Journal articles on the topic 'Coalition research'
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1
Mithani, Murad A., and Jonathan P. O’Brien. "So What Exactly Is a “Coalition” Within an Organization? A Review and Organizing Framework." Journal of Management 47, no. 1 (August 24, 2020): 171–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206320950433.
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An organizational coalition consists of individuals who, despite their persistent differences, work together to pursue a mutually beneficial goal. While central to the political view of the firm, the research on organizational coalitions has evoked diverse characterizations of its members, their relationship with the rest of the organization, and how coalitions balance conflicts and compromise. The result is a fragmented literature that has limited the theoretical clarity necessary to appreciate one of the most important forms of collective political influence in organizations. Drawing on six decades of research, we offer a systematic review of organizational coalitions. We anchor our review on the actors who are party to a coalition, the structures that characterize the boundaries of a coalition, and the processes that lead to a coalition’s influence. This synthesis reveals significant overlaps with regard to the definition of actors, their structural positions, and the perpetual nature of conflict and negotiations. Yet we also note significant divergence in the interactions between actors, how the structure of a coalition maps onto that of an organization, and the processes that affect a coalition’s bargaining position and outcomes. These divergences reveal six distinct streams of research. Using our actor-structure-process model, we organize these research streams into a framework that identifies the diverse conceptualizations as contextual and reconcilable manifestations of a common underlying construct, thus yielding a dynamic model of organizational coalitions. Building on this framework, we propose an agenda for future research.
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Sotirov, Metodi, Georg Winkel, and Katarina Eckerberg. "The coalitional politics of the European Union’s environmental forest policy: Biodiversity conservation, timber legality, and climate protection." Ambio 50, no. 12 (October 10, 2021): 2153–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13280-021-01644-5.
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AbstractEuropean forest policymaking is shaped by progressing European integration, yet with notable ideological divisions and diverging interests among countries. This paper focuses on the coalitional politics of key environmental forest issues: biodiversity conservation, timber legality, and climate protection policy. Combining the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Shifting Coalition Theory, and informed by more than 186 key informant interviews and 73 policy documents spanning a 20-year timeframe, we examine the evolution of coalitional forest politics in Europe. We find that the basic line-up has remained stable: an environmental coalition supporting EU environmental forest policy integration and a forest sector coalition mostly opposing it. Still, strategic alliances across these coalitions have occurred for specific policy issues which have resulted in a gradual establishment of an EU environmental forest policy. We conclude with discussion of our findings and provide suggestions for further research.
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Borges, André, and Mathieu Turgeon. "Presidential coattails in coalitional presidentialism." Party Politics 25, no. 2 (April 6, 2017): 192–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068817702283.
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Research on presidential coattails in elections has focused nearly exclusively on two-party systems like the United States. Much less is known, however, about presidential coattails in multiparty systems where electoral and governing coalitions are common currency. Under coalitional presidentialism, we argue that presidential coattails are diffused, benefiting the president’s party but also her coalition party members, especially those most strongly associated with the coalition itself. Using electoral data from Chile and Brazil, two widely studied but distinct cases of coalitional presidentialism, we find strong evidence supporting this claim. The results carry important implications for students of coalitional presidentialism, presidential coattails, and party systems, more generally.
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Morey, Daniel S. "Centralized command and coalition victory." Conflict Management and Peace Science 37, no. 6 (July 15, 2020): 716–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0738894220934884.
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Building upon research that found that coalitions are more likely to win wars, recent work has sought to differentiate effective from ineffective coalitions. Much of this work focuses on characteristics of member states and not the coalition itself. This paper takes a first step in exploring how the structure of a coalition contributes to its performance. Specifically, coalitions vary in how much control members must transfer to the coalition. Some coalitions form weak command structures with states maintaining primary control while other coalitions form a strong centralized command. The impact of command structure on coalition performance is vital to understanding the success and failure of coalitions. Highly centralized command structures allow states to overcome the problems associated with coalition warfare and achieve victory. Empirical evidence supports this claim; the odds of victory increase as states surrender more control to the coalition. These findings provide direct advice to policy makers considering forming a coalition. The implications of this research extend to the alliance literature and the war bargaining literature, which tend to assume either that wars are dyadic or that states can seamlessly aggregate military capabilities.
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Bachrach, Yoram, Pushmeet Kohli, Vladimir Kolmogorov, and Morteza Zadimoghaddam. "Optimal Coalition Structure Generation in Cooperative Graph Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 27, no. 1 (June 30, 2013): 81–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8653.
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Representation languages for coalitional games are a key research area in algorithmic game theory. There is an inherent tradeoff between how general a language is, allowing it to capture more elaborate games, and how hard it is computationally to optimize and solve such games. One prominent such language is the simple yet expressive Weighted Graph Games (WGGs) representation (Deng and Papadimitriou, 1994), which maintains knowledge about synergies between agents in the form of an edge weighted graph. We consider the problem of finding the optimal coalition structure in WGGs. The agents in such games are vertices in a graph, and the value of a coalition is the sum of the weights of the edges present between coalition members. The optimal coalition structure is a partition of the agents to coalitions, that maximizes the sum of utilities obtained by the coalitions. We show that finding the optimal coalition structure is not only hard for general graphs, but is also intractable for restricted families such as planar graphs which are amenable for many other combinatorial problems. We then provide algorithms with constant factor approximations for planar, minor-free and bounded degree graphs.
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Rossow, Ingeborg, Trygve Ugland, and Bergljot Baklien. "Use of research in local alcohol policy-making." Drugs and Alcohol Today 15, no. 4 (December 7, 2015): 192–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/dat-05-2015-0022.
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Purpose – On-premise trading hours are generally decided at the local level. The purpose of this paper is to identify relevant advocacy coalitions and to assess to what extent and how these coalitions used research in the alcohol policy-making process concerning changes in on-premise trading hours in Norway. Design/methodology/approach – Theory-driven content analyses were conducted, applying data from city council documents (24 Norwegian cities) and Norwegian newspaper articles and broadcast interviews (n=138) in 2011-2012. Findings – Two advocacy coalitions with conflicting views and values were identified. Both coalitions used research quite extensively – in the public debate and in the formal decision-making process – but in different ways. The restrictive coalition, favouring restricted trading hours and emphasising public health/safety, included the police and temperance movements and embraced research demonstrating the beneficial health/safety effects of restricting trading hours. The liberal coalition of conservative politicians and hospitality industry emphasised individual freedom and industry interests and promoted research demonstrating negative effects on hospitality industry turnover. This coalition also actively discredited the research demonstrating the beneficial health/safety effects of restricting trading hours. Originality/value – Little is known about how local alcohol policy-making processes are informed by research-based knowledge. This study is the first to analyse how advocacy coalitions use research to influence local alcohol policy-making.
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Darbishire, Lily, Sarah Wiehe, and Dennis Savaiano. "4034 Can Connections IN Health become a research-based model to improve health outcomes through community health coalitions?" Journal of Clinical and Translational Science 4, s1 (June 2020): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cts.2020.231.
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OBJECTIVES/GOALS: Connections IN Health’s goal is to coordinate, integrate, and enrich health coalition work through extended connections among community and academic stakeholders within and across coalitions and geographies within Indiana. We aim to evaluate stakeholder connections to assess coalition effectiveness and the quality of partnership networks. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: We will collect data longitudinally to evaluate Connections IN Health using a unique triangulation of effectiveness surveys, social network analysis, and health data. Cross-sectional functioning and social network analysis surveys were distributed to coalition members before the transition to Connections IN Health engagement (baseline) and will be distributed again each year thereafter to identify changes in coalition perceived effectiveness and changes in the structure/nature of partnership networks after implementation of the partnership. We plan to utilize publicly available health data to measure proximal changes in health outcomes at the neighborhood level and use Pearson’s correlations to check for associations between perceived coalition effectiveness and health outcomes. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We found low baseline scores in perceived effectiveness, especially in the areas of leadership, operational understanding, and satisfaction, from the coalition members. From our social network analysis, we found relatively low cohesion scores (measured as network density) among each of the coalition networks, and even lower scores for collaboration among coalition members. We expect to see positive increases in perceived coalition effectiveness, as well as an increase in the density and level of collaboration among coalition networks as Connections IN Health develops. Finally, we expect to see positive changes in proximal health outcomes associated with our measures of coalition effectiveness. DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: The results of our project will be distributed back to the coalition leaders and members in order to sustain and improve the coalitions. The visualization of the coalition member’s network can be used to demonstrate opportunities for enhanced partnerships and collaboration.
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Jenkins, Garrett J., Brittany Rhoades Cooper, Angie Funaiole, and Laura G. Hill. "Which aspects of coalition functioning are key at different stages of coalition development? A qualitative comparative analysis." Implementation Research and Practice 3 (January 2022): 263348952211126. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/26334895221112694.
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Background Coalitions are increasingly utilized to promote positive community health outcomes. Typically, coalitions produce more desirable outcomes when coalition functioning is strong and the coalition model is implemented with fidelity. Although theory indicates that coalitions proceed through predictable stages of development, minimal research explicitly examines functioning and fidelity at these different stages. Method Within a larger evaluation of Washington State Community Prevention and Wellness Initiative, this cross-sectional study employs qualitative comparative analysis to illuminate the coalition functioning conditions necessary and sufficient to produce high model fidelity at different stages of development in 43 substance misuse prevention coalitions in one state. Results In the formation stage, only the presence of high levels of coalition leadership was sufficient to produce high model fidelity. In the maintenance stage, three combinations of conditions were sufficient: (1) sustainability planning if, and only if, accompanied by the absence of coalition participation costs, (2) coordinator leadership, and (3) a combination of coalition leadership and team cohesion. In the institutionalization stage, two solutions were sufficient: (1) coalition leadership if, and only if, accompanied by the absence of sustainability planning, and (2) sustainability planning if, and only if, accompanied by the absence of coordinator leadership. Conclusions This study illustrates several tangible steps technical assistance providers may take to increase the likelihood of achieving model fidelity. In the formation stage, skillful and inclusive coalition leadership is important. In the maintenance stage, technical assistance should focus on reducing participant-perceived costs; increasing sustainability planning; enhancing coordinator-specific leadership; and developing team cohesion and coalition leadership. For coalitions in the institutionalization stage, coalition leadership and sustainability planning may be prime targets for technical assistance. Plain Language Summary: Community coalition approaches to addressing social problems are common and have some evidence of producing positive community outcomes. Research shows that coalitions produce more desirable outcomes when coalition functioning is strong and the coalition model is implemented as it was designed. Although theory suggests that coalitions proceed through predictable stages of development, few studies look at which supports are most needed, at each stage, to improve coalition functioning and implementation. This study aims to help answer that question by determining which aspects of coalition functioning, in which combinations, are key to strong, well-functioning coalitions at different developmental stages in a sample of prevention coalitions in Washington State focused on youth substance misuse. The results suggest that having a strong coalition leadership team is key for all coalitions, regardless of development stage. For coalitions earlier in their formation, this was especially true. For coalitions further into their development, the combination of strong coordinator leadership and strong team cohesion was particularly important. Finally, for the most well-established coalitions, if sustainability planning was weak, strong coalition team leadership was key; but if coordinator leadership was weak, strong sustainability planning was critical to offset the lack of strong leadership. The results can be used to inform the types of technical assistance provided to support coalitions at different developmental stages.
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Siboy, Ahmad. "Desain Koalisi Permanen Partai Politik dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Indonesia." Jurnal Inovasi Ilmu Sosial dan Politik (JISoP) 3, no. 1 (April 6, 2021): 81. http://dx.doi.org/10.33474/jisop.v3i1.9716.
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The pattern of political party coalitions that fluctuate ahead of the general election indicates that the coalitions are not built based on substantial interests but pragmatic interests. As a result, the status of each party becomes unclear, which one acts on the side of the government and which one acts as the opposition. This study aims to discuss the options of permanent coalition patterns that can be applied. The research problem of this study was “What is the permanent coalition design that can be applied in the Indonesian government system?”. This study used normative legal research with statutory, conceptual, and case-study approaches. The results indicated that a permanent coalition is needed to strengthen the coalition pattern of political parties as a support for the Indonesian government system. The permanent coalition design that can be applied is a two-pole model, in which there will only two coalition groups of political parties: parties supporting the government and parties opposing the government. This two-pole model can be balanced in terms of the power between a coalition of government parties and a coalition of opposition parties. Another design that can be adopted is the coalitions which are established based on the similarity of the ideology of each political party.
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Groseclose, Tim, and James M. Snyder. "Buying Supermajorities." American Political Science Review 90, no. 2 (June 1996): 303–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2082886.
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Minimal winning coalitions have appeared as a key prediction or as an essential assumption of virtually all formal models of coalition formation, vote buying, and logrolling. Notwithstanding this research, we provide a model showing that supermajority coalitions may be cheaper than minimal winning coalitions. Specifically, if vote buyers move sequentially, and if the losing vote buyer is always granted a last chance to attack the winner's coalition, then minimal winning coalitions will generally not be cheapest, and equilibrium coalitions will generally not be minimal winning. We provide results relating equilibrium coalition size with preferences of the legislators and vote buyers, and we show that minimal winning coalitions should occur in only rare cases. We discuss these results in light of empirical work on coalition size and suggest other possible avenues for testing our model.
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Wang, Yinying. "Examining the Actor Coalitions and Discourse Coalitions of the Opt-Out Movement in New York: A Discourse Network Analysis." Teachers College Record: The Voice of Scholarship in Education 123, no. 5 (May 2021): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/016146812112300506.
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Background/Context Since 2013, opting out of state standardized tests has become a movement—the grassroots, organized efforts to refuse to take high-stakes state standardized tests. In particular, opt-out rates in the state of New York have been consistently fluctuating around 20%. Purpose/Objective This study aims to examine the actor coalitions and discourse coalitions that have propelled the opt-out movement in the state of New York—the movement's epicenter with the highest opt-out rate in the United States. Conceptual Framework This study is conceptually grounded in the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), a prominent conceptual lens to investigate the formation of coalitions and their impact on policymaking. The ACF posits that advocacy coalitions are forged by policy actors who have similar policy preferences. By contrast, differences in policy preferences are manifested in the discourse that serves to defend or propose coherent arguments as justifications for policy preferences held by the opposition coalitions. Research Design This study compiled the Opt-out Discourse Data Set by using data from 323 press articles and 52 archival documents from 2015 to 2018. Each news article or archival document was coded with three variables: movement actors, statements articulated by the actors, and the actors’ sentiment toward the statements. An actor-statement bipartite network, an actor coalition network, and a discourse coalition network were created, respectively. Next, Freeman degree centrality was calculated to identify major actors and their statements. The network metrics of density and connectedness of the two competing coalitions were calculated to compare the coalitions’ network structure. Findings In the actor coalition network, the movement advocacy coalition is clearly more densely connected than the movement opposition coalition in terms of the number of actors, coalition density, and coalition connectedness. The discourse coalition network shows similar patterns: the movement advocacy coalition is densely connected, as evidenced by the numbers of nodes in each coalition and the network metrics of coalition density and connectedness. Conclusions/Recommendations This study concludes with a discussion on how the future of the opt-out movement depends on (1) how the movement advocacy coalition continues to amass power and influence in education policymaking, and (2) how the New York State Education Department exercises its power over implementation of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA). Moreover, this article demonstrates the application of discourse network analysis to examine qualitative data in education research. The discourse network approach is particularly instrumental in explaining a policy output by identifying coalitions and their interactions within and across the coalitions.
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Biroscak, Brian Joseph, Carol Bryant, Mahmooda Khaliq, Tali Schneider, Anthony Dominic Panzera, Anita Courtney, Claudia Parvanta, and Peter Hovmand. "Using system dynamics modeling to evaluate a community-based social marketing framework." Journal of Social Marketing 9, no. 1 (January 7, 2019): 53–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jsocm-01-2018-0014.
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PurposeCommunity coalitions are an important part of the public milieu and subject to similar external pressures as other publicly funded organizations – including changes in required strategic orientation. Many US government agencies that fund efforts such as community-based social marketing initiatives have shifted their funding agenda from program development to policy development. The Florida Prevention Research Center at the University of South Florida (Tampa, Florida, USA) created community-based prevention marketing (CBPM) for policy development framework to teach community coalitions how to apply social marketing to policy development. This paper aims to explicate the framework’s theory of change.Design/methodology/approachThe research question was: “How does implementing the CBPM for Policy Development framework improve coalition performance over time?” The authors implemented a case study design, with the “case” being a normative community coalition. The study adhered to a well-developed series of steps for system dynamics modeling.FindingsResults from computer model simulations show that gains in community coalition performance depend on a coalition’s initial culture and initial efficiency, and that only the most efficient coalitions’ performance might improve from implementing the CBPM framework.Originality/valuePractical implications for CBPM’s developers and users are discussed, namely, the importance of managing the early expectations of academic-community partnerships seeking to shift their orientation from downstream (e.g. program development) to upstream social marketing strategies (e.g. policy change).
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Yoneda, Azusa, Yasuhito Tanaka, Hiromasa Fujii, Shinji Isomoto, and Kazuya Sugimoto. "Morphologic Analysis of Nonosseous Talocalcaneal Coalitions Using 3D Reconstruction." Foot & Ankle Orthopaedics 6, no. 4 (October 1, 2021): 247301142110394. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/24730114211039487.
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Background: Resection of talocalcaneal coalitions has generally involved osseous coalitions. We attempted to evaluate the morphology of nonosseous talocalcaneal coalitions. This study aimed to investigate if the calcaneal articular surface area of feet with talocalcaneal coalitions is different than that of normal feet. Methods: Twenty nonosseous talocalcaneal coalition cases with analyzable computed tomography (CT) scans were compared to 20 control cases. Three-dimensional models of the talus and calcaneus were constructed, and the surface areas of the posterior facet (SPF), whole talocalcaneal joint of the calcaneus (SWJ), and coalition site (SCS) of each 3D-CT model were measured. “Calibrated” values of the 2 groups were created to adjust for relative size of the tali and then compared. The preoperative and postoperative AOFAS Ankle-Hindfoot scale was calculated for 9 cases that had undergone single coalition resection. Results: The calibrated SPF and SWJ were significantly greater in the coalition group than in the control group (40% and 12%, respectively). No significant difference was detected between the calibrated (SWJ – SCS) value of the coalition group and the calibrated SWJ value of the control group. The AOFAS scale was improved postoperatively in all 9 cases analyzed. Conclusion: The calcaneal articular surface of nonosseous talocalcaneal coalition feet in our series was larger than that of the normal feet. This study indicates that the total calcaneal articular surface after coalition resection may be comparable to the calcaneal articular surface of normal feet. We suggest that the indication for coalition resection be reconsidered for nonosseous coalition. Level of Evidence: Level III, retrospective comparative study.
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Jang, Jinhyuk, Charles Crabtree, and Sona N. Golder. "Electoral coalition signals and voter perceptions." Japanese Journal of Political Science 23, no. 2 (June 2022): 167–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109922000020.
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AbstractHow do electoral coalition signals affect voters' perceptions of party positions and coalition behavior in parliamentary democracies? Scholars have found that coalition signals can influence how voters view policy positions of parties. Extending research on the impact of government coalition participation on voter perceptions, a recent study found that Spanish voters update their perceptions of party positions when they receive a signal that a party joined an electoral coalition, believing it to be farther to the left (right) if the signal was of a left- (right-)leaning coalition. That study also found, in agreement with the literature, that electoral coalition signals lead to expectations of future coalition behavior. Much of the literature on electoral coalitions focuses on parliamentary democracies in Europe that use proportional representation. Since the effects of electoral coalitions might vary across contexts, we conduct a similar survey experiment in Japan, a parliamentary democracy that uses a mixed electoral system with an important disproportional component. We find no evidence that electoral coalition signals affect how Japanese voters view the ideological positions of parties, a result that matches a similar analysis conducted in Sweden. However, some coalition signals – if they contain new information – do increase Japanese respondents' expectations that certain coalitions are more likely to form in the future.
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Klöck, Carola. "Multiple Coalition Memberships: Helping or Hindering Small States in Multilateral (Climate) Negotiations?" International Negotiation 25, no. 2 (May 18, 2020): 279–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718069-25131244.
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Abstract This study explores multiple coalition memberships in multilateral negotiations, with a focus on climate negotiations. Why do countries engage in multiple coalitions, and how do multiple coalition memberships affect their influence? I argue that coalitions differ in important respects. Accordingly, countries may belong to both, long-term and short-lived coalitions; they may consciously decide to join a coalition, but also be associated by default. Finally, larger coalitions confer numerical strength, while smaller (sub-)coalitions help voice common positions. Regarding effects, I propose two perspectives. The zero-sum perspective highlights coordination costs and potentially incompatible positions, while the win-win perspective focuses on the complementarity of different coalitions and the potential for mutual support. Anecdotal evidence from the climate negotiations offers support for these perspectives, but further empirical research is needed to better understand why countries join several coalitions, how they navigate these multiple coalition memberships, and how these affect their influence.
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Nasir, Muhammad Touqeer Akhter, and Khan Faqir. "A Critical Analysis of Coalition Politics in Pakistan A Case Study of PPP-led Coalition 2008-2013." Global Political Review VI, no. IV (December 30, 2021): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2021(vi-iv).01.
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Coalition politics have played a unique role in the modernsystem of governance. It played a vital role in politics forbringing the smaller political parties closer by reducing the chances ofserious conflicts. Coalitions can be governmental, which are formed afterelections, and coalitions also can be formed before elections. Like most ofthe Third World countries, Pakistan is an emerging democratic state witha multi-party setup. Present research work tried to analyze differentaspects of coalition politics since the creation of Pakistan; however, thescope of this research was restricted to the era from 2008 to 2013. Thestudy has included the concept of coalitions, the formation of coalitions,their governance, terminations, and their implications on the politics ofPakistan. In order to get pinpoint the performance of the coalition during2008-2013, primary sources, including official documents, statements,and interviews, and secondary sources like books, journals, newspapers,and websites have been consulted. Basically, it is qualitative research, butsometimes quantitative material is also utilized. To complete the research,historical, descriptive, and experimental methods were used. The studyrevealed that how coalition politics has become a backbone of democracyin Pakistan, where many parties were getting representation in thelegislative assembly. Here, the successful tenure of the PPP-led coalitiongave new hope to the political stakeholders to work together for sustainabledemocracy in Pakistan.
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Nyhuis, Dominic, and Carolina Plescia. "The nonideological component of coalition preferences." Party Politics 24, no. 6 (February 17, 2017): 686–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068817690933.
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Recent research on political attitudes has emphasized that coalition preferences determine electoral choices, prompting scholars to investigate the sources of coalition preferences. While it is not surprising that coalition preferences are strongly informed by spatial considerations, several studies have drawn attention to additional nonideological factors. Relying on this insight, the present study aims to systematically investigate the nonideological or valence component of coalition preferences. In order to decompose attitudes into their principal ideological and nonideological components, we apply a Bayesian unfolding model to coalition sympathy ratings. We find that coalitions differ strongly with regard to their valence component. This surplus cannot be reconstructed as a linear combination of the coalitions’ constituent party valences and is predominantly structured by campaign valence.
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Kegler, Michelle C., and Deanne W. Swan. "An Initial Attempt at Operationalizing and Testing the Community Coalition Action Theory." Health Education & Behavior 38, no. 3 (March 10, 2011): 261–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1090198110372875.
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The Community Coalition Action Theory (CCAT) blends practice wisdom with empirical data to explain how community coalitions achieve community change and community capacity outcomes. The current study uses data from an evaluation of 20 California Healthy Cities and Communities coalitions to test relationships between coalition factors and outcomes as predicted by CCAT in two stages of coalition development. Data are from two rounds of coalition member surveys, interviews with local coalition coordinators, and semiannual progress reports. Consistent with CCAT predictions and prior research, shared decision making and leadership were correlated with participation; staff competence, task focus, and cohesion were correlated with member satisfaction. Coalition size was associated with participation and dollars leveraged. Also, consistent with CCAT, diversity of funding sources was associated with new leadership opportunities and program expansion; dollars leveraged was correlated with new leadership opportunities and new partners. Findings provide preliminary support for many, but not all, of the relationships predicted by CCAT.
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Filippova, E. "Factors of Coalitional Governments Formation Between Regionalist and Nationwide Political Parties in Regions of Spain." World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 4 (2021): 71–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-4-71-79.
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Received 09.09.2020. The paper focuses on one of the most significant arenas of multi-level politics – the interaction between regionalist and state-wide parties in the creation and functioning of government coalitions at the regional level. The research is aimed at determining the factors influencing the creation of such coalitions in which regionalist parties act as coalition partners with a specific agenda. Spain provides significant empirical material for research on this issue, where regionalist parties function in most regions, and state-wide parties often enter government coalitions with them at the level of autonomous communities. A comparative analysis of the practices of concluding coalition agreements between statewide and regionalist political parties in the regions of Spain during the democratic period is a key research method. The theoretical part of the article provides an overview of the theories of party coalitions accumulated by Political Science since the 1950s and updated by researchers due to actualization of new circumstances in the context of multilevel politics. The empirical part of the article examines the influence of three categories of factors on the construction of coalition deals between regionalist and state-wide political parties in the Spanish autonomous communities, including: the size of the coalition, the ideological inter-party distance (comprising the regionalist-ideological dimension) and correspondence of the alignments of party forces at the regional and national levels. The research demonstrates that the factor of coalition size is fundamental for transactions between regionalist and state-wide political parties, while the other two categories of factors manifest themselves situationally. Acknowledgements. The research was carried out at the expense of a grant from the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 19-18-00053 " Subnational regionalism and dynamics of multilevel politics (Russian and European practices)") at the Perm Federal Research Center of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
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Saito, Leland. "Urban Development and the Growth with Equity Framework: The National Football League Stadium in Downtown Los Angeles." Urban Affairs Review 55, no. 5 (January 9, 2018): 1370–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1078087417751216.
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In political economy, research on growth coalitions and regime theory concludes that progressive coalitions representing lower-income residents and effectively working for policy change at the local level involving development are unlikely since they lack the resources necessary to build and maintain strong coalitions with long-term influence with elected officials. In Los Angeles, a coalition representing the homeless filed a lawsuit in 2012, which involved one of the most powerful developers in the region, and reached a favorable settlement. Given the strength of growth interests and factors working against redistributive policies, I ask the question, how did the coalition muster the political influence and resources necessary to compel the developer to settle the lawsuit? I contend that the settlement is evidence of a progressive coalition in the region that is working to establish a growth with equity framework and that the coalition has established political influence with local officials.
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Anastasio, Albert T., Emily M. Peairs, Caitlin Grant, Billy I. Kim, Anthony Duruewuru, and Samuel B. Adams. "Fracture through Pre-Existing Tarsal Coalition: A Narrative Review." Children 10, no. 1 (December 29, 2022): 72. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/children10010072.
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Tarsal coalitions are abnormal fibrous or bony connections between the tarsal bones of the foot. While not always symptomatic, coalitions can cause pain, alterations in forefoot and hindfoot morphology, and alterations in foot and ankle biomechanics. Previous research has described the association of tarsal coalitions with fractures of the lower extremity. Multiple reports of acute fracture in the presence of tarsal coalition have been presented, as have reports of stress fractures of the foot and ankle with concomitant coalition, insidious in onset and thought to be related to aberrancies in foot and ankle biomechanics. The purpose of this review is to discuss the biomechanics seen in tarsal coalitions and to describe reports of fracture occurring concomitantly with tarsal coalitions. We will discuss diagnostic options and treatment approaches in the setting of fracture with preexisting tarsal coalition.
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Palsule-Desai, Omkar D. "Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions." International Game Theory Review 17, no. 01 (March 2015): 1540006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021919891540006x.
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In this paper, we develop a non-cooperative game theoretic model for our problem context in which the competing producers adopt one of the two alternate production and marketing technologies — efficient and inefficient. We examine stability related implications of the producers' decisions regarding the choices of (i) technologies, (ii) coalition formation, (iii) coalition form, (iv) intensity of collusion. The coalitions can adopt either complete collusion or partial collusion by determining intensity of collusion using endogenously determined sharing rules. The motivation for our study comes from the Costa Rican coffee industry and interesting findings presented in the existing literature focusing on a variety of competing-coalitions settings. Our results can be categorized as: (i) Nash equilibrium of the endogenously determined sharing rules, (ii) the equilibrium coalition forms, and (iii) stability of coalitions. They highlight the dynamics between the number of coalition producers and the cost of inefficiency. We show that the equilibrium sharing rules may have interior solutions and they are not necessarily (a)symmetric. We also show that both coalitions forming complete collusion of the respective producers in not always a Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium coalition forms need not be (a)symmetric. Our main contribution to existing literature rests in determining the situations in which (i) competing players form coalitions, and (ii) they adopt the coalition form of either complete or partial collusion. Moreover, we provide an alternate explanation to why competing producers horizontally merge in the presence of a competing coalition adopting partial collusion in spite of the merger paradox. We also show that none of the two types of producers considered in this paper have any incentives in not making the information on their coalition form public. Moreover, we establish that situations yielding stable coalitions always exist. Our results demonstrate that the cost advantage to the efficient producers decreases in the number of producers adopting the efficient technology, and the coalition stability related conditions need not imply better profitability for one type of producer vis-à-vis the other. Our model essentially provides a platform for future research in a variety of competing-coalitions settings adopting endogenously determined sharing rules.
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Harirah, Zulfa. "Kerangka Advokasi Koalisi dalam Kebijakan Penataan Pemukiman Bantaran Sungai Winongo di Kota Yogyakarta." Nakhoda: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan 17, no. 2 (March 7, 2019): 128. http://dx.doi.org/10.35967/jipn.v17i2.7065.
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The basic idea of this article is to examine the policy advocacy process on Winongo settlement arrangement riverbanks in Yogyakarta. Problems settlements along the river Winongo become increasingly critical as more densely populated to cause the symptoms of poverty and slums. This condition is then ignited the presence Arkom and FKWA to show arrangement ideas through policy advocacy process. Therefore, this article will focus on answering two things, there are how the coalition framework was formed and how the coalition manage their belief system, resources and strategies. To answer that questions above, this research was escorted by theory Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of Sabatier and Jenkins Smith. Through the case study method, this research will explore the case of advocacy of policies Winongo settlement on the riverbanks. The results of the research shows that there are two coalitions in structuring settlements along the river Winongo, they are River coalitions and “Right to the city” coalition. Both are proven to stand on two legs, as a member of the coalition and as a policy broker. This shows that the policy is not just a stage of systemic and technocratic, but the policy is a political process that allows each actor to act politically.
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Harirah, Zulfa. "Kerangka Advokasi Koalisi dalam Kebijakan Penataan Pemukiman Bantaran Sungai Winongo di Kota Yogyakarta." Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan Nakhoda 17, no. 30 (March 7, 2019): 128. http://dx.doi.org/10.35967/jipn.v17i30.7065.
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The basic idea of this article is to examine the policy advocacy process on Winongo settlement arrangement riverbanks in Yogyakarta. Problems settlements along the river Winongo become increasingly critical as more densely populated to cause the symptoms of poverty and slums. This condition is then ignited the presence Arkom and FKWA to show arrangement ideas through policy advocacy process. Therefore, this article will focus on answering two things, there are how the coalition framework was formed and how the coalition manage their belief system, resources and strategies. To answer that questions above, this research was escorted by theory Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of Sabatier and Jenkins Smith. Through the case study method, this research will explore the case of advocacy of policies Winongo settlement on the riverbanks. The results of the research shows that there are two coalitions in structuring settlements along the river Winongo, they are River coalitions and “Right to the city” coalition. Both are proven to stand on two legs, as a member of the coalition and as a policy broker. This shows that the policy is not just a stage of systemic and technocratic, but the policy is a political process that allows each actor to act politically.
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Wright, John R., and Arthur S. Goldberg. "Risk and Uncertainty as Factors in the Durability of Political Coalitions." American Political Science Review 79, no. 3 (September 1985): 704–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1956839.
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The central purpose of this article is to shed some light on the roles that risk attitudes and uncertainty may play in determining the durability of political coalitions. Although Axelrod theorized that polarized, or “unconnected,” coalitions would be less durable than “connected” coalitions, subsequent empirical research has found little support for Axelrod's hypothesis. In this article we demonstrate theoretically that many of the anomalies associated with Axelrod's polarization hypothesis can be explained by incorporating risk attitudes and uncertainty into a logical model of a coalition maintenance process. The model we have constructed assumes that coalition members are uncertain about their ultimate payoffs and therefore are subject to persuasion and manipulation by a coalition leader. Through computer simulation we demonstrate that polarized coalitions are indeed capable of enduring for relatively long periods of time once members' risk characteristics and uncertainty are taken into consideration.
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Stanislav, Balík, and Hruška Jan. "When Preferential Voting Really Matters: Explaining the Surprising Results of Parties in Electoral Coalitions." Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science 29, no. 3 (2022): 316–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/pc2022-3-316.
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Preferential voting in a proportional list system is an essential means by which voters can significantly influence which particular politician will represent them. However, preferential voting takes on a new dimension when several parties run on the same list as a coalition. In this case, the intra-party competition may become inter-party competition, where one or more parties may gain significantly from preferential voting at the expense of their partners. Despite this, research on this topic has been significantly neglected. Using the case of the 2021 Czech general election, where two newly formed electoral coalitions (SPOLU and PIRSTAN) run, we examine the nature of preferential voting in this different context of electoral coalitions. In the first part of the analysis, when we analyzed the characteristics of all candidates of both coalitions, we first confirmed that the candidate effect commonly observed in the case of conventional candidate lists also exists in this context. At the same time, we found that the candidate effect (through the adequate distribution of influential characteristics across parties in a coalition) can also affect the inter-party competition (as was the case of the PIRSTAN coalition). In the second part of the analysis, we found that in the context of electoral coalitions, party characteristics can also have a substantial effect on preferential voting (as was the case of the SPOLU coalition). Thus, both of these categories of effects can exist in the case of coalition lists, and both can affect inter-party competition. Nevertheless, future research is needed to confirm whether these findings are generally valid or whether the Czech case is somehow deviant. Existing research on this topic does not allow for a comparison.
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MARTIN, LANNY W., and RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON. "The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation." American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (August 2010): 503–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055410000213.
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Previous research on coalition politics has found an “incumbency advantage” in government formation, but it has provided no clear explanation as to why this advantage exists. We classify existing theories as either preference-based or institutions-based explanations for why incumbent coalitions might be likely to form again, and we integrate these explanations into a coherent theoretical argument. We also claim that it is possible, to some extent, to distinguish these explanations empirically by taking into account the “historical context” of coalition bargaining. Using a comprehensive new data set on coalition bargaining in Europe, we show that coalitions, in general, are more likely to form if the parties comprising them have worked together in the recent past, and that incumbent coalitions are more likely to re-form if partners have not experienced a severe public conflict while in office together or suffered a recent setback at the polls. The incumbency advantage disappears completely if partners have become mired in conflict or have lost legislative seats (even after accounting for the impact of seat share on coalition size). Moreover, in certain circumstances, institutional rules that grant incumbents an advantage in coalition bargaining greatly enhance their ability to remain in office.
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Hupert, Nathaniel, Karen Biala, Tara Holland, Avi Baehr, Aisha Hasan, and Melissa Harvey. "Optimizing Health Care Coalitions: Conceptual Frameworks and a Research Agenda." Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 9, no. 6 (November 6, 2015): 717–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2015.144.
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AbstractThe US health care system has maintained an objective of preparedness for natural or manmade catastrophic events as part of its larger charge to deliver health services for the American population. In 2002, support for hospital-based preparedness activities was bolstered by the creation of the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program, now called the Hospital Preparedness Program, in the US Department of Health and Human Services. Since 2012, this program has promoted linking health care facilities into health care coalitions that build key preparedness and emergency response capabilities. Recognizing that well-functioning health care coalitions can have a positive impact on the health outcomes of the populations they serve, this article informs efforts to optimize health care coalition activity. We first review the landscape of health care coalitions in the United States. Then, using principles from supply chain management and high-reliability organization theory, we present 2 frameworks extending beyond the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response’s current guidance in a way that may help health care coalition leaders gain conceptual insight into how different enterprises achieve similar ends relevant to emergency response. We conclude with a proposed research agenda to advance understanding of how coalitions can contribute to the day-to-day functioning of health care systems and disaster preparedness. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness.2015;9:717–723)
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Friedman, Henry L., and Mirko S. Heinle. "Influence Activities, Coalitions, and Uniform Policies: Implications for the Regulation of Financial Institutions." Management Science 66, no. 9 (September 2020): 4336–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3335.
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We examine a setting in which agents can form lobbying coalitions to influence a policy maker. Policy uniformity causes agents to free ride on each other’s lobbying and gives them an incentive to form lobbying coalitions. We investigate when coalitions are formed by similar or dissimilar agents and show that endogenous coalition formation causes the effects of policy uniformity and lobbying costs on aggregate lobbying activity and policy strength to be nonmonotonic. Our model suggests that increased competition in the market for coalition-facilitating lobbyists can lead to less lobbying. We discuss implications for the regulation of financial institutions. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.
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Lima, Valesca. "Housing coalition dynamics: a comparative perspective." Comparative European Politics 19, no. 4 (May 10, 2021): 534–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00245-6.
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AbstractSocial movement coalitions are a vital component within the dynamics of political mobilization. While previous research has established why and how coalitions emerge and dissolve, how they are maintained and the outcomes they generate have been less explored, especially in housing studies. This research contributes to the study of movement coalitions through an empirical examination of the dynamics of how coalitions interact, cooperate, and sustain alliances, in addition to exploring the outcomes that are produced as a result of these coalitions. It draws upon a comparative approach of housing coalitions in Dublin and Lisbon, where local housing groups have played a critical role in protesting against housing injustices and in articulating alternative policy solutions to the housing crisis. In mapping the diversity of coalition members, this research finds that tolerance for difference and negotiation capacity impacts how long coalitions last as well as the outcomes that they lead to. This study contributes to the study of coalitions by analyzing the relationship between outcomes and the mechanisms which sustain coalitions using a comparative framework.
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Biroscak, Brian J., Tali Schneider, Anthony D. Panzera, Carol A. Bryant, Robert J. McDermott, Alyssa B. Mayer, Mahmooda Khaliq, et al. "Applying Systems Science to Evaluate a Community-Based Social Marketing Innovation." Social Marketing Quarterly 20, no. 4 (November 5, 2014): 247–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1524500414556649.
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In the United States, community coalitions are an important part of the public health milieu, and thus, subject to many of the same external pressures as other organizations—including changes in required strategic orientation. Many funding agencies have shifted their funding agenda from program development to policy change. Thus, the Florida Prevention Research Center created the Community-Based Prevention Marketing (CBPM) for Policy Development framework to teach community coalitions how to apply social marketing to policy change. The research reported here was designed to explicate the framework’s theory of change. We describe and demonstrate a hybrid evaluation approach: utilization-focused developmental evaluation. The research question was “What are the linkages and connections among CBPM inputs, activities, immediate outcomes, intermediate outcomes, and ultimate impacts?” We implemented a case study design, with the case being a normative community coalition. The study adhered to a well-developed series of steps for system dynamics modeling. Community coalition leaders may expect CBPM to provide immediate gains in coalition performance. Results from causal diagramming show how gains in performance are delayed and follow an initial decline in performance. We discuss the practical implications for CBPM’s developers—for example, importance of managing coalition expectations—and other social marketers—for example, expansion of the evaluation toolkit.
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Auzan, A., and A. Zolotov. "Coalition for Modernization: Possibility of Genesis." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 1 (January 20, 2008): 97–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2008-1-97-107.
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Different ways of genesis of broad coalitions for modernization are considered in the article. The authors apply three-level approach to deal with interests groups: analytical (most aggregate), statistical and real, and examine the possibility of the coalition for modernization at the level of analytical ones. On the basis of the conducted research suggestions are made about further studies of the said coalition genesis opportunities and means of increasing its stability.
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Kleinowski, Marcin. "Poland's Ability to Build Blocking Coalitions after Brexit." Politeja 16, no. 6(63) (December 31, 2019): 43–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.16.2019.63.03.
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The article presents the results of research on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union on Poland’s ability to build small, minimalblocking coalitions in the Council of the European Union. To this end, the theory of voting games was used, but departing from the assumption that the creation of each possible coalition of players is equally likely. It was also assumedthat they do not necessarily make decisions independently of each other, and the analysis focuses on the ability to build minimally blocking coalitions. The obtained results indicate that after Brexit, for Poland to build a blocking coalition in opposition to the German-French tandem will be a very difficult task, and the loss of the United Kingdom as a potential coalition partner in the Council may be irreplaceable in some matters.
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Murphy, Gillian. "Coalitions and The Development of The Global Environmental Movement: A Double-Edged Sword." Mobilization: An International Quarterly 10, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 235–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.17813/maiq.10.2.8u3626408607643t.
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Censuses reveal an increasing prominence of coalition organizations within transnational social movements. However, the causes and implications of this change are unclear. Using original data on a population of transnational environmental social movement organizations, this research shows that coalition presence is a double-edged sword. While greater numbers of coalitions suggest movement expansion, empirical evidence suggests that this rise makes foundings of new organizations less likely.
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Kreling, Barbara A., Janet Cañar, Ericson Catipon, Michelle Goodman, Nancy Pallesen, Jyl Pomeroy, Yosselyn Rodriguez, et al. "Latin American Cancer Research Coalition." Cancer 107, S8 (2006): 2015–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cncr.22145.
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Deschouwer, Kris. "The termination of coalitions in Belgium." Res Publica 36, no. 1 (March 31, 1994): 44–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/rp.v36i1.18752.
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Coalitions have a limited life-span. There has been quite some research on the duration of coalitions and on the factors explaining variations in duration. But there is so far no solid theory on the mechanics of the termination of coalitions.This article gives an overview of the mechanics of termination in Belgian politics. By using the contextual approach (Pridham), that has originally been produced to analyse coalition formation, this overview might be a first step in the construction of a comparative explanatory model. The historical context, the institutional setting, the international context and the economical situation are described as elements that affect the termination of coalitions. The Belgian ethno-linguistic cleavage proves to be a very effective coalition-killer.
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Johnson, Jerry C., U. Tara Hayden, Nicole Thomas, Jennine Groce-Martin, Thomas Henry, Terry Guerra, Alia Walker, William West, Marina Barnett, and Shiriki Kumanyika. "Building Community Participatory Research Coalitions from the Ground Up: The Philadelphia Area Research Community Coalition." Progress in Community Health Partnerships: Research, Education, and Action 3, no. 1 (2009): 61–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cpr.0.0052.
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Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. "Coalitions and Cabinet Government." American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 873–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962770.
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The formal study of coalitions is active in Europe, whereas the formal study of political institutions preoccupies American scholars. We seek to integrate aspects of these two bodies of research. For nearly thirty years models of coalition government have focused more on coalition than on government. Thus, these theories are essentially extensions of the theory of voting in legislatures. Unlike passing a bill or “dividing a dollar,” however, forming a government is not the end of politics but the beginning. During the formation process, rational actors must entertain expectations of subsequent government behavior. We provide a model of rational expectations with an emphasis on the credibility of the policy promises of prospective government partners as determined by the allocation of portfolios in the new government. Portfolio allocation becomes the mechanism by which prospective coalitions make credible promises and so inform the expectations of rational agents in the coalition formation process.
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Eniayejuni, Anthony, Shona Olalere, and Eugene Obiora Eugene. "Non-governmental organizations coalition in influencing global agenda." Masyarakat, Kebudayaan dan Politik 35, no. 4 (October 4, 2022): 422–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/mkp.v35i42022.422-432.
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This study aims to show how a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can influence the human rights agenda. This study relies on the advocacy coalition Framework (ACF) assumption that multiple varieties of actors involved in the policy process may combine to form coalitions. This study examines how Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the International Crisis Group (ICG) formed a coalition to advocate for measures to address humanitarian crises in Sri Lanka and Darfur. This study employed qualitative research methods and relied on secondary sources related to the topic. The findings show that a coalition formed by human rights organizations can influence policies adopted by the international community and can also influence actions taken by national communities. This study concludes that just as states need to form a coalition with other states or work as “allies” to promote human rights on a national and global level, NGOs also function in a similar manner.
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Bensahel, Nora. "A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation Against Terrorism." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 1 (January 2006): 35–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100500351284.
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Brandt, Felix, Martin Bullinger, and Anaëlle Wilczynski. "Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures in Hedonic Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 6 (May 18, 2021): 5211–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16658.
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The formal study of coalition formation in multiagent systems is typically realized using so-called hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this branch of research has been on the existence and the computational complexity of deciding the existence of coalition structures that satisfy various stability criteria. The actual process of forming coalitions based on individual behavior has received little attention. In this paper, we study the convergence of simple dynamics leading to stable partitions in a variety of classes of hedonic games, including anonymous, dichotomous, fractional, and hedonic diversity games. The dynamics we consider is based on individual stability: an agent will join another coalition if she is better off and no member of the welcoming coalition is worse off. We identify conditions for convergence, provide elaborate counterexamples of existence of individually stable partitions, and study the computational complexity of problems related to the coalition formation dynamics. In particular, we settle open problems suggested by Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002), Brandl, Brandt, and Strobel (2015), and Boehmer and Elkind (2020).
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Okasha, Mona. "The National Coalition for Cancer Research." Lancet Oncology 2, no. 4 (April 2001): 249. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1470-2045(00)00301-6.
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Evans, Jeff. "Coalition Starts Autism Genetics Research Plan." Family Practice News 35, no. 4 (February 2005): 42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0300-7073(05)71449-3.
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Xing, Zhi Wei, Jun Hui Li, and Peng Cheng Zhang. "Game Theoretical Research for Airlines Apply for Deicing Resources." Advanced Materials Research 339 (September 2011): 411–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.339.411.
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This paper analyzed airlines’ game in the process of apply for deicing resources based on Game Theory. In this game, if a airline company cooperate with others, they will achieve more utility in the form of coalition. However, the coalition can’t be formed spontaneously, Sometimes airlines will adopt inefficient strategic behavior, and moreover, the block of coalition will come forth due to the inequity of gamers’ status. Therefore, a proper approach is proposed to the airline coalition, to make cooperation an optimal strategy. Finally, the best solution of income distribution is proposed to assure the distribution fair and efficiency, the results have verified base on the software Matlab.
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Beyers, Jan, and Bart Kerremans. "Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Societal Interests." Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 10 (December 2004): 1119–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414004269828.
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Often it is argued that the EU depoliticizes political issues as bureaucrats and nonmajoritarian institutions are key in the policy-making process. However, recent research rejects this perspective and shows that domestic political cleavages organize the European political space. This article demonstrates that (a) political cleavages affect the organization of policy networks among Euro-level bureaucrats, politicians, and societal interests; and (b) that the institutional organization of government facilitates the emergence of advocacy coalitions mobilizing these political cleavages. The empirical analysis demonstrates that the European political space is dominated by a cleavage between a progrowth coalition and a sustainability coalition. Furthermore, it shows that political officials occupy a pivotal position enabling them to mediate between these two coalitions. Finally, data on the actors’ resource reputations suggest that in granting access, public officials attach considerable value to the public support coalitions enjoy.
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Abramson, Paul R. "Measuring the Southern Contribution to the Democratic Coalition." American Political Science Review 81, no. 2 (June 1987): 567–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1961969.
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Measuring the southern contribution to the Democratic coalition is an important task. To measure this contribution one must choose appropriate data and the appropriate unit of analysis for studying party coalitions in the United States. Two recent studies of party coalitions use the National Election Studies to estimate the southern contribution to the Democratic party, and these studies illustrate the problems one may encounter. This note demonstrates two points. First, survey research results may lead to erroneous estimates and it is preferable, where possible, to rely upon official election statistics. Second, the contribution of demographic groups to party coalitions should be assessed within the context of the political rules that make such coalitions meaningful.
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Wijayanti, Septi Nur, and Kelik Iswandi. "Sinergitas Kabinet Presidensiil Multipartai pada Masa Pandemi Covid-19 di Indonesia." Jurnal Konstitusi 18, no. 2 (November 15, 2021): 437. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/jk1828.
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Implement the simultaneous election in Indonesia has supported by the multiparty system. The multiparty system has an impact on the President’s leadership. In the formation of the cabinet, the President must accommodate political party coalition interest. One form of that accommodations occurs of the minister which came from the coalition political party. Different from the minister's interest background has an impact on the different policies each minister especially on COVID-19 handler in Indonesia. The research method is normative research with a case approach and concept approach. This research used secondary data that used primary, secondary, and tertiary materials. This research shows that the presidential cabinet in Indonesia is a cabinet which forms by multi-party coalitions. On multiparty coalition implementation of Kabinet Indonesia Maju 2019-2024, there were several times, the minister has different policy among the minister or with local governments such as the case of the ban on taking passengers for online biking and prohibition against homecoming. Different policies among the minister or with local government can be minimized by the President’s political leadership.
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Wiegand, Krista, and Eric Keels. "Oil Wealth, Winning Coalitions, and Duration of Civil Wars." Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 4 (April 3, 2018): 1077–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002718766414.
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New research has begun to underscore the complicated relationship between democratic institutions and the duration of civil wars. Specifically, greater constraints placed on executives often lead to considerably longer civil wars as leaders are limited in how they bargain with dissidents. This presents a puzzle as democracies are often seen as credible negotiators in international disputes. This article suggests that the size of the government’s winning coalition represents a double-edged sword. Larger winning coalitions allow governments to bargain more credibly but also place constraints on what governments can offer since peace agreements may alienate coalition members. Fortunately, future access to postwar oil wealth provides the feasibility for the governments to compensate hard-liners who may lose out on any settlement, making them more likely to allow concessions to rebels. This combined credibility of large winning coalitions and the feasibility provided by oil wealth allows for peace agreements, therefore shortening the duration of civil wars. We test these propositions by examining the conditional relationship between oil wealth and coalition size on the duration of all civil wars between 1950 and 2009.
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Ueda, Suguru, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Marius Silaghi, Katsutoshi Hirayama, and Toshihiro Matsui. "Coalition Structure Generation based on Distributed Constraint Optimization." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 24, no. 1 (July 3, 2010): 197–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7552.
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Forming effective coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and multi-agent systems (MAS). Coalition Structure generation (CSG) involves partitioning a set of agents into coalitions so that social surplus (the sum of the rewards of all coalitions) is maximized. A partition is called a Coalition Structure (CS). In traditional works, the value of a coalition is given by a black box function called a characteristic function. In this paper, we propose a novel formalization of CSG, i.e., we assume the value of a characteristic function is given by an optimal solution of a distributed constraint optimization problem (DCOP) among the agents of a coalition. A DCOP is a popular approach for modeling cooperative agents, since it is quite general and can formalize various application problems in MAS. At first glance, one might assume that the computational costs required in this approach would be too expensive, since we need to solve an NP-hard problem just to obtain the value of a single coalition. To optimally solve a CSG, we might need to solve n-th power of 2 DCOP problem instances, where n is the number of agents. However, quite surprisingly, we show that an approximation algorithm, whose computational cost is about the same as solving just one DCOP, can find a CS with quality guarantees. More specifically, we develop an algorithm with parameter k that can find a CS whose social surplus is at least max(k/(w*+1), 2k/n) of the optimal CS, where w* is the tree width of a constraint graph. When k=1, the complexity of this algorithm is about the same as solving just one DCOP. These results illustrate that the locality of interactions among agents, which is explicitly modeled in the DCOP formalization, is quite useful in developing an efficient CSG algorithm with quality guarantees.
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Johnson, Alexander J., and Eric Gokcen. "Tarsal Coalition of the Cuneiforms in an Elite Athlete: A Case Report." Foot & Ankle Orthopaedics 4, no. 4 (October 1, 2019): 2473011419S0023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2473011419s00233.
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Category: Midfoot/Forefoot, Sports Introduction/Purpose: Tarsal coalitions are a relatively common, often asymptomatic disorder with an incidence of 1-6% in clinical studies and 11-13% in cadaver studies. Calcaneonavicular, followed by talonavicular, are the most common forms of coalitions, but a variety of other coalitions have been described in radiographic, anatomic, and clinical literature. Despite the varied research that has focused on the topic in recent decades, there are no identified reports of cuneiform to cuneiform coalition in the literature. Methods: The authors present the unique case of medial and intermediate cuneiform coalition in a young female track athlete. A 19 year old female Division 1 hurdler presented with 1 year of atraumatic midfoot pain limiting her ability to compete. Despite evaluation by multiple orthopedic surgeons, the etiology of the pain was undetermined, and she had failed multiple conservative treatment options. Her exam revealed diffuse midfoot tenderness and increased midfoot pain with twisting motion. MRI and CT evaluation showed coalition between medial and intermediate cuneiforms with early degenerative changes. Ultrasound guided injection in this area resulted in relief of symptoms, confirming the diagnosis. The patient underwent coalition release and medial- intermediate cuneiform arthrodesis. Results: Postoperatively the patient underwent a period of nonweightbearing then progressed back to activity. CT scan confirmed solid arthrodesis and she was cleared to return to track competition. She successfully returned to competitive collegiate hurdling 11 months after surgery while noting only occasional discomfort in the foot. Conclusion: With no previous reports identified in the literature, cuneiform to cuneiform coalitions are a rare clinical entity. It is likely that the patient in the current case experienced symptoms related to this pathology because of her high level athletic participation. After failing conservative management, the patient experienced a good outcome after coalition release and arthrodesis. Although it is likely that patients with similar pathology who fail conservative management may expect similarly positive outcomes, review of future cases will help further define the optimal treatment for this condition.