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1
Címerová, Helena. "Three essays on the market for CEOs." Doctoral thesis, NSBE - UNL, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11838.
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Wang, Lingling. "CEO Risk Taking and Firm Policies: Evidence from CEO Employment History." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2009. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/finance_diss/15.
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I propose that CEO employment history is an observable characteristic that reveals the CEO’s unobservable risk-taking preferences. I hypothesize that CEOs that change employers more frequently (mobile CEOs) have a propensity to bear risk and implement riskier firm policies. Using a sample of S&P 1500 CEOs, I find that firms are more likely to hire mobile CEOs when the firm’s prior risk is high, firm-specific human capital is less important, the prior CEO turnover is forced, the prior CEO has a shorter tenure and the board is smaller and has fewer insiders. Mobile CEOs increase financial leverage, invest more in advertising and less in capital expenditures, and increase firm-specific risk. Mobile CEOs invest more (less) in R&D in homogenous (heterogeneous) industries where firm-specific knowledge is less (more) important in making investment decisions. Shareholders react positively to appointments of CEOs who change employers more frequently. I find no difference in long-run accounting performance for CEOs with different employment histories. Firms’ annual stock returns and sales growth are higher for CEOs who change employers more frequently. The cost of debt increases after the firm appoints a mobile CEO. These findings suggest that lower CEO risk aversion and the potential risk-shifting from shareholders to bondholders are sources of shareholder value increases. In sum, my findings provide evidence that CEO employment history is an observable characteristic that reveals the risk-taking preference of the CEO.
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Fong, Eric Alan. "Chief executive officer (ceo) responses to ceo compensation equity." [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2004. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0004160.
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Li, Ying 1971 Mar 16. "Maintaining optimal CEO incentives through equity grants and CEO portfolio rebalancing." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8479.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2002.<br>Includes bibliographical references.<br>My thesis examines the joint hypotheses that firms set optimal levels for CEO incentives, and that firms and CEOs jointly correct deviations from these optimal levels through equity grants and CEO portfolio rebalancing. I investigate two equity-based CEO incentives, pay-for-performance sensitivity and risk-taking incentive. Pay-for-performance sensitivity is defined as the change in CEO wealth for a given change in the firm's stock price, while risk-taking incentive the sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk. Chapter One examines the relation between incentive deviations and subsequent incentive adjustments based on Black-Scholes model (1973). I use this model to estimate both the incentives from CEOs' equity holdings and adjustments to these incentives. I find that firms' and CEOs' combined annual adjustment to pay-for-performance sensitivity or risk-taking incentive is negatively related to the degree that each incentive deviates from its target level at the beginning of the year, consistent with firms and CEOs jointly correcting the incentive deviations. Overall, the findings suggest that firms and CEOs coordinate their equity-granting and portfolio-rebalancing decisions to manage optimal CEO incentive levels consistent with economic theory. Chapter Two examines the relation between incentive deviations and subsequent incentive adjustments based on a certainty-equivalent approach. I only use this alternative approach to re-estimate incentive deviations, and still use Black-Scholes model to calculate incentive adjustments. The results support my findings in Chapter One.<br>by Ying Li.<br>Ph.D.
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Chaigneau, Pierre. "Essays on CEO compensation." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2009. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2050/.
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This thesis analyzes CEO compensation contracts in a principal-agent framework with moral hazard. It focuses on two issues: the form and the timing of performance-based pay. On the one hand, if CEOs are assumed to be mean-variance maximizers, I show that it is suboptimal to provide incentives with contracts which are convex in performance. This is because these contracts make the variance of pay an increasing function of the CEO's effort, which is inefficient. Sticks are more efficient than carrots, although the latter may be used in case the agent is protected by limited liability. On the other hand, if CEOs are assumed to be not only risk averse but also prudent, convex contracts and rewards may be optimal, since they protect against downside risk. A calibration of a HARA-lognormal model shows that CEO preferences which minimize the suboptimality of the typically observed contracts (relative to the optimal contract) feature decreasing absolute risk aversion, as well as low and decreasing relative risk aversion. However, when CEO pay is contingent on a lognormally distributed stock price, it is hard to rationalize the use of convex contracts for incentive provision. The thesis then examines the optimal evaluation and payment date, when the CEO's actions materialize with a lag. Information asymmetries are progressively resolved: the precision of signals that shareholders receive regarding the final outcome is increasing with time. However, the accumulation of exogenous shocks make deferred compensation noisy. The optimal timing of CEO pay, which minimizes the extent of the mispricing at the payment date, is derived. Opportunities for two types of managerial short-termism are then introduced. To ensure that the manager does not engage in short-termist and inefficient behavior, it is often optimal to reduce the power of incentives, and to postpone the evaluation and payment date.
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Johnson, Omobola. "An exploratory study of CEO practices in an emerging economy." Thesis, Cranfield University, 2013. http://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/handle/1826/8417.
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This study of CEOs in Nigeria sought to discover the practices that CEOs engaged in as
relevant and effective in an emerging economy. Twenty eight CEOs of national and
expatriate extraction running national and multi-national companies were interviewed to
understand their experiences of the contextual influences of an emerging economy and how
this impacted what they did, ie. their practices. In support of contingency theories that seek
to explain how effective leadership is the result of appropriateness of fit between particular
behaviours and particular situations , CEO practices in an emerging economy were found to
be attributable to the macro influences of an emerging economy, discovered in the Nigerian
environment to include: - undue government influence, unwholesome competitor practices,
short supply of skills and talent, inadequate social and physical infrastructure, a large
untapped market and poor government capacity to implement policies and laws. The
inclusion of previously unresearched but potentially relevant meso and micro influences of
company type and CEO nationality status led to the discovery of additional CEO practices
that were perceived to be relevant in an emerging economy context and the attribution of
differences in CEO practices to the individual or combined influence of these contexts. A
conceptual model derived from the findings of this study provided a new understanding of
the relationship between the macro influences of an emerging economy, the meso influence
of company type and the micro influence of CEO nationality status on CEO practices and the
intended outcomes of those practices. Practical knowledge about the development of business
leaders in an emerging economy has been extended as a result of deeper insights into the
contextually influenced and relevant CEO practices in an emerging economy.
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Nílsson, David, and Myhre Mauritz Smedensjö. "CEO Power, Discretion and Firm Performance : The Moderating Role of Formal CEO Board Membership." Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för nationalekonomi och statistik (NS), 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-106068.
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Background: Formal CEO board membership is a unique feature of Swedishboards. The share of firms having Formal CEO board membership hassignificantly decreased in the last 20 years and thus, this feature might haveevolved to be used as a signal of high CEO quality. CEO quality is in turnlikely to, through Formal CEO board membership, serve as a moderator of therelationship that both CEO power and CEO discretion has to firm performancewhich has previously been somewhat ambiguous. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explain how the CEO’s power anddiscretion is related to firm performance and if this relation is moderated byFormal CEO board membership. Method: To fulfill the purpose of this thesis, a deductive research approachwas used. The theoretical model used is built on four theories namely,Stewardship theory, CEO power, CEO discretion and Signaling theory. With a five-year interval stretching between 1998 to 2018, the quantitative empiricalmethod relies on compensation and financial data from Swedish firms. Conclusion: The results indicate that the relation that both CEO power andCEO discretion have to firm performance, consistent with the theoreticalmodel, is positive. The results further indicate that Formal CEO boardmembership as a signal of CEO quality can moderate these relationships. Thisfinding is, however, exclusive to the years after 2008.
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Julian, Amanda Lynn. "IDENTIFYING THE TRAITS THAT DIFFERENTIATE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PERFORMANCE LEVELS." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1126033649.
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Crighton, Lindsay. "CEO Icon to GOP Hopeful: A Quantitative Analysis Exploring Politically Motivated Celebrity CEOs." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/76998.
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This study examined the perceptions of celebrity CEOs potentially transitioning to political candidates. Using Carly Fiorina's campaign for Senator of California, this study identified how young voters perceive celebrity CEOs as politicians, their identification of celebrity CEOs, and the evaluations of CEOs and their companies. Results indicate a more favorable evaluation of Fiorina resulted in a more favorable reaction to Hewlett- Packard. Results also confirm the use of media messages to prime young voters about political candidates. Finally, political party affiliation was found to significantly influence the findings of this study while gender and political cynicism did not. Theoretical implications and areas of future research in celebrity and politics are discussed.<br>Master of Arts
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Li, Qian. "CEO Turnover and Divisional Investment." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2005. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/finance_diss/2.
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This paper examines the impact of CEO turnover from an internal capital allocation perspective. We test whether new CEOs make different divisional investment decisions than their predecessors, and if yes, how would this difference affect firm performance. We find that segment investments respond to factors, such as segment investment opportunity, segment cash flow, and other segments’ cash flows, differently after CEO turnover. Evidence also indicates that new CEOs adjust the segments’ previous over-investment /under-investment status to match industry average investment level, and they adjust the relative investment preference among divisions. These findings support the argument that different CEOs have their own set of skills and incentives, which directly affect their internal capital allocation decisions after they take over the office. We also examine the affiliation relationship between certain divisions and new CEOs, and find that new CEOs do not make capital allocation in favor their affiliated divisions. Furthermore, the analyses on firm-level internal capital allocation sensitivity do not support the literature about positive relationship between firm performance and the “Q-sensitivity”. But, our analyses do find a positive and robust relationship between changes in firm performance and changes in the “cash flow-sensitivity”. This suggests that new CEOs making internal capital allocation in favor of their “cash cow” segments are more likely to improve firm performance after CEO turnover.
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Zhang, Qiongyao. "CEO Compensation around Corporate Spinoffs." Thesis, State University of New York at Binghamton, 2018. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10620290.
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<p> Our study examines whether CEO compensation decreases in response to the reduction in firm size after a corporate spinoff. We find overall that CEO pay decreases subsequent to the spinoff, consistent with efficiency theory. However, the decrease is driven by the pay adjustment ac- companying CEO turnover around the spinoff. New CEOs hired around the spinoff have little bargaining power in regards to their compensation and thus we observe a decline in CEO compensation around these spinoff events. The compensation of those CEOs which span the spinoff event does not decrease, consistent with the notion of CEO entrenchment.</p><p>
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Intintoli, Vincent J., and Kathleen M. Kahle. "Cash Holdings and CEO Turnover." WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/623458.
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Chief Executive Offier (CEO) characteristics, such as the level of risk aversion, are known to affect corporate financial policies, and therefore are likely to impact corporate liquidity decisions. We examine changes in cash holdings around CEO turnover events, a period in which discrete changes in managerial preferences and abilities are likely to have the most dramatic effect on cash holdings. Our results suggest that cash holdings increase significantly following forced departures. The increase is persistent over the successor's tenure and is robust to controls for the standard firm-level determinants of cash holdings and corporate governance characteristics. We find that higher cash holdings arise mainly through the management of net working capital, as opposed to asset sales or reductions in investment. This suggests that the changes are optimal for shareholders rather than an indication of serious agency problems. This conclusion is supported further by our finding that the marginal value of cash does not decrease following the turnover.
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Tibbetts, Bollaert Helen. "CEO Characteristics and Firm Performance." Thesis, Lille 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011LIL20005.
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Dans les trois chapitres de cette thèse nous explorons le lien entre les performances des entreprises et les caractéristiques psychologiques des dirigeants. Dans un premier chapitre conceptuel, nous étudions les fondements théoriques des travaux en finance comportementale d'entreprise en analysant l'hubris et les concepts qui lui sont apparentés. Nous suggérons des pistes de recherche futures qui, pour certaines, sont mises en oeuvre dans les deux autres chapitres de ce travail. Dans le second chapitre, nous étudions l'impact du narcissisme des dirigeants acquéreurs et cibles sur les aspects privés d'un échantillon de fusions-acquisitions américaines. Nos résultats indiquent que desniveaux de narcissisme plus élevés chez les dirigeants acquéreurs sont associés à une plus forte probabilité que l'acquéreur initie l'opération et à une période plus courte entre l'initiation de l'opération et son annonce publique. Nos résultats suggèrent également que des niveaux de narcissisme plus élevés chez les dirigeants cibles sont positivement associés à la prime offerte et négativement associés aux rendements anormaux cumulés de l'acquéreur. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous analysons l'effet du leadership authentique du dirigeant sur les performances boursières etd'exploitation d'un échantillon d'entreprises du SBF 250. Nous collectons des données sur le leadership authentique par le biais de questionnaires. Nous analysons la différence entre les performances des entreprises en les affectant à trois portefeuilles selon le niveau de leadership authentique en utilisant l'analyse en trois facteurs de Fama et French. Nous ne trouvons aucun lien significatif entre le niveau de leadership authentique du dirigeant et la performance boursière. Dansles analyses des performances d'exploitation, nous trouvons un lien positif et significatif entre le niveau de leadership authentique et la rentabilité économique (ROA)<br>We study the effect of CEO psychological characteristics on firm performance in three papers. We first consider the theoretical background to work in behavioral corporate finance in a conceptual paper analyzing hubris and related psychological concepts. In this paper we put forward ideas for future research, some of which we implement subsequent papers. In paper 2, we study the effect of acquirer and target CEO narcissism on the private aspects of the takeover process in a sample of US M&A deals. We find that higher levels of acquirer CEO narcissism are associated with a higher probability of deal initiation by the acquirer and with a shorter length of time between deal initiation and announcement. Concerning value effects, our results suggest that higher levels of target CEO narcissism are positively related to bid premium and negatively related to acquirer cumulative abnormal returns. In addition, the difference between acquirer and target CEO narcissism is a significant factor in explaining the different aspects of the takeover process. In the third paper, we analyze the effect of CEO authentic leadership on the market and operating performance of a sample of listed French firms. We collect data on CEO authentic leadership using questionnaires. We analyze the difference in performance of firms sorted into three portfolios according to the level of CEO authentic leadership using a Fama French three factor analysis. We fail to find a significant relationship between CEO authentic leadership and market performance. In the operating performance analyses, we find a positive association between CEO authentic leadership and ROA
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MA, Yiu Chung. "CEO compensation and loan contracting." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2011. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/econ_etd/3.
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The agency theory literature implies the pay-performance based managerial compensation can relieve the agency problem between shareholders and managers. As the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned, managers have incentive to invest in best projects and hence to improve firms’ performance. While the use of equity compensation to managers may reduce the agency cost between managers and shareholders, its impact on agency cost of debts is ambiguous. On the one hand, a large portion of equity compensation discourages risk-averse managers to invest in risky investment and hence reduce the credit risk. On the other hand, while the equity compensation brings the interests of managers in alignment to shareholder it may encourage managers to take opportunistic corporate strategies and to exploit the wealth of creditors. As a result, creditors may response to the CEO compensation package by imposing different covenant restrictions according to their perception of the credit risk.
Supported with empirical evidence, this research finds that loan agreement contains more restrictive covenants if the firm’s CEO has a higher portion of option compensation to the total compensation, but contains less restrictive covenants if the firm’s CEO has a higher portion of stock compensation to the total compensation. It implies that creditors view that the increase in the use of option compensation would increase the credit risk of the firm, while the increase in the use of stock compensation would decrease the credit risk. This research also investigates the relation between the CEO option compensation and some specific financial covenants. The finding shows that the use of liquidity covenant and minimum net worth covenant is positively related to the CEO option compensation.
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MA, Yiu Chung. "CEO traits and loan contract." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2017. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/econ_etd/32.
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The first part of the thesis investigates the relationship between managerial overconfidence and loan covenant usage. Empirical findings show that creditors use significantly more covenants, increase covenant intensity, and rely on different types of covenants, such as debt-to-cash flow and coverage ratio to lower the default risk emanating from managerial overconfidence. Besides, creditors tighten individual covenants, such as debt-to-cash flow covenants and current ratio covenants in order to alleviate their risk exposure. Covenant usage is reported to be quantitatively larger in the loan contracts of firms with higher market-to-book ratios, reflecting that high-growth firms provide opportunities for overconfident CEOs to invest more excessively. To address endogeneity and self-selection, the thesis employs natural experiment with Sarbanes Oxley Acts (SOX) implemented in 2002, propensity score matching, and change-in-change equation. The results are robust in these tests. Besides, empirical evidence shows that CEO overconfidence is positively associated which loan maturity and loan amount, suggesting that the impacts of CEO overconfidence on loan contract terms are not one-sidedly negative.
The second part of the research investigates the interaction between firms' CEO compensation and overconfidence, which is crucial for banks to assess credit risk. The empirical results suggest that covenant restrictions imposed by creditors increase with CEO’s holding of option compensation but decreases with CEO’s holding of stock compensation. Option compensation and CEO overconfidence interact to accentuate the usage of financial covenants. The results also suggest that option compensation and CEO overconfidence significantly increase credit risk, mainly in young, high-growth, or high-risk firms. However, these different contract terms could not replace covenant usage, pointing to the crucial importance of using financial covenants to curb overconfidence/incentive risks.
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Bugayeva, Natalia. "Synthesis and characterisation of CeO?, Sm?O? and Sm-doped CeO? nanoparticles with unique morphologies." University of Western Australia. School of Mechanical Engineering, 2006. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2007.0012.
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[Truncated abstract] This work was concerned with investigations into the synthesis of Ce(OH)4, Sm(OH)3 and hydrated Ce-Sm mixed oxide nanoparticles with anisotropic morphologies via a chemical precipitation technique. The effect of various experimental parameters including temperature, aging time, ionic environment and thermal treatment on the morphology, structure of nanoparticles as well as elemental homogeneity of the mixed oxide nanoparticles was emphasised. It was shown that different experimental conditions resulted in different particle morphologies. This suggested that by tuning experimental parameters an ultimate goal of nanotechnology, the formation of nanoparticles with desired morphologies and sizes, may be achieved. It was found that by modifying experimental parameters it was possible to influence the development of various morphological and structural characteristics of Ce(OH)4 nanoparticles. The resulting morphologies were fibrous needle-like, rod-like and nanowire particles of various sizes. Characterisation of the nanoparticles was conducted through analysis by X-ray diffraction, surface area analysis and transmission electron microscopy techniques. Investigations into the structure of the hydrated CeO2 nanoparticles were undertaken since it is considered to be a key to the relevant properties of the material. The structure was found to exhibit multiple twinning phenomenon with 5-fold symmetry, with a consequence that atomic planes formed the particle surface. However, upon thermal treatment of needle-like particles, structural transformation was observed that possibly led to the development of more reactive and particle circumferential facets. A structural model and formation mechanism of such structures was proposed. ... A preliminary study into suitability of particle anisotropic morphology for compaction and densification processes was undertaken. Investigations into the sintering behaviour of the particles with anisotropic morphology were conducted on ceria nanoneedles. It was found that these particles displayed favourable sintering characteristics. The final densities of the hydrated ceria needle-like particle samples were achieved as high as 94.1% of the theoretical density after sintering at 1100°C for 5 hours.
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Rescigno, Elizabeth. "Relationship Between Chief Executive Officer Compensation, Duality, and Return on Equity." ScholarWorks, 2018. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/6097.
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Poor decisions and conflicts of interest by members of company boards of directors have been a factor in the dramatic rise in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, resulting in a lower return on equity (ROE) for shareholders. The purpose of this correlational study was to examine the relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size, as measured by total assets. Agency theory was the theoretical framework for this study. The study examined whether a statistically significant relationship existed between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. Archival data were collected and analyzed from a sample of publicly traded firms in the United States listed on the 2016 Standard & Poor's 500 Index. Hierarchical multiple regression techniques were used to test the relationship between variables. The results indicated that there was not a statistically significant relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. The study may contribute to positive social change by increasing the potential for board of directors' members to implement best practices, contributing to reduced shareholder conflicts, less litigation, higher ROE, and enhanced investor confidence benefiting emerging economies and local communities.
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Andersson, Fredrik, and Fredrik Lilja. "Earnings Management in times of CEO turnover : A quantitative study with the attributes – Industry, Company Size, CEO Origin, and CEO Age on the Swedish market." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-202617.
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This thesis researches to which extent companies use earnings management in times of CEO turnover, which is a continuing, complex and rather complicated issue. Earnings management was tested on different attribute such as: firm industry, firm size, CEO’s age, and the CEO’s origin (internal or external). The data was gathered through a quantitative study based on public companies’ financial reports. The sample includes 252 firms listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and have been subject of a CEO change at some occasion during 2005-2011. The statistical result from the mixed-model ANOVA tests showed in general significant result of upward earnings management the year of CEO change, but not the following year. While there are many explanations to the findings of how earnings management is used on the Swedish market, the analysis and conclusion elaborate the reason that ought to be the blueprint of reality.
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Eiras, Mélanie Sónia. "An analysis of narcissistic CEO characteristics." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/20869.
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Mestrado em Finanças<br>Os diretores executivos (CEOs) são pessoas com poder nas decisões. Alguns CEOs são conhecidos como "narcisistas", o que significa que exibem grandiosidade, auto-admiração e obsessão pelo poder.
Esta dissertação estuda as características de um CEO narcisista. Para isso, analisámos algumas características dos CEOs, como idade, género, experiência profissional, escolaridade, estado civil, nível de rendimento e autoconfiança. Além disso, também investigámos algumas características das empresas que os CEOs lideram, como vendas, tamanho da empresa e ROA.
Para tal, recorreu-se a uma amostra de empresas portuguesas registadas, recolhendo os dados a partir de um questionário online.
Os resultados indicam que existem muitas características que diferem CEOs narcisistas de CEOs não narcisistas. Os nossos estudos demonstram que CEOs narcisistas são caracterizados por CEOs mais jovens, CEOs com menos anos de experiência profissional, indivíduos que se consideram autoconfiantes, género feminino também é mais narcisista do que o género masculino. Além disso, os CEOs narcisistas recebem menos do que os não narcisistas com um rendimento de até 20,000€, os indivíduos solteiros são mais narcisistas, seguidos por pessoas divorciadas e pessoas com apenas uma licenciatura são as mãos narcisistas em comparação com pessoas que têm mestrado ou doutoramento. Além disso, no que se refere às empresas, os resultados mostram que CEOs com alto nível de narcisismo tendem a liderar empresas com ROA mais baixo (menos de 10%), empresas de menor porte (vendas até 2,000,000€ e funcionários até 10 pessoas).<br>Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are persons with power in decisions. Some CEOs are known as "narcissistic", which means that they exhibit grandiose, self-admiration and obsession with power.
This dissertation studies the characteristic of a narcissistic CEO. To do that, we investigated certain characteristics of CEOs, such as age, gender, professional experience, education, marital status, income level and self-confidence. Moreover, we also investigated some characteristics of the companies that they lead, such as sales, company size and ROA.
To do that, a sample of Portuguese registered companies was used, collecting the data from an online questionnaire.
The results indicate that are a lot of characteristics that differ narcissistic CEOs from non-narcissistic CEOs. Our studies demonstrate that narcissistic CEOs are characterized by younger CEOs, CEOs with lower experience, individuals that consider themselves as self-confident, females that are also more narcissistic than males. Moreover, narcissistic CEOs receive less than non-narcissists with an income up to 20,000€, single individuals are more narcissistic, followed by divorced persons and people with only a bachelor's degree are the most narcissistic compared with person that have master or PhD degree. Moreover, regarding the companies, results show that high narcissism CEO tend to lead companies with lower ROA (less than 10%), smaller companies (revenues up to 2,000,000€ and employees up to 10 persons).<br>info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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Nogueira, Lêda Ribeiro [UNESP]. "Toxicidade aguda e crônica do pesticida chlorantraniliprole sobre o organismo-teste Ceriodaphnia dubia." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/144509.
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Previous issue date: 2016-09-02<br>Os estudos dos efeitos de agentes tóxicos nos organismos aquáticos são necessários para o estabelecimento de concentrações seguras de exposição, destacando-se o uso para a proteção da vida aquática. Nesse contexto, o pesticida emergente chlorantraniliprole tem sido utilizado desde 2007 em algumas culturas como cana-de-açúcar, arroz, milho, maçã, uva, dentre outras. Poucas informações ecotoxicológicas sobre este pesticida são relatadas na literatura considerando-se sua atuação nos ambientes de águas doces. Diante do exposto, o objetivo deste trabalho foi avaliar os aspectos ecotoxicológicos deste inseticida sobre o organismo-teste Ceriodaphnia dubia por meio de testes de toxicidade aguda, buscando-se obter o valor médio de CE50 (48h) (Concentração que causa efeito em 50% da população em 48h, por meio da análise da imobilidade ou mortalidade) calculado por meio do Software ICPIN e do método de Interpolação Linear, e por meio de testes de toxicidade crônica, buscando-se adquirir os valores de CENO (maior concentração de efeito não observado na reprodução), CEO (menor concentração de efeito observado sobre os aspectos reprodutivos) e VC (valor crônico – média geométrica entre CENO e CEO). Os valores de CENO e CEO foram obtidos utilizando-se o Software BioStat 5.3 e o método de Kruskal-Wallis, a fim de se comparar a significância da redução no número de neonatos em relação ao grupo controle. As soluções-teste foram preparadas, a partir do padrão puro de chlorantraniliprole ( Sigma-Aldrich, 99% de pureza) e solubilizado em acetona. O resultado para a toxicidade aguda com C. dubia foi de 2,9±1,11 µg/L. Os testes de toxicidade crônica revelaram CENO de 0,61±0,33 µg/L, CEO de 0,91±0,49 µg/L e VC foi de 0,74 µg/L. Considerando-se a proteção da vida aquática, recomenda-se, com base na presente pesquisa, uma concentração de 0,74 µg/L do princípio ativo do pesticida chlorantraniliprole, como limite seguro.<br>Studies of the effects of toxic agents on aquatic organisms are needed to establish safe levels of exposure, especially the use for the protection of aquatic life. In this context, chlorantraniliprole emerging pesticide has been used since 2007 in some crops such as sugarcane, rice, corn, apples, grapes and others. Few ecotoxicological information is reported in the literature considering its performance in freshwater environments. Given the above, the objective of this study was to evaluate the ecotoxicological aspects of this insecticide on the Ceriodaphnia dubia test organism through acute toxicity tests, seeking to obtain the average value of EC50 (48h) (concentration causing effect by 50% population in 48 hours, through the analysis of inhibition of swimming or mortality), and through chronic toxicity tests, searching for acquiring the NOEC values (greater concentration effect not observed in the reproduction ), LOEC (lowest observed effect concentration on the reproductive aspects) and CV (chronic value - geometric mean of NOEC and LOEC). The NOEC and LOEC values were performed using the BioStat 5.3 software and the statistical analysis Kruskal-Wallis test to compare the significance of the reduction in the number of newborns in the control group. The test solutions were prepared from the neat standard chlorantraniliprole (Sigma-Aldrich, 99% purity) and solubilized in acetone. The results for acute toxicity C. dubia were 2.9 ± 1.11 µg / L-1. The chronic toxicity tests revealed NOEC of 0.61 ± 0.33 µg / L-1, LOEC of 0.91 ± 0.49 µg / L-1 and CV was 0.74 µg / L-1. Considering and protection of aquatic life, it is recommended based on this study, a concentration of 0.74 µg / L-1 of the active ingredient of the pesticide chlorantraniliprole as safe limit.
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Sandahl, Carl, and Fredrik Tinglöf. "The purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations : A qualitative study of CEO compensation in sports organisations from both a board perspective and a CEO perspective." Thesis, Jönköping University, Internationella Handelshögskolan, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-52731.
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Background: CEO compensation as a phenomenon is a well explored topic in both forprofit and non-profit organisations but limited research is made on sports organisations. Due to the important social role that sports organisations entails, one can argue for the need to investigate the purpose of CEO compensation in these organisations as well. Purpose: The main purpose of this study is to explore the purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations. The purpose of executive compensation will further be studied from both a CEO perspective as well as from the board perspective. Method: This thesis has an abductive research approach and proceeds from previous theories within corporate governance to investigate the purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations. The empirical part consists of a qualitative interview study to investigate if previous theories are applicable to explain the purpose of CEO compensation in these organisations or if there exists other, unexplored purposes. ii Findings: The findings of the study suggests that the view on the purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations is different from the board perspective and the CEO perspective. From the board perspective, the purpose appears to be to control the behaviour of the CEO, to gain organisational legitimacy, to make the organisation more business-oriented and to attract individuals with shared interests. On the other hand, from the CEO perspective, the purposes appear to be to increase the motivation and to attain individual legitimacy.
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Ramirez, Eduardo A. "Does Size and Industry Affect CEO Performance? The Effect of CEO Succession Announcements on Firm Value." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1410.
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This study expands on previous research regarding the effect of CEO performance on firm value. An event study is conducted using a market model of CEO successions and daily returns in order to generate predicted returns. Two separate regressions are run using a 3 day and 5 day event window respectively. The results of the regressions are using to compare abnormal returns between industries and market capitalization. While some daily abnormal returns are statistically significant, cross-sectional analysis of CAR are for the most part not significant. Further study is needed in order to come to a stronger conclusion.
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Probert, Joana Amora. "Becoming the CEO : the CEO identity construction process in the transition of newly appointed chief executives." Thesis, Cranfield University, 2015. http://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/handle/1826/9996.
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This study investigates the personal experience of newly appointed chief executives in
transitioning into the CEO role. Adopting an exploratory qualitative design, data was
obtained from two semi-structured interviews with 19 newly appointed chief executives,
for a total of 38 interviews.
The main contribution of this thesis to the extant literature is to show the ways in which
CEOs go through an identity construction process when transitioning into the role, which
is characterized in two ways. First, there exists a bi-directionality of influence between the
personal identity of the CEO and the organizational identity. Second, this process
comprises strong identity demands (lack of specificity of the role and weak situation) and
identity tensions (personal identity intrusion and identity transparency) that dispose new
CEOs towards an unbalance that promotes individuality.
This disequilibrium might hinder the integration of new chief executives into the
organization, since the data suggests that new CEOs are responsible for fostering their
own integration by connecting aspects of their personal identity with the identity and
culture of the organization. The thesis offers a theoretical model of the CEO identity
construction process and concludes with a series of propositions that address the
ramifications of these findings to our understanding of CEO succession.
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Gustafsson, Peter, and Eda Uysal. "CEO? Or More Like RiskEO? : A Cross-Sectional Study of CEO Characteristics and Firm Risk-Taking." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-149641.
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Risk is something intrinsic to business, and something firms are exposed to on a daily basis. This means that there exists a great deal of pressure on the Top Management of a firm to successfully navigate the different risks to which they are exposed. The CEO holds a unique position in the firm, as she is ultimately responsible for deciding which strategies to employ in order to properly respond to these risks. But what influenced the CEO when making such decisions? The Upper Echelon Theory suggests that decisions made by the Top Management Team of a firm are influenced by their values and their cognitive base, which is formed throughout their upbringing. Researchers on Upper Echelon Theory suggest that these two abstract constructs can be difficult to measure and analyse, and should therefore be approximated using specific and observable characteristics of the Top Management Team. In our study, this theory has applied to Swedish CEOs as they are the ultimate decision-maker in a firm. The specific characteristics observed and analysed in our investigation into the relationship between the CEO and risk are; gender, age, nationality, and tenure. Thus, the purpose of this study is formulated as follows: “The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between CEO characteristics, specifically age, gender, tenure, and nationality, and firm risk-taking, as measured by the leverage ratio, stock return volatility, cash holdings, and R&D expenditure, on the Swedish market. As a sub-purpose, we intend to investigate whether there is a nonlinear relationship between CEO tenure and risk-taking.” By collecting data from the databases, Thomson Reuters Eikon and Amadeus, a dataset of 284 firms and their CEOs was collected and used in the cross-sectional analysis. Multiple linear regression analysis was employed to determine the relationships between the previously mentioned CEO characteristics and the proxies for firm risk-taking. The majority of the relationships found were of a non-significant nature, indicating that the relationship between Swedish CEO characteristics and the strategies they employ when running their firms is weak and differs from relationships found in earlier studies, using data from different markets. The significant relationships found were between cash holdings and age, long tenures and leverage ratio, and short tenures and stock return volatility. This indicates that older CEOs are more risk-averse, while longer seated CEOs maintain less debt, and shorter seated CEOs are perceived as more risky by the market. However, as these results only entail 15% of our observed results, none of the hypotheses constructed for this study were verified. Therefore, our conclusion is that the previously observed relationships between the characteristics of CEOs and their risk-taking is not present within our sample of firms listed on the Swedish market. Some tendencies that align with previous results have been found but are not generalisable and as a result, we cannot recommend that private actors act on these results.
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Boström, Sofia, and Emelie Lund. "Compensation and Rewards : - A Family firm CEO's perspective." Thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Jönköping University, IHH, Företagsekonomi, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-48582.
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Background/Problem: The financial crisis in 2008 affected the whole economy and the CEO's compensation was one of the factors causing this crisis. Although, it is now years after the onset of the financial crisis, the CEO’s compensation is still an ongoing topic of debate and, for this reason, vital to study. According to literature, non-family CEOs are more likely to emphasize financial performance rather than socioemotional objectives and returns. On the contrary, family CEOs are more motivated by socioemotional wealth and non-financial goals. Taking these viewpoints into consideration, this study examines how CEOs in family firms view and value compensation and rewards. Purpose: This study aims to explore how family CEOs view and value compensation and rewards, in comparison to non-family CEOs in family firms. Method: This study is conducted using a qualitative method and utilizing semi-structured interviews. Five family firms participate in this study and they comprise of 4 family CEOs and 1 non-family CEO. Conclusion: The findings of this study support the idea that family CEOs view and value compensation and rewards in other terms than just financial value. Moreover, the evidence points to that the non-family CEO is more connected to financial factors. Weighing together the evidence from this study there is a difference regarding how family CEOs and non-family CEOs view and value compensation and rewards. Additionally, based on this research, SEW exists within family firms. The findings in this study contribute to the current knowledge in designing compensation packages for CEOs in family firms. Moreover, this study is the first step towards enhancing our understanding of how CEOs view and value compensation and rewards.
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Wang, Hongxia. "Essays On CEO Turnover, Succession, And Compensation." Available to subscribers only, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1879673281&sid=20&Fmt=2&clientId=1509&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2009.<br>"College of Business Administration." Keywords: CEO compensation, CEO succession, CEO turnover, Managerial discretion, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Successor age. Includes bibliographical references (p. 112-124). Also available online.
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Peng, Yan. "Accounting system quality and CEO compensation /." view abstract or download file of text, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3181120.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2005.<br>Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-71). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Yau, Josephine Tan Hwang. "CEO personal attributes and corporate decisions." Thesis, Durham University, 2017. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/12319/.
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This thesis examines the effect of CEOs’ personal attributes on CEOs’ optimistic behaviour and further investigates their effect on corporate leasing and hedging decisions. We integrate behavioural finance with management, leadership and psychological approaches to provide a better understanding of the influence of personal attributes on CEO optimistic behaviour and decision making. By investigating 248 CEOs who worked with the UK FTSE 100 firms from 2000 to 2013, we find that CEO personal attributes (traits, skills & experiences, and networking) do cultivate CEOs’ optimistic behaviour (acquisitiveness in the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) market). CEO personal traits that were examined in this study are age, gender, nationality and marital status. We find (chapter 2) that for CEO personal traits; younger, male, married and UK nationality CEOs are likely to be optimistic. CEO skills and experiences (e.g. their educational background (MBA, or PhD holder), founder status, financial literacy, duality, tenure as CEO, and emoluments) have also been found to have significant positive relationships with CEO optimism. In the case of CEO networking attributes, we examine CEOs’ internal networking (tenure with the firm, and internal promotion), and CEO external networking ties (external directorships, and social networking prestige) and find that CEO networking ties have a significant positive influence on triggering CEO optimistic behaviour. In addition, we propose three personal attributes indexes, namely Traits Index (TI), Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), and Networking Index (NI). Once again all the indexes have a significant influence on cultivating CEO optimistic behaviour. This thesis adds to the growing literature on behavioural finance by proposing an alternative proxy to managerial optimism (chapter 2) – the CEO Optimism Index (CEOOI) - and by investigating the influence of CEOOI on corporate decisions such as corporate leasing (chapter 3) and hedging decisions (chapter 4). This study uses manually collected information relating to Mergers and Acquisitions, Stock Option exercise behaviour, Insider Transaction and CEO personal attributes. In addition, we also manually collected data on operating lease, finance lease and total lease for corporate leasing analysis (chapter 3) and the derivative instruments data for a study of corporate hedging (chapter 4). The results (chapter 3) suggest that optimistic CEOs tend to use more lease financing. This finding is in line with the notion that optimistic CEOs are reluctant to raise external funding by issuing new equity as they believe that the capital market tends to undervalue their firms (Heaton, 2002). Additionally, since optimistic CEOs are highly confident of their own ability to bring in future earnings, they are unwilling to share the potential earnings with new equity holders and avoid this by choosing lease financing (lease is a type of debt). Hedging decisions results (chapter 4) indicate that optimistic CEOs employ more financial derivatives to hedge potential firm risks. Optimistic CEOs have high self-confidence, are committed to the firm’s good outcome and believe they themselves can control the firm’s future earnings; hence they use derivative instruments to control and reduce the firm’s cash flow volatility to deliver more predictable outcomes. Our findings provide evidence that CEOs’ personal attributes and optimistic behaviour affected corporate leasing and hedging decisions. Our study suggests that recognizing the presence and importance of CEO personal behaviour will help bridge the gap between the theory and practice of corporate decisions.
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Monteiro, Suse Filipa dos Santos. "Caracteristicas individuais do CEO e Turnover." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/12439.
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Mestrado em Contabilidade, Fiscalidade e Finanças Empresariais<br>O objetivo do presente estudo é a identificação dos fatores determinantes do turnover dos CEOs (Chief Executive Officers), focando nas suas características individuais, como idade, tempo de permanência no cargo, dualidade e género, tendo sido estas as variáveis analisadas. A análise foi efetuada para um período compreendido entre os anos 2000 e 2012, sendo a amostra do estudo composta por 2.508 CEOs pertencentes a 1.552 empresas cotadas europeias. Para a análise estatística destes dados usaram-se modelos de regressão logística, tendo-se concluído que as características individuais dos CEOs são efetivamente determinantes relevantes do seu turnover. De acordo com os resultados, são os CEOs mais velhos, com menor tempo de permanência no cargo, não sendo presidentes do conselho de administração, assim como os CEOs femininos, aqueles que têm maior propensão para o turnover.<br>This paper aims to identify the factors that determine CEO's (Chief Executive Officers) turnover, focusing on their individual characteristics such as age, tenure, duality and gender, that were the variables analyzed. The study covers the period between 2000 and 2012, covering 1.552 European listed companies, and 2.508 CEOS. Using a logistic regression models, the results show that the individual characteristics of the CEOs are in fact determinant for their turnover. According to the results the older CEOs, with shorter tenure, that are not presidents of the board, as well as the female CEOs, are the ones that are more likely to turnover.
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Almeida, Ana Margarida Martins de. "When do startups hire a CEO?" Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/13235.
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Mestrado em Finanças<br>Este estudo avalia os fatores que levam um fundador a contratar um Director Geral (Gestor Profissional) para a sua empresa.
A literatura anterior tem vindo a estudar os Directores Gerais e as startups separadamente, sendo o tema de estudo ignorado. Pretendemos contribuir para a literatura ao pesquisar em que momento as startups decidem contratar um Gestor Profissional e as transformações que daí ocorrerão.
A revisão da literatura refere: se as startups contratam ou não um Gestor Profissional, quais os determinantes para o contratar e, por fim, quais as características de um Gestor Profissional. Para esclarecer esta investigação, utilizamos dados recolhidos através de uma entrevista semi-estruturada e complementa-mo-la com fontes secundárias.
A nossa amostra inclui startups incubadas na região de Lisboa, que contrataram um Gestor Profissional ou que permaneceram com os fundadores iniciais no papel de CEO (Gestor Fundador).
A nossa principal conclusão indica que o Gestor Fundador tem habilidades de liderança incomparáveis e ao ser crucial na vida de uma startup, a longo prazo, as empresas geralmente permanecem com estes no papel de Director Geral.<br>This study evaluates the factors that drive a founder to hire a Chief Executive Officer (Professional CEO) for its start-up. Previous literature have studied CEOs and start-ups, separately, being the study topic itself ignored. We aim to contribute to the literature by researching in which moment the startups decide to hire a Professional CEO and the transformations that from there will occur.
The literature review refers to: startups hire or not a Professional-CEO, which are the determinants to hire him/her and finally, which are the characteristics of a Professional-CEO.
To enlighten this investigation, we use data collected through a semi-structured interview and complement it with secondary sources. Our sample includes startups incubated in the region of Lisbon, which hired a Professional CEO or remained with the initial founders in the role of CEO (Founder-CEO).
Our major findings indicate that as Founder-CEO have unmatched leadership skills and are crucial in the life of a startup, in the long-term, the ventures usually remain with them in the role of Chief Executive Officers.<br>info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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Santos, Pedro José Inácio da Costa. "Does CEO turnover influence dividend policy?" Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/19397.
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Mestrado em Finanças<br>Neste estudo pretendemos estudar se as mudanças de CEO influenciam a política de dividendos das empresas.
Este trabalho é motivado pela extensiva conceptualização e análise empírica de que as mudanças de CEO e a política de dividendos têm sido alvo ao longo dos anos. No entanto, a nosso conhecimento, não existe até agora literatura empírica que relacione mudanças de CEO com política de dividendos. Por isso, com este estudo pretendemos contribuir para um tópico que ainda não foi estudado.
Os dados usados neste estudo contêm 394 empresas cotadas no S&P 500 Index com um período de amostra entre 2004 e 2017. Os resultados da análise feita sugerem que mudanças de CEO aumentam o rendimento dos dividendos das empresas em 0.2%. Além disso, mudanças de CEO que ocorrem entre 2008 e 2012 têm um efeito positivo no rendimento dos dividendos de 0.5% e levam a uma diminuição dos dividendos pagos pelas empresas. Durante esta crise financeira, o preço por ação é mais volátil, por isso, quando uma empresa anuncia a mudança de CEO, os mercados vão reagir de uma forma mais drástica, resultando num preço por ação ainda mais baixo, aumentando, ainda mais, o rendimento dos dividendos. Os resultados também referem que a mudança de CEO tem um efeito positivo nos dividendos por ação e no rendimento dos dividendos depois da crise financeira.
Assim, na prática este trabalho evidencia, pela primeira vez, que a mudança de CEO tem um impacto significativo na política de dividendos.<br>In this research, we aim to assess whether CEO turnover influences firms' dividend policy.
This work is motivated by the extensive conceptualisation and empirical research that CEO turnover and dividend policy have been subject to throughout the years. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical literature that links CEO turnover and dividend policy, so far. Therefore, with this study we intend to contribute to an unexplored topic.
The data used in this study contains 394 firms listed in the S&P 500 Index with a sample period between 2004 and 2017. The empirical evidence suggests that CEO turnover increases firms' dividend yield by 0.2%. Moreover, CEO turnover that occurs during 2008 and 2012 has a positive effect on the dividend yield of 0.5%, although it leads to a decrease in the dividends paid by firms. During the financial crisis stock prices are more volatile, therefore, when a firm announces a CEO turnover, the market reacts less smoothly and may lead to even lower stock prices, increasing, even more, the dividend yields. Evidence also indicates that CEO turnover has a positive effect on dividend per share and dividend yield after the financial crisis.
Thus, this work contributes to practice since evidences, for the first time, that CEO turnover has a significant impact on dividend policy.<br>info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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Toscano, Roberta. "Board members’ attitudes to CEO arrogance." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/23055.
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As a CEO assumes an important role in an organization, his or her personality, with emphasis on arrogance, may affect a multitude of board members’ attitudes. This study gauges the effect of CEO arrogance on board members’ attitudes, which includes the engagement; cohesiveness; collaboration; job satisfaction; consensual decision making and desirability of the CEO. This investigation drew from existing literature that personality traits affect a leaders’ effectiveness in terms of group performance and followers’ satisfaction (Avolio, Gardner, Walumbwa, Luthans&May, 2004). Through experimental design, actual board meetings were simulated and CEO arrogance was manipulated, mainly by adapting the indicators from the Arrogance Scale in the Workplace developed by Johnson et al. (2010). Experiments were conducted in samples of MBA students and senior management consultants of roughly similar demographics. The findings confirmed that CEO arrogance has a detrimental effect on all the board members’ attitude. Arrogance accounted for almost 60 per cent of the board members’ attitudes ratings. This study is confirms that an arrogant CEO negatively affects the board member dynamics which are essential in maintaining an effective board. This urges the organizations to acquire non-arrogant CEOs to improve the organisation’s productivity. Alternatively, an organization can consider alternatives to dilute a CEO’s arrogance.<br>Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012.<br>Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)<br>unrestricted
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Stancill, Alan Jonathan. "CEO Severance Agreements and Tax Avoidance." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77862.
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This study investigates the association between CEO severance agreements and corporate tax avoidance. Severance agreements, by providing executives with additional compensation when there is a change in employment status, should serve to encourage additional risk-taking, as reflected by increased tax avoidance activities. Using a large sample of aggregate compensation data, I find some evidence of a relation between the presence of a CEO severance agreement and tax avoidance. Using a smaller sample of hand-collected data, I find a significant negative relation between the magnitude of cash severance pay and tax avoidance and a significant positive relation between the magnitude of equity severance pay and tax avoidance. Overall, this study provides evidence that the structure and magnitude of severance agreements are related to tax avoidance.<br>Ph. D.
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Uygur, Ozge. "CEO POLITICAL DONATIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2010. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/100132.
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Business Administration/Finance<br>Ph.D.<br>This dissertation studies the association between CEO ability and various aspects of corporate governance, specifically firm performance, executive compensation contracts and firm opacity. In the first essay of this dissertation (Chapter 2), I examine the effect of CEO ability on firm performance. My analysis uses a unique instrument of CEO ability that is based on a CEO's commitment decisions in US presidential elections. Intuitively, CEO ability is measured based on how well they forecast US presidential elections, one year prior to the race, relative to the candidates expected chances of winning. I find that this instrument of CEO ability is positively related to firm performance. Interestingly, I find that high ability CEOs have a greater impact on Tobin's q in small firms than in large firms. Yet, high ability CEOs have the greatest dollar impact on shareholder value in large firms. In addition, CEO ability appears to be quite important to outside shareholders in high growth firms. Lastly, I find that CEO ability is positively associated to merger announcement returns, which implies that higher ability CEOs engage in value-creating merger activities. The results are robust to industry and time controls, as well as various tests that consider an alternative explanation focusing on political influence.
The second essay (Chapter 3) explores the effect of CEO ability on the structure and level of compensation contracts. I find that CEO ability is positively associated with total compensation level. CEOs in the highest quartile of the ability proxy earn almost $2.2 million more than CEOs in the lowest quartile of CEO ability. Further analysis indicates that CEO compensation structure differs markedly between the highest and lowest ability CEOs. Specifically, I find that the high ability CEOs receive 2.1% more stock based incentives than low ability CEOs. Thus, the low ability CEOs receive more of their pay in the form of cash compensation than do high ability CEOs. Further tests indicate that high ability CEOs have significantly greater variance in their pay than low ability CEOs, specifically due to the higher variance in stock based incentives. Overall, I provide evidence that CEO pay is associated with CEO ability and that CEO ability appears a key issue in designing CEO compensation contracts.
In the third essay (Chapter 4), I examine whether CEO ability is related to corporate opacity. I argue that high-ability CEOs may seek to create greater transparency to convey their ability to the market. Simultaneously, low-ability CEOs may be signal-jamming the market's inferences about their talent by limiting the available information. An alternative aspect is that the results are driven by low-ability CEOs who seek to work in opaque firms. My analysis indicates that firms with high-ability CEOs are significantly less opaque than firms with low-ability CEOs. These findings are also robust to using a propensity score matched sample. Finally, I show that the deteriorating impact of corporate opacity on firm performance decreases when the decision belongs to a high-ability CEO, suggesting that opacity is not necessarily value-destructing decision for corporations. Overall, my analysis suggests that CEO ability is an important factor for corporate opacity.<br>Temple University--Theses
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Shan, Wei-Yang, and 沈維洋. "CEO Duality, CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70313957562413056749.
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碩士<br>東海大學<br>會計學系<br>97<br>This study examines the relationships among CEO duality, CEO compensation, and firm performance. Panel data was collected from listed companies on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) during 1999-2005, and construct simultaneous equations model with three-stage least squares estimation.
Empirical results show that (1) CEO duality is significantly negative associated with CEO compensation; (2) the CEO duality is also significantly positive associated with ROA and EP; (3) CEO compensation is significantly positive associated with current performance and they are jointly determined; (4) a negative relationship exists between current performance (or CEO compensation) and subsequent CEO compensation (or performance); (5) the interaction effect of CEO compensation and CEO duality is significantly negative associated with subsequent ROA.
The findings indicate that the leadership structure of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange is consistent with stewardship theory. It implies that firms’ incentive compensation mechanism overemphasizes short-run financial performance on CEO compensation contract. That would lead to CEO’s dysfunctional behavior and be unfavorable to firm’s future performance.
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Fernandes, Filipe Nunes de Carvalho Catarino. "Substituição do CEO." Master's thesis, 2015. https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/handle/10216/81436.
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Fernandes, Filipe Nunes de Carvalho Catarino. "Substituição do CEO." Dissertação, 2015. https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/handle/10216/81436.
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WANG, YU-WEN, and 王郁雯. "CEO Ownership and Earnings Management: The Moderating Effect of CEO Power." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/41319706296326284824.
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碩士<br>國立高雄應用科技大學<br>財富與稅務管理系碩士在職專班<br>105<br>This thesis contains listed firms in Taiwan from 1996 to 2015 to investigate the relationship between CEO ownership and earnings management, and explore whether the CEO power has effect on the relationship between them. The results indicate the non-linear relationship between CEO ownership and earnings management, earnings management increases with a low CEO ownership level, but earnings management increases with CEO ownership at a higher ownership level. When the CEO ownership is low, the earnings management is used to enhance the financial performance and help CEO entrenchment. However CEO take downside risk where earnings manipulation is detected, thus CEO with a particular ownership level will reduce the earnings manipulation behavior. The result also finds that CEO power has positive effect on the relationship between CEO ownership and earnings management. According to stewardship theory, the chairman of the board serves as CEO will have a positive effect on firm operating, and reduce the earnings manipulation. In addition, the chairman of the board serves as CEO means the CEO entrenchment thus reduce the incentive of CEO to enhance performance through earnings manipulation.
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Huang, Ching-Ting, and 黃靖婷. "Are CEO turnover and CEO pay cuts solutions to financial distress?" Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/v9454u.
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碩士<br>元智大學<br>財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程)<br>107<br>CEOs is important in financial distress because CEOs play a role of the main decision maker in their firms. If they make wrong decisions, they will cause their companies are in crisis. Therefore, I would like to know whether CEO pay cuts and force to turnover are good policies or not when firm is in financial distress. The sample of my study is 426 public listed companies in the USA from 2000 to 2015 which are in financial distress. And I divide the policies of CEOs into three types:(1)pay cuts,(2)forced turnover,(3)no action. Further, I focus on the sample of CEOs force to turnover. The results show that if CEOs are forced to turnover, the company's performance will be better; if totalpay of CEOs is significantly decreasing , the company will be better able to solve financial distress.
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Chen, Hsiang, and 陳薌. "The Determinants of CEO Turnover-From Accounting Performance and CEO Characteristics Perspective." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/15173631335060475746.
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碩士<br>真理大學<br>管理科學研究所<br>97<br>Our research using accounting performance and CEO characteristic analyzed the main reasons of CEO turnover. We evaluated corporate performance by dividing its finance numbers into four sectors; debt payable ability in short term and long term, profit ratio and market value from traditional accounting view. In characteristic analysis of CEO, we used not only the effect factors, providing by other researchers, but also other factors of studying background to analysis the CEO turnover. The empirical results found that short-term debt payable ability of inventory turnover and CEO turnover showed no obvious relation. Long term debt payable ability of liabilities to equity ratio and CEO turnover showed obviously negative relation. Short-term earnings ability of total assets returned ratio and CEO turnover showed negative relation. Long term debt payable ability of sales growth rate and CEO turnover showed negative relation. Market value of price earnings ratio and CEO turnover show negative relation but did not reach standard level. CEO education levels and CEO turnover showed positive relation. Education background and CEO turnover have not direct relation. Besides, foreign degrees and CEO turnover showed negative relation. Therefore, this research supports the main reason caused by CEO turnover is accounting performance and CEO characteristics supplement.
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Lee, Pei-Chen, and 李珮禎. "CEO succession plan disclosure and its effect on the CEO succession process." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/gdtw7u.
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碩士<br>元智大學<br>財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程)<br>107<br>This paper studies the effect of CEO succession plan disclosure on the process of identifying its CEO successor. A CEO succession plan helps evaluate the capability of the top executives and identify a competent successor when the existing CEO steps down. Therefore, we find a firm that discloses its succession plan is more likely to force out an underperforming CEO. In addition, the board of such firms has long term plan and is better prepared for CEO succession and thus can find a competent successor in the event of CEO forced and retire turnover. That is, such firms are more likely to hire a permanent successor, may take shorter time to name its permanent successor, and will have more increased performance after the turnover.
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Lin, Hung-Ju, and 林宏儒. "CEO Compensation and Takeover." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93832503444016056883.
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碩士<br>國立交通大學<br>財務金融研究所<br>102<br>This paper investigates the relationship between the incentive compensation and takeover activities including friendly takeover events and hostile takeover events. Due to the fact that hostile takeover is perceived as a high risk task, therefore to test whether the higher incentive compensations granted to CEOs in advance are strong enough to compensate them for choosing to challenge the hostile takeover tasks which are associated with higher risk, rather than choosing the safer friendly takeover jobs is our main purpose. On the other hand, we will also examine that whether the incentive compensation granted to the CEOs in advance will make them to use the cash-only method of payment which is associated with high risk to merge the target firms instead of choosing the stock-only or even the mix tactics. Our result shows that the incentive compensation granted to the acquiring firm’s CEOs beforehand actually urge them to choose a riskier future career path namely to implement the high risk hostile takeover jobs. In addition, we also find out that the incentive compensation granted to the CEOs in advance will urge them to use the cash-only method of payment to acquire the target firms.
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Lai, Chang-Hong, and 賴昌宏. "Overconfident CEO and Hedge." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/71540903827445331051.
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碩士<br>國立雲林科技大學<br>財務金融系碩士班<br>100<br>This paper examines the relation between CEO overconfidence and derivative usage. Using a sample of 605 US observations over year 2005 through 2010, we find that firms with overconfidence CEO have higher chance to use derivative than firms without overconfidence managers. Furthermore, we examine the impact of derivative usage by overconfidence CEO. The results show that hedge firms have lower performance than non-hedge firms. Overconfidence CEO with derivative usage have inferior performance than non-overconfidence CEO in using derivative.
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Abakah, Emmanuel Joel Aikins. "CEO Network In Finance." Thesis, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2440/121338.
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This thesis examines how information flow among CEOs with social and professional connections affects firms and the market environment. Using biographical information about CEOs of U.S. public companies supplied by BoardEx from 2000-2016, the thesis relies on CEOs’ educational background, employment history and social activities (e.g., social clubs) to estimate the social and professional connections of CEOs as a measure of firms’ network size. The thesis then examines how networks among CEOs facilitate commonality in liquidity and commonality in asset growth among connected firms. The essay titled “CEO Connectedness and Commonality in Liquidity”, examines the effects of CEOs’ social and professional networks on stock liquidity commonality. We hypothesize that the stock liquidity of firms whose CEOs are connected will covary. In this essay, we uniquely construct our measure of commonality in stock liquidity among connected firms and provide strong evidence supporting the hypothesis. Outcomes reveal that the more connections firms share with each other, the more their stock liquidity comove. The essay further tests channels through which CEOs social and professional networks drive commonality in stock liquidity across connected firms. Results indicate that similarity in corporate finance policies and trading activities across connected firms are two channels through which CEOs’ personal connections drive liquidity covariation. We address endogeneity concerns and provide results that demonstrate that the magnitude of stock liquidity covariation among connected firms reduces when a CEO dies. The essay titled “CEO Peer Effects and Commonality in Asset Growth”, sought to investigate whether educational, social and professional networks among CEOs affect managerial asset growth decisions. We hypothesize that the asset growth rate of firms whose CEOs are connected will comove because of group thinking and peer influence. Using biographical information regarding CEOs of U.S. public firms from 2000 – 2016, the results suggest that CEO connectedness facilitates asset growth covariation. We conclude that a CEO is more likely to increase assets if peers in the network have recently done so leading to asset growth covariation across connected firms. Next, we test for channels through which CEOs’ connections may drive asset growth commonality across connected firms. The results reveal that commonality in asset growth decisions among connected firms stems from two possible channels: the adoption of related acquisition and research and development investment strategies. On the economic benefits of commonality in asset growth to shareholders, results show that commonality in asset growth across connected firms affects shareholders negatively. On endogeneity, tests indicate that the death of a CEO significantly reduces the extent of asset growth comovement between connected firms.<br>Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Business School, 2019
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Xie, Zong-Ting, and 謝宗廷. "CEO Narcissism, International Strategy and Corporate Social Responsibility：The Moderating effect of CEO power." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/35460083403274630652.
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碩士<br>國立中正大學<br>企業管理系研究所<br>105<br>Today, internationalization is major trend. The firms gain profit through firm internationalization. In the meantime, the public concerns whether firms make social responsibility.. As top decision makers for their firms, CEOs have the ultimate responsibility and power to utilize their perspectives for strategy formulation and implementation. Especially, characteristics of CEOs will affect strategic decision processes and among those characteristics, narcissism plays an important role. The research aims to examine the effect of narcissistic CEOs on the firms’ internationalization process, international market distance and corporate social responsibility initiatives. In addition, this thesis discusses the moderating effect of CEO power.
This study was based on data collected from Taiwan Economic Journal(TEJ).The samples were tested hypotheses by using data from 519 firms over the period 2014-2015. The empirical evidence indicates that narcissism in CEOs is positively related to the depth of internationalization, the scope of internationalization, the institutional distance of international market, and the cultural distance of international market, as well as the corporate social responsibility initiatives. Moreover, we also find that this positive relationship is stronger when the CEOs have high power.
The study has important theoretical contributions. First, existing literature on the upper echelon theory has long focused on demographics like the age, functional background, and industry tenure to explain the CEO’s influence on firm’s strategy. The present study advances this research on the CEO’s personality. Second, the concepts of narcissism or overconfidence have been widely discussed in personality and finance literature .Our study contributes to strategy management research by introducing personality psychology, such as narcissism. Third, we introduce important psychological measurement, signature size, to narcissistic indicator and modify corporate social responsibility indicator.
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"Inside or outside CEO succession and firm performance: evidence from CEO turnover in China." 2010. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5894378.
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Xiao, Rui.<br>"August 2010."<br>Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 28-30).<br>Abstracts in English and Chinese.<br>Abstract --- p.i<br>摘要 --- p.ii<br>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.iii<br>Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1<br>Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.2<br>Chapter 3. --- Research Hypothesis --- p.5<br>Chapter 3.1 --- Institutional Background --- p.5<br>Chapter 3.2 --- Hypothesis Development --- p.6<br>Chapter 3.2.1 --- Firm Performance and Outside Succession --- p.6<br>Chapter 3.2.2 --- Board Composition and Outside Succession --- p.6<br>Chapter 3.2.3 --- Predecessor Characteristics and Outside Succession --- p.7<br>Chapter 3.2.4 --- Successor Characteristics and Outside Succession --- p.7<br>Chapter 3 2 --- 5 Performance Consequences and the Source of Successor --- p.9<br>Chapter 4. --- Methodology --- p.9<br>Chapter 4.1 --- Measurement --- p.9<br>Chapter 4.2 --- Bivariate Probit with Sample Selection --- p.11<br>Chapter 4.3 --- Event Study --- p.13<br>Chapter 5. --- Data --- p.15<br>Chapter 5.1 --- Sample Selection and Data Sources --- p.15<br>Chapter 5.2 --- Descriptive Statistics --- p.16<br>Chapter 6. --- Empirical Results --- p.17<br>Chapter 6.1 --- The Determinants of Outside Succession --- p.17<br>Chapter 6.1.1 --- Univariate Tests of Outside Succession and Firm Performance --- p.17<br>Chapter 6.1.2 --- Univariate Tests of Outside Succession and Board Composition --- p.18<br>Chapter 6.1.3 --- Univariate Tests of Outside Succession and Predecessor Characteristics --- p.18<br>Chapter 6.1.4 --- Regression Results --- p.18<br>Chapter 6.2 --- Outside Succession and Successor Characteristics --- p.21<br>Chapter 6.2.1 --- Univariate Tests --- p.21<br>Chapter 6.2.2 --- Regression Results --- p.21<br>Chapter 6.3 --- Market Reaction and CEO Succession --- p.22<br>Chapter 6.4 --- Post-turnover Performance and Outside Succession --- p.23<br>Chapter 6.5 --- Robustness Tests --- p.26<br>Chapter 7. --- Conclusion --- p.26<br>Reference --- p.28<br>Table 1. The Percentage of CEO Outside Succession during the Sample Period …… --- p.31<br>Figure 1. CEO Turnover and Outside Succession in Each Year --- p.32<br>Figure 2. Outside Succession Rate in the Turnover Sample --- p.32<br>Table 2. Literature Summary of Outside Succession --- p.33<br>Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables --- p.34<br>Table 4. Outside Succession Rates at Different Performance Levels --- p.36<br>Table 5. Relation between Outside Succession Rates and Board Composition --- p.37<br>Table 6. Relation between Outside Succession Rates and CEO Predecessor Characteristics --- p.38<br>Table 7. Outside Successions Regression Results --- p.39<br>Table 8. CEO Successor Characteristics --- p.41<br>Table 9. Regression Results of the CEO Successor Characteristics --- p.42<br>Table 10. Cumulative Abnormal Returns around the Announcement of CEO
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Lin, Pin-Hsin, and 林品馨. "CEO Reputation and Earnings Quality." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/92p77b.
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碩士<br>國立東華大學<br>會計與財務碩士學位學程<br>100<br>Financial reporting credibility is important because decision-useful information is well appreciated by all market participants. This paper explores if CEO reputation matters to corporate financial reporting quality by examining their connections. The efficient contracting hypothesis suggests that reputed CEOs are associated with good earnings quality, while the rent extraction hypothesis argues the opposite. Empirical results indicate that reputed CEOs are associated with better earnings quality than less-reputed CEOs, supporting the efficient contracting hypothesis. In addition, this paper incorporates corporate governance variables to investigate their impact on earnings quality on firms helmed by reputed CEOs. Empirical findings indicate no significant effects, advocating the stewardship theory. In-depth analysis reveals that reputation effects are more pronounced in family firms for their strong incentive to protect longevity and reputation of the family. In the family firm context, non-family member CEOs is more sensitive to reputation than family member CEOs in providing higher quality earnings information. The results respond the public interest in knowing that CEO reputation matters to financial reporting quality.
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Zhou, Yibin. "Earnings distortion and CEO compensation." 2006. http://link.library.utoronto.ca/eir/EIRdetail.cfm?Resources__ID=449771&T=F.
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Pan, Chien-Chih, and 潘建志. "The Leadership Style of CEO." Thesis, 1997. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83323331920017980390.
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Song, Yu-Chen, and 宋妤甄. "CEO ability and firm innovation." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/8u9ard.
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碩士<br>中原大學<br>會計研究所<br>105<br>This study examines whether a chief executive officers (CEOs) with general managerial skills
promotes innovation. The results of this study provide direct evidence that the generalist CEOs
produce more patent counts than specialist CEOs.