Journal articles on the topic 'Chinese Communist Party School'
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1
Shambaugh, David. "Training China's Political Elite: The Party School System." China Quarterly 196 (December 2008): 827–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741008001148.
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AbstractOne of the most important, but under-researched and least well understood, instruments of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the extensive national network of Party schools (approximately 2,700). They serve as the key institution of mid-career training and indoctrination for all Party cadres, many government cadres, some military officers and selected businessmen. In addition to its training and indoctrination functions, the Party school system (particularly the Central Party School in Beijing) is also an important generator of policy initiatives. Not all Party schools are stalwart institutions, with some being involved in corruption scandals, but on the whole they have come to play an increasingly important role in the CCP's rebuilding efforts in recent years.
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WANG, CHEN-CHENG. "Intellectuals and the One-party State in Nationalist China: The Case of the Central Politics School (1927–1947)." Modern Asian Studies 48, no. 6 (January 31, 2014): 1769–807. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x12000893.
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AbstractThis paper aims to provide a new perspective on the relationship between Nationalist Party (GMD) cadres and Chinese intellectuals. By studying the Central Politics School, a major GMD political training institute for professional party cadres, I hope to reassess the nature of the GMD one-party state and remind researchers of the difficult choices it faced between backing party-liners needed for the political struggle and accommodating depoliticized intellectuals needed for public administration. This paper will argue that GMD political impotence in competition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was due less to an inadequate recruitment of capable experts than to the over-specialization of its well-trained cadres on technical tasks. In fact, the cadres from the Central Politics School generally resembled those considered to be ‘intellectuals’ at educational level and in ideology. This compels us to reconsider how to define ‘intellectuals’ and whether they were as uniformly alienated from the one-party state as most of the scholarly literature suggests.
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Kubat, Aleksandra. "Morality as Legitimacy under Xi Jinping: The Political Functionality of Traditional Culture for the Chinese Communist Party." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 47, no. 3 (December 2018): 47–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261804700303.
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Taking as an example Xi Jinping's use of the phrase “excellent traditional culture” ([Formula: see text], youxiu chuantong wenhua), this article looks at the construction of a centrally sanctioned narrative of traditional Chinese culture in resources produced within the Party school system. The specific focus of analysis is on how these resources theorise the functionality of traditional culture for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a political organisation, and what culture-based solutions they put forward to tackle the problems with Party theory and ideology, the state governance model, and cadre performance. It is argued that by referencing traditional culture, and, in particular, by drawing on traditional moral virtues, the CCP realigns itself with societal expectations without making concessions over the ideological foundations of the party state.
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Kuo–tai, Hu. "The Struggle Between The Kuomintang And The Chinese Communist Party On Campus During The War Of Resistance, 1937–45." China Quarterly 118 (June 1989): 300–323. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000017823.
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Between 1937 and 1945 higher education was one of the main arenas of struggle between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Both sides regarded it as an important area to be controlled. The Bureau of Investigation's 1951 report suggested that KMT support from youth in schools was “the key to success or failure.” The Chinese Communist Party also regarded the work of winning over intellectuals as vital for the Party's future. In 1939 Mao Zedong said that “without the participation of intellectuals victory in the revolution is impossible.” Thus, the two parties competed both overtly and covertly in colleges and universities to win the support of both staff and students.
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Zhang, Lisa Lindkvist, and Prem Poddar. "Espionage, Intrigue, and Politics: Kalimpong Chung Hwa School as International Playhouse." China and Asia 3, no. 1 (September 29, 2021): 35–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2589465x-030103.
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Abstract This article examines the ways in which Kalimpong, living up to its moniker as a “nest of spies,” was a site where local and international intrigues played out, especially at the local Chinese Chung Hwa School. It examines the period between the 1940s and early 1960s, when Kalimpong, on account of its strategic location, was home to “foreign Kautilyas” of different intelligence services. The Chung Hwa School came to play a part in this game as it provided cover/camouflage for Chinese secret agents. The secret services run by the British colonial state—and later the Indian state—suspected it to be a platform for intelligence gathering. A close reading of the archives uncovers the circuit of suspicion and misgiving surrounding the school. This article analyses these narratives and the ways in which, through the enmeshment of espionage, the Indian Intelligence Bureau, the local Chinese, and “China” were constituted in Kalimpong’s (under)world. The school also emerges as tangled in transnational and international machinations epitomizing People’s Republic of China–Republic of India relations and Guomindang–Chinese Communist Party rivalry.
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Shuhua, Zhang, Guo Jing, and Gaoyan Qiuyu. "Development of a National School of Political Science in China." World Economy and International Relations 64, no. 11 (2020): 84–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2020-64-11-84-95.
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Under the conditions of China’s steadily growing role in world politics, the task of moving from assimilation and criticism of Western theoretical discourse to creation and development of national political science schools is becoming more and more urgent. The article gives a brief review of the Chinese political science history, outlines the main achievements and tasks of the current stage in the process of formation of political science with Chinese characteristics. The article disputes the thesis of the universal nature of Western political science, critically evaluates some Western political theories: democracy, constitutional government, civil society; an attempt is made to show their shortcomings and limitations of their application. The main focus of the article is on clarifying the Chinese theory of democracy, which enriches and develops Marxist democratic theory, based on a generalization of the history of China’s democratic practice and an analysis of modern democratic politics led by the CCP. Another important area of interest of the Chinese political science school – the empirical studies of the political development of China – is also covered. The features of the Chinese parliamentary system, the system of political parties where the Communist Party plays the leading role, are described. An attempt is made to depict the relationship between the party leadership and the legislative branch in China. It justifies the need for the formation of government bodies from top to bottom on the basis of the Chinese consultative democracy principles, which to a certain extent oppose the “elective democracy” concept. Particular attention is paid to rural self-government bodies and difficulties in their formation, which have recently caused a hightened interest among Chinese researchers. The final part of the article outlines the most important tasks of Chinese political science for the near future.
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ZHAO, Yanrong. "The Way to Understand the Nature and Extent of Judicial Independence in China." Asian Journal of Law and Society 6, no. 01 (September 20, 2018): 131–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/als.2018.27.
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AbstractIn order to portray the true extent of judicial independence in China’s judicial practices, this article first clarifies the contested meanings of “judicial independence” within Chinese judicial circles and provides a detailed literature review of the main school of thoughts on the extent of judicial independence in China. In contrast to the existing literature—most of which sees judicial independence in China as stagnant—this thesis suggests employing the strategic interaction approach to study the development of impartial adjudication in China and argues that the extent of adjudicative independence is evolving with the amount of judicial discretion afforded by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to judges.
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Schoenhals, Michael. "Yang Xianzhen's Critique of the Great Leap Forward." Modern Asian Studies 26, no. 3 (July 1992): 591–608. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x00009926.
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Kang Sheng—a veteran counter-intelligence official and close political ally of Mao Zedong's—is said to have remarked in the winter of 1959 that among the critics of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) there was ‘One soldier’ and ‘One civilian’ whose criticisms were ‘in close harmony’. The soldier was Peng Dehuai, China's Minister of Defence, who had clashed with Mao at the Lushan Conference that summer, and whose criticism of the GLF had subsequently been denounced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee as an ‘attempt at splitting the Party´ and ‘a ferocious assault on the Party Center and Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership’. The civilian was Yang Xianzhen, the President of the Central Party School, who had aroused Kang's wrath by condemning the GLF as hopelessly Utopian, and by claiming that it already had brought on starvation and might yet bring about the collapse of the CCP.
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Ahn, Ji-Young. "An Analysis of Market Failure aspects in Chinese High School's ｢Ideological and Political｣ Textbooks." Korean Association For Learner-Centered Curriculum And Instruction 22, no. 18 (September 30, 2022): 171–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.22251/jlcci.2022.22.18.171.
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Objectives This study aims to analyze the trend of market failure by period in the Chinese high school ｢Ideological and Political｣ textbook published from 1983 to 2019 to explore how market failure in China by period is reflected in the textbook.
Methods 12 textbooks were collected and analyzed in 1983, 1989, 1998, 2004, 2011, 2016, and 2019 published in line with the revision cycle of the ｢Ideological and Political｣ curriculum in Chinese high schools. The collected data were analyzed based on China's economic development stage and the definition of market failure, and both text and illustration were included.
Results As a result of the analysis, the pattern of market failure in the Chinese high school ｢Ideological and Political｣ textbooks appears differently depending on the period. Market failure in the textbooks during the Chinese market economy exploration stage (1978-1991) was monopolization, corruption, inflation, and widening the income gap. Market failure in textbooks during the Initial construction stage of the market economy (1992-2001) is administrative monopoly, Counterfeit Products, mammonism, unfair competition. Market failure in the textbooks during the stage of full-scale and in-depth reform (2002-2012) is corruption, economic instability, administrative monopoly, counterfeit products, distributionism, unfair competition, illegal fundraising and investment, socioeconomic inequality, and environmental issues. Market failure in textbooks in comprehensive deepening of reform (2013~present) is administrative monopoly, unfair competition, monopoly, Socio-economic inequality, environmental issues, urbanization, economic instability and supply-side structural reform.
Conclusions In Chinese high school ｢Ideological and Political｣ textbooks, market failure is the basis for the party and the government's involvement in the economic field. Administrative monopoly, which appears only in China, a country in the transition period of the economic system in Chinese textbooks, is also a problem in the market. Since the market has inherent problems such as unfair competition, monopoly, damage to social equity, and widening income gap, it is argued that control and control of the national economy of the country are needed before the market failure of the market. The logic of the Communist Party of China has been consistently reflected since China adopted a socialist market economy system, and in particular, the 2019 textbook shows a strong tendency for state-led economic growth led by the party.
10
Averill, Stephen C. "Party, Society, and Local Elite in the Jiangxi Communist Movement." Journal of Asian Studies 46, no. 2 (May 1987): 279–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2056015.
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AbstractIn August 1927 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Jiangxi seemed moribund, yet by the end of 1930 the movement was larger and more active than ever before. How did this occur? Past studies have especially emphasized Mao Zedong's famous rural guerrilla strategy, but this was only part of the story. Equally significant was the little-studied success of members of the Jiangxi hill-country elite who were also in the CCP in using established schools and educational societies, time-honored traditions of local strongman behavior, and existing bandit–secret society gangs to build many localized base areas. Such techniques were congenial to CCP leaders and essential to the movement's survival in the early days when its prestige and material resources were at a very low ebb, and when radical reforms would almost certainly have failed. Nevertheless, this strategy also fostered parochial attitudes and organizational weaknesses that clashed with the later efforts of Mao and his allies to carry out mass mobilization and fundamental land reform. Only after a prolonged and violent crisis within the base areas did the “Maoist” policies vital for the revolution's long-term growth begin to overcome the policies of elite coalition building that had been necessary for the movement to obtain its initial foothold in the Jiangxi hill country.
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Chen, Feng. "An Unfinished Battle in China: The Leftist Criticism of the Reform and the Third Thought Emancipation." China Quarterly 158 (June 1999): 447–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000005853.
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With the curtain of its 15th National Congress falling, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) completed the generational change in the leadership. Jiang Zemin claimed that the CCP would continue Deng Xiaoping's line of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The Party's consensus on upholding Deng's policy was reflected in its revised constitution that paralleled Deng's theory with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as the Party's guiding principle. However, the ongoing market reform has not proceeded without challenge, especially from the left. Between 1995 and 1997, four so-called wanyanshu (“ten-thousand-word” articles) circulated privately in Beijing, severely criticizing market reform for its deviation from socialism. On the eve of the 15th National Party Congress, the capital was stirred up again by a publicized counter-attack from reformers at the leftist criticisms, with Jiang Zemin's speech at the Central Party School on 29 May 1997 as a signal. Some even call this counter-criticism the “third thought emancipation.” Speculation arose of political rift in Beijing. These developments at least indicate that leftism represents a strong ideological force that the Party has to take seriously. Although the 15th National Congress ended up with a declaration of even bolder measures in economic reform, particularly in restructuring state-owned enterprises (SOEs), no one should expect that the leftist voice will easily fade away.
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Weatherley, Robert, and Coirle Magee. "Using the Past to Legitimise the Present: The Portrayal of Good Governance in Chinese History Textbooks." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 47, no. 1 (January 2018): 41–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261804700102.
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This article examines how Chinese middle-school history textbooks are written as a means of legitimising the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), by carefully utilising China's past. The authors identify (or perhaps “construct”) a sinified model of good governance in the textbooks that derives from the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, and the subsequent practises of certain revered Chinese emperors. This model is then applied to CCP leaders in the modern-era textbooks in order to cast them as diligently upholding a time-honoured Chinese tradition of legitimate rule. In a broader context, our analysis fits within the ongoing discussions about the continuing legacy of Confucianism in contemporary China and the CCP's efforts to locate itself within this as a way of fortifying its own legitimacy. We also note how some of the themes of good governance contained in the textbooks are closely linked to contemporary government policies and priorities, such as anti-corruption schemes and constitutionalism. The objective in so doing is to propagate the importance of these themes to a young audience.
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LI, LAN. "The Changing Role of the Popular Religion ofNuo(傩) in Modern Chinese Politics." Modern Asian Studies 45, no. 5 (August 12, 2010): 1289–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x10000090.
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AbstractSince the early 1980s, China's rapid economic growth and profound social transformation have greatly changed the role of popular religion in modern Chinese politics. In the case ofnuo, these changes have been directly responsible for the incorporation of this popular religion into the implementation of Party-state's policy on ethnic minority and the provision of evidence to support the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party's regime. Through manipulation and reinterpretation by local governments, the popular religion ofnuohas not only become the target of local socio-economic development, a common phenomenon in contemporary China, but has also played a key role in ethnic identification, which is an important step for a post-Mao's CCP to maintain political stability in ethnic minority areas. In addition,nuohas through the research of Marxism-influenced schools fundamentally altered its position from an officially unrecognized religion opposed to both socialist political order and atheist ideology to a politically favoured ‘living fossil’1of primitive culture. This proves the Marxist evolutionary theory in which socialism and communism are thought to be inescapable consequences of social development. The positive role played bynuoin modern Chinese politics has brought the popular religion much open support and endorsement from party-state officials at all levels, including top-ranking officials within the Central Committee of the CCP. Like any popular religion,nuohas over the centuries undergone significant changes, but never before has it experienced such dramatic changes in its relationship with an anti-religious and pragmatic central government, something which has significantly altered the course of its development.
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Xu, Jian. "The Return of Ideology to China’s Journalism Education: The ‘Joint Model’ Campaign Between Propaganda Departments and Journalism Schools." Asia Pacific Media Educator 28, no. 2 (October 9, 2018): 176–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1326365x18799134.
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In December 2013, the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Ministry of Education jointly announced a nationwide ‘joint model’ between state propaganda departments and journalism schools in higher education institutions, signalling a new era for China’s journalism education. The ‘joint model’ campaign aims to enhance the party’s ideological control over journalism education in China’s highly globalized, commercialized and digitized media environment. This essay examines the political context, concrete measures, expected benefits, debate and problems of the new era of China’s journalism education.
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Dong, Shengzu. "China’s New Laws and Policies on Nongovernmental Education: Background, Characteristics, and Impact Analysis." ECNU Review of Education 3, no. 2 (June 2020): 346–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2096531120918148.
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Purpose: China has a long history of private school education. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, nongovernmental education (private school education) once disappeared from Chinese society until its revival following the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. With its development of more than four decades, nongovernmental education has become an important part of China’s educational system and is vigorously promoting the modernization progress of Chinese education. Design/Approach/Methods: Being different from the overseas private school education, which is mostly funded by donations, China’s nongovernmental education sector has operated on the basis of private capital investments and contributions, with the organizers (contributors) typically expecting economic returns. Marked by the introduction of regulations and policies for nongovernmental education around the year of 2016, China’s nongovernmental education sector officially entered a new era of registration, support, and regulation by category. Findings: The macroscopic policies of China’s nongovernmental education in new era present the following new characters: (I) Emphasizing education provision as a public interest and comprehensively strengthening private school leadership; (II) managing negative lists and broadening the means by which social forces participate in operating schools; (III) implementing preferential policies for private schools through categories based on the principle of being fair but different; (IV) supporting the development of private schools with the goal of improving education quality; (V) standardizing private schools’ operating practices in order to promote healthy and orderly development. Originality/Value: The implementing of the new policies on nongovernmental education shall have significant impact on the development and reform of China’s nongovernmental education in the future: (1) The rapid development of nonprofit private schools due to government support; (2) for-profit private schools may face polarization in a fiercely competitive market environment; (3) heavy burden of categorizing and transferring existing stock of schools due to various historical and realistic constraints.
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Liu, Zhongkai. "An Analysis on the Importance of Habit-Forming Education." Learning & Education 10, no. 3 (November 7, 2021): 94. http://dx.doi.org/10.18282/l-e.v10i3.2402.
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The Chinese nation is undergoing great changes, and all people are working together to achieve great rejuvenation and two centenary goals. Education bears the mission and the future. The opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on deepening the reform of education and teaching and improving the quality of compulsory education in an all-round way clearly requires “to establish a scientific outlook on education quality, deepen the reform, build an education system of all-round cultivation of morality, intelligence, physical education, beauty and labor, and improve the implementation mechanism of establishing morality and cultivating talents” . In order to carry out the national policy of education, we must attach importance to the cultivation of children’s habits in the process of growth, and attach importance to the cultivation of students by society, family, school and teachers.
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Chin, Gregory T. "Innovation and Preservation: Remaking China's National Leadership Training System." China Quarterly 205 (March 2011): 18–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741010001372.
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AbstractThis article details the reorganization of China's national leadership training system, and analyses the reforms as an integral element of the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to adapt institutionally to a rapidly changing environment. Three main findings are presented. First, the national leadership training system is being remade under the direction of the Party's Central Organization Department to give greater emphasis to the “spirit of reform and innovation,” as seen especially in the creation of the China Executive Leadership Academy in Pudong, Shanghai, and in the formation of sister academies in Jinggangshan and Yan'an. Second, China's political elite have given greater priority to leadership innovation, although they are trying to balance this with ensuring that sufficient attention and resources are also given to preserving the ruling status of the CCP. Third, by establishing the new group of training academies under the COD, the Party is diversifying beyond the Party School system for leadership research and training. The article suggests that the guiding logic behind these reforms is to promote enough innovation in managerial training and research to enable the Party to meet the changing governance requirements of the market transition and economic globalization, while at the same time putting in place institutional measures that help to preserve the Party's rule.
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БАРБЕНКО, Ярослав Александрович. "Материалы обследования кафедры китайского языка ДВГУ, декабрь 1935 – январь 1936 годов. Часть 1." Известия Восточного института 48, no. 1 (2021): 89–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.24866/2542-1611/2021-1/89-113.
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“Oriental Institute Journal” publishes a series of documents related to the dramatic pages in the history of the Far Eastern University and the Russian higher school as a whole. One of the indicative situations that reveal the atmosphere of that time is a set of documents stored in the Russian State Historical Archive of the Far East. These are the documents related to the internal audit of the educational activities of the staff of the Department of Chinese Studies, conducted in December 1935 – January 1936. The audit was initiated by M. Potapov's note in the university newspaper (Fig. 1). The author, on behalf of Chinese-learning students, reproaches the teachers (Rudakov and Zhang are mentioned) for despotism and formalism, evading the decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. In response, the faculty administration organized an audit of the work of the Department of Chinese Studies, authorizing K. P. Feklin, an employee of the Department of Japanese Studies, and student activists (Potapov and Denishchenko). The “inspection team” presented several analytical and summarizing documents: materials, conclusions, and practical proposals. In these documents, the work of teachers A. V. Rudakov, T. D. Chervonetsky, and Zhang Yue Ren was criticized. As a result, A. V. Rudakov (Fig. 2) and T. D. Chervonetsky (Fig. 3) presented explanatory notes to the administration of the faculty and the university. The publication of the entire series of documents is scheduled for four issues in 2021.
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Hung, Chang-Tai. "The Politics of Songs: Myths and Symbols in the Chinese Communist War Music, 1937–1949." Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (October 1996): 901–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x00016838.
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Nie Er (1912–1935), a young Communist musician from Yunnan, could not possibly have imagined that when he wrote this patriotic song (with lyrics by the left-wing writer Tian Han [1898–1968]) for the 1935 filmChildren of Troubled Times (Fengyun ernü) it would soon become one of the most popular tunes in China. The overwhelming success of the song reflected a nation, long frustrated by imperialist (especially Japanese) aggression, thwarted reforms, domestic armed conflicts, and government ineptitude, venting its anger and crying out for a solution. When the Japanese invaded China two years later, ‘The March of the Volunteers’ was rapidly transformed into the quintessential song of resistance against Japan, sung at schools, in the army, at rallies, and on the streets. The song was influential in capturing the hearts and minds of millions during China's eight-year War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945); its impact, in the words of one contemporary song critic, was ‘similar to that of the “Marseillaise” [in the French Revolution]’. When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized power in it adopted the song as the official national anthem.
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WANG, Jianhua. "The Latinxua Sin Wenz Movement in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region of China: Centred on Winter schools in Yan’an County." Cultura 17, no. 2 (January 1, 2020): 101–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.3726/cul022020.0008.
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Abstract: In October 1940, the government of the Shaanxi-Ganjiang-Ningxia Border Region used Yan’an County as the center for trying out the Latinxua Sin Wenz Movement for winter schools. It went through three stages: experimentation, promotion, and reformation. Faced with insurmountable difficulties, the Education Department quietly terminated the project in 1943. The foremost reason why the Communist Party promoted this project was to remove the obstacle posed by Chinese characters for eliminating illiteracy. Despite problems such as ignorance of the officials, uncultured teachers, resistance from intellectuals, subjective and unrealistic beliefs, the Latinxua Sin Wenz Movement in border regions of China could not be ignored since it brought out the tension between popular culture and nationalism.
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Brownell, Susan. "Beijing's Olympic Education Programme: Re-Thinking Suzhi Education, Re-Imagining an International China." China Quarterly 197 (March 2009): 44–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741009000034.
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AbstractStarting in 2005, the largest “Olympic education” programme ever implemented by an Olympic host country was carried out in schools in Beijing and across China. By looking at the ways in which the policies for this programme were created and implemented, this article challenges the common perception that there was a “master plan” surrounding all aspects of the Beijing Olympics that was imposed by the party-state from the top down with the singular goal of promoting nationalist and communist ideology. It makes the point that by contrast with the suzhi (“quality”) education that preceded it, Olympic education contained a de-politicized patriotic education that linked national identity with sports heroes rather than political systems, and re-situated Chinese national identity within an international community in which it would now take its place as an equal partner.
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Thinley, Wangchuk. "Unheard Voices in the Trans-Himalayan Politics - Tibetan Reincarnation and the Larger Political Goal of CCP." Ushus Journal of Business Management 19, no. 2 (August 30, 2021): 49–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.12725/ujbm.51.4.
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This research paper through empirical research aims to analyze the unique tradition of the reincarnation system of Tibetan Buddhism since the 11th century and the role of China. The first part of the paper will deal with the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism and the various traditional methods used to recognize the reincarnation in Tibetan Buddhism starting from 11th century to present, as rituals are playing a vital role in the process of finding Trulku or reincarnation of enlightened individuals at the time of death of an individual. The second part will examine the role of CCP in Tibetan reincarnation through its state-approved religious laws, how CCP is planning to recognize the 14th Dalai Lama’s reincarnation to fulfill the larger political goal of Chinese Communist Party. The third part aims to understand China’s cultural assimilation policy in Tibet, similar to that of the ‘Go West Han population’ employed in Xinjiang.
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Tsang, Winnie. "Creating National Narrative: The Red Guard Art Exhibitions and the National Exhibitions in the Chinese Cultural Revolution 1966 - 1976." Contemporaneity: Historical Presence in Visual Culture 3 (June 5, 2014): 117–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/contemp.2014.58.
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The artistic development in China experienced drastic changes during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. Traditional Chinese art was denounced, whereas propaganda art became predominant in shaping the public’s loyalty towards the Communist Party and the country. Two major groups of art exhibitions emerged during the Revolution—the unofficial Red Guard art exhibitions organized by student activists in collaboration with local communes and art schools between 1966 and 1968, and the state-run national exhibitions from 1972 to 1975. These exhibitions were significant to this period because they were held frequently in the capital city Beijing and occasionally elsewhere, and through art they presented unique revolutionary beliefs to the Chinese people in a public setting. While the Red Guard art exhibitions and the national exhibitions certainly created different national narratives, I argue that the national exhibitions were in fact an attempt to revise the national narrative created by the Red Guard art exhibitions in order to re-establish a more utopian, consistent, and official national narrative. This paper unravels the intricate relationship between the two groups of exhibitions by comparing their exhibition venues, ideological focuses, work selection and quality editing.
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Khereid Jamsran, Urangua, and Polyanskayа Oksana N. "Chinese Workers in the History of the Mongolian People’s Republic in the 1950s–1960s: Cooperation, Politics, Ideology." Humanitarian Vector 16, no. 6 (December 2021): 8–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.21209/1996-7853-2021-16-6-8-19.
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The article is devoted to one of the historic periods of Mongolia of the 20th century, when the Mongolian People’s Republic built the foundations of a socialist society, and key modernization processes took place with the support of the Soviet Union. The economic component of Soviet-Mongolian relations was dominant at that time. However, the assistance from the People’s Republic of China played a definitely important role in the economic development and formation of modern Mongolian society. Labour constraint was one of the main difficulties in promoting industrial economy in Mongolia. The study of the Mongolian-Chinese economic cooperation is also relevant today, despite the influence of the “third force” in Mongolia’s foreign policy. Russian and Chinese directions are in priority. In this regard, it is important to refer to the experience accumulated by countries in the field of economic interaction, which determined the purpose of the publication ‒ to study one of the aspects of Mongolian-Chinese cooperation in the 1950s and early 1960s, namely, the employment of Chinese labour in Mongolia based on a rich source base, including both the published documents and documents from the National Archives of Mongolia, as well as historical works by Russian and Mongolian authors, and to consider such issues as the role of foreign labour, in particular, Chinese workforce in the industrialization of Mongolia, traffic of foreign workers into the Mongolian People’s Republic, and then their family members, the employment of Chinese workers, ideological and cultural events organized by party officials of the Chinese Communist Party. The research methodology is specified by the principles of scientific objectivity, historicism and historical determinism. The work uses both universal scientific methods and special methods of historical research determined by the formulated problem and includes problem-chronological method, comparative analysis method, and systemic method. The study revealed that the employment of workers from the PRC in Mongolia took place within the framework of the diplomatic relations established in 1949 and based on the agreements reached in 1956, 1958 and 1960 in respect of providing economic and technical assistance. It was emphasized that Chinese workers became an integral part of the changing Mongolian society for almost a decade, from 1955 to 1964. The Mongolian side fulfilling bilateral agreements on the working conditions of Chinese employees opened schools for Chinese children, created additional medical centers where Chinese doctors worked, and so on; all this introduced some adjustments to the everyday life of Mongolian society in the mid-20th century. Today, the process of rethinking, re-evaluating the path traversed by Mongolia throughout the 20th century continues, the external conditions of the Mongolian People’s Republic are being revised, so a detailed reference to its history can contribute to the formation of a more objective approach to this process.
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Zhou, Liping, Yenan He, and Jian Zhang. "Exploring the Value Path of Integrating the Red Elements of “Zhenjiang Symbol” into Civic Education in Vocational Colleges: Constructing a “1+1+N” Model to Build a New Carrier of Civic Education in an Integrated Way." Journal of Contemporary Educational Research 6, no. 9 (September 28, 2022): 99–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.26689/jcer.v6i9.4358.
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Zhenjiang has always been a city of heroes, where revolutionary heroes shed their blood and red genes are passed down from generation to generation. In terms of the Zhenjiang region, a hundred years of struggle to cast the “Iron Army Spirit” of the New Fourth Army in Mao mountain anti-Japanese Base Area, the “Yafu Spirit” that lived up to the people’s expectations of fighting for the city’s glory and poverty alleviation, and the “war spirit” of southern Jiangsu, which was first encountered under Zhenjiang City and was decapitated by the small Lou Lan and other “Zhenjiang symbols” series of Chinese Communist Party spiritual spectrum. The red elements of “Zhenjiang symbols” consists of the blood, tears, and wisdom of the revolutionary predecessors, and shine with the glorious deeds of revolutionary battles. Compared with other schools, vocational colleges are colleges with applied application, practical, and close to nature. How to integrate the red elements of “Zhenjiang symbols” into the classroom of local vocational colleges and a give role to the function of red education has become an important subject of ideological and political education in vocational colleges.
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Safitri, Priska Nur, Santi Indra Astuti, Nuril Hidayah, Cahya Suryani, Mizati Dewi Wasdiana, and Anita Wahid. "When Politics and Religion Become Disaster: An Annual Mapping of Hoax in Indonesia." Ultimacomm: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi 13, no. 2 (February 25, 2022): 343–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.31937/ultimacomm.v13i2.2104.
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Since 2016, hoax has been massively circulated in Indonesia, due to low literacy rates and poor detection habit of disinformation among the people. Approaching general elections in April 2019, political hoax dominated in the scene. A content analysis toward 997 hoaxes in 2018 has found that half of hoaxes circulated among society was political hoaxes (49.94%), followed by hoaxes on religious themes (11.94%). Political hoaxes mixed with religion, racism, and any other topic has been creating multiplying effect that threaten democracy. The mapping toward hoaxes during 2018 showed how such possibility might appear due to political hoaxes that framed the issue or candidates of presidential election based on fictitious data or made-up stories. Both candidates were subjected to hoax. But deeper investigation revealed that hoaxes targeted Jokowi as the incumbent candidate surpassed the number of hoaxes toward Prabowo as Jokowi’s counterpart. Hoax to Jokowi was associated with Communist Party, and the arrival of ten thousands Chinese migrant work to replace native workers. Hoax toward Prabowo mainly concerned of gay-lesbian movement. Both candidates presidential election also became the target of religion hoax. Hoax to Jokowi concerned with the abolition of Islamic Boarding School, whereas hoax toward Prabowo targeted his manner that deemed inappropriate for religious community. Overall, serious disinformation was detected. This mapping also showed that over time, hoaxes become more sophisticated, complex and dfficult to encounter. Neither accident nor prank, hoax is an effort by design to disturb harmony and stability in the country.
Keywords: hoax, political, religion, mapping 2018
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Drifte, Reinhard. "Der Aufstieg Ostasiens in der Weltpolitik 1840–2000 (The Rise of East Asia in World Politics, 1840–2000). By Gottfried-Karl Kindermann. [Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001. €44.99. 727 pp. ISBN 3-421-05174-7.]." China Quarterly 176 (December 2003): 1097–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741003280632.
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This monumental work is in many ways the essence of Professor Kindermann's 50 years' research on East Asia, theoretically based on the Munich school of neo-realism (of which he is the pre-eminent representative) and inspired by his many personal encounters with those Asian leaders who shaped the region's rise in world politics. It also introduces interesting research by other German scholars, which is often excluded from the English-language literature that dominates the Asian studies field. The focus of the analysis is on the foreign policy of the states in the West Pacific region (including Myanmar and Indochina), their interactions and their place in world politics. It is impossible to summarize the 34 chapters within this review. The books offer a superb chronological and contextual overview of a crucial period in East Asia that is highly readable and illustrated with relevant photos. The most space is devoted to China, documenting its rise from imperial victim to major economic power. The coverage of China's interaction with foreign powers and the domestic background is very detailed, especially concerning the Kuomintang before and after 1949, and the Taiwan issue. The account of the era after the Pacific War focuses mostly on the People's Republic of China. Several pages are devoted to the Quemoy crisis of 1954–55, which revealed the complexities of the US–PRC–Taiwan triangle. Kindermann demonstrates how this crisis was the first application of Washington's “calculated ambiguity” towards the PRC concerning Taiwan. A whole chapter is devoted to the second Taiwan crisis of 1958 and its aftermath in 1962. Kindermann's interviews in Taiwan show how the US actively prevented Chiang Kai-shek's plan of occupying two mainland Chinese cities to start the “liberation” of the PRC. There are four chapters on how the Communist Party established and maintained its rule over China, but the majority deal with China's foreign interactions. On Tibet, Kindermann argues that the 17-item agreement of 1951 between Tibetan leaders and the Communist government may have served as a tolerable solution to the Tibet issue and thus have prevented a lot of hardship for the Tibetan people, even though the Tibetan representatives had been coerced into signing it.
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L P GORE, Lance. "Revamping the Chinese Communist Party." East Asian Policy 07, no. 01 (January 2015): 16–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930515000021.
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The 2014 Party reform aimed to modernise the CCP. The Politburo passed the “Action Plan for Deepening Party-building Institutional Reforms”, outlining 26 concrete reforms in four key areas to be completed by 2017. Notable departures include the re-emphasis on ideological unity, the rollback on intra-party democracy, the renewed emphasis on intra-party legislation and the control on the growth of the Party's size. However there are inherent dilemmas in building a Leninist party in a globalised market economy.
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Rappai, M. V. "Chinese communist party— back to business." Strategic Analysis 23, no. 10 (January 2000): 1815–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160008455162.
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Chambers, Collin L. "Having Faith in the Party Again: The Two-Line Party Struggle in the Chinese Communist Party." Human Geography 11, no. 1 (March 2018): 44–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/194277861801100104.
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At the present time, the Communist Party is not looked upon as an agent for revolutionary change. It is seen as an archaic artifact that needs to be left in the dustbin of 20th century history. Some in the “New Left” argue for a “post-party politics” – because contemporary party politics are so “closely bound up with structures of power, the possibility that political parties will transform themselves and formulate a new politics is extremely low” (Wang 2016, 169). In sum, we should not have faith in the Party in radically changing social formations. However, this view abstracts from the political and social dynamics of communist parties. Communist parties provide the “affective infrastructure” for activists (Dean 2016) and create the flexible, disciplined organizational form necessary for maneuvering through the complexities of a revolutionary moment. An investigation of the historical and contemporary “line struggles” within the Chinese Communist Party gives insight into how communist parties can foster change in a social formation. This paper seeks to install hope that the Party, particularly the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), can once again create revolutionary change.
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Delury, John, Sheila A. Smith, Maria Repnikova, and Srinath Raghavan. "Looking Back on the Seventieth Anniversary of Japan's Surrender." Journal of Asian Studies 74, no. 4 (November 2015): 797–820. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021911815001631.
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Editor's Introduction: In mid-August 2015, Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzo gave a high-profile speech looking back at the Japanese surrender of 1945. Three weeks later, also to mark the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II in Asia, China's Communist Party head and president Xi Jinping presided over a lavish parade in the heart of Beijing, which featured missiles and other Chinese military hardware as well as large contingents of People's Liberation Army soldiers and small contingents of troops from various other countries. Following up on a trio of essays in the August issue of the JAS, which looked ahead to events such as these, we now publish this special “Asia Beyond the Headlines” section made up of four essays that explore the meaning, for different individual or sets of countries, of Abe's speech and Xi's spectacle. This quartet of commentaries, by three political scientists and one historian, is designed to complement the last issue's contributions by historians Carol Gluck, Rana Mitter, and Charles Armstrong, as well as the historical photograph from seventy years ago that appears on the cover of this issue.The set begins with an essay by historian John Delury, a scholar trained in Chinese history and currently teaching in Seoul, who has written on varied aspects of East Asian international relations and notes, among other things, the curious fact that the representative from South Korea rather than from North Korea got the warmer reception from Xi during the recent Beijing spectacle. Following this comes Sheila A. Smith, a scholar based at a Washington, D.C., think tank, reflecting on the current state of the complex bilateral relationship between Tokyo and Beijing. Appearing next is a commentary by Maria Repnikova, a specialist in both Chinese and Russian affairs who was trained in political science and holds a postdoctoral fellowship in a school of communications. She writes on the increasingly close ties yet lingering tensions between Beijing and Moscow, as well as the way that official media has celebrated, while some users of social media have mocked, the symbolism of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping presiding over recent victory day parades in their respective capitals. The series concludes with a commentary by Srinath Raghavan, a London-trained scholar now based at a New Delhi policy institute. He completes our survey of commemoration of the end of World War II with a look at the way recent parades revealed the Indian government's tricky position vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing, as well as the relatively scant attention that India's significant contributions to World War II received, at home and internationally, during the season of commemorative speeches and displays.
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Narendra, Nadif Hanan, Hieronymus Purwanta, and Nur Fatah Abidin. "Perkembangan Pemikiran Pluralisme Gus Dur (1971-2001)." Criksetra: Jurnal Pendidikan Sejarah 11, no. 2 (August 17, 2022): 97–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.36706/jc.v11i2.16184.
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Abstrak: Gus Dur adalah salah satu tokoh yang identik dengan pemikiran pluralismenya. Permasalahan penelitian ini yaitu bagaimana perkembangan pemikiran Gus Dur tentang pluralisme (1971-2001)?. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis perkembangan pemikiran Gus Dur tentang pluralisme (1971-2001). Penelitian dilaksanakan dengan metode sejarah. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa pemikiran Gus Dur tentang pluralisme dipengaruhi oleh faktor internal dan eksternal. Menurut Gus Dur, pluralisme terfokus pada tauhid, hukum (fiqh), dan etika (akhlaq). Kebijakan ini sering menimbulkan kontroversi namun demikian kebijakan pluralisme Gus Dur mampu menghilangkan pengaruh Orde Baru, memulihkan hak asasi para korban diskriminasi seperti korban yang dianggap terlibat dalam partai komunis dan etnis Tionghoa, serta menyelesaikan permasalahan separatisme yang terjadi di Indonesia. Pemikiran pluralism Gus Dur terbentuk berdasarkan dialektika Gus Dur dengan lingkungan sekitarnya mulai dari masa sekolah sampai dengan menjabat sebagai presiden. Meskipun menghasilkan kontroversi, pemikiran pluralisme Gus Dur telah membuka cakrawala bangsa mengenai praktik baik pluralisme yang perlu dilanjutkan pada era saat ini. Kata Kunci: Gus Dur, Pemikiran Islam, Pluralisme, Ulama.The Development of Gus Dur’s Pluralism Thought (1971-2001)Abstract: Gus Dur is well acknowledge as pluralists. The problem this research is how Gus Dur's thoughts on pluralism from 1971 to 2001. This article aims to analyze the development of Gus Dur's thoughts on pluralism from 1971 to 2001. This research used historical method. The research findings show that Gus Dur's thoughts on pluralism were influenced by internal and external factors. According to Gus Dur, pluralism focuses on monotheism, law (fiqh), and ethics (akhlaq). This policy often caused controversy, however, Gus Dur's policy of pluralism was able to eliminate the influence of the New Order, restore the human rights of victims of discrimination such as victims who were considered involved in the communist party and ethnic Chinese, as well as resolve the problems of separatism that occurred in Indonesia. Gus Dur's thought of pluralism was formed based on Gus Dur's dialectic with the surrounding environment from his school days to serving as president. Although it generates controversy, Gus Dur's thinking of pluralism has opened the nation's horizons regarding the good practice of pluralism that needs to be continued in the current era. Keywords: Clerics, Gus Dur, Islamic Thought, Pluralism.
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Jenner, W. J. F. "A history of the Chinese Communist Party." International Affairs 65, no. 4 (1989): 761. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2622663.
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Leib, Ethan J. "The Chinese Communist Party and Deliberative Democracy." Journal of Deliberative Democracy 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.16997/jdd.28.
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Young, Graham. "Contemporary "Socialism" and the Chinese Communist Party." Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 7 (August 5, 1992): 39. http://dx.doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v7i1.1810.
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Bonnin, Michel. "The Chinese Communist Party and June 4th." China Perspectives 2009, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 52–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.4806.
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Zagoria, Donald S., and Stephen Uhalley. "A History of the Chinese Communist Party." Foreign Affairs 68, no. 3 (1989): 185. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20044092.
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Lambert, Anthony P. B. "Post‐Tiananmen Chinese communist party religious policy." Religion, State and Society 20, no. 3-4 (January 1992): 391–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637499208431567.
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Saich, Tony. "The Chinese Communist Party and the Future." China Information 4, no. 4 (March 1990): 15–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0920203x9000400402.
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Li, Jieli. "Geopolitics of the Chinese Communist Party in the Twentieth Century." Sociological Perspectives 36, no. 4 (December 1993): 315–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1389391.
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Geopolitical theory is employed to address the question of why the Chinese Communist Party-state persists, despite Western pressures stemming from the suppression of student demonstrators in “Tienanmen Square” in 1989. As the theory postulates, macro dynamic forces revolving around the geopolitical processes are crucial to the resource mobilization and legitimacy of the state. The entire history of the Chinese Communist Party is reviewed in order to document the conclusion that changes in the geopolitical position of the Party are associated with periods of internal strength and weakness. Since 1979, the Chinese Communist Party-state has been increasingly favored by geopolitical circumstances, thereby facilitating its internal strength even in the face of Western pressures, potential for internal dissent, and collapse of the Soviet empire. As long as this favorable geopolitical trend continues, the Chinese Communist Party will likely exist as a ruling political force in China.
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Hartono, M. Paulina. "“A Good Communist Style”." Representations 151, no. 1 (2020): 26–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/rep.2020.151.2.26.
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This essay focuses on the history and politicization of radio announcers’ vocal delivery in China during the mid-twentieth century. It explores how Chinese Communist Party leaders used internal party debates, national policies, and broadcasting training to construct an ideal Communist voice whose qualities would ostensibly communicate party loyalty and serve as a sonic representation of political authority.
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Paltiel, Jeremy T. "PLA Allegiance on Parade: Civil-Military Relations in Transition." China Quarterly 143 (September 1995): 784–800. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000015046.
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Civil-military relations in China demonstrate a unique fusion of military and political leadership within the Communist Party. Variously described as a “symbiosis,” “dual-role elite” or “the Party in uniform,” this feature rooted in the guerrilla experience of the Chinese Communist Party was sustained over six decades by the political longevity of the Long March generation. The civil war experience formed political leaders skilled in both civil affairs and military command. Analysts of civil-military relations in China must therefore define the scope of “civil” in relation to the Chinese Communist Party.
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Mrkić, Ivan. "Socialism with Chinese characteristics." Napredak 2, no. 2 (2021): 11–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/napredak2-32948.
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The text speaks about the formation of the Communist Party of China, its beginnings and development, as well as the categorizations ever since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. The new geopolitical reality has been explained, especially since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The argumentation is made about the peculiarities of Chinese history and modern development. The immeasurable importance of the Communist Party of China in governing the most populous country is pointed out. A short section on the relations between Serbia and China has been included. The conclusion highlights the general views encompassing most of the claims presented in the previous text.
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Pan, David. "The Invisible Hand of the Chinese Communist Party." Telos 2022, no. 199 (2022): 99–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.3817/0622199099.
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Goodman, David. "Factionalism in the Chinese Communist Party. Jing Huang." China Journal 47 (January 2002): 143–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3182091.
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Walker, Kenneth C. "THE BRITTLE STRENGTH OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY." Asian Affairs 43, no. 2 (July 2012): 280–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2012.682372.
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CHEN, Gang. "The Chinese Communist Party and Politics 2019/2020." East Asian Policy 12, no. 02 (April 2020): 5–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930520000100.
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In September 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping urged the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to gear up in countering imminent “struggles” and in achieving the ambitious “two centennial” targets amid the US–China trade war, Hong Kong unrest and a slowing economy. A novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak that erupted in Wuhan in October 2019 had scuppered China’s timeline to achieve its targets. While China successfully curbed the spread of COVID-19 within its border, enormous challenges lie ahead for China to maintain its economic growth and social stability. The daunting combat against the COVID-19 pandemic marks the beginning of the testing time.
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Christiansen, Flemming. "The fourteenth congress of the Chinese communist party." Journal of Communist Studies 9, no. 2 (June 1993): 101–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523279308415210.
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Goodman, David S. G. "The 13th congress of the Chinese Communist Party." Pacific Review 1, no. 1 (January 1988): 97–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748808718754.
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Chongyi, Feng. "Democrats within the Chinese Communist Party since 1989." Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 57 (October 29, 2008): 673–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670560802253378.
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