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Journal articles on the topic 'Coalition politics'
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Moten, Abdul Rashid. "The 14th General Elections in Malaysia." Asian Survey 59, no. 3 (May 2019): 500–520. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2019.59.3.500.
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In the 14th general election in Malaysia, the opposition coalition overturned the ruling coalition’s entrenched incumbency of over six decades. The ruling coalition suffered from a legitimacy deficit and corruption scandals. The election witnessed four coalitions of parties, but these coalitions have been ephemeral, and Malaysian politics continues to be based on racial arithmetic.
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Wiley, Kimberly Kay. "Leveraging Political Resources: Applying the Advocacy Coalition Framework to the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence." Nonprofit Policy Forum 13, no. 1 (October 15, 2021): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/npf-2020-0020.
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Abstract As politics becomes increasingly polarized, the value of collective political action becomes more visible and overt. Nonprofit organizations act collectively in pursuit of their policy goals in nearly all aspects of public policy. Understanding how nonprofits borne of social movements engage politically expands our insight into advocacy coalition behavior following seemingly effective social movements. The coalition’s leveraging of political resources provides us this insight. This study assesses the policy activities produced or maintained within a U.S. national domestic violence advocacy coalition over its lifetime to determine how and when resources were leveraged. A directed content analysis is conducted on historical data to capture the evolution of coalition activities over a 41-year period. The coalition’s emphasis on policy change waned over time as it achieved its policy goals. The coalition then leaned on its largest resources, mobilizable troops, and information to increasingly emphasize policy implementation and evaluation. These findings indicate that when in the policy process coalitions leverage their political resources may be more important than how coalitions leverage resources. Framing nonprofit political activity across the stages of the policy process can open doors to better use of scarce political resources.
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Sotirov, Metodi, Georg Winkel, and Katarina Eckerberg. "The coalitional politics of the European Union’s environmental forest policy: Biodiversity conservation, timber legality, and climate protection." Ambio 50, no. 12 (October 10, 2021): 2153–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13280-021-01644-5.
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AbstractEuropean forest policymaking is shaped by progressing European integration, yet with notable ideological divisions and diverging interests among countries. This paper focuses on the coalitional politics of key environmental forest issues: biodiversity conservation, timber legality, and climate protection policy. Combining the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Shifting Coalition Theory, and informed by more than 186 key informant interviews and 73 policy documents spanning a 20-year timeframe, we examine the evolution of coalitional forest politics in Europe. We find that the basic line-up has remained stable: an environmental coalition supporting EU environmental forest policy integration and a forest sector coalition mostly opposing it. Still, strategic alliances across these coalitions have occurred for specific policy issues which have resulted in a gradual establishment of an EU environmental forest policy. We conclude with discussion of our findings and provide suggestions for further research.
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Nasir, Muhammad Touqeer Akhter, and Khan Faqir. "A Critical Analysis of Coalition Politics in Pakistan A Case Study of PPP-led Coalition 2008-2013." Global Political Review VI, no. IV (December 30, 2021): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2021(vi-iv).01.
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Coalition politics have played a unique role in the modernsystem of governance. It played a vital role in politics forbringing the smaller political parties closer by reducing the chances ofserious conflicts. Coalitions can be governmental, which are formed afterelections, and coalitions also can be formed before elections. Like most ofthe Third World countries, Pakistan is an emerging democratic state witha multi-party setup. Present research work tried to analyze differentaspects of coalition politics since the creation of Pakistan; however, thescope of this research was restricted to the era from 2008 to 2013. Thestudy has included the concept of coalitions, the formation of coalitions,their governance, terminations, and their implications on the politics ofPakistan. In order to get pinpoint the performance of the coalition during2008-2013, primary sources, including official documents, statements,and interviews, and secondary sources like books, journals, newspapers,and websites have been consulted. Basically, it is qualitative research, butsometimes quantitative material is also utilized. To complete the research,historical, descriptive, and experimental methods were used. The studyrevealed that how coalition politics has become a backbone of democracyin Pakistan, where many parties were getting representation in thelegislative assembly. Here, the successful tenure of the PPP-led coalitiongave new hope to the political stakeholders to work together for sustainabledemocracy in Pakistan.
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Hancock, Rosemary. "Religion in Coalition: Balancing Moderate and Progressive Politics in the Sydney Alliance." Religions 10, no. 11 (November 4, 2019): 610. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10110610.
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This article examines how the engagement of diverse religious organisations and individuals in grassroots politics impacts the nature of politics and coalition building through a case study of an urban grassroots political coalition in Australia: the Sydney Alliance. Based on eight-months of exploratory ethnographic fieldwork in one campaign team, this article argues that whilst religious organisations bring significant symbolic and institutional resources to political coalitions, and can be flexible coalition partners, they tend to moderate both conservative and progressive political tendencies within a coalition and demand focused attention from organisers and leaders to manage the coalition dynamics. This article examines the way many religious activists understand their political action to be an inherent and necessary part of their religious practice: problematizing the characterisation common in much social science literature that religious engagement in more progressive politics primarily serves political, and not religious, ends. In doing so, it shows how political action can be directed both outward towards the work, and inward towards the ‘church’.
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Baccaro, Lucio, and Jonas Pontusson. "The politics of growth models." Review of Keynesian Economics 10, no. 2 (April 29, 2022): 204–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/roke.2022.02.04.
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This article develops a framework for studying the politics of growth models. These, the authors posit, are sustained by ‘growth coalitions’ based in key sectors. Their members are first and foremost firms and employer associations, but fractions of labor are also included, if their interests do not impair the model’s functionality. There is no guarantee that a growth coalition and a winning electoral coalition coincide. In normal times, a growth coalition effectively insulates itself from political competition, and mainstream political parties converge on key growth model policies. In moments of crisis, however, the coalition shrinks, favoring the emergence of challengers that fundamentally contest the status quo. The way governing parties respond to electoral pressures can also play an important role in the recalibration of growth models. The authors illustrate the argument by examining the politics of ‘export-led growth’ in Germany, ‘construction-led growth’ in Spain, and ‘balanced growth’ in Sweden.
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Schofield, Norman. "Coalition Politics." Journal of Theoretical Politics 7, no. 3 (July 1995): 245–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692895007003002.
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Filippova, E. "Factors of Coalitional Governments Formation Between Regionalist and Nationwide Political Parties in Regions of Spain." World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 4 (2021): 71–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-4-71-79.
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Received 09.09.2020. The paper focuses on one of the most significant arenas of multi-level politics – the interaction between regionalist and state-wide parties in the creation and functioning of government coalitions at the regional level. The research is aimed at determining the factors influencing the creation of such coalitions in which regionalist parties act as coalition partners with a specific agenda. Spain provides significant empirical material for research on this issue, where regionalist parties function in most regions, and state-wide parties often enter government coalitions with them at the level of autonomous communities. A comparative analysis of the practices of concluding coalition agreements between statewide and regionalist political parties in the regions of Spain during the democratic period is a key research method. The theoretical part of the article provides an overview of the theories of party coalitions accumulated by Political Science since the 1950s and updated by researchers due to actualization of new circumstances in the context of multilevel politics. The empirical part of the article examines the influence of three categories of factors on the construction of coalition deals between regionalist and state-wide political parties in the Spanish autonomous communities, including: the size of the coalition, the ideological inter-party distance (comprising the regionalist-ideological dimension) and correspondence of the alignments of party forces at the regional and national levels. The research demonstrates that the factor of coalition size is fundamental for transactions between regionalist and state-wide political parties, while the other two categories of factors manifest themselves situationally. Acknowledgements. The research was carried out at the expense of a grant from the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 19-18-00053 " Subnational regionalism and dynamics of multilevel politics (Russian and European practices)") at the Perm Federal Research Center of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
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Kumar, Nakul. "The Political Economy of Intergovernmental Transfers—Evidence from Indian Disaster Relief." Journal of South Asian Development 11, no. 3 (December 2016): 261–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0973174116666441.
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India’s National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF) is a discretionary federal grant that supports the sub-national governments with their disaster relief efforts. Evidence suggests that discretionary intergovernmental transfers in countries with national coalition governments contribute to distributive politics. Coalition formateur(s) use these transfers to form or hold together fractious coalitions. We use data on the NCCF from 1997 to 2013 for 23 Indian states to test for distributive politics. Our results show no evidence of NCCF contributing to distributive politics. We argue instead that the NCCF contributes to a different political phenomenon— tactical redistribution.
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Spieldenner, Andrew R., and Shinsuke Eguchi. "Different Sameness: Queer Autoethnography and Coalition Politics." Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 20, no. 2 (October 28, 2019): 134–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532708619884962.
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As a method, we use autoethnography to explore coalition politics from our positions in academia. We use autoethnography to examine how similar identity categories presume sameness and can lead to conflict within institutions. This autoethnography looks at how coalitional politics were learned, as well as how coalitional politics are practiced within the institutional spaces of the university and academic discipline. In particular, we examine how we have experienced conflict and competition, as well as ways that we continue to build coalitional spaces. Through this, we place autoethnography as an explicitly political methodology.
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Whitford, Andrew B. "The Structures of Interest Coalitions: Evidence from Environmental Litigation." Business and Politics 5, no. 01 (April 2003): 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1046.
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This paper addresses the intersection of coalition formation, judicial strategies, and regulatory politics. Coalitions are a low-cost means for assembling minority interests into more powerful blocs. However, in most cases in regulatory politics, judicial strategies are high cost efforts. I argue that coalitions among interests form one basis for judicial participation, but that participation manifests in an array of coalition “microstructures.” For any one event, the microstructure of the interest group coalition varies, but across events the coalitions take on general forms. The paper offers evidence for a variety of coalition microstructures in interest group participation as amici curiae (“friends of the court”) in cases before the United States Supreme Court. The evidence is drawn from the case of the Group of Ten, a stable, long-term coalition of environmental interest groups that operated from 1981 to 1991.
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Durac, Vincent, and Tamirace Fakhoury. "Adversarial Power-Sharing and “Forced Marriages”: Governing Coalitions in Lebanon and Yemen." Middle East Law and Governance 15, no. 3 (September 1, 2023): 287–319. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763375-20231424.
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Abstract How do power-sharing governing coalitions work in the context of politicized identities and external pressures? And how do they emerge, develop, and disintegrate when governing parties share power in the context of colliding agendas? Working on the premise that coalition governments may be messy constellations of power, rather than rational avenues for deliberation, this article explores the politics of coalitions in the Middle East as a case of adversarial power-sharing, or what we frame as ‘forced marriages.’ We focus on Yemen and Lebanon, two polities that have developed power-sharing arrangements in conflict-laden environments, albeit under different circumstances and logics of state-building. We argue that while both countries are different on a wide range of variables, they have broader lessons to convey on the ways coalition governments perform and the policy consequences they yield. Throughout both countries’ political history, coalition governance patterns have led to political fragmentation and policy gridlock. However, the puzzle is that notwithstanding antagonistic policy agendas and despite popular disaffection with ruling arrangements, coalition governments have kept re-emerging. This requires an incisive look into the relational and complex dynamics that sustain their logic.
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Lee, Frances E. "Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics." American Political Science Review 94, no. 1 (March 2000): 59–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586380.
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The Senate's equal representation of states shapes coalition building in distributive politics. The great variation in state population means that some states have far greater need for federal funds than others, but all senators have equal voting weight. As a result, even though all senators' votes are of equal value to the coalition builder, they are not of equal “price.” Coalition builders can include benefits for small states at considerably less expense to program budgets than comparable benefits for more populous states. Building on formal models of coalition building, two hypotheses are developed and tested. First, coalition builders will seek out less costly members to build supportive coalitions efficiently. Second, the final outcomes of distributive policy will more closely reflect the preferences of small-state senators than large-state senators. The hypotheses are tested by examining the 1991 and 1997–98 reauthorizations of federal surface transportation programs. The findings support both hypotheses.
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Decker, Frank, and Philipp Adorf. "Coalition Politics in Crisis?" German Politics and Society 36, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 5–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2018.360202.
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The 2017 federal election illustrated the transformation of Germany’s political party system with six parties managing to enter the Bundestag. With the Christian and Social Democrats finally coming to an agreement almost half a year after the election, a grand coalition is set to govern for two consecutive terms for the very first time. The Alternative for Germany’s success also signaled the definite parliamentary establishment of right-wing populism in Germany. Multiparty coalitions that bridge ideological gulfs as the political fringe has grown in size are a new reality that must be accommodated. The 2017 election and subsequent arduous negotiations point towards a period of uncertainty and further upheaval for Germany’s party system.
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JEONG, GYUNG-HO, GARY J. MILLER, and ITAI SENED. "Closing the Deal: Negotiating Civil Rights Legislation." American Political Science Review 103, no. 4 (October 30, 2009): 588–606. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055409990189.
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Our investigation of the Senate politics of four major civil rights acts indicates that they did not result from winning coalitions bulldozing helpless minorities, nor did they result from some unpredictable chaotic process. These critical bills were the result of a flexible, multidimensional coalition-building process that proceeded by offering amendments carefully constructed to split off pivotal members of the winning coalition. Ideal point estimates of U.S. senators reveal that this coalitional negotiation process led to outcomes at some distance from the first choice of the winning coalition, testimony to significant compromise, both in early proposals and in refinements. This negotiation process resulted in outcomes apparently constrained by the boundaries of the uncovered set (McKelvey 1986; Miller 1980). “Closing the deal” in the U.S. Senate meant finding an outcome that could withstand robust attacks on pivotal coalition members—and that meant finding an outcome in the uncovered set.
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Lewerissa, Christina Martha, Ruly Artha, Rahul Chauhan, Neel Rajpurohit, and Mohd Hairy Ibrahim. "contestious dynamics of politics that occurred in the singular election." Linguistics and Culture Review 5, S1 (August 12, 2021): 363–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.21744/lingcure.v5ns1.1402.
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This paper explores the contestious dynamics of politics that occurred in the Singular Election. We examine how in a feud of actors involved interacting dynamically with each other. The phenomenon of a single candidate is considered as an anomaly in the function of political parties which appears as a form of pragmatism in addressing pairs of candidates which are electable too strong. The strategy adopted by political parties in the lead-up to the elections by forming a coalition became the easiest strategy to achieve victory in a multiparty political system. There are two approaches in the perspective of the rational choice theory that can explain the reasons for political parties to do coalitions, namely office-seeking and policy-seeking. The characteristics of the office-seeking coalition model are fluid, not permanent. This justifies a practical political adage that states that in politics there are no eternal friends or enemies, there are eternal interests. In the context of democratic coalitions that are built with office-seeking motives are considered very detrimental to the constituents. Political parties are considered to deny the constituents' trust by changing the alignments of coalitions that have the same platform to coalitions that have different platforms.
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Qasim, Muhammad, and Ahmad Ali. "History of Coalitions in Pakistan (1947 To 1973) and the Factors Shaping it." Global Political Review IV, no. IV (December 30, 2019): 19–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2019(iv-iv).03.
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A political alliance is a temporary combination of groups or individuals formed to pursue specific objectives through joint action. Pluralist democracies are characterized by alliances and coalitions by diverse political parties. Political parties, desiring to exercise powers in democracies having parliamentary setups, naturally have to come in coalition with the major political party in parliament. Political parties sometimes make preelection alliances while some make coalitions in the post-election era with the ruling party. Alliance political culture has deep-rooted impacts on Pakistani politics. These alliances gave tough times to military dictators throughout the history of Pakistan and contributed towards strengthening democracy in Pakistan. For instance, Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) was formed on 30th April 1967against Ayub Khan and the Movement for Restoration of Democracy on 8th February 1981. This paper enunciates and explores the politics of coalition in Pakistan before the dismemberment of Bangladesh and its impacts on the consequent events.
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Sonenshein, Raphe. "Biracial Coalition Politics in Los Angeles." PS: Political Science & Politics 19, no. 03 (1986): 582–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s104909650001814x.
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In their 1984 bookProtest Is Not EnoughBrowning, Marshall, and Tabb suggest that biracial coalitions are powerful vehicles for achieving minority incorporation in the political life of cities. They argue that black electoral mobilization and subsequent incorporation depend on both the relative size of the black community and white support. Similarly, Hispanic incorporation is a function not only of the percentage of Hispanics in the population but also joint membership with blacks in a liberal coalition (pp. 245–246).Their optimistic view of biracial and multiracial coalitions contrasts strikingly with the more common pessimism about cross-racial politics. Racial polarization in such major cities as New York, Chicago and Philadelphia (as well as in a number of medium and smaller-sized cities) has fed the belief that the black protests and white backlash of the 1960s have doomed biracial politics.Protest Is Not Enoughfocuses on ten small and medium-sized Northern California cities. The largest, San Francisco, is the 16th most populous city in the U.S. But biracial coalition politics has been most advanced in Berkeley, a city of only 103,328 in 1980. Thus the book's argument is vulnerable to the challenge that full-blown biracial politics worked only in a rather small, unusual city and otherwise had a significant impact in cities of only moderate size in the traditionally liberal Bay Area.
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Sonenshein, Raphe. "Biracial Coalition Politics in Los Angeles." PS 19, no. 3 (1986): 582–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0030826900626292.
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In their 1984 book Protest Is Not Enough Browning, Marshall, and Tabb suggest that biracial coalitions are powerful vehicles for achieving minority incorporation in the political life of cities. They argue that black electoral mobilization and subsequent incorporation depend on both the relative size of the black community and white support. Similarly, Hispanic incorporation is a function not only of the percentage of Hispanics in the population but also joint membership with blacks in a liberal coalition (pp. 245–246).Their optimistic view of biracial and multiracial coalitions contrasts strikingly with the more common pessimism about cross-racial politics. Racial polarization in such major cities as New York, Chicago and Philadelphia (as well as in a number of medium and smaller-sized cities) has fed the belief that the black protests and white backlash of the 1960s have doomed biracial politics.Protest Is Not Enough focuses on ten small and medium-sized Northern California cities. The largest, San Francisco, is the 16th most populous city in the U.S. But biracial coalition politics has been most advanced in Berkeley, a city of only 103,328 in 1980. Thus the book's argument is vulnerable to the challenge that full-blown biracial politics worked only in a rather small, unusual city and otherwise had a significant impact in cities of only moderate size in the traditionally liberal Bay Area.
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Walby, Sylvia. "From Community to Coalition." Theory, Culture & Society 18, no. 2-3 (June 2001): 113–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/02632760122051814.
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This article considers how to go beyond the polarities of individualism and communitarianism in the analysis of contemporary political cultures in a global era. It is argued that there is a need to ground analysis in a presumption of social networks and coalitions, rather than in the concept of recognition. Political cultures are always already riddled with complexity and cross-cutting relations with other political cultures, coalitions and alliances. Within the politics of recognition, the conventional operationalization of the concept of the ‘social’ via the concept of ‘community’ misleadingly narrows the analysis of key aspects of social relations. Rather, we should invoke a wider range of sociological concepts to capture the nature of the social including, among many others, coalition, network and reference groups. In particular, the selection of the ‘other’ against whom aspirational comparisons are made is a complex social process, much previously analysed by reference group theory. The contemporary framing of some political claims in reference to a socially constructed conception of the universal is an increasingly common strategy. The politics of recognition is shown to be subordinate to the politics of equality, when sociological analysis of contemporary political cultures, of how people actually do make ethical and political claims, is prioritized.
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Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. "Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics." British Journal of Political Science 20, no. 4 (October 1990): 489–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400005950.
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A new model of government formation is elaborated and developed to allow consideration of politics within political parties. The impact of coalition bargaining on intraparty politics is considered, as well as the impact of intraparty politics on coalition bargaining. Different intraparty decision-making regimes are shown to affect coalition outcomes. Finally, the potential impact of anticipated coalition bargaining on the choice of decision-making regime within a party is explored.
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Oyugi, Walter O. "Coalition politics and coalition governments in Africa." Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24, no. 1 (January 2006): 53–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589000500513739.
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Haynie, Kerry L. "CONTAINING THE RAINBOW COALITION." Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 16, no. 1 (2019): 243–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1742058x19000122.
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AbstractThe emergence of an African American and Latino-dominated coalition with the potential to reconfigure American government and politics at the national, state, and local levels is one of the most noteworthy developments in U.S. politics over the past two decades. Racialized mass incarceration and felon disenfranchisement are impediments to this coalition’s political power. Social scientists, legal scholars, and activists have long paid attention to how devices like poll taxes, English competency tests, voter intimidation, racial gerrymandering, and voter identification laws restrict participation and diluted the political influence of racial and ethnic minorities. This essay seeks to direct renewed scholarly attention to racialized mass incarceration and felon disenfranchisement as similar devices for suppressing and containing minority group political power.
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Stacks, Stephen. "Bernice Johnson Reagon's Musical Coalition Politics, 1966–81." Journal of the Society for American Music 18, no. 1 (February 2024): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1752196323000469.
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AbstractIn 1981, Bernice Johnson Reagon gave a talk at the West Coast Women's Festival, challenging the group of mainly white feminists to embrace coalition politics—a political praxis theorized and advocated by Black and Israeli feminists that sought to build coalitions only after distinct group identities were embraced and nurtured. Long before she articulated this concept as the future of the Movements within which she worked, Reagon piloted it in her post-Civil Rights Movement music making. In her work with the Harambee Singers and the Southern Folk Cultural Revival Project between 1966 and 1974, Reagon developed a musical coalition politics that would inform her later interventions. Not only were Reagon's musical coalition politics during this period a musical embodiment of the vanguard of feminist theory, but they also shed light on how one of the most important musician-scholar-activists of the twentieth century approached the crafting of a new political identity in conversation with the shifting front of the Black Freedom Movement in the immediate wake of the classical phase of the Civil Rights Movement. This little-known period of Reagon's output offers scholars of Black music, scholars of American music, feminists/Black feminists, and activists much to contemplate and incorporate into our work.
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Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. "Coalitions and Cabinet Government." American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 873–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962770.
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The formal study of coalitions is active in Europe, whereas the formal study of political institutions preoccupies American scholars. We seek to integrate aspects of these two bodies of research. For nearly thirty years models of coalition government have focused more on coalition than on government. Thus, these theories are essentially extensions of the theory of voting in legislatures. Unlike passing a bill or “dividing a dollar,” however, forming a government is not the end of politics but the beginning. During the formation process, rational actors must entertain expectations of subsequent government behavior. We provide a model of rational expectations with an emphasis on the credibility of the policy promises of prospective government partners as determined by the allocation of portfolios in the new government. Portfolio allocation becomes the mechanism by which prospective coalitions make credible promises and so inform the expectations of rational agents in the coalition formation process.
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Birnir, Jóhanna Kristín, and Nil S. Satana. "Religion and Coalition Politics." Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 1 (October 2012): 3–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414012453029.
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Kiss, Áron. "Coalition politics and accountability." Public Choice 139, no. 3-4 (February 12, 2009): 413–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9401-7.
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von Wahl, Angelika. "From Family to Reconciliation Policy: How the Grand Coalition Reforms the German Welfare State." German Politics and Society 26, no. 3 (September 1, 2008): 25–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2008.260302.
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For decades conservative welfare states have reformed reluctantly. To understand recent family policy reforms in Germany we must add institutions and economics to any account of politics. This article focuses on the grand coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD formed after the 2005 Bundestag election. Two opposed assumptions pertain to grand coalitions: one holds that a coalition of parties with different ideologies will act according to the lowest common denominator resulting in policy inertia. The opposite holds that grand coalitions enable policy change because constraints are removed by the supermajority. This article develops five conditions for successful reform, arguing that traditional family policies directed at the protection of motherhood are shifting towards reconciliation policies that emphasize labor market activation and increased birth rates. The shift indicates 1) that even conservative states have the potential for bounded reform; and, 2) that agency—particularly partisan and coalitional interests—needs to be considered more seriously.
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Zouggari, Najate. "Compte rendu. Politique de coalition. Politics of Coalition." TSANTSA – Journal of the Swiss Anthropological Association 23 (November 16, 2020): 185–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.36950/tsantsa.2018.23.7334.
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Kim, Yong Bok. "Japan’s Coalition Politics and LDP - Komeito Election Coalition -." Journal of Migration & Society 8, no. 1 (February 28, 2015): 255. http://dx.doi.org/10.15685/jms.2015.02.8.1.255.
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Hamdanny, Daniel Rusyad, and Khoiruddin Mukhtar. "Wacana Poros Partai Islam untuk PILPRES 2024: Politik Identitas atau Penggalangan Suara Oposisi?" Politea 4, no. 2 (November 12, 2021): 190. http://dx.doi.org/10.21043/politea.v4i2.11735.
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<p><em>Amidst increasing polarization of society after the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, identity politics has been reintroduced by Islamic political parties. PKS and PPP are trying to initiate the Islamic pollitical axis for 2024 elections. The discourse about Islamic political axis springs due to the fact that incumbents cannot re-nominate as president for next election. Secondly, public trust level toward the executive has decreased due to various unpopular policies that brought about increasing critical voices toward the government. From the internal ummah, the presence of Islamic political figures who consitently won various surveys, stimulates the passion of Islamic political parties to form coalitions to win 2024 presidential election. This study uses a qualitative approach with content analysis methods toward various sources of literature; book, ebook, scientific journals, articles on conference proceedings, as well as journalistic works on the Islamic political axis discourse from identity politics theory, and theories of party coalition’s perspective that introduced by Lijphart and Rikers. The phenomenon of the coalition of Islamic political parties – once called the center axis – has succeeded in bringing KH Abdurrahman Wahid as President, defeating the candidate of the party that won the 1999 election. The similarity of identity (ideological) and interests (pragmatic) became the basis of the coalition of Islamic political parties. In addition to these two reasons, the discourse of the Islamic axis coalition in the 2024 election is also motivated by dissatisfaction with the performance and policies of the incumbent government. The regulation of the Presidential Threshold for presidential candidacy as stated by law number 7 year 2017 makes the coalition of Islamic political parties can be function as an alternative house in accomodating opposition voices. However, the elite of Islamic political parties is divided in responding to the discourse of the Islamic political axis. PKS, PPP, PKB. PBB, and Masyumi (Reborn) supports the idea of </em><em></em><em>a coalition based on political calculations and the interests of each political party. On the other hand, PAN and the Gelora Party reject the discourse which is worried to be increasing polarization in Indonesian society. The Ummat Party's skepticism is backed by the view that the existing parliamentary Islamic political parties are not serious to grasp the aspirations of the ummah and have not been able to offer alternative policies for a better Indonesia. </em></p>
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Finke, Daniel, and Annika Herbel. "Coalition Politics and Parliamentary Oversight in the European Union." Government and Opposition 53, no. 3 (September 19, 2016): 388–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2016.28.
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According to the literature, parliamentary scrutiny is either used by the opposition to control the government or by a coalition partner to control the leading minister. Yet, neither the opposition alone nor individual governing parties alone can muster a parliamentary majority to adopt recommendations, resolutions or statements. Therefore, we ask which parties coalesce in co-sponsoring such joint position papers on European Union policy proposals and why. Tying in with the existing literature, we offer three explanations. Firstly, position papers are co-sponsored by so-called ‘policy coalitions’, a group of parties that hold similar preferences on the policy under discussion. Secondly, governing parties form coalitions which support their minister’s position vis-à-vis his or her international partners in Brussels. Thirdly, party groups co-sponsor position papers to counterbalance the leading minister’s deviation from the floor median.On the empirical side, we study the statements issued by committees of the Finnish Eduskunta and recommendations adopted by committees of the German Bundestag over a period of 10 years. Though having similarly strong parliaments, the two countries are characterized by very different types of coalition governments. These differences are mirrored in the observed co-sponsorship patterns.
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Badcock, Sarah. "Personal and political networks in 1917: Vladimir Zenzinov and the Socialist Revolutionary Party." Journal of Modern Russian History and Historiography 9, no. 1 (October 17, 2016): 133–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22102388-00900008.
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This article explores the place of individuals, ideologies and personal and political networks in shaping the larger political landscape in revolutionary Russia. The shape and culture of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (psr) will be at the heart of my analysis of coalition politics. I focus particularly on the personal and political networks surrounding Vladimir Mikhailovich Zenzinov during 1917. This analysis suggests that the shape of coalition politics in 1917 was defined in part by pre-revolutionary social and political networks, and that these to some extent transcended party political affiliations. While the nature of coalition politics necessitated this political fluidity, it is nevertheless worth emphasizing, because the discourse around 1917 is often framed along explicitly party political lines.
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Pullum, Amanda. "Spontaneity, Coalition Structure, and Strategic Choice." Sociological Perspectives 63, no. 5 (March 4, 2020): 851–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0731121420908891.
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Following the Great Recession, austerity programs and restrictions on the public sector were introduced worldwide. In this article, I ask how and why labor coalitions in two states used differing organizational structures to respond to “shock politics” that severely restricted public-sector unions in 2011. I find the availability or lack of a citizen-initiated veto referendum shaped but did not completely explain differences in strategic choices between unions in Wisconsin and Ohio. Rather, tensions among allies and lack of time for strategic planning also contributed to a nonhierarchical coalition in Wisconsin, while Ohio unions had ample time to create a bureaucratic coalition and plan a successful veto referendum campaign. I argue that given sufficient time to respond to political threats, hierarchical organizations can promote efficient, effective deployment of some political tactics.
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Saha, Tularam, and Goutam Dakua. "The Changing Trends of Coalition Politics of Kerala from its Origin to 2016 in India." RESEARCH REVIEW International Journal of Multidisciplinary 9, no. 3 (March 15, 2024): 124–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.31305/rrijm.2024.v09.n03.012.
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The Constitution of India provide for a federal system of government though the term ‘federalism’ which is nowhere been used in the constitution. But the article 1 of the constitution describes that India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States. K.C. where describes Indian federalism as “Quasi-federal”. Granville Austin called it ‘co-operative federalism.’ And Ivor Jennings describes it as ‘federation with strong centralizing tendency’. This nature of Indian federalism has leads India towards coalition. The coalition politics at the central level has been relatively a recent phenomenon but at the state level it has been in operation right after the first general election (1952). The growth of regional parties and dominant leadership at state level has federalized the polity and the state government has stretched their arms. The first coalition at state level formed in Kerala in 1954. The coalition politics is a time-tested thing in contemporary democracy. The concept of coalition politics occurred when the states used to ally with each other in order to defect of a common enemy. In 1954 the Congress created a coalition government in Kerala. Since this time Kerala has been living with coalition rule after regular intervals. The politics in Kerala is dominated by two coalition fronts: the communist party of India (Marxist)- led left Democratic front (LDF) and the Indian National Congress – led United Democratic Front (UDF) since late 1970s. Kerala was the first Indian state where the communists were chosen to power. Since the early 1980s these two coalitions have alternate in government. They are unable to gain re- election for a second term. These two-alliance coalition have occurred periodically and ruled continued to 2016 election. In May 2016, the LDF win election and now in power. This LDF coalition occurred with CPI (M)-58, CPI-19, TDS-3, NCP-2, KCB-1, CPM(L)-1, CS-1 and Independents-5.
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Beyers, Jan, and Iskander De Bruycker. "Lobbying Makes (Strange) Bedfellows: Explaining the Formation and Composition of Lobbying Coalitions in EU Legislative Politics." Political Studies 66, no. 4 (October 11, 2017): 959–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032321717728408.
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This article analyzes the formation of lobbying coalitions in European Union legislative politics. Specifically, we investigate whether interest organizations establish coalitions and under which conditions business interests and non-business interests join a coalition. Our explanatory framework emphasizes three factors that drive coalition formation: the influence-seeking needs of interest groups, the need to ensure organizational maintenance, and policy-related contextual factors. To test our hypotheses, we analyze 72 policies initiated by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010 and 143 semi-structured interviews with representatives of European interest organizations. Our results demonstrate that non-governmental organizations that depend relatively less on membership support are strongly inclined to engage in coalitions. Moreover, the heterogeneous coalitions we identified—consisting of both business and non-business interests—are usually situated in policy areas that enjoy considerable salience among the broader public and emerge on issues that receive substantial media visibility.
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MARTIN, LANNY W., and RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON. "The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation." American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (August 2010): 503–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055410000213.
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Previous research on coalition politics has found an “incumbency advantage” in government formation, but it has provided no clear explanation as to why this advantage exists. We classify existing theories as either preference-based or institutions-based explanations for why incumbent coalitions might be likely to form again, and we integrate these explanations into a coherent theoretical argument. We also claim that it is possible, to some extent, to distinguish these explanations empirically by taking into account the “historical context” of coalition bargaining. Using a comprehensive new data set on coalition bargaining in Europe, we show that coalitions, in general, are more likely to form if the parties comprising them have worked together in the recent past, and that incumbent coalitions are more likely to re-form if partners have not experienced a severe public conflict while in office together or suffered a recent setback at the polls. The incumbency advantage disappears completely if partners have become mired in conflict or have lost legislative seats (even after accounting for the impact of seat share on coalition size). Moreover, in certain circumstances, institutional rules that grant incumbents an advantage in coalition bargaining greatly enhance their ability to remain in office.
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Schniewind, Aline, Markus Freitag, and Adrian Vatter. "Big Cabinets, Big Governments? Grand Coalitions and Public Policy in the German Laender." Journal of Public Policy 29, no. 3 (October 22, 2009): 327–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x09990092.
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AbstractThe inauguration of Germany's grand coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) raises questions about the public policy performance of a coalition of ideological opposite. This paper turns attention to influence of coalition governments on the size of government in the German Laender from 1992 to 2005. We investigate whether grand coalitions at the sub-national level in Germany systematically affect government spending for education (including cultural affairs) and internal security. The article argues that the effects of grand coalitions on the size of the public sector are moderated by partisan politics but sometimes in unexpected ways. For example, government spending in the field of education is reduced when leftist parties are powerful in the Laender.
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Poguntke, Thomas, and Paul Webb. "Presidentialization and the politics of coalition: lessons from Germany and Britain." Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 45, no. 3 (October 8, 2015): 249–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2015.16.
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IntroduzioneIn this article, we seek to re-consider the ‘presidentialization of politics’ argument in the light of recent developments in Germany and the United Kingdom. The experiences of coalition government suggest prima facie grounds for the erosion of the presidentialization process in each country. Germany has operated with a Grand Coalition in which domination of the executive by the Chancellor would seem less likely, whereas the long history of single-party governments in the United Kingdom gave way to a rare experiment in coalitional power sharing between 2010 and 2015, circumstances which should limit prime ministerial power. However, it is our contention that the presidentialization thesis retains its purchase in these two countries. German Chancellors and British prime ministers have been increasingly able to mobilize power resources, which allow them to govern more independently of their own parties and their coalition partners, and this seems to hold across a variety of political circumstances.
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Just, Petr. "Slovakia’s Oversized Cabinet after the 2020 Parliamentary Elections: Barrier against Extremism Vol. II, or Protection of Its Own Stability?" Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science 27, no. 3 (2020): 388–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/pc2020-3-388.
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This article deals with one of the major political consequences of parliamentary elections in every parliamentary regime – the process of government formation. It focuses on the formation of the coalition government following the 2020 parliamentary elections in Slovakia, in the context of both pre-election developments as well as the main challenges and appeals of contemporary politics in general – the rise of far-right political parties. Its aim is to identify the coalition strategies presented before the elections of political parties and movements that had a theoretical chance of being elected to Parliament. Special emphasis is placed on the definition by the other political parties and movements of the long-time ruling party Smer and the far-right party Our Slovakia. The analysis continues with the post-election government formation process, the classification of the established coalition, including the allocation of cabinet portfolios, assessment of the similarities and differences of coalition parties, and factors that could possibly cause both instability as well as stability. It concludes that the joint definition by the new ruling parties and movements of Smer and Our Slovakia will, at least for some time, serve as a unifying factor keeping the coalition together. However, the coalition’s stability will be under almost constant pressure coming from both relations between coalition parties and the possibility of internal conflicts within the coalition parties and movements. The article argues that the establishment of the surplus majority coalition might – besides the official justification for it – serve as a protection against government destabilization.
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Taylor, Liza. "Coalition from the Inside Out: Women of Color Feminism and Politico-Ethical Coalition Politics." New Political Science 40, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 119–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2017.1416447.
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Tzelgov, Eitan. "Coalition oversight and blame avoidance in Greece." European Political Science Review 9, no. 1 (September 8, 2015): 95–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773915000284.
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This article examines the behavior of Greek political parties before, as well as during, the recent austerity period. Drawing on coalition oversight and blame avoidance literature, it argues that the unpopularity of austerity governments leads to extreme levels of dissent within the coalition. I operationalize this ‘intra-coalition opposition’ behavior using parliamentary questions, a legislative institution that has not been studied in the context of coalition politics. The analysis demonstrates that junior members in unpopular austerity governments increase their use of parliamentary questions to a degree that matches or even exceeds the formal opposition. However, intra-coalition dissent is conditional on the type of unpopular government policies, and on the ideology of coalition members. Specifically, using a new method of text analysis, I show that while the socialist Panhellenic Socialist Movement uses its parliamentary questions to avoid or minimize the blame associated with austerity policies, the conservative New Democracy does not, because left-leaning parties are electorally vulnerable to austerity measures. The results have implications for studying dissent in coalition politics in general, and the politics of austerity in particular.
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Unal, Didem. "The Abortion Debate and Profeminist Coalition Politics in Contemporary Turkey." Politics & Gender 15, no. 4 (December 11, 2018): 801–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x18000703.
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AbstractThis article presents a qualitative analysis of profeminist Islamic women public figures’ discourses in the abortion debate in Turkey in 2012. The aim is to reveal the possibilities and limitations of achieving an intersectional and egalitarian profeminist collaboration on the Islamic-secular axis in contemporary Turkey. Drawing on recent feminist scholarship on coalition politics, the article exposes the fluctuations of meaning and the shifting frames of reference in these women's narratives and relates this hybrid, dynamic narrative quality to profeminist Islamic women's unique social location. It also elaborates on the blockage points in these narratives that hinder coalitional ways of thinking. Within this frame, this article suggests that in a social and political context that has witnessed a striking upsurge of antifeminist gender politics in the last decade, the building of coalitional profeminist politics beyond the Islamic-secular divide can be facilitated by shifting the focus from the apparently irreconcilable character of ideological positionings and lived experiences toward coalitional rhetorical strategies and intermediary narrative lines in profeminist subjects’ accounts.
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Ng, Jason Wei Jian, Gary John Rangel, Santha Vaithilingam, and Subramaniam S. Pillay. "The 2013 Malaysian Elections: Ethnic Politics or Urban Wave?" Journal of East Asian Studies 15, no. 2 (August 2015): 167–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800009334.
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In this article we examine the electoral impact of urbanization vis-à-vis ethnicity in Malaysia. We employ a robust econometric technique, the fractional response logit model, on data from the recently concluded thirteenth general election. The findings show that there are both an ethnic effect and an urban effect in determining the distribution of parliamentary seats among the political groups. Strong support for the opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat, was evident in urban constituencies, while the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional, continued to enjoy success in rural constituencies. Although Barisan Nasional is still dependent on Bumiputera support, its success is also dependent on non-Bumiputera support from rural constituencies. However, with declining birthrates among the Chinese electorates, this support may not be forthcoming in future elections. We also provide insights for both coalitions to consider in developing strategies for the next election.
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Reutter, Werner. "Constitutional Politics in East Germany and the Grand Coalition State." Perspectives on Federalism 8, no. 3 (December 1, 2016): E—23—E—44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pof-2016-0015.
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Abstract Constitutional politics seemingly corroborate the assumption that Germany is a Grand Coalition state. In this perspective German cooperative federalism and the supermajority required for any amendment to the constitution privilege bargaining and intertwined policy-making as modes of conflict resolution and thus support grand coalitions. In this paper I will explore whether this theory can explain constitutional politics in the German Länder. Firstly, I examine how far sub-national constitutional politics match the functioning of cooperative federalism that is a defining feature of the Grand Coalition state. Secondly, I examine sub-national constitutional politics in the five new Länder and bring the role parties played in this policy field to the fore. Overall, I conclude that cooperative federalism did not impact on constitutional politics in East Germany and that the features of consensus democracy are only partly able to explain law-making in this sector.
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Abinales, Patricio N. "Coalition Politics in the Philippines." Current History 100, no. 645 (April 1, 2001): 154–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2001.100.645.154.
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To understand the rise and fall of the Estrada presidency, it is not enough to focus on the ‘personalistic’ leadership style for which Estrada was notorious. We must also look at the nature of coalition politics itself and how it will affect governing in the Philippines in the new century.
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Deschouwer, Kris. "The termination of coalitions in Belgium." Res Publica 36, no. 1 (March 31, 1994): 44–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/rp.v36i1.18752.
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Coalitions have a limited life-span. There has been quite some research on the duration of coalitions and on the factors explaining variations in duration. But there is so far no solid theory on the mechanics of the termination of coalitions.This article gives an overview of the mechanics of termination in Belgian politics. By using the contextual approach (Pridham), that has originally been produced to analyse coalition formation, this overview might be a first step in the construction of a comparative explanatory model. The historical context, the institutional setting, the international context and the economical situation are described as elements that affect the termination of coalitions. The Belgian ethno-linguistic cleavage proves to be a very effective coalition-killer.
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Ibrahima, Diarassouba. "La démocratie ivoirienne à l’épreuve des stratégies coalitionnelles politiques." European Scientific Journal, ESJ 17, no. 28 (August 31, 2021): 150. http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2021.v17n28p150.
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L’adoption du multipartisme par la Côte d’Ivoire en 1990 s’est accompagnée du phénomène de la coalition comme nouvelle stratégie de conquête du pouvoir par des partis politiques à travers des alliances politiques. La première coalition (le front républicain) visant à former une majorité électorale est née en 1995 de l’alliance entre le FPI et le RDR pour évincer le PDCI du pouvoir. Ensuite s’en sont suivi le Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP) en 2005, et La Majorité Présidentielle (LMP) en 2010. Ces coalitions ont toutes fait preuve de fragilité face aux opportunités politiques au point que deux d’entre elles n’existent plus (Front Républicain ; LMP), et celle qui existe (RHDP), est exposée au risque de désintégration à cause des querelles internes de positionnement. Le présent article a pour objectif d’identifier et d’analyser des causes des échecs des coalitions politiques et leurs conséquences sur la démocratie en Côte d’Ivoire. C’est une étude qualitative ancrée dans le courant théorique du changement social. Elle s’appuie sur la méthode de l’analyse de contenu. Après l’analyse des données, quatre principales causes de la fragilité des coalitions ont-été identifiées. Il s’agit : (1) du charisme trop fort des leaders politiques dans la coalition ; (2) du non-respect du principe d’inclusivité dans la prise de décision par les partis dans la mise en place des coalitions (3) de l’inexistence d’un projet de société commun clairement formalisé dès le départ entre les partis coalisés; (4) du comportement nombriliste des partis politiques membres des coalitions qui nourrissent des projets personnels inavoués.
The adoption of multiparty politics by the Ivory Coast in 1990 was accompanied by the phenomenon of the coalition as a new strategy for the conquest of power by political parties through political alliances. The first coalition (the Republican Front) aimed at forming an electoral majority arose in 1995 from the alliance between the FPI and the RDR to oust the PDCI from power. Then followed the Gathering of Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) in 2005, and The Presidential Majority (LMP) in 2010. These coalitions have all shown fragility in the face of political opportunities to the point that two of them between them no longer exist (Republican Front; LMP), and that which exists (RHDP) is exposed to the risk of disintegration because of internal disputes over positioning. The objective of this article is to identify and analyze the causes of the fragility of political coalitions and their consequences on democracy in Côte d'Ivoire. It is a qualitative study rooted in the theoretical stream of social change. It is based on the method of content analysis. After analyzing the data, four main causes of the fragility of coalitions were identified. These are: (1) the too strong charisma of political leaders in the coalition; (2) the failure to respect the principle of inclusiveness in decision-making by the parties in the establishment of coalitions (3) the non-existence of a common social project clearly formalized from the start between the united parties; (4) the navel-gazing behavior of the political parties that are members of the coalition, which have unacknowledged personal projects.
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Goddard, Stacie E. "When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power." International Security 33, no. 3 (January 2009): 110–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.110.
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From 1864 to 1871, Prussia mounted a series of wars that fundamentally altered the balance of power in Europe. Yet no coalition emerged to check Prussia's rise. Rather than balance against Prussian expansion, the great powers sat on the sidelines and allowed the transformation of European politics. Traditionally, scholars have emphasized structural variables, such as mulitpolarity, or domestic politics as the cause of this “underbalancing.” It was Prussia's legitimation strategies, however—the way Prussia justified its expansion—that undermined a potential balancing coalition. As Prussia expanded, it appealed to shared rules and norms, strategically choosing rhetoric that would resonate with each of the great powers. These legitimation strategies undermined balancing coalitions through three mechanisms: by signaling constraint, laying rhetorical traps (i.e., framing territorial expansion in a way that deprived others states grounds on which to resist), and increasing ontological security (i.e., demonstrating its need to secure its identity in international politics), Prussia effectively expanded without opposition. An analysis of Prussia's expansion in 1864 demonstrates how legitimation strategies prevented the creation of a balancing coalition.
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Falcó-Gimeno, Albert, and Pablo Fernandez-Vazquez. "Choices that matter: Coalition formation and parties’ ideological reputations." Political Science Research and Methods 8, no. 2 (January 15, 2019): 285–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2018.63.
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AbstractThis paper examines how a party’s decision to enter a coalition government affects voter perceptions of the party’s policy position. We argue that, for the decision to change voter beliefs, it must be at odds with voters’ prior opinions about the party. Specifically, the party must join a coalition that is not the one voters perceive as the ideologically closest option. Otherwise, the party’s action simply confirms voters’ pre-existing beliefs. Hence, whether or not joining a coalition alters voter attitudes depends on the type of alternative coalitions the party could enter. We test the hypothesis using three complementary empirical strategies: a cross-country analysis of party reputations in five coalition-prone European countries, individual panel data, and a quasi-experimental test. All three empirical tests provide support for our claim. This paper contributes to our understanding of voter information processing, coalition politics, and party competition.