Academic literature on the topic 'Coal trade Government policy'

AbstractWestern Europe's industrialization was powered largely by coal. Within 15 years after the end of the Second World War, however, governments were subsidizing coal and protecting producers from foreign competition while allowing their industries to contract in a way that avoided large-scale unemployment of miners. The oil-price shocks of 1973–1974 and 1979–1980 gave temporary reprieve to hard-coal production until international oil prices slumped in 1986. This event, combined with ever more stringent environmental regulations and, later, caps on carbon-dioxide emissions, led to the disappearance of subsidized coal mining in one country after another. As of the end of 2019, hard coal was still being mined – in small amounts – in only three Western European countries: Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom. This paper describes the history of the industry from 1945 through to the present, and the consequences of subsidy policy for trade in hard coal and its substitutes. A common observation is that a reduction in subsidized coal production by a country has not necessarily translated into increased imports of coal on a one-for-one basis.

For reliving the pressure of air pollution and corresponding the sustainability development policy in China, the companies are urging the creation of a highly productive low-carbon supply chain. This work uses price regulation, the cap-and-trade model, and a green financial policy background to establish a strategy for the coal–electric power supply chain with two-level carbon reduction and operation with financial constraints. A Stackelberg model was built to help investigate the rate of thermal order realization, the carbon reduction strategy in the coal enterprise, and the amount of thermal energy ordered in the electric enterprise. Results show that under a green financial background, a high bank loan discount rate for investing in carbon reduction technology equates to large carbon reduction in coal enterprises, large quantities of thermal energy ordered in electric enterprises, and high profit for coal and electric enterprises. However, the realization rate of thermal power ordered decreased when the price regulation become strict, thereby reducing the profit and carbon emission in electric enterprise. Therefore, the thermal price regulation level increased, the profit on both company and the production did not respond with sensitivity, and the government could encourage a low carbon model by controlling the bank loan rate.

The current study employs a Granger causality test within a Quantile approach investigating CO2 emission determinants in China. Results show urbanization, financial development and openness to trade are leading determinants of CO2 emissions in China. These results highlight climate change issues while taking advantage of a new methodology to fill a gap in the current literature. Our findings show key implications for PRC government policy related to pollutant reduction policy.

During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Montreal’s air was blackened by smoke from coal-burning homes, factories, and the locomotives and lake freighters connecting its growing economy to the rest of Canada. Lacking regulatory tools suited to the task of abating this nuisance, the municipal government passed the country’s first modern smoke bylaw, consisting of an objective emissions standard, a smoke control bureau, and requirements for the installation and utilization of technology to lessen emissions. In providing an account of the process through which Montreal’s smoke nuisance was addressed, this article describes the role of the city’s most influential local growth coalition, the Montreal Board of Trade, in introducing the issue on the city’s policy agenda, participating in the formulation of a policy response, and monitoring the implementation of the resulting bylaw. The Board of Trade sought a resolution to the problem because it damaged the city’s reputation and business climate. Consistent with other documented examples of smoke abatement in large urban areas, the response promoted by this elite growth coalition consisted largely of technology-based measures that managed the problem while eschewing recourse to measures that would dampen economic activity.

Patrick Conroy, the secretary-treasurer of the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL) from 1941 to 1951, was not someone who gave up easily. As a friend observed, the Scottish-born coal miner was a committed trade unionist whose “moral certitude was admirable and… one of his great strengths.” In late 1942, however, Conroy seemed ready to call it quits on the CCL's campaign to win a national collective-bargaining policy in Canada. Since its inception in September 1940, the Congress, which represented most of the industrial unions in the country, had pushed hard for a comprehensive labor policy like the National Labor Relations or Wagner Act in the United States, which protected and advanced the rights of workers. But the Liberal government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King repeatedly refused to move beyond a turn-of-the-century conciliatory framework that emphasized moral suasion and compromise. In late 1942, when a regional organizer asked Conroy whether a collective-bargaining policy appeared likely in the future, the CCL leader replied: “We do not feel it worthwhile to raise people's hopes when the record of the federal government is as it has been.”

Medium size developing countries like Chile that commit to decarbonization goals need to carefully assess the trade-offs associated to their intensity and timing, since most of the technologies required will be absorbed, not produced, by these countries. A rapid expansion of renewables in the Chilean energy matrix, mostly thanks to exceptional solar and wind resources, combined with a rapid decrease in the cost of renewable energy technologies, intensified current policy debates to reduce the role of coal, which is the largest source of CO2 emissions in the generation mix. Recently, the main generation companies in Chile made a voluntary commitment to not invest in new coal projects that do not include carbon capture and storage systems. In addition, the Chilean government announced its plans to phase out coal plants completely by 2040. In this context, the aim of this research is to study the economy-wide and emission reduction impacts of different decarbonization paths in the Chilean power sector. For this purpose, we consider dynamic simulations using a new energy-oriented version of the Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGE)- General Equilibrium Model for the Chilean Economy (ECOGEM)-Chile which is soft linked to the bottom-up engineering energy model. The results show the major impacts under both the business as usual (BAU) scenario and the coal phase-out scenario. Additionally, the study discusses to what extent the ambitious decarbonization goals of the Chilean government are coherent with the current technological limitations.

South Africa has been dismantling the challenges of Global warming and climate change issues pertaining Carbon emissions which have aggravated environmental problems over the past years due to its heavy reliance on coal. About 77% of South Africa's electricity needs are been bestowed by coal. This study serves to determine the relationship between carbon emissions and economic growth in South Africa covering the period between 1984 and 2018. The study employed the ARDL bounds technique to determine the long run relationship among the variables and the VECM to determine the direction of causality among variables. The findings established that there is a long relationship between carbon emission, economic growth, energy consumption, foreign direct investment and trade openness in South Africa. The VECM suggested that there is bidirectional causality flowing between economic growth and carbon emissions. The results also validated the EKC hypothesis both in the long run and short run. It is thus imperative for the policy makers and government to divert their thoughts to more innovative and creative strategies of attaining alternative energy sources especially renewable sources. There is a need for the best environmental policy to enhance infrastructure investment to improve energy efficiency and reduce emissions.

The article is devoted to energy policy of Germany. In the coalition treaty, the new German “red-green-yellow” coalition confirmed the commitment to achieve climate neutrality by 2045. In line with this goal Germany has developed a strategy to move away from coal as a primary source of energy. And, in the meantime, Berlin will close the last three Nuclear Power Plants by the end of the year 2022. The Russian special military operation in Ukraine has influenced the German energy policy significantly. Since February 2022, the German government has put a premium on substitution of Russian energy. The aim of this article is to analyze the coherence of the two policies: energy transition and rejection of Russian energy resources. The author explores phasing out nuclear power and coal, import of oil and gas, development of hydrogen production and renewables in Germany. The analysis revealed that two tracks do not complement each other. Both tracks should trace to the same goal – carbon-free energy, – but they have different temporal frameworks. While political elites claim to phase out Russian fuels within two years, the energy transition should take around 30 years. The natural gas was supposed to be the transitional energy, but more than half of it comes from Russia. Substitution of Russian coal and Russian oil requires more investment, and it could reduce the ability to subsidize renewables. Potential cooperation between Germany and Russia in hydrogen production was frozen. Only the policy aimed at improving energy efficiency and developing new building standards is likely to fit both tracks.

John Hartwell is Head of the Resources Division in the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Canberra Australia. The Resources Division provides advice to the Australian Government on policy issues, legislative changes and administrative matters related to the petroleum industry, upstream and downstream and the coal and minerals industries. In addition to his divisional responsibilities, he is the Australian Commissioner for the Australia/East Timor Joint Petroleum Development Area and Chairman of the National Oil and Gas Safety Advisory Committee. He also chairs two of the taskforces, Clean Fossil Energy and Aluminium, under the Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (AP6). He serves on two industry and government leadership groups delivering reports to the Australian Government, strategies for the oil and gas industry and framework for the uranium industry. More recently he led a team charged with responsibility for taking forward the Australian Government’s proposal to establish a global carbon capture and storage institute. He is involved in the implementation of a range of resource related initiatives under the Government’s Industry Action Agenda process, including mining and technology services, minerals exploration and light metals. Previously he served as Deputy Chairman of the Snowy Mountains Council and the Commonwealth representative to the Natural Gas Pipelines Advisory Committee. He has occupied a wide range of positions in the Australian Government dealing with trade, commodity, and energy and resource issues. He has worked in Treasury, the Department of Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Primary Industries and Energy before the Department of Industry, Science and Resources. From 1992–96 he was a Minister Counsellor in the Australian Embassy, Washington, with responsibility for agriculture and resource issues and also served in the Australian High Commission, London (1981–84) as the Counsellor/senior trade relations officer. He holds a MComm in economics, and Honours in economics from the University of New South Wales, Australia. Prior to joining the Australian Government, worked as a bank economist. He was awarded a public service medal in 2005 for his work on resources issues for the Australian Government.

AbstractThe Conservative Party has long faced concerns that in regard to the great British miners’ strike of 1984–1985, senior Tories had, in fact, planned the confrontation as early as 1977, when still on the opposition benches. Historian John Savile pointed to the existence of the Ridley Report—a Conservative think-tank paper produced in 1977, which appeared to include a detailed blueprint on how to provoke, and secondly win, a battle against Britain's powerful miners’ union. After Margaret Thatcher's second election victory, and her first landslide, in 1983, the Prime Minister populated the Downing Street Policy Unit with private-sector allies who looked to implement aspects of the report. Some of these allies had clear economic incentives in running down British coal. Nevertheless, the Policy Unit members were instrumental in determining government policy concerning all aspects of the strike, including preparation, policing, the law courts, financial concerns and the portrayal of the strike in the media. The campaign by Thatcher's Policy Unit resulted in a shattering blow for Britain's trade union movement from which it has yet to recover—just as the Ridley Report had predicted.

Since the start of the 21st century, energy security concerns and rising international energy costs have led China to pursue the development of a coal to oil industry, whereby converting a portion of the nation's abundant coal reserves into gasoline, diesel, or jet fuel, China might be able to increase its domestic oil production and generate profits. But a large-scale coal to oil industry exerts added pressure on China's domestic coal reserves and water resources, and generates significant greenhouse gas emissions. The tension between the potential benefits of coal to oil development and its associated negative externalities present a challenge for China's energy policymakers, who must balance competing demands for energy security, resource management, and equitable development. The challenge of effectively managing the development of this industry is complicated by the characteristic problems plaguing energy sector governance in China, including the absence of a powerful energy policymaking institution, the decentralized nature of the country's economic development, and the influence of large energy companies. This study examines the evolution of China's coal to oil industry and the policies shaping its development in order to better understand energy sector governance in China and the complex challenges confronting policymakers as they strive to balance an array of competing demands. It finds that weak energy institutions and powerful domestic actors indeed hinder China's ability to efficiently formulate energy policies for the coal to oil industry, while considerations about the industry's environmental and resource impacts compel a cautious approach to development. China's incremental approach to formulating a long-term plan for the development of the coal to oil industry may, in the end, yield more effective policies.

The thesis examines the responses, as articulated in language, of the trade union movement in the UK (especially, the TUC) to changes in labour legislation introduced by the Conservative Government between 1979 and 1990. The research attempts to identify and interpret key words, themes and repertoires within union discourse by analysis of TUC pamphlets, 'campaign' literature, policy documents and speeches at the annual Congress, supplemented by information obtained from informal interviews with several union figures involved in constructing a response to the legislation. The nature and extent of changes in patterns of union language are explored through consideration of the materials over two distinct time periods - 1979-1983 and 1986-1990 - thus allowing examination of the rhetorical responses of the TUC/unions throughout the duration of the Thatcher Government. In order to place such responses in context, and to examine the extent to which the vocabulary of the unions was both shared with and shaped by other participants in the policy process, consideration has also been given to the language of Government in documents such as Green Papers and in Parliamentary debates, in addition to that of 'New Right' commentators who may have influenced the making of policy on labour legislation. Particular attention is paid to the way in which the characterisation of union immunities from legal liability as 'privileges' shaped the linguistic response of the unions and their strategy towards the presence of law in industrial relations. Union language during the period 1979-1990 is found to exhibit characteristics both of change and continuity. Those alterations which occured are considered in the light of theories of Thatcherism as a hegemonic project and in the context of wider changes in the discourse of the Left. The problem of isolating causative factors is also addressed.

Thesis (M.S. in Program Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003.
Thesis advisor(s): Richard Doyle, Raymond Franck. Includes bibliographical references (p. 111-120). Also available online.

A high level of a country’s foreign trade is related to the growth of foreign earnings, to the acceleration of investments, to increase employment and contributes significantly to the growth of the country's economy. In this context, SMEs as one of the mile stones of the economy, foreign trade and economic growth are located in the leading roles. Especially SMEs sufficiently developed oppressed against strong opponents abroad, government policies or practices in trade restrictive policies are some of the reasons for this downside. SMEs that exports goods, or the infrastructure needed to produce goods for SMEs who import raw materials as well as the country's foreign trade policies and developments in the world economy is important. SMEs to follow the development, recognizing competitors, new markets, new products is very important in terms of growth both business and the countries. In this study, SMEs engaged in foreign trade in Sivas Province performing an application on in terms of both the business and government policy at the local level status will be examined. Data will be obtained on issues such as ultimately foreign trade potential of existing SMEs while doing foreign trade problems they face, strengths and weaknesses, market policies at national and international levels, the opinions about the state's foreign trade policy. The results obtained from the data on SMEs engaged in foreign trade by making general inferences about the data obtained on a micro scale, will allow making inferences on the macro scale.

Abstract The National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) is the Department of Energy’s (DOE) only government-owned and -operated national laboratory. With homesites in Morgantown, West Virginia, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Tulsa, Oklahoma, NETL has been addressing global, national, regional, and local energy and environmental issues for the past 50 years. NETL’s core functions are to: shape, fund, and manage contracted research, development, demonstration, and deployment programs; conduct on-site science and technology research, and; conduct analyses to support policy development and best management and business practices. In support of the President’s recently released National Energy Policy, NETL’s work is concentrated in five major program areas: (1) Energy and Environmental Policy Support — Providing the scientific bases for sound policy decisions on key energy and environmental issues that relate to the global use of fossil energy. (2) Electric Power Using Coal — Developing the sound, scientific bases for clean, efficient power generation using coal, from mining to light switch. (3) Strategic Center for Natural Gas — Integrating and coordinating all Federal natural gas research, development, analysis, and policy development, from exploration through utilization. (4) Fuels — Addressing the integrated supply and delivery of clean fossil (petroleum, natural gas, and coal) derived fuels for transportation and other end-use sectors. (5) Environmental Quality/Nuclear Security — Supporting development and deployment of environmental technologies that reduce the cost and risk of cleaning up DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. Currently, NETL has over 1,100 research projects in all 50 states and more than 20 countries. NETL conducts this work through a broad range of partnerships with private industry, universities and colleges, not-for-profit laboratories, other DOE national laboratories, other government organizations at the federal, state, and local levels, and various international partners. Through these partnerships, NETL has fostered and will continue to foster the development and deployment of scientific and engineering technologies and know-how that offer sustainable solutions to domestic and international energy and environmental problems. See Proceedings Appendix B.

In East Asia economic regionalism and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are proliferating at tremendous pace despite being the latecomer as compared to Americas and Europe. Proliferation of FTAs in East Asia started to spread after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The East Asian economies were dissatisfied with the way the IMF handled the crisis, particularly in Thailand and Indonesia. Presently, about over 100 FTAs are at various stages of development in East Asia. China is also actively engaged in FTAs like the other East Asian neighboring countries for achieving multiple objectives. In this paper we analyzed the detailed reasons that why China is pursuing FTAs? Furthermore, it is said that FTAs may jeopardize the multilateral trading system. As FTAs undermine the WTO policy of maintaining a liberal, non discriminatory and multilateral trading system by supporting the government interventions and prudential controls. Thus we would also explore that whether FTAs are building or stumbling blocks?

The dynamics of the conflict in bio-fuel commodity trade policies was triggered by the conflict of economic interests between Indonesia and the European Union. A series of steps for negotiation and diplomacy were taken by the government and Indonesian business actors to negotiate and resolve these problems by holding talks with important (state) actors in Europe.

Twin deficits hypothesis suggests that there is a positive relationship between budget and current account deficits. The present study examines Twin Deficits Hypothesis over the period of 2005:01–20013:12 in Kyrgyzstan by using Vector Autoregressive Model technique. The results show that there are relationships between government expenditure, export and import. The causalities are from government expenditure to export and import. These results confirm the Keynesian view, which asserts the existence of twin deficits, meaning that the state budget deficit at weak real economy, in an open economy, increase imports, which is the cause of twin deficits in the economy of Kyrgyzstan. To solve the problem of twin deficits, the state must pursue an active foreign trade policy in addition to fiscal policy, as it is proven empirically the state budget deficit has a big impact on trade deficit, but not the main factor of trade deficit.

A relatively small number of countries have an explicit “Feminist Foreign Policy” (FFP). Those most often cited are Sweden, Canada, France, Mexico, and Spain. In theory, an FFP moves beyond gender mainstreaming in foreign development assistance to include: (1) a wider range of external actions, including defence, trade and diplomacy (2) a wider range of marginalised people, not just women. Within foreign development assistance, it implies a more coherent and systematically institutionalised approach to gender mainstreaming. In practice, those countries with an explicit FFP implement it in different ways. Canada currently focuses on development assistance, France on development assistance and formal diplomacy, Sweden more comprehensively covers the trade and defence policy arenas. Mexico and Spain are yet to produce detailed implementation plans. There is increasing academic interest in FFP, but most analyses found during the course of this rapid review focus on narrative content of policies rather than impact. Policy advocacy and advice is provided by several high-profile advocacy organisations. National government agencies in Sweden, France and Canada have produced some evaluations of their FFP, but the evidence is weak. There are many international institution evaluations of gender mainstreaming for many different sectors that are context-specific.

The internet and digital technologies are upending global trade. Industries and supply chains are being transformed, and the movement of data across borders is now central to the operation of the global economy. Provisions in trade agreements address many aspects of the digital economy – from cross-border data flows, to the protection of citizens’ personal data, and the regulation of the internet and new technologies like artificial intelligence and algorithmic decision-making. The UK government has identified digital trade as a priority in its Global Britain strategy and one of the main sources of economic growth to recover from the pandemic. It wants the UK to play a leading role in setting the international standards and regulations that govern the global digital economy. The regulation of digital trade is a fast-evolving and contentious issue, and the US, European Union (EU), and China have adopted different approaches. Now that the UK has left the EU, it will need to navigate across multiple and often conflicting digital realms. The UK needs to decide which policy objectives it will prioritise, how to regulate the digital economy domestically, and how best to achieve its priorities when negotiating international trade agreements. There is an urgent need to develop a robust, evidence-based approach to the UK’s digital trade strategy that takes into account the perspectives of businesses, workers, and citizens, as well as the approaches of other countries in the global economy. This working paper aims to inform UK policy debates by assessing the state of play in digital trade globally. The authors present a detailed analysis of five policy areas that are central to discussions on digital trade for the UK: cross-border data flows and privacy; internet access and content regulation; intellectual property and innovation; e-commerce (including trade facilitation and consumer protection); and taxation (customs duties on e-commerce and digital services taxes). In each of these areas the authors compare and contrast the approaches taken by the US, EU and China, discuss the public policy implications, and examine the choices facing the UK.

The CPTPP allows economies and countries in other regions to formally incorporate trade flows with the Asia-Pacific and Pacific Rim, as well as boost trade with countries in these regions. The TPP was signed by 12 countries in February 2016 and on December 9 of the same year the Japanese government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe approved the TPP by a majority in the House of Representatives. However, in January 2017, Trump, as the new President of the United States, officially declared the withdrawal of the United States from the TPP to fulfill one of his election promises. In the end, Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the TPP has done nothing but exclude the United States from strengthening its trade ties with the Pacific Rim, while establishing the new 21st century rules for multilateral trade. In this context, this paper focuses on the study of two axes: the process and strategy of U.S. trade policy, and the current situation and a perspective of the TPP 11.

This Handbook has been created for development partners and civil society actors that design and implement youth employment interventions, particularly in contexts marked by fragility and political-economic crises. Youth employment programmes usually strengthen young people’s business and entrepreneurship skills. They fail to consider the civic and political competencies needed by young people in order to negotiate fair, safe, and decent working conditions and influence the wider policy environment for decent work. The Handbook offers suggestions for integrating youth active citizenship strategies into youth employment interventions, thus building young people’s civic and political skills. Adopting these strategies will strengthen the capacities of young people to engage both private sector and government actors, foster inclusion, and strengthen coalitions that can influence a enabling environment for decent jobs for youth. Recognising that many young people start their trade and businesses in theinformal economy, the Handbook takes their experiences as the point of departure. It is widely recognised that political economy matters for development and development interventions. This also applies to youth employment programming. Ideas in this Handbook recognise that politics influence youth employment opportunities. This is particularly the case in contexts commonly referred to as fragile, conflict-affected and violent settings (FCVS). Approaches to youth employment interventions need to respond to these dynamics to avoid that powerful actors capture them to serve their interests and avoid increasing risks to conflict. Moreover, the Covid-19 pandemic has proved that fragility is multidimensional and manifests in many countries across the globe. Early on in the pandemic, it quickly became clear that the informal economy would be hard hit. In addition, the challenging politics of FCVS influence opportunities for both formal and informal employment.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

The performance of supply chains used to be mainly the concern of academics and professionals who studied the potential efficiencies and risks associated with this aspect of globalisation. In 2021, major disruptions in this critical sector of our economies are making headlines and attracting the attention of policy makers around the world. Supply chain bottlenecks create shortages, fuel inflation, and undermine economic recovery. This report provides a transversal and multidisciplinary analysis of the challenges and opportunities regarding data interoperability and data sharing as they relate to the ‘Great Lakes - St. Lawrence Seaway Trade Corridor’ (GLSLTC)’s intermodal transportation and trade data strategy. The size and scope of this trade corridor are only matched by the complexity of its multimodal freight transportation systems and growing urbanization on both sides of the Canada-US border. This complexity is exacerbated by the lack of data interoperability and effective collaborations between the different stakeholders within the various jurisdictions and amongst them. Our analytical work relies on : 1) A review of the relevant documentation on the latest challenges to supply chains (SC), intermodal freight transport and international trade, identifying any databases that are to be used.; 2) A comparative review of selected relevant initiatives to give insights into the best practices in digital supply chains implemented in Canada, the United States, and the European Union.; 3) Interviews and discussions with experts from Transport Canada, Statistics Canada, the Canadian Centre on Transportation Data (CCTD) and Global Affairs Canada, as well as with CIRANO’s research community and four partner institutions to identify databases and data that they use in their research related to transportation and trade relevant data availabilities and methodologies as well as joint research opportunities. Its main findings can be summarized as follow: GLSLTC is characterized by its critical scale, complexity, and strategic impact as North America’s most vital trade corridor in the foreseeable further intensification of continental trade. 4% of Canadian GDP is attributed to the Transportation and Logistics sector (2018): $1 trillion of goods moved every year: Goods and services imports are equivalent to 33% of Canada’s GDP and goods and services exports equivalent to 32%. The transportation sector is a key contributor to the achievement of net-zero emissions commitment by 2050. All sectors of the Canadian economy are affected by global supply chain disruptions. Uncertainty and threats extend well beyond the COVID-19 Pandemic. “De-globalization” and increasing supply chains regionalization pressures are mounting. Innovation and thus economic performance—increasingly hinges on the quantity and quality of data. Data is transforming Canada’s economy/society and is now at the center of global trade “Transport data is becoming less available: Canada needs to make data a priority for a national transportation strategy.” * “How the Government of Canada collects, manages, and governs data—and how it accesses and shares data with other governments, sectors, and Canadians—must change.”

Chinese-sponsored Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones offer African countries opportunities for new sources of investment, employment, skills transfer and technology transfer that promote industrialisation. For more than 15 years, these economic zones have provided a window into the complexities of transforming African aspirations for industrialisation into realities. Through policy frameworks and incentives, Chinese firms have been encouraged to link with local economies. Despite varied outcomes, African support for industrial parks remains strong. To be sustainable, African Special Economic Zones need constructive partnerships and strong African governance, backed by high-quality data to inform both Chinese and African government decisions.

In the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, published in March 2021, the UK government set out four strategic objectives for ‘Global Britain’. A year later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the shift to a more divided world have put the vision of the UK as a ‘problem-solving and burden-sharing nation with global perspectives’ to an urgent and severe test. This research paper finds that the UK has made clear contributions to its objectives of upholding the values and security of the liberal democracies. But it has undercut its commitments to support global resilience, and its international economic agenda remains very much a work in progress. The government must now prioritize rebuilding its relationship with the EU; leverage the G7 to avoid being sidelined by closer US–EU cooperation; and give greater strategic purpose to its trade agenda. It also needs to follow through on its commitments to support the resilience of the international community, or it will fail to live up to its goal of launching a truly global Britain.

Across the Blue Economy, science must play a fundamental role in moving us away from business as usual to a more sustainable pathway. It provides evidence to inform policy by understanding baselines, trends and tipping points, as well as the multiple and interacting effects of human activities and policy interventions. Measuring progress depends on strong evidence and requires the design of a monitoring framework based on well-defined objectives and indicators, informed by the diverse disciplines required to inform progress on cross-cutting policy objectives such as the Just Transition. The differences between the scientific and policy processes are stark and affect interaction between them, including, among other factors, the time pressures of governmental decision-making, and the lack of support and reward in academia for policy engagement. To enable improved integration, the diverse nature of the science / policy interface is important to recognise – improved communication between scientists and policy professionals within government is important, as well as interaction with the wider academic community through secondments and other mechanisms. Skills in working across boundaries are valuable, requiring training and professional recognition. We also discussed the science needs across the themes of the Just Transition, Sustainable Seafood, Nature-based Solutions and the Circular Economy, where we considered: • What research and knowledge can help us manage synergies and trade-offs? • Where is innovation needed to promote synergies? • What type of indicators, data and evidence are needed to measure progress? The insights developed through dialogue among participants on these themes are outlined in Section 4 of this report.