Journal articles on the topic 'Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'
To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Chinese Communist Party (CCP).'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Garver, John W. "The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet Communism." China Quarterly 133 (March 1993): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000018178.
Full textAbstract:
The collapse first of Communist rule of the USSR and then of the USSR itself was without question one of the pivotal events of the era. Since China's 20th-century history has been so deeply influenced by Soviet developments, it is important to examine the impact of these events on China. This article asks, first, whether the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), had a deliberate policy towards the decline of Soviet Communism, and if so, what was the nature of that policy? Did the CCP attempt to assist their comrades in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as the latter battled for survival during 1990 and 1991?
2
L P GORE, Lance. "Revamping the Chinese Communist Party." East Asian Policy 07, no. 01 (January 2015): 16–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930515000021.
Full textAbstract:
The 2014 Party reform aimed to modernise the CCP. The Politburo passed the “Action Plan for Deepening Party-building Institutional Reforms”, outlining 26 concrete reforms in four key areas to be completed by 2017. Notable departures include the re-emphasis on ideological unity, the rollback on intra-party democracy, the renewed emphasis on intra-party legislation and the control on the growth of the Party's size. However there are inherent dilemmas in building a Leninist party in a globalised market economy.
3
Li, Danhui, and Yafeng Xia. "Jockeying for Leadership: Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1961–July 1964." Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 1 (January 2014): 24–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00430.
Full textAbstract:
In October 1961 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted a policy of tacit struggle against the program of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The CPSU's resumption of de-Stalinization alarmed the Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, but he did not yet want to discard a limited rapprochement with Moscow. However, when high-level Sino-Soviet talks in July 1963 collapsed, the relationship between the CPSU and the CCP became irretrievable. Through the subsequent great polemics, the CCP intended to project itself as the spokesman of true Marxism-Leninism and the natural leader of world Communism. After the CCP attacked the top leaders of the CPSU by name, hostility between the two parties intensified. The breakdown of the CCP-CPSU organizational relationship was only a matter of time. Relying on a large array of Chinese-language sources, including records of Chinese leaders' speeches and comments at secret party meetings, this article reassesses the most critical period in the Sino-Soviet split from October 1961 to July 1964.
4
Smith, Ewan. "On the Informal Rules of the Chinese Communist Party." China Quarterly 248, S1 (October 12, 2021): 141–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741021000898.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a closely constituted party. Recent studies of the CCP describe and evaluate its formal rules, but to understand the Party as an institution we also need to understand its informal rules. The literature on “party norms”, “institutionalization” and the “unwritten constitution” often fails to distinguish rules from other political phenomena. It confuses informal rules with political practices, constitutional conventions, behavioural equilibria and doctrinal discourse. It is prone to overlook important rules, and to see rules where there are none. Hence, it potentially overstates how institutionalized the CCP is, and therefore how resilient it is. The article provides a clearer account of informal rules and suggests a different explanation for the resilience of the CCP.
5
Kit-ching, Chan Lau. "The Perception of Chinese Communism in Hong Kong 1921–1934." China Quarterly 164 (December 2000): 1044–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000019299.
Full textAbstract:
This article attempts to present the impression made by Chinese communism in Hong Kong during the germinal period of the Chinese Communist Movement from 1921, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded, to 1934, when the communist presence in Hong Kong and Guangdong had virtually disappeared and communist activities were not to be revived until shortly before the outbreak of China's war with Japan. The early perception of communism and its importance have to be understood in the context of the dual society of the colony, with the British as the ruler and the Chinese as the ruled in almost totally separate communities.
6
Meyer, David A., Megha Ram, and Laura Wilke. "CIRCULATION OF THE ELITE IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY." Journal of East Asian Studies 16, no. 1 (March 2016): 147–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jea.2015.6.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe history of leadership change in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exemplifies Pareto's notion ofcirculationof the elite. To analyze it we have compiled a partially ranked dataset of members and alternates of the Politburo Standing Committee, Politburo, and Central Committee for the 1st through 18th National Party Congresses. Quantitative studies of leadership change in the CCP have typically focused on the fraction of new members in each political body from one Party Congress to the next, but the existence of partially ranked data calls for a more subtle quantification of leadership change. Thus, we define a new family of metrics which consider change within each political body, the magnitude of such change, and the importance of each change to CCP structure and policy. We use two of these metrics to compute the distances between each pair of successive, partially-ranked leadership lists in our dataset. Our results capture important political developments from the irregular leadership change of the early years to the subsequent transformation of the CCP into a more institutionalized polity. This metric-based analysis also supplements our understanding of anomalous leadership transitions, intra-Party dynamics, and systemic change in the CCP.
7
Han, Xiaorong. "Revolution knows no boundaries? Chinese revolutionaries in North Vietnam during the early years of the First Indochina War." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 52, no. 2 (June 2021): 246–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463421000412.
Full textAbstract:
This article analyses the roles and activities of three groups of Chinese communist revolutionaries in the early phase of the First Indochina War. The author argues that although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did not begin to provide substantial aid to North Vietnam until 1950, the involvement of Chinese communists, including members of both the CCP and the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), in the First Indochina War started at the very moment the war broke out in 1946. Although the early participants were not as prominent as the Chinese political and military advisers who arrived after 1949, their activities deserve to be examined, not only because they were the forerunners of later actors, but also because they had already made concrete contributions to the Vietnamese revolution before the founding of the People's Republic of China and the arrival of large-scale Chinese military and economic aid. Moreover, interactions between early Chinese participants and the Vietnamese revolutionaries established a pattern that would characterise Sino–Vietnamese relations in the subsequent decades.
8
GORE, Lance L. P. "Rebuilding the Leninist Party Rule: Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping's Stewardship." East Asian Policy 08, no. 01 (January 2016): 5–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930516000015.
Full textAbstract:
In 2015, Xi Jinping tried to restore many Leninist features to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He took measures to rebuild the ideological faith, entrench Party organisations with state administration and run the CCP as a meritocracy. “Party groups” (dangzu) are extended to non-governmental, non-profit and other societal organisations. He insisted that party members must observe both formal disciplines and informal norms of the Party, and show loyalty to the leadership.
9
Chambers, Collin L. "Having Faith in the Party Again: The Two-Line Party Struggle in the Chinese Communist Party." Human Geography 11, no. 1 (March 2018): 44–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/194277861801100104.
Full textAbstract:
At the present time, the Communist Party is not looked upon as an agent for revolutionary change. It is seen as an archaic artifact that needs to be left in the dustbin of 20th century history. Some in the “New Left” argue for a “post-party politics” – because contemporary party politics are so “closely bound up with structures of power, the possibility that political parties will transform themselves and formulate a new politics is extremely low” (Wang 2016, 169). In sum, we should not have faith in the Party in radically changing social formations. However, this view abstracts from the political and social dynamics of communist parties. Communist parties provide the “affective infrastructure” for activists (Dean 2016) and create the flexible, disciplined organizational form necessary for maneuvering through the complexities of a revolutionary moment. An investigation of the historical and contemporary “line struggles” within the Chinese Communist Party gives insight into how communist parties can foster change in a social formation. This paper seeks to install hope that the Party, particularly the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), can once again create revolutionary change.
10
Kampen, Thomas. "Wang Jiaxiang, Mao Zedong and the ‘Triumph of Mao Zedong-Thought’ (1935–1945)." Modern Asian Studies 23, no. 4 (October 1989): 705–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x00010179.
Full textAbstract:
While Mao Zedong might still be China's most famous communist, only scholars of the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have heard of Wang Jiaxiang and even they have never studied his career in detail. But recent Chinese publications show that there were very few CCP leaders who had such a tremendous impact on the Chinese communist movement in general and Mao Zedong's career in particular. This article will show that Wang not only supported Mao during the power struggles of the 1930s and helped convince Stalin that Mao should be acknowledged as the CCP's leader, but that Wang also played a decisive role in establishing Mao Zedong-Thought as the Party's guiding ideology. The release of numerous Party documents in the last five years also throws some light upon the relations and conflicts between Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders such as Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao and Liu Shaoqi in the decade between the Long March and the Seventh Party Congress of 1945.
11
Brødsgaard, Kjeld Erik, and Gang Chen. "The Chinese Communist Party since 1949: Organization, Ideology, and Prospect for Change." Brill Research Perspectives in Governance and Public Policy in China 3, no. 1-2 (September 4, 2018): 1–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24519227-12340004.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractResearch on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the world’s largest political party, has seen a revival in recent years. Today, studies of the CCP are a key part of any attempt to understand China’s development trajectory in the post-1949 era. This review takes a new and closer look at how the study of the CCP has evolved in terms of themes, concepts, and areas of research. In the following we explore nine topics: Party organization, cadre management, cadre advancement and training, Party ideology, Party reform and adaptation, local Party work, the Party and business, the Party and corruption, and the Party and the law. Combining the pieces of the puzzle provides the picture of a political machine and organization of amazing durability.
12
Chan, Gordon Y. M. "The communists in rural Guangdong, 1928–1936." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland 13, no. 1 (April 2003): 77–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1356186302002985.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractResearch on the subject of Chinese communism has long been marred by the “spotlight approach”, which, as Kathleen Hartford rightly criticises, “illuminates key actors and events, but leaves in the shadow the action transpiring in the corners of the historical stage”. Assuming that only a few great names and signal events bear relevance to its development, such an approach often produces simplified pictures of the Chinese communist revolution. During the last decade or so, however, an increasing number of historians have begun to take seriously the great complexities and diversities involved in this revolutionary movement. Using newly available communist Party sources, they have ventured to excavate forgotten or even deliberately ignored episodes in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In so doing, they have not only expanded the scope of enquiry in Chinese communism but also provided new evidence for testing old interpretive structures. This article joins that trend by presenting the little-known story of the Communist struggle in rural areas of the Guangdong province from 1928 to 1936.
13
Yongnian, Zheng. "Interest Representation and the Transformation of the Chinese Communist Party." Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 16 (March 10, 2002): 57–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v16i0.5.
Full textAbstract:
At the 80th anniversary celebration of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on 1
July 2001, Jiang Zemin called on the party to admit into its ranks of 'outstanding
social elements' of private entrepreneurs, professionals, technical and managerial
personnel from non-state firms and MNCs. Party ideologues, however, have raised
a great hue and cry. In order to establish his political legacy, the CCP leadership
has intensified the campaign to educate its cadres and members. Reform and
development have bourgeoisified and benefited many party members and cadres.
Jiang's public support of the capitalists is not going against the tide but is a
recognition of reality instead. In fact, to continue to grow and expand, the party
must embrace the better educated and the most enterprising in society. The
capitalists within the party will certainly be catalysts to quicken the transformation
of the party. In its attempt to admit capitalists, has the CCP unknowingly let in
the Trojan horse? Jiang Zemin's original aim may have been to strengthen the
party-state by broadening its social base. And as the party metamorphoses, perhaps
into a kind of social democratic party, Jiang will be favourably judged for paving
the way for such a metamorphosis. Nevertheless, it is not an easy transition:
insurmountable difficulties lie ahead for the party leadership.
14
Seppänen, Samuli. "Formalism and anti-formalism in the Chinese Communist Party’s governance project." Global Constitutionalism 10, no. 2 (July 2021): 290–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2045381720000271.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThis article argues that the governance project of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) oscillates between rule-based formalism and anti-formalist scepticism about rule-based governance. In this dichotomy, anti-formalist arguments support CCP leaders’ efforts to maintain and increase the Party’s influence over the judiciary and other state organs, which is a key justification for the Party’s power. Formalist language, in contrast, supports Party leaders’ attempts to constrain lower-level cadres’ uses of power within the Party. Formalist language is particularly prominent in the writings of Party ideologues on the interpretation of the Party’s internal regulations, including the CCP Constitution. At the same time, Party ideology also provides for various anti-formalist arguments about rule-based governance within and outside the Party. Paradoxical as it may be, the Party leadership seeks to exert rule-transcending political leadership through formal rules. While the focus of this article is on China, it argues that other illiberal regimes may also be studied in terms of similar, potentially incoherent approaches to rule-based governance.
15
Li, Hua-yu. "Reactions of Chinese Citizens to the Death of Stalin: Internal Communist Party Reports." Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 2 (April 2009): 70–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.2.70.
Full textAbstract:
When the long-time Soviet leader Iosif Stalin died in March 1953, China was in the midst of a social transformation that was generating widespread anxiety and social tensions. Such sentiments were reflected in 30 reports compiled by Xinhua reporters of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) concerning ordinary Chinese citizens' reactions to the death of Stalin. Some Chinese citizens had supported Stalin and, by extension, the CCP and were anxious about the CCP's ability to survive and rule in an uncertain post-Stalin world. Others were happy to see Stalin's departure and waited hopefully for the collapse of the CCP. This article assesses the wide range of opinions as reflected in the CCP's internal reports.
16
CHEN, Gang. "The Chinese Communist Party and Politics 2019/2020." East Asian Policy 12, no. 02 (April 2020): 5–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930520000100.
Full textAbstract:
In September 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping urged the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to gear up in countering imminent “struggles” and in achieving the ambitious “two centennial” targets amid the US–China trade war, Hong Kong unrest and a slowing economy. A novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak that erupted in Wuhan in October 2019 had scuppered China’s timeline to achieve its targets. While China successfully curbed the spread of COVID-19 within its border, enormous challenges lie ahead for China to maintain its economic growth and social stability. The daunting combat against the COVID-19 pandemic marks the beginning of the testing time.
17
Yang, Benjamin. "The Zunyi Conference as One Step in Mao's Rise to Power: A Survey of Historical Studies of the Chinese Communist Party." China Quarterly 106 (June 1986): 235–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030574100003856x.
Full textAbstract:
In January 1935, three months after the epic Long March was under way, the Chinese Communists captured the second largest city in Guizhou province, Zunyi, and held an enlarged Politburo conference there. The importance of the Zunyi Conference in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) history and, particularly, in the late Chairman Mao Zedong's political career has aroused the interest of both Chinese and western scholars; their reflections on this episode have in turn greatly enhanced its importance, perhaps too much so.
18
Li, Cheng. "The Chinese Communist Party: Recruiting and Controlling the New Elites." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 38, no. 3 (September 2009): 13–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810260903800302.
Full textAbstract:
This article explores two interrelated aspects of the new dynamics within the CCP leadership – the new elite groups and the new ground rules in Chinese politics. The first shows profound changes in the recruitment of the elite and the second aims to reveal the changing mechanisms of political control and the checks and balances of the Chinese political system. The article argues that the future of the CCP largely depends on two seemingly contradictory needs: how broad-based will the Party's recruitment of its new elites be on the one hand and how effective will the top leadership be in controlling this increasingly diverse political institution on the other. The emerging fifth generation of leaders is likely to find the challenge of producing elite harmony and unity within the Party more difficult than their predecessors. Yet, the diverse demographic and political backgrounds of China's new leaders can also be considered a positive development that may contribute to the Chinese-style inner-Party democracy.
19
Cho, Young Nam. "How Does the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) Control Social Organizations?" JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 15, no. 2 (August 31, 2022): 153–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.52594/jcp.2022.08.15.2.153.
Full text
20
Burns, John P. "Chinese Civil Service Reform: The 13th Party Congress Proposals." China Quarterly 120 (December 1989): 739–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000018440.
Full textAbstract:
Since 1980, in their pursuit of economic development, reformist Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders have decentralized personnel administration and transferred formal authority over some personnel matters to state institutions. To manage its more complex economy, Party authorities have been forced to select professionals and specialists based in part on their technical qualifications and job performance. To a limited extent, the Party has begun to place personnel management in the hands of experts who are competent to assess the qualifications and work of their peers, and directly in the hands of employing institutions. The CCP has beat a limited, if unsteady retreat.
21
Dahana, Abdullah, and Kelly Rosalin. "Challenges against Xi Jinping: an ASEAN Perspective." JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies) 2, no. 1 (July 31, 2014): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.21512/jas.v2i1.82.
Full textAbstract:
Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping in 1997, factionalism and power struggle as the characteristic of leadership change in China has ended. Although factionalism still exists, it has been converted to collaboration among all factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The election of Xi Jinping to the presidency of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and to the position as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is therefore, as the result of cooperation among factions. This paper discusses various challenges, including nationalism as the most serious issue faced by Xi Jinping as a leader elected through compromise.
22
Kojima, Kazuko, and Ryosei Kokubun. "The 'Shequ Construction' Programme and the Chinese Communist Party." Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 16 (March 10, 2002): 86–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v16i0.6.
Full textAbstract:
In recent years, the community development programme called 'Shequ
Construction' has been making rapid progress in China. The discussion
surrounding the programme focuses on how to adjust the relationship between
the street offices (which fall under the jurisdiction of the government) and the
shequ residents' committees (defined as the people's self-governing entity).
The programme has also led the debate over the position and role of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the newly reconstructed shequ. While the
party's Organization Department proposes the unification of the shequ party
branches and shequ residents' committees, others maintain that the shequ party
branch should be differentiated from the shequ residents' committee, which is
still viewed as an agent of government. They say 'the greatest advantage of the
CCP is that it is the embodiment of social power and it is not a non-socialist
external force like the administrative organ'. Their proposal raises further
questions: How should the party change its direction and guidance within the
framework of the separation of government and society? Will this affect the
party's ability to continue to provide society with effective 'guidance' and
become representative of society? This paper will provide some clues to help
answer these questions.
23
ZHAO, Litao. "Chinese Society: Stability and Governance." East Asian Policy 08, no. 01 (January 2016): 25–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930516000039.
Full textAbstract:
Chinese society was largely stable in 2015 despite the slower economic growth and the stock market crash. Overall, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has prevented local protests from spreading and escalating into a political threat on a national scale. In November 2015, the CCP announced the guidelines for the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). The shift towards “innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared” development would require more changes in government and society.
24
Shen, Zhihua, and Yafeng Xia. "Hidden Currents during the Honeymoon: Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference." Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 4 (October 2009): 74–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.4.74.
Full textAbstract:
The Conference of World Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in November 1957 was the largest gathering of world Communists since the birth of Marxism. Scholars have long assumed that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) dominated the conference. Newly declassified archival records and memoirs indicate that the idea of convening a conference and issuing a joint declaration was proposed by both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the CPSU. During the conference the CCP leader, Mao Zedong, played an important role. Mao's extemporaneous remarks at the conference shocked the leaders of the CPSU. His comments on the Soviet intraparty struggle, his blunt remarks about nuclear war, and his declaration that China would overtake Great Britain within fifteen years created doubts and dissatisfactions in the minds of the delegates and cast a cloud over the conference. The Moscow Declaration also revealed incipient Sino-Soviet disagreements, portending Beijing's challenge to Soviet leadership in the socialist bloc. Thus, the Moscow Conference was a turning point for Sino-Soviet relations.
25
LU, Jie. "Ideological and Political Education in China’s Higher Education." East Asian Policy 09, no. 02 (April 2017): 78–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930517000186.
Full textAbstract:
After decades of continuous investment and efforts, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has established a multi-tiered system, including co-option, surveillance and monitoring, and ideological and political education, to ensure its domination of Chinese college students, For the foreseeable future, Chinese college students, as a group, are unlikely to actively mount significant challenges (like those of the 1989 incident) against the CCP that could undermine its political survival.
26
Berton, Peter. "The Chinese and Japanese communist parties: three decades of discord and reconciliation, 1966–1998." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37, no. 3 (September 1, 2004): 361–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2004.06.004.
Full textAbstract:
This article depicts a painful period in the relations between the Chinese and Japanese communist parties. Using a case study of relations between a ruling Chinese communist party and a non-ruling Japanese communist party, the article covers negotiations and communique ´ between the JCP leader Miyamoto and CCP leadershipin 1966 that was overruled by Mao Zedong on the issue of Soviet ‘‘revisionism’’ and revolutionary line for the JCP. It discusses the resulting breakdown of negotiations and CCP’s efforts to splinter the Japanese party by setting up a pro-Beijing Japanese communist group. The article analyzes the obstacles to normalization, and the reasons why the leadershipof the two parties decided to compromise and reach normalization in 1998 after 30 years of acrimony.
27
Shambaugh, David. "Civil-Military Relations in China: Party-Army or National Military?" Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 16 (March 10, 2002): 10–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v16i0.3.
Full textAbstract:
This article examines the changing dynamics of relations between the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It argues that
while the PLA remains politically loyal to the CCP, there is evidence of important
changes in the institutional relationship between the two institutions. The partyarmy
relationship is no longer as intertwined and symbiotic as it has historically
been; rather, this article argues that there is evidence of a 'bifurcation' between the
two. The catalysts for this change have been the professionalization and relative
depoliticization of the military, as well as the leadership transition in the CCP.
These changes raise important and central issues for the future of Chinese politics.*
28
LI, Yao. "Chinese Communist Party’s Grass-roots Organisations in Enterprises since the 1990s: Changes and Challenges." East Asian Policy 11, no. 03 (July 2019): 96–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930519000308.
Full textAbstract:
Since 1994, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has highlighted the different roles, functions and responsibilities of CCP’s Grass-root Party Organisations (GPOs) in different periods and enterprises of different ownership types. To solve the inconsistency between a modern corporation governance structure and the involvement of GPOs in firms, the CCP pays great attention to embedding GPOs in the corporate governance structure of enterprises, which is a cause for concern for domestic and foreign investors.
29
Burns, John P. "China's Governance: Political Reform in a Turbulent Environment." China Quarterly 119 (September 1989): 481–518. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000022918.
Full textAbstract:
In 1989, after 40 years in power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is faced with its worst crisis since the Cultural Revolution (1966–69) over the issue of reform of the Stalinist political system. Arguing that political reform was the necessary pre–condition for further change in China's economy, the reform wing of the CCP confronted conservatives who feared that the Party was losing its monopoly of Chinese politics. The result was that thousands of unarmed civilians in Central Beijing were killed by the army in the J early hours of 4 June 1989.
30
Dickson, Bruce J. "The Party Is Far from Over." Current History 106, no. 701 (September 1, 2007): 243–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2007.106.701.243.
Full textAbstract:
Does the Chinese Communist Party derive enough legitimacy from economic growth? Can a party-state survive by co-opting some potential challengers while repressing others? So far, the CCP has answered these questions in the affirmative. Yet the debate goes on. This year, as the party's Seventeenth Congress prepares to unveil a new Politburo (same as the old Politburo?), we asked four scholars to offer their latest thinking on the subject.
31
Wang, Yuhua. "Empowering the Police: How the Chinese Communist Party Manages Its Coercive Leaders." China Quarterly 219 (August 22, 2014): 625–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741014000769.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractHow does the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secure the loyalty of its coercive leaders, and its public security chiefs in particular, in the face of numerous domestic protests every year? This article presents the first quantitative analysis of contemporary China's coercive leaders using an original data set of provincial public security chiefs and public security funding during the reform era. I demonstrate that the CCP, owing to its concern for regime stability, has empowered the public security chiefs by incorporating them into the leadership team. Empowered public security chiefs then have stronger bargaining power over budgetary issues. I rely on fieldwork, qualitative interviews and an analysis of Party documents to complement my statistical analysis. The findings of this analysis shed light on the understanding of regime durability, contentious politics and the bureaucracy in China.
32
Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. "Organisation and (Lack of) Democracy in the Chinese Communist Party: A Critical Reading of the Successive Iterations of the Party Constitution." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 51, no. 3 (December 2022): 364–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/18681026221117287.
Full textAbstract:
There has always been a lack of democratic life in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Former CCP Secretary General Hu Jintao attempted in the first decade of the twenty-first century to promote reform, including a revision of the party constitution, aimed at enhancing “intra-party democracy” (党内民主, dangnei minzhu). However, Xi Jinping has put on hold this plan, fully restoring the verticality of the institution where it may have been weakened. This article has three objectives. First, it compares the successive versions or iterations of the CCP constitution in the last 100 years and analyses all the changes related to democratic centralism, elections, and democracy that have been introduced. Then, it assesses Hu's reforms and their failure. Finally, it explains why the CCP cannot reform and democratise as long as it remains a party-state and China remains a one-party system.
33
Frenkiel, Emilie, and Anna Shpakovskaya. "The Evolution of Representative Claim-Making by the Chinese Communist Party: From Mao to Xi (1949–2019)." Politics and Governance 7, no. 3 (September 24, 2019): 208–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v7i3.2151.
Full textAbstract:
This article traces the evolution of representative claim-making by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 up to the present day. Based on the analysis of official political discourses on the mass line, the Three Represents and more recent ongoing discourses on digitalization, we demonstrate the change and continuity of claim-making by the CCP. We show that while representative claim-making has undergone a significant transformation from the CCP as the representative of the working class to the sole representative of the Chinese people and nation, the CCP has been consistent throughout decades in maintaining its hegemony over representative claim-making.
34
Doyon, Jérôme. "The Strength of a Weak Organization: The Communist Youth League as a Path to Power in Post-Mao China." China Quarterly 243 (December 17, 2019): 780–800. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741019001516.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractHow can a weak organization be a path to power? The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) lacks autonomy and coherence yet it is seen as the cradle for one of the main factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To understand this tension, I provide a novel account of the role played by the CYL in the recruitment of leading cadres since the 1980s. Against explanations based on factional struggles, I argue that the rise of CYL-affiliated cadres is a by-product of the organization's weakness. As the Party appoints CYL heads, CCP leaders, at various levels and at different points in time, have used the League to accelerate the promotion of their protégés. For years, there has been little incentive for Party bosses to dismantle this promotion path. However, in his bid to consolidate his power, Xi Jinping has weakened this channel so that it may not be used by potential rivals.
35
Kubat, Aleksandra. "Morality as Legitimacy under Xi Jinping: The Political Functionality of Traditional Culture for the Chinese Communist Party." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 47, no. 3 (December 2018): 47–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261804700303.
Full textAbstract:
Taking as an example Xi Jinping's use of the phrase “excellent traditional culture” ([Formula: see text], youxiu chuantong wenhua), this article looks at the construction of a centrally sanctioned narrative of traditional Chinese culture in resources produced within the Party school system. The specific focus of analysis is on how these resources theorise the functionality of traditional culture for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a political organisation, and what culture-based solutions they put forward to tackle the problems with Party theory and ideology, the state governance model, and cadre performance. It is argued that by referencing traditional culture, and, in particular, by drawing on traditional moral virtues, the CCP realigns itself with societal expectations without making concessions over the ideological foundations of the party state.
36
Holbig, Heike. "Remaking the CCP's Ideology: Determinants, Progress, and Limits under Hu Jintao." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 38, no. 3 (September 2009): 35–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810260903800303.
Full textAbstract:
Two decades after the predicted “end of ideology”, we are observing a re-emphasis on party ideology under Hu Jintao. The paper looks into the reasons for and the factors shaping the re-formulation of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) ideology since 2002 and assesses the progress and limits of this process. Based on the analysis of recent elite debates, it is argued that the remaking of ideology has been the consequence of perceived challenges to the legitimacy of CCP rule. Contrary to many Western commentators, who see China's successful economic performance as the most important if not the only source of regime legitimacy, Chinese party theorists and scholars have come to regard Deng Xiaoping's formula of performance-based legitimacy as increasingly precarious. In order to tackle the perceived “performance dilemma” of party rule, the adaptation and innovation of party ideology is regarded as a crucial measure to relegitimize CCP rule.
37
Wang, Jiayu. "Representations of the Chinese Communist Party’s political ideologies in President Xi Jinping’s discourse." Discourse & Society 28, no. 4 (February 8, 2017): 413–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926516687418.
Full textAbstract:
This article analyzes how president Xi Jinping’s political discourse legitimizes the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as China’s ruling Party through representations of political ideologies. It probes two dimensions of the representations: thematic representations concerning the topics and topical patterns in Xi’s discourse, and evaluative representations concerning the attitudes and emotions associated with these topics. This study adapts Fairclough’s three-dimensional approaches to Chinese political discourse analysis: description regarding the linguistic features of the discourse, interpretation and explanation of the discourse by considering China’s social, especially political and cultural, particularities. Through the analysis, this article reveals the discursive practice through which the CCP utilizes a range of political ideologies to legitimize its politics. It is hoped that this study can shed light on adapting critical discourse analysis (CDA) to Chinese political discourse analysis in the context of China’s particular culture and politics.
38
Saich, Tony. "Introduction: The Chinese Communist Party and the Anti-Japanese War Base Areas." China Quarterly 140 (December 1994): 1000–1006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000052875.
Full textAbstract:
The new materials on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) history that have become available from the late 1970s onwards, the opportunity to inter-view key participants in the Chinese revolution and changing intellectual agendas in the West have led to a major reassessment of the reasons for the CCP's rise to power. Recent research has contributed significantly to understanding of the process of change in China in the century or so before the Communists came to power and has even moved the Party out of the immediate spotlight while explaining long-term socio-economic changes and their structural consequences. Similarly, the focus has moved away from Mao Zedong and a few senior leaders operating out of the key geographic centres of the revolution (Jiangxi in the early 1930s, Yan'an in the late 1930s and early 1940s). This latter research has retrieved those forgotten in the revolutionary histories or those who have been deliberately ignored in the writings of the victors.
39
Averill, Stephen C. "Party, Society, and Local Elite in the Jiangxi Communist Movement." Journal of Asian Studies 46, no. 2 (May 1987): 279–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2056015.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractIn August 1927 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Jiangxi seemed moribund, yet by the end of 1930 the movement was larger and more active than ever before. How did this occur? Past studies have especially emphasized Mao Zedong's famous rural guerrilla strategy, but this was only part of the story. Equally significant was the little-studied success of members of the Jiangxi hill-country elite who were also in the CCP in using established schools and educational societies, time-honored traditions of local strongman behavior, and existing bandit–secret society gangs to build many localized base areas. Such techniques were congenial to CCP leaders and essential to the movement's survival in the early days when its prestige and material resources were at a very low ebb, and when radical reforms would almost certainly have failed. Nevertheless, this strategy also fostered parochial attitudes and organizational weaknesses that clashed with the later efforts of Mao and his allies to carry out mass mobilization and fundamental land reform. Only after a prolonged and violent crisis within the base areas did the “Maoist” policies vital for the revolution's long-term growth begin to overcome the policies of elite coalition building that had been necessary for the movement to obtain its initial foothold in the Jiangxi hill country.
40
Van Slyke, Lyman P. "The Battle of The Hundred Regiments: Problems of Coordination and Control during the Sino-Japanese War." Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (October 1996): 979–1005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x00016863.
Full textAbstract:
Communist sources record that between 20 August and 5 December 1940, the Eighth Route Army (8RA) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fought 1,824 large and small engagements with Japanese and puppet troops from the plains of Hebei to the mountains of Shanxi. These engagements are known collectively as ‘the Battle of the Hundred Regiments’ and they are the subject of this essay.
41
Hung, Chang-tai. "The Red Line: Creating a Museum of the Chinese Revolution." China Quarterly 184 (December 2005): 914–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741005000561.
Full textAbstract:
The establishment of the Museum of the Chinese Revolution, which opened its doors in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on 1 July 1961, the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, was a complicated political and cultural decision on the part of the Chinese government. The museum was never intended to be an artistic enterprise. Rather, it was conceived as a political institution to serve the interest of the Party. This article argues that the Party was ubiquitous in the building of the museum, exercising tight control through strict institutional means, especially through its Propaganda Department. Museum staff, under the close supervision of senior Party officials, sought to pursue an indigenous path different from the Soviet model. Staff members collected artifacts related to the Chinese Communist Revolution, commissioned historical paintings, arranged displays according to the historical framework stipulated by Mao Zedong, and, most important, struggled to instil in the museum the correct “Red Line,” that is, the policy of the CCP under Mao's leadership. The article concludes that the museum was an intricate amalgam of political supervision from the top, official historical interpretations, strategic displays and a reflection of the internal Party struggle. The construction of the museum reflects the attempt by the CCP to control the collective memory of the nation and to monopolize the writing of history.
42
Shih, Victor, Wei Shan, and Mingxing Liu. "Gauging the Elite Political Equilibrium in the CCP: A Quantitative Approach Using Biographical Data." China Quarterly 201 (March 2010): 79–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741009991081.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractCan one man dominate the Chinese Communist Party? This has been a much debated issue in the field of Chinese politics. Using a novel database that tracks the biographies of all Central Committee (CC) members from 1921 to 2007, we derive a measure of top CCP leaders' factional strength in the CC. We show that Mao could not maintain a commanding presence in the Party elite after the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, although the Party chairman enjoyed a prolonged period of consolidated support in the CC at a time when the CCP faced grave external threats. No Chinese leader, not even Mao himself, could regain the level of influence that he had enjoyed in the late 1940s. Our results, however, do not suggest that a “code of civility” has developed among Chinese leaders. The Cultural Revolution saw the destruction of Liu Shaoqi's faction. Although violent purges ended after the Cultural Revolution, Chinese leaders continued to promote followers into the CC and to remove rivals' followers.
43
Garver, John W. "The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party." China Quarterly 113 (March 1988): 29–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000026394.
Full textAbstract:
The role of the Comintern in the formation of the second Chinese Communist Party-Kuomintang (CCP-KMT) united front has long been the subject of debate. Scholars have long recognized that an understanding of Moscow's role during the pivotal year and a half prior to the Xian Incident, and especially of possible conflict between the Comintern and Mao Zedong over the issue of a united front with Chiang Kai-shek, was essential to an evaluation of subsequent CCP-Soviet relations. This article is a contribution to our understanding of this important problem.
44
Zhang, Wenzhuo. "Multicultural Ethnic Music Education in Communist China." International Journal of Multicultural Education 19, no. 3 (October 31, 2017): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.18251/ijme.v19i3.1359.
Full textAbstract:
The Central Communist Party (CCP) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) describes China as a unified multinational country. National policies advocate cultural diversity in the educational system with particular emphasis on the notion that diverse ethnic minorities contribute to zhonghua minzu—a single united Chinese nationality. Drawing upon the theoretical frameworks of musical authenticity as well as two tenets of liberalism theory, equal concern and cultural neutrality, the study aims to understand how government-designed national K1–9 music textbooks represent the Chinese ethnic minority’s musical and cultural traditions.
45
Tsai, Wen-Hsuan, and Chien-Wen Kou. "The Party's Disciples: CCP Reserve Cadres and the Perpetuation of a Resilient Authoritarian Regime." China Quarterly 221 (March 2015): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741015000338.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThis article discusses the origin and consolidation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reserve cadre system and considers its impact on the resilience and perpetuation of the Party's authoritarian regime. Reserve cadres are essentially the Party's “disciples”; through careful selection and training, the CCP is able to build a legion of youthful political elites with exceptional administrative ability and correct political thinking. Upon assumption of Party and government posts, these reserve cadres are able to reinforce the Party's autonomy and resist outside pressures to democratize, thereby manifesting the very nature of a resilient authoritarian regime.
46
Seppänen, Samuli. "A Global Turn in Chinese Legal Ideology?" Verfassung in Recht und Übersee 55, no. 3 (2022): 287–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0506-7286-2022-3-287.
Full textAbstract:
The Chinese approach to law and development has been perceived in terms of experimentalism and resistance towards globally applicable development models. In recent years, however, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideologues and pro-establishment legal scholars have become increasingly ambitious about the global significance of Chinese legal thought. CCP ideologues and Chinese legal scholars’ global ambitions are particularly evident in writings on “Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law.” According to these ideologues and scholars, Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law is the “height of world history and global thought,” and provides a new governance model for developing countries. Yet, while Party ideologues espouse the globally pathbreaking nature of Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law, they are often unconcerned with describing the specific legal theoretical advantages of this form of legal thought in comparison to existing modes of legal thought. This article argues that CCP ideologues’ global ambitions and the discrepancy between Party ideologues’ ideological and theoretical ambitions should be understood as consequences of domestic Chinese politics. While globally ambitious speech in CCP ideology and pro-establishment legal scholarship reflects China’s international aspirations, it does not aim to persuade foreign audiences about the advantages of Chinese legal thought. Instead, this form of ideological speech aims at producing and reproducing political relationships within the Chinese body politic. Insisting on the global relevance of Chinese legal thought is one method for achieving this goal. At least for now, globally ambitions CCP ideology is domestic in its aspirations.
47
Takeuchi, Hiroki, and Saavni Desai. "Chinese politics and comparative authoritarianism: institutionalization and adaptation for regime resilience." Japanese Journal of Political Science 22, no. 4 (October 12, 2021): 381–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109921000268.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractChina's authoritarian regime under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains resilient and responsive to domestic and international threats to its survival, especially considering the inherent instability of other authoritarian regimes. What strategies allow the CCP to stay in power? How do institutions help the CCP to sustain one-party rule, if at all? How does the regime maintain centralized rule over its vast population and territory? Finally, how does the regime respond to the people's demands and dissatisfactions? This review essay discusses how the growing literature of comparative authoritarianism helps (or does not help) us to answer these questions. It discusses three books – one on comparative authoritarianism and two on Chinese politics. In How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse, the authors (i.e., Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz) test various hypotheses exploring the issues regarding the central political processes that shape the policy choices of authoritarian regimes, such as seizing power, consolidation of elites, information gathering, and how dictatorships break down. Are their findings consistent or contradictory with observation of Chinese authoritarian politics? To answer this question, we draw empirical evidence from Bruce Dickson's The Dictator's Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for Survival and Min Ye's The Belt Road and Beyond: State Mobilized Globalization in China, 1998–2018. These books suggest why China's authoritarian regime remains resilient.
48
Kuo–tai, Hu. "The Struggle Between The Kuomintang And The Chinese Communist Party On Campus During The War Of Resistance, 1937–45." China Quarterly 118 (June 1989): 300–323. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000017823.
Full textAbstract:
Between 1937 and 1945 higher education was one of the main arenas of struggle between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Both sides regarded it as an important area to be controlled. The Bureau of Investigation's 1951 report suggested that KMT support from youth in schools was “the key to success or failure.” The Chinese Communist Party also regarded the work of winning over intellectuals as vital for the Party's future. In 1939 Mao Zedong said that “without the participation of intellectuals victory in the revolution is impossible.” Thus, the two parties competed both overtly and covertly in colleges and universities to win the support of both staff and students.
49
Goodman, David S. G. "China and the Legacy of Deng Xiaoping: From Communist Revolution to Capitalist Evolution. By Michael E. Marti. [Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002. xviii+265 pp. $27.95. ISBN 1-57488-416-6.]." China Quarterly 172 (December 2002): 1065–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009443902210621.
Full textAbstract:
In retrospect, 1991–1992 may well prove to be a pivotal period in the evolution of the People's Republic of China. The reform era ushered in by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the Third Plenum of its 11th Central Committee in December 1978 had dramatically restructured the economy and the state, but in the aftermath of the events of June 1989, it appeared to falter. Partly through reactions from outside China, and partly because of resistance within (including elements within the leadership of the Party), the programme of ‘reform and openness’ seemed challenged and about to topple.
50
Siek, Yany. "Chinese Democratization: An Inevitability or Possibility?" Political Science Undergraduate Review 1, no. 2 (February 15, 2016): 121–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/psur28.
Full textAbstract:
China's rapid economic growth since its late 1970 reforms has produced significant debate among scholars concerning whether or not it will democratize. Despite extensive liberalization of its economy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains an iron grip on its political system. Modernization theory and the potential for a stagnating economy present two compelling arguments for a democratic future. Although Chinese authoritarianism faces significant pressures, the CCP's use of pragmatic political reforms, adaptation, and alternative forms of legitimacy make it resilient. Economic growth or decline is not a sufficient condition for democratization. Rather, the likelihood of democratization will depend on the ability of the CCP to address emerging challenges such as political corruption that could threaten China's authoritarian resilience.