Academic literature on the topic 'CEOs entrenchment'
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Journal articles on the topic "CEOs entrenchment":
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Shi, Juehui, and Ngoc Cindy Pham. "The Boundary Conditions of Optimal Contracting and Managerial Entrenchment: A Simultaneous Two-Equation Vector Autoregression with Exogenous Variables Approach for Chief Executive Officer Compensation and Firm Performance." American Business Review 27, no. 1 (May 2024): 182–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.37625/abr.27.1.182-206.
Abstract:
We apply the vector autoregression with exogenous variables (VARX) approach to integrate the optimal contracting theory, the managerial entrenchment theory, the principal-agent theory, the contextual criteria theory, and the upper echelon theory. Based on this new approach, we discover two middle ground conditions between the boundary of managerial entrenchment and optimal contracting, where CEO non-entrenchment or entrenchment cannot be explained by the managerial entrenchment theory or optimal contracting theory alone. For example, some CEOs are not entrenched when the agency problem is not mitigated, while others are entrenched when the agency problem is mitigated. The results imply that merely mitigating the agency problem cannot prevent managerial entrenchment. However, not mitigating the agency problem at all leads to managerial entrenchment. We recommend the boards look at other non-financial means and social approaches (e.g., value- and culture-based trainings, performance recognition, goodwill and friendship building events, pay transparency increase, smooth flow of information among stakeholders, value-adding managerial investments, oversight committee) to minimize the impact of managerial entrenchment on both firm performance and CEO compensation. In addition, we recommend the boards take on the approaches unique to their own firms and their CEOs to address managerial entrenchment.
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Forst, Arno, Myung Seok Park, and Benson Wier. "Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation: Evidence from Initial Public Offering Firms." Journal of Management Accounting Research 26, no. 1 (September 1, 2013): 101–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-50622.
Abstract:
ABSTRACT We examine how insider entrenching governance choices of firms conducting their initial public offering (IPOs) influence the CEOs compensation contracts post-IPO. Using ten legal provisions affecting insider entrenchment, we find that entrenching governance decisions have a significant effect on CEO compensation post-IPO. Specifically, we observe a positive association between entrenchment and levels of post-IPO salary, total compensation, and pay-for-performance sensitivity. We also find a negative relation between entrenchment and the proportion of CEOs' salary to total compensation. Our observed relationships are principally driven by takeover readiness provision choices rather than voting rights limitation choices. Our results are robust to controlling for potential confounding effects. JEL Classifications: M41; M52; G34; G32.
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ASLANOĞLU, Suphi, and Tri DAMAYANTİ. "TÜRKİYE'DE YERLEŞTİRME ETKİSİ VE İLİŞKİLİ TARAF İŞLEMLERİ." Muhasebe ve Vergi Uygulamaları Dergisi 15, no. 3 (November 1, 2022): 463–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.29067/muvu.1080458.
Abstract:
This research aimed to understand the important powers that affect Related Party Transactions (RPTs) decisions. It used the agency theory perspective to examine the effect of corporate mechanism, comprising variables of controlling ownership, the CEOs characteristics, and independent board of directors, on the decision of RPTs regarding potential conflicts of interest.
A total of 310 financial reports of Turkish manufacturing listed companies in 2019 and 2020 were assessed. Subsequently, controlling shareholder and CEOs characteristics were discovered to play significant roles in the RPTs mechanism, while the independent board director variable had the highest impact.
The strength of the independent board director effect on RPTs decision represents the function of corporate governance mechanisms. Although entrenchment effects occur in RPTs, the denial or approval of independent board directors was dependent on minority interest. It also highlighted the impact of alignment on RPTs’ decision, since the expropriation of ultimate power was balanced within the independent board director’s role.
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Yang, Mei-Ling. "The Impact of Controlling Families and Family CEOs on Earnings Management." Family Business Review 23, no. 3 (June 18, 2010): 266–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0894486510374231.
Abstract:
This study explores the relationships between insider ownership and earnings management in family firms and the impact of family versus nonfamily CEOs on earnings management. The results show that the larger the level of insider ownership, the greater the extent of earnings management, supporting an entrenchment effect of family ownership. Furthermore, consistent with traditional agency analyses, nonfamily CEOs exhibit a greater tendency to manage earnings than do family CEOs.The study suggests that family firms should promote information transparency and quality of accounting reporting to avoid a negative image that suggests that family firms expropriate the interests of outside shareholders.
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Hollandts, Xavier, Nicolas Aubert, Abdelmehdi Ben Abdelhamid, and Victor Prieur. "Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on CEO entrenchment." Management international 22, no. 2 (March 11, 2019): 112–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1058165ar.
Abstract:
Employee stock ownership gives employees a voice and therefore may have a major impact on corporate governance. Thus, employee stock ownership may be a powerful mean to protect CEOs from both market for corporate control and dismissal threat. In this paper, we examine the relationship between employee stock ownership and CEO entrenchment. Following the recent French legislative changes, we use a comprehensive panel dataset of the major French listed companies over the 2009-2012 period. We document inverted U-shaped relationships between employee stock ownership and CEO entrenchment. Board employee ownership representation also plays a role and increases the inflexion points of these curvilinear relationship.
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Woo, Heejin. "New CEOs’ previous experience and acquisition performance." International Journal of Organizational Analysis 27, no. 3 (July 8, 2019): 745–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijoa-03-2018-1389.
Abstract:
Purpose This study aims to investigate how new CEOs’ previous experiences in other organizations and other industries create value in acquisitions. Drawing on the upper echelon perspective, this study theorizes that the multiorganizational experience of new CEOs is positively associated with acquisition performance and, in particular, that the multi-industry experience of new CEOs leads to better performance in diversifying acquisitions than in related acquisitions. While new CEOs without multiorganizational experience undergo a cognitive entrenchment in firm-specific experience, new CEOs with multiorganizational experience can lead acquisitions with more flexibility and agility. Design/methodology/approach Acquisition and organizational data were drawn from the US manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) between 2008 and 2010. The event study method was used to test hypotheses. In 346 acquisitions made by 139 firms, acquisition performance was measured according to cumulative abnormal returns. Findings Consistent with the hypotheses, the multiorganizational experience of new CEOs was positively associated with acquisition performance and, in particular, the multi-industry experience of new CEOs led to better performance in diversifying acquisitions than in related acquisitions. Originality/value This paper contributes to the CEO literature and acquisition literature by suggesting that the multiorganizational experience of new CEOs can be a valuable source of competitive advantages, particularly when implementing corporate strategies involving interorganizational integration processes.
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Keil, Thomas, Markku Maula, and Evangelos Syrigos. "CEO Entrepreneurial Orientation, Entrenchment, and Firm Value Creation." Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 41, no. 4 (July 2017): 475–504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/etp.12213.
Abstract:
We investigate how CEO entrepreneurial orientation affects firm value creation and how this relationship is moderated by three sources of CEO entrenchment. We conducted a longitudinal analysis of S&P 500 firms between 1999 and 2007, and, in line with our predictions, we found that CEO entrepreneurial orientation enhances firm value creation and that this positive effect is reduced when CEOs are entrenched (1) due to corporate governance provisions that protect them from the majority will of shareholders, (2) due to substantial ownership that provides them too much decision–making power, and (3) because their family has substantial holdings in the corporation.
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Mateus, Cesario, Thomas Hall, and Irina B. Mateus. "Are listed firms better governed? Empirical evidence on board structure and financial performance." Corporate Ownership and Control 13, no. 1 (2015): 736–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i1c7p2.
Abstract:
We examine the relationship among board characteristics (network centrality, leadership structure, outsider participation, portion of male directors, director age, and presence of financial experts) and firm-level financial performance (cash holdings, leverage, ROA, risk, and risk-adjusted return). Our data encompass firms from eight countries during 2003-2012. Unlisted firms are smaller and have less leverage. Despite the fact that unlisted firms have prima facie better average governance (they are less likely to have an executive chair (or CEO as chair of the board) and a higher average portion of outside directors), they exhibit worse risk-adjusted returns. Higher levels of director connectedness (centrality) are generally associated with more observable entrenchment (more cash, less leverage), whereas other board characteristics do not show clear relationships with entrenchment. Our findings are consistent with the view that firmly established CEOs are willing and able to pack the board with qualified and connected members, who nevertheless do not act to constrain CEO entrenchment. This is true for both listed and unlisted firms
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Fagbemi, Temitope Olamide, Olubunmi Florence Osemene, and Oyinlade Agbaje. "Management Entrenchment, Firm Characteristics and Earnings Management Of Conglomerate Companies In Nigeria." Jurnal Administrasi Bisnis 9, no. 1 (March 22, 2020): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/jab.v9i1.28576.
Abstract:
Sometimes the rivalry between shareholders and management is an indication of the level of entrenchment within the corporate environment. Managers are believed to routinely manipulate earnings in order to mislead shareholders about their company's actual economic outlook or performance. As a result, the study investigated the impact of managerial entrenchment, firm characteristics and earnings management of conglomerate companies in Nigeria. Employing the ex-post facto research design, the data was gathered from secondary source of the 6 listed conglomerate companies for the 11-year period running (2008-2018). The study used discretionary accruals a proxy for earnings management and to calculate discretionary accruals, the study used modified Jones model. The result showed that management entrenchment and firm characteristics have Impact on multinational firms ' earnings management in Nigeria. Specifically, from the conglomerate’s entrenchment proxies, CEO’s tenure has a positive and significant impact on earnings management (coff. =1.062821, p-value =0.0367) and management entrenchment as measured by CEO’s shareholding has a negative and insignificant effect on earnings management (coff. =-6252391, p-value = 0.4090) while firm size, profitability and leverage indicated a significant and positive impact on earnings management (coff, = 0.124587, p-value = 0.0000; coff. = 0.006647, p-value = 0.0431 and coff. = 0.032065, p-value = 0.0000). The study therefore recommended among others that management should reduce the debt in their capital structure in order to improve their companies’ value and their capital structure should be majorly financed by equity rather than debt and reduce CEOs tenure to minimise earnings management practices.
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Kang, Hyung Cheol, and Jaemin Kim. "Why do family firms switch between family CEOs and non-family professional CEO?" Review of Accounting and Finance 15, no. 1 (February 8, 2016): 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-03-2015-0032.
Abstract:
Purpose – This study aims to examine whether a switching decision between a family CEO and a non-family professional CEO has a different effect on firm performance and what determines such a decision by family firms. Design/methodology/approach – This study uses multiple regressions, Probit and univariate analyses, based the sample of family-controlled Chaebol firms in Korea for the 11-year period from 2001 to 2011. Findings – Evidence found was consistent with the family entrenchment hypothesis: firms experiencing declining Q value are more likely to replace family CEOs with non-family CEOs, and that these firms, having switched to non-family CEOs, exhibit an improvement in firm performance as measured by the change in Q value. On the other hand, for those firms that replace non-family CEOs with family member CEOs, no evidence was found that the switching decision either decreases or increases firm performance. The results of Probit and univariate analyses suggest that firms switching to family CEOs tend to be larger, stock-exchange listed and more “central”, with more cash flow rights held by the controlling families and with relatively more equity holdings in the other affiliated firms of the same Chaebol group. In contrast, firms switching to non-family CEOs tend to be smaller, unlisted and less “central”, with less equity holdings in the other affiliated firms of the same Chaebol group. Originality/value – This study sheds light on the different value implications and determinants of a decision between “family CEO” and “non-family CEO”.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "CEOs entrenchment":
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Forst, Arno. "Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Empirical Investigation." VCU Scholars Compass, 2009. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/1714.
Abstract:
This study investigates the effects of insider entrenchment on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation in firms conducting an initial public offering (IPO). The sample comprises 220 US firms that went public between 1996 and 2002. Corporate governance choices regarding entrenchment are captured by six provisions in the corporate charter and bylaws, as well as five anti-takeover statutes, which may or may not be in effect in the state of incorporation. Firm-level items are supermajority requirements for charter amendments, bylaws amendments, and merger approvals, along with the presence or absence of a staggered board of directors, poison pills, and golden parachute agreements. The anti-takeover laws examined are Business Combination, Control Share Acquisition, Fair Price, Poison Pill Endorsement, and Constituencies Statutes. A factor analysis reveals three distinct components of entrenchment: firm- and state-level external entrenchment and firm-level internal entrenchment. External entrenchment is related to market control over management by means of corporate takeovers; internal entrenchment relates to shareholder control over management by means of their voting power. Evidence is found for a positive association between entrenchment at IPO and subsequent CEO cash and total compensation. These relationships are driven by firm-level external entrenchment. Firm-level external entrenchment is also significantly and positively associated with CEO stock-based compensation. The positive effects of entrenchment at IPO on CEO compensation appear not to be transitory and remain constant for at least five years post-IPO. Furthermore, entrenchment at IPO is shown to affect CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. On balance, entrenchment reduces the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock returns and returns on assets. The results of this study underscore the crucial importance of insiders' governance decisions made at the time of the IPO. Little support is found for a re-balancing of components of the CEO's compensation contract in response to entrenchment as predicted under the optimal contracting theory of compensation contracts. The findings of this study are almost entirely consistent with the managerial power theory, according to which entrenchment at IPO causes a permanent shift in bargaining power, which enables CEOs to influence compensation contracts in their favor.
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Ben, Abdelhamid Abdelmehdi. "Corporate governance and employee ownership : evidence from France." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université Clermont Auvergne (2021-...), 2021. http://www.theses.fr/2021UCFAD016.
Abstract:
Ce travail doctoral s’interroge sur la manière de l’actionnariat salarié à influencer la gouvernance et les choix stratégiques d’une entreprise. Le premier chapitre de la thèse présente un état de lieux de la littérature sur l’actionnariat salarié et la gouvernance des entreprises. Cette recension permet de développer les fondements conceptuels sur les questions de recherche abordées dans la thèse. Le chapitre 2 évalue l’impact de l’actionnariat salarié sur l’enracinement des PDG à leur poste. Les mesures de l'enracinement managérial dans notre recherche sont l'âge, l'ancienneté et le taux de rotation du PDG. Notre étude empirique examine la majorité des entreprises françaises composant l'indice boursier SBF 120 et la méthodologie des moments généralisés (GMM) est mise en œuvre. Essentiellement, les résultats montrent une relation en U inversé entre l’actionnariat salarié et l’enracinement des PDG. Nous montrons également que la présence de représentants des actionnaires salariés au sein des conseils d’administration ou de surveillance a également un impact et varie les points d’inflexion des relations observées. Le chapitre 3 examine l’incidence de l’actionnariat salarié et de sa représentation au conseil d’administration sur le coût du capital d’une entreprise. L’étude focalise sur les entreprises de l’indice SBF 120. Les résultats empiriques documentent l’accroissement de l’actionnariat salarié qui se traduit par une hausse du coût du capital jusqu’à un certain niveau, et que par la suite cette relation s’inverse. Les résultats sont convergents et montrent que les variations de l’actionnariat salarié et la présence de salariés au sein du conseil d’administration affectent de manière significative le coût des capitaux propres de l’entreprise et donc influence implicitement la valeur de l’entreprise. Le chapitre 4 s’intéresse à l’impact de l’actionnariat salarié sur le niveau de responsabilité environnementale des entreprises. Les résultats ressortent qu’une relation positive existe entre l’actionnariat salarié, l’implication des employés au sein des conseils et les scores de responsabilité environnementale des entreprises. Enfin, cette recherche apporte un éclairage additionnel sur les conséquences de l’actionnariat salarié dans le contexte françaisThis doctoral work examines the way employee share ownership influences the governance and strategic choices of a company. The first chapter of the thesis presents an inventory of the literature on employee share ownership and corporate governance. This review helps to develop the conceptual foundations on the research questions addressed in the thesis. Chapter 2 assesses the impact of employee share ownership on the entrenchment of CEOs in their jobs. The measures of managerial entrenchment in our research are the age, seniority and turnover rate of the CEO. Our empirical study examines the majority of French companies making up the SBF 120 stock market index and the methodology of generalized moments (GMM) is implemented. Essentially, the results show an inverted U-shaped relationship between employee ownership and CEO entrenchment. We also show that the presence of employee shareholder representatives on boards of directors or supervisory boards also has an impact and varies the inflection points of the relationships observed. Chapter 3 examines the impact of employee share ownership and its representation on the board of directors on a company's cost of capital. The study focuses on the companies in the SBF 120 index. The empirical results document the increase in employee ownership which results in an increase in the cost of capital up to a certain level, and that subsequently this relationship is reversed. The results converge and show that variations in employee share ownership and the presence of employees on the board of directors significantly affect the cost of equity of the company and therefore implicitly influence the value of the company. Chapter 4 examines the impact of employee share ownership on the level of environmental responsibility of companies. The results show that a positive relationship exists between employee share ownership, employee involvement in boards and corporate environmental responsibility scores. Finally, this research sheds additional light on the consequences of employee ownership in the French context
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Markham, James. "CEO entrenchment versus boards of directors performance is not all that matters to turnover /." Access to citation, abstract and download form provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company; downloadable PDF file, 172 p, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1654492691&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=8331&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Dah, Mustafa A. "Essays on the Effect of Excess Compensation and Governance Changes on Firm Value." Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2012. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/5179.
Abstract:
This dissertation consists of three essays on the effect of excess compensation and corporate governance changes on the firm's performance. The first paper utilizes a cost minimization stochastic frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of director total compensation. Our findings suggest that board members are over compensated. We show that, on average, the director actual compensation level is above the efficient compensation level by around 63%. Our results suggest that an increase in director excess compensation decreases the likelihood of CEO turnover, reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity, and increases managerial entrenchment. Thus, the surplus in director compensation is directly associated with managerial job security and entrenchment. Furthermore, although director excess compensation is not significantly inversely related to the firm's future performance, it has an indirect negative effect on future performance through its impact on the entrenchment-performance relationship. Therefore, this essay proposes that the overcompensation of directors is directly associated with a board culture predicated by mutual back-scratching and collusion between the CEO and the board members. The second essay tests the effect of an exogenous shock, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, on the structure of corporate boards and their efficiency as a monitoring mechanism. The results suggest an increase in the participation of independent directors at the expense of insiders. Consequently, we investigate the implications of board composition changes on CEO turnover and firm value. We document a noticeable reduction in CEO turnover in the post-SOX period. We also demonstrate that, after SOX, a board dominated by independent directors is less likely to remove a CEO due to poor performance. Finally, we highlight a negative association between the change in board composition and firm value. We propose that our findings are predicated on an off equilibrium result whereby firms were forced to modify their endogenously chosen board composition. Therefore, contrary to the legislators' objectives, we suggest that the change in board structure brought about inefficient monitoring and promoted an unfavorable tradeoff between independent directors and insiders. The third essay examines the relationship between the firm's governance structure and its value during different economic conditions. We show that both relative industry turnover and CEO entrenchment increase during economic downturns. We also find that relative industry turnover and managerial entrenchment have opposite impacts on the value of the firm throughout the recessionary period. While industry turnover leads to an appreciation in firm value, managerial entrenchment reduces shareholders' wealth. The negative impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value, however, outweighs the positive impact of industry turnover. Accordingly, we propose that a recession provides managers with a good opportunity to camouflage their behavior and extract more private benefits and, thus, blame the poor performance on bad economic conditions.ID: 031001341; System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.; Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Title from PDF title page (viewed April 15, 2013).; Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Central Florida, 2012.; Includes bibliographical references.
Ph.D.
Doctorate
Business Administration
Business Administration; Finance
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Ampofo, Akwasi Amankwaah. "Two Essays on Capital Structure Decisions of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Managerial Entrenchment and Ethical Corporate Citizenship." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/103152.
Abstract:
This dissertation consists of two essays on the impact of managerial entrenchment and ethical corporate citizenship on capital structure decisions of the firm. The first essay examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on financial flexibility and capital structure decisions of firms. Agency conflicts and asymmetric information between managers and shareholders of firms exacerbate managerial entrenchment, which is operationalized using the entrenchment index. The excess cash ratio of a firm over the median cash ratio of firms within the same 3 digits SIC code is the proxy for financial flexibility. Capital structure decisions include the extent and maturity of debt as proxied by debt-to-equity ratio, and average debt maturity respectively. Results indicate that compared to managers who are not entrenched, entrenched managers obtain less rather than more debt, and they use long-term rather than short-term debt maturity. Also, entrenched managers keep more excess cash than managers who are not entrenched. This is especially the case for firms in small and large market value groups compared to medium sized firms. Results do not change before, during, and after the 2008 global economic crisis.
The second essay examines the impact of ethical corporate citizenship and CEO power on cost of capital, and firm value in the context of stakeholder theory. Firms listed as World's Most Ethical Companies (WMECs) exemplify ethical corporate citizenship, which is operationalized as a binary variable of 1 for WMECs, and zero for non-WMECs. This paper matches WMECs and non-WMECs control firms in the same 3 digits SIC code, and within 10 percent of total assets. CEO power is primarily measured using CEO pay slice calculated as CEO total compensation as a percentage of top 5 executives of the firm. Powerful CEOs have pay slice above the 50th percentile, and weak CEOs pay slice is below the 50th percentile. Tobin's q is the proxy for firm value, and cost of capital is measured as the market value weighted cost of debt, and cost of equity. Results indicate that WMECs have neither lower cost of capital nor higher Tobin's q than matched control sample of non-WMECs. Firms led by powerful CEOs have significantly lower cost of debt capital, and lower industry-adjusted Tobin's q than firms led by weak CEOs. The negative impact of CEO power on firm value is consistent with agency theory that self-interested CEOs extract firm value for personal advantage, subject to managerial controls. Results have implications for research and practice in capital structure, corporate governance, CEO compensation, and corporate social responsibility.Doctor of Philosophy
This study consists of two essays. Essay 1 examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on financial flexibility, and leverage decisions of the firm. Managerial entrenchment is measured using the entrenchment index. The excess cash ratio of a firm over the median cash ratio of firms measures financial flexibility. Capital structure decisions include the extent and maturity of debt as measured by debt-to-equity ratio, and average debt maturity respectively. I find that entrenched managers use less debt than managers who are not entrenched. Also, entrenched managers prefer using long-term rather than short-term debt, and they keep more excess cash than managers who are not entrenched. This is especially the case for small and large firms compared to medium sized firms. Essay 2 investigates the impact of ethical corporate citizenship and CEO power on cost of capital, and firm value. Ethical corporate citizenship (ECC) refers to firms' commitment to a culture of ethics, effective governance, leadership, and innovation. ECC is measured as a binary variable of one if a firm is listed on World's Most Ethical Companies (WMEC), and zero otherwise. CEO power is primarily measured using CEO pay slice that is calculated as CEO total compensation as a percentage of top 5 executives of the firm. Powerful CEOs have pay slice above the 50th percentile, and weak CEOs pay slice is below the 50th percentile. WMECs and non-WMECs in the same 3 digits standard industry classification, which have similar total assets as the WMECs are compared. I find that WMECs have neither lower cost of capital nor higher Tobin's q than non-WMECs. Powerful CEOs often utilize their influence to reduce cost of debt capital, but also reduce firm value compared to weak CEOs. Self-interested CEOs who extract firm value for personal advantage partly explains the negative effect of CEO power on firm value.
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Backlund, Carl-Oscar, and Viktor Granström. "Påverkar VD:ns aktieinnehav bolags finansiella prestation? : En kvantitativ studie om sambandet mellan VD:ns nivå av aktieinnehav inom bolaget och dess finansiella prestation." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-186680.
Abstract:
Titel: Påverkar VD:ns aktieinnehav bolags finansiella prestation? - En kvantitativ studie om sambandet mellan VD:ns nivå av aktieinnehav inom bolaget och dess finansiella prestation. Författare: Carl-Oscar Backlund & Viktor Granström Handledare: Jörgen Hellström Problembakgrund och problemdiskussion Synen på VD:ns roll och dennes betydelse för ett bolag har ändrats mycket genom åren. I modern tid anses en VD vara ytterst ansvarig för bolagets verksamhet, med lagstadgade uppgifter, men också samtidigt vara ansiktet utåt mot media och press. Hur pass stark är korrelationen mellan bolaget prestation och dess VD? Många börsnoterade bolag väljer att knyta VD:ns finansiella kompensation till dess aktiekurs, och på så vis få VD:n att börja arbeta mer utifrån aktieägarnas intressen. Andra bolag väljer att tillämpa olika typer av incitamentsprogram. Huruvida VD:ns aktieägande inom ett bolag påverkar bolagets prestation är studerat ur ett internationellt perspektiv, men det saknas forskning på svenska bolag. Vidare finns det ett flertal faktorer som särskiljer den position svenska bolag befinner sig i gentemot utländska bolag. Syfte Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka huruvida det finns ett samband mellan VD:ns finansiella incitament och bolagets finansiella prestation. Studien avser bolag listade på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. Vidare är syftet att redogöra för relevanta teorier inom ämnesområdet för att därefter avgöra ifall det återfinns stöd för dessa utifrån studiens resultat. Metod Studien utgår ifrån en kvantitativ metod med en deduktiv forskningsansats där en tvärsnittsstudie tillämpas med hjälp av insamlade sekundärdata. Den data som samlats in är för bolag som varit listade på stockholmsbörsen under år 2019. Multipla regressionsmodeller har skapats för att undersöka huruvida samband existerar genom testande av hypoteser. Teori Agentteorin, stewardship-teorin, entrenchment-teorin, och det resursbaserade synsättet ligger till grund för studiens teoretiska referensram tillsammans med tidigare forskning kring ämnet. Empiri & slutsats Uppsatsens resultat tyder på att inga säkerställda samband mellan VD:ns nivå av aktieinnehav och den finansiella prestationen, operationaliserat som ROA och ROE kan återfinnas under räkenskapsåret 2019 på Stockholmsbörsen. Varpå studiens resultat genomförande finner stöd för stewardship-teorin, och därmed återfinns inget stöd för agentteorin respektive entrenchment-teorin på en 5% signifikansnivå.
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Lin, Chuan-Ju, and 林娟如. "Debt Maturity Choice in CEO Entrenchment: Evidence in Taiwan." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4mt79j.
Abstract:
碩士國立交通大學
管理學院財務金融學程
107
This study examines the effect of CEO entrenchment on a firm’s debt maturity choice. We examine Taiwanese firms over the period 1998–2016 and find that entrenched managers choose long-term debt financing to avoid early liquidation. In addition, we show that the effect of CEO entrenchment on long-term debt is more pronounced for firms with a higher degree of informational opacity and poorer credit quality. Our evidence supports the agency theory argument for the manager–creditor conflict. This investigation provides novel empirical insights into CEO entrenchment and debt maturity.
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Chen, Ting-Chung, and 陳鼎中. "The Relationship between Audit Fees, CEO Perquisites and Entrenchment index in the Post-SOX Era." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61625298527808119948.
Abstract:
碩士元智大學
財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程)
105
This study examines the relationship between audit fee and CEO perquisites with Entrenchment Index, after the implement of SOX Act. Wysocki (2010) indicates that the CEO compensation is significantly positive linked with the audit fees. However, Kim et al. (2011) indicate this positive relation between CEO compensation and audit fees is mitigated for the firms which have better corporate governance. Furthermore, there is no study uses the CEO perquisites to examine the relation with audit fee. In that case, I use the Entrenchment Index (See Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009)) to be a standard of corporate governance, and examine the relationship between audit fee and perquisites. The evidence shows that the firm with higher corporate governance quality (lower E-index), the committee will ask for higher audit quality. Furthermore, the relation between audit fee and perquisites is significantly negative. However, this negative relation will be mitigated when the firm is under better corporate governance.
Books on the topic "CEOs entrenchment":
1
Rose, Nancy L. Firm diversification and CEO compensation: Managerial ability or executive entrenchment? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994.
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Rose, Nancy L. Firm diversification and CEO compensation: Managerial ability or executive entrenchment? Cambridge, Mass: Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994.
Book chapters on the topic "CEOs entrenchment":
1
Lee, Kin Wai, and Gillian Hian Heng Yeo. "Capital Structure in Asia and CEO Entrenchment." In Handbook of Quantitative Finance and Risk Management, 863–72. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77117-5_56.
2
Finet, Alain. "The Agency Theory, CEO Entrenchment and Corporate Governance Theories." In Handbook of Top Management Teams, 576–82. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230305335_68.
3
Dherment-Ferere, Isabelle, and Luc Renneboog. "Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French Companies." In Corporate Governance Regimes, 297–322. Oxford University PressOxford, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199247875.003.0013.
Abstract:
Abstract Managerial quality is maintained by the intervention of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. Yet, when insufficient monitoring or when managerial entrenchment has insulated management, markets will tend to react favorably to the CEO departures. In this chapter, we investigate whether forced CEO dismissal triggers positive abnormal returns in listed French companies. Voluntary CEO departures or unexpected deaths of CEOs may entail a loss of human capital to the firm. We analyses whether negative abnormal returns are generated in these cases. However, these market reactions may be dimmed or intensified depending on the qualities of the CEO’s successor and corporate characteristics.
4
Ferretti, Paola, and Cristina Gonnella. "Governance Practices and CEO Hubris." In Transforming Corporate Governance and Developing Models for Board Effectiveness, 161–82. IGI Global, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-6669-5.ch008.
Abstract:
This chapter analyzes the connection between CEO hubris and corporate governance contingencies, including a case study of an Italian bank for which the state of financial distress shall be linkable also to bad governance. The main objective is to verify whether, in presence of hubristic CEO, the internal control mechanisms, set to ensure the board vigilance and limit the overconfidence of the leader, are implemented, and if so, whether such mechanisms, even when formally respected, may be not so appropriate to guarantee a good governance. Particularly, the existence of a CEO hubris could neutralize their positive expected balancing effects on the power dynamics between CEO and board, such as to give prevalence to substance over form. Therefore, it may occur that some governance mechanisms (e.g., independence, non-duality), even if formally implemented, are unable to stem the managerial entrenchment of the CEO, who succeeds in enhancing immoderately his substantial power in the decision-making process.
Conference papers on the topic "CEOs entrenchment":
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Yuan, Chun-sheng. "A study of the effect of managerial entrenchment on CEO turnover in Chinese listed companies." In 2009 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2009.5318057.
Reports on the topic "CEOs entrenchment":
1
Rose, Nancy, and Andrea Shepard. Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4723.