Academic literature on the topic 'Chinese A-share Market'

We investigate the effectiveness of two recent regulatory policy changes on market efficiency in the Chinese A- and B-share markets. Overall, the opening of the B-share market to domestic Chinese investors and the limited opening of the A-share market to foreign investors increase market efficiency. The opening of the B-share market significantly reduces the price differential between A- and B-shares. Furthermore, there is no longer feedback in returns between the two markets in recent years. Our results provide evidence that there is no detrimental effect to market efficiency by integrating Chinese investors to international markets and foreign investors to the Chinese stock markets.

This paper investigates share price linkages between Chinese corporations' foreign-designated B shares and the numerically dominant domestic A shares of the same companies. Chinese share return seasonalities are examined and the suggested satellite trading relationships are subsequently tested in order to provide an understanding of the linkages between A and B shares. The seasonality results along with arbitrage activity in the market for Chinese A and B shares suggest that a dominant-satellite relationship is likely to exist whereby the A share market is the dominant market for price formation and the B share market is the satellite. The paper identifies significant price linkages from the A to B share markets which are nevertheless weaker in an economic sense than might be expected.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the evidence of herding phenomenon, spill-over effects related to herding and whether herding is driven by fundamentals or non-fundamentals for various sub-periods and sub-samples. Design/methodology/approach The cross-sectional absolute deviation model is applied to China’s A- and B-share markets in combination with fundamental information. Findings Herding is prevalent on both A- and B-share markets. In detail, investors on A-share market herd for small and growth stock portfolios irrespective of market states while they only herd for large or value stocks in down market, therefore leading the whole herding behaviour to be pronounced in down market. Comparatively, on B-share market, herding is robust for various investment styles (small or large, value or growth) or market situations. Additionally, spill-over effects related to herding do not exist no matter from A-shares to B-shares or from B-shares to A-shares. Moreover, investors on B-share markets tend to herd as the response to non-fundamental information more frequently during financial crisis. Originality/value Investors on A- and B-share markets tend to herd as the response to non-fundamental information more frequently during financial crisis. Analysing the herding behaviours could be helpful in controlling the financial risk.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the momentum phenomenon in two market segments of the Chinese stock market – the Class A share market and Class B share market over time period spanning from January 1996 to December 2010. Design/methodology/approach – The authors largely follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) paper; the authors decompose the momentum returns following the procedure first proposed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1995). In addition, a liquidity factor (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) and a share ownership factor (Wang and Xu, 2004) are incorporated in the procedure to gauge the contribution of liquidity and the dynamics of share ownership towards the momentum returns, respectively in the two segments of the Chinese stock market. Findings – The authors find compelling evidence showing distinctively different momentum phenomena exist in the two market segments of the Chinese stock market. Specifically, the momentum phenomenon is more pronounced in the Chinese Class A share market compared to those found in the Chinese Class B share market. Through decomposing the momentum returns, the authors find evidence showing the dismal momentum returns observed in the Class B share market can be attributed to markedly weakened contributions of the liquidity factor and the share ownership factor. Research limitations/implications – Relatively short sample time horizon compared to the most of major financial markets such as USA and UK. The number of B shares has been rather limited. Practical implications – Subsequent to the opening of the Chinese Class B share market to domestic investors in 2001 and the opening of the Chinese Class A share market to qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) in 2003, the empirical evidence found in this study provides a crucial reference point for domestic and foreign portfolio strategists in guiding them to form suitable portfolio strategies concerning investments in a nascent financial market such as the Chinese stock market, fraught with volatility and speculative trading behaviour. Social implications – It offers a comprehensive view of the momentum phenomenon in the Chinese Class A and B share markets over the sample period from January 1996 to December 2010. Second, the reasons behind the dichotomy of the momentum returns found in the two market segments were investigated through decomposing the momentum returns based on Jegdeesh and Titman’s (1995) method while incorporating three new explanatory factors – the liquidity factor, share ownership factor and the under reaction towards firm-specific news factor. Originality/value – A couple of extant papers have visited the topic before. yet this paper offers more comprehensive view on the existence of momentum premium in both Chinese Class A and B share markets and investigates the driving forces behind the subdued momentum returns observed in the B share market.

Purpose The existing literature about return reversal effect in Chinese stock markets is inconclusive and controversial. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the presence of return reversal effect in the Shanghai A stock market. Design/methodology/approach The authors used the late-stage contrarian strategy of Malin and Bornholt (2013) for the period March 2011‒March 2016. Findings The results show that there is a long-term return reversal effect in the Shanghai A stock market for the period March 2011‒March 2016. When portfolios are in the formation period (P=24 months), the excess returns are significant in the holding period, Q=6, 9, 12, 24 months. Further, there is also a significant short-term momentum effect in the Shanghai A stock market. For the robustness check, a new reversal factor was introduced into the Fama‒French three-factor model. Results show that portfolios have a smaller size and have lower book-to-market ratios; the return reversal factor explains a portion of the abnormal returns and coefficient of the reversal effect is significant. Research limitations/implications The authors caution readers from generalizing the findings of this study, as the sample is small and the focus is only on A stocks listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Originality/value The present research expands the current literature by providing a comprehensive information about the presence of the long-term and short-term return reversal effects in Shanghai A stock market. Furthermore, the Chinese stock markets have distinctive features in comparison to the developed stock markets in terms of government control, institutional structure, liquidity, cultural background, etc. Such differences affect the pattern in stock returns compared with those observed in developed stock markets. Contrary to previous studies, the present study also accounts for robustness checks. Finally, it also evaluates the possible reasons for the return reversal effect in the Shanghai market.

This paper focuses on investors’ different behavioral biases in China’s segmented stock markets and investigates the correlation between average holding periods, stock returns and investors’ disposition effect between 2010 and 2014. The results show that the disposition effect is prevalent in A-share market but is very weak in Growth Enterprise market and there is a lack of evidence to support the existence of disposition effect in B-share market. The study supports the view that investors’ experience and sophistication can partly help reduce investors’ behavioral biases in stock markets. It also indicates that investors in A-shares market prefer to hold stocks with larger market capitalization for longer periods, while investors of B-shares markets and Growth Enterprise market do not reveal a specific preference for market capitalization.

Returns of the same companies' common stocks, both non-market-adjusted and market-adjusted, exhibit greater volatility, on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong where short selling is allowed than on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange where short selling is restrained. This unique evidence indicates that short selling increases stock price volatility for the Chinese stocks in the Chinese stock markets.

Purpose – A number of Chinese firms have dual-listed in USA and China. The US listing takes the form of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) whereas the China listing in the form of A-shares. Though ADRs and their underlying A-shares lack full fungibility due to regulatory constraints, they nevertheless represent the same claiming rights and hence should be affected by the same fundamentals or news. The purpose of this paper is to examine the mutual return influences between ADRs and A-shares of dual-listed Chinese firms, and whether and how the recent global financial crisis has altered the mutual feedback dynamics. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses the bivariate VAR approach to model the returns of ADRs and A-shares. The model is jointly estimated with the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method. It also accounts for the non-synchronous trading problem caused by the fact that the Chinese and US markets are located in different time zones and that the two market observe different national and religious holidays. Findings – The authors find significant mutual return transmissions between ADRs and their A-share counterparts. In the absence of local market sentiments, the return transmission is more prevalent going from USA to China than it is the other way around. After the market factors are included in the models, the information flows between A-shares and ADRs become stronger and bidirectional. Additionally, both ADR and A-share returns are strongly affected by the market sentiment of the marketplace where they are traded. Lastly, the authors find evidence showing that the recent global financial crisis has enhanced the linkage between ADRs and their underlying A-shares. Originality/value – This paper adopts a more rigorous approach to overcome the potential issue caused by non-synchronous trading. It investigates how the global financial crisis has altered the ADR and A-share return feedback dynamics.

This paper discusses the initial value sensitivity (IVS) of Chinese stock market, including the single stock market and the Chinese A-share stock market, with respect to real markets and evolving models. The aim is to explore the relationship between IVS of the Chinese A-share stock market and the investment psychology based on the evolving model of genetic cellular automaton (GCA). We find: (1) The Chinese stock market is sensitively dependent on the initial conditions. (2) The GCA model provides a considerable reliability in complexity simulation (e.g. the IVS). (3) The IVS of stock market is positively correlated with the imitation probability when the intensity of the imitation psychology reaches a certain threshold. The paper suggests that the government should seek to keep the imitation psychology under a certain level, otherwise it may induce severe fluctuation to the market.

This study examines whether Piotroski's (2000) F-Score strategy can successfully be applied to the Chinese A-Share market. The empirical evidence shows that in the Chinese A-Share market, the high F-Score portfolio significantly outperforms the low F-Score portfolio. Especially within a low BM firm sample, buying high F-Score firms and shorting low F-Score firms consistently, on average, generate 1.28% market adjusted profit per month. The results are robust for size partition. However, the benefits of Piotroski's F-Score strategy are concentrated in low liquidity and analyst following sample. Within the high BM firm sample, Piotroski's F-Score strategy cannot generate any significant return. The excess return of a low BM sample persists across time, as well as after controlling for size, book-to-market ratio, and market beta. In addition, if we measure risk in terms of beta and volatility, high F-Score firms are less risky than low F-Score firms. To conclude, the empirical evidence presented in this study suggests investors can use Piotroski's F-Score to identify mispriced stocks and earn abnormal returns in the Chinese A-share market, especially within a low BM firm sample.

China's rapid economic growth and the development of its domestic stock market have attracted considerable attention from foreign investors. China's economic financial expansion, however, has emerged from an environment of state planning and radical socialist ideology. With a view of providing investors with a better understanding of the risk and return relationship in the Chinese A-share market over the past decade, this thesis adapts several empirical models to the circumstances in China and conducts four empirical analyses. First, in order to rationalize foreign investors' entry into the A-share market, the thesis compares the diversification benefits in three China-related stock markets, namely the A-share, the B-share and the H-share markets in a mean-variance framework using daily, weekly and monthly data respectively. The results suggest that of the three stock markets, the B-share market generates the highest average annual returns while the A-share market has the most significant diversification benefits regardless of whether the analysis is undertaken implementing a traditional mean-variance framework or a downside risk framework. Next, an empirical analysis using the Fama and MacBeth two-pass procedure is undertaken to test the relationship between beta, firm factors and stock returns. Similar to the findings in other stock markets, the results of this analysis show that the static betas for individual stocks fail to capture variation in stock returns in the A-share market. In contrast, the effects of book-to-market and trading volume are significant in the sample period. However, the fact that none of these factors have a persistent role in explaining stock returns suggests a possible change in the investment philosophy of Chinese domestic investors over the past decade. In the third analysis, two global betas are incorporated into the cross-sectional regressions in a bid to examine the integration or segmentation of the A-share market with the world and Hong Kong stock markets. Specifically, both time-varying betas and static betas are used in the analysis. The results suggest that there is no beta effect and the A-share marke t is totally segmented from both the world and Hong Kong stock markets. Finally, when the segmentation and integration status of the A-share market is further examined using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation framework without beta estimation and the assumption of a linear relationship between beta and stock returns, the findings suggest that the A-share market is becoming increasing integrated with the B-share and the Hong Kong stock markets.

China's rapid economic growth and the development of its domestic stock market have attracted considerable attention from foreign investors. China's economic financial expansion, however, has emerged from an environment of state planning and radical socialist ideology. With a view of providing investors with a better understanding of the risk and return relationship in the Chinese A-share market over the past decade, this thesis adapts several empirical models to the circumstances in China and conducts four empirical analyses. First, in order to rationalize foreign investors' entry into the A-share market, the thesis compares the diversification benefits in three China-related stock markets, namely the A-share, the B-share and the H-share markets in a mean-variance framework using daily, weekly and monthly data respectively. The results suggest that of the three stock markets, the B-share market generates the highest average annual returns while the A-share market has the most significant diversification benefits regardless of whether the analysis is undertaken implementing a traditional mean-variance framework or a downside risk framework. Next, an empirical analysis using the Fama and MacBeth two-pass procedure is undertaken to test the relationship between beta, firm factors and stock returns. Similar to the findings in other stock markets, the results of this analysis show that the static betas for individual stocks fail to capture variation in stock returns in the A-share market. In contrast, the effects of book-to-market and trading volume are significant in the sample period. However, the fact that none of these factors have a persistent role in explaining stock returns suggests a possible change in the investment philosophy of Chinese domestic investors over the past decade. In the third analysis, two global betas are incorporated into the cross-sectional regressions in a bid to examine the integration or segmentation of the A-share market with the world and Hong Kong stock markets. Specifically, both time-varying betas and static betas are used in the analysis. The results suggest that there is no beta effect and the A-share marke t is totally segmented from both the world and Hong Kong stock markets. Finally, when the segmentation and integration status of the A-share market is further examined using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation framework without beta estimation and the assumption of a linear relationship between beta and stock returns, the findings suggest that the A-share market is becoming increasing integrated with the B-share and the Hong Kong stock markets.

In this thesis, we conduct a case study by applying simple technical trading rules on Chinese stock market. The technical trading rules we tested are moving average rules and trading range breakout rules. The stock indices we tested are SSE A (Shanghai A) and SZSE (Shenzhen A) share, these shares are limited to the Chinese domestic traders. Our main trading rule frameworks are mainly from Brock, Lakonishok& Lebaron (1992), which including the most basic technical trading rules and covered various length of period, however we add the 25 days moving average to our frame work. We obtained our data from DataStream; the data are the daily closing prices of two indices we mentioned above.

We compared the mean return and Sharpe ratio with buy and hold. We further calculated breakeven transaction costs to test whether the technical trading rules can still add wealth to investors after adjusting the transaction costs. Our results showed that most technical trading rules perform better than buy and hold. VMA perform better than FMA and TRB, short period (25 and 50 days) performed better than longer period. On mean return, our data violated the assumption of parametric statistical test. We performed non-parametric tests, all the trading rules showed statistical significance at 95% level than buy and hold except FMA (1, 25,0), all the trading rules resulted higher Sharpe ratio than buy and hold. On transaction costs, 7 trading rules on SSE A are performed poorer than buy and hold, all the other rules provided positive breakeven transaction costs. Across the entire trading rule, both stock markets offered positive break-even transaction costs, 0.436% for SSE A and 1.369% for SZSE A. and they are both higher than the maximum transaction costs one bears.

This research attempts to test the performance of the Fama-French three-factor model (1993) in explaining the stock portfolio returns on the China A-share Stock Market from 1996 to 2005. We will follows Drew, Naughton and Veeraraghavan (2003) method, who adopted the Fama and French's (1993) method to test small sample stock markets. We find the positive relation between book-to-market ratio and stock excess returns, and the negative relationship between size and stock excess returns. And our result demonstrated that the three-factor model is more accurate in predicting stock excess returns than the CAPM, since the adjusted R² value increased and the intercept are not significantly different from zero. The size effect is stronger than the BTM ratio effect. Moreover, our results present that stock profitability is related to size and BTM ratio in China stock market. However, the relationship between stock profitability and size and BTM ratio are unconditional.

This thesis examines the impact of China's 2007 reforms on the information environment in the Chinese A-share market. The 2007 reforms introduced profound changes in the information disclosure regulations and accounting standards in the Chinese stock market. The reforms were expected to improve the information environment in the Chinese stock market by requiring continuous disclosure, prohibiting "selective disclosure" of private information, and converging Chinese accounting standards with IFRS. The influence of the 2007 reforms is examined from four aspects over the pre- and post-reform periods spanning the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2008: (i) the quantity of information disclosed by Chinese listed companies; (ii) the earnings forecast error and earnings forecast dispersion of financial analysts in the Chinese A-share market; (iii) the abnormal return around earnings announcements; and (iv) the transaction costs of stocks and the possibilities of informed trading in the Chinese stock market. The main findings of the research are as follows: 1. The quantity of information disclosed by companies increased significantly after the 2007 reforms, suggesting that the reforms enhanced the level of information disclosure by companies in the Chinese A-share market. 2. The earnings forecast accuracy by local financial analysts decreased in the post-reform period, which is contrary to expectations and suggests that the information environment of local financial analysts worsened after the reforms. On the other hand, the earnings forecast accuracy of foreign financial analysts did not change significantly. 3. The abnormal return or price reaction around the earnings announcement dates increased significantly after the 2007 reforms, suggesting a larger information gap between companies and investors in the Chinese A-share market. This result is also contrary to expectations, and it indicates that the information environment of investors in the Chinese stock market has deteriorated in the post-reform period. 4. The bid-ask spread increased in the post-reform period, which is also consistent with a poorer information environment for local financial analysts and investors in the Chinese A-share market. However, in the post-reform period, there was a significant decrease in the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread. These results suggest that informed trading decreased after the 2007 reforms, which indicates a reduced level of "selective disclosure" of private information to local analysts. Overall, I find that the impact of the 2007 reforms on the information environment in the Chinese stock market was two-fold. On the one hand, the reforms enhanced the level of information disclosure by Chinese listed companies and led to an increase in the level of public information given to the market; on the other hand, the reforms prohibited "selective disclosure" by companies and caused a decrease in the amount of private information given to the market. Consequently, an effect of the reforms is that they impaired the information environment of local financial analysts, caused deterioration in the information environment of investors, and increased the transaction costs in the Chinese A-share market. However, it also reduced the level of informed trading in the Chinese stock market.

Notre thèse explore les facteurs de risque et les modèles des facteurs sur le marché boursier chinois A-share. Notre étude est basée sur le contexte du modèle facteur de Fama-French (FF). Tout d'abord, au chapitre 1, nous réexaminons l'applicabilité du Modèle Fama-French à Trois Facteurs (FF3F) et du dernier Modèle Fama-French à Cinq Facteurs (FF5F), compte tenu de plusieurs caractéristiques spéciales du marché boursier chinois. Les résultats empiriques montrent que le Modèle FF3F peut expliquer la majorité des variations de séries chronologiques des rentabilités des actions chinoises A-share. Au cours de la période d'échantillonnage, le marché bêta et le facteur SMB sont des déterminants importants pour expliquer la variation transversale des rentabilités des actions, cependant nous ne trouvons aucune prime de valeur. D’après la comparaison des performances des modèles FF3F et FF5F en présence de facteurs de rentabilité et d'investissement, le Modèle FF5F ne semble pas capturer plus de variations de rentabilités espérées que le modèle à trois facteurs, à l'exception des six portefeuilles pondérées en valeurs qui formés à partir de la taille et de la rentabilité opérationnelle.Dans le chapitre 2, nous examinons si les facteurs FF, SMB et HML, sont des proxys d'innovations de variables d'état sélectionnées (rendement de dividende agrégée, taux de T-bonds en un mois, l’écart de terme et l’écart de défaut) qui décrivent, sur la période recherche, les opportunités futures d'investissement sur le marché boursier chinois A-share. Les régressions chronologiques et les régressions des séries transversales sont réalisées sur cinq modèles comparatifs en utilisant l'approche à deux étapes Fama-MacBeth. Les facteurs FF ne perdent pas leur pouvoir explicatif, avec ou sans la présence des innovations des quatre variables d’états sélectionnées, à la fois dans les examens de séries chronologiques et les examens transversaux. Nous trouvons que l'information contenue dans l'innovation de rendements de dividende agrégés semble totalement capturée par la combinaison du marché bêta et du facteur de taille. Les facteurs FF ont pu jouer un rôle limité de capturer d'opportunités d'investissement alternatives représentées par les innovations des quatre variables d'état sélectionnées.Dans le chapitre 3, nous étudions si les facteurs FF sont des proxys de facteurs de risque de détresse et si différentes méthodes de construction des facteurs entraînent des résultats différents. Les résultats empiriques suggèrent qu'il n'y a pas de preuve significative que les facteurs FF représentent un risque de détresse sur le marché boursier chinois A-share. En comparant les résultats des régressions des séries chronologiques à partir de deux méthodes différentes, la performance du facteur de risque de détresse basé sur le DLI semble légèrement meilleure que celui basé sur le O-score. Cependant, le facteur de risque de détresse n'est pas un déterminant important des rentabilités transversales moyennes, et les facteurs FF ne peuvent pas représenter le facteur de risque de détresse dans la section transversale du marché boursier chinois A-share
This dissertation is to explore the risk factors and factor models on Chinese A-share stock market based on the context of Fama-French (FF) factor model. First of all, chapter 1 re-examines the applicability of Fama-French Three-Factor (FF3F) Model and the latest Fama-French Five-Factor (FF5F) Model considering several special features of Chinese stock market. FF3F Model can explain a majority of time-series variation of the Chinese A-share stock returns. The market beta and SMB are important determinants in explaining the cross-sectional variation in the average stock returns over the sample period; however, we find no value premium. Comparing the performance of both FF3F Model and FF5F Model on Chinese A-share stock market, in the presence of profitability and investment factors, FF5F Model seems not capture more variations of expected stock returns than the three-factor model except the six value-weighted portfolios formed on size and operating profitability.Chapter 2 examines whether FF factors SMB and HML proxy for the innovations of selected state variables (aggregate dividend yield, one-month T-bill rate, term spread and default spread) that describe future investment opportunities on Chinese A-share stock market during the research period. Both time-series and cross-sectional regressions are performed on five comparative models using Fama-MacBeth two-stage approach. FF factors don’t lose their explanatory power with or without the presence of the innovations of selected four state variables in both the time-series and cross-sectional examinations. We find that the information contained in innovation of aggregate dividend yields seems totally captured by the combination of market beta and size factor. FF factors might have played a limited role in capturing alternative investment opportunities proxied by innovations of the selected four state variables.Chapter 3 investigates whether FF factors proxy for distress risk factor and whether different methods of constructing factors result in the different outcomes. The empirical results suggest that there is no significant evidence that FF factors are proxying for distress risk on Chinese A-share stock market. Comparing the time-series regression results by using two different methods, the distress risk factor constructed based on DLI seems to perform slightly better than that constructed based on O-score in capturing time-series average returns. However, the distress risk factor is not an important determinant of cross-sectional average returns, and FF factors cannot proxy as distress risk factor in the cross-section on Chinese A-share stock market

In order for corporations to develop their business, they could apply an approach of exchanging ideas and knowledge with other corporations could contribute to new significant innovations. The international approach is called Open Innovation and could be implemented both externally and internally within firms. The purpose of this thesis was to examine how Open Innovation is used by Swedish and Chinese entrepreneurs in an international market context. By implementing a qualitative research method, the researchers obtained a deeper understanding of how networks and trust affect Open Innovation when the approach is used. This thesis derived from an inductive approach since the authors made observations and generated theories from those observations, which created a theoretical synthesis. The theoretical synthesis conducted into the operationalization and the interview guide for the data gathering of the semi- structured interviews. The gathered empirical data was compared with the theories in order to analyze the similarities and differences between them. Lastly, the study was concluded by answering the research questions, theoretical, practical, and policy implications, limitations for the study, and suggestion for future research.

The efficacy and accuracy of information is very important for making decision in stock markets. In this paper, we study on the effect of information diffusion in Chinese stock market before and after the owership release in February 19, 2001, by testing the stationary of A share premium and cointegration between A and B share prices. The panel unit root tests we propose on A share premium are Augmented Dickey-Fullar (ADF) tests for individual firm and Fisher tests for the panel, based on combining pvalues from each individual cross-section. The panel cointegration tests on A and B shares we use is Johansen’s likelihood ratio tests for individual firm and likelihoodbased panel cointegraion tests for panel, based on combining the test statistics. The results show that before the opening of B share markets to domestic investors, A share premiums have a unit root and there is no cointegration relationship between A and B share markets. On the contrary, after ownership release, A share premium is stationary and there is cointegration relationship between A and B share markets.

This thesis comprises, firstly, a careful and detailed description of the institutional workings of the Chinese stock market; secondly, a literature review of the Chinese segmented markets and dual-listed shares price premium; and thirdly, three evidence-based contributions designed to cast new light on the Chinese A-shares premium puzzle. Publicly-listed firms in China, under certain criteria, can issue two different types of shares, namely A-shares and B-shares, to local and foreign investors respectively. These shares carry the same rights and obligations, but are however priced differently due to market segmentation. After a review of the literature on determinants of the premium, the first contribution offers a complementary explanation. I propose that the premium reflects the difference in valuation preferences between the local and foreign investors, i.e., local investors pay more attention to stock liquidity, while foreign investors pay more attention to firm’s intrinsic value, and so firms having more favorable fundamentals tend to have lower premia. The second contribution involves the examination of a controversial question that which investor group is better informed about local assets, by testing the direction of information flows between the A- and B-shares markets. Both time series methods, and panel data techniques which are used for the first time in this context, are employed, in order to get a distinct and more insightful picture against the current literature. The third contribution compares and contrasts institutional settings of China, Singapore and Thailand which have similar market segmentation and dual-listing systems; examines whether or not the premia in the three countries are caused by same factors; and tries to answer why foreign investors in China pay less, rather than more, as commonly observed in other segmented markets, for identical assets. It provides the first cross-country comparison evidence after 1999 with updated data.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.

AbstractThe 70th year of the IAU has been marked not only by the Covid-19 pandemic but by the geopolitical tension between the United States and China. After almost four decades of cooperation, which began in shared opposition to Soviet Russia and a shared interest in China’s modernisation, the leaders of each country have become strident critics of the other. The escalating war of words has led to disruptions in trade, communications and visas and now threatens the vast and fruitful cooperation between universities and researchers. Much is at stake. Many US universities are in China, such as Stanford with its state-of-the-art centre at Peking University and NYU with a branch campus in Shanghai. Chinese universities benefit from visits in both directions, from bench-marking using American partner templates and from the return of US-trained doctoral graduates. US-China links in science are focused on crucial areas like biomedicine and epidemiology, planetary science and ecology, engineering, materials, energy, cybernetics.

Economic growth in China has had a major impact on global commodity markets. The Chapter documents the significance of China in terms of its share of global consumption and world imports of a number of commodities, as well as China’s dependence on such imports. This shows that there is considerable variation between different commodities, with China being particularly important for minerals and metals. Chinese demand has had an impact on commodity prices and was one factor that contributed to the commodity boom of 2002–11. Non-price aspects of Chinese involvement are also discussed, including Chinese strategies to secure resources; Chinese policies to encourage processing at home; and the specific characteristics of the Chinese market in terms of social and environmental standards.

This case demonstrates an award-winning performance improvement project conducted by a large state-owned enterprise in China that satisfies the 10 standards of performance improvement and adds value to the organization. Multiple tools developed by performance improvement professionals in China are used to develop and implement marketing strategies and achieve market share improvement goals. These tools are based on the performance improvement literature, specifically designed for and empirically tested in the Chinese market. The case also shows benefits and challenges associated with integrating performance improvement and marketing management.

China is not like most other countries around the world. The Chinese market has not embraced Airbnb whole-heartedly. There are a number of explanations: Chinese people prefer online platforms in Chinese language, and have available to them several platforms, many of which they perceive to have advantages over Airbnb: these are more flexible and better cater to the needs of the Chinese market. And Chinese people feel that their home is only for the use of their family. In traditional culture, homes are not places shared with strangers.

This chapter compares qiaopi letters and institutions with their European equivalent. It first discusses the migrant settings and the emergence of a postal culture. European and Chinese migrants shared many characteristics, but their sending places and the communities they formed abroad differed greatly. These differences were reflected in their letters. The chapter compares the letters of European migrants and qiaopi in regard both to the institutions that kept the correspondence going and letter contents and conventions. It concludes that qiaopi letters shared some features with European migrants’ letters as a result of the convergence of cultures, the spread of markets, the commonalities of the migrant condition, and the universality of epistolary conventions, but that their remittance role gave a special shape to their style and content.

This chapter reviews the affairs of frontier people from the first direct but sporadic encounters between Russians and Chinese. Relations between the Russian and Chinese empires on their shared steppe frontier can be divided into three phases. The first phase lasted through the late seventeenth century. During this time, Cossacks entered Transbaikalia and came in contact with Mongol nobles while the Qing established rule over Hulunbeir. The second phase, from roughly 1728 to 1851, was characterized by a balance of power between Beijing and Saint Petersburg, the establishment of permanent yet deficient border surveillance by both polities, and intensifying contacts on the border, in particular routed through Kiakhta, the year-round location for border trade. The third and final phase lasted from 1851 to the end of the nineteenth century. This period was marked by a shift of power in favor of Russia.

From this edition, the Financial Stability Report will have fewer pages with some changes in its structure. The purpose of this change is to present the most relevant facts of the financial system and their implications on the financial stability. This allows displaying the analysis more concisely and clearly, as it will focus on describing the evolution of the variables that have the greatest impact on the performance of the financial system, for estimating then the effect of a possible materialization of these risks on the financial health of the institutions. The changing dynamics of the risks faced by the financial system implies that the content of the Report adopts this new structure; therefore, some analyses and series that were regularly included will not necessarily be in each issue. However, the statistical annex that accompanies the publication of the Report will continue to present the series that were traditionally included, regardless of whether or not they are part of the content of the Report. In this way we expect to contribute in a more comprehensive way to the study and analysis of the stability of the Colombian financial system. Executive Summary During the first half of 2015, the main advanced economies showed a slow recovery on their growth, while emerging economies continued with their slowdown trend. Domestic demand in the United States allowed for stabilization on its average growth for the first half of the year, while other developed economies such as the United Kingdom, the euro zone, and Japan showed a more gradual recovery. On the other hand, the Chinese economy exhibited the lowest growth rate in five years, which has resulted in lower global dynamism. This has led to a fall in prices of the main export goods of some Latin American economies, especially oil, whose price has also responded to a larger global supply. The decrease in the terms of trade of the Latin American economies has had an impact on national income, domestic demand, and growth. This scenario has been reflected in increases in sovereign risk spreads, devaluations of stock indices, and depreciation of the exchange rates of most countries in the region. For Colombia, the fall in oil prices has also led to a decline in the terms of trade, resulting in pressure on the dynamics of national income. Additionally, the lower demand for exports helped to widen the current account deficit. This affected the prospects and economic growth of the country during the first half of 2015. This economic context could have an impact on the payment capacity of debtors and on the valuation of investments, affecting the soundness of the financial system. However, the results of the analysis featured in this edition of the Report show that, facing an adverse scenario, the vulnerability of the financial system in terms of solvency and liquidity is low. The analysis of the current situation of credit institutions (CI) shows that growth of the gross loan portfolio remained relatively stable, as well as the loan portfolio quality indicators, except for microcredit, which showed a decrease in these indicators. Regarding liabilities, traditional sources of funding have lost market share versus non-traditional ones (bonds, money market operations and in the interbank market), but still represent more than 70%. Moreover, the solvency indicator remained relatively stable. As for non-banking financial institutions (NBFI), the slowdown observed during the first six months of 2015 in the real annual growth of the assets total, both in the proprietary and third party position, stands out. The analysis of the main debtors of the financial system shows that indebtedness of the private corporate sector has increased in the last year, mostly driven by an increase in the debt balance with domestic and foreign financial institutions. However, the increase in this latter source of funding has been influenced by the depreciation of the Colombian peso vis-à-vis the US dollar since mid-2014. The financial indicators reflected a favorable behavior with respect to the historical average, except for the profitability indicators; although they were below the average, they have shown improvement in the last year. By economic sector, it is noted that the firms focused on farming, mining and transportation activities recorded the highest levels of risk perception by credit institutions, and the largest increases in default levels with respect to those observed in December 2014. Meanwhile, households have shown an increase in the financial burden, mainly due to growth in the consumer loan portfolio, in which the modalities of credit card, payroll deductible loan, revolving and vehicle loan are those that have reported greater increases in risk indicators. On the side of investments that could be affected by the devaluation in the portfolio of credit institutions and non-banking financial institutions (NBFI), the largest share of public debt securities, variable-yield securities and domestic private debt securities is highlighted. The value of these portfolios fell between February and August 2015, driven by the devaluation in the market of these investments throughout the year. Furthermore, the analysis of the liquidity risk indicator (LRI) shows that all intermediaries showed adequate levels and exhibit a stable behavior. Likewise, the fragility analysis of the financial system associated with the increase in the use of non-traditional funding sources does not evidence a greater exposure to liquidity risk. Stress tests assess the impact of the possible joint materialization of credit and market risks, and reveal that neither the aggregate solvency indicator, nor the liquidity risk indicator (LRI) of the system would be below the established legal limits. The entities that result more individually affected have a low share in the total assets of the credit institutions; therefore, a risk to the financial system as a whole is not observed. José Darío Uribe Governor