Academic literature on the topic 'Chinese Victoria Melbourne'

AbstractLowe Kong Meng (Liu Guangming 劉光眀, 1831-1888),1 pre-eminent merchant and community leader of gold-rush Melbourne, was active in Australian politics, self-regarded as a British subject yet engaged with the Qing dynasty and was likely the first overseas Chinese awarded rank in the Chinese imperial service. Victoria’s mid-1880 election was a watershed: the immediate aftermath was the re-introduction of regulations penalising Chinese, after over 15 years of free immigration and no official discrimination. After the election it was claimed that Lowe Kong Meng persuaded Victoria’s Chinese to vote for the government, but was it in his interests to do so? This article examines the nature of Lowe Kong Meng’s engagement in European and Chinese political activity in the colony, as well as the extent of his leadership in Chinese colonial and diasporic life and explores how much he could have used that leadership to influence electoral outcomes. The article also examines how Lowe Kong Meng and the wider Chinese population of the colony brought changing political agendas to Victoria and developed these agendas through their colonial experiences.

AbstractIn 1887 Qing Imperial Commissioners General Wong Yung Ho and U Tsing visited Melbourne as part of an investigative mission to enquire into the treatment of Chinese imperial subjects in Southeast Asia and the Australian colonies. In this article I suggest that the political ramifications of their visit should be understood in the context of the larger imperial and national contestations occurring in the colony of Victoria in the 1880s. White colonial assertions of the rights of self-government — argued in defiance of imperial power both British and Chinese — and Chinese appeals to international law were antagonistic, but mutually constitutive claims. The more Chinese community leaders and the Imperial Commissioners appealed to the primacy of international law, the more strident were white colonial invocations of a newly defined national interest couched in a republican discourse on national sovereignty defined as border protection.

AbstractObjective:To assess longitudinal changes in the consumption of nutrients and the impact of socio-economic factors on diet transition in the Melbourne Chinese Health Study (MCHS) cohort.Design:Longitudinal study including two phases: baseline (1989/90) and follow-up (1995/97).Settings:Melbourne metropolitan areas in Victoria, Australia.Study subjects and method:Two hundred and sixty-two Chinese men and women aged 25 years and over, recruited at baseline, who had completed the both baseline and follow-up food-frequency questionnaires.Results:Women increased their daily intakes of energy (+549 kJ), protein (+7.8 g), fat (+7.3 g) and dietary fibre (+5.6 g) whereas men decreased their daily consumption of carbohydrate (-38.5 g) over an average period of 8 years. Energy contributions from protein and fat rose while that from carbohydrate dropped for all cohort subjects. Increased intakes of riboflavin, β-carotene and iron were observed in men, while an increased consumption of thiamine, riboflavin, niacin and minerals (except sodium) was observed in women. Socio-economic factors such as education, family income levels and occupational categories appeared to have a far more powerful influence on changes in individual daily nutrient intakes than age or length of stay in Australia. Changes in nutrient intake in women were less affected by sociodemographic variables.Conclusion:The observed changes in nutrient intakes indicated a progressive approach towards the Australian Recommended Dietary Intakes within this Chinese cohort population.

Abstract This study investigates achievement in second language learning (Chinese) in primary school in relation to learner variables such as amount and duration of instruction and home language background.1 Currently in the State of Victoria it is recommended that all students learn a second language from the beginning of primary school to the end of Year 10. As the majority of students in some LOTE (Languages Other Than English) classes such as Chinese are background speakers, some parents and teachers are concerned that non-background learners can be disadvantaged compared with classmates who have some exposure to the LOTE outside school. In order to examine whether home language use has any impact on achievement, we developed a test of four skills and administered it to Year 6 students in two primary schools in Melbourne. The results showed that Chinese background students scored much higher than non-Chinese background students in all four areas. However a close examination of the data revealed that other variables such as Chinese study outside school and the number of years of study at school also influenced the test scores. This research has strong implications for developing a LOTE curriculum for both background and non-background speakers.

Despite Australia being a multicultural country, there is limited evidence regarding ethnic perspectives about gambling, problem gambling, and associated help seeking. The aim of this paper is to examine the role and nature of stigma in relation to gambling, in particular its association with the concept of saving face. Interview data were thematically analysed from a study investigating the attitudes and experiences of gambling among ethnic minority communities (Tamil and Chinese) in Melbourne, Victoria. By using two well-established frameworks for understanding stigma, we examine the extent to which gambling is stigmatized within these two communities. The desire to save face (a form of stigma management) significantly influences what is said about gambling and the reluctance of individuals to seek help should it become problematic. Thresholds for stigmatized behaviour appear to differ between the communities studied, as well as from what is known about the Anglo-Celtic majority. Understanding this heterogeneity may be important for informing more effective, tailored interventions.Bien que l’Australie soit un pays multiculturel, il existe peu de données probantes sur les perspectives ethniques du jeu, le jeu problématique et la demande d’aide connexe. L’objectif du présent article est d’examiner le rôle et la nature du stigmate associé au jeu, en particulier son lien avec le concept de sauver la face. Les données d’entrevues réalisées dans le cadre d’une étude sur les attitudes et les expériences de jeu de membres de communautés ethniques minoritaires (tamiles et chinoises) à Melbourne, en Australie, ont été analysées par thème. À l’aide de deux cadres de travail reconnus pour la compréhension du stigmate, nous avons examiné la mesure dans laquelle le jeu est stigmatisé dans ces deux communautés. Le désir de sauver la face (qui est une forme de gestion du stigmate) a une grande incidence sur ce qui est dit sur le jeu et sur la réticence à demander de l’aide lorsque le jeu devient problématique. Le seuil de stigmatisation du comportement semble être différent dans les deux communautés étudiées, ainsi que de ce que l’on sait du stigmate dans la communauté majoritaire anglo-celte. Comprendre cette hétérogénéité pourrait aider à élaborer des interventions personnalisées plus efficaces.

Despite Australia being a multicultural country, there is limited evidence regarding ethnic perspectives about gambling, problem gambling, and associated help seeking. The aim of this paper is to examine the role and nature of stigma in relation to gambling, in particular its association with the concept of saving face. Interview data were thematically analysed from a study investigating the attitudes and experiences of gambling among ethnic minority communities (Tamil and Chinese) in Melbourne, Victoria. By using two well-established frameworks for understanding stigma, we examine the extent to which gambling is stigmatized within these two communities. The desire to save face (a form of stigma management) significantly influences what is said about gambling and the reluctance of individuals to seek help should it become problematic. Thresholds for stigmatized behaviour appear to differ between the communities studied, as well as from what is known about the Anglo-Celtic majority. Understanding this heterogeneity may be important for informing more effective, tailored interventions.Bien que l’Australie soit un pays multiculturel, il existe peu de données probantes sur les perspectives ethniques du jeu, le jeu problématique et la demande d’aide connexe. L’objectif du présent article est d’examiner le rôle et la nature du stigmate associé au jeu, en particulier son lien avec le concept de sauver la face. Les données d’entrevues réalisées dans le cadre d’une étude sur les attitudes et les expériences de jeu de membres de communautés ethniques minoritaires (tamiles et chinoises) à Melbourne, en Australie, ont été analysées par thème. À l’aide de deux cadres de travail reconnus pour la compréhension du stigmate, nous avons examiné la mesure dans laquelle le jeu est stigmatisé dans ces deux communautés. Le désir de sauver la face (qui est une forme de gestion du stigmate) a une grande incidence sur ce qui est dit sur le jeu et sur la réticence à demander de l’aide lorsque le jeu devient problématique. Le seuil de stigmatisation du comportement semble être différent dans les deux communautés étudiées, ainsi que de ce que l’on sait du stigmate dans la communauté majoritaire anglo-celte. Comprendre cette hétérogénéité pourrait aider à élaborer des interventions personnalisées plus efficaces.

07–533Anh Tuan, Truong & Storch Neomy (U Melbourne, Australia; neomys@unimelb.edu.au), Investigating group planning in preparation for oral presentations in an EFL class in Vietnam. RELC Journal (Sage) 38.1 (2007), 104–124.07–534Bada, Erdogan & Bilal Genc (U Çukurova, Turkey; erdoganbada@gmail.com), An investigation into the tense/aspect preferences of Turkish speakers of English and native English speakers in their oral narration. The Reading Matrix (Readingmatrix.com) 7.1 (2007), 141–150.07–535Beasley, Robert (Franklin College, USA; rbeasley@franklincollege.edu), Yuangshan Chuang & Chao-chih Liao, Determinants and effects of English language immersion in Taiwanese EFL learners engaged in online music study. The Reading Matrix (Readingmatrix.com) 6.3 (2006), 330–339.07–536Campbell, Dermot, Ciaron Mcdonnell, Marti Meinardi & Bunny Richardson (Dublin Institute of Technology, Ireland; dermot.campbell@dit.ie), The need for a speech corpus. ReCALL (Cambridge University Press) 19.1 (2007), 3–20.07–537Chambers, Andrea (Insa de Lyon, France; andrea.emara@insa-lyon.fr) & Stephen Bax, Making CALL work: Towards normalisation. System (Elsevier) 34.4 (2006), 465–479.07–538Chan, Alice (City U Hong Kong, China; enalice@cityu.edu.hk), Strategies used by Cantonese speakers in pronouncing English initial consonant clusters: Insights into the interlanguage phonology of Cantonese ESL learners in Hong Kong. International Review of Applied Linguistics in Language Teaching (Walter de Gruyter) 44.4 (2006), 331–355.07–539Crabbe, David (Victoria U Wellington, New Zealand; david.crabbe@vuw.ac.nz), Learning opportunities: Adding learning value to tasks. ELT Journal (Oxford University Press) 61.2 (2007), 117–125.07–540Elia, Antonella (U Naples, Italy; aelia@unina.it), Language learning in tandem via skype. The Reading Matrix (Readingmatrix.com) 6.3 (2006), 269–280.07–541Feuer, Avital (York U, Canada), Parental influences on language learning in Hebrew Sunday school classes. Language, Culture and Curriculum (Multilingual Matters) 19.3 (2006), 266–277.07–542Griffiths, Carol (AIS St Helens, Auckland, New Zealand; carolgriffiths5@gmail.com), Language learning strategies: Students' and teachers' perceptions. ELT Journal (Oxford University Press) 61.2 (2007), 91–99.07–543Hamid, Md. Obaidul (U Dhaka, Bangladesh; obaid_hamid@yahoo.com), Identifying second language errors: How plausible are plausible reconstructions?ELT Journal (Oxford University Press) 61.2 (2007), 107–116.07–544Hauck, Mirjam (The Open U, UK; m.hauck@open.ac.uk), Critical success factors in a TRIDEM exchange. ReCALL (Cambridge University Press) 19.2 (2007), 202–223.07–545Hellermann, John (Portland State U, Portland, Oregon, USA; jkh@pdx.edu) & Andrea Vergun, Language which is not taught: The discourse marker use of beginning adult learners of English. Journal of Pragmatics (Elsevier) 39.1 (2007), 157–179.07–546Hwu, Fenfang (U Cincinnati, USA; hwuf@ucmail.uc.edu), Learners' strategies with a grammar application: The influence of language ability and personality preferences. ReCALL (Cambridge University Press) 19.1 (2007), 21–38.07–547Karlsson, Leena (Helsinki U, Finland; leena.karlsson@helsinki.fi), Felicity Kjisik & Joan Nordlund, Language counselling: A critical and integral component in promoting an autonomous community of learning. System (Elsevier) 35.1 (2007), 46–65.07–548Karlström, Petter (Stockholm U, Sweden; petter@dsv.su.se), Teresa Cerratto-Pargman, Henrik Lindström & Ola Knutsson, Tool mediation in focus on form activities: Case studies in a grammar-exploring environment. ReCALL (Cambridge University Press) 19.1 (2007), 39–56.07–549Kim, Yongho (Korea National U of Education) & David Kellogg, Rules out of roles: Differences in play language and their developmental significance. Applied Linguistics (Oxford University Press) 28.1 (2007), 25–45.07–550Liaw, Meei-Ling (National Taichung U, China; meeilingliaw@gmail.com), Constructing a ‘third space’ for EFL learners: Where language and cultures meet. ReCALL (Cambridge University Press) 19.2 (2007), 224–241.07–551Matsuzaki Carreira, Junko (Tsuda College, Japan), Motivation for learning English as a foreign language in Japanese elementary schools. JALT Journal (Japan Association for Language Teaching) 28.2 (2006), 135–157.07–552Mozzon-McPherson, Marina (U Hull, UK; M.Mozzon-Mcpherson@hull.ac.uk), Supporting independent learning environments: An analysis of structures and roles of language learning advisers. System (Elsevier) 35.1 (2007), 66–92.07–553Napier, Jemina (Macquarie U, Australia), Effectively teaching discourse to sign language interpreting students. Language, Culture and Curriculum (Multilingual Matters) 19.3 (2006), 251–265.07–554Reinders, Hayo (U Auckland, New Zealand; system@hayo.nl), Supporting independent learning environments: An analysis of structures and roles of language learning advisers. System (Elsevier) 35.1 (2007), 93–111.07–555Stracke, Elke (U Canberra, Australia; Elke.Stracke@canberra.edu.au), A road to understanding: A qualitative study into why learners drop out of a blended language learning (BLL) environment. ReCALL (Cambridge University Press) 19.1 (2007), 57–78.07–556Stroud, Christopher (U West Cape, South Africa; cstroud@uwc.ac.za) & Lionel Wee, Anxiety and identity in the language classroom. RELC Journal (SAGE Publications) 37.3 (2006), 299–307.07–557Taguchi, Naoko (Carnegie Mellon U, USA), Task difficulty in oral speech act production. Applied Linguistics (Oxford University Press) 28.1 (2007), 113–135.07–558Webb, Stuart (Japan), The effects of repetition on vocabulary knowledge. Applied Linguistics (Oxford University Press) 28.1 (2007), 46–65.07–559Yihong, Gao, Zhao Yuan, Cheng Ying & Zhou Yan, Relationship between English learning motivation types and self-identity changes among Chinese students. TESOL Quarterly (Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages) 41.1 (2007), 133–155.07–560Xuesong, Gao (U Hong Kong, China; Gao@hkusua.hku.hk), Strategies used by Chinese parents to support English language learning. RELC Journal (SAGE Publications) 37.3 (2006), 285–298.07–561Zhenhui, Rao (Jiangxi Normal U, Nanchang, China), Understanding Chinese students' use of language learning strategies from cultural and educational perspectives. Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development (Multilingual Matters) 27.6 (2006), 491–508.

04–198Chandler-Olcott, Kelly and Mahar, Donna (Syracuse U., USA; Email: kpchandl@syr.edu). ‘Tech-savviness’ meets multiliteracies: exploring adolescent girls' technology-mediated literacy practices. Reading Research Quarterly (Newark, USA), 38, 3 (2003), 356–85.04–199Chung, Teresa Mihwa & Nation, Paul (Victoria U., New Zealand; Email: Paul.Nation@vuw.ac.nz). Identifying technical vocabulary. System (Oxford, UK), 32, 2 (2004), 251–63.04–200Ellis, Rod and Yuan, Fangyuan (U. of Auckland, New Zealand; Email: r.ellis@auckland.ac.nz). The effects of planning on fluency, complexity, and accuracy in L2 narrative writing. Studies in Second Language Acquisition (New York, USA) 26, 1 (2004), 59–84.04–201Gascoigne, Carolyn (U. of Nebraska-Omaha, USA). Examining the effect of feedback in beginning L2 composition. Foreign Language Annals (New York, USA), 37, 1 (2004) 71–76.04–202Hamston, J. and Love, K. Reading relationships: Parents, boys, and reading as cultural practice. Australian Journal of Language and Literacy (Adelaide, Australia), 26, 3 (2003), 44–57.04–203Hobbs, Renee and Frost, Richard (Babson College, USA). Measuring the acquisition of media-literacy skills. Reading Research Quarterly (Newark, USA), 38, 3 (2003), 330–55.04–204Huang, Jingzi (Monmouth University, USA; Email: jhuang@Monmouth.edu). Socialising ESL students into the discourse of school science through academic writing. Language and Education (Clevedon, UK), 18, 2 (2004), 97–123.04–205Johnston, Brenda (U. of Southampton, UK; Email: bhm@soton.ac.uk). Teaching and researching critical academic writing: scrutiny of an action research process. Educational Action Research (Oxford, UK), 11, 3 (2003), 365–87.04–206Kamler, B. (Deakin University, Australia). Relocating the writer's voice – from voice to story and beyond. English in Australia (Norwood, Australia), 138 (2003), 34–40.04–207Kim, Hae-Ri (Kyungil U., South Korea; Email: hrkimasu@hanmail.net). Dialogue journal writing through a literature-based approach in an EFL setting. English Teaching (Anseonggun, South Korea), 58, 4 (2003), 293–318.04–208Kim, Myonghee (Indiana University, USA; Email: mahn@indiana.edu). Literature discussions in adult L2 learning. Language and Education (Clevedon, UK), 18, 2 (2004), 145–66.04–209Lee, Icy (Hong Kong Baptist U., Hong Kong; Email: icylee@hkbu.edu.hk). L2 writing teachers' perspectives, practices and problems regarding error feedback. Assessing Writing (New York, USA), 8, 3 (2003), 216–37.04–210Lindgren, Eva (Email: eva.lindgren@engelska.umu.se) and Sullivan, Kirk P. H. Stimulated recall as a trigger for increasing noticing and language awareness in the L2 writing classroom: a case study of two young female writers. Language Awareness (Clevedon, UK), 12, 3&4 (2003), 172–86.04–211Luke, A. (U. of Queensland, Australia/National Institute of Education, Singapore). Making literacy policy and practice with a difference. Australian Journal of Language and Literacy. (Adelaide, Australia), 26, 3 (2003), 58–82.04–212Mission, R. (U. of Melbourne, Australia). Imagining the self: the individual imagination in the English classroom. English in Australia (Norwood, Australia) 138 (2003), 24–33.04–213Morris, Darrell, Bloodgood, Janet W., Lomax, Richard G. and Perney, Jan (Appalachian State U., USA). Developmental steps in learning to read: a longitudinal study in kindergarten and first grade. Reading Research Quarterly (Newark, USA), 38, 3 (2003), 302–28.04–214Ryu, Hoyeol (Hankyong National University, Korea; Email: hoyeol@hnu.hankyong.ac.kr). Process approach to writing in the post-process era: A case study of two college students' writing processes. English Teaching (Anseonggun, Korea), 58, 3 (2003), 123–42.04–215Shen, Helen H. (University of Iowa, USA; Email: Helen-shen@uiowa.edu). Level of cognitive processing: effects on character learning among non-native learners of Chinese as a foreign language. Language and Education (Clevedon, UK), 18, 2 (2004), 167–82.04–216Shi, Ling (U. of British Columbia, Canada). Textual borrowing in second-language writing. Written Communication (Thousand Oaks, California, USA), 21, 2 (2004), 171–200.04–217Spence, Lucy K. (Arizona State University, USA). Stepping out of the conversation: giving students a space to co-construct writing. Bilingual Research Journal (Arizona, USA), 27, 3 (2003), 523–32.

04–538 Allford, D. Institute of Education, University of London. d.allford@sta01.joe.ac.uk‘Grasping the nettle’: aspects of grammar in the mother tongue and foreign languages. Language Learning Journal (Rugby, UK), 27 (2003), 24–32.04–539 Álvarez, Inma (The Open U., UK). Consideraciones sobre la contribución de los ordenadores en el aprendizaje de lenguas extranjeras. [The contribution of computers to foreign language learning.] Vida Hispánica (Rugby, UK), 28 (2003), 19–23.04–540 Arkoudis, S. (U. of Melbourne, Australia; Email: sophiaa@unimelb.edu.au). Teaching English as a second language in science classes: incommensurate epistemologies?Language and Education (Clevedon, UK), 17, 3 (2003), 161–173.04–541 Bandin, Francis and Ferrer, Margarita (Manchester Metropolitan U., UK). Estereotípicos. [Stereotypes.] Vida Hispánica. Association for Language Learning (Rugby, UK), 28 (2003), 4–12.04–542 Banno, Eri (Okayama University). A cross-cultural survey of students’ expectations of foreign language teachers. Foreign Language Annals, 36, 3 (2003), 339–346.04–543 Barron, Colin (U. of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; Email: csbarron@hkusua.hku.hk). Problem-solving and EAP: themes and issues in a collaborative teaching venture. English for Specific Purposes (Amsterdam, The Netherlands), 22, 3 (2003), 297–314.04–544 Bartley, Belinda (Lord Williams's School, Thame). Developing learning strategies in writing French at key stage 4. Francophonie (London, UK), 28 (2003), 10–17.04–545 Bax, S. (Canterbury Christ Church University College). The end of CLT: a context approach to language teaching. ELT Journal (Oxford, UK), 57, 3 (2003), 278–287.04–546 Caballero, Rodriguez (Universidad Jaume I, Campus de Borriol, Spain; Email: mcaballe@guest.uji.es). How to talk shop through metaphor: bringing metaphor research to the ESP classroom. English for Specific Purposes (Amsterdam, The Netherlands), 22, 2 (2003), 177–194.04–547 Field, J. (University of Leeds). Promoting perception: lexical segmentation in L2 listening. ELT Journal (Oxford, UK), 57, 4 (2003), 325–334.04–548 Finkbeiner, Matthew and Nicol, Janet (U. of Arizona, AZ, USA; Email: msf@u.Arizona.edu). Semantic category effects in second language word learning. Applied Psycholinguistics (Cambridge, UK), 24, 3 (2003), 369–384.04–549 Frazier, S. (University of California). A corpus analysis of would-clauses without adjacent if-clauses. TESOL Quarterly (Alexandria, VA, USA), 37, 3 (2003), 443–466.04–550 Harwood, Nigel (Canterbury Christ Church University College, UK). Taking a lexical approach to teaching: principles and problems. International Journal of Applied Linguistics (Oxford, UK), 12, 2 (2002), 139–155.04–551 Hird, Bernard (Edith Cowan U., Australia; Email: b.hird@ecu.edu.au). What are language teachers trying to do in their lessons?Babel, (Adelaide, Australia) 37, 3 (2003), 24–29.04–552 Ho, Y-K. (Ming Hsin University of Science and Technology, Taiwan). Audiotaped dialogue journals: an alternative form of speaking practice. ELT Journal (Oxford, UK), 57, 3 (2003), 269–277.04–553 Huang, Jingzi (Monmouth University, West Long Branch, NJ, USA). Chinese as a foreign language in Canada: a content-based programme for elementary school. Language, Culture and Curriculum (), 16, 1 (2003), 70–89.04–554 Kennedy, G. (Victoria University of Wellington). Amplifier collocations in the British National Corpus: implications for English language teaching. TESOL Quarterly (Alexandria, VA, USA), 37, 3 (2003), 467–487.04–555 Kissau, Scott P. (U. of Windsor, UK & Greater Essex County District School Board; Email: scotkiss@att.canada.ca). The relationship between school environment and effectiveness in French immersion. The Canadian Journal of Applied Linguistics (Ottawa, Canada), 6, 1 (2003), 87–104.04–556 Laurent, Maurice (Messery). De la grammaire implicite à la grammaire explicite. [From Implicit Grammar to Explicit Grammar.] Tema, 2 (2003), 40–47.04–557 Lear, Darcy (The Ohio State University, USA). Using technology to cross cultural and linguistic borders in Spanish language classrooms. Hispania (Ann Arbor, USA), 86, 3 (2003), 541–551.04–558 Leeser, Michael J. (University of Illianos at Urbana-Champaign, USA; Email: leeser@uiuc.edu). Learner proficiency and focus on form during collaborative dialogue. Language Teaching Research, 8, 1 (2004), 55.04–559 Levis, John M. (Iowa State University, USA) and Grant, Linda. Integrating pronunciation into ESL/EFL classrooms. TESOL Journal, 12 (2003), 13–19.04–560 Mitchell, R. (Centre for Language in Education, University of Southampton; Email: rfm3@soton.ac.uk) Rethinking the concept of progression in the National Curriculum for Modern Foreign Languages: a research perspective. Language Learning Journal (Rugby, UK), 27 (2003), 15–23.04–561 Moffitt, Gisela (Central Michigan U., USA). Beyond Struwwelpeter: using German picture books for cultural exploration. Die Unterrichtspraxis (Cherry Hill, NJ, USA), 36, 1 (2003), 15–27.04–562 Morley, J. and Truscott, S. (University of Manchester; Email: mfwssjcm@man.ac.uk). The integration of research-oriented learning into a Tandem learning programme. Language Learning Journal (Rugby, UK), 27 (2003), 52–58.04–563 Oliver, Rhonda (Edith Cowan U., Australia; Email: rhonda.oliver@cowan.edu.au) and Mackey, Alison. Interactional context and feedback in child ESL classrooms. The Modern Language Journal (Madison, WI, USA), 87, 4 (2003), 519–533.04–564 Pachler, N. (Institute of Education, University of London; Email: n.pachler@ioe.ac.uk). Foreign language teaching as an evidence-based profession?Language Learning Journal (Rugby, UK), 27 (2003), 4–14.04–565 Portmann-Tselikas, Paul R. (Karl-Franzens Universität Graz, Austria). Grammatikunterricht als Schule der Aufmerksamkeit. Zur Rolle grammatischen Wissens im gesteuerten Spracherwerb. [Grammar teaching as a training of noticing. The role of grammatical knowledge in formal language learning.] Babylonia (Switzerland, www.babylonia), 2 (2003), 9–18.04–566 Purvis, K. (Email: purvis@senet.com.au) and Ranaldo, T. Providing continuity in learning from Primary to Secondary. Babel, 38, 1 (2003), (Adelaide, Australia), 13–18.04–567 Román-Odio, Clara and Hartlaub, Bradley A. (Kenyon College, Ohio, USA). Classroom assessment of Computer-Assisted Language Learning: developing a strategy for college faculty. Hispania (Ann Arbor, USA), 86, 3 (2003), 592–607.04–568 Schleppegrell, Mary J. (University of California, Davis, USA) and Achugar, Mariana. Learning language and learning history: a functional linguistics approach. TESOL Journal, 12, 2 (2003), 21–27.04–569 Schoenbrodt, Lisa, Kerins, Marie and Geseli, Jacqueline (Loyola College in Maryland, Baltimore, USA; Email: lschoenbrodt@loyola.edu) Using narrative language intervention as a tool to increase communicative competence in Spanish-speaking children. Language, Culture and Curriculum (Clevedon, UK), 16, 1 (2003), 48–59.04–570 Shen, Hwei-Jiun (National Taichung Institute of Technology). The role of explicit instruction in ESL/EFL reading. Foreign Language Annals (New York, USA), 36, 3 (2003), 424–433.04–571 Sifakis, N. C. (Hellenic Open U., Greece; Email: nicossif@hol.gr). Applying the adult education framework to ESP curriculum development: an integrative model. English for Specific Purposes (Amsterdam, The Netherlands), 22, 2 (2003), 195–211.04–572 Simpson, R. and Mendis, D. (University of Michigan). A corpus-based study of idioms in academic speech. TESOL Quarterly (Alexandria, VA, USA), 37, 3 (2003), 419–441.

Introduction The highly contagious COVID-19 virus has presented particularly difficult public policy challenges. The relatively late emergence of an effective treatments and vaccines, the structural stresses on health care systems, the lockdowns and the economic dislocations, the evident structural inequalities in effected societies, as well as the difficulty of prevention have tested social and political cohesion. Moreover, the intrusive nature of many prophylactic measures have led to individual liberty and human rights concerns. As noted by the Victorian (Australia) Ombudsman Report on the COVID-19 lockdown in Melbourne, we may be tempted, during a crisis, to view human rights as expendable in the pursuit of saving human lives. This thinking can lead to dangerous territory. It is not unlawful to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms when there are compelling reasons for doing so; human rights are inherently and inseparably a consideration of human lives. (5) These difficulties have raised issues about the importance of social or community capital in fighting the pandemic. This article discusses the impacts of social and community capital and other factors on the governmental efforts to combat the spread of infectious disease through the maintenance of social distancing and household ‘bubbles’. It argues that the beneficial effects of social and community capital towards fighting the pandemic, such as mutual respect and empathy, which underpins such public health measures as social distancing, the use of personal protective equipment, and lockdowns in the USA, have been undermined as preventive measures because they have been transmogrified to become a salient aspect of the “culture wars” (Peters). In contrast, states that have relatively lower social capital such a China have been able to more effectively arrest transmission of the disease because the government was been able to generate and personify a nationalist response to the virus and thus generate a more robust social consensus regarding the efforts to combat the disease. Social Capital and Culture Wars The response to COVID-19 required individuals, families, communities, and other types of groups to refrain from extensive interaction – to stay in their bubble. In these situations, especially given the asymptomatic nature of many COVID-19 infections and the serious imposition lockdowns and social distancing and isolation, the temptation for individuals to breach public health rules in high. From the perspective of policymakers, the response to fighting COVID-19 is a collective action problem. In studying collective action problems, scholars have paid much attention on the role of social and community capital (Ostrom and Ahn 17-35). Ostrom and Ahn comment that social capital “provides a synthesizing approach to how cultural, social, and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect their capacity of dealing with collective-action problems” (24). Social capital is regarded as an evolving social type of cultural trait (Fukuyama; Guiso et al.). Adger argues that social capital “captures the nature of social relations” and “provides an explanation for how individuals use their relationships to other actors in societies for their own and for the collective good” (387). The most frequently used definition of social capital is the one proffered by Putnam who regards it as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 65). All these studies suggest that social and community capital has at least two elements: “objective associations” and subjective ties among individuals. Objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations that are formed and engaged in on a voluntary basis by individuals and social groups. Subjective ties or norms, on the other hand, primarily stand for trust and reciprocity (Paxton). High levels of social capital have generally been associated with democratic politics and civil societies whose institutional performance benefits from the coordinated actions and civic culture that has been facilitated by high levels of social capital (Putnam, Democracy 167-9). Alternatively, a “good and fair” state and impartial institutions are important factors in generating and preserving high levels of social capital (Offe 42-87). Yet social capital is not limited to democratic civil societies and research is mixed on whether rising social capital manifests itself in a more vigorous civil society that in turn leads to democratising impulses. Castillo argues that various trust levels for institutions that reinforce submission, hierarchy, and cultural conservatism can be high in authoritarian governments, indicating that high levels of social capital do not necessarily lead to democratic civic societies (Castillo et al.). Roßteutscher concludes after a survey of social capita indicators in authoritarian states that social capital has little effect of democratisation and may in fact reinforce authoritarian rule: in nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance (752). In China, there has been ongoing debate concerning the presence of civil society and the level of social capital found across Chinese society. If one defines civil society as an intermediate associational realm between the state and the family, populated by autonomous organisations which are separate from the state that are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values, it is arguable that the PRC had a significant civil society or social capital in the first few decades after its establishment (White). However, most scholars agree that nascent civil society as well as a more salient social and community capital has emerged in China’s reform era. This was evident after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the government welcomed community organising and community-driven donation campaigns for a limited period of time, giving the NGO sector and bottom-up social activism a boost, as evidenced in various policy areas such as disaster relief and rural community development (F. Wu 126; Xu 9). Nevertheless, the CCP and the Chinese state have been effective in maintaining significant control over civil society and autonomous groups without attempting to completely eliminate their autonomy or existence. The dramatic economic and social changes that have occurred since the 1978 Opening have unsurprisingly engendered numerous conflicts across the society. In response, the CCP and State have adjusted political economic policies to meet the changing demands of workers, migrants, the unemployed, minorities, farmers, local artisans, entrepreneurs, and the growing middle class. Often the demands arising from these groups have resulted in policy changes, including compensation. In other circumstances, where these groups remain dissatisfied, the government will tolerate them (ignore them but allow them to continue in the advocacy), or, when the need arises, supress the disaffected groups (F. Wu 2). At the same time, social organisations and other groups in civil society have often “refrained from open and broad contestation against the regime”, thereby gaining the space and autonomy to achieve the objectives (F. Wu 2). Studies of Chinese social or community capital suggest that a form of modern social capital has gradually emerged as Chinese society has become increasingly modernised and liberalised (despite being non-democratic), and that this social capital has begun to play an important role in shaping social and economic lives at the local level. However, this more modern form of social capital, arising from developmental and social changes, competes with traditional social values and social capital, which stresses parochial and particularistic feelings among known individuals while modern social capital emphasises general trust and reciprocal feelings among both known and unknown individuals. The objective element of these traditional values are those government-sanctioned, formal mass organisations such as Communist Youth and the All-China Federation of Women's Associations, where members are obliged to obey the organisation leadership. The predominant subjective values are parochial and particularistic feelings among individuals who know one another, such as guanxi and zongzu (Chen and Lu, 426). The concept of social capital emphasises that the underlying cooperative values found in individuals and groups within a culture are an important factor in solving collective problems. In contrast, the notion of “culture war” focusses on those values and differences that divide social and cultural groups. Barry defines culture wars as increases in volatility, expansion of polarisation, and conflict between those who are passionate about religiously motivated politics, traditional morality, and anti-intellectualism, and…those who embrace progressive politics, cultural openness, and scientific and modernist orientations. (90) The contemporary culture wars across the world manifest opposition by various groups in society who hold divergent worldviews and ideological positions. Proponents of culture war understand various issues as part of a broader set of religious, political, and moral/normative positions invoked in opposition to “elite”, “liberal”, or “left” ideologies. Within this Manichean universe opposition to such issues as climate change, Black Lives Matter, same sex rights, prison reform, gun control, and immigration becomes framed in binary terms, and infused with a moral sensibility (Chapman 8-10). In many disputes, the culture war often devolves into an epistemological dispute about the efficacy of scientific knowledge and authority, or a dispute between “practical” and theoretical knowledge. In this environment, even facts can become partisan narratives. For these “cultural” disputes are often how electoral prospects (generally right-wing) are advanced; “not through policies or promises of a better life, but by fostering a sense of threat, a fantasy that something profoundly pure … is constantly at risk of extinction” (Malik). This “zero-sum” social and policy environment that makes it difficult to compromise and has serious consequences for social stability or government policy, especially in a liberal democratic society. Of course, from the perspective of cultural materialism such a reductionist approach to culture and political and social values is not unexpected. “Culture” is one of the many arenas in which dominant social groups seek to express and reproduce their interests and preferences. “Culture” from this sense is “material” and is ultimately connected to the distribution of power, wealth, and resources in society. As such, the various policy areas that are understood as part of the “culture wars” are another domain where various dominant and subordinate groups and interests engaged in conflict express their values and goals. Yet it is unexpected that despite the pervasiveness of information available to individuals the pool of information consumed by individuals who view the “culture wars” as a touchstone for political behaviour and a narrative to categorise events and facts is relatively closed. This lack of balance has been magnified by social media algorithms, conspiracy-laced talk radio, and a media ecosystem that frames and discusses issues in a manner that elides into an easily understood “culture war” narrative. From this perspective, the groups (generally right-wing or traditionalist) exist within an information bubble that reinforces political, social, and cultural predilections. American and Chinese Reponses to COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan in December 2019. Initially unprepared and unwilling to accept the seriousness of the infection, the Chinese government regrouped from early mistakes and essentially controlled transmission in about three months. This positive outcome has been messaged as an exposition of the superiority of the Chinese governmental system and society both domestically and internationally; a positive, even heroic performance that evidences the populist credentials of the Chinese political leadership and demonstrates national excellence. The recently published White Paper entitled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” also summarises China’s “strategic achievement” in the simple language of numbers: in a month, the rising spread was contained; in two months, the daily case increase fell to single digits; and in three months, a “decisive victory” was secured in Wuhan City and Hubei Province (Xinhua). This clear articulation of the positive results has rallied political support. Indeed, a recent survey shows that 89 percent of citizens are satisfied with the government’s information dissemination during the pandemic (C Wu). As part of the effort, the government extensively promoted the provision of “political goods”, such as law and order, national unity and pride, and shared values. For example, severe publishments were introduced for violence against medical professionals and police, producing and selling counterfeit medications, raising commodity prices, spreading ‘rumours’, and being uncooperative with quarantine measures (Xu). Additionally, as an extension the popular anti-corruption campaign, many local political leaders were disciplined or received criminal charges for inappropriate behaviour, abuse of power, and corruption during the pandemic (People.cn, 2 Feb. 2020). Chinese state media also described fighting the virus as a global “competition”. In this competition a nation’s “material power” as well as “mental strength”, that calls for the highest level of nation unity and patriotism, is put to the test. This discourse recalled the global competition in light of the national mythology related to the formation of Chinese nation, the historical “hardship”, and the “heroic Chinese people” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). Moreover, as the threat of infection receded, it was emphasised that China “won this competition” and the Chinese people have demonstrated the “great spirit of China” to the world: a result built upon the “heroism of the whole Party, Army, and Chinese people from all ethnic groups” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). In contrast to the Chinese approach of emphasising national public goods as a justification for fighting the virus, the U.S. Trump Administration used nationalism, deflection, and “culture war” discourse to undermine health responses — an unprecedented response in American public health policy. The seriousness of the disease as well as the statistical evidence of its course through the American population was disputed. The President and various supporters raged against the COVID-19 “hoax”, social distancing, and lockdowns, disparaged public health institutions and advice, and encouraged protesters to “liberate” locked-down states (Russonello). “Our federal overlords say ‘no singing’ and ‘no shouting’ on Thanksgiving”, Representative Paul Gosar, a Republican of Arizona, wrote as he retweeted a Centers for Disease Control list of Thanksgiving safety tips (Weiner). People were encouraged, by way of the White House and Republican leadership, to ignore health regulations and not to comply with social distancing measures and the wearing of masks (Tracy). This encouragement led to threats against proponents of face masks such as Dr Anthony Fauci, one of the nation’s foremost experts on infectious diseases, who required bodyguards because of the many threats on his life. Fauci’s critics — including President Trump — countered Fauci’s promotion of mask wearing by stating accusingly that he once said mask-wearing was not necessary for ordinary people (Kelly). Conspiracy theories as to the safety of vaccinations also grew across the course of the year. As the 2020 election approached, the Administration ramped up efforts to downplay the serious of the virus by identifying it with “the media” and illegitimate “partisan” efforts to undermine the Trump presidency. It also ramped up its criticism of China as the source of the infection. This political self-centeredness undermined state and federal efforts to slow transmission (Shear et al.). At the same time, Trump chided health officials for moving too slowly on vaccine approvals, repeated charges that high infection rates were due to increased testing, and argued that COVID-19 deaths were exaggerated by medical providers for political and financial reasons. These claims were amplified by various conservative media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham of Fox News. The result of this “COVID-19 Denialism” and the alternative narrative of COVID-19 policy told through the lens of culture war has resulted in the United States having the highest number of COVID-19 cases, and the highest number of COVID-19 deaths. At the same time, the underlying social consensus and social capital that have historically assisted in generating positive public health outcomes has been significantly eroded. According to the Pew Research Center, the share of U.S. adults who say public health officials such as those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are doing an excellent or good job responding to the outbreak decreased from 79% in March to 63% in August, with an especially sharp decrease among Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020). Social Capital and COVID-19 From the perspective of social or community capital, it could be expected that the American response to the Pandemic would be more effective than the Chinese response. Historically, the United States has had high levels of social capital, a highly developed public health system, and strong governmental capacity. In contrast, China has a relatively high level of governmental and public health capacity, but the level of social capital has been lower and there is a significant presence of traditional values which emphasise parochial and particularistic values. Moreover, the antecedent institutions of social capital, such as weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal et al.), environmental turbulence and resource scarcity along with the transactional nature of guanxi (gift-giving and information exchange and relationship dependence) militate against finding a more effective social and community response to the public health emergency. Yet China’s response has been significantly more successful than the Unites States’. Paradoxically, the American response under the Trump Administration and the Chinese response both relied on an externalisation of the both the threat and the justifications for their particular response. In the American case, President Trump, while downplaying the seriousness of the virus, consistently called it the “China virus” in an effort to deflect responsibly as well as a means to avert attention away from the public health impacts. As recently as 3 January 2021, Trump tweeted that the number of “China Virus” cases and deaths in the U.S. were “far exaggerated”, while critically citing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's methodology: “When in doubt, call it COVID-19. Fake News!” (Bacon). The Chinese Government, meanwhile, has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy across the South China Sea, on the frontier in the Indian sub-continent, and against states such as Australia who have criticised the initial Chinese response to COVID-19. To this international criticism, the government reiterated its sovereign rights and emphasised its “victimhood” in the face of “anti-China” foreign forces. Chinese state media also highlighted China as “victim” of the coronavirus, but also as a target of Western “political manoeuvres” when investigating the beginning stages of the pandemic. The major difference, however, is that public health policy in the United States was superimposed on other more fundamental political and cultural cleavages, and part of this externalisation process included the assignation of “otherness” and demonisation of internal political opponents or characterising political opponents as bent on destroying the United States. This assignation of “otherness” to various internal groups is a crucial element in the culture wars. While this may have been inevitable given the increasingly frayed nature of American society post-2008, such a characterisation has been activity pushed by local, state, and national leadership in the Republican Party and the Trump Administration (Vogel et al.). In such circumstances, minimising health risks and highlighting civil rights concerns due to public health measures, along with assigning blame to the democratic opposition and foreign states such as China, can have a major impact of public health responses. The result has been that social trust beyond the bubble of one’s immediate circle or those who share similar beliefs is seriously compromised — and the collective action problem presented by COVID-19 remains unsolved. Daniel Aldrich’s study of disasters in Japan, India, and US demonstrates that pre-existing high levels of social capital would lead to stronger resilience and better recovery (Aldrich). Social capital helps coordinate resources and facilitate the reconstruction collectively and therefore would lead to better recovery (Alesch et al.). Yet there has not been much research on how the pool of social capital first came about and how a disaster may affect the creation and store of social capital. Rebecca Solnit has examined five major disasters and describes that after these events, survivors would reach out and work together to confront the challenges they face, therefore increasing the social capital in the community (Solnit). However, there are studies that have concluded that major disasters can damage the social fabric in local communities (Peacock et al.). The COVID-19 epidemic does not have the intensity and suddenness of other disasters but has had significant knock-on effects in increasing or decreasing social capital, depending on the institutional and social responses to the pandemic. In China, it appears that the positive social capital effects have been partially subsumed into a more generalised patriotic or nationalist affirmation of the government’s policy response. Unlike civil society responses to earlier crises, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there is less evidence of widespread community organisation and response to combat the epidemic at its initial stages. This suggests better institutional responses to the crisis by the government, but also a high degree of porosity between civil society and a national “imagined community” represented by the national state. The result has been an increased legitimacy for the Chinese government. Alternatively, in the United States the transformation of COVID-19 public health policy into a culture war issue has seriously impeded efforts to combat the epidemic in the short term by undermining the social consensus and social capital necessary to fight such a pandemic. Trust in American institutions is historically low, and President Trump’s untrue contention that President Biden’s election was due to “fraud” has further undermined the legitimacy of the American government, as evidenced by the attacks directed at Congress in the U.S. capital on 6 January 2021. As such, the lingering effects the pandemic will have on social, economic, and political institutions will likely reinforce the deep cultural and political cleavages and weaken interpersonal networks in American society. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated global public health and impacted deeply on the world economy. Unsurprisingly, given the serious economic, social, and political consequences, different government responses have been highly politicised. Various quarantine and infection case tracking methods have caused concern over state power intruding into private spheres. The usage of face masks, social distancing rules, and intra-state travel restrictions have aroused passionate debate over public health restrictions, individual liberty, and human rights. Yet underlying public health responses grounded in higher levels of social capital enhance the effectiveness of public health measures. In China, a country that has generally been associated with lower social capital, it is likely that the relatively strong policy response to COVID-19 will both enhance feelings of nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism and help create and increase the store of social capital. 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This chapter examines the Chinese response to the need of the people of Victoria, in the southeastern corner of Australia, to continually raise funds to support their charitable institutions. Resolved to avoid the taxes associated with a state based system of caring for the sick, elderly and poor, the settlers of Victoria established institutions that required public support. Fund raising was a constant concern resulting in frequent public events for charities, such as processions, fairs and grand bazaars. Chinese communities generously participated in these events and proved to be great assets for fundraising committees. They fashioned a means to utilize western fascination with the splendor of aspects of Chinese culture, to serve Victoria’s need to support its charitable institutions. The costumes, and acrobatic and martial arts traditions of Cantonese opera were publicly displayed and demonstrated to extensive gatherings. Eventually the processing of a Chinese dragon was also used to attract crowds to charity events. Despite the restrictions that the host society placed on Chinese immigration the Chinese in Melbourne and various Victorian country towns readily expended considerable energy and money in responding to frequent calls for their involvement in charity events.