Journal articles on the topic 'Coalition governments – Belgium'

AbstractUsing a role-playing simulation on government formation with pre- and posttest assessment format, I show that students developed a significantly greater capacity for precision and specificity in their answers about the process of coalition government formation in parliamentary systems; students changed their beliefs in the ability of institutional rules to causally affect the process of coalition government formation in parliamentary systems; and, finally, students, changed their views on whether office-seeking politicians are more successful than policy-seeking politicians in forming coalition governments in parliamentary systems.

In this article, we focus on manifest interparty conflict over policy issues and the role of coalition agreements in solving these conflicts. We present empirical findings on the characteristics of coalition agreements including deals over policy controversy and on inter-party conflict occurring during the lifetime of governments in Germany, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. We analyze the ways in which parties in government were or were not constrained by written deals over disputed issues. Coalition agreements from all four countries include specific policy deals, one third of which are precisely defined. These policy deals concern both consensual and controversial issues. Our central finding is that, in the case of intra-party conflict, parties almost always fall back on the initial policy deals when these exist. As such, policy statements of the coalition agreement facilitate decision making in each of the countries studied.

The Christian-democrat/socialist government Martens IV resigned at the end ofMarch 1981, because the socialist party could not agree with an urgency plan to reorganize the public finances. Mark Eyskens, Minister of Finance in that cabinet, put together a new government as soon as April 6 of the same year. He succeeded as Prime Minister while all the other resigning ministers remained in their function. Minister Robert Vandeputte, an extra-parlementarian and honorary governor of the Central Bank, became the new Minister of Finance. Like the preceding governments, the Eyskens cabinet was strongly hampered by deep mistrust between the coalition partners, opposing views between the two communities of Belgium and by disagreements about the way to deal with the socio-economic crisis.The Eyskens cabinet was particularly confronted with the organization of the restructured steelmill Cockerill-Sambre and with the absolute low point of the economic crisis. The budget was strongly affected by the increasing unemployment benefits and the collapse of the fiscal revenues. Due to the continuing protest of the trade unions, Mark Eyskens did not succeed to adapt the automatic wage indexation in order to improve the competitive position ofthe Belgian enterprises. He did however manage to prevent the devaluation of the Belgian franc, which had come under pressure regularly on the financial markets.By the middle of September 1981 the Eyskens government fell as a result of disagreements between the coalition partners about the financing ofthe money loosing steelmill Cockerill-Sambre in Wallonia. Parliamentary elections were advanced to November 8, 1981. The Christiandemocrats lost a considerable number of seats. A Christian-democrat/liberal cabinet, again headed by Wilfried Martens, emerged by mid December. It would carry out a neoliberal policy. Mark Eyskens became the Minister of Economicaffairs in the new government.

This article analyses the impact of government prospects and government participation on party policy preferences. Comparing the content of manifestos of governing and opposition parties in Belgium during three decades, I observed that the relationship of a party to the act of governing influences the content of its manifesto. In that sense, party preferences are not only driven by ideology and vote-seeking arguments but are part of a larger party strategy: parties adapt their electoral platform when they are in government or are willing to enter into it. The conclusion of the article also discusses the literature on government formation. Such literature hypothesizes that parties that are ideologically similar would form a coalition. However, results for the Belgian case demonstrate that parties strategically adapt their electoral platform when wanting to enter the government. Coalitions are made up of parties with similar policy preferences, not because they ‘are’ alike but because parties strategically ‘make’ them alike.

Na de Eerste Wereldoorlog en de invoering van het enkelvoudig stemrecht voor mannen werd de socialistische partij bijna even groot als de katholieke. De verkiezingen verscherpten de regionale en ideologische asymmetrie. De katholieke partij behield de absolute meerderheid in Vlaanderen, de socialistische verwierf een gelijkaardige positie in Wallonië. Nationaal werden coalitieregeringen noodzakelijk. In de Kamer veroverden zowel de socialisten als de christendemocratische vleugel een machtsbasis, maar tot de regering doordringen bleek veel moeilijker. Die bleven gedomineerd door de conservatieve katholieke vleugel en de liberale partij, met steun van de koning en van de haute finance. Eenmaal het socialistische minimumprogramma uit angst voor een sociale revolutie aanvaard (1918-1921), werden de socialisten nog slechts getolereerd tijdens crisissituaties of als het niet anders kon (1925-1927, 1935-1940). Het verklaart een toenemende frustratie bij Waalse socialisten. Tevens bemoeilijkte hun antiklerikalisme de samenwerking van Vlaamse socialisten met christendemocraten en Vlaamsgezinden, zoals in Antwerpen, en dat gold ook voor de vorming van regeringen. In de BWP waren de verhoudingen veranderd. De macht lag nu gespreid over vier actoren: de federaties, het partijbestuur, de parlementsfractie en eventueel de ministers. De eenheid was bij momenten ver zoek. In 1919 was het Vlaamse socialisme veel sterker geworden. In Vlaanderen behaalde het 24 zetels (18 meer dan in 1914) en werd het met 25,5% de tweede grootste partij. Bovendien was de dominantie van Gent verschoven naar Antwerpen, dat met zes zetels de vierde grootste federatie van de BWP werd. Het aantrekken van Camille Huysmans als boegbeeld versterkte haar Vlaamsgezind profiel. In een eerste fase moest Huysmans nog de Vlaamse kwestie als een vrije kwestie verdedigen. Zelfs tegen de Gentse en de Kortrijkse federatie in, die de vooroorlogse Vlaamsgezinde hoofdeis – de vernederland-sing van de Gentse universiteit – hadden losgelaten. Naar 1930 toe, de viering van honderd jaar België, was de Vlaamse beweging opnieuw sterker geworden en werd gevreesd voor de electorale doorbraak van een Vlaams-nationalistische partij. Een globale oplossing voor het Vlaamse probleem begon zich op te dringen. Dat gold ook voor de BWP. Interne tegenstellingen moesten overbrugd worden zodat, gezien de financiële crisis, de sociaaleconomische thema’s alle aandacht konden krijgen. Daarbij stonden de eenheid van België en van de partij voorop. In maart 1929 leidde dit tot het ‘Compromis des Belges’ en een paar maanden later tot het minder bekende en radicalere partijstandpunt, het ‘Compromis des socialistes belges’. Voortbouwend op de vooroorlogse visie van het bestaan van twee volken binnen België, werd dit doorgetrokken tot het recht op culturele autonomie van elk volk, gebaseerd op het principe van regionale eentaligheid, ten koste van de taalminderheden. Voor de Vlaamse socialisten kwam dit neer op een volledige vernederlandsing van Vlaanderen, te beginnen met het onderwijs en de Gentse universiteit. Niet zonder enige tegenzin ging een meerderheid van Waalse socialisten daarmee akkoord. In ruil eisten zij dat in België werd afgezien van elke vorm van verplichte tweetaligheid, gezien als een vorm van Vlaams kolonialisme. Eentalige Walen hadden in Wallonië en in nationale instellingen (leger, centrale besturen) recht op aanwerving en carrière zonder kennis van het Nederlands, zoals ook de kennis ervan als tweede landstaal in Wallonië niet mocht worden opgelegd. De betekenis van dit interne compromis kreeg in de historiografie onvoldoende aandacht. Dat geldt ook voor de vaststelling dat beide nationale arbeidersbewegingen, de BWP vanuit de oppositie, in 1930-1932 mee de invoering van het territorialiteitsbeginsel hebben geforceerd. Een tussentijdse fase C uit het model van Miroslav Hroch.________‘Frenemies’? 2Communitarian tensions in the Socialist Party 1919-1940. Division, Compromise. Crisis. Part One: 1918-1935After the First World War and the introduction of simple universal male suffrage, the Socialist Party was almost as large as the Catholic Party. Elections sharpened the regional and ideological asymmetry. The Catholic Party maintained an absolute majority in Flanders; the Socialists acquired a similar position in Wallonia. Coalition gov-ernments were a necessity at the national level. In the Chamber, both the Socialists and the Christian Democratic wing of the Catholics had a strong base of power, but entering in the government turned out to be much more difficult. Governments remained dominated by the conservative wing of the Catholic Party and by the Liberal Party, with support from the king and high finance. Once the Socialist minimum program had been accepted out of fear of a social revolution in the years 1918-1921, the Socialists were only tolerated in government during crises or in case there was no other possibility (1925-1927, 1935-1940). This explains an increasing frustration among Walloon Socialists. At the same time, Flemish Socialists’ anticlericalism hindered their cooperation with Christian Democrats and members of the Flemish Movement, as in Antwerp, and that also held true for the forming of national governments.In the Belgian Workers’ Party (BWP), balance had changed. Power now lay spread among four actors: the federations, the party administration, the parliamentary faction, and sometimes, government ministers. Unity was sometimes hard to find. In 1919 Flemish socialism became much stronger. In Flanders it took 25 seats (18 more than in 1914) and, with 25.5% of the vote, was the second-largest party. In addition, the centre of gravity moved from Ghent to Antwerp, which with six seats became the fourth-largest federation in the BWP. Camille Huysmans’s appeal as the figurehead strengthened its profile with regard to the Flemish Movement. At first, Huysmans had to defend the treatment of the Flemish Question as a matter of individual conscience for party members, even against the Ghent and Kortrijk federations, which had abandoned the foremost pre-war demand of the Flemish Movement, the transformation of the University of Ghent into a Dutch-language institution. As 1930, the centenary of Belgium, approached, the Flemish Movement became stronger once again and an electoral breakthrough by a Flemish nationalist party was feared. An overall solution to the Flemish problem was pressing, also in the BWP. Internal divisions needed to be bridged in order to give full attention to socioeconomic questions, in light of the financial crisis. The unity of Belgium and of the party came first and foremost. In 1929 this led to the ‘Compromis des Belges’ (Compromise of the Belgians) and a few months later to the lesser-known but more radical position of the party, the ‘Compromise of the Belgian Socialists’. Building on the pre-war vision of the existence of two peoples within Belgium, this point of view was imbued with the right of each people to cultural autonomy, based on the principle of regional monolingualism, at the expense of linguistic minorities. For Flemish socialists this came down to a full transformation of Flanders into a Dutch-speaking society, beginning with education and the University of Ghent. The majority of Walloon socialists went along with this, though not without some reluctance. In return, they demanded the elimination of any form of required bilingualism in Belgium, which they saw as a form of Flemish colonialism. In Wallonia and in national institutions (the army, the central administration), monolingual Walloons had a right to be recruited and have a career without a knowledge of Dutch, just as knowledge of Dutch as a second national language was not supposed to be imposed in Wallonia. The significance of this internal compromise has received insufficient attention in the historiography. The same observation applies to the finding that both national workers’ movements – the BWP from the ranks of the opposition – forced the introduction of the principle of territoriality in 1930-1932: an interim phase C of Miroslav Hroch’s model.

During the second half of the 1930s, Belgium and its institutions were about to undergo testing. The first serious test came about after the shocking results of the legislative elections held on May 24, 1936. Léon Degrelle’s party, the Rex, gained 21 seats. Consequently, a new coalition government had to be constituted in order to safeguard political stability. In parallel with this, a redefinition of the European political landscape was taking place due to the effects caused by the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936. Vis-à-vis that new European scenario, the Belgian government decided upon a new foreign policy that aimed at liberating the country of its international commitments enshrined in the Versailles and Locarno treaties. Both political levels were narrowly connected, influencing each other. Given this connection the Belgian political debate was distorted when it was transferred to the realm of emotions provoked by the Spanish conflict.

This article analyses the election of the Speakers of both houses of the Belgian parliament, the House of Representatives and the Senate, in the period 1918-1974. According to the Belgian constitution, the election of the Speaker is a competence of each house. As can be expected in a system of parliamentary government, the Speakers belong to the government majority, as they did already before 1914. But with the disappearance of a homogeneous majority and the need for cabinet coalitions after 1918 - result of the proportional representation - someeffects which tended to erode parliamentary autonomy more substantially occurred. At several occasions the election of the Speakers was postponed until the result of cabinet formation was known. In addition, the coalition parties had to make an agreement for the partition of the two Speakers' positions. The coalition practice also affected procedure. Since agreements were less easily implemented in a secret ballot, the provisions of the parliamentary statute were put aside for an election by acclamation to strengthen party discipline. In this context a further shift in the election process occurs: from the parliamentary groups to the party leadership. Eventually, the appointment of the Speakers becamepart of the cabinet formation itself. This practice appears to be firmly established in the 1970' and has been criticized severely. It can be considered one aspect of the decline of parliaments in this period.

In this article a simpte model of Belgian government coalition formation is proposed. lts main advantages over the traditional game theoretical approach are, first, its dynamic nature (explicity linking the outcome of a new 'game' to the characteristics of the previous coalition) and, second, the fact that only one coalition is predicted per 'game '. As a result of the latter characteristic, the integration of this coalition formation submodel in a larger (econometric) politico-economic model should be far less complicated. Moreover, statistical tests indicate that the proposed model works at least as good as the traditional theories, despite its parsimonious nature.

The Stance of France and Belgium Toward the Polish-Bolshevik War The article is an attempt to underline the difference in the conduct of foreign policy by two allied countries. One of them – France, had the opinion of the most powerful state in Europe after World War I, and the other – Belgium, was a small country that decided to abandon its neutrality (imposed by the great powers in 1839). Such an alliance, salutary for strengthening the security guarantees towards the former occupant, brought with it fears of domination and instrumental treatment. In matters of eastern policy, both countries were concerned about the loss of numerous investments and capital investments in tsarist Russia. It was through this prism that the Polish-Bolshevik war was assessed. The second factor that distinguished the two countries in their approach to the war was the different composition of the government. While in France the electoral victory of the National Bloc facilitated the conduct of politics, the government of catholic-socialist coalition in Belgium faced serious obstacles from the socialists, which was manifested in the decision concerning the transit of weapons to Poland. French aid in the form of weapons supplies and support for Poland from the diplomatic side led to an alliance with Poland. Belgium took advantage of the end of the war to establish, above all, economic cooperation.

The position of the Belgian prime minister (PM) is hardly mentioned in the Belgian Constitution. lt was only after almost 140 years, in 1970 he was mentioned for the first time. lts power is rather a matter of common law. Since 1831 through the years, the position and power of the PM changed strongly. This often happened together with changes concerning the power of the King: the weaker the King, the stronger the PM.The existence of coalition governments puts forward bis role as coordinator and even as arbitrator, whereas the federalisation process since the seventies places him as a conciliator between Regions and Communities. The growing importance of the European Council of Head of States have made him the most important decision-maker among the national politicians in the European integration process. The PM's skills concerning timing and agendasetting are very important because it is one of his most important power instruments. Other key skills are bis profound knowledge in certain issues but mostly as a generalist, his insisting on good minister nominations by the party leaders, the way he can motivate his cabinet members, a good team spirit among the government members and the existence of a clear government contract. In order to avoid a strongdependency on or tutelage from the political parties of the majority it is important to have their top politicians in the government.

Tussen 1884 en 1914 kende België homogeen katholieke regeringen. Wat veranderde de democratisering van het stemrecht in 1893 (algemeen meervoudig stemrecht voor mannen) en de invoering van de evenredige vertegenwoordiging in 1899 aan de machtsverhoudingen binnen de katholieke partij? De conservatieve kiesverenigingen werden toen extern met het socialisme en intern met een opstand van de middenklasse geconfronteerd. Katholieke subelites eisten namens een miljoen nieuwe kiezers de decratisering van de lijsten en de erkenning van deelgroepen op een gezamenlijke lijst. Dit vormt de bredere context ter verklaring van het vrij unieke parcours van de daensistische beweging. In welke mate slaagde de katholieke cijnselite erin haar politiek monopolie in de kiesverenigingen veilig te stellen en hoe deed ze dat? Hoe evolueerde de christendemocratie, die nog geen arbeidersbeweging was? Wat werd de aparte positie van de daensistische beweging en welke voorhoederol nam ze in?Parlementair mislukte de christendemocratische doorbraak in Vlaanderen. Zowel externe als interne oorzaken zorgden voor de genese van een ‘daensistische christendemocratie’ en haar ontwikkeling tot een zelfstandige partij, in tegenstelling tot een integrerende ‘katholieke christendemocratie’. Deze laatste zag haar linkerzijde verzwakt en werd een paternalistisch geleide organisatie. De daensistische beweging daarentegen radicaliseerde qua zelfdefiniëring en programmatische toenadering tot de linkerzijde op sociaal en politiek gebied. De kwestie van al dan niet kartelvorming met liberalen en socialisten tijdens verkiezingen zorgde echter voor een langdurige impasse. Naargelang de katholieke meerderheid in het parlement slonk, hoopten de daensisten scheidsrechter te kunnen worden. Tevergeefs. Wel kon de conservatieve regering vanaf 1907 de katholieke christendemocratie niet langer negeren, zodat haar boegfiguren minister werden. Hun opstelling verscherpte de confrontatie met de daensisten. De voorhoederol van die beweging bleek ook op een andere manier. Gezien het gebrek aan toegeeflijkheid bij de conservatieven en het episcopaat zouden zowel katholieke christendemocraten als katholieke flaminganten in het decennium voor 1914 hun burgerlijke vrijheid in politieke kwesties moeten inroepen en steun van de oppositie nodig hebben om een aantal cruciale eisen te forceren.________The Rupture of “Daensist” Christian-Demo-cracy from the Catholic Establishment and “Catholic” Christian Democracy, 1893-1914Between 1884 and 1914, Belgium had homogeneous Catholic governments. How did the democratisation of the suffrage in 1893 (general multiple suffrage for men) and the introduction of proportional representation in 1899 change power relationships within the Catholic Party? Conservative electoral associations were confronted externally with socialism and internally with a revolting middle class. In the name of a million new voters Catholic subelites demanded democratisation of electoral lists and the recognition of subgroups within a common list. This formed the broader context that explains the very unique trajectory of the Daensist Movement. To what extent did the Catholic censitary elite succeed in securing its political monopoly in electoral associations and how did it do so? How did Christian Democracy, which was not yet a workers’ movement, evolve? What were the particular positions of the Daensist Movement, and what role did they play in the vanguard?In Flanders, the Christian Democratic breakthrough failed in parliament. External as well as internal causes saw to the birth of a ‘Daensist Christian Democracy’ and its development toward an independent party, in contrast to the integration of the ‘Catholic Christian Democracy’. The latter saw its left wing weakened, and became a paternalistically-run organization. The Daensist Movement on the other hand radicalized its self-definition and political program towards the left parties. However, forming a coalition with Liberals and Socialists during elections caused a serious, long-lasting impasse. As the Catholic majority in Parliament shrank, the Daensists hoped to hold the balance of power – in vain. However, the conservative government could not, from 1907 onward, neglect Catholic Christian Democracy, so that leading personalities of the movement became ministers. Their accession to these positions and their political attitude sharpened the confrontation with the Daensists. The vanguard role of the Daensist movement appeared in another manner as well. Given the lack of permissiveness on the part of the conservatives as well as the episcopate, Catholic Christian Democrats and Catholic flamingants had to invoke their civil liberty in political questions, and needed support of the opposition in order to force a few crucial demands through.

The party executive is the most important organ within a political party especially in Belgium which is charaterised as one of the strongest particracies in Western Europe. Focusing on the functioning of the party executive within the CVP (1959-1960) and the BSP (1956-1957) at a moment both parties govern with the Liberal Party as coalition partner, the attendances and interventions within the party executive show a group of approximately fives persons playing a predominant role in the decision making process. In both cases the party president is the most important and powerful person. The almost complete absence of government membres within the party executive of the CVP forms a remarkabledifference to the BSP. The relationship between party and government is quite different in both parties. In the BSP the cooperation and support between party and government is much better than within the CVP.

Since the creation of the Belgian state in 1830, the kings, head of state, always tried to expand their political influence. Part of this strategy was the treatment of the ministers as individuals, not as a council. The process of democratisation and the development of political parties pushed back this royal influence. In the meantime, as a result of the fact that coalitions were necessary to establish a government, the Council of Ministers was developping more and more as an institution. That was necessary to gain some governmental stability. Thispermanent Council was not stated in the constitution of 1830. King Leopold III did the same during the thirties as his predecessors and tried to block this evolution. The Second World War established the circumstances to expand his power. The Council ofM inisters choosed for the western democracies. Leopold III did not. Nevertheless the dynasty was not treathened but Leopold, who was not able to adapt, had to forsake the throne. After the war, the Council of Ministers was acknowledged as one of the most important institutions of the Belgian political system.

El presente artículo aborda el estudio del sistema electoral de la Cámara de Representantes belga y sus reformas electorales. Bélgica fue el primer país europeo en adoptar un sistema de representación proporcional y, desde entonces, sus elementos centrales han exhibido una extraordinaria estabilidad. Sin embargo, con el cambio de siglo, el gobierno de coalición liderado por el liberal Guy Verhofstadt situó el debate sobre las reformas institucionales en el centro de la agenda política. Ello condujo a una reforma electoral que supuso la «provincialización» del mapa electoral, el establecimiento de una barrera electoral del 5 por ciento y la reducción a la mitad del peso de voto de lista. En 2012, se produjo la última reforma electoral, que consistió en la división de la polémica circunscripción de Bruselas-Halle-Vilvoorde. Este último episodio evidencia la complejidad del modelo federal belga, de carácter consociacional, bipolar y con dinámicas centrífugas.This paper deals with the study of the electoral system of the Belgian House of Representatives and its electoral reforms. Belgium was the first European country to adopt an electoral system of proportional representation and, since then, its main elements have exhibited extraordinary stability. However, with the turn of the century, the coalition government headed by the liberal Guy Verhofstadt put the debate on institutional reforms at the center of the political agenda. This led to an electoral reform that involved several novelties: the «provincialization» of the electoral map, the establishment of a 5 percent threshold and the reduction of the list vote weight by half. In 2012, there was the last electoral reform, which consisted of the division of the controversial constituency of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. This last episode shows the complexity of the Belgian federal model, consociational, bipolar and with centrifugal dynamics.

Tbe struggle for the liberalization of the law on abortion began in Belgium in 1970 when the taboo was breached in an initial bill. However, support by pressure groups failed and this led to a long period of nondecision, which may be explained by the disunity in the camp of the supporters on the one hand and the blocking tactics of the Flemish Christian Democrats on the other. In 1986 a compromise between supporters finally emerged, and via a majority which cut right through the governmental coalition an abortion law was approved at the end of March 1990, which closely corresponds to British, French and Dutch legislation. The catholic monarch's refusal to ratify the bill caused a political crisis which was solved by the unanimous signing by the assembled ministers.

Besides classical issues of parliamentary control and pressure groups' influence, coordination between ministers and administrations involved in foreign policy making and harmonization of national foreign policy with external cultural relations led by the french, flemish and german Communities are the major problems belgian foreign policy making has to cope with.Divergences on options or heterogeneity of functional missions (Finance and Third World Cooperation e.g.) require arbitration and cooperative procedures provided by foreign affairs ministerial comitee at the governmental level. Competition for leading role and confrontation of functional paradigms foster «bureaucratic politics» between services. European affairs constitues a major issue for bureaucratic coordination.Attribution to the Communities of assessment power to cultural agreements and reservation to national government of the treaty making power let arise a kind of illogism and a conflict of competences that pragmatic concertation tends to get round.As to parliamentary control, it consists in a greater influence of majority's deputies than in an effective opposition's countervailing power to amend coalition foreign policy. So play pressure groups a role in influencing bilateral much more than multilateral affairs.

On june 13th, the Belgian voters had to choose their representatives in four assemblies: the European Parliament, the Chamber of Representatives, the Senate, and the Regional Council of either the Flemish, the Walloon or the Brussels Capital regions accordingly.Thus these elections made it possible to measure possible differences in the results a same list obtained in the different polls. These differences could be observed for some lists, but not for all and were essentially due to the personality of certain candidates rather than to a political will to differentiate, with the exception perhaps of the Ecologists, who traditionally perform better in European elections.These elections also saw an increased use of computer based voting: some 44 % of the registered voters had to express their choice via a computer screen. As a consequence one observed a sensitive drop in "blank and spoilt" ballots.The elections have been characterized by several phenomena. First, there was a marked decline, amounting to some 10 % of the votes, in the support for the parties of the outgoing majority: christian democrats and socialists. In losing each somewhat less than 5 %, they have both hit their historical low and together no langer hold a simpte majority in Parliament.The liberal family bas become the largest in Belgium, which had never accured since the introduction of the single vote system (1919). This first position was conquered more through the decline in the results of the socialists and the christian democrats than via a true advance of the liberals. Though the Flemish component of the liberals progressed by 1.14 %, the French-speaking wing receded by 0.13 %.The overall winners of the elections are the ecologists who on the whole climb from 8. 44 % to 14.36 %. This progression is ho wever proportionately much more marked for the French-speaking component (Ecolo) than for the Flemish part (Agalev). Ecolo bas become the thirdmost important party of Wallonia and the second one in Brussels, whereas Agalev remains the fifth party in Flanders.The extremist parties have had diverging results. The extreme left remains altogether very marginal in Belgium (about 1 %) , whereas the extreme right appears to be a typically Flemish phenomenon. Indeed, the Vlaams Blok increases its share of votes by 3 .12 % and with 15.31 % has become the third party in Flanders and thereby even surpasses somewhat the result obtained by the VN.V in 1939.The French-speaking extreme right suffered a decline due among others to internal divisions and only stands for 4.09 % in Wallonia and 4 % in Brussels. As a consequence of these results the composition of the assemblies has changed drastically. To constitute a government holding a simpte majority in the Chamber of Representatives, one needs at least three political families (i.e. 6 parties) or two families and the support of another party (5 parties). In the Flemish parliament, one needs either a three party coalition, but necessarily comprising the CVP, or a four party coalition to obtain a majority. In the Walloon parliament, a two party coalition is only possible if the PS participates.In Brussels, the Vlaams Blok, although passing from 2 to 4 seats, bas not succeeded in paralysing the functioning of the institutions as this party didn't obtain the majority in the Flemish group.Opinion polls held before the elections had forecast the direction in which votes would shift, but not the extent. The dioxine crisis bas reinforced this shift and has undoubtedly accentuated the progression of the ecologist lists.

The Belgian constitutional system is based upon the classic principle of the trias politica, which means that there is a separation of powers, but also a balanced cooperation between them. This article focuses on the Belgian federal Parliament, which bas been, together with the reform of the state from a unitary to a federal state, radically reformed.The Belgian Parliament nowadays is much better equipped to fulfil the function of checks and balances than thirty years ago. The number of staff and the material equipment has increased considerably. At the same time, the emphasis in parliamentary activity bas shifted from the plenary session to the committees. The control upon the budget was long time a nearly empty box. Since the reform of 1989, it has become a much stronger instrument to hold the government to account. The annual debate on the budget is rather a genera/political evaluation of the government policy and is always ended by a vote of confidence.As for the law-making function, the share of the government in adopted laws is much higher than that of Parliament. Parliament bas still the power to amend government bills, but this power is limited because there is often already an agreement between the government and the parliamentary party of the coalition-parties. Nevertheless, several important amendments have been adopted in the last legislature.The control function bas evolved in different directions. Due to an enormous increase in the number of interpellations, they have lost a great part of their importance. They constitute no langer a real threaten to the survival of the government. On the other hand, there are more oral and written questions than before and the use of parliamentary inquiry committees has augmented considerably. Despite their inherent shortages, these committees play, an important role in preparing and correcting policy.The new challenges for Parliament in the future are serving as forum of the nation and the evaluation of laws. The core business of the trias politica, namely budgetary, law-making and controlling duties, also remain to befulfilled by Parliament.

The political agenda for the first year of governing of the second autonomous Fiemish government in the history of the Belgian state, was dominated by the debate concerning the additional financial resources and authorities for the communities and regions. The immediate cause for this, was the extensive saving-plan (Saint-Anna plan) of the national government, which also hit the communities and regions. The final outcome of the debate was the so-called Saint-Catherina agreement, which not only provides a number of savings, but also the transferring of a series of public services and scientific institutions to the communities and regions.A project of decree was agreed to by the Flemish government, which creates a legal scheme for the foundation of a private TV-station in Flanders. In this way they want to cease the monopoly of the publicbroadcasting station «BRT». The bill would only pass the Flemish Parliament in 1987.A number of issues lead to tensions between the Christian-Democrats and the Liberal coalition partners, issues like the affection of green areas around the Brussels agglomerate or the construction of golflinks in Flanders. This contribution ends with a review of a number of important decisions made by the Flemish government on various subjects.

Flanders (Belgium) is one of the most densely populated regions in Europe. Intensive land use, widespread suburbanization, inadequate environmental qualities, and fragmentation everywhere deteriorate living conditions and put pressure on species and natural habitats. In the past, several governmental initiatives were launched to establish a coherent ecological network to improve the situation. Despite the set objectives, only a little progress was made. Therefore, to establish green infrastructure, a new approach that moves away from previous top-down and one-sided strategies is developed. Making use of Green Infrastructure as a boundary concept, interpretation was given through an open and participatory process. The core is the identification of common objectives (ecosystem services or other objectives/services), the selection of appropriate green infrastructure elements to support the services, and the co-design of a network taking the local socio-ecological realm into account. By applying the methodology in concrete urban and rural projects, we learned that establishing strong coalitions of stakeholders, obtaining and sharing reliable knowledge of the systems are key to an effective realization of green infrastructure.

The function of Deputy Prime Minister is not specified in the Belgian Constitution, nevertheless it is imposed by force ofcustom. Since 1961, there have been in each government one or more Deputy Prime Ministers whether or not carrying the formal title. The Deputy Prime Minister was originally the number two in the government, behind the Prime Minister. Usually, he belongs to another party. Thanks to the competences attributed to him in the government, his position in his party and his natural authority and leadership, he tries, together with the prime minister, to manage the government in the right direction and to maintain the cohesion in the coalition. The Deputy Prime Minister is at the same time also in charge of a given ministry. The function of Deputy Prime Minister has become more important due to the increased influence of political parties within and upon the government. The Deputy Prime Minister acts now explicitly as spokesperson of his party within the government and defends the decisions of the government within his party. After the split of the national parties in a Flemish and a Walloon party and as consequence, the increase of parties in government, the number of Deputy Prime Ministers also increased. It became usual that each party in government had his own Deputy Prime Minister, even the party of the Prime Minister since the latter is considered to be politically neutral. Under the name of 'Cabinet for general affairs ', the 'kernkabinet' raised in1961 to handle all major problems and initiatives of the government. The 'kernkabinet' interpreted this rather vague description of its competences in a broad way. lts members were the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and some other senior ministers. Usually, an equilibrium on the basis of party- and language-affiliations was installed. In the second half of the 1970s, the role and the impact of the 'kernkabinet' increased gradually. The 'kernkabinet' had become a real decision-making institution, gathering several times a week. As a consequence, the role of the Council of Ministers on certain issues was degraded to merely ratify decisions taken by the 'kernkabinet'. Much critique was voiced on this evolution, especially upon the lack of transparency and efficiency.Although heavily criticized, the 'kernkabinet' has proved to be a very helpful instrument to take decisions on complex and delicate problems. In 1981, the 'kernkabinet' was formally abolished and in 1992, the Dehaene-government abolished all ministerial committees. Despite these abolitions, there was and still is nowadays the tendency to gather with the senior ministers to solve complex problems. De facto the kernkabinet holds strong.

Organized after an almost complete term of office, but the end of which was marked by the resurgence of the community-linked problems and by the departure of the Ministers of the Volksunie, the parliamentary elections of 24th November 1991 will remain characterized by the punishment inflicted by apart of the voters, not only on the majority's parties, but also on the traditional parties as a whole.The opposition of the dissatisfied voters did not show itself either in a reduced participation to the vote, a rather normal phenomenon in a country where voting is compulsory, or in a rise of the blank and spoilt ba/lot papers. The 1991 figures are, in these respects, very similar to the average figures of the last thirty years.The opposition was first characterized by high variations in the choice of the voters, which dit not, however, exceed the size of the movements noticed at previous elections. The rate of external mobility, as computed by us, is ranked fifth among the 22 levels that have been counted since universal suffrage has been introduced in Belgium. In 1991, this rate was the highest in Brussels, which is traditional, but it was also considerably higher in Flanders than in the Walloon Region, which quite seldom happens.Then, the opposition found expression in a setback for the Jour ruling parties.This set back amounted to about 8% and even 10% if account is taken of the Volksunie which was part of the Government until the very last weeks before the dissolution of the Houses of Parliament. Such a setback for an outgoing majority is not exceptional; a more unusual phenomenon lies in the f act that this decline was not profitable, on the whole, to the third traditional "family", i.e. the Liberals. As a result of this simultaneous setback for the three traditional families, these total only about 70% of the valid votes, which is the worst result of the whole Belgian electoral history.The political formations that are progressing are the Ecologists, on the one hand, and the far-right lists, on the other hand. Ecolo improves its results considerably in the Walloon Region and in Brussels, without however reaching the level obtained at the 1989 European elections, while Agalev only registers a slight progress.On the contrary, the winner of the elections in the Flemish Region, is unquestionablythe Vlaams Blok, as well as the "Rossem" lists that draw some 5% of the angry voters.If the far-left trend has almost disappeared from the Belgian political scene, the far-right parties, on the contrary, are making a breakthrough on it. The current made up by the Vlaams Blok and the openly far-right lists wins a bit less than 8% of the votes in the whole country. It is likely, however, that those who voted for the Vlaams Blok do not all adhere to the far-right ideas, but that some of them are attracted by the Flemish autonomist stands. The real electoral power of the far-right parties can then be assessed at 6 to 7%, which is much more than in 1987, hut does not make a record in comparison with other European countries.The votes of opponents without any clear political orientation, the bulk of which is won by the "Rossem" lists, amount to some 3%, which is new for Belgium.In a country where voting is optional, many of these voters would probably have stayed at home.This being so, and as f ar as these concepts still remain meaningful, the Belgian electoral pendulum shifted some 5% towards the right, at the expense of the left for more than 3% and the centre for a bit less than 2%.As far as the Parliament is concerned, the situation is clear in the Walloon Region and in the French-speaking Community where the Socialist Party, by far the most important party, is almost inevitable. It is however much more vague on the Flemish side, where the CVP's setback and the dispersion of the polical farces make several types of coalitions possible.

After the swiftly abolished liberal Constitution of 1835 and the imposed 'Turkish' one of 1838 (imposed by the Russians and Ottomans, guarantors of Serbia's autonomy granted in 1830, to limit the princely power), the development of constitutionalism in modern Serbia went through several phases. As elsewhere in the Balkans, constitutions usually resulted from a compromise between the ruler and the elites rather than from the will of the people. The 1868 Constitution drew to an extent upon the early nineteenth-century German constitutional monarchies, but, under pressure from the politically mobilized population, the 1888 Constitution, proposed by the Radical Party in response to the egalitarian aspirations of the nation's agrarian majority, adopted a French constitutional model - with a unicameral system and frequent coalition governments. Shaped on the model of the Belgian Constitution of 1831, which in its turn was a modified version of the French Charte of 1830, it restored a French influence, expressed for the first time in the 1835 Constitution. The 1888 Constitution was passed by the Grand National Assembly with its five-sixth majority of Radicals, representatives of the agrarian majority. It was soon annulled by the coup d'?tat of 1894 and the Court-imposed Constitution of 1869 was reinstituted. The Constitution of 1901 was an attempt to introduce a bicameral system as a means of upholding the influential role of the ruler, while limiting that of the Radical Party, which had enjoyed an ample electoral support since the 1888 Constitution. After the assassination in 1903 of the last Obrenovic ruler king Alexander, and his wife, queen Draga, the liberal Constitution of 1888 with minor modifications was reinstituted. Under this Constitution - which is commonly known as the 1903 Constitution and which, during the democratic reign of king Peter I Kardjordjevic, was no longer challenged - Serbian democracy remained fragile, because there was no upper house to counteract as it did in the French Third Republic, the predominantly party-biased way of running the affairs of state.

In de tweede helft van 1936 beleefde België een periode van politieke destabilisering. Dat was het gevolg van de verkiezingen van 24 mei die een nederlaag betekenden voor de katholieke partij en een overwinning voor Rex van Léon Degrelle, die dictatoriale ambities koesterde en steun vond bij Hitler en Mussolini. Ook het Vlaams Nationaal Verbond, dat eveneens in fascistische richting was geëvolueerd, en de communisten boekten winst. De socialisten waren nu de grootste partij, maar accepteerden een regering van nationale unie met katholieken en liberalen onder de technocraat Paul Van Zeeland. Die regering kwam onmiddellijk onder vuur te liggen van links en rechts en werd geconfronteerd met afvalligheid in eigen rangen. Het nationaalsocialisme in Duitsland, het linkse Volksfront in Frankrijk en de burgeroorlog in Spanje vormden het referentiekader voor een periode van sterke polarisatie en felle agitatie, waarin partijen en politici streefden naar een herschikking, een “concentratie” van politieke krachten. Rechtse politici probeerden de regering omver te werpen en een coalitie zonder socialisten (die zij beschouwden als cryptocommunisten) op de been te brengen. Sommige katholieken probeerden de politieke eendracht onder geloofsgenoten te herstellen door een vorm van samenwerking met Rex en VNV, en nog andere katholieken probeerden met de Vlaams-nationalisten in Vlaanderen een Vlaamse Concentratie tot stand te brengen. De bakens werden verzet toen Rex en VNV op 6 oktober een alliantie sloten en daarmee een krachtig oppositiefront vormden. Op 25 oktober verijdelde de regering-Van Zeeland een rexistische “mars op Brussel”. Om dit nieuwe front de wind uit de zeilen te halen probeerden de Vlaamse katholieken, die zich hergroepeerden in de Katholieke Vlaamse Volkspartij, alsnog samenwerking te realiseren met de Vlaams-nationalisten. Dat leidde op 8 december 1936 tot het akkoord KVV-VNV, dat evenwel meteen van beide kanten werd gedesavoueerd. De tegenstelling tussen aanhangers van de bestaande orde en van de nieuwe orde, tussen voorstanders en tegenstanders van de regering, was te groot. De christendemocratische strekking in de katholieke partij haalde de bovenhand toen de bisschoppen op het einde van 1936 in een publieke brief niet alleen het communisme, maar ook alle strevingen naar een rechtse dictatuur veroordeelden. De destabilisering van de Belgische politiek verdween pas na de nederlaag van Degrelle in zijn verkiezingsduel met premier Van Zeeland op 11 april 1937. De democratiekritiek die de beweging naar “concentratie” ondersteunde bleef echter voortleven.________The unsuccesful formatiob of a Flemish and right-wing front. The history of the 1936 concentrationBelgium experienced a period of political destabilization in the second half of 1936. That was the result of the 24 May elections, the defeat of the catholic party and the victory of Rex, a movement led by Léon Degrelle, who had dictatorial ambitions and would soon be supported by Hitler and Mussolini. The Flemish Nationalists (VNV), also oriented towards fascism, and the Communists had made progress too. The socialists, who ended up being the largest party, accepted a cabinet of national union with the Catholics and the liberals under the leadership of a technocrat, Paul Van Zeeland. The Van Zeeland cabinet immediately came under fire from left and right and was confronted with deserters in its own ranks. National Socialism in Germany, the Front populaire in France and the civil war in Spain formed the horizon for a period of strong polarization and agitation in which politicians and parties aimed at redesigning political forces, “concentration” being the keyword. Politicians from the right attempted to establish a cabinet without socialists whom they considered crypto communists. Catholics tried to restore political union among the faithful through forms of cooperation with Rex and VNV, and some among them tried to install a “Flemish Concentration” through collaboration with the Flemish Nationalists. A decisive fact occurred on 0ctober 6 when Rex and VNV formed an alliance creating a strong opposition front. On October 25 the government foiled a rexist mass rally in Brussels. To regain control Flemish Catholics, who regrouped in the Katholieke Vlaamse Volkspartij (KVV), attempted to realize a form of collaboration with the Flemish Nationalists. It resulted in the December 8 KVV-VNV agreement, which was, however, immediately denounced from both sides. The antagonism between supporters of the existing order and those of a new order, between the partisans of the government and its opponents, was too strong. The Christian democrats in the catholic party finally gained the upper hand when the Belgian bishops, at the end of December 1936, issued a pastoral letter not only condemning communism but also a dictatorship of the right. The destabilization of Belgian politics disappeared after the defeat of Degrelle in his electoral duel with Prime Minister Van Zeeland on April 11, 1937. However, the fundamental criticism of democracy underlying the “concentration” movement did not.

Abstract Parties usually argue in favour or against a government coalition based on party considerations in terms of projected policy implementation, power in office and vote maximization – that is, the ‘policy, office, votes’ triad. So far, however, it remains unclear which claims mainstream parties invoke to motivate their choice to rule or not rule with populist parties. Adopting the ‘policy, voter, office’ triad, this article examines mainstream parties' Twitter claims on ruling with populist parties in Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (2006–2021, N = 1,919). Mainstream parties mainly reject ruling with (mostly radical right) populist parties. To justify unwillingness, policy-based motives referring to the populist parties' extremist nature trump motives on office-seeking and vote maximization. To justify willingness, predominantly office-seeking motivations are invoked. Party characteristics (ideology, incumbency status, size) and context, however, shape these claims. This study sheds light on mainstream parties' patterns of political communication on coalition formation with populist parties.

Although the position of the party on the ground has been weakened by cartelization, grassroots activists remain an important recruitment pool for political professionals. Based on unique survey data collected among the staff of 14 Belgian and Dutch parties (N = 1009), this article offers an in-depth analysis of party activism among this under-researched population. Introducing a new supply and demand framework, I argue that staff recruitment is shaped by candidate preferences (supply) and party preferences (demand). The findings demonstrate that most political staffers are high-intensity activists with a strong commitment to their party. Moreover, the theoretical model accurately predicts that non-activists are more common among policy and communication experts, ministerial staff, and those working for ideologically moderate parties. These findings show that paid staffers do not necessarily widen the gap between parties and activists. They also raise normative questions about internal congruence within parties in coalition governments.