Journal articles: 'Coalition strategy'

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Mithani, Murad A., and Jonathan P. O’Brien. "So What Exactly Is a “Coalition” Within an Organization? A Review and Organizing Framework." Journal of Management 47, no. 1 (August 24, 2020): 171–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206320950433.

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An organizational coalition consists of individuals who, despite their persistent differences, work together to pursue a mutually beneficial goal. While central to the political view of the firm, the research on organizational coalitions has evoked diverse characterizations of its members, their relationship with the rest of the organization, and how coalitions balance conflicts and compromise. The result is a fragmented literature that has limited the theoretical clarity necessary to appreciate one of the most important forms of collective political influence in organizations. Drawing on six decades of research, we offer a systematic review of organizational coalitions. We anchor our review on the actors who are party to a coalition, the structures that characterize the boundaries of a coalition, and the processes that lead to a coalition’s influence. This synthesis reveals significant overlaps with regard to the definition of actors, their structural positions, and the perpetual nature of conflict and negotiations. Yet we also note significant divergence in the interactions between actors, how the structure of a coalition maps onto that of an organization, and the processes that affect a coalition’s bargaining position and outcomes. These divergences reveal six distinct streams of research. Using our actor-structure-process model, we organize these research streams into a framework that identifies the diverse conceptualizations as contextual and reconcilable manifestations of a common underlying construct, thus yielding a dynamic model of organizational coalitions. Building on this framework, we propose an agenda for future research.

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Miyata, Mayuko, and Shao-Chin Sung. "Coalition Formation Based Staffing Strategy Development." Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics 16, no. 3 (May 20, 2012): 430–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.20965/jaciii.2012.p0430.

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In this paper, we propose game theoretical models for developing staffing strategies, i.e., strategies which support managers’ decision making on hiring, head hunting, staff reassignment, and implementation of staff development policy in enterprises. Our staffing models are hedonic coalition formation games with newly proposed stability concepts calledinvitation based stabilities, in which players’ activities of changing their coalitions are motivated based on invitation from other coalitions. These stabilities capture behaviors of managers, employees, and contractors depending on the balance of power in business situations. We analyze the existence of stable coalition structures under invitation based stabilities, and provide several sufficient conditions with natural interpretations as staffing strategies.

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Singhal, Shiksha, and Veeraruna Kavitha. "Coalition Formation Resource Sharing Games in Networks." ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review 49, no. 3 (March 22, 2022): 57–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3529113.3529132.

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Cooperative game theory deals with systems where players want to cooperate to improve their payoffs. But players may choose coalitions in a non-cooperative manner, leading to a coalition-formation game. We consider such a game with several players (willing to cooperate) and a possible adamant player (unwilling to cooperate) involved in resource-sharing. Here, the strategy of a player is the set of players with whom it wants to form a coalition. Given a strategy profile, an appropriate partition of coalitions is formed; players in each coalition maximize their collective utilities leading to a non-cooperative resource-sharing game among the coalitions, the (unique) utilities at the resulting equilibrium are shared via Shapley-value; these shares define the utilities of players for the given strategy profile in the coalition-formation game. We also consider the utilitarian solution to derive the price of anarchy.

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Rathke, Eva-Maria, Andreas Berghänel, Annie Bissonnette, Julia Ostner, and Oliver Schülke. "Age-dependent change of coalitionary strategy in male Barbary macaques." Primate Biology 4, no. 1 (January 26, 2017): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/pb-4-1-2017.

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Abstract. Inter- and intra-specific variation in the propensity to form coalitions has been explained by variation in the availability of suitable partners, distribution of fighting ability, coalition profitability, and costs of coordination. Male coalition formation can be an alternative reproductive strategy to one-on-one competition to maximize male reproductive success. Here we focus on age as a state variable to explain within-group variation in individual propensity to form coalitions against other group members. We specifically test the prediction that males conditionally switch from a solo strategy for achievement of high mating success to a cooperative strategy after reaching post-prime age in male Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus). We combined new observations with data collected in 2006 and 2008 on the same individuals from one captive group living in semi-natural conditions at Affenberg Salem, Germany, and found that in all years males between 5 and 13 years formed significantly fewer coalitions than males 14 years and older (post-prime). More importantly, we found those males that aged into the post-prime phase to have switched their reproductive strategy and to form significantly more coalitions in 2014 compared to 2008. These first longitudinal data together with earlier cross-sectional analyses in this and other primate species suggest that group-level measures of coalition propensity may be strongly affected by the age composition of groups and that male coalition formation can be a conditional reproductive strategy.

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Weiner, Bryan J., Jeffrey A. Alexander, and Stephen M. Shortell. "Management and Governance Processes in Community Health Coalitions: A Procedural Justice Perspective." Health Education & Behavior 29, no. 6 (December 2002): 737–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/109019802237941.

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Community-based coalitions are a popular strategy for promoting community health despite the fact that coalitions often fail to achieve measurable results. Using a procedural justice framework, this study seeks to advance knowledge about the relationship between coalition governance and management processes and indicators of coalition functioning. Member survey data from 25 coalitions participating in the Community Care Network Demonstration Program were analyzed using two-stage least squares regression. Results show that personal influence in decision making, decision process clarity, and collaborative conflict resolution were significantly associated with procedural fairness perceptions. Procedural fairness perceptions, in turn, were positively associated with member satisfaction with coalition decisions, but not personal engagement in the coalition or organizational integration of coalition goals and activities. Personal influence in decision making and collaborative conflict resolution also exhibited direct relationships with all three indicators of coalition functioning examined in the study.

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LIN, Yu-Hsuan. "How Does Altruism Enlarge A Climate Coalition?" Journal of Environmental Management and Tourism 9, no. 3 (September 11, 2018): 553. http://dx.doi.org/10.14505//jemt.9.3(27).15.

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This study examines the relationship between individual altruistic attitudes and the incentives of participating in a climate coalition by using a laboratory experiment. A dominant strategy solution design categorizes players into two roles in the game: critical and non-critical players. The critical players have a weakly dominant strategy of joining and are essential to an effective coalition. On the other hand, the non-critical players have a dominant strategy of not-joining. The theory suggests that strong altruism would lead non-critical players to join a coalition. The experimental evidence shows that coalitions could be enlarged from the self-interest prediction. However, the result indicates that the individual incentives for participation seem to be negatively correlated with altruistic attitudes. The stronger the altruistic tendencies the less likely individuals are to join a coalition.

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Takamiya, Koji. "Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems." International Journal of Game Theory 42, no. 1 (April 17, 2012): 115–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0318-x.

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Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo. "Strategy-proof coalition formation." International Journal of Game Theory 38, no. 3 (June 9, 2009): 431–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0162-9.

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Feldman, M., and T. Tamir. "Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 36 (November 30, 2009): 387–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.2892.

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A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile resilient to unilateral deviations, and is predominantly used in the analysis of multiagent systems. A downside of NE is that it is not necessarily stable against deviations by coalitions. Yet, as we show in this paper, in some cases, NE does exhibit stability against coalitional deviations, in that the benefits from a joint deviation are bounded. In this sense, NE approximates strong equilibrium. Coalition formation is a key issue in multiagent systems. We provide a framework for quantifying the stability and the performance of various assignment policies and solution concepts in the face of coalitional deviations. Within this framework we evaluate a given configuration according to three measures: (i) IR_min: the maximal number alpha, such that there exists a coalition in which the minimal improvement ratio among the coalition members is alpha, (ii) IR_max: the maximal number alpha, such that there exists a coalition in which the maximal improvement ratio among the coalition members is alpha, and (iii) DR_max: the maximal possible damage ratio of an agent outside the coalition. We analyze these measures in job scheduling games on identical machines. In particular, we provide upper and lower bounds for the above three measures for both NE and the well-known assignment rule Longest Processing Time (LPT). Our results indicate that LPT performs better than a general NE. However, LPT is not the best possible approximation. In particular, we present a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for the makespan minimization problem which provides a schedule with IR_min of 1+epsilon for any given epsilon. With respect to computational complexity, we show that given an NE on m >= 3 identical machines or m >= 2 unrelated machines, it is NP-hard to determine whether a given coalition can deviate such that every member decreases its cost.

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Skarzhinskaya, E. M., and V. I. Tzurikov. "THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: RULES TRANSFORMATION." Economics of Contemporary Russia 86, no. 3 (October 2, 2019): 29–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.33293/1609-1442-2019-3(86)-29-51.

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The authors examine the mathematical modeling of methods for the coordination of collective action in the self-organization and self-governance mode. It is assumed that members of the collective create aggregate income whose value grows, as each member invests more effort. The goal pursued by each member of the collective is to maximize personal gains. As we established in the first part of the study, the lack of universal interpersonal trust prevents members of a uniform (unstructured) collective from overcoming a non-effective, Nash equilibrium outcome. Alternative options for structuring the collective were considered, such as creating small groups (coalitions) of agents sharing mutual trust within each group. The strategy of such coalition, aimed at maximizing coalitional gains rather than personal, leads to greater investment of effort by each coalition member, which in turn produces greater aggregate gains for the entire collective. We have shown that in order to secure stability of a coalition structure, first, stimuli for each coalition member are needed such that imply redistribution of quasi-rent to their benefit, and second, control must be exercised on the efforts of the agents. As models demonstrate, members of the collective left outside coalitions or forming small coalitions with a low share taken together (in aggregate) gains, have weaker stimuli for investment. The potential of increasing such stimuli and thereby increasing aggregate gains may be furnished by another, stronger hierarchic-shaped structure – provided transactional costs are sufficiently low. In order to realize this potential, entitlements to residual income must be concentrated in the hands of a single largest coalition or a number of largest coalitions, while banning all other members of the collective from receiving such income. The income of each agent is defined by the terms of the stimulating contract. We have proposed a general design of such a stimulating contract, creating all prerequisites for achieving equilibrium outcome, with Pareto-dominates equilibrium outcomes for other collective structuring options.

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Till, Geoffrey. "Maritime strategy or coalition defense?" Marine Policy 9, no. 2 (April 1985): 159–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0308-597x(85)90009-0.

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Naumov, Pavel, and Jia Tao. "Blameworthiness in Strategic Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (July 17, 2019): 3011–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33013011.

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There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.

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Ariyanto, Nur, Muhammad Fazri, Farida Yustina, and Arif Purbantara. "Value Coalition Sebagai Strategi Pengembangan BUMDesa Pertanian." Jurnal Ilmiah Membangun Desa dan Pertanian 8, no. 1 (January 20, 2023): 19–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.37149/jimdp.v8i1.227.

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Gajah District is one of the centers of food crops in Demak Regency, but not a single agricultural BUMDesa grew in Gajah District until the end of 2019. Only a few researchers have used the value chain, and value coalition approaches in mapping potential business fields and forms of collaboration between BUMDesa-based agriculture. This study aims to formulate an agriculture-based BUMDesa development strategy through a value chain and coalition approach in Gajah District, Demak Regency. Data was collected through in-depth interviews, observation, and Focus Group Discussion (FGD). Value chain analysis is used to map alternative BUMDesa business fields. SWOT analysis with a value coalition approach is used to answer the development strategy. Selection of research locations based on Hierarchical Cluster Analysis. The suggested development of agriculture-based BUM Desa in Gajah District, Demak Regency is to follow the value coalitions process as follows: BUM Desa Kedondong focuses its business on agriculture machine rental services (rice transplanter, hand tractors, and combined harvesters), BUM Desa Mlatiharjo plays the role of superior provider seeds, BUM Desa Tambirejo as distributors of production inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural inputs), while BUM Desa Banjarsari is engaged in rice milling and warehousing.

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Friedman, Henry L., and Mirko S. Heinle. "Influence Activities, Coalitions, and Uniform Policies: Implications for the Regulation of Financial Institutions." Management Science 66, no. 9 (September 2020): 4336–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3335.

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We examine a setting in which agents can form lobbying coalitions to influence a policy maker. Policy uniformity causes agents to free ride on each other’s lobbying and gives them an incentive to form lobbying coalitions. We investigate when coalitions are formed by similar or dissimilar agents and show that endogenous coalition formation causes the effects of policy uniformity and lobbying costs on aggregate lobbying activity and policy strength to be nonmonotonic. Our model suggests that increased competition in the market for coalition-facilitating lobbyists can lead to less lobbying. We discuss implications for the regulation of financial institutions. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.

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UTSUMI, YUKIHISA, and MIKIO NAKAYAMA. "STRATEGIC CORES IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY." International Game Theory Review 06, no. 04 (December 2004): 509–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198904000332.

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In a public goods economy with linear production technologies, we consider a strategic game with coalitions in which each player is required as a strategy to reallocate his or her own initial endowments for exchange and production. Allowing negative strategies, i.e., reallocations with negative amount, we show that the core of this economy can be characterized as the set of allocations corresponding to strategy profiles for which no coalition has a self-supporting deviation, i.e., a deviation that is not free-riding on the allocations made by the complementary coalition. Moreover, restricting strategies to be nonnegative, the classical β-core and α-core both generate precisely the core allocations of the economy.

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Toumasatos, Evangelos, and Stein Ivar Steinshamn. "Coalition Formation with Externalities: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Fishery in a Pre- and Post-Brexit Context." International Game Theory Review 20, no. 02 (June 2018): 1850001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198918500019.

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The partition function approach is applied to study coalition formation in the Northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery in the presence of externalities. Atlantic mackerel is mainly exploited by the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, the Faroe Islands and Iceland. Two games are considered. First, a four-player game where the UK is still a member of the EU. Second, a five-player game where the UK is no longer a member of the union. Each game is modeled in two stages. In the first stage, players form coalitions following a predefined set of rules. In the second stage, given the coalition structure that has been formed, each coalition chooses the economic strategy that maximizes its own net present value of the fishery, given the behavior of the other coalitions. The game is solved using backward induction to obtain the set of Nash equilibria coalition structures in pure strategies, if any. We find that the current management regime is among the stable coalition structures in all eight scenarios of the four-player game but in only one case of the five-player game. In addition, stability in the five-player game is sensitive to the growth function applied and the magnitude of the stock elasticity parameter.

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Li, Jialun, Shuai Chang, Xiaomei Fu, Liang Zhang, Yishan Su, and Zhigang Jin. "A Coalitional Formation Game for Physical Layer Security of Cooperative Compressive Sensing Multi-Relay Networks." Sensors 18, no. 9 (September 4, 2018): 2942. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s18092942.

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Cooperative relaying is an effective technology to improve the capacity of physical-layer security, in which the relay helps forward the received signal to the destination. In this paper, a cooperative compressive sensing and amplify-and-forward (CCS-AF) scheme, which combines the compressive sensing theory and amplify-and-forward strategy, is proposed to increase the secrecy capacity. To optimize the secrecy performance, a coalition formation algorithm based on coalitional game theory of optimal relay selection is proposed to maximize the secrecy capacity. Different to maximizing the individual utility based on the traditional pareto order, the max-coalition order rule is newly defined to guide the coalitional formation. Simulation results indicate that with the proposed algorithm, part of the relays could form a coalition to forward the information and the proposed algorithm could significantly improve the secrecy capacity of cooperative multi-relay networks.

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Hasan, Mohammad, and Anita Raja. "The Role of Complex Network Dynamics in the Emergence of Multiagent Coalition." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 27, no. 1 (June 29, 2013): 1615–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8537.

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Emergence of a single coalition among self-interested agents operating on large scale-free networks is a challenging task. Many existing approaches assume a given static network platform and do not use the network dynamics to facilitate the dynamics of agent interactions. In this paper, we present a decentralized game-theoretic approach to this single coalition emergence problem in which agent communications are limited only to their immediate neighbors. Our coalition emergence algorithm is based on the heuristic that agents benefit by forming coalitions with wealthy (higher payoff) and influential (higher accumulated coupling strength) neighbors. Simulation results show that the emergence phenomenon is significantly enhanced when the topological insights, such as increasing degree-heterogeneity and clustering, are embedded into the agent partner selection strategy.

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Plescia, Carolina. "The Effect of Pre-Electoral Party Coordination on Vote Choice: Evidence from the Italian Regional Elections." Political Studies 65, no. 1 (July 9, 2016): 144–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032321715607512.

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Although it is theoretically relevant, the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on vote choice remains a largely unexplored area in the field of party strategy. The article addresses this gap by focusing on the Italian regional elections, where the electoral rules allow parties to run alone and, at the same time, to present pre-electoral coalitions on the ballot paper. This setting allows us to investigate under what conditions citizens vote for their preferred party and the coalition that this party indicated to coalesce with. The results suggest that ideological congruence and the size of the parties entering a pre-electoral agreement are decisive factors. Findings also reveal that the time elapsed since the establishment of a coalition has no effect on vote choice.

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Shkel, Stanislav N. "Neo-patrimonial practices and sustainability of authoritarian regimes in Eurasia." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 52, no. 2 (April 30, 2019): 169–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.04.002.

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The article analyzes authoritarian regimes within the post-Soviet territory in terms of informal practices (clannishness, clientelism and patronage) and their characteristics used by political leaders to form a power coalition. It has been argued that any of these informal practices determine a power coalition of a certain size, which is consequential for regime sustainability. Power coalitions formed on the basis of a clan-like nature is the least effective way to retain power and generally leads to regime destabilization. Clientelism, which allows for forming a power coalition on a wider basis, is a more effective strategy in terms of regime sustainability. Maximum regime sustainability is reached when patronage practices are used, which require more material resources and are only accessible to a limited number of wealthy states.

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Lewerissa, Christina Martha, Ruly Artha, Rahul Chauhan, Neel Rajpurohit, and Mohd Hairy Ibrahim. "contestious dynamics of politics that occurred in the singular election." Linguistics and Culture Review 5, S1 (August 12, 2021): 363–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.21744/lingcure.v5ns1.1402.

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This paper explores the contestious dynamics of politics that occurred in the Singular Election. We examine how in a feud of actors involved interacting dynamically with each other. The phenomenon of a single candidate is considered as an anomaly in the function of political parties which appears as a form of pragmatism in addressing pairs of candidates which are electable too strong. The strategy adopted by political parties in the lead-up to the elections by forming a coalition became the easiest strategy to achieve victory in a multiparty political system. There are two approaches in the perspective of the rational choice theory that can explain the reasons for political parties to do coalitions, namely office-seeking and policy-seeking. The characteristics of the office-seeking coalition model are fluid, not permanent. This justifies a practical political adage that states that in politics there are no eternal friends or enemies, there are eternal interests. In the context of democratic coalitions that are built with office-seeking motives are considered very detrimental to the constituents. Political parties are considered to deny the constituents' trust by changing the alignments of coalitions that have the same platform to coalitions that have different platforms.

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Gatti, Nicola, Marco Rocco, and Tuomas Sandholm. "Algorithms for Strong Nash Equilibrium with More than Two Agents." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 27, no. 1 (June 30, 2013): 342–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8652.

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Strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) is an appealing solution concept when rational agents can form coalitions. A strategy profile is an SNE if no coalition of agents can benefit by deviating. We present the first general-purpose algorithms for SNE finding in games with more than two agents. An SNE must simultaneously be a Nash equilibrium (NE) and the optimal solution of multiple non-convex optimization problems. This makes even the derivation of necessary and sufficient mathematical equilibrium constraints difficult. We show that forcing an SNE to be resilient only to pure-strategy deviations by coalitions, unlike for NEs, is only a necessary condition here. Second, we show that the application of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions leads to another set of necessary conditions that are not sufficient. Third, we show that forcing the Pareto efficiency of an SNE for each coalition with respect to coalition correlated strategies is sufficient but not necessary. We then develop a tree search algorithm for SNE finding. At each node, it calls an oracle to suggest a candidate SNE and then verifies the candidate. We show that our new necessary conditions can be leveraged to make the oracle more powerful. Experiments validate the overall approach and show that the new conditions significantly reduce search tree size compared to using NE conditions alone.

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Kenis, Vladimir Markovich, Andrei Viktorovich Sapogovsky, and Ruslan Khalilovich Husainov. "TARSAL COALITIONS IN CHILDREN WITH CEREBRAL PALSY: CLINICAL OBSERVATION AND TREATMENT STRATEGY." Pediatric Traumatology, Orthopaedics and Reconstructive Surgery 2, no. 1 (March 15, 2014): 13–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/ptors2113-17.

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Tarsal coalition is a congenital anomaly of the foot, characterized by later appearance of the clinical and radiological signs, which become obvious in adolescents. Tarsal coalitions in children with cerebral palsy can lead to diagnostic confusion, as well as to complicate natural course of foot deformity and surgical treatment. The paper presents first experience with the systematized data for tarsal coalitions in children with cerebral palsy. Among 157 children operated for foot deformities this anomaly was identified in 4 patients (incidence - 2,5 % in our series). Clinical and radiological descriptions, surgical management, including complications, are presented for these cases, which demonstrate significance of tarsal coalitions for diagnostics, surgical management and prognosis. Information and caution, regarding tarsal coalitions in children with cerebral palsy, who undergo surgical treatment for foot deformities, as well as advanced methods of diagnostics (magnetic resonance and computed tomography), are required in order to avoid preventable complications.

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Valler, David. "Local Economic Strategy and Local Coalition-Building." Local Economy: The Journal of the Local Economy Policy Unit 10, no. 1 (May 1995): 33–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02690949508726261.

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Outline This paper considers the increasing prevalence of coalition-building in urban politics, associated characterisations of local public-private relations, and the developing function of local economic strategy in such processes. It concludes with a discussion of local economic strategy-making by Norwich City Council, which emphasises the distinctiveness of local policy and the limits of coalition politics.

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GARRATT, ROD, JAMES E. PARCO, CHENG-ZHONG QIN, and AMNON RAPOPORT. "POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION." International Game Theory Review 07, no. 04 (December 2005): 407–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000612.

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A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In particular, the data support the prediction that non-minimal winning coalitions occur when the distance between policy positions of the parties is small relative to the value of forming the government. These conditions hold in games 1, 3, 4 and 5, where subjects played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 91, 52, 82 and 84 percent of the time, respectively. In the remaining game (Game 2) experimental data support the prediction of a minimal winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 84 and 86 percent of the time, respectively, and the predicted minimal-winning government formed 92 percent of the time (all strategy choices for player C conform with potential maximization in Game 2). In Games 1, 2, 4 and 5 over 98 percent of the observed Nash equilibrium outcomes were those predicted by potential maximization. Other solution concepts including iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies and strong/coalition-proof Nash equilibrium are also tested.

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Nayana. "Energy Management Scheme in Hierarchical Integrated Energy Systems with Coalition." March 2021 3, no. 1 (May 25, 2021): 34–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.36548/jeea.2021.1.004.

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Often, coalitions are formed by the hierarchical integrated energy systems (HIESs) and their evolutionary process which is driven by the benefits of stakeholders and consolidate energy consumers and producers. Several literature have failed to analyze the operation of HIES under the impact of multiple coalitions. At the lower level, multiple users, in the middle level, the multiple distributed energy stations (DESs) and at the upper level, one natural gas and one electricity utility company structure is used for analyzing the HIES operation with a trading scheme. The Lagrange function is used for deriving the optimal operation strategy based analytical function for each probable coalition and each market participant comprising of users and the DESs. It is evident from the results that in a single coalition, the profits linked to other DESs will decrease while increasing the profit of one DES with technological enhancements, users show an aversion towards DESs with high generation coefficient while they are attracted to the ones that enable reduction of heat and electricity price. Maintaining their isolation is preferred by high heat and electricity consuming DESs at the same energy price. Other coalitions and their operations are not affected by the change in parameters of one coalition.

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Zweig, David. "The Reluctant Dragon: Crisis Cycles in Chinese Foreign Economic Policy. By Lawrence C. Reardon. [Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002. 355 pp. £34.50. ISBN 0-295-8121-0.]." China Quarterly 177 (March 2004): 217–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741004230120.

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According to Lawrence Reardon, most Western scholarship on PRC foreign economic policy before 1978 painted the entire period as one highlighted by Maoist autarky. In fact, argues Reardon in this conceptually framed and empirically rich book, from 1949 to 1979 China's foreign trade policy actually shifted back and forth in a cyclical pattern between “semi-autarky” and an “import substitution industrialization” (ISI) strategy. These were the two dominant, but competing, elite visions of how to attain the uniformly accepted goal of “self-reliance.” The two coalitions who held these views also disagreed about the motivational strategy the state should employ, with the semi-autarkists favouring a normative/mobilizational strategy, while the ISI coalition preferred a remunerative/administrative one. The driving force of the cyclical shifts were economic crises that triggered reassessments of the ongoing policy position by the competing elite group, who used problems in the extant development strategy to undermine the legitimacy of its opponents and their policy. The new dominant coalition then proposed its program, which eventually faced a crisis, ending the cycle of the policy process.

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Parish, Colin. "Coalition set to abandon new horizons strategy." Mental Health Practice 14, no. 2 (October 2010): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.7748/mhp.14.2.5.s6.

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Goldman, Joseph Richard. "Book Review: Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?" Armed Forces & Society 12, no. 4 (July 1986): 622–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x8601200414.

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Sharma, Pramodita, and Sanjay Sharma. "Drivers of Proactive Environmental Strategy in Family Firms." Business Ethics Quarterly 21, no. 2 (April 2011): 309–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/beq201121218.

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ABSTRACT:Globally, family firms are the dominant organizational form. Family involvement in business and unique family dynamics impacts organizational strategy and performance. However, family control of business has rarely been adopted as a discriminating variable in the organizations and the natural environment (ONE) research field. Drawing on the theory of planned behavior we develop a conceptual framework of the drivers of proactive environmental strategy (PES) in family firms. We argue that family involvement in business influences the attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control of a firm’s dominant coalition. Together these factors determine the extent of the dominant coalition’s intentions to undertake PES. Further, family firms with lower levels of relationship conflict within the controlling family will be more successful in translating the dominant coalition’s intentions to allocate resources for the pursuit of PES. Research implications of the theory are discussed.

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Naumov, Pavel, and Yuan Yuan. "Intelligence in Strategic Games." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 71 (July 24, 2021): 521–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.12883.

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If an agent, or a coalition of agents, has a strategy, knows that she has a strategy, and knows what the strategy is, then she has a know-how strategy. Several modal logics of coalition power for know-how strategies have been studied before. The contribution of the article is three-fold. First, it proposes a new class of know-how strategies that depend on the intelligence information about the opponents’ actions. Second, it shows that the coalition power modality for the proposed new class of strategies cannot be expressed through the standard know-how modality. Third, it gives a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between the coalition power modality with intelligence and the distributed knowledge modality in games with imperfect information.

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Varshavsky, Arseny Y. "Institutional Foundations of Intraparty Coalitions in Presidential Systems: Case of Uruguay." RUDN Journal of Political Science 21, no. 4 (December 15, 2019): 673–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-1438-2019-21-4-673-686.

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The article analyzes the institutional foundations of the emergence and functioning of the major party factions in Uruguay and their influence on maintaining the stability of the presidential regime. The Uruguayan parties are historically characterized by fragmentation and consist of many ideologically diverse movements, which allows us to view them as coalitions. The factions competing among themselves for the influence on the political agenda ultimately form the party’s common strategy. Coalition tendency within parties is largely determined by the peculiarities of the electoral system established in Uruguay. The elected president with a broad mandate, being a representative of his faction, must build coalition relations with other factions of his party, giving them various concessions in the executive branch. Based on the factors considered, the author concludes that the electoral characteristics of the Uruguayan political system create the necessity for coalitions among party factions, thus affecting the stability of presidential rule.

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Ibrahima, Diarassouba. "La démocratie ivoirienne à l’épreuve des stratégies coalitionnelles politiques." European Scientific Journal, ESJ 17, no. 28 (August 31, 2021): 150. http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2021.v17n28p150.

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L’adoption du multipartisme par la Côte d’Ivoire en 1990 s’est accompagnée du phénomène de la coalition comme nouvelle stratégie de conquête du pouvoir par des partis politiques à travers des alliances politiques. La première coalition (le front républicain) visant à former une majorité électorale est née en 1995 de l’alliance entre le FPI et le RDR pour évincer le PDCI du pouvoir. Ensuite s’en sont suivi le Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP) en 2005, et La Majorité Présidentielle (LMP) en 2010. Ces coalitions ont toutes fait preuve de fragilité face aux opportunités politiques au point que deux d’entre elles n’existent plus (Front Républicain ; LMP), et celle qui existe (RHDP), est exposée au risque de désintégration à cause des querelles internes de positionnement. Le présent article a pour objectif d’identifier et d’analyser des causes des échecs des coalitions politiques et leurs conséquences sur la démocratie en Côte d’Ivoire. C’est une étude qualitative ancrée dans le courant théorique du changement social. Elle s’appuie sur la méthode de l’analyse de contenu. Après l’analyse des données, quatre principales causes de la fragilité des coalitions ont-été identifiées. Il s’agit : (1) du charisme trop fort des leaders politiques dans la coalition ; (2) du non-respect du principe d’inclusivité dans la prise de décision par les partis dans la mise en place des coalitions (3) de l’inexistence d’un projet de société commun clairement formalisé dès le départ entre les partis coalisés; (4) du comportement nombriliste des partis politiques membres des coalitions qui nourrissent des projets personnels inavoués. The adoption of multiparty politics by the Ivory Coast in 1990 was accompanied by the phenomenon of the coalition as a new strategy for the conquest of power by political parties through political alliances. The first coalition (the Republican Front) aimed at forming an electoral majority arose in 1995 from the alliance between the FPI and the RDR to oust the PDCI from power. Then followed the Gathering of Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) in 2005, and The Presidential Majority (LMP) in 2010. These coalitions have all shown fragility in the face of political opportunities to the point that two of them between them no longer exist (Republican Front; LMP), and that which exists (RHDP) is exposed to the risk of disintegration because of internal disputes over positioning. The objective of this article is to identify and analyze the causes of the fragility of political coalitions and their consequences on democracy in Côte d'Ivoire. It is a qualitative study rooted in the theoretical stream of social change. It is based on the method of content analysis. After analyzing the data, four main causes of the fragility of coalitions were identified. These are: (1) the too strong charisma of political leaders in the coalition; (2) the failure to respect the principle of inclusiveness in decision-making by the parties in the establishment of coalitions (3) the non-existence of a common social project clearly formalized from the start between the united parties; (4) the navel-gazing behavior of the political parties that are members of the coalition, which have unacknowledged personal projects.

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Klepac, Petra, Itamar Megiddo, Bryan T. Grenfell, and Ramanan Laxminarayan. "Self-enforcing regional vaccination agreements." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 13, no. 114 (January 2016): 20150907. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2015.0907.

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In a highly interconnected world, immunizing infections are a transboundary problem, and their control and elimination require international cooperation and coordination. In the absence of a global or regional body that can impose a universal vaccination strategy, each individual country sets its own strategy. Mobility of populations across borders can promote free-riding, because a country can benefit from the vaccination efforts of its neighbours, which can result in vaccination coverage lower than the global optimum. Here we explore whether voluntary coalitions that reward countries that join by cooperatively increasing vaccination coverage can solve this problem. We use dynamic epidemiological models embedded in a game-theoretic framework in order to identify conditions in which coalitions are self-enforcing and therefore stable, and thus successful at promoting a cooperative vaccination strategy. We find that countries can achieve significantly greater vaccination coverage at a lower cost by forming coalitions than when acting independently, provided a coalition has the tools to deter free-riding. Furthermore, when economically or epidemiologically asymmetric countries form coalitions, realized coverage is regionally more consistent than in the absence of coalitions.

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Sula, Piotr. "Diligent or just smart students? Small governmental parties’ approach to the European Semester in Poland." Politics in Central Europe 17, no. 4 (December 1, 2021): 773–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pce-2021-0040.

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Abstract All governments in Poland formed after the introduction of the European Semester were coalitional ones. All these governments contained junior coalition partners representing all party families. Irrespective of their affiliation, all these junior parties adopted policies that appeared to comply with the European Semester. Hence, junior coalition parties might be recognised as very diligent European students, even if two out of three represented quite extreme views and were undeniably more Eurosceptic than their respective senior partners. However, it can be argued that their strategy was mixed: even if these two more Eurosceptic parties might be regarded as being so in their rhetoric, they accepted all recommendations from the European Semester, except for the farmers’ insurance privileges reduction. The salience of their approach to this latter issue was seen even after a few years in government, making these parties clearly different from their senior coalition partners.

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Mocek, Ondřej. "Analysis of the Voting Behaviour of Czech Members of European Parliament in Areas of the Europe 2020 Strategy." Politics in Central Europe 12, no. 3 (December 1, 2016): 37–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pce-2016-0016.

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Abstract Aim of this paper is to analyse the behaviour of Czech MEPs in the topics related to Europe 2020 Strategy. This Strategy is one of the most important documents of recent decade on the European level and it is not so often studied on the level of the European Parliament. The purpose of this text is to find out if Czech political parties in the European Parliament are cohesive or not. The second question is related to the voting patterns, whether Czech MEPs create some kind of voting coalitions or not and if these coalitions reflect the national coalition. Methodology is based on the analyses of roll-call votes. The research period is the first two years of the 8th term of the European Parliament.

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Parkin, Russell. "Future Wars: Coalition Operations in Global Strategy (review)." Journal of Military History 68, no. 1 (2004): 311–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jmh.2003.0400.

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Moulin, Hervé. "Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness." Social Choice and Welfare 16, no. 2 (February 3, 1999): 279–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050145.

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Demange, Gabrielle. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games." Games and Economic Behavior 65, no. 1 (January 2009): 83–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.001.

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Quinsaat, Sharon Madriaga. "The Philippines Waltzes with the Big Boys: Coalition-building Strategy in the WTO." Asian Survey 52, no. 5 (September 2012): 970–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2012.52.5.970.

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Abstract This article explores the emergence and development of the Philippine coalition-building strategy in the World Trade Organization (WTO) from the Uruguay Round to the Doha Development Agenda. Coalition building is an outcome of social learning, adaptation, and bounded rationality of trade negotiators based on years of working within the norms of the WTO.

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Løvlie, Frode. "Explaining Hamas's Changing Electoral Strategy, 1996–2006." Government and Opposition 48, no. 4 (March 26, 2013): 570–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2013.3.

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Hamas, the most influential Islamist party in the occupied Palestinian territories, replaced its strategy of electoral boycott in 1996 with participation in 2006 – a change that is not explained in the literature. Assisted by theories of party change, the article seeks to fill this gap. The article demonstrates that the move from boycott to participation can largely be attributed to a change of dominant coalition. In line with the theoretical assumptions, environmental challenges and shocks altered the power–balance within Hamas, robbing the coalition dominating at the time of the boycott of its power and allowing a new faction to obtain dominance. This new dominant faction saw political participation as a legitimate avenue to pursue Hamas's cause, and its rise to power secured the change of strategy and participation in the 2006 elections.

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Walby, Sylvia. "From Community to Coalition." Theory, Culture & Society 18, no. 2-3 (June 2001): 113–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/02632760122051814.

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This article considers how to go beyond the polarities of individualism and communitarianism in the analysis of contemporary political cultures in a global era. It is argued that there is a need to ground analysis in a presumption of social networks and coalitions, rather than in the concept of recognition. Political cultures are always already riddled with complexity and cross-cutting relations with other political cultures, coalitions and alliances. Within the politics of recognition, the conventional operationalization of the concept of the ‘social’ via the concept of ‘community’ misleadingly narrows the analysis of key aspects of social relations. Rather, we should invoke a wider range of sociological concepts to capture the nature of the social including, among many others, coalition, network and reference groups. In particular, the selection of the ‘other’ against whom aspirational comparisons are made is a complex social process, much previously analysed by reference group theory. The contemporary framing of some political claims in reference to a socially constructed conception of the universal is an increasingly common strategy. The politics of recognition is shown to be subordinate to the politics of equality, when sociological analysis of contemporary political cultures, of how people actually do make ethical and political claims, is prioritized.

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Arriola, Leonardo R. "Capital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic Societies." World Politics 65, no. 2 (April 2013): 233–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887113000051.

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Under what conditions can opposition politicians with ethnic constituencies form electoral coalitions? In Africa's patronage-based political systems, incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure the endorsement of politicians from other ethnic groups. Opposition politicians, however, must rely on private resources to do the same. This article presents a political economy theory to explain how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital influences the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions. It shows that the opposition is unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages where incumbents use their influence over banking and credit to command the political allegiance of business—the largest potential funder of opposition in poor countries. Liberalizing financial reforms, in freeing business to diversify political contributions without fear of reprisal, enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to mimic the incumbent's pecuniary coalition-building strategy. A binomial logistic regression analysis of executive elections held across Africa between 1990 and 2005 corroborates the theoretical claim: greater financial autonomy for business—as proxied by the number of commercial banks and the provision of credit to the private sector—significantly increases the likelihood of multiethnic opposition coalitions being formed.

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Dodick, David W., Messoud Ashina, Fumihiko Sakai, Wolfgang Grisold, Hitoshi Miyake, Deborah Henscheid-Lorenz, Audrey Craven, et al. "Vancouver Declaration II on Global Headache Patient Advocacy 2019." Cephalalgia 40, no. 10 (April 28, 2020): 1017–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0333102420921162.

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In 2017, the International Headache Society convened a Global Patient Advocacy Summit (GPAS-1) to begin a collaborative effort involving patients, patient advocates, patient advocacy organizations, healthcare professionals, scientists, professional pain, neurology, and headache societies, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and regulatory agencies to advance issues of importance to patients affected by headache worldwide. In September 2019, the second Global Patient Advocacy Summit (GPAS-2) was convened to revisit issues from the inaugural meeting, assess the progress of the International Headache Society Global Patient Advocacy Coalition (IHS-GPAC) in meeting the goals set forth therein, and discuss strategies for achieving established goals and supporting future development. Short- and long-term mandates from the first Summit were realized, including publishing the Vancouver Declaration on Global Headache Patient Advocacy 2018, determining the governing and operational structures of the IHS-GPAC, and helping to facilitate the first World Federation of Neurology World Brain Day dedicated to migraine. Another short-term mandate, creating a unified advocacy strategy, was fulfilled by the Coalition’s decision to focus on encouraging support from employers and implementing employee support programs for people with migraine. To help execute the strategy, the Coalition is developing an employer engagement toolkit that will educate employers and employees about the impact of migraine in the workplace, reduce stigma directed toward employees with migraine, and facilitate the care of employees with migraine to reduce the burden of illness and improve workplace productivity. Coalition members will disseminate the toolkit and encourage the adoption of migraine workplace programs by employers worldwide. The Coalition has established an alliance with two global, multinational employers to expand migraine awareness and support among policy makers and other stakeholders around the world. The IHS-GPAC met many of the goals established at GPAS-1, and it has initiated a global strategy focused on the psychosocial and economic toll of headache disorders, especially migraine, in the workplace. Ongoing and future activities will explore a range of opportunities with employers and across the full spectrum of advocacy goals.

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Cosgrove, Richard A. "The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916–1918." History: Reviews of New Books 24, no. 4 (June 1996): 173–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.1996.9952509.

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Woodward, David R., and David French. "The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918." American Historical Review 102, no. 2 (April 1997): 460. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2170883.

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Yang, Fan. "Evolving Strategy: South-South Coalition in the GATT/WTO." China and WTO Review 2, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 69–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.14330/cwr.2016.2.1.03.

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Robinson, Marc. "THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT STRATEGY OF THE VICTORIAN COALITION GOVERNMENT." Australian Journal of Public Administration 53, no. 2 (June 1994): 232–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8500.1994.tb01884.x.

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SHINOHARA, RYUSUKE. "COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A NORMAL-FORM GAME AND ITS SUBGAMES." International Game Theory Review 12, no. 03 (September 2010): 253–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198910002659.

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The relationship between coalition-proof (Nash) equilibria in a normal-form game and those in its subgame is examined. A subgame of a normal-form game is a game in which the strategy sets of all players in the subgame are subsets of those in the normal-form game. In this paper, focusing on a class of aggregative games, we provide a sufficient condition for the aggregative game under which every coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is also coalition-proof in the original normal-form game. The stringency of the sufficient condition means that a coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is rarely a coalition-proof equilibrium in the whole game.

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Adam, Silke, Thomas Häussler, Hannah Schmid-Petri, and Ueli Reber. "Coalitions and counter-coalitions in online contestation: An analysis of the German and British climate change debate." New Media & Society 21, no. 11-12 (June 19, 2019): 2671–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461444819855966.

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We seek to understand the role of the Internet in policy monopolies characterized by a dominant coalition in traditional political venues. In these settings, we identify coalitions and counter-coalitions on the Web and ask how these coalitions differ resource-wise and where these differences come from. To do so, we combine link tracing and quantitative content analysis in the field of climate change in Germany and the United Kingdom. Our results show that online contestation is indeed structured by competing coalitions of climate advocates and skeptics. Moreover, the counter-coalitions of climate skeptics turn out to be the true winners of online communication: they have not only incorporated conservative media as their allies, but also managed to make themselves more visible than climate advocates. This visibility stems from their own link setting activity, which makes climate advocates’ passive online strategy of just ignoring the skeptical camp ineffective.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Coalition strategy'

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