Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'
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Zhou, Shanding. "Changes of the Chinese Communist Party’s Ideology and Reform Since 1978." Thesis, Griffith University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10072/366150.
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The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s ideology has undergone remarkable changes in the past three decades which have facilitated China’s reform and opening up as well as its modernization. The thesis has expounded upon the argumentation by enumerating five dimensions of CCP’s ideological changes and development since 1978. First, the Party had restructured its ideological orthodoxy, advocating of ‘seeking truth from facts.’ Some of central Marxist tenets, such as ‘class struggle’, have been revised, and in effect demoted, and the ‘productive forces’ have been emphasized as the motive forces of history, so that the Party shifted its prime attention to economic development and socialist construction. The Party theorists proposed treating Marxism as a ‘developing science’ and a branch of the social sciences, but not an all-encompassing ‘science of sciences.’ These efforts have been so transformative that they have brought revolutionary changes in Chinese thinking of, and approach to Marxism. The Party has also changed the role that ideology plays in the Chinese policy process while remolding its doctrine.Thesis (PhD Doctorate)
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Griffith Business School
Griffith Business School
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Hearn, Kay, and n/a. "Sniffer Packets & Firewalls." University of Canberra. n/a, 2008. http://erl.canberra.edu.au./public/adt-AUC20081217.153550.
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Falun Gong protesters, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the spy
plane incident and a series of mine accidents are just some of the events over the past
decade that involved the Internet. In each incident the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) was caught off guard by the circumvention of informational
flows as a consequence of the Internet. This is in some ways indicative of the impact
the medium is having on the ability of the CCP to manage political discourse within
the confines of the country. This thesis examines the way that political discourse in
contemporary China is managed in response to the development of the Internet, using
the concepts of time and space as conceived by Harold A. Innis.
This historical study considers the strategies used in the management of time and
space in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) across a broad range of ways in which
the medium is used by particular groups, such as online gamers, bloggers, hackers,
and activists. I have also looked at the way information flows are managed during a
crisis or disaster using critical textual analysis of Internet sources, and specific
examples. These sources are both official and unofficial including Chinese
government sites, journalistic sources both Chinese and Western and Chinese legal
databases that appear on the World Wide Web (WWW). The study finds that there is
an emerging shift from propaganda based media manipulation and suppression to a
style of stage managed spin. The CCP have used three strategies to contain and
maintain their hold over central power, including the rule of law, investment in the
development of content and technological means. The development of the Internet in
China is marked by a dialect of desire for the technology for economic purposes and
the perceived need to control the technology for political purposes. The Internet has
also enabled the central government in Beijing to reassert its position as a central
authority over local and provincial governments.
This study contributes to the existing knowledge about Chinese media policy and the
Internet, and will shed light on the ways in which the tehcnology influences the
production and consumption of media and the impact that the development of this
medium has upon media policy in China. Furthermore, this study will contribute to a
greater understanding of CCP's ability to manage information and the impact that this
medium will have on the operations of Chinese politics within the space of the
Internet, as well as the impact of the technology on politics, and China's interaction
with the international community.
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Smith, Douglas. "Public Spaces, Parks and Democratic Transition: A Case Study of Republican China." Thesis, Griffith University, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10072/366151.
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This thesis has two related objectives. First, it proposes a general critique of the way in which liberal theorists have understood the democratisation process—particularly in their search for its nascent forms in the late Qing Dynasty and early Republican China. In this sense, it is a work of political philosophy and aims to counter poorly formulated criticisms of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This is not to condone everything the CCP does, but rather to highlight the frequent misperceptions of key concepts employed by their international interlocutors—especially freedom, democracy and government. The core of the argument rests on Dankwart Rustow’s three stage “matrix” which suggests that those factors that bring a democracy into being are not necessarily the same as those that sustain it. The argument, here, is that certain types of government have a role to play in the democratisation process. This problematises the generally-accepted view that the role of government (any government) is to remove itself from this process altogether. This is evidenced by the long standing liberal “truth” of the necessity of the public/private divide.
Second, the thesis outlines a history of the first indigenous Chinese public park—Zhongyuan Gongyuan (Central Park). In this sense, the thesis is also a work of history. The park, itself, is significant because, unlike the west, there has not been a history of formalised public spaces in Chinese history—like the agora, forum or piazzas. The establishment of the park, therefore, highlights a considerable, albeit geographically localised, watershed in the objectives of Chinese government. Previous governments kept their gaze towards heaven; early Republican governments reversed the direction, and looked towards the people. The newly established municipal authorities clearly saw the health, morality and conduct of the masses as the raison d’être of the park; the aim was new citizens who would contribute to the political modernity and capitalism that would make China strong. To build a new China required a dramatic rethinking of what the citizen would look like, and the earlier intellectual reconfigurations—especially those of Liang Qichao’s xin min—found their material expression, at least partially, in the ways in which the patrons consumed these new public spaces like Zhongyuan Gongyuan. The story of the park, then, provides a case study that demonstrates that government, at least in Republican China, did play a role in the creation of some of the basic elements of democracy—for example, civil society, modern citizenship and the public sphere.Thesis (PhD Doctorate)
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Griffith Business School
Griffith Business School
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Dumm, Elena. "Show No Weakness: An Ideological Analysis of China Daily News Coverage of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests." Wittenberg University Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wuhonors1617884910805174.
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Chi, Chia-Lin. "Lee Teng-Hui’s political cross-straits policy and mainland china’s reaction." Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/28534.
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By the end of the twentieth century, there were many secessionist groups, but, the move towards Taiwanese secessionism has arguably been the most significant of these. It triggered the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which resulted in a historical military confrontation between Mainland China and the US. As will be shown, from 1988 to 2000, Lee Teng-hui, as president of Taiwan, manipulated the political Cross-Straits relationship to promote what was ultimately a secessionist policy. This caused Mainland China to react strongly and triggered sharp tension between Taiwan and Mainland China. This thesis considers what motivated Lee Teng-hui to implement a secessionist Cross-Straits policy and why he supported unification while adopting a substantive secessionist policy. It looks at how he was able to instigate Taiwanese hostility towards Mainlanders, to transform the hostility into a sense of Taiwanese national identity and ultimately into Taiwanese secessionist ideology. A historical approach was used in exploring the origins of secessionism, and descriptive and analytical methods to review systematically and comprehensively political developments in the ROC and its civil war, and to study Lee Teng-hui’s life; the national identity of Taiwan and Mainland China; the implementation of Lee Teng-hui’s political Cross-Straits policy; and the reaction of Mainland China. The study showed that the main cause of Taiwanese secessionism was ethnic conflict between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. It originated from the 228 Incident of 1947, in which Mainlander-led troops slaughtered many Taiwanese. Soon after, the Mainlander-led government fled to Taiwan from Mainland China, and many Taiwanese (including Mainlanders) were killed during the State of Emergency in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the Mainlander-led government fled to Taiwan in its original central government form, the Mainlander élite occupied key positions in the government during the 1950s and 1960s. It resulted in unfair power-sharing for Taiwanese, and caused the Taiwanese élite to believe that they had to establish their own government (nation). Lee Teng-hui had participated in the CCP and had been under political surveillance by the Mainlander-led government for over twenty years. He weathered these political difficulties, but by reasonable inference, there was a close relationship between the political oppression by the Mainlander-led government and his secessionist political Cross-Straits policy. Because Taiwanese residents were indoctrinated by Chiang Ching-kuo and his father, Chiang Kai-shek’s administration for about 40 years, Chinese ideology was dominant and Lee Teng-hui initially paid lip-service to Cross-Strait unification whilst working towards secessionism as reflected in the Chingdao-Lake Incident (1994); the private dialogue between Lee Teng-hui and Shiba Ryotaro (1994); the address at Cornell University (1995); and his two-state theory (1999). However, due to strong pressure from Mainland China, he did not reach his secessionist goal during his presidential term (1988-2000). In conclusion, this thesis shows that Taiwan Island’s geopolitical importance is at the heart of the US’ support for Taiwan’s secession from the Mainland. Therefore, Lee’s secessionist Cross-Strait policy aside, US national interests lie in containing Mainland China and it has, therefore, always played an important role in the secessionist issue and always will. From the perspective of Mainland China, either in terms of nationalism or national security, Taiwan’s secession is a life-and-death issue. If Taiwanese authorities were to declare independence, the only option for Mainland China would be to launch a unification war. For the US, Taiwan is only a pawn that it uses to contain Mainland China. Therefore, in the Cross-Strait issue, the US has more options than Mainland China, namely, to use military intervention in the future to deter Chinese unification or to decide to share common peaceful international relations with Mainland China by accepting Cross-Strait unification.Thesis (DPhil (International Relations))--University of Pretoria, 2004.
Political Sciences
unrestricted
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Zhang, Yang. "Taming factions in the Chinese Communist party." Diss., University of Iowa, 2016. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/2170.
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How does the Chinese Communist Party tame factions from breaking it apart? Relying on thousands of biographies, the dissertation attempts to uncover the complex network of Chinese political elites and investigate how institutions constrain the expansion of factions.
First, it finds that the rule of avoidance has been effectively implemented. Native provincial officials are often assigned with secondary party positions, especially so in deeply indebted provinces that are heavily reliant on the central government for fiscal transfer. Second, the centralization of the disciplinary inspection system helps maintain the momentum of the anticorruption campaign since the 2012 leadership succession. Compared to native officials, the officials who were transferred from a different province or a central government agency are likely to investigate much more corrupt party cadres in their jurisdictions. Third, when it comes to promotions of provincial party secretaries, many performance-based criteria appear to be less important than factional ties. Good economic performance such as fast GDP growth does not increase a provincial party secretary’s odds to join the Politburo. However, the effects of factional ties are mixed. For example, family ties to a top party leader greatly increase the likelihood of promotion, but college ties disadvantage the candidates. Finally, the dissertation shows that network centrality in the Central Committee is a strong predictor of the outcomes of the Politburo turnover. The network centrality is positively associated with party seniority, but due to the age limits, it cannot grow without a ceiling.
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Sanson, Esther Mary. "The Chinese Communist Party and China's Rural Problems." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Languages and Cultures, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/1903.
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Vast disparities exist between China’s rural and urban areas. Throughout the history of Communist Party rule, ever-widening rural-urban inequality, problems with migration to the cities, and the threat of rural unrest have afflicted the countryside. Efforts by previous administrations have largely failed to solve the nation’s rural problems. China’s current leaders are determined to tackle these issues by means of a change in the direction in policy: the new focus is on sustainable development and social justice rather than rapid economic growth. At the same time, the central government hopes to strengthen the Communist Party’s power base and reduce potential threats to its ongoing reign. While the new policy direction is expected to improve the standard of living of China’s rural people and reduce social conflict in the short term, it may be insufficient to bring peace and satisfaction among the people in the long term.
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Merrill, Ian Scott. "Exercising Control: Chinese Communist Party Policy Toward Religion." Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/321896.
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Chun, Philip. "The Paths to Power in the Chinese Communist Party." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2014. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/867.
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China’s current crop of leaders has inherited a country full of promise. After the disastrous socialist transformation under Mao, Deng Xiaoping and his successors have implemented large scale, successful economic and social reforms and in less than two generations brought China to the forefront of the global economy. As a result they have gartered most of the praise, glory, and often, economic windfall, associated with China’s success. The goal of this thesis is to examine the complex, non-linear fashion in which China’s top leadership is chosen, and explore the best possible paths to ascend the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party. An investigation of China’s current governing leaders’ paths to power will be included to illuminate how various factors including merit, patronage, institutional role, and luck play a part in the ultimate makeup of China’s top leadership. Key findings show that family pedigree, faction loyalty, and exceptional performance in important roles, especially in provincial governments are the most influential variables when predicting Chinese leadership.
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Zhang, Chi. "How does the Chinese Communist Party legitimise its approach to terrorism?" Thesis, University of Leeds, 2018. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/22740/.
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This thesis explores how China's narratives of legitimacy and history condition the ways in which the state frames and approaches "real" and perceived terrorism challenges. Rooted in the Chinese political context and historical continuities, China's counter-terrorism agenda prioritises the concept of national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. This agenda is justified through the narratives of the Century of Humiliation, and is underpinned by the friend/enemy division that was inherited from the Mao era. Anxious about the impact of democratisation on regime stability, Chinese political elites and scholars are highly sensitive to the sympathy of the international community towards dissident groups that have a separatist agenda. To ensure political conformity, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has established a regime of "truth" by controlling the framing and discourse of counter-terrorism. To maintain its legitimacy and mobilise the public, the CCP has complemented the highly centralised counter-terrorism system with a revival of the Mass Line strategy which was central to Mao's governance but faded from view for much of the post-Mao era. The desire to maintain control has resulted in various problems in counter-terrorism policy and practice, which raise questions about - or even threaten to undermine - the government's ability to demonstrate the legitimacy and efficacy of its counter-terrorism strategy. In exploring the peculiar characteristics of China's counter-terrorism approach, this thesis makes original contributions in five respects: 1) it draws on a wide range of Chinese-language sources that have been under-explored in the study of China's perception of its security threats. Introducing these sources, this thesis brings forwards domestic "insider" debates to a wider non-Chinese-speaking audience interested in the concept of security, unity, separatism, and terrorism in China. 2) It provides an in-depth analysis of China's usage and manoeuvring of the frames, narratives, and labels in the construction of its counter-terrorism discourse, which offers an interesting insight into how the Chinese state and security apparatus works. 3) It analyses the evolution of the friend/enemy distinction in the Chinese political discourse and how it is embedded in the counter-terrorism discourse. 4) It contributes to terrorism research by examining the under-studied case of China, which is often neglected in mainstream "Western" terrorism research. 5) Finally, the thesis contributes to China studies by investigating how China responds to "real" and perceived terrorist threats.
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Young, Susan Amanda. "The price of modernisation : Chinese Communist Party policy towards intellectuals since 1978 /." Title page, contents and introduction only, 1985. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09AR/09ary76.pdf.
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Zeng, Jinghan. "The Chinese Communist Party's capacity to rule : legitimacy, ideology, and party cohesion." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2014. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/64241/.
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This thesis studies the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s capacity to rule in contemporary China by examining (a) its quest for popular legitimacy and (b) its search for party cohesion. In explaining the CCP’s ruling basis, a plethora of political science and economics literature has pointed to China’s economic growth. Conventional wisdom considers ideology to be obsolete and the political reform to be too limited to take any substantive effect in China. This thesis argues that ideological adaptation and the institutionalization of power succession play crucial roles in maintaining the CCP’s popular legitimacy and party cohesion. China’s economic success is certainly important, however, it also creates a fundamental dilemma of the CCP’s rule. If a communist party is not to deliver communism and class victory, why is it there at all? There is a potential contradiction between generating economic success by utilizing quasi capitalist economic policies on the one hand, and the fact that this is a communist party that supposedly justifies its rule by being the vehicle to deliver a communist society on the other. This thesis shows how the CCP has been constantly revising its ideological basis for justifying – if not legitimizing – its rule. By studying the CCP’s ideological discourses, the mechanism of ideological promotion, and their effectiveness, this thesis makes a valuable contribution to the relevant literature. In addition to ideology, the institutionalization of power succession is also crucial to the CCP’s rule. During Mao Zedong’s rule, an un-institutionalized power system had caused endless fierce power struggles within the party, which indirectly led to economic stagnation and social unrest. Thirty years of institutionalization has made leadership transitions in China more stable, transparent, predictable, and smoother now than ever before. By offering a large amount of first- and second-hand data on China’s leadership transition, this thesis shows how the institutionalization of power succession helps to maintain regime stability and legitimacy.
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Ding, Yuanyuan. "The Party, the Oil Companies, and Energy Security: Who Determines Chinese Policy?" unrestricted, 2008. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-04212008-131346/.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008.Title from file title page. John Duffield, committee chair; Daniel Franklin, Michael Herb, committee members. Electronic text (48 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed August 25, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-48).
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Zwisler, Evan. "Tibetan Buddhism and the Chinese Communist Party: Moving Forward in the 21st Century." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/454.
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I examine the state of Tibetan Buddhism that exists in China in the 21st century and what are the best methods to increase religious freedom and political autonomy. I look at what cause China and Tibet to reach this point, and why do the respective nations do what they do. Man people fundamentally misunderstand the reasons why the Chinese Communist Party oppresses Tibetan Buddhism; they aren't concerned with eradicating religion, they want to simply maintain longterm political legitimacy in Tibet.
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Brasnett, Jonathan. "Tibetan Buddhism and Chinese Communist Party authority : the fundamental problem of Dalai Lama leadership." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/57774.
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Tibet has been under the administrative control of the People’s Republic of China since 1950. The Seventeen-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, signed in 1951, promised autonomy to Tibetans, as well as the freedom to practice their religion, Tibetan Buddhism. In practice, however, the PRC has not allowed this autonomy or freedom of religion to Tibetans within its borders. The identity of the Tibetan people is largely based on their strong religiosity, manifested in their reverence of their leadership institutions: the Dalai Lama and to a lesser extent, the Panchen Lama. As the PRC government has sought to suppress religion and control religious practices, it has exerted a stricter level of control over the religions perceived as ‘foreign,’ of which Tibetan Buddhism is one. This strict control of ‘foreign’ religions (specifically their leadership institutions) has manifested in the defamation and coercive manipulation of the Dalai and Panchen Lama institutions, in order for the Chinese Communist Party to maintain its control over Tibet. This thesis asks why the CCP perceives the control of these leadership institutions as necessary for achieving its broader policy goals. Through an in-depth review and analysis of relevant literature, this thesis will argue that the strong religiosity of Tibetans and the corresponding politico-religious power wielded by the Dalai and Panchen Lama leadership institutions are perceived as threats by the CCP. The power of Tibetan Buddhism and its leadership institution, as well as the identity they instill in Tibetans, threatens not only the CCP’s control over the resource-rich region, but also its legitimacy as the unique governing power over a secular, unified China. To the Chinese government in Beijing, allowing the Dalai and Panchen Lamas the freedom to return to Tibet, whether in body or just through the worship of Tibetan Buddhists, would be tantamount to losing its control over the entire region.Arts, Faculty of
Asian Research, Institute of
Graduate
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Feeney, Caitlin. "China's Censored Leap Forward: The Communist Party's Battle with Internet Censorship in the Digital Age." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/408.
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Citizens around the world are using the Internet to connect with an international community, speak out against governmental injustices, and dissolve informational barriers. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a regime known for its strict control and harsh repression, is faced with the challenge of balancing an appropriate amount of civilian freedom on the Internet while still maintaining its monopolistic power. How does a one-party system successfully maintain control over the flow of information and sustain its unchallenged control of citizens in an increasingly-liberalized world? The Party’s answer to this question is a finely-tuned Internet censorship strategy, which this paper seeks to investigate.
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Liu, Jianyi. "The origins of the Chinese Communist Party and the role played by Soviet Russia and the Comintern." Thesis, University of York, 2000. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/9813/.
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Arantes, Virginie. "From the Avoidable to the Desirable: the Chinese Communist Party "Green" Authoritarian Strategy. Shanghai as Case Study." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/304319.
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The argument goes that, as living standards rise, the demand for better environmental management increases and a liberal political system is best placed to deal with such issues. In contrast to the dominant discussions of environmentalism, which concentrates on the relationship between democracy and environmentalism, this thesis suggests that environmental protection can become a playground for authoritarian regimes to pursue ulterior motives and goals. Using the concept of environmental authoritarianism, the following research assesses the resilience capacity of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) despite the gravity of its environmental crisis and mounting citizen grievances. An ethnographic methodology composed of different methods is employed to undertake the investigation including participant observation, field notes, interviews and document analysis. The implementation of cooperation and legitimation strategies are investigated at an urban city level in the field of environmental sustainability. Broadly, the thesis argues that the environmental governance capacity of the CCP has been developed around three ideas: (1) (re)centralise environmental governance efforts; (2) create a consensus around environmental protection (e.g. âecological civilisationâ); and (3) institutionalise grassroots movements. Using actor-network-theory as a method of analysis, I explore how these processes occur in practice at a local level through two case studies: a registered NGO working on waste reduction and a social enterprise aimed at strengthening rural communities and promoting sustainable agriculture. The thesis findings indicate that there has been a shift from fragmentation to a consolidation resulting in less room for contentious participation. The instrumentalisation of environmental issues by the government prevent environmental activists to resist co-optation by the government machinery. Still, empirical evidence demonstrates that actors continuously adapt to new pressures. Broadly, by focusing on Shanghai as a case study, the following research advances that environmental protection is being instrumentally mobilised to legitimise a variety of planning practices through the use of a complex combination of mobilising, politicising and depoliticising techniques. Wider conclusions are drawn on authoritarian resilience, Chinaâs public participation, and authoritarian modes of environmental governance.Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Wu, Yang. "Changing faces in the Chinese Communist revolution : party members and organization building in two Jiaodong counties, 1928-1948." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/45675.
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The revolution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from the 1920s to the late 1940s was a defining moment in China’s modern history. It dramatically restructured Chinese society and created an authoritarian state that remains the most important player in shaping the country’s development today. Scholars writing to explain the success of the revolution began with trying to uncover factors outside of the party that helped to bring it to power, but have increasingly emphasized the ability of party organizations and their members to direct society to follow the CCP’s agendas as the decisive factor behind the party’s victory.
Despite highlighting the role played by CCP members and the larger party organization in the success of the revolution studies have done little to examine how ordinary individuals got involved in the CCP at different stages and locations. Nor have scholars analyzed in depth the process of how the CCP molded millions of mostly rural people who joined it from the 1920s to the 40s into a disciplined force to seize control of China. Through a study of the CCP’s revolution in two counties of Jiaodong, a region of Shandong province in eastern China during this period my dissertation explores this process by focusing on their local party members. It also expands on the subject of how the CCP became a cohesive organization by looking at how the party dealt with the issue of localism. This latter subject is very pertinent to understanding the CCP’s development, since the party managed to become an effective national organization in a country whose populace was heavily divided by regional and local ties.
My study concludes that local ties were major impediments to cohesion in the CCP, and that the party’s central leaders imposed their authority in Jiaodong by weakening these ties down through purges, ideological education and class struggle. These programs made the CCP in Jiaodong a top down organization that was dependent on the directions from Mao Zedong, the CCP’s paramount leader and his loyalists. They also sowed the seeds for the next thirty years of constant Maoist political campaigns.
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Clegg, Jennifer R. "Peasant organisation in the Chinese Revolution : a study of agrarian relations and the methods of the Chinese Communist Party in organising rural struggles." Thesis, University of Manchester, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.734451.
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Gruin, Julian Y. "Communists constructing capitalism : socio-economic uncertainty, Communist party rule, and China's financial development, 1990-2008." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a70d4158-ac36-477c-accb-37f940071a0d.
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To what extent does China's experience of economic reform since 1989 compel a reconsideration of the ontological foundations of contemporary capitalist development? China's political economy remains characterized by a unique and resilient political structure (the Chinese Communist Party) that penetrates both 'private' (market) and 'public' (state) organizations. The conceptual rootedness of contemporary theories of comparative and international political economy in a distinctly Western historical experience of capitalist development hinders their ability to understand Chinese capitalism on its own terms—as historically, culturally, and globally embedded. To generate greater analytic traction in understanding China's otherwise paradoxical constellation of actors and dynamics, I argue that contemporary capitalism should be studied as a set of mechanisms for managing and exploiting socio-economic uncertainty, rather than according to the binary logics of state regulation and market competition. These mechanisms can be conceptualized as an overarching risk environment. On this basis, I trace how the cognitive frames, social institutions, and relational networks that emerged within the 'socialist market economy' in China's post-Tiananmen financial system have placed the Chinese Communist Party at the nexus of the state and the market. I argue that specific ideas emerged about how to manage the flow of capital, playing a significant role in underpinning expectations of financial growth and stability. During this period the financial system underpinned the CCP's capacity to both manage and exploit socio-economic uncertainty through the path of reform, forming a central explanatory factor in a developmental trajectory marked by a trifecta of rapid economic growth, macroeconomic stability, and deepening socio-economic imbalances. Rather than viewing the path of financial reform in China solely in terms of 'partial' or 'failed' free- market reform, it thus becomes possible to cast China's development in a new light as the product of a more concerted vision of how the financial system would enable a mode of economic development that combined the drive for capital accumulation with the distinctive socio-political circumstances of post-1989 China.
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Blizzard, William D. Jr. "The Building of the Shenyang Jianzhu University 1998-2007: A Case Study of the Role of Professor Fuchang Zhang and His Communist Party Network." [Yellow Springs, Ohio] : Antioch University, 2008. http://etd.ohiolink.edu/view.cgi?acc_num=antioch1240840793.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Antioch University, 2008.Title from PDF t.p. (September 26, 2009). Advisor: Al Guskin. "A dissertation submitted to the Ph. D. in Leadership and Change program of Antioch University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2008"--The title page. Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-81).
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Bell, James. "Economic Statecraft and Ethnicity in China." Wright State University / OhioLINK, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1527196412862614.
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Douglas, Dan. "Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping: A Trait Analysis." Wright State University / OhioLINK, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1500049187715943.
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Guo, Zhenglin. "Cun min zi zhi yu dang de ling dao : Zhongguo nong cun dang zheng guan xi de lei xing yan jiu = Village self-government and leadership of Chinese Communist Party : study on the types of the relation between the party and village government /." click here to view the abstract and table of contents, 1999. http://net3.hkbu.edu.hk/~libres/cgi-bin/thesisab.pl?pdf=b1564621xa.pdf.
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Wang, Lili. "Becoming Urban in the Chinese Way: The Politics of Planning and Urban Change in Nanjing, China." The Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1480505387185065.
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郭正林. "村民自治與黨的領導 : 中國農村黨政關係的類型硏究 = Village self-government and leadership of Chinese Communist Party : study on the types of the relation between the party and village government." HKBU Institutional Repository, 1999. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/194.
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Knight, John Marcus. "Our Nation’s Future? Chinese Imaginations of the Soviet Union, 1917-1956." The Ohio State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu149406768131314.
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Wolfe, Christian J. "Clinging to Power: Authoritarian Leaders and Coercive Effectiveness." Wright State University / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1629981480039829.
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Wan, Yao-Jun, and 萬耀鈞. "Article:An Analysis of the Information Warfare engaged by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) - A Case Study on the Cyber Army of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/k7yu9h.
Full textAbstract:
碩士淡江大學
國際事務與戰略研究所碩士在職專班
106
The 21st century signifies the era where information technologies are used in non-force wars and the research on the theory of information warfare also reaches the peak in this period. From the experience of success in the Gulf War based on high technologies, the CCP realized that the war has been irreversibly affected by high technologies and information. According to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017, China will transform itself from an "Cyber power"into an"Cyber superpower," which demonstrates that the rapid military transformation initiated by the Chinese Communist Party will bring about rapid development of modern high technologies with the information technology as the core. According to the Defense White Paper of "China''s Military Strategy," in order to carry out the military strategic plans, strengthen its military forces under the new situation, and serve the core needs for national security, China should focus on building an information-based military network to win the information war and enhance the system combat capability of the network information system. The network information system shall integrate all kinds of combat forces, units and elements into the overall combat capability and gradually build an integrated, autonomous and synergetic system for joint operations. monographs and internet resources to study on "Cyber force" and the "Strategic Support Forces," analyze their development situations, and provide suggestions for Taiwan′s newly established Command of the Information, Communication Electronic Warfare Force in terms of the research highlights. Keywords: Cyber Force, Strategic Support Forces, Command of the Information, Communication Electronic Warfare Force
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Chan, Hsiu-Hui, and 詹綉慧. "A Research on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Criticized the Film ’’Wu Xun Zhuan’’." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/peqbvf.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立中央大學
歷史研究所
104
May 20, 1951, Mao Zedong published the article ’’ We should pay attention to the discussion of the film Wu Xun Zhuan’’ （應當重視電影《武訓傳》的討論）in People's Daily , opened to criticize the film. The film had been acclaimed literary and art circles, also gained praise for Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, but criticized by Mao. The CCP organized a series of critical articles to criticize Wu Xun and the film Wu Xun Zhuan related people and things. After three months of criticism , it was finished at the end of August. Mao Zedong in the article criticized Wu Xun ‘begging up schools’ not to touch the foundation of feudalism, but to promote its feudalism. The film praised of Wu Xun ‘serving the people’ and in contrasted to the peasant revolution failed. Mao thought it was the reactionary bourgeois ideology. Mao therefore expanded to clarify the CCP and literary and art circles within the reactionary ideas. During the ‘Cultural Revolution’, the film's director Sun Yu and actor Zhao Dan have suffered persecution, Laogai, imprisoned in Niupeng and writed self-examination. Until 1985, Hu Qiaomu was in vindication of Wu Xun and the film Wu Xun Zhuan. Hu said Mao was very one-sided, extreme and rough. Wu Xun Zhuan as the first film since the founding of the PRC was criticized , it was also the first banned film. Until 2012, it lifted, the film was special. So, why did Mao criticize it and how did Mao criticize it ? After being criticized open arts rectification campaign and movie unified. These will be discussed in this dissertation.
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Shan, Wei-Shuenn, and 許惟順. "Military Strategy of the CCP(Chinese Communist Party)Navy in the South China Sea." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/65032005091694148132.
Full textAbstract:
碩士淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士在職專班
100
The South China Sea is known to hold abundant crude petroleum resources. This has led to many sovereign and political controversies in the region, and prompted countries bordering the South China Sea to emphasize their ability to project regional power while at the same time allying with the US through joint maneuvers as well as economic co-operation to ensure their interests. In recent years the PRC has achieved considerable technological advancement on the strength of their booming economic growth in the past decades, and this has brought their weapons development to another level. As a result, their role in the South China Sea has changed to a certain extent. With Chinese nationalism on the rise, consolidating national interests has become their first priority, and their sea power strategy has changed. The PRC’s real intention now is to use the South China Sea as an opportunity to aggressively expand its sea power by developing new lines of surface and subsurface naval vessels as well as aircraft carriers. There is no doubt that the PRC intends to build up a formidable military power that will enable it to hold opposing forces at bay and enjoy absolute superiority in the region. This research relies primarily upon the “documentary analysis method,” referencing professional publications to discuss the direction and purpose of PRC military strategy, how the CCP Navy is developing and changing, and changes in the country''s South China Sea military strategy as well as the impact thereof. This research will also include an “Expert In-depth Interview” to further reinforce the points made through documentary analysis. In addition, with the help of “Scenario Analysis” we can trace evidence of a correlation between changes in the CCP naval development strategy and its South China Sea military strategy. This study will go on to examine linkages between the PRC’s naval strategy and its disputes with South China Sea nations, an on that basis will explore the future direction of the PRC’s military strategy vis-à-vis the South China Sea. Through this research, we have come to a realization that sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea are handled in one of two ways. One approach relies on diplomacy, while the other relies on military force, and the impact of the approach employed determines whether problems will be mitigated or exacerbated. A military approach is more likely to intensify problems, while a diplomatic approach is more likely to mitigate them.The interplay between escalation and defusing of tensions has given rise to a model for movement toward conflict. This model enables us to understand the reasons for conflict, the processes thereof, and whether the situation will move in the direction of war or peace. This model can facilitate the development of a more reasonable basis for deciding whether to use military or diplomatic means to handle regional conflicts and controversies. In the expert’s interview, we learn that future PRC policies on South China Sea are likely to stress several points: aircraft carriers as the starting point for strengthening command and control capabilities; a dual focus on development of both surface and subsurface vessels; preventing seizure of islands by other nations, and strengthening the nation''s capacity to project military power; and use of non-bellicose military action to bolster the nation''s strategic undertakings. The CCP (PLA) navy regards enhancement of its sea power as the foundation for achievement of the following goals: upgrading of its military capabilities; improvement of its ability to hold opposing forces at bay; consolidation of its national sovereignty; maintenance of the PRC''s access to petroleum; and assurance that petroleum shipping lanes are kept open. South China Sea controversies are now becoming a global issue. It would thus be beneficial for our country to issue a public statement on the South China Sea issue. We have several preliminary suggestions for current South China Sea policy: 1. The government should move toward establishing a national-level strategic plan for the South China Sea. 2. We should develop basic infrastructures in the Pratas Islands and on Taiping Island. 3. We should boost our ability to defend these two islands. It is hoped that the above will serve as useful reference for the ROC authorities, and that they will promote our country’s development in the South China Sea.
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Lee, Shu-fen, and 李淑芬. "A Study on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Governing Xinjiang and the Early Development of the Production and Construction Corps (1949-1966)." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/41737371199327027199.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立中央大學
歷史研究所碩士在職專班
100
After the emancipation of Xinjiang, the People’s Liberation Army in Xinjiang immediately incorporated the troops led by Tao Shi-Yue and the National Army in Ili,Tuscaloosa and Koy-Assa. In order to effectively suppress the anti-communist forces and meet the large demands of army provisions in Xinjiang, CCP set up the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps by following the ancient method of stationing troops and reclaiming and safeguarding the border regions. Established in 1954, the corps experienced two important stages from 1949 to 1966: Lasting from October 1949 to the end of 1957, the first stage is the fundamental and also the hardest period for agricultural reclamation in Xinjiang. Before the establishment of the corps, troops entered and were stationed in every region in Xinjiang to suppress the anti-communist forces and stabilize CCP political power. In order to encourage self-sufficiency, they set up army reclamation farms there. After the establishment of the corps, they shifted their priority from armed struggle to economic development like planning and construction of state-run livestock farms and overall efforts geared toward economic development. The second stage from 1958 to May 1966 is the height of the development period of the corps. During this period, the corps rapidly developed into an agricultural reclamation system of strong economic strength. Meanwhile, in order to deal with the Itard Incident caused by the worsening relations between China and the Soviet Union, the corps received instructions to establish farms along the Sino-Soviet border and took the task of stationing troops and reclaiming and safeguarding the border regions. The development of the corps is not only related to Xinjiang’s stabilization and development but also the Sino-Soviet border safety.
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Cheng, yi-shin, and 陳義興. "Chinese Communist Party Unions." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30485633339292721788.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立中山大學
大陸研究所
93
Abstract As Marx said, workers can fight owing to their impoverishment. So before the Chinese Communist Party taking the sovereignty, the unions and working class played the part as the vanguard. During the primary phase in building the sovereignty, the Chinese Communist Party still gave certain weight to the union. Trade Unions Act, Land Reform Law, and Marital Law called three principal law in primary phase were all adopted. But as the public ownership of socialism was set up, the unions were marginalized because the formation of “unit” system. Besides, under the extreme thoughts of “Left”, legal nihilism interfered in the development of national legal system. When “Revolutionary Labor Convention” replaced the local and basic unions during the Cultural Revolution, the unions had functioned nothing to zero. After the 11th The Third Plenary Session of the Communism Central Executive Committee, the political and economical reformation led to relation’s transformation between the party and labor. It then prompted the collapse of social control by nation. Furthermore, to expand the non-state-run industry needs to organize union. In addition, workers’ demonstration in Poland in July 1980 and the appeals for democratization in Tian''anmen Square in 1989 both influenced the labor movement quite much at that time. But the unions in China were not fully recovered and developed until the economic globalization, especially being a member of WTO. That forced the Chinese Communist Party to adjust the labor right policy. And by reforming the unions, the Chinese Communist Party attained to the independence, democracy and publicity of the unions. But in order to attract foreign investment and develop the economics, Chinese Communist Party did not apply enough measures to the non-state-run industries. The rate of organization in non-state-run industries can not be compared with state-run ones. After reformation and openness, the change in labor relation made protecting labor’s legal rights the most principal obligation and function out of unions’ four functions. And all they mainly through the followings to attain this. 1. participating the legislation and policy making; 2.involving in the negotiation between the labor, capital and official; 3.signing the collective contract under equal negotiations; 4.settling the labor dispute etc. At higher level, the unions may participate the politics.At lower level, labor convention inside the industry is also a basic form to organize the labor participate the democracy. By which the labor will practice the autonomy . The workers’ rights in China will not be worse than the ones in capitalist countries if the unions there can really exercise the rights endowed with law. But in reality, the exercise of the unions must be based on the operative principles .That is, “the unions’ activities should concentrate on the economic buildup and insist the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party”. Therefore, under such considerations labor’s rights may be sacrificed. And as the Chinese scholar Feng said, the unions or labor convention in China are more functional than beneficial ones.
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Kositz, Bryce William. "Chinese Communist Party Historiography of the 1911 Revolution, 1935-1976." Phd thesis, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/144233.
Full textAbstract:
Mao Zedong’s ascension to a position within the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—unparalleled either before or
since—was in part due to his ability to control the narration
of history. Mao’s master narrative retold Chinese history so
that it provided the foundation for Mao Zedong Thought and
validated his power and policies. This thesis follows the
creation, rise to prominence and ongoing revisions of this master
narrative by examining its treatment of one, important historical
event: the 1911 Revolution. I focus on the period of Mao’s
leadership of the CCP between 1935 and 1976 in order to
understand how his master narrative changed over time. Mao built
his narrative of the 1911 Revolution around four themes: the
United Front, the periodisation of history, class analysis and
the unique nature of China. Each of these themes represents an
aspect of Mao Zedong Thought. Changes in the relative prominence
of these themes across the course of Mao’s life are related to
changes in the way he sought to establish his power, the rise of
perceived challenges to his revolutionary politics and power,
changes in the policies that he was seeking to justify and
changes in the nature of Mao Zedong Thought.
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Tien, Fei-Sheng, and 田飛生. "Elite Recruitment in the Chinese Communist Party : A Case Study of the Sixteenth Party Congress." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/80948604135560898749.
Full textAbstract:
碩士淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士在職專班
92
According to the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) charter, the national party congress serves three major tasks: firstly, to establish ideological, political, and organizational guidelines for the party through the ratification of Central Committee’s work report; secondly, to revise the party’s organizational charters according to the new guidelines; thirdly, to establish a new central leadership. The major objective of this study is to investigate into the process of elite recruitment in the central committee during the sixteenth party congress. In order to further our understanding of CCP elites’ advancement to their current positions, the following questions will be examined: Are there any special institutional and political features in the recruitment process of the sixteenth party congress compared to previous ones? What are the development and impact of the “four standards of cadre promotion” on CCP’s political recruitment process? What are the political implications of the leadership lineup of the sixteenth party congress? What are the possible interaction between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao during the power transition period? In this thesis, “elites” are defined as talents who earned their qualifications through a selection process; “recruitment” is defined as the selection of talents to fill up official positions. While political elites contend for official posts via regular and open elections in democracies, the recruitment of political elites in authoritarian regimes, such as China, have been done in less institutionalized manners. The first and second generation Chinese leaders (contemporaries of Mao Zedong and Den Xiaoping) earned their qualifications with their credentials as revolutionary war heroes and with their own charisma. Yet the demand for more definite and transparent rules of recruitment to build up the legitimacy of new leadership has become stronger for the third and fourth generation leaders (contemporaries of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao) who do not enjoy the same political authority as their predecessors did. According to the observation of some China specialists, this demand for procedural transparency has been the driving force behind the expansion of “intra-party democracy” in the CCP in recent years. This study analyzes the leadership lineup of the sixteenth Central Committee with special attention to the members and standing members of the political bureau, the central secretariat, and the central military commission. The major findings of this study are as follows. Firstly, while the national party congress holds the final say in the recruitment of national leaders, it is only the vertical dimension of political recruitment in China. An investigation into the changeover of provincial level party secretaries (usually immediately before the party congress) and of the National People’s Consultation Conference (held right after the congress) will reveal the horizontal dimension of political recruitment process. Secondly, the new leadership lineup ratified by the sixteenth party congress has manifested an incremental overall handover of power from the third to the fourth generation leaders. Nevertheless, the process of political succession at the top is still contingent on the wills of a few central leaders in the political bureau. Thirdly, the fact that Hu Jintao, the new general secretary of the CCP, has not assumed the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission indicates the existence of factional power struggle within the central leadership. Fourthly, although the political succession process in the sixteenth party congress was done in an opaque and uncertain manner as usual, the historical trends of peaceful generational transfer of power and continual institutionalization of power transfers move further. Lastly, the fourth generation leaders as a whole are technocrats who are younger, better educated, and have more professional experience than previous generations.
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Yu, Chung-Kwang, and 游重光. "On the Chinese Communist Party''s "Anti-Peaceful Evolution" (1989-1994)." Thesis, 1999. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/56949176838437610346.
Full textAbstract:
碩士淡江大學
國際事務與戰略研究所
87
The goal of this research is to investigate and present an analytical description of Chinese Communist Party''s subjective understanding of the West''s "peaceful evolution" in the post-cold war period (especially in the wake of the June 6, 1989 Tiananmen incident) and the aspect of the struggles caused by the influence of the objective international environment, and introduce the inherent conventional factors and internal pressure factors that compel the communist authorities to oppose peaceful evolution. The reference literature includes Chinese and foreign periodicals, primarily monographs, and a conventional analysis of this literature is performed. This paper contains four chapters plus an introduction and a conclusion. The first chapter compares Chinese Communist Party''s subjective understanding of "peaceful evolution" with the objective international environment. The second chapter analyzes the factors that compel CCP to oppose peaceful evolution, namely its own historical background, the ideological crisis, the administrative crisis, and the pressure of corruption. The third chapter investigates of the direction of economic reform, spiritual culture, and nationalistic education policies realization under the new interpretation of the theory of diplomacy and socialism. The fourth chapter assesses the effects of peaceful evolution, explains the role played by nationalism vis-a-vis peaceful evolution, and notes restrictions limiting the utilization of the literature. On the whole, the Chinese Communist Party authorities have attemptted to merge socialism and nationalism, and take this as the principal content of their opposition to peaceful-evolution. The CCP will strengthen and consolidate national power in diplomatic affairs and economic development. The increasing reliance on nationalism as a means of opposing peaceful evolution will discolse the irrelvance of socialism in the face of peaceful evolution''s counterattack. The CCP''s understanding is that reliance only on new interpretations and new developments of theory and the system is insufficient for a strong sense of psychological security.
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Liu, Tung-Shu, and 劉東旭. "The Chinese Communist Party central Asia strategy moves towards the research." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/42596340415464462398.
Full textAbstract:
碩士淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士在職專班
96
Central Asia contains plentiful sources of energy and is the only place where the energy has not been developed yet in the whole word. The reason causes major powers prolonging their influence to control Central Asia countries. After 911, the USA makes excuses of anti-terrorism to send troops into Afghanistan which challenging the deployment of China’s strategy towards Central Asia. Under the circumstance, China has adopted some methods to deal with the threaten of USA, they are as follows : 1、China develops cooperative relation with the USA by using the issue of combating terrorism. It is helpful that the direct conflict of both countries in Central Asia’s interest could be avoided. 2、China uses the method of multilateral diplomacy which includes cooperation and exchange in culture, technical and educational field to enhance relationship with Russia and Central Asia countries. 3、China signed an agreement with Kazakhstan to build an oil pipe which is going to connect with Central Asia’s oil transportation network. And this will bring China to be an irreplaceable strategic position in “Pan-Asia global energy bridge”. Not only China has adopted diversiform ways to maintain and strive for the benefit in Central Asia, but also the major power such as USA and Russia does too. The future tendency of Central Asia still needs longtime observation.
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Wang, Wen-Tser, and 王文澤. "The Study of the Chinese Communist Party Cultivated in Political Elites." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/40597161756819319952.
Full textAbstract:
碩士淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士在職專班
98
The objective existence does not transfer with subjective will. According to Marxist philosophy, nothing transfers with human’s subjective will no matter on science, social studies, history, or human thoughts. In the understanding rule, the assurance rule, and in terms of the rule, can develop the human subjective will of creativeness correctly. But the affairs internal contradiction unceasingly with the movement and the solution process is “development”. The old contradiction was solved, with the result that the new one would be come up. The affairs develop with spiral type forward according to this rule, repeatedly, “contradictory” namely for development power. Thus, by observing the political elites cultivated model in the central of Chinese Communist Party could discover the model of the central, has swayed in the contradiction between “the ideology orientation” and “the technical specialized orientation” all along since establishing the government. The Chinese Communist Party recover the postwar economy in new democracy time, with the aim of being socialism fast, has begun using a lot of technical specialized bureaucrat; this time “the technical specialized orientation” has exceeded “the ideology orientation” slightly. In Three Red Flag times, it had intense struggle between “the ideology” and “the expert”, and had the victory mutually. But in the Cultural Revolution time, “the ideology” had substituted “the expert” completely, also had caused Mainland China turbulent politics and depressed economy. After reform and open policy, the central of Chinese Communist Party had cultivated political elites from technical specialized bureaucracy in order to reconstruct rational bureaucracy of Mainland China; “the expert” had got ahead “the ideology” for the time being. But, it is noteworthy that the central of Chinese Communist Party cultivates political elites in present age, “the ideology” is not opposite of “the expert” or exclusion completely but infiltration and dialectic relations mutually. Mainland China emphasizes economic development currently, and therefore needs the massive technical experts. However, the political objective only draws back the inferior position, not be substituted completely. In the cultivated process, it is still important estimate standard regarding the purity of “party character”,” party morality”, and the loyalty of “insisted that Chinese Communist Party leads”, “insisted Chinese characteristic socialism”. 表單編號：ATRX-Q03-001-FM031-01
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Huang, Ching-hsien, and 黃清賢. "Dialectics of Globalization and Localization on the Chinese Communist Party''s Ideology." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/ck4md4.
Full textAbstract:
博士國立中山大學
大陸研究所
95
The foundation of the Chinese Communist Party was originated from the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the May Forth movement in 1919. Of the two events, the former inherited the ideological characteristics of “globalization” on Marxism, while the latter embodied the ideological features of “localization” on nationalism. Up to now, the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party has still been involving the dialectics of “globalization” and “localization”. This doctoral dissertation first elaborates on the research motivation, purpose, method, documents, framework and so forth. It then continues to expound on the definitions of ideology, dialectics, globalization and localization. The third chapter discusses Marxism and Leninism which are the origins of the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology. Chapter four analyzes how Mao Zedong conducted the dialectics of ideology and helped the Chinese Communist Party to seize power. Chapter five explores why Mao Zedong led the dialectics of the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology to advance the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The sixth chapter studies how Deng Xiaoping guided the dialectics of ideology and promoted the Chinese Communist Party to transform a political movement into an economic reform. Chapter seven investigates why and how Jiang Zemin, and later, Hu Jintao carry on the dialectics of the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology and construct the important thought of Three Represents, harmonious society of socialism, etc. Chapter eight concludes the achievements and discoveries of this research. Be it Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, or, as a matter of fact, regardless of whoever was or is in charge, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party invariably conducts the dialectics of ideology on the “globalization” of Marxism-Leninism and the “localization” of the Chinese Communist Party in power. Based on the successful experience of “localization” of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese Communist Party expects to achieve the goal of “globalization” of the Marxism-Leninism.
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Hsiao, Chin-yen, and 蕭錦炎. "The Impact of Village Election on the Rule of Chinese Communist Party." Thesis, 1999. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/63246966997379735620.
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Kim, Tae-hee, and 金泰姬. "The Chinese Communist Party and Local People's Congress Since the 1980's." Thesis, 2001. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/58943754125876240523.
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Shen, Lin Mei, and 沈伶鎂. "Liberation and discipline: the Chinese communist party and gender discourse. (1921-1949)." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78545344950812060530.
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Kuo, Yi-Chi, and 郭怡岐. "A study of the Eleventh Party Congress of Chinese Communist Party and the following development of it." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/50502101501097352535.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立中央大學
歷史研究所碩士在職專班
98
In the late years of Mao Zedong, whose successor was the focus of events, though Deng Xiaoping had performed well in the reform activity taken place in 1975, his opinions regarding the Cultural Revolution were quite different from those of Mao; therefore, Deng was forced to undertake his personal 3rd stepping down from the power, due to the “April Fifth Movement”. Finally, Hua Guofeng became the successor of Mao, he overthrew “the Gang of Four ”, and terminated the Cultural Revolution spanning a period of ten years. As people across the nation hoped that Hua Guofeng could correct the mistaken “Leftist” implemented for past years; in contrast, he still continued to execute the false strategies of Mao arising in his late years. In the Eleventh Party Congress of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hua announced to continue the “class struggle”, presenting “two whatevers”, which contributed to the failure of the correction. Ultimately, Deng Xiaoping resumed his job because of the negotiation and supports of senior governors, he frustrated the prestige of Hua by means of commending opposite ideology, demonstrating his philosophy in relation to politics and economics to obtain supports; hence, the Thrid Plenum of Eleventh Party Congress ensured Deng the position of top leader in the CCP. The Thrid Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress disapproved the policies determined in the Eleventh Party Congress, presented to transfer the overall works of the party to the modernization construction, reforming the party, organization, redressing those mishandled cases of jurisdiction, promoting the reforms regarding industry and agriculture, thereby lifting the economic development of China. Hua Guofeng fell out of the power after the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress of CCP, due to his faults in economic policies and “two whatevers”. After assumption of the top leader, Deng Xiaoping set the “open-door and reform” economic policy, from then on, China formally escaped from the era of Mao during which frequent class struggle were taking place.
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Hsieh, Chu-chih, and 謝曲治. "The Research of Chinese Political Situation During the 9th Chinese Communist Party Congress (The 9th Congress)." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/28mj3m.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立中央大學
歷史研究所碩士在職專班
96
The Research of Chinese Political Situation During the 9th Chinese Communist Party Congress (The 9th Congress) Abstract The 9th Chinese Communist Party Congress was held in 1969. This Congress was deeply influenced by The China’s Cultural Revolution while it was taking place (1966-1976).The 9th Congress continued the sprit of proletarian revolution. Due to the particular timing, the 9th Congress was different from the previous one. Mao hosted the 9th Congress to celebrate the victory of China’s Cultural Revolution and the primary purpose was to win over more and more united Chinese people. At that time, Lin Biao and Jiang Qing were both open strife and veiled struggle. The Chinese political situation was sly and shrewd. Mao wanted the Congress of victors, but it was difficult. There are four topics in this research. First, why did Mao bring down Peng Dir White after Lushan meeting (1959)? Liu Shaoqi was Mao’s preferable successor during the 7th Congress. Why did Liu Shaoqi be refuted afterwards ? Second, why did Mao adopt Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan’s political report? How did this report affect the 9th Congress and China’s political situation in the future? Third, the armed force threat from Soviet caused the evacuation of China government cadre members in 1969. Was Liu Shaoqi involved in this event? Lin Biao issued First Order and urged that China should keep the position of chairman. Is it against Mao’s idea? Forth, Mao got lots of assistance from Lin Biao in the issues of Three Red Flags, Personality Cult and the starting of Culture Revolution. Mao made an exception to let Lin Biao to be his successor and wrote it in the party constitution. But Mao broke up with Lin Biao when Lin Biao started the conflict with Zhang Chunqiao in Lushan Meeting（1970）. Why did Mao break up with Lin Biao to protect Zhang Chunqiao? The issues mentioned above will be researched in this thesis.
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Cheng-Li-Lin and 林政澧. "Xi Jinping of 「China Dream」and Chinese Communist party of Country Publicity Strategy." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82772568918465151125.
Full textAbstract:
碩士淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士班
103
Propaganda of the right to speak, is an important tool under the Communist Party and government institutions, leaders consolidate leadership, advocacy thought "China Dream" theory of fifth-generation leader Xi Jinping put forward, the most important reason of course is to be able to construct a part of his ideology, in order to establish a position of authority within the party theory to construct the foundation for their ideology. So, if we can successfully construct "China Dream" in theory, will help to establish the rule of authority Xi Jinping, allowing access to the CCP''s propaganda and ideological identity and trust of the people.
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Wang, Linlin. "Another way out : the wartime communist movement in Jiangsu, 1937-1945." Thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2012-05-5635.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation examines the survival and expansion strategies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by focusing on its organization and mobilization activities during the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945). I argue that the Communist forces quickly expanded during the wartime not merely because the War provided an opportunity to avoid the Guomingdang (GMD)’s intensive military aggression and legitimately expand itself throughout China. More importantly, it also allowed the CCP to develop a unique political culture with a grasp on local knowledge during the years under investigation. This cultural climate worked to rejuvenate itself through organizational consolidation and the rebuilding of political identity. Together, these factors accounted for the dramatic expansion of the CCP’s membership and military forces, which prepared the Party for its takeover of the country after the Japanese surrender.
The main body of this dissertation is composed of five thematic chapters. Chapter two explores the CCP’s penetration into local society through mass resistance associations and political renovation of existing power structures. Chapter three investigates Communist propaganda activities, the success of which laid in coordination with the Party’s follow-up organizational arrangements. The next chapter examines the Communist educational institutions as a channel of mass mobilization that further reinforced its penetration into various social groups. Chapter five uses Grain Tax, conscription and mobilization of anti-pacification campaign, all of which required personal sacrifice from the masses, as three instances that exemplified the Party’s controllability over local communities. Finally, chapter six focuses on its strategies to contain undesirable tendencies of local cadres and strengthen ideological consensus within the Party.text
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HAN韓家德, CHIA-TE, and 韓家德. "A Study of Chinese Communist Party Military Relations - Case Study of the seventeenth largest." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/73352461301445666460.
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碩士淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士在職專班
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Communist China is the communist country has been party-military relations, but also military and political experts at home and abroad are interested in research issues. Especially after the congress by Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin and the ruling party, government, and military leaders of the three powers one of the literati, Communist Party of Communist China military relations have become important political and military focus of the CPC. Traditional Communist party-military relations has repeatedly adhered to the "party leader" to a military mission 1990s transition period, domestic and international situation changes, and enhance the modernization and professionalization of the armed forces, whether military role and the party will give the military a total of relations challenges? Hu Jintao, the Chinese Communists took over the military power is becoming another military strongman? Communist Party Congress, the Communist Party head of the military division, will give party-military relations is the new Communist party-military relations? These issues gradually scholars to study Chinese military and political concerns. Therefore, this paper aims to review Hu Jintao at the congress of the Communist Party after the military relations, and the future after the age of eighteen major trend of party-military relations; and the Communist Party Congress, for example, to examine the fourth generation of the fifth generation of the CPC and the future party-military relations. This paper studies the relationship between the military of the Chinese Communist Party - Communist Party Congress as an example. Discussed include: Communist party-military relations and interactions for the congress of the Communist Party after the years after the previous military relations and the differences in the system, but also to the Communist leaders in defense policy, military defense policy changes or the differences , Communist Party Congress, the complement system in the political elite, how to adjust the screening operation and planning, scheduling and political succession, and the stable development of the party to make a military relationship; of the emphasis on "the party''s absolute leadership over the military," the political thinking on the future of the party the impact and influence of the military relations and military relations between the party congress after the assessment, and to explore whether the Hu Jintao regime has a substantial effect. Looking ahead, the military relations between the Communist Party of the situation at home and abroad, and military modernization and professionalization of the urgent need, coupled with the "Military Law", "nationalization of the military" has become a party-military relations with new challenges. Communist Party Congress to modify the content of the constitution, law officers and echelon fixed succession succession, and the class level, position limits on retirement decisions, whether the Chinese Communist Party stay in power, monopoly power, control the armed forces, it is worth inquiry. In addition to the military of the relationship between the CPC should continue to be of the observations, the later development of national security policy, we must pay more attention to the future development trend of its armed forces and strengthen the cognitive and as we should to protect our national security.
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Lutze, Thomas D. "The Battle for the Middle Forces United States relations with the Chinese Communist Party /." 1989. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/20863745.html.
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Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1989.Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 143-148).
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張妍庭. "Research on the system of recruitment of leading cadres by the Chinese communist party." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/00797296677549283408.
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