoretical interest, bidding dynamics in auctions is an important question from a practical viewpoint as well. We study the repeated game between bidders in which a single item is sold at each time step and the bidder's value is drawn from an unknown distribution. We show that if the bidders use any mean-based learning rule then the bidders converge with high probability to the truthful pure Nash Equilibrium in a second price auction, in VCG auction in the multi-slot setting and to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a first price auction. We note mean-based algorithms cover a wide variety of known no-regret algorithms such as Exp3, UCB, \epsilon-Greedy etc. Also, we analyze the convergence of the individual iterates produced by such learning algorithms, as opposed to the time-average of the sequence. Our experiments corroborate our theoretical findings and also find a similar convergence when we use other strategies such as Deep Q-Learning.
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Paccagnan, Dario, Rahul Chandan, Bryce L. Ferguson, and Jason R. Marden. "Optimal Taxes in Atomic Congestion Games." ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 9, no. 3 (September 30, 2021): 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3457168.

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How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of problems, including traffic routing. Within this context, a methodology for designing tolling mechanisms that minimize the system inefficiency (price of anarchy) exploiting solely local information is so far missing in spite of the scientific interest. In this article, we resolve this problem through a tractable linear programming formulation that applies to and beyond polynomial congestion games. When specializing our approach to the polynomial case, we obtain tight values for the optimal price of anarchy and corresponding tolls, uncovering an unexpected link with load balancing games. We also derive optimal tolling mechanisms that are constant with the congestion level, generalizing the results of Caragiannis et al. [8] to polynomial congestion games and beyond. Finally, we apply our techniques to compute the efficiency of the marginal cost mechanism. Surprisingly, optimal tolling mechanism using only local information perform closely to existing mechanism that utilize global information, e.g., Bilò and Vinci [6], while the marginal cost mechanism, known to be optimal in the continuous-flow model, has lower efficiency than that encountered levying no toll. All results are tight for pure Nash equilibria and extend to coarse correlated equilibria.
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Feldman, Michal, and Galia Shabtai. "Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 6 (May 18, 2021): 5391–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16679.

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We study the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous 2nd price auctions (S2PA) under a new natural condition of no underbidding, meaning that agents never bid on items less than their marginal values. We establish improved (mostly tight) bounds on the PoA of S2PA under no underbidding for different valuation classes (including unit demand, submodular, XOS, subadditive, and general monotone valuations), in both full information and incomplete information settings. To derive our results, we introduce a new parameterized property of auctions, termed (gamma,delta) revenue guaranteed, which implies a PoA of at least gamma/(1+delta). Via extension theorems, this guarantee extends to coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in full information settings, and to Bayesian PoA (BPoA) in settings with incomplete information and arbitrary (correlated) distributions. We then show that S2PA are (1,1) revenue guaranteed with respect to bids satisfying no underbidding. This implies a PoA of at least 1/2 for general monotone valuation, which extends to BPOA with arbitrary correlated distributions. Moreover, we show that (lambda,mu) smoothness combined with (gamma,delta) revenue guaranteed guarantees a PoA of at least (gamma+lambda)/(1+delta+mu). This implies a host of results, such as a tight PoA of 2/3 for S2PA with submodular (or XOS) valuations, under no overbidding and no underbidding. Beyond establishing improved bounds for S2PA, the no underbidding assumption sheds new light on the performance of S2PA relative to simultaneous 1st price auctions.
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Barman, Siddharth, and Katrina Ligett. "Finding any nontrivial coarse correlated equilibrium is hard." ACM SIGecom Exchanges 14, no. 1 (November 12, 2015): 76–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2845926.2845929.

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Georgalos, Konstantinos, Indrajit Ray, and Sonali SenGupta. "Nash versus coarse correlation." Experimental Economics 23, no. 4 (February 20, 2020): 1178–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-020-09647-x.

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Abstract We run a laboratory experiment to test the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial in Int J Game Theory 7:201–221, 1978), with a two-person game with unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The subjects are asked to commit to a device that randomly picks one of three symmetric outcomes (including the Nash point) with higher ex-ante expected payoff than the Nash equilibrium payoff. We find that the subjects do not accept this lottery (which is a coarse correlated equilibrium); instead, they choose to play the game and coordinate on the Nash equilibrium. However, given an individual choice between a lottery with equal probabilities of the same outcomes and the sure payoff as in the Nash point, the lottery is chosen by the subjects. This result is robust against a few variations. We explain our result as selecting risk-dominance over payoff dominance in equilibrium.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Coarse correlated equilibria"

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Sen, Gupta Sonali. "Coarse correlated equilibria in duopoly games." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2014. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5102/.

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We consider the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) in various contexts; games with quadratic payoff functions (which include Cournot duopoly, public good provision and emission abatement) and a linear duopoly game. For the games with quadratic payoffs we compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE and show that it is achieved by a CCE involving only two strategy profiles. The improvement over and above the Nash equilibrium payoff is substantial in the various economic examples considered for this class of games. In case of the linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric CCE, and any unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.
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Βουδούρης, Αλέξανδρος Ανδρέας. "Μελέτη της απόδοσης μηχανισμών κατανομής διαιρέσιμων πόρων." Thesis, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10889/8413.

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Στην παρούσα μεταπτυχιακή διπλωματική εργασία χρησιμοποιούμε έννοιες και εργαλεία της Θεωρίας Παιγνίων με σκοπό να μελετήσουμε την απόδοση μηχανισμών κατανομής διαιρέσιμων πόρων εστιάζοντας κυρίως στον μηχανισμό αναλογικής κατανομής. Σύμφωνα με αυτόν τον μηχανισμό, ένα σύνολο χρηστών ανταγωνίζονται για ένα διαιρέσιμο πόρο -- όπως το εύρος ζώνης ενός τηλεπικοινωνιακού καναλιού -- υποβάλλοντας προσφορές. Ο μηχανισμός κατανέμει σε κάθε χρήστη ένα μέρος του πόρου το οποίο είναι ανάλογο της προσφοράς του και συλλέγει ένα ποσό ίσο με την προσφορά αυτή ως πληρωμή. Οι χρήστες στοχεύουν στη μεγιστοποίηση της ωφέλειας τους και συμπεριφέρονται στρατηγικά αλλάζοντας τις προσφορές τους με σκοπό να το πετύχουν. Έτσι, ο μηχανισμός ορίζει ένα παιχνίδι αναλογικής κατανομής. Παρουσιάζουμε γνωστά αποτελέσματα από τη σχετική βιβλιογραφία καθώς και νέα βελτιωμένα φράγματα για το κόστος της αναρχίας ως προς το κοινωνικό όφελος για συσχετιζόμενες ισορροπίες στο μοντέλο πλήρους πληροφόρησης και για ισορροπίες κατά Bayes-Nash στο μοντέλο ελλιπούς πληροφόρησης. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, παρουσιάζουμε ένα κάτω φράγμα 1/2 για το κόστος της αναρχίας ως προς τις προαναφερθείσες έννοιες ισορροπίας, βελτιώνοντας σημαντικά το προηγούμενο καλύτερο κάτω φράγμα 26.8% που πρόσφατα απέδειξαν οι Syrgkanis και Tardos (STOC 2013). Επίσης, μελετάμε για πρώτη φορά τη περίπτωση όπου οι χρήστες διαθέτουν περιορισμένους προϋπολογισμούς και παρουσιάζουμε ένα κάτω φράγμα περίπου 36% και ένα άνω φράγμα 50% για το κόστος της αναρχίας χρησιμοποιώντας ως αντικειμενική συνάρτηση το αποτελεσματικό όφελος το οποίο λαμβάνει υπόψη προϋπολογισμούς.
In this thesis, we use notions and techniques from Game Theory in order to analyze the performance of divisible resource allocation mechanisms focusing mainly on the proportional allocation mechanism. According to this mechanism, a set of users are competing for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth of a communication link -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource that is proportional to the user's bid and collects an amount equal to the bid as payment. Users aim to maximize their individual utility and act strategically in order to achieve their goal. Hence, the mechanism defines a proportional allocation game. We cover previously known results from the related literature and present new bounds on the price of anarchy with respect to the social welfare over coarse-correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria in the full and incomplete information settings, respectively. In particular, we prove a lower bound of $1/2$ for the price of anarchy over both equilibrium concepts, significantly improving the previously best known lower bound, presented by Syrgkanis and Tardos (STOC 2013). Furthermore, we study for the first time the scenario where users have budget constraints and present lower bounds on the price of anarchy using the effective welfare (which takes budgets into account) as an objective function.
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Book chapters on the topic "Coarse correlated equilibria"

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Feldman, Michal, Brendan Lucier, and Noam Nisan. "Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions." In Web and Internet Economics, 131–44. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10.

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Conference papers on the topic "Coarse correlated equilibria"

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Bennis, M., S. M. Perlaza, and M. Debbah. "Learning coarse correlated equilibria in two-tier wireless networks." In ICC 2012 - 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications. IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icc.2012.6364308.

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Anagnostides, Ioannis, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Andrea Celli, and Tuomas Sandholm. "Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria." In EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538288.

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Barman, Siddharth, and Katrina Ligett. "Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard." In EC '15: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764497.

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Koh, Heeyuen, and Shigeo Maruyama. "Measuring Thermal Energy From Cross Correlated Modulation in Single Walled Carbon Nanotubes." In ASME 2022 Heat Transfer Summer Conference collocated with the ASME 2022 16th International Conference on Energy Sustainability. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/ht2022-83352.

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Abstract Recently, it has shown that the equation of motion (EOM) modified with heat diffusion process can replace the drift-diffusion terms in Langevin equation as conserving the total energy and temperature without extra thermalization process for single-walled carbon nanotubes (SWCNT) in coarse-grained (CG) model.[1] The motion of simple beads model from modified EOM maintains well-synchronized macroscopic behavior as observed in all-atom molecular dynamics simulation (AAMD) over couple of nano seconds. The same definition of heat diffusion which is derived from the cross correlated momentum is applied to suspended SWCNT in non-equilibrium molecular dynamics (NEMD) to visualize the heat energy related to macroscopic motion. The energy proportion involved in modulation by heat diffusion process has well observed by analyzing the data from simplified coordinate of trajectory of NEMD result into simple beads condition by averaging the coordinates from all atomic simulation. Further discussion on second sound and Green-Kubo relation from the trend in dispersion plot and Markovian characteristics of heat diffusion are included alongside the brief introduction of derivation.
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