Academic literature on the topic 'Church and social problems Victoria Reformed Church'

The nineteenth century witnessed a transition from the ancien régime to the ‘age of mobilisation’, says Charles Taylor, from an organically and hierarchically connected society to a fragmented society based on mass participation, charismatic leaders and organisational tactics. Amid this upheaval the Netherlands Reformed Church faced an unprecedented crisis as it lost its taken-for-granted social status. This essay examines the new legitimation that Abraham Kuyper offered the Church through his Free Church theology, and how various other aspects of his theology, including his baptismal and public theology, developed in conjunction with his ecclesiology. Kuyper's ecclesiology thus offers a case study of problems that ecclesiology in general faced due to the social and cultural shifts of the nineteenth century.

Christianity entered Nepal more than three and half centuries ago but religious conversion is still a contentious issue. This paper explores the trend of conversion to Christianity in Pokhara, Nepal. The study method was qualitative and quantitative. Observation, interview schedule and case study guidelines were used to obtain data from 70 converts of AG Church, Fulbari, Pokhara. The study findings reveal that females and oppressed of all caste/ethnicities with low occupational status were more interested in conversion. With no single cause of conversion, process and consequence, there is a nexus between conversion and modernity, consequences and the elements of continuity. With healing and church charity as the key motivations behind conversion, people convert with different intentions to overcome health problems, discontent with present religion, for money, friends and family influences. Christian church activates charities/supports for conversion. Conversion as a choice is a product of modern individualism, and the converts perceived contentment and changes in post-convert life. The accusation that conversion to Christianity is for financial gains may be valid for those who come with expectations, but the majority converts economic status is not satisfactory. In the absence of a state sponsored health and social security system, prevailing socioeconomic inequalities and pseudo-scientific non-medics superstition of church, conversion may be a way to break predominant sociocultural hierarchy/barriers. Hence, it should not be very surprising that many more will adopt Christianity in future. Educational systems should be reformed to reflect each religion’s genuine teaching and ideology and hence generate awareness on proselytizing.

Abstract The focus of this article is on the actions of Reverend Frits Slomp, vicar of the Reformed Church in Heemse, during the economic depression of the 1930s, and his response to the rise of national socialism as a new political movement. During the depression many labourers in Heemse and Hardenberg lost their jobs. Reverend Slomp put a great deal of personal effort into helping these men and into trying to solve their social-economic problems. When in 1933 the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) came into power in Germany and the National Socialist Party (NSB) was gaining ground in the Netherlands, Reverend Slomp warned about the dangers of National Socialism.

This paper investigates the health and welfare needs of students (n = 15,806) and the current service model in Catholic schools in the Ballarat Diocese of Victoria, Australia. Catholic schools use a service model underpinned by an ethos of pastoral care; there is a strong tradition of self-reliance within the Catholic education system for meeting students' health and welfare needs. The central research questions are: What are the emerging health and welfare needs of students? How does pastoral care shape the service model to meet these needs? What model/s might better meet students? primary health care needs? The research methods involved analysis of (1) extant databases of expressed service needs including referrals (n = 1,248) to Student Services over the last 2.5 years, (2) trends in the additional funding support such as special needs funding for students and the Education Maintenance Allowance for families, and (3) semi-structured individual and group interviews with 98 Diocesan and school staff responsible for meeting students' health and welfare needs. Analysis of expressed service needs revealed a marked increase in service demand, and in the complexity and severity of students' needs. Thematic analysis of qualitative interview data revealed five pressing issues: the health and welfare needs of students; stressors in the school community; rural isolation; role boundaries and individualised interventions; and self-reliant networks of care. Explanations for many of these problems can be located in wider social and economic forces impacting upon the church and rural communities. It was concluded that the pastoral care model - as it is currently configured - is not equipped to meet the escalating primary health care needs of students in rural areas. This paper considers the implications for enhanced primary health care in both rural communities and in schools.

EditorialThis voluminous issue consists of 13 articles and 8 notes dealing with various legal topics in South Africa and abroad. The articles commences with Ig Rautenbach’s discussion of the ever-elusive concept of proportionality in the light of the text of the South African Constitution. Mmaphuti Tuba analyses the different approaches adopted for the regulation of payment systems in a variety of legislative instruments by the European Union. Phoebe Boltondeals with the thorny issue of public tenders and the extent to which bidders must comply with tender specifications and conditions. Leentjie de Jong examines present-day family arbitration and the problems experienced with it. Daleen Millard and Birgit Kuschke evaluate the insurer’s pre-contractual duties in the light of the transparency principle in insurance law. Karin Calitz deals with the question if a church can be held liable for the sexual assault of children by a priest, when the victims claim as adults, many years after the events took place. The entitlement of a non-member spouse to the member’s pension forms the focus point of Clement Marumoagae’scontribution. Mitzi Wiese reflects on the correctness of the classification of liens into enrichment and contractual liens. Frans Viljoen and Nicholas Orago analyses the importance and implications of the individual communications procedure under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OP-ICESCR) and details some of the reasons why it would be beneficial for South Africa to accede thereto. The interplay between international law and labour law in South Africa in the context of diplomatic immunity is investigated byEzette Gericke. Cornelius Kilian and Elizabeth Snyman-Van Deventer consider section 75 in the Companies Act of 1973 (or its equivalent, section 36(2) in the Companies Act of 2008) and the topic of statutory approval for an artificial decrease or increase in the number of issued shares. Annelie Laas and Trynie Boezaart give a critical analysis of the legal measures available to curb bullying in schools. Further afield, Mtendeweka Mhango discusses the development and current status of the political question doctrine in Ghana.The first note by Roger Evans and Lienne Steyn deliberate on the seemingly contradictory outcomes of three high court judgments regarding the question of ownership of property which vests in the master of the high court by virtue of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. Philip Stevens also discusses recent judgments pronouncing on the entering of the particulars of child sex offenders into the register for sex offenders as enunciated in Chapter 6 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. Sieg Eiselen illustrates how the Department of Trade and Industry’s proposed amendment to the definition of “electronic signature” would undermine the key principles of functional equivalence, media neutrality and party autonomy. Luanda Hawthorne deliberates on the element of exploitation in bargaining relationships between contractual parties, as highlighted in Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 (WCC). Anneliese Roos and Magda Slabbert discuss the case of Isparta v Richter 2013 6 SA 4529 (GP), which dealt with defamation in the social media on the Facebook platform. Rowena Bernard considers the case of Department of Correctional Services v Police and Prison Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) 2011 32 ILJ 2629 (LAC), where the employer's application of rules relating to the dress code of employees impacted on the religious beliefs and practices of five of the staff members. Nico Buitendag and Karin van Marle reflect on Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC), which drew considerable attention in the media and in the public discourse. In the last contribution, James Linscott analyses F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 1 SA 536 (CC), which dealt with the “standard” test for vicarious liability.EditorChrista Rautenbach

This paper examines the ideology of the German Neukirchen Mission and its implication on education in Tana River County, Kenya 1887 to 1986. Western education and Christianity in Africa were introduced by Christian missionaries from Europe as early as the 16th century but took root in around the mid-nineteenth century. In Tana River, several missionary organizations ventured in the area notably the Methodist Missionary Society (MMS), the German Neukirchen Mission (GNM), the Holy Ghost Fathers (HGF) and the Swedish Mission. They all gave up in the area due to a multiplicity of hardships save for the GNM which hang on and continued with evangelization and education. Consequently, there is need to look at the ideology of the GNM that influenced its resolve to persist in an area shunned by its contemporaries. An understanding of GNM’s ideology would come in handy in helping to improve education standards in the area bearing in mind that the same problems that bedeviled the region have to a large extent remained to date The study had three objectives which were: to identify the educational institutions opened by the GNM in Tana River County 1887-1986; to establish the hardships experienced by the GNM in Tana River County in the period 1887-1986 and to examine the ideology which influenced GNM’s activities in Tana River County in the period 1887-1986. The time frame was 1887 to 1986. This period covers the time the GNM arrived in Tana River to the year the first secondary school was established at Ngao i.e 1986. Ngao served as GNM’s mission base or station since the arrival of the missionaries in the region. The study was historical in nature and utilized a historical research design. Sources of data were both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources were mainly drawn from the Kenya National Archives (KNA) and schools and churches in Tana River. Document analysis was also utilized as a data collection method. The research instruments were interview schedules and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Respondents to these research instruments were retired educationists, civil servants and politicians, church leaders and village elders selected through purposive and snowball sampling techniques; all totaling 33. Collected data was analyzed through qualitative and quantitative methods while documents were analyzed through external and internal criticism. The study found out that the GNM established 31 primary schools 28 of which are still operational. The GNM missionaries experienced several challenges among them deportation during the two World Wars, frequent Somali attacks, floods, poor transport network, malaria infections and inadequate finances. The ideology was examined under five perspectives namely The Great Commission, Faith Mission, Reformed Theology, Social Darwinism and Socio-Political and Economic view point. The study recommends improvement of road and school infrastructure, investing more on Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) institutions, opening of a secondary school wing in every primary school, delocalization of teachers and establishment of an institution of higher learning in the area.

JACQUES ELLUL: A Companion to His Major Works by Jacob E. Van Vleet and Jacob Marques Rollison. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2020. 187 pages. Paperback; $25.00. ISBN: 9781625649140. *Jacques Ellul stands as a towering figure in this discourse on theology, politics, violence, and technology. Ellul was a professor of history and sociology of institutions at the University of Bordeaux in France, but he is most known in the English-speaking world as a technological critic and lay theologian. Over the course of his life, he wrote over fifty books and over one thousand essays on topics ranging from cultural critique to biblical exegesis. In his early life, Ellul was influenced by the French personalist movement, especially by his friend Bernard Charbonneau, and played a role in the French Resistance during World War II. As an academic, thinker, and commentator he considered his three main intellectual influences to be--perhaps a strange mixture--Karl Marx, Søren Kierkegaard, and Karl Barth. Throughout his life, he was a committed member of the Reformed Church in France although, in significant ways, his thought diverged from both historic Calvinism and varieties of modern, liberal Protestantism. *In Jacques Ellul: A Companion to His Major Works, Jacob E. Van Vleet and Jacob Marques Rollison take readers through succinct, well-ordered summaries of eleven of Ellul's most important works, including a one-chapter summary of his theological ethics. Both scholars are well versed in Ellul's corpus. Van Vleet, a professor of philosophy at Diablo Valley College in California, has already published at least two books on Ellul. Rollison, an independent scholar in Strasbourg, France, has published on Ellul and edited some of his work. The authors divide their book into two main sections: the first, reviewing Ellul's theological works; and the second, his sociological works. They borrow from Ellul the image of train tracks, "separate but parallel, moving toward the same goal," to describe the relationship between theology and sociology in his body of work (p. 2). The two disciplines have different frameworks and methodologies, but the authors argue that examining both in a "dialectical" way is necessary to understanding the heart of Ellul's thought. *In the first five chapters, the authors review what they consider to be Ellul's most important theological works. Chapter 1 reviews the book Presence in the Modern World, published originally in French in 1948; in English in 1951. That book introduces the main concerns of Ellul's project: a critical analysis of society and an approach to Christian engagement with society through the category of "presence." Cautious, for theological reasons, about creating explicit ethical systems, Ellul instead gives readers a general commentary on how to "live in the world, but not of the world"--a world marked by an idolatrous concern for efficiency, quantification, and bureaucratic control. Chapter 2 does a good job summarizing the book Violence: Reflections from a Christian Perspective, first published in 1969. Critiquing both uncritical acceptance of violence and traditional just-war theory, Ellul outlines instead his own defense of Christian nonviolence. In chapter 3, the authors review Ellul's masterful work The Meaning of the City. This book is an extended meditation on the theme of the city in the Bible as both a symbol of human sin and hubris, and a symbol of hope. Jerusalem, in particular, becomes a sign of God's willingness to meet humanity on our own terrain. *Chapter 4 deals with the book that Ellul considered to be his greatest theological work, Hope in Time of Abandonment. The book puts forward the thesis that, while God "perhaps ... still speaks to the heart of [an individual]," he no longer speaks or is present at the level of society's institutions or its history (p. 47). In the context of God's marked absence, Christians are called to a peculiar practice of hope marked by perseverance, prayer, and a disciplined, fearless realism. Chapter 5 explores Ellul's commentary on the book of Revelation published in English as Apocalypse: The Book of Revelation in 1978. The book follows some sort of personal religious transformation for Ellul, and in it, he boldly proclaims his hope for universal salvation. Against interpretations of Revelation that see the book as a promise that evil people will be judged and defeated, he sees in it instead a promise that God will be victorious over evil powers--the spiritual systems and sociological forces that rule our lives. *Chapter 6 ends the theological section of the book. Unlike the chapters before and after, this chapter does not look at a single book but instead looks at Ellul's theological ethics. The authors admit that, while Ellul wrote both theology and biblical commentaries, none of these were his specialty. "It is most correct," they argue, "to view Ellul as a theological ethicist (rather) than a theologian" (p. 70). His theological ethics are marked by a refusal (most explicitly in his book The Ethics of Freedom) to set up any kind of moral system, universal solutions, or rules for Christians. He writes, "We can only put the problems as clearly as possible and then, having given the believer all the weapons that theology and piety can offer, say to him: ‘Now it is up to you'" (p. 69). Van Vleet and Rollison do not explore the historical or theological circumstances that led Ellul to such a unique approach to Christian ethics. If I were to hazard a guess, it seems that this particular approach was influenced by Kierkegaard's existentialism and Barth's theology of revelation. Such an atypical vision for Christian ethics, to my mind, deserves more contextual explanation than Van Vleet and Rollison afford it. *The next six chapters deal with Ellul's sociological writings, in particular, on the topics of technology, politics, and communications. Chapter 7 deals with the book The Technological Society, arguably his most famous work. Van Vleet and Rollison argue that in this book Ellul does for twentieth-century technology what Karl Marx did for nineteenth-century capitalism--namely, identify the key systemic forces that shape our lives. While much of The Technological Society deals with Ellul's analysis of "technique" as an all-encompassing cultural phenomenon, a more intriguing dimension of his analysis is his application of "the sacred" as a sociological concept to our relationship with technology. Humans cannot live without the sacred and, in our supposedly post-religious world, we have transferred religious feelings and behaviors onto technology itself. Chapter eight deals with one particular facet of the technological society, mass media. Ellul's book Propaganda: The Formation of Man's Attitudes was first published in 1965 and looks at how the powers-that-be use mass media to fashion public opinion and manipulate human behavior. After analyzing the social and psychological effects of mass media and propaganda, Ellul suggests that it is imperative for human beings to "wake up" to this reality as the first and most important step in resisting it. *In chapter 9, the authors review the book The Political Illusion, also published in 1965. In that book, Ellul condemns the expansion of the state, the increased politicization of everyday life, and society's self-defeating political illusions. Once again, he counsels a kind of existentialist resistance, encouraging individuals to "question clichés" and (implicitly) suggesting the impossibility of any kind of collective, systemic reform. Chapter 10 builds on this political critique with a review of the book Autopsy of Revolution. In Autopsy, Ellul questions the continued hope among some for a revolution that will solve our political and economic problems. Tracing the history of the concept of revolution from before and after 1789, he specifically critiques the Marxist conception of revolution as no longer viable, particularly pointing out how modern hopes for revolution tend to "absorb all the religious emotions" that have nowhere else to go in a secular society. In chapter 11, Ellul's critical analysis of both technology and politics is brought together in the book The New Demons. Once again drawing upon the concept of "the sacred," Ellul argues that our collective religious inclinations have not disappeared but have focused themselves instead on science, technology, and politics. While none of these things are bad in themselves, they have become idols in need of spiritual dethroning. The final chapter in this volume deals with the book The Humiliation of the Word. That book begins with a discussion about the different functions of both hearing and seeing in human perception. An ideal society would balance hearing and seeing, the word and image, but, in our society, the image dominates. Cataloguing the negative effects of this imbalance, Ellul urges us to revive an appreciation for the word. The word, he argues, brings qualities of discussion, paradox, and mystery--qualities we desperately need as individuals and as a society. *Overall Jacques Ellul: A Companion to His Major Works fulfills its promise of providing short, readable summaries of Ellul's most important works. Van Vleet and Rollison are to be commended for their discerning choice of eleven books that represent well both the sociological and theological dimensions of his corpus. Furthermore, they competently identify and trace core themes that appear book after book so that readers gain an impression of Ellul's overall thought and how his discrete ideas form parts of a coherent whole. The only book that seemed conspicuously absent from the volume is the book Anarchy and Christianity (although it is referenced on occasion). This seemed a regrettable omission given the importance of Ellul's anarchism for both his faith and his politics. *When introducing a major thinker and their body of thought, the choice of framework is critical. In this volume, Van Vleet and Rollison chose to present Ellul's work as a collection of sociological and theological writings, with each book contextualized (for the most part) in reference to his other writings. For some readers, this might make an excellent choice, but others may find it unsatisfying for their purposes. For example, I came to the book as someone widely read in political theology, strategic nonviolence, and the appropriate technology tradition (Schumacher, Illich, and others). With every chapter I was left with an unsatisfied desire to understand Ellul in reference to these larger traditions. How do Ellul's thoughts on violence connect to other Christian reflections on violence (Niebuhr, Yoder, etc.) or broader conceptions of strategic nonviolence (Gandhi, Sharp, Chenoweth, etc.)? How does his critique of the technological society compare and contrast to Ivan Illich's vision in Tools for Conviviality or E. F. Schumacher's work on appropriate technology? *On the whole, I found this book to be an accessible, useful introduction to the work of Jacques Ellul. That being said, an introductory chapter situating Ellul's thoughts within the larger intellectual traditions would have been helpful. *Reviewed by Isaiah Ritzmann, Community Educator, The Working Centre in Kitchener, ON N2G 1V6.

Orientation: The ministry is one occupation where burnout is increasingly considered to be a consequence of the problems with which ministers have to cope. However, few studies focused on the positive antipode of a minister’s work.Research purpose: The objective of this study was to investigate the effects of job-demands and job-resources on ministers’ burnout and engagement. Congregational commitment and health were included as possible consequences of burnout and engagement.Motivation for the study: Ministers’ well-being has become an important topic for both researchers and practitioners.Research design, approach and method: A survey design with a non-probability, purposive voluntary sample of 115 ministers was used. The Job-Demands–Resources Questionnaire, Maslach Burnout Inventory, Work Engagement Scale, General Health Questionnaire, and Congregational Commitment Scale were administered.Main findings: Regression analysis indicated that the pace, amount of work and emotional demands were indicators of burnout while growth opportunities, social support and job significance were indicators of engagement. Furthermore, it was found that exhaustion predicted somatic symptoms and depression, while mental distance predicted depression. Engagement predicted social functioning and affective commitment.Practical implications: Interventions should be implemented to help ministers deal more effectively with any burnout symptoms experienced in order to prevent ministers who are already showing signs of burnout from getting sick to increase their engagement and to rehabilitate individuals who are ill as a result of the work place.Contribution: The study contributes to knowledge regarding the effects of job-demands and resources on the well-being of ministers.

This article engages with the Missional Framework Document of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) from the perspectives of solidarity with the poor and justice for South African society. The democratic South Africa continues to face significant socio-economic problems and an increasingly dissatisfied population. In the light of this, the article presents an introductory conversation with the Missional Framework Document in order to ask whether it offers an adequate response to South Africa�s current contextual challenges. The lens through which this article will engage the Framework Document is the theological paradigm of justice, specifically the theory of justice presented by Nicholas Wolterstorff as well as some important contributions from contemporary South African scholars who advocate for a theology from the margins of society. It is contended that the DRC remains a predominantly white middle-class church. This social, economic and political location has an impact on the missional theology of the church as expressed in the Framework Document. Hence, we engage with the Missional Theology of the DRC by means of a paradigm that operates from the �underside� or the economic, political and social �margins� of South African society. We argue that any missional theology aimed at furthering God�s Kingdom in South Africa at present must develop in community with the marginalised majority of the nation. The critical engagement with the Framework Document will be done by sketching a theological landscape where current contextual realities are brought into relief against a kairos moment on which the efficacy of this church�s mission, indeed its public work and witness, is being called into question.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: This interdisciplinary study in Systematic Theology and Ethics engages the missional theology found in the Missional Framework Document of the Dutch Reformed Church. Methodologically, the research advocates for a contextual engagement with the missional theology proposed by this important document. The outcome of this contextual theological consideration is an invitation for the Church to consider the ethics of justice as an important aspect of their approach to faithful Christian mission in the South African social, economic and political context.

Introduction The highly contagious COVID-19 virus has presented particularly difficult public policy challenges. The relatively late emergence of an effective treatments and vaccines, the structural stresses on health care systems, the lockdowns and the economic dislocations, the evident structural inequalities in effected societies, as well as the difficulty of prevention have tested social and political cohesion. Moreover, the intrusive nature of many prophylactic measures have led to individual liberty and human rights concerns. As noted by the Victorian (Australia) Ombudsman Report on the COVID-19 lockdown in Melbourne, we may be tempted, during a crisis, to view human rights as expendable in the pursuit of saving human lives. This thinking can lead to dangerous territory. It is not unlawful to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms when there are compelling reasons for doing so; human rights are inherently and inseparably a consideration of human lives. (5) These difficulties have raised issues about the importance of social or community capital in fighting the pandemic. This article discusses the impacts of social and community capital and other factors on the governmental efforts to combat the spread of infectious disease through the maintenance of social distancing and household ‘bubbles’. It argues that the beneficial effects of social and community capital towards fighting the pandemic, such as mutual respect and empathy, which underpins such public health measures as social distancing, the use of personal protective equipment, and lockdowns in the USA, have been undermined as preventive measures because they have been transmogrified to become a salient aspect of the “culture wars” (Peters). In contrast, states that have relatively lower social capital such a China have been able to more effectively arrest transmission of the disease because the government was been able to generate and personify a nationalist response to the virus and thus generate a more robust social consensus regarding the efforts to combat the disease. Social Capital and Culture Wars The response to COVID-19 required individuals, families, communities, and other types of groups to refrain from extensive interaction – to stay in their bubble. In these situations, especially given the asymptomatic nature of many COVID-19 infections and the serious imposition lockdowns and social distancing and isolation, the temptation for individuals to breach public health rules in high. From the perspective of policymakers, the response to fighting COVID-19 is a collective action problem. In studying collective action problems, scholars have paid much attention on the role of social and community capital (Ostrom and Ahn 17-35). Ostrom and Ahn comment that social capital “provides a synthesizing approach to how cultural, social, and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect their capacity of dealing with collective-action problems” (24). Social capital is regarded as an evolving social type of cultural trait (Fukuyama; Guiso et al.). Adger argues that social capital “captures the nature of social relations” and “provides an explanation for how individuals use their relationships to other actors in societies for their own and for the collective good” (387). The most frequently used definition of social capital is the one proffered by Putnam who regards it as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 65). All these studies suggest that social and community capital has at least two elements: “objective associations” and subjective ties among individuals. Objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations that are formed and engaged in on a voluntary basis by individuals and social groups. Subjective ties or norms, on the other hand, primarily stand for trust and reciprocity (Paxton). High levels of social capital have generally been associated with democratic politics and civil societies whose institutional performance benefits from the coordinated actions and civic culture that has been facilitated by high levels of social capital (Putnam, Democracy 167-9). Alternatively, a “good and fair” state and impartial institutions are important factors in generating and preserving high levels of social capital (Offe 42-87). Yet social capital is not limited to democratic civil societies and research is mixed on whether rising social capital manifests itself in a more vigorous civil society that in turn leads to democratising impulses. Castillo argues that various trust levels for institutions that reinforce submission, hierarchy, and cultural conservatism can be high in authoritarian governments, indicating that high levels of social capital do not necessarily lead to democratic civic societies (Castillo et al.). Roßteutscher concludes after a survey of social capita indicators in authoritarian states that social capital has little effect of democratisation and may in fact reinforce authoritarian rule: in nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance (752). In China, there has been ongoing debate concerning the presence of civil society and the level of social capital found across Chinese society. If one defines civil society as an intermediate associational realm between the state and the family, populated by autonomous organisations which are separate from the state that are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values, it is arguable that the PRC had a significant civil society or social capital in the first few decades after its establishment (White). However, most scholars agree that nascent civil society as well as a more salient social and community capital has emerged in China’s reform era. This was evident after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the government welcomed community organising and community-driven donation campaigns for a limited period of time, giving the NGO sector and bottom-up social activism a boost, as evidenced in various policy areas such as disaster relief and rural community development (F. Wu 126; Xu 9). Nevertheless, the CCP and the Chinese state have been effective in maintaining significant control over civil society and autonomous groups without attempting to completely eliminate their autonomy or existence. The dramatic economic and social changes that have occurred since the 1978 Opening have unsurprisingly engendered numerous conflicts across the society. In response, the CCP and State have adjusted political economic policies to meet the changing demands of workers, migrants, the unemployed, minorities, farmers, local artisans, entrepreneurs, and the growing middle class. Often the demands arising from these groups have resulted in policy changes, including compensation. In other circumstances, where these groups remain dissatisfied, the government will tolerate them (ignore them but allow them to continue in the advocacy), or, when the need arises, supress the disaffected groups (F. Wu 2). At the same time, social organisations and other groups in civil society have often “refrained from open and broad contestation against the regime”, thereby gaining the space and autonomy to achieve the objectives (F. Wu 2). Studies of Chinese social or community capital suggest that a form of modern social capital has gradually emerged as Chinese society has become increasingly modernised and liberalised (despite being non-democratic), and that this social capital has begun to play an important role in shaping social and economic lives at the local level. However, this more modern form of social capital, arising from developmental and social changes, competes with traditional social values and social capital, which stresses parochial and particularistic feelings among known individuals while modern social capital emphasises general trust and reciprocal feelings among both known and unknown individuals. The objective element of these traditional values are those government-sanctioned, formal mass organisations such as Communist Youth and the All-China Federation of Women's Associations, where members are obliged to obey the organisation leadership. The predominant subjective values are parochial and particularistic feelings among individuals who know one another, such as guanxi and zongzu (Chen and Lu, 426). The concept of social capital emphasises that the underlying cooperative values found in individuals and groups within a culture are an important factor in solving collective problems. In contrast, the notion of “culture war” focusses on those values and differences that divide social and cultural groups. Barry defines culture wars as increases in volatility, expansion of polarisation, and conflict between those who are passionate about religiously motivated politics, traditional morality, and anti-intellectualism, and…those who embrace progressive politics, cultural openness, and scientific and modernist orientations. (90) The contemporary culture wars across the world manifest opposition by various groups in society who hold divergent worldviews and ideological positions. Proponents of culture war understand various issues as part of a broader set of religious, political, and moral/normative positions invoked in opposition to “elite”, “liberal”, or “left” ideologies. Within this Manichean universe opposition to such issues as climate change, Black Lives Matter, same sex rights, prison reform, gun control, and immigration becomes framed in binary terms, and infused with a moral sensibility (Chapman 8-10). In many disputes, the culture war often devolves into an epistemological dispute about the efficacy of scientific knowledge and authority, or a dispute between “practical” and theoretical knowledge. In this environment, even facts can become partisan narratives. For these “cultural” disputes are often how electoral prospects (generally right-wing) are advanced; “not through policies or promises of a better life, but by fostering a sense of threat, a fantasy that something profoundly pure … is constantly at risk of extinction” (Malik). This “zero-sum” social and policy environment that makes it difficult to compromise and has serious consequences for social stability or government policy, especially in a liberal democratic society. Of course, from the perspective of cultural materialism such a reductionist approach to culture and political and social values is not unexpected. “Culture” is one of the many arenas in which dominant social groups seek to express and reproduce their interests and preferences. “Culture” from this sense is “material” and is ultimately connected to the distribution of power, wealth, and resources in society. As such, the various policy areas that are understood as part of the “culture wars” are another domain where various dominant and subordinate groups and interests engaged in conflict express their values and goals. Yet it is unexpected that despite the pervasiveness of information available to individuals the pool of information consumed by individuals who view the “culture wars” as a touchstone for political behaviour and a narrative to categorise events and facts is relatively closed. This lack of balance has been magnified by social media algorithms, conspiracy-laced talk radio, and a media ecosystem that frames and discusses issues in a manner that elides into an easily understood “culture war” narrative. From this perspective, the groups (generally right-wing or traditionalist) exist within an information bubble that reinforces political, social, and cultural predilections. American and Chinese Reponses to COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan in December 2019. Initially unprepared and unwilling to accept the seriousness of the infection, the Chinese government regrouped from early mistakes and essentially controlled transmission in about three months. This positive outcome has been messaged as an exposition of the superiority of the Chinese governmental system and society both domestically and internationally; a positive, even heroic performance that evidences the populist credentials of the Chinese political leadership and demonstrates national excellence. The recently published White Paper entitled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” also summarises China’s “strategic achievement” in the simple language of numbers: in a month, the rising spread was contained; in two months, the daily case increase fell to single digits; and in three months, a “decisive victory” was secured in Wuhan City and Hubei Province (Xinhua). This clear articulation of the positive results has rallied political support. Indeed, a recent survey shows that 89 percent of citizens are satisfied with the government’s information dissemination during the pandemic (C Wu). As part of the effort, the government extensively promoted the provision of “political goods”, such as law and order, national unity and pride, and shared values. For example, severe publishments were introduced for violence against medical professionals and police, producing and selling counterfeit medications, raising commodity prices, spreading ‘rumours’, and being uncooperative with quarantine measures (Xu). Additionally, as an extension the popular anti-corruption campaign, many local political leaders were disciplined or received criminal charges for inappropriate behaviour, abuse of power, and corruption during the pandemic (People.cn, 2 Feb. 2020). Chinese state media also described fighting the virus as a global “competition”. In this competition a nation’s “material power” as well as “mental strength”, that calls for the highest level of nation unity and patriotism, is put to the test. This discourse recalled the global competition in light of the national mythology related to the formation of Chinese nation, the historical “hardship”, and the “heroic Chinese people” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). Moreover, as the threat of infection receded, it was emphasised that China “won this competition” and the Chinese people have demonstrated the “great spirit of China” to the world: a result built upon the “heroism of the whole Party, Army, and Chinese people from all ethnic groups” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). In contrast to the Chinese approach of emphasising national public goods as a justification for fighting the virus, the U.S. Trump Administration used nationalism, deflection, and “culture war” discourse to undermine health responses — an unprecedented response in American public health policy. The seriousness of the disease as well as the statistical evidence of its course through the American population was disputed. The President and various supporters raged against the COVID-19 “hoax”, social distancing, and lockdowns, disparaged public health institutions and advice, and encouraged protesters to “liberate” locked-down states (Russonello). “Our federal overlords say ‘no singing’ and ‘no shouting’ on Thanksgiving”, Representative Paul Gosar, a Republican of Arizona, wrote as he retweeted a Centers for Disease Control list of Thanksgiving safety tips (Weiner). People were encouraged, by way of the White House and Republican leadership, to ignore health regulations and not to comply with social distancing measures and the wearing of masks (Tracy). This encouragement led to threats against proponents of face masks such as Dr Anthony Fauci, one of the nation’s foremost experts on infectious diseases, who required bodyguards because of the many threats on his life. Fauci’s critics — including President Trump — countered Fauci’s promotion of mask wearing by stating accusingly that he once said mask-wearing was not necessary for ordinary people (Kelly). Conspiracy theories as to the safety of vaccinations also grew across the course of the year. As the 2020 election approached, the Administration ramped up efforts to downplay the serious of the virus by identifying it with “the media” and illegitimate “partisan” efforts to undermine the Trump presidency. It also ramped up its criticism of China as the source of the infection. This political self-centeredness undermined state and federal efforts to slow transmission (Shear et al.). At the same time, Trump chided health officials for moving too slowly on vaccine approvals, repeated charges that high infection rates were due to increased testing, and argued that COVID-19 deaths were exaggerated by medical providers for political and financial reasons. These claims were amplified by various conservative media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham of Fox News. The result of this “COVID-19 Denialism” and the alternative narrative of COVID-19 policy told through the lens of culture war has resulted in the United States having the highest number of COVID-19 cases, and the highest number of COVID-19 deaths. At the same time, the underlying social consensus and social capital that have historically assisted in generating positive public health outcomes has been significantly eroded. According to the Pew Research Center, the share of U.S. adults who say public health officials such as those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are doing an excellent or good job responding to the outbreak decreased from 79% in March to 63% in August, with an especially sharp decrease among Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020). Social Capital and COVID-19 From the perspective of social or community capital, it could be expected that the American response to the Pandemic would be more effective than the Chinese response. Historically, the United States has had high levels of social capital, a highly developed public health system, and strong governmental capacity. In contrast, China has a relatively high level of governmental and public health capacity, but the level of social capital has been lower and there is a significant presence of traditional values which emphasise parochial and particularistic values. Moreover, the antecedent institutions of social capital, such as weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal et al.), environmental turbulence and resource scarcity along with the transactional nature of guanxi (gift-giving and information exchange and relationship dependence) militate against finding a more effective social and community response to the public health emergency. Yet China’s response has been significantly more successful than the Unites States’. Paradoxically, the American response under the Trump Administration and the Chinese response both relied on an externalisation of the both the threat and the justifications for their particular response. In the American case, President Trump, while downplaying the seriousness of the virus, consistently called it the “China virus” in an effort to deflect responsibly as well as a means to avert attention away from the public health impacts. As recently as 3 January 2021, Trump tweeted that the number of “China Virus” cases and deaths in the U.S. were “far exaggerated”, while critically citing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's methodology: “When in doubt, call it COVID-19. Fake News!” (Bacon). The Chinese Government, meanwhile, has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy across the South China Sea, on the frontier in the Indian sub-continent, and against states such as Australia who have criticised the initial Chinese response to COVID-19. To this international criticism, the government reiterated its sovereign rights and emphasised its “victimhood” in the face of “anti-China” foreign forces. Chinese state media also highlighted China as “victim” of the coronavirus, but also as a target of Western “political manoeuvres” when investigating the beginning stages of the pandemic. The major difference, however, is that public health policy in the United States was superimposed on other more fundamental political and cultural cleavages, and part of this externalisation process included the assignation of “otherness” and demonisation of internal political opponents or characterising political opponents as bent on destroying the United States. This assignation of “otherness” to various internal groups is a crucial element in the culture wars. While this may have been inevitable given the increasingly frayed nature of American society post-2008, such a characterisation has been activity pushed by local, state, and national leadership in the Republican Party and the Trump Administration (Vogel et al.). In such circumstances, minimising health risks and highlighting civil rights concerns due to public health measures, along with assigning blame to the democratic opposition and foreign states such as China, can have a major impact of public health responses. The result has been that social trust beyond the bubble of one’s immediate circle or those who share similar beliefs is seriously compromised — and the collective action problem presented by COVID-19 remains unsolved. Daniel Aldrich’s study of disasters in Japan, India, and US demonstrates that pre-existing high levels of social capital would lead to stronger resilience and better recovery (Aldrich). Social capital helps coordinate resources and facilitate the reconstruction collectively and therefore would lead to better recovery (Alesch et al.). Yet there has not been much research on how the pool of social capital first came about and how a disaster may affect the creation and store of social capital. Rebecca Solnit has examined five major disasters and describes that after these events, survivors would reach out and work together to confront the challenges they face, therefore increasing the social capital in the community (Solnit). However, there are studies that have concluded that major disasters can damage the social fabric in local communities (Peacock et al.). The COVID-19 epidemic does not have the intensity and suddenness of other disasters but has had significant knock-on effects in increasing or decreasing social capital, depending on the institutional and social responses to the pandemic. In China, it appears that the positive social capital effects have been partially subsumed into a more generalised patriotic or nationalist affirmation of the government’s policy response. Unlike civil society responses to earlier crises, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there is less evidence of widespread community organisation and response to combat the epidemic at its initial stages. This suggests better institutional responses to the crisis by the government, but also a high degree of porosity between civil society and a national “imagined community” represented by the national state. The result has been an increased legitimacy for the Chinese government. Alternatively, in the United States the transformation of COVID-19 public health policy into a culture war issue has seriously impeded efforts to combat the epidemic in the short term by undermining the social consensus and social capital necessary to fight such a pandemic. Trust in American institutions is historically low, and President Trump’s untrue contention that President Biden’s election was due to “fraud” has further undermined the legitimacy of the American government, as evidenced by the attacks directed at Congress in the U.S. capital on 6 January 2021. As such, the lingering effects the pandemic will have on social, economic, and political institutions will likely reinforce the deep cultural and political cleavages and weaken interpersonal networks in American society. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated global public health and impacted deeply on the world economy. Unsurprisingly, given the serious economic, social, and political consequences, different government responses have been highly politicised. Various quarantine and infection case tracking methods have caused concern over state power intruding into private spheres. The usage of face masks, social distancing rules, and intra-state travel restrictions have aroused passionate debate over public health restrictions, individual liberty, and human rights. Yet underlying public health responses grounded in higher levels of social capital enhance the effectiveness of public health measures. In China, a country that has generally been associated with lower social capital, it is likely that the relatively strong policy response to COVID-19 will both enhance feelings of nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism and help create and increase the store of social capital. 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Text in Afrikaans with abstracts in Afrikaans, English and Zulu. Translated title in English supplied
Die hoofdoel van die verhandeling is om die fundamentele aanspraak van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk aan te spreek dat sy belydenisskrifte, met spesifieke verwysing na daardie leerstellings wat met die vraag oor die ontstaan van die mensdom en die oorsprong van sonde handel en wat in 1619 deur die Sinode van Dordrecht aanvaar is, waar is. Hierdie leerstellings word (teologies) as waarhede voorgehou dat dit op die Bybel as die Woord van God gegrond is. Die vertrekpunt van die verhandeling is dat die betrokke leerstellings vanuit ’n toepaslike historiese konteks benader moet word wanneer die vraag van hulle geldigheid aangespreek word. Nog meer, betoog die verhandeling dat dit vandag epistemologies geregverdig is om te glo dat die betrokke leerstellings deur hedendaagse wetenskaplike bevindings en ander tersaaklike bewyse onwaar gemaak is. Die kwessie van waarheid moet daarom (her-)aangespreek word vanuit ’n perspektief wat moderne wetenskaplike bevindings insluit. Die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk het egter in 2010 suggereer dat sy fundamentele leerstellings met daardie (wetenskaplike) bewyse wat dit onwaar maak, kan medebestaan. Die verhandeling demonstreer dat dit nie moontlik is nie.
Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology
M.A. (Philosophy)

Declaring in the late 1950s that Sydney City was in much need of a car free civic square, Professor Denis Winston, Australia’s first chair in town and country planning at the University of Sydney, was echoing a commonly held view on how to reconfigure the city for a modern-day citizen. Queen’s Square, at the intersection of Macquarie Street and Hyde Park, first conceived in 1810 by Governor Lachlan Macquarie, remained incomplete until 1978 when it was developed as a pedestrian only plaza by the NSW Government Architect under a different set of urban intentions. By relocating the traffic bound statue of Queen Victoria (1888) onto the plaza and demolishing the old Supreme Court complex (1827), so that nearby St James’ Church (1824) could becoming freestanding alongside a new multi-storey Commonwealth Supreme Court building (1975), by the Sydney-based practise of McConnel Smith and Johnson, the civic and social ambition of this pedestrian space was assured. Now somewhat overlooked in the history of Sydney’s modern civic spaces, the adjustment in the design of this square during the 1960s translated the reformed urban design agenda communicated in CIAM 8, the heart of the city (1952), a post-war treatise developed and promoted by the international architect and polemicist, Josep Lluis Sert. This paper examines the completion of Queen’s Square in 1978. Along with the symbolic role of the project, that is, to provide a plaza as a social instrument in humanising the modern-day city, this project also acknowledged the city’s colonial settlement monuments beside a new law court complex; and in a curious twist in fate, involving curtailing the extent of the proposed plaza so that the colonial Supreme Court was retained, the completion of Queen’s Square became ultra – civic.