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1
Merutiu, Monica D. "Christian Heritage and Democracy in Europe." Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 21, no. 1 (2009): 51–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jis2009211/23.
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The Judeo-Christian tradition has put its imprint on a fascinating and complex creation: Europe. Looking at the European stage today, one cannot help notice its struggles, challenges, and changes. The core of European unity cannot be stable and durable if the spiritual dimension is left aside, considered unimportant compared to the political and economic dimensions. In an era said to experience "pathologies of reason" and "pathologies of religion," the interdependence of reason and religion in a democratic, liberal state becomes highlty relevant. Understanding the complementarity between Christian values and the democratic ideal is the key to a genuine democracy that remains true to its goals. Maritain insisted that democracy needs virtue, and hence must not be separated from its moral dimension.
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Kaiser, Wolfram. "Christian Democracy in Twentieth-Century Europe." Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 1 (January 2004): 127–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022009404039888.
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Medhurst, Kenneth. "Christian democracy in Europe: a comparative perspective." International Affairs 70, no. 3 (July 1994): 571–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2623775.
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SARDARYAN, G. Т. "REASONS FOR THE CRISIS OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACYIN WESTERN EUROPE." Political Science Issues, no. 3(33) part: 9 (December 18, 2019): 285–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.35775/psi.2019.33.3.007.
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The article discusses the causes and characteristics of the crisis of Christian democracy in West European countries in the second half of the XX century and at the present stage. The author notes that the crisis manifests itself in several directions: on the one hand, it is expressed in a significant decrease of the electoral support of the Christian Democratic parties in most West European countries and, on the other, in the crisis of the European Union as an integration project of a united Europe, the founders of which were the authors of the concept of the pan-European Christian republic. The article analyzes both external and internal reasons of the loss by the Christian Democrats of their ruling status in Europe. The key factor contributing to the development of the crisis is the desire of the demochristians to expand their electoral base bysecularizing their ideology and moving away from the fundamental Christian Democratic principles.
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Kobets, Yuliia. "Christian democracy as a modern political doctrine." Good Parson: scientific bulletin of Ivano-Frankivsk Academy of John Chrysostom. Theology. Philosophy. History, no. 14 (January 29, 2020): 119–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.52761/2522-1558.2019.14.11.
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Christian Democracy is one of the youngest political doctrines of our time, a product of the twentieth century. But it influenced the formation of the post-war order of Europe, of the world, and the formation of new political parties and whole party systems, and a new type of political culture. The reaction of Christianity to manifestations of anti-clericalism and socialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. became Christian democracy. Christian democracy is a fairly broad concept. In its content, it includes the direction of socio-political thought, political movement as well as a network of public organizations and associations. The article discusses the essence of the concept "Christian democracy", its contentfulness in the twentieth century. The key stages of the development of modern political doctrine of Christianity and the main principles are analyzed. The article traces the institutional development of Christian-democratic organizations. Particular attention is devoted to the Christian Democratic parties of the countries of Western Europe, which are the most powerful in the world. Characteristics of the development of Christian Democratic parties in Ukraine are given, and tendencies of their further development are revealed. The question of the ideological and social significance of Christian democracy in the context of the formation of Western political culture is explored. The basic tasks and directions of development of Christian Democratic Movement as Important Parameters of Christian Politics, and the Importance of Political Participation of Christian Parties in the World and in Ukraine are formed. The main principles of Christian democracy are outlined: solidarity, subsidiarity, personalism, responsibility, decentralizationю These principles laid the specific understanding of the concept of "person-society-state". The concept of the doctrine of Christian democracy as the basis for the formation of a pluralistic society and a deligatory state is highlighted.
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Gottfried, Paul. "The Rise and Fall of Christian Democracy in Europe." Orbis 51, no. 4 (January 2007): 711–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2007.08.012.
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Tjalve, Vibeke Schou. "Judeo-Christian democracy and the Transatlantic Right: Travels of a contested civilizational imaginary." New Perspectives 29, no. 4 (November 6, 2021): 332–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2336825x211052979.
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“Judeo-Christian civilization” and “Christian democracy” have emerged as darling far Right tropes, seemingly uniting radical conservatives in the US and Europe behind a single, geopolitical imaginary. This article presents a brief political-conceptual story of how “Judeo-Christianity” and “Christian democracy” became a rhetorical meeting ground for radical conservatives across the Atlantic. But it also sheds light on why deep, historical, intellectual, and ethnographic divides beneath, make those grounds highly unstable terrain. Divides not only between European and American traditions of liberalism and conservatism but also between the experiences and practices of state power that inform them. Beneath the slogans of Christian democracy espoused in such disparate contexts as Charlottesville and Budapest, move different legacies, memories, enemies.
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CORDUWENER, PEPIJN. "DEMOCRACY AS A CONTESTED CONCEPT IN POST-WAR WESTERN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEBATES IN FRANCE, WEST GERMANY, AND ITALY." Historical Journal 59, no. 1 (October 27, 2015): 197–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x14000673.
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ABSTRACTThis article explores how political parties in France, West Germany, and Italy conceptualized democracy and challenged the conceptions of democracy of their political adversaries between the end of the 1940s and the early 1960s. It studies from a comparative perspective the different conceptions of democracy held by Christian democrat, Left-wing, and Gaullist political actors and shows how these diverged on key issues such as the economic system, foreign policy, the separation of powers, electoral systems, and the use of state institutions in the defence of democracy against anti-democratic forces. In this way, the article reveals how in the first fifteen years after the Second World War, government and opposition parties disputed each other's democratic credentials and political legitimacy, and it thereby reconsiders the claim that there existed a broad consensus on the meaning of democracy among political elites in post-war Western Europe. It is argued that these different conceptions of democracy only started to converge after they had clashed during political crises at the turn of the 1960s in all three states. This study thereby contributes to an enhanced understanding the formation of the post-war democratic order in Western Europe.
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Λάβδας, Κώστας. "Stathls Ν. Kalyvas, The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe." Επιστήμη και Κοινωνία: Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής και Ηθικής Θεωρίας 4 (September 24, 2015): 208. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/sas.748.
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Grzymala-Busse, Ann. "Why there is (almost) no Christian Democracy in post-communist Europe." Party Politics 19, no. 2 (June 10, 2011): 319–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068811407596.
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Compared to its West European counterparts, post-communist Christian Democracy is notable for its lack of success. Even in the most religious of post-communist democracies, no Christian Democratic (CD) party has claimed a plurality of the electorate. At the same time, there is a considerable range in average electoral support from 1990 to 2010, i.e. from 0.7 percent in Estonia to as high as 18.4 percent in Slovakia. The most successful CD parties have arisen in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Lithuania, and (with qualifications) in Macedonia. The reasons for this success lie not in popular religiosity, state–church conflict or alliances between CD parties and churches. Instead, where parties can point to a history of nation and state-building in the inter-war period, they receive an initial electoral boost from this historical legacy. Yet even these favourable historical reputations have transitory effects: by the second or third elections, the impact of inter-war support rapidly faded.
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Carlson, Allan. "Europe and the Christian Democracy Movement: A Once and Future Hope?" Linacre Quarterly 74, no. 2 (May 2007): 94–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20508549.2007.11877812.
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Keating, Joan. "Looking to Europe: Roman Catholics and Christian Democracy in 1930s Britain." European History Quarterly 26, no. 1 (January 1996): 57–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/026569149602600104.
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Cowell, Kimberly. "The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe by Stathis N. Kalyvas." Catholic Historical Review 84, no. 1 (1998): 141–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cat.1998.0122.
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Karatnycky, Adrian. "Christian Democracy Resurgent: Raising the Banner of Faith in Eastern Europe." Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (1998): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20048358.
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Rutan, Gerard F. "Christian Democracy in Western Europe: an idea whose time has passed?" International Journal of Social Economics 24, no. 10 (October 1997): 1103–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03068299710184921.
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Taylor, Leonard. "Catholic Cosmopolitanism and the Future of Human Rights." Religions 11, no. 11 (October 30, 2020): 566. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel11110566.
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Political Catholicism began in the 20th century by presenting a conception of confessional politics to a secularizing Europe. However, this article reveals the reworking of political Catholicism’s historical commitment to a balance of two powers—an ancient Imperium and Sacerdotium—to justify change to this position. A secular democratic faith became a key insight in political Catholicism in the 20th century, as it wedded human rights to an evolving cosmopolitan Catholicism and underlined the growth of Christian democracy. This article argues that the thesis of Christian democracy held a central post-war motif that there existed a prisca theologia or a philosophia perennis, semblances of a natural law, in secular modernity that could reshape the social compact of the modern project of democracy. However, as the Cold War ended, human rights became more secularized in keeping with trends across Europe. The relationship between political Catholicism and human rights reached a turning point, and this article asks if a cosmopolitan political Catholicism still interprets human rights as central to its embrace of the modern world.
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Gargan, Edward T. "The Purpose of Tocqueville’s Democracy." Tocqueville Review 7, no. 1 (January 1986): 67–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/ttr.7.1.67.
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C. S. Lewis. (he brilliant and graceful historian of sixteenth-century English literature, summarizing the impact on Europe of the discovery of America, observed: “The existence of America was one of the greatest disappointments in the history of Europe.” Lewis was referring to Europe’s unfulfilled expectations that the winds and currents of the Atlantic would bring her bankers, merchants, soldiers, and priests to the Orient. This disillusionment was, however, less significant than other negative reactions that accompanied Columbus’s news. Renaissance Europe was forced, not without reluctance, to rethink its own place in history, its philosophy, theology, anthropology, linguistic theories, geographic knowledge. When the Renaissance got down to the task of comprehending the explosive announcement, and Europe’s writers, commentators, and observers employed what John H. Elliott has called a “selective eye” and not Ruskin’s “innocent eye.” From this vision classical antiquity, Christian tradition, humanist aspirations, and the politics of Europe determined what would be seen when Europe encountered the New World; what would be admitted into the collective consciousness of scholars, clerics, popes, adventurers, and poets. Pride, the not so hidden inflexibility at the heart of Renaissance civilization, framed and fixed what America would be permitted to mean.
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Gargan, Edward T. "The Purpose of Tocqueville’s Democracy." Tocqueville Review 7 (January 1986): 67–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/ttr.7.67.
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C. S. Lewis. (he brilliant and graceful historian of sixteenth-century English literature, summarizing the impact on Europe of the discovery of America, observed: “The existence of America was one of the greatest disappointments in the history of Europe.” Lewis was referring to Europe’s unfulfilled expectations that the winds and currents of the Atlantic would bring her bankers, merchants, soldiers, and priests to the Orient. This disillusionment was, however, less significant than other negative reactions that accompanied Columbus’s news. Renaissance Europe was forced, not without reluctance, to rethink its own place in history, its philosophy, theology, anthropology, linguistic theories, geographic knowledge. When the Renaissance got down to the task of comprehending the explosive announcement, and Europe’s writers, commentators, and observers employed what John H. Elliott has called a “selective eye” and not Ruskin’s “innocent eye.” From this vision classical antiquity, Christian tradition, humanist aspirations, and the politics of Europe determined what would be seen when Europe encountered the New World; what would be admitted into the collective consciousness of scholars, clerics, popes, adventurers, and poets. Pride, the not so hidden inflexibility at the heart of Renaissance civilization, framed and fixed what America would be permitted to mean.
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FORLENZA, ROSARIO. "The Politics of theAbendland: Christian Democracy and the Idea of Europe after the Second World War." Contemporary European History 26, no. 2 (March 13, 2017): 261–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777317000091.
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This article traces the deep cultural and experiential foundations that animated Christian Democratic Europeanism between the mid-1940s and the birth of the European Economic Community in the late 1950s. It shows how the language of Europeanness, generated in a period of multiple and intense crisis, congealed around symbolisms of Christianity and spirituality. More specifically, it connects the post-Second World War Christian Democratic vision of Europe to the 1920s German-Catholic articulation of theAbendland(the Christian West), understood as a supranational and symbolic space alternative to the Soviet Union and the United States and imbued with anti-materialist, anti-socialist and anti-liberal principles. The argument here is that, in mutated form and in context of the Cold War, this view sustained the political reconstruction of Western Europe after the horrors of the Second World War, the ‘European’ thought and language of Christian Democracy and the commitment to the project of European integration.
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Searle, Joshua T. "A Theological Case for Ukraine’s European Integration: Deconstructing the Myth of “Holy Russia” versus “Decadent Europe”." International Journal of Public Theology 16, no. 3 (October 18, 2022): 289–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15697320-20220053.
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Abstract The overall aim of this article is to make a theological case for Ukraine’s integration into the European family of nations. I build this case by pursuing two primary lines of argument: firstly, by demonstrating the implausibility of the common assumptions (held by many Ukrainian Christians) that Russia is more ‘spiritual’ and ‘Christian’ than ‘secular’ and ‘godless’ Europe. Secondly, I seek to make a positive case for why principles, such as human dignity and human rights, cultural diversity, democracy, justice, fairness, equality and the rule of law, are much more appropriate indicators of Christian values than nominal allegiance to religious institutions among a certain population. This article is divided into three parts. Part One identifies and critiques the salient features of the “Holy Russia” myth with illustrations drawn from various representative figures. Part Two is devoted to the defence of the European tradition in which I advance the counterintuitive argument that secular liberalism is more in continuity with orthodox Christianity than Christian nationalism. In Part Three, I apply these general points to the specific issue of Ukraine and its fate as a European nation.
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Geva, Dorit, and Felipe G. Santos. "Europe's far-right educational projects and their vision for the international order." International Affairs 97, no. 5 (September 2021): 1395–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab112.
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Abstract Figures like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and former French National Front leader Marion Maréchal are seeking to establish what we call a new globalist illiberal order. The globalist illiberal agenda extends elements of the globalist project while reclaiming a radicalized view of Christian democracy. Europe's far-right views the global order as composed of strong nations who need to defend their sovereignty on ‘cultural’ issues while protecting their common Christian roots. We trace their project by focusing on two new institutions of higher education, Hungary's National University of Public Service Ludovika (Ludovika-UPS) and the Institut de sciences sociales, économiques et politiques (Institute of Social Sciences, Economics and Politics—ISSEP), based in France and Spain. Through these institutions, globalist illiberals aim to cultivate new leaders outside the liberal ‘mainstream’ and redefine the meaning of Christian democracy. We conclude that surging nationalism among mid- to small powers is not resulting in deglobalization but is fostering illiberal globalization, which has no place for those who do not fit in their exclusionary vision of Christian Europe.
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Dummons, Bruno. "Between Religion and Politics." Contemporary European History 8, no. 1 (March 1999): 141–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s096077739900017x.
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Jean-Marie Mayeur, La question laïque (XIXe–XXe siècle) (Paris: Fayard, 1997), 239 pp., 95 FF. IBSN 2–213–60013–9.Etienne Fouilloux, Les chrétiens français entre crise et libération (1937–1947) (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 293 pp, 130 FF. ISBN 2–020–28131–7.Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 300 pp., £15.95. ISBN 0–8014–8320–4.Emiel Lamberts, ed., Christian Democracy in the European Union (1945–1995) (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997), 511 pp. ISBN 9–061–86808–4.‘Christians and political life’ (taking the latter term in its widest sense) is a theme which continues to attract a great deal of interest among contemporary historians, in terms of both detailed research and broader surveys. René Rémond and Aline Coutrot demonstrated the interconnectedness of the two domains of religion and politics when they abandoned the restricted subject of relations between states and the Roman Catholic church and initiated the study of religion as an integral part of history, and the social sciences, as a whole. Approaches since 1966 have been greatly modified, as shown by the treatment of the material in the four works now to be reviewed.
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Sigmund, Paul E. "The Catholic Tradition and Modern Democracy." Review of Politics 49, no. 4 (1987): 530–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500035452.
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This article argues that there has been a movement in Catholic political thought from a position of doctrinal neutrality concerning forms of government — provided that they promote the common good — to an endorsement of democracy as the morally superior form of government. It traces the various theoretical and practical elements in the Catholic tradition that have favored or opposed liberal democracy, giving particular attention to the ambiguity of medieval theories, the centralizing and authoritarian tendencies in the early modern period, and the intense hostility of the nineteenth-century popes to French and Italian liberalism. After analyzing the emergence of neo-Thomistic theories of democracy in the twentieth century and their influence on Christian Democratic parties in Europe and Latin America, the article concludes that John XXIII's encyclical Pacem in Terris (1963) and the discussion of democracy by the Second Vatican Council in Gaudium et Spes (1965) marked the abandonment of earlier opposition to liberal democracy and a decisive commitment to democracy and human rights.
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MATTESINI, Maria CHIARA. "La pensée des femmes catholiques en Europe. Les combats de Maria Paola Colombo Svevo." Journal of European Integration History 27, no. 2 (2021): 243–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2021-2-243.
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‘Equal pay for equal work’, ‘Action against trafficking in human beings’ and the ‘Role of cooperatives in the growth of women's employment’ are those three important battles carried out by the women at the European Parliament in the 1990s. They represent greater justice, more dignity, increased democracy. In particular, the article wants to remember the figure of Maria Paola Colombo Svevo, senator of the Italian Christian-Democratic Party, member of the European People's Party and member of the European Parliament between 1995 and 1999.
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LUNKIN, R. N. "The Social and Political Role of Religion in Europe: the Demand for Christian Identity." Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 11, no. 4 (October 16, 2018): 46–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2018-11-4-46-64.
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Inthearticleanalyzedthesocial and political role of Christian churches, their position in Europe from the pint of view of statistics and presence of the faith-based organizations in the society. The author made a conclusion that the politicized Christianity on the European continent tied with the preserving of the role of Christian churches in the social structure as with the secularizationthatdidnotbecomedesecularization (thereturningofreligiontouchedonlyLatin America,Africa,Asia)andcreatedthevacuum of identity. The weakness of the modern Western European society in its capacity to defend and express the identity forced politicians to seek the support from Christian worldview. Different confessions demonstrated stable development and social mobility in the period of the formation of EU structures. The European politicization of Christianity became the part of the world process of the transfiguration of the religion into a way of the self expression of multiple identities in the circumstances of the inevitable globalization and becoming of the democracy as the optimal form of the social existence. The basic features of the process: the high number of church affiliated (faith based) civil organizations, network church activity, the possibility to reflect various forms of identity in a frames of the Christianized democratic structures.
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Forlenza, Rosario, and Bjørn Thomassen. "The Globalization of Christian Democracy: Religious Entanglements in the Making of Modern Politics." Religions 13, no. 7 (July 16, 2022): 659. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13070659.
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This article throws light on a crucial, yet overlooked, aspect of global entanglements that significantly came to shape modern politics: the global spread of Catholic ideas that, from the late nineteenth century and through the twentieth century, became translated into various political platforms and, eventually, into Christian Democratic parties. The article will cover three broad periods where such global entanglements took shape: the mid-nineteenth century up until World War I, the interwar period, and the aftermath of World War II. We primarily address developments across the Atlantic in Europe and Latin America, while briefly touching upon Asian developments. The article aims to show the role of non-secular ideologies in political globalization processes and the co-existence of centric and multi-polar tendencies in such processes.
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Ginsborg, Paul. "The Politics of the Family in Twentieth-Century Europe." Contemporary European History 9, no. 3 (November 2000): 411–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777300003076.
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This article aims to offer a first overview of family politics in twentieth-century Europe. The term ‘family politics’ is here taken to imply not just family policies – what states do for, or to, families – but, more broadly, the relations between individuals, families, civil society and the state. Four different visions of family politics, at different moments of the century, are analysed in detail: that of the Bolsheviks in the early years of the Russian Revolution; that of the great dictators (Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Franco) from the 1920s to the 1940s; that of Catholicism in the central decades of the century; and finally that of democracy, from 1945 onwards. It is argued that in each of these instances there emerges a strikingly different configuration of the relations in question (individual–family–civil society–state). For many of the Bolsheviks the family itself was the target of attack, while the individual was to be subsumed into a collectivised society. For the great dictators civil society was swiftly eliminated and the family was formally exalted, but the crucial relationships became those between the authoritarian state and regimented individuals. For the Catholic Church of Pius XII the principal menace to the Christian family was seen to come from the state on the one hand and individualism on the other; the family and an integrist society were to be the principal links of his chain. Democracy alone, albeit imperfectly, has held fast to all four elements, trying in different ways in different countries to strike a balance between them.
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Navarro, Vicente. "A Critique of Social Capital." International Journal of Health Services 32, no. 3 (July 2002): 423–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/6u6r-ltvn-fhu6-kcnu.
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This article critiques the concepts of communitarianism and social capital as used in the United States and in Europe. For the United States, the author focuses on Robert Putnam's understanding of both concepts, showing that the apolitical analysis of the Progressive Era, of the progressive developments in Northern Italy, and of the situation of labor unions in the United States is not only insufficient but wrong. The critique also includes the difference between U.S. communitarianism and its European versions, Christian democracy and New Labour, and the limitations of both approaches. The uses and misuses of these concepts in the political debate are discussed.
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Camus, Jean-Yves. "The Transnational Networks of the European Radical Populist Right and the Beacon of Hungarian Illiberal Democracy." Journal of Illiberalism Studies 2, no. 1 (2022): 47–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.53483/wcjv3537.
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Radical right parties in Europe have been in negotiations since 2018 in order to form a single, unified group in the European Parliament. Today, there are two competing caucuses: one, which is considered the “extreme right” by European standards; and another, which is a collection of far-right, Euroskeptic parties. A unified caucus would challenge the leadership of mainstream conservatives and Christian Democrats in the Parliament and be a show of strength by the radical right. For those who are at the origin of this attempt, namely Marine Le Pen from the French National Rally and Matteo Salvini, leader of the Italian Lega, the goal is also to mainstream their ideology by reaching an alliance with the Hungarian Fidesz party and the Polish Law and Justice Party. Both have become the beacons of illiberal democracy and role models for Western parties that used to be labeled “extreme right” and in need of a break from their past. However, tactical as well as ideological issues have, so far, prevented this unification of the radical right from becoming a reality.
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Durand, Jean-Dominique. "Michael Gehler, Wolfram Kaiser, Helmut Wohnout (éds.), Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert – Christian Democracy in 20th Century Europe – La Démocratie Chrétienne en Europe au XXe siècle." Archives de sciences sociales des religions, no. 120 (October 1, 2002): 63–126. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/assr.717.
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Ghosh, Debanjali. "European Union’s Response to Rising Xeno-Racism in Europe." Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies 15, no. 1 (September 20, 2022): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v15i1.2815.
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Ever since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Europe has experienced a huge influx of refugees, which has led to demographic and social changes and created fears about the erosion of the European civilisation and Christian values. The Continent has also experienced several Islamic terrorist attacks- like those in Paris, London, Brussels and Berlin. This, coupled with the rise of the right-wing in Europe, has led to increasing xeno-racism, particularly of an Islamophobic variety that has resulted in the creation of an environment of intolerance and exclusion. At times this has manifested itself as outright hostility towards the Muslim community through hate crimes which take the form of physical and verbal attacks on visibly identifiable and more tangible symbols of Islam like hijabs, headscarves, burkhas and mosques. Yet, most of these hate crimes remain unreported and unaddressed. The European Union (EU) is a one of a kind post-modern entity professing values of equality, democracy and human rights. Given this commitment, this paper attempts to take stock of the EU’s response to rising xeno-racism with particular attention to Islamophobia and the Member States’ attempts to grapple with the same.
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Lunkin, R. N. "Religion and the Political Process: the Fourth Wave of Democratization." Journal of International Analytics 12, no. 4 (December 24, 2021): 11–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2021-12-4-11-27.
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The article analyzes the role of religion in socio-political processes in Europe, in the post-Soviet space, and more broadly in the Western world. The structural and functional approach, methods of sociological and political analysis of the religious factor as a political phenomenon are applied. The purpose of the study is to analyze the role of religion (mainly Christian churches) in democratic processes on the example of the EU member states and the post-Soviet space. Special attention is paid to the participation of various Christian churches in socio-political transformations, conflicts and “orange” revolutions, as well as to the opposition of religion to the ideology of modern liberal democracy from the standpoint of traditionalism (identity). It is concluded that religion has become an important marker of a global phenomenon that can be called the “fourth wave” of democratization (following the periodization of S. Huntington). If within the framework of the third wave, religion was one of the elements and at the same time objects of democratization, then since the 2000s religion is the main impulse factor of the entire process of traditionalist democratization in social, political and cultural dimensions. The civic activity of believers corrects liberal democracy, makes it more “moral,” and not archaic. The merit of religion is that it has clearly defined the boundaries beyond which the democracy of the future should not be transgressed: the recognition of the right to traditional moral foundations for entire societies and states along with the usual liberal freedoms, i.e., equality of all races and peoples, the value of every person, the freedom of speech.
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Sharova, Veronika L. "The problem of the crisis of ideals in the political philosophy of Semyon Frank (to the 100th anniversary of the “Philosophical steamer”)." Philosophy Journal 15, no. 3 (August 29, 2022): 21–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-21-33.
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The subject of the article is the problem of the crisis of ideals generated by the European Enlightenment and the Modern era, as interpreted by Russian thinkers of the first third of the 20th century. Building on the conception of Semyon Frank, the author analyzes the relationship between the socio-political ideals of the Enlightenment in the Russian version and false “idols” that led Russia and Europe to an unprecedented escalation of evil in the early 20th century, is analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the assumption that the ideals of democracy as a true power of the people, as a result of uncritical implementation, lead to revolutionary violence and further reproduction of tyranny. Two versions of democracy are considered: according to Frank, one of them is genuine, based on the idea of disinterested service to the truth, and the second is “false”, oriented towards a totalitarian utopia, fundamentally hostile to freedom. The author also analyzes Frank’s views on the phenomenon of the “idol of culture”, which is based on the idea of linear progress. According to Frank, linear progress cannot prevent Russia and Europe from falling into barbarism. Moreover, it even significantly contributed to that breakdown. It is concluded that Frank as a Christian philosopher and political thinker became one of the relatively few (along with, for example, Fyodor Stepun and Vladimir Weidle), but all the more significant conductors of the Russian cultural tradition in Europe and the European cultural tradition in Russia: that is, a genuine personification of the phenomenon of a “Russian European”.
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Byrd, Dustin J. "Palingenetic Ultra-Nationalist Christianity: History, Identity, and the Falsity of Peripeteic Dialectics." Praktyka Teoretyczna 42, no. 4 (December 15, 2021): 39–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/prt2021.4.2.
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The recent upsurge of European nationalism is partially an attempt to address the ongoing identity crisis that began with the Bourgeois revolution, which expressed itself through positivistic scientism and aggressive secularization, and culminated in the post-World War II “liberal consensus”: representative democracy and free-market capitalism as the “end of history.” Due to the needs of capitalism after World War II, coupled with the liberalization and Americanization of European societies, there has been a growing presence of “non-identical” elements within Europe, which itself is reexamining the very geography of what it means to be European. In this essay, I explore the historical context of the current identity struggles that are facing Europeans. From a Critical Theory perspective, I challenge the idea that Christianity or a Christian age can be resurrected by ultra-nationalists in their attempt to combat the cosmopolitanism of Western modernity. Moreover, I demonstrate how such attempts to return to an idealized Christian identity are rooted in a false possibility: Peripeteic Dialectics, or “dialectics in reverse.”
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Žvirgždas, Manfredas. "Ethnolinguistic Nationalism and Other Political Contexts of Maironis." Interlitteraria 24, no. 2 (January 15, 2020): 436–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/il.2019.24.2.13.
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Widely acclaimed as the Lithuanian national poet, the Catholic clergyman Jonas Mačiulis-Maironis (1862–1932) in his canonical poems of the epoch of national revival expressed his romantic primordialist point of view that every nation has an inherent right to its independence that had been given by divine institution. Linguistic factors determined national identity in Eastern Europe of the late 19th century. Maironis as a follower of linguocentric nationalism modelled the conditions for the elite Lithuanian culture which would be significant at the European level. The longing for the so-called European virtues (universally based on Christian ethics) penetrated through all the poet’s world-view, therefore he was impressed by the diligence and activism of Western nations but did not support the ideas of social activism and individual liberties, opposed the ideas of secular philosophical trends, especially socialism and scientism. Eurocentrist motives in his rhetoric did not mean any challenge to the governing conservative Russian regime because they did not invoke opposition to the ideology of Pan-Slavism which was supported by the Tsarist ideologues. The poetical archetype of springtime awakening was related to the youthful activism of the “new” political nations of Eastern and Central Europe. Maironis was one of the first Lithuanian authors who openly criticized ideas of socialism and positivism; on the other hand, he provoked discussions of the enlightened group of the developing Lithuanian-speaking elite. He regarded the slogans of liberty, equality and fraternity as deceptive justification of populism and collective violence. Sceptically regarding parliamentary democracy, he emphasized the principles of Classical-Christian law and justice and the need for solidarity, consciousness and creativity. Maironis related the ideological dispute of conservative and radical trends to the decisive struggle of Christianity and atheism. He was a consistent and orthodox Catholic thinker, the opponent of any revolutionary upheavals; discussing social questions he emphasized that politicians should take into account doctrine of the Holy See on the obligations of Christians and principles of charity.
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Peker, Efe. "Finding Religion: Immigration and the Populist (Re)Discovery of Christian Heritage in Western and Northern Europe." Religions 13, no. 2 (February 11, 2022): 158. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13020158.
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Why and in what ways do far-right discourses engage with religion in geographies where religious belief, practice, and public influence are particularly low? This article examines religion’s salience in the rhetoric of leading right-wing populist parties in eight European countries: the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. Based on a qualitative content analysis of various documents such as party programmes, websites, election manifestos, reports, and speeches of their leadership, the article offers insight into the functions that Christianist discourses serve for anti-immigration stances. The findings are threefold: first, they confirm previous research suggesting that while these parties embrace Christianity as a national/civilizational heritage and identity, they are also careful to avoid references to actual belief or practice. Second, the data suggests, their secularized take on Christianity rests not simply on the omission of theological content, but also on the active framing Christianity itself as an inherently secular and progressive religion conducive to democracy. Third, and finally, they starkly contrast this notion of Christianity with Islam, believed to be incompatible due to its alleged backward and violent qualities. Emphasizing religio-cultural hierarchies—rather than ethno-racial ones—plays an indispensable role in presenting a more palatable form of boundary-making against immigrants, and helps these parties mainstream by giving their nativist cause a liberal and enlightened aura. Preliminary comparisons with traditional conservative parties, moreover, reveal that while some of the latter partially embraced a similar nativism, variations remain across countries.
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Deim, Reka. "Entanglements of art and memory activism in Hungary’s illiberal democracy." International Journal of Heritage, Memory and Conflict 2 (January 12, 2022): 61–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3897/hmc.2.70927.
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This paper explores how art contributes to the articulation of memories that counter the official historical narrative of Hungary’s self-proclaimed political and ideological system, illiberal democracy. Amid deepening polarization between Europe’s post-colonialist and post-socialist countries, the Hungarian government promotes a Christian conservative national identity against the “liberal” values of Western Europe. Systematic appropriation of historical traumas is at the core of such efforts, which largely manifests in removing, erecting and reinstating memorials, as well as in the re-signification of trauma sites. Insufficient civic involvement in rewriting histories generates new ways of resistance, which I demonstrate through the case study of a protest-performance organized by the Living Memorial activist group as a response to the government’s decision to displace the memorial of Imre Nagy in 2018. I seek to understand the dynamics between top-down memory politics, civil resistance and art within the conceptual apparatus of the “memory activism nexus” (Rigney 2018, 2020) and “multidirectional memories” (Rothberg 2009). I argue that artistic memory activism has limited potential to transform the dynamics of memory in a context where a national conservative political force has gradually taken control over historical narratives, triggering inevitably polarizing responses in the society. Although profoundly embedded in local histories, the case-study may offer new ways of negotiating traumatic heritages through the entanglement of art and memory activism.
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Vermeir, Maarten M. K. "Brabantia: decoding the main characters of Utopia." Moreana 49 (Number 187-, no. 1-2 (June 2012): 151–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/more.2012.49.1-2.9.
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In this study, we propose a new understanding, according to the principles of ‘humanistic interpretation’, of a fundamental layer of meaning in Utopia. In the work of Thomas More, major references can be found to the particular genesis and a crucial purpose of Utopia. Desiderius Erasmus arranged the acquaintance of Thomas More with Peter Giles, a key figure in the development of Erasmus as political thinker. More and Giles together in Antwerp (Giles’s home town), both jurists and humanists, would lay the foundation of Utopia. With this arranged contact, Erasmus handed over to More the knowledge of a particular political system - the earliest form of ‘parliamentary democracy’ in Early modern Europe - embedded in the political culture of the Duchy of Brabant and its constitution, named the ‘Joyous Entry’. We argue that Erasmus, through the indispensable politicalliterary skills of More in Utopia, intended to promote this political system as a new, political philosophy: applicable to all nations in the Respublica Christiana of Christian humanism. With reference to this genesis of Utopia in the text itself and its prefatory letters, we come to a clear recognition of Desiderius Erasmus in the figure of Raphael Hythlodaeus, the sailor who had discovered the ‘isle of Utopia’ and discoursed, as reported by More, about its ‘exemplary’ institutions.
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Makarkin, A. V. "Orthodoxy and Liberalism in Russian Politics." Journal of Political Theory, Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics Politeia 102, no. 3 (September 23, 2021): 99–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2021-102-3-99-124.
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Russia, in contrast to other modern Orthodox European count ries, has never experienced struggle for church autocephaly and the formation of political pluralism simultaneously, which naturally brought the church and liberals closer together. The distinguishing feature of the Russian liberalism is its late, or “catch up”, development. In the 19th century, libera lism no longer needed a religious approval; the appeal to the Holy Scriptures looked archaic. Another Russian distinguishing feature — divergence of secu lar and spiritual traditions — is also very important. After the emergence of the dualistic monarchy in Russia (1906—1917), religious topics were no lon ger a taboo, but Christian liberalism as an influential trend failed to develop. The attempts of combining liberal and Christian ideas in the pre-revolutiona ry Russian politics faced a number of problems. The results in practice were modest either due to the lack of the electoral demand, or due to the blocking of specific initiatives at the state and church levels. The promotion of liberal va lues contradicted Ortho dox tenets, and the target electoral group — the lower clergy — heavily depended on the episcopate. In the post-Soviet Russia, in contrast to the count ries in Central Europe, Christian politics, including its liberal version, did not revive. At the end of the day, all such projects have remained marginal. The episcopate focuses on cooperation with the authorities, and there is little support for liberal ideas among the faithful. The future might see a gradual strengthening of liberal tendencies within the church, but at the same time, the Russian version of Christian democracy remains extreme ly unlikely.
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Golden, Miriam A. "International Economic Sources of Regime Change." Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 10 (December 2004): 1238–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414004269821.
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Italy’s 1992 elections marked the end of political dominance by Christian Democracy (DC). The conventional account of the collapse of the DC’s vote to less than 30% focuses on the breakup of the Soviet Union, which is said to have freed Catholic voters to switch to new regionalist protest parties. The author documents that this argument is empirically inadequate. Evidence shows that electoral districts more exposed to international trade were where the DC lost larger vote shares and where the Northern League received more support. These findings corroborate that social groups linked to small firms in the north and center whose products were exported throughout Europe underwent electoral realignment in response to the economic opportunities offered by the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. The author argues that DC was not credible in providing national macroeconomic policies that would have allowed Italy to partake fully of the opportunities offered by European economic integration.
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van Kersbergen, Kees. "The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. By Stathis N. Kalyvas. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996. 300p. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper." American Political Science Review 92, no. 1 (March 1998): 249–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585989.
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Mitchell, M. "The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. By Stathis N. Kalyvas. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996. 300 pp. $45.00 cloth; $19.95 paper." Journal of Church and State 40, no. 4 (September 1, 1998): 896–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jcs/40.4.896.
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Bosetti, Giancarlo. "Introduction: Addressing the politics of fear. The challenge posed by pluralism to Europe." Philosophy & Social Criticism 37, no. 4 (May 2011): 371–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453711400998.
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The introduction to this issue is meant to address the ways in which turbulent immigration is challenging European democratic countries’ capacity to integrate the pluralism of cultures in light of the current state of economic instability, strong public debt, unemployment and an aging resident population. The Reset-Dialogues on Civilizations Association has organized its annual İstanbul Seminars in order to fill the need for constructive dialogue dedicated to increasing understanding and implementing social and political change. Turkey’s accession to the European Union represents in this light a challenge to our liberal views, which must become more open-minded in order to address adequately cultural and religious differences, Islam included. We must set ourselves the task of finding a new perspective so that we may defuse the populist radicalization, fear-mongering politicians and xenophobia that are emerging in many countries. Yet it is equally essential that we reconfigure and recontextualize the traditional secular battle for freedom from the dominance of the Christian majority away from a binary opposition to a plural dimension that takes into account other religious communities. After introducing the major challenges our seminars were organized to address, the introduction will summarize and explain the articulation of the contents of this issue in the following three parts: (1) realigning liberalism in the context of globalization (with contributions by Nilüfer Göle, Alain Touraine, Albena Azmanova, Stephen Macedo, Zygmunt Bauman); (2) different paths: towards modernity and democracy from within different cultures and religions (Fred Dallmayr, Sadik Al Azm, Irfan Ahmad, Ibrahim Kalin); and (3) philosophical presuppositions of intercultural dialogue and multiculturalism (Maeve Cooke, Sebastiano Maffettone, Volker Kaul).
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Morgan, Kimberly J. "The Politics of Mothers' Employment: France in Comparative Perspective." World Politics 55, no. 2 (January 2003): 259–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2003.0013.
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Contemporary theories and typologies of welfare states in Western Europe assume that social democratic parties are the engine behind progressive policies on gender roles and on the participation of women in the labor force. The French case challenges these assumptions—this conservative welfare state, surprisingly, provides an extensive system of public day care along with other forms of support that facilitate mothers' employment. This article explains the existence of the French system through a comparative historical analysis of child care policy in France and other European welfare states. The mainfindingsconcern the role of organized religion in shaping contemporary public day care policies. In contrast to most conservative welfare regimes, the French welfare state has been shaped not by clericalism and Christian democracy but by secularism and republican nationalism—forces that influenced some of the earliest public policies for the education of young children in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that later affected the founding of the contemporary day care system in the 1970s. In that latter period of propitious economic circumstances, pragmatic policy elites eschewed moralizing critiques of mothers' employment and established a system of financing that has enabled the long-term expansion of public day care. These findings have implications for our understanding of gender politics and welfare regimes in Western Europe. The secularization of political life—not social democratic power—best explains why public policies in France and in many Scandinavian countries have promoted the demise of the traditional family model.
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van der Ven, Johannes A. "Religion’s Political Role in Rawlsian Key." Religion & Theology 19, no. 1-2 (2012): 1–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157430112x650357.
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AbstractIn Political Liberalism, expanded edition, Rawls repeatedly wants religions to accept liberal democracy for intrinsic reasons from their own religious premises, not as a modus vivendi. This article is to be considered an exploration in that field. In the first part the narrative of the St. Paul’s speech before the Areopagus in Athens by Luke is hermeneutically analyzed, as it tries to find common ground with Hellenistic philosophy and to do so by using deliberative rhetoric. In the second part these two characteristics of the Lukean story are considered the building blocks for the intrinsic acceptance of liberal democracy, albeit not in a substantive, but a formal key. The common ground Luke explored then was religious in nature, whereas in our days, at least in North-Western Europe, religion belongs to a cognitive minority. Moreover philosophy does not provide a common ground either, as there is a pluralism of competing schools nowadays. But intercontextual hermeneutics metaphorically permits to draw the following quadratic equation: as Lukean Paul related the Christian message to his philosophical context in order to find common ground, so we are to relate it to our context, the common ground of which is not philosophical, but political, which refers to the context of public reason. This article argues for accepting Rawls’ concept of using a bilingual language game for religion to present its religious convictions into the public debate and in due course translate them in terms of public reason. Such a translation requires a deliberative argumentation, that corresponds to the rules of logics and epistemology in practical reason.
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Gill, Anthony. "Book ReviewsThe Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. By Stathis N. Kalyvas. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Pp. x+300. $45.00 (cloth); $19.95 (paper)." American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 2 (September 1997): 472–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/231219.
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Nodia, Ghia. "Chasing the Meaning of ‘Post-communism’: a Transitional Phenomenon or Something to Stay?" Contemporary European History 9, no. 2 (July 2000): 269–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s096077730000206x.
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Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 743 pp., ISBN 0–521–57101–4Bruno Coppieters, Alexei Zverev and Dmitri Trenin, eds., Commonwealth and Independence in Post-Soviet Eurasia (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 232 pp., ISBN 0–714–64480–3Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism: an Introduction (Oxford: Polity Press, 1997), 260 pp., ISBN 0–745–61311–xMichael Mandelbaum, ed., Post-Communism: Four Perspectives (US Council of Foreign Relations, 1996), 208 pp., ISBN 0–876–09186–9Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 443 pp., ISBN 0–521–57157–xRichard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies (Oxford: Polity Press, 1998), 270 pp., ISBN 0–745–61926–6Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder, Post-Soviet Political Order (London/New York: Routledge, 1998), 201 pp., ISBN 0–415–17068–0Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr and Edward Allworth, Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 304 pp., ISBN 0–521–59045–0Vladimir Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 217 pp., ISBN 0–691–04826–6Gordon Wightman, ed., Party Formation in East-Central Europe: Post-Communist Politics in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria (Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1995), 270 pp., ISBN 1–858–898132–8It is now about 10 years since the communist bloc ceased to exist (1989 is the year when communism was defeated in central-eastern Europe, and in 1991 its bastion – the Soviet Union – fell). What it left behind are a couple of die-hard communist survivor-states, an urge to ‘rethink’ or ‘re-define’ many fundamental concepts of political science, and a large swathe of land that is still to be properly categorised in registers of comparative political science. ‘Post-communism’ is the most popular term to cover this territory. But does it refer to something real today, or does it just express some kind of intellectual inertia? How much do the ‘post-communist countries’ still have in common with each other and to what extent are they different from any others?
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Semenenko, I., and I. Prokhorenko. "From Elitist Project to Mass Politics: Challenges of Politicization to European Integration." World Economy and International Relations, no. 7 (2015): 29–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2015-7-29-40.
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The current recession has stimulated the politicization of the economic regulation in the EU and has brought about a change in the priorities of European integration. European identity landmarks emerge amid a growing interdependence of the European and divergent national political agendas and a “conflictual Europeanization” of mass politics. Protest publics have come to the forefront of European politics, and a conspicuous rise of the voters support for hybrid anti-establishment parties repudiating traditional politics demonstrates a cumulative effect of dissatisfaction and frustration in both national and European political institutions. Hence a growing support for Eurosceptics in the 2014 European parliamentary elections. As the Greek crisis and the results of the following national elections in Greece testify, the politicization of European integration through contentious politics can be regarded as an answer to the growing alienation of the political and institutional design of contemporary Europe from its social roots. Social welfare, alongside political democracy and a Christian heritage, remains a pillar of a common European identity. Contentious politics break into this political space in diverse, often populist and brutal forms, and point to the need to rethink existing stereotypes about politics and everyday life, about the changing motivation of political action and the changing nature of political actors. Europe faces the necessity to adapt its institutions both to the challenges of effective policies and of democratic politics. The on-going politicization processes can contribute to this end, on condition that the European political elite is capable to face this challenge.
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Fahlbeck, Reinhold. "Ora et Labora – On Freedom of Religion at the Work Place: A Stakeholder cum Balancing Factors Model." International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 20, Issue 1 (March 1, 2004): 27–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/ijcl2004003.
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Abstract: Religious pluralism has become a fact in most European countries. So have religious manifestations and symbols in schools and at places of work, in particular non-Christian, the Muslim scarf being the most controversial case. The purpose of this article is to analyse and reflect on the extent to which it is possible to combine work and religious manifestations in Europe today. The article focuses on the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and case law under it but discusses some national law as well. The text is problem-oriented, abstaining from providing even a cursory survey of freedom of religion under the Convention. Five areas are singled out for analysis. They all pit freedom to manifest religion against some other value, from (1) the supra-norm of democracy via (2) freedom from religion, (3) right to gender equality and (4) freedom of contract to (5) mundane norms concerning the management and running of private enterprises. The balancing of competing interests is shown often to be of a most delicate nature. To conclude, a model for resolving competing interests is presented. It involves two components: schemes (1) to determine the stakeholders and (2) to assess the character in various respects of the interests of each stakeholder.
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Zuidervaart, Lambert. "Fantastic Things: Critical Notes Toward A Social Ontology of the Arts." Philosophia Reformata 60, no. 1 (December 17, 1995): 37–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116117-90000086.
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Future historians will note many parallels between the 1930s and the 1990s in Europe and North America. Both decades appear to be times of dramatic cultural upheaval and societal transformation. Indeed, many of the battles fought over capitalism, democracy, and cultural modernism in the 1930s have returned in recent struggles over a global economy, the welfare state, and cultural postmodernism. Hence it may be instructive for contemporary Christian scholars to revisit the seminal texts of European philosophy in the 1930s. Cultural theorists have long recognized the significance of Martin Heidegger’s essay “The Origin of the Work of Art,” both as a turning point in his own thinking and as a fundamental challenge to modern aesthetics. Presented as lectures in 1935-36 and first published in German in 1950, the essay develops a conception of artistic truth that breaks entirely with Kantian divisions among epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Much less recognized, even among his students and followers, is the significance of Herman Dooyeweerd’s discussion of art from around the same time.3 First published in Dutch in 1936 and then revised and republished in English in 1957, Dooyeweerd’s discussion presents a conception of the artwork that reconfigures the Kantian divisions discarded by Heidegger.