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Relevant bibliographies by topics / CEO

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Academic literature on the topic 'CEO'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 August 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "CEO"

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Yunusa, Ibrahim, Mohammed Babakatun Abubakar, and Mohammed Maidugu Umar. "Moderating Effect of Independent Directors on the Relationship between Chief Executive Officers Characteristics and Performance of Listed Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria." Journal of Business Management and Economic Development 1, no. 03 (September 29, 2023): 510–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.59653/jbmed.v1i03.284.

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The study examined the moderating effect of independent directors on the relationship between Chief Executive Officers characteristics and performance of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. Ex-post facto research design was used and panel data was collected from the audited annual financial statements of thirteen listed DMBs in Nigeria for a period of 2014-2022. Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method of Panel Regression, Fixed and Random Effects was employed in its estimations with the aid of STATA Software Version 14. Performance is dependent variable proxied by Return on Assets and Tobin’s Q, the independent variable is CEO characteristics proxied by CEO tenure, CEO gender, CEO age, CEO educational level, CEO financial expertise, CEO duality, CEO political connection and CEO ownership, the moderating variable is independent directors while board size and bank size are the control variables. The study found that CET, CEG, CEE, CFE, CPC, IDD and CEO have significant positive effect on banks performance, CEA has significant negative effect on banks performance while CED has non-significant positive effect on performance of listed DMBs in Nigeria. Also, the study found that independent directors did not only have a positive and significant direct effect on bank performance, but it also moderates the relationship between CEO characteristics and DMBs performance. However, the study recommends that Central Bank of Nigeria should make it mandatory for DMBs in Nigeria to have a board majorly composed of independent directors since their presence on board strengthens the relationship between CEO characteristics and banks performance.

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Siregar, Anitaria, and Khomsiyah Khomsiyah. "THE EFFECT OF CEO CHARACTERISTICS AND CARBON EMISSION DISCLOSURE ON FIRM PERFORMANCE WITH BUSINESS ETHICS DISCLOSURE AS A MODERATING VARIABLE." Assets: Jurnal Akuntansi dan Pendidikan 12, no. 1 (April 29, 2023): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.25273/jap.v12i1.12177.

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<p class="JurnalASSETSABSTRAK"><strong>ABSTRACT</strong></p><p>This study examines the effect of CEO characteristics and carbon emission disclosure (CED) on firm performance with business ethics disclosure (BED) as a moderating variable. The conclusion from this study is that CEO education and CED significantly affect a firm's financial performance. Meanwhile, CEO tenure and age do not significantly affect a firm's financial performance. BED can moderate the influence of CEO education and CEO age on a firm's financial performance. However, neither CEO characteristics nor CED had any significant effect on non-financial performance. In addition, BED does not moderate the effect of CEO characteristics and CED on non-financial performance.</p><p class="JurnalASSETSABSTRAK"><strong><em>ABSTRAK</em></strong><em></em></p><p>Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk meneliti pengaruh CEO characteristics dan carbon emission disclosure (CED) terhadap kinerja perusahaan dengan business ethics disclosure (BED) sebagai variabel moderasi. Kesimpulan dari penelitian ini yaitu CEO education dan CED berpengaruh signifikan terhadap kinerja keuangan perusahaan. Sementara CEO tenure dan CEO age tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap kinerja keuangan perusahaan. BED mampu memoderasi pengaruh CEO education dan CEO age terhadap kinerja keuangan perusahaan. Namun untuk kinerja non keuangan, baik CEO characteristics dan CED tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap kinerja non keuangan tersebut, serta BED tidak memoderasi pengaruh CEO characteristics dan CED terhadap kinerja non keuangan.</p>

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Zhang, Ni, Huiyuan Xue, and Rongrong Hu. "The activity and stability of CeO2@CaO catalysts for the production of biodiesel." RSC Advances 8, no. 57 (2018): 32922–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1039/c8ra06884d.

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Hakim, Luqman, and Mitsalina Tantri. "CEO Power, CEO Founder, CEO Financial Expertise, CEO Ownership, CEO Tenure on Bank Performance in Indonesia." Atestasi : Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi 6, no. 1 (March 30, 2023): 13–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.57178/atestasi.v6i1.570.

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The purpose of this research is to examine the influence of the personal characteristics of the chief executive officer (CEO) on the performance of commercial banks in Indonesia. In addition, it also analyzes the nonlinear relationship of CEO power, CEO founder, CEO financial expertise, CEO ownership, and CEO tenure to bank performance. A balanced panel data approach has been used in this study. In particular, fixed effect estimation techniques were used to examine the relationship between CEO power, CEO founder, CEO financial expertise, CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and bank performance from 2015 to 2021. so that the total amount of data processed is 3,780 data. The writer finds that the professional qualifications of CEOs are in bank performance. In addition, the impact of the CEO's financial expertise and tenure was positive and significant on performance. And the influence of CEO power, CEO founder, and CEO ownership was seen to be negative and not crucial to bank performance. CEO tenure is beneficial for bank performance. Experienced CEO contributes to higher bank performance. The results are robust across various bank performance proxies and control variables. This study provides insight into the policy regulators and policymakers entrusted with appointing CEOs in banks in light of the ongoing regulatory reforms in Indonesia. This study is one of the early studies examining the relationship between CEO power, CEO founding, CEO financial expertise, CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and bank performance from an emerging economy perspective. It also expands on existing studies to consider both state-owned and private banks operating in Indonesia.

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Kim, Hyeong Joon, and Seongjae Mun. "Does CEO Confidence Complement or Substitute Antitakeover Provisions?: Evidence from CEO Turnover." Korean Business Education Review 36, no. 4 (August 31, 2021): 117–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.23839/kabe.2021.36.4.117.

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Magdalena, Renna, and Yanuar Dananjaya. "CEO Capability and CEO Arrogance." International Journal of Scientific Research and Management 9, no. 07 (July 26, 2021): 2319–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.18535/ijsrm/v9i07.em06.

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This study aims to see the effect of the CEO Capabilities and CEO Arrogance to fraudulent financial statements indication. The study used a sample of all manufacturing companies from 2017 to 2019. In accordance with the sample selection, there are 162 manufacturing companies that meet the sample criteria. In this study using multiple linear regression test. This study uses secondary data for the 2017-2019 annual report. Based on the results that have been tested, CEO capability as a respected party (CEO Age), CEO capability as the person who knows the most about the company (CEO Tenure) and CEO arrogance as a person who has political connections (CEO Political Connection) have an influence on the indication of fraudulent financial statements. Furthermore, the hypothesis of CEO Capability in Accounting/finance knowledge (CEO Education), CEO arrogance in the form of narcissism (CEO PIC) and CEO arrogance as company founder (Founder CEO) have no influence on indications of fraudulent financial statements.

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Sung, Jaehwan, Jaeseung Moon, and Suyeong Kim. "A Study on The Relationship Among Emotional Leadership, CEO Trust, Work Engagement, and CEO Legitimacy." Korean Review of Corporation Management 10, no. 1 (February 28, 2019): 153–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.20434/kricm.2019.02.10.1.153.

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Leesombun, Arpron, Karnchanarat Thanapakdeechaikul, Jiraporn Suwannawiang, Pipada Mukto, Sivapong Sungpradit, Norasuthi Bangphoomi, Tanasak Changbunjong, Orathai Thongjuy, Thekhawet Weluwanarak, and Sookruetai Boonmasawai. "Effects of Coleus amboinicus L. Essential Oil and Ethanolic Extracts on Planktonic Cells and Biofilm Formation of Microsporum canis Isolated from Feline Dermatophytosis." Antibiotics 11, no. 12 (December 1, 2022): 1734. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/antibiotics11121734.

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Microsporum canis is an important zoonotic fungus that causes dermatophytosis in domestic animals and their owners. Domestic cats are the primary reservoir for M. canis. Antifungal drugs frequently produce adverse effects on the host animal, increasing the demand for novel alternative treatments derived from nature. We evaluated the antifungal activity of Coleus amboinicus essential oil (CEO) and ethanolic extracts (CEE) against M. canis in planktonic and biofilm growth. Twelve clinical isolates of M. canis were identified in feline dermatophyte samples. Using GC-MS, 18 compounds were identified in CEO, with carvacrol being the major constituent. HPLC analysis of CEE revealed that it contained rosmarinic acid, apigenin, and caffeic acid. The planktonic growth of all M. canis isolates was inhibited by C. amboinicus extracts. The minimum inhibitory concentration at which ≥50% of the isolates were inhibited (MIC50) was 128 µg/mL (32–256 µg/mL) for both CEO and CEE. The MIC90 values of CEO and CEE were 128 and 256 µg/mL, respectively. CEO at MIC (128 µg/mL) and 2× MIC (256 µg/mL) significantly inhibited the biofilm formation of weak, moderate, and strong biofilm-producing M. canis. CEE at 2× MIC (256 µg/mL) significantly inhibited the biofilm formation of all isolates. Overall, C. amboinicus extracts inhibited planktonic growth and exhibited a significant antibiofilm effect against M. canis. Thus, C. amboinicus is a potential source of natural antifungal compounds.

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Yu, Chia-Feng (Jeffrey). "CEO Overconfidence, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Manipulation." Journal of Management Accounting Research 26, no. 2 (January 1, 2014): 167–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-50722.

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ABSTRACT In the wake of recent financial crises and corporate failures, chief executive officers (CEOs) are often blamed for their overconfidence leading to earnings manipulation and excessive risks. Why is it then that these overconfident CEOs obtain job offers in the first place? This paper presents a novel explanation for the co-existence of CEO overconfidence and earnings manipulation observed in practice. In an agency model with an external capital market, I identify two potential reasons for a board to hire an overconfident CEO and design a contract that accommodates earnings manipulation: an internal motive, directed at maximizing the ex ante firm value, and an external motive, directed at enhancing the interim market valuation of the firm. The flip side, however, is that the firm can be more likely to become insolvent and bear greater risks of bankruptcy. Some policy implications and limitations are also discussed. JEL Classifications: D86; G34; M41.

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Brown, Rayna, and Neal Sarma. "CEO overconfidence, CEO dominance and corporate acquisitions." Journal of Economics and Business 59, no. 5 (September 2007): 358–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.04.002.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "CEO"

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Címerová, Helena. "Three essays on the market for CEOs." Doctoral thesis, NSBE - UNL, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11838.

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Wang, Lingling. "CEO Risk Taking and Firm Policies: Evidence from CEO Employment History." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2009. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/finance_diss/15.

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I propose that CEO employment history is an observable characteristic that reveals the CEO’s unobservable risk-taking preferences. I hypothesize that CEOs that change employers more frequently (mobile CEOs) have a propensity to bear risk and implement riskier firm policies. Using a sample of S&P 1500 CEOs, I find that firms are more likely to hire mobile CEOs when the firm’s prior risk is high, firm-specific human capital is less important, the prior CEO turnover is forced, the prior CEO has a shorter tenure and the board is smaller and has fewer insiders. Mobile CEOs increase financial leverage, invest more in advertising and less in capital expenditures, and increase firm-specific risk. Mobile CEOs invest more (less) in R&D in homogenous (heterogeneous) industries where firm-specific knowledge is less (more) important in making investment decisions. Shareholders react positively to appointments of CEOs who change employers more frequently. I find no difference in long-run accounting performance for CEOs with different employment histories. Firms’ annual stock returns and sales growth are higher for CEOs who change employers more frequently. The cost of debt increases after the firm appoints a mobile CEO. These findings suggest that lower CEO risk aversion and the potential risk-shifting from shareholders to bondholders are sources of shareholder value increases. In sum, my findings provide evidence that CEO employment history is an observable characteristic that reveals the risk-taking preference of the CEO.

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Fong, Eric Alan. "Chief executive officer (ceo) responses to ceo compensation equity." [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2004. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0004160.

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Li, Ying 1971 Mar 16. "Maintaining optimal CEO incentives through equity grants and CEO portfolio rebalancing." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8479.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2002.
Includes bibliographical references.
My thesis examines the joint hypotheses that firms set optimal levels for CEO incentives, and that firms and CEOs jointly correct deviations from these optimal levels through equity grants and CEO portfolio rebalancing. I investigate two equity-based CEO incentives, pay-for-performance sensitivity and risk-taking incentive. Pay-for-performance sensitivity is defined as the change in CEO wealth for a given change in the firm's stock price, while risk-taking incentive the sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk. Chapter One examines the relation between incentive deviations and subsequent incentive adjustments based on Black-Scholes model (1973). I use this model to estimate both the incentives from CEOs' equity holdings and adjustments to these incentives. I find that firms' and CEOs' combined annual adjustment to pay-for-performance sensitivity or risk-taking incentive is negatively related to the degree that each incentive deviates from its target level at the beginning of the year, consistent with firms and CEOs jointly correcting the incentive deviations. Overall, the findings suggest that firms and CEOs coordinate their equity-granting and portfolio-rebalancing decisions to manage optimal CEO incentive levels consistent with economic theory. Chapter Two examines the relation between incentive deviations and subsequent incentive adjustments based on a certainty-equivalent approach. I only use this alternative approach to re-estimate incentive deviations, and still use Black-Scholes model to calculate incentive adjustments. The results support my findings in Chapter One.
by Ying Li.
Ph.D.

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Chaigneau, Pierre. "Essays on CEO compensation." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2009. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2050/.

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This thesis analyzes CEO compensation contracts in a principal-agent framework with moral hazard. It focuses on two issues: the form and the timing of performance-based pay. On the one hand, if CEOs are assumed to be mean-variance maximizers, I show that it is suboptimal to provide incentives with contracts which are convex in performance. This is because these contracts make the variance of pay an increasing function of the CEO's effort, which is inefficient. Sticks are more efficient than carrots, although the latter may be used in case the agent is protected by limited liability. On the other hand, if CEOs are assumed to be not only risk averse but also prudent, convex contracts and rewards may be optimal, since they protect against downside risk. A calibration of a HARA-lognormal model shows that CEO preferences which minimize the suboptimality of the typically observed contracts (relative to the optimal contract) feature decreasing absolute risk aversion, as well as low and decreasing relative risk aversion. However, when CEO pay is contingent on a lognormally distributed stock price, it is hard to rationalize the use of convex contracts for incentive provision. The thesis then examines the optimal evaluation and payment date, when the CEO's actions materialize with a lag. Information asymmetries are progressively resolved: the precision of signals that shareholders receive regarding the final outcome is increasing with time. However, the accumulation of exogenous shocks make deferred compensation noisy. The optimal timing of CEO pay, which minimizes the extent of the mispricing at the payment date, is derived. Opportunities for two types of managerial short-termism are then introduced. To ensure that the manager does not engage in short-termist and inefficient behavior, it is often optimal to reduce the power of incentives, and to postpone the evaluation and payment date.

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Johnson, Omobola. "An exploratory study of CEO practices in an emerging economy." Thesis, Cranfield University, 2013. http://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/handle/1826/8417.

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This study of CEOs in Nigeria sought to discover the practices that CEOs engaged in as relevant and effective in an emerging economy. Twenty eight CEOs of national and expatriate extraction running national and multi-national companies were interviewed to understand their experiences of the contextual influences of an emerging economy and how this impacted what they did, ie. their practices. In support of contingency theories that seek to explain how effective leadership is the result of appropriateness of fit between particular behaviours and particular situations , CEO practices in an emerging economy were found to be attributable to the macro influences of an emerging economy, discovered in the Nigerian environment to include: - undue government influence, unwholesome competitor practices, short supply of skills and talent, inadequate social and physical infrastructure, a large untapped market and poor government capacity to implement policies and laws. The inclusion of previously unresearched but potentially relevant meso and micro influences of company type and CEO nationality status led to the discovery of additional CEO practices that were perceived to be relevant in an emerging economy context and the attribution of differences in CEO practices to the individual or combined influence of these contexts. A conceptual model derived from the findings of this study provided a new understanding of the relationship between the macro influences of an emerging economy, the meso influence of company type and the micro influence of CEO nationality status on CEO practices and the intended outcomes of those practices. Practical knowledge about the development of business leaders in an emerging economy has been extended as a result of deeper insights into the contextually influenced and relevant CEO practices in an emerging economy.

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Nílsson, David, and Myhre Mauritz Smedensjö. "CEO Power, Discretion and Firm Performance : The Moderating Role of Formal CEO Board Membership." Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för nationalekonomi och statistik (NS), 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-106068.

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Background: Formal CEO board membership is a unique feature of Swedishboards. The share of firms having Formal CEO board membership hassignificantly decreased in the last 20 years and thus, this feature might haveevolved to be used as a signal of high CEO quality. CEO quality is in turnlikely to, through Formal CEO board membership, serve as a moderator of therelationship that both CEO power and CEO discretion has to firm performancewhich has previously been somewhat ambiguous. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explain how the CEO’s power anddiscretion is related to firm performance and if this relation is moderated byFormal CEO board membership. Method: To fulfill the purpose of this thesis, a deductive research approachwas used. The theoretical model used is built on four theories namely,Stewardship theory, CEO power, CEO discretion and Signaling theory. With a five-year interval stretching between 1998 to 2018, the quantitative empiricalmethod relies on compensation and financial data from Swedish firms. Conclusion: The results indicate that the relation that both CEO power andCEO discretion have to firm performance, consistent with the theoreticalmodel, is positive. The results further indicate that Formal CEO boardmembership as a signal of CEO quality can moderate these relationships. Thisfinding is, however, exclusive to the years after 2008.

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Julian, Amanda Lynn. "IDENTIFYING THE TRAITS THAT DIFFERENTIATE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PERFORMANCE LEVELS." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1126033649.

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Crighton, Lindsay. "CEO Icon to GOP Hopeful: A Quantitative Analysis Exploring Politically Motivated Celebrity CEOs." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/76998.

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This study examined the perceptions of celebrity CEOs potentially transitioning to political candidates. Using Carly Fiorina's campaign for Senator of California, this study identified how young voters perceive celebrity CEOs as politicians, their identification of celebrity CEOs, and the evaluations of CEOs and their companies. Results indicate a more favorable evaluation of Fiorina resulted in a more favorable reaction to Hewlett- Packard. Results also confirm the use of media messages to prime young voters about political candidates. Finally, political party affiliation was found to significantly influence the findings of this study while gender and political cynicism did not. Theoretical implications and areas of future research in celebrity and politics are discussed.
Master of Arts

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Li, Qian. "CEO Turnover and Divisional Investment." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2005. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/finance_diss/2.

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This paper examines the impact of CEO turnover from an internal capital allocation perspective. We test whether new CEOs make different divisional investment decisions than their predecessors, and if yes, how would this difference affect firm performance. We find that segment investments respond to factors, such as segment investment opportunity, segment cash flow, and other segments’ cash flows, differently after CEO turnover. Evidence also indicates that new CEOs adjust the segments’ previous over-investment /under-investment status to match industry average investment level, and they adjust the relative investment preference among divisions. These findings support the argument that different CEOs have their own set of skills and incentives, which directly affect their internal capital allocation decisions after they take over the office. We also examine the affiliation relationship between certain divisions and new CEOs, and find that new CEOs do not make capital allocation in favor their affiliated divisions. Furthermore, the analyses on firm-level internal capital allocation sensitivity do not support the literature about positive relationship between firm performance and the “Q-sensitivity”. But, our analyses do find a positive and robust relationship between changes in firm performance and changes in the “cash flow-sensitivity”. This suggests that new CEOs making internal capital allocation in favor of their “cash cow” segments are more likely to improve firm performance after CEO turnover.

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Books on the topic "CEO"

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Chŏng-yŏn, Kim, ed. Hanʼguk ŭi CEO =: CEO of Korea. Sŏul-si: Eksŏllŏnsŭ Kʻoria, 2008.

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Kim, Sŏng-ho. Hanʼguk ŭi CEO =: CEO of Korea. Sŏul-si: Eksŏllŏnsŭ Kʻoria, 2008.

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Shekshnia, Stanislav, Kirill Kravchenko, and Elin Williams. CEO School. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7865-1.

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Blumberg, Matt, ed. Startup CEO. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118683194.

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Frydman, Carola. CEO compensation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.

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Dunaway, Michele. Bachelor Ceo. Toronto ; New York: Harlequin, 2009.

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Ayob, Osman. CEO baru. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2013.

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Agung, A. M. Lilik. CEO wisdom. Jakarta: Elex Media Komputindo, 2011.

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Dayton, Ogden, ed. CEO succession. Oxford [UK]: Oxford University Press, 2000.

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Bebchuk, Lucian A. Ceo centrality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 2007.

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Book chapters on the topic "CEO"

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Cribb, Dwight, and Gisbert Rühl. "CEO-Kommunikation." In Kommunikation in der digitalen Transformation, 21–32. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-17630-3_3.

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Villars, P., K. Cenzual, J. Daams, R. Gladyshevskii, O. Shcherban, V. Dubenskyy, V. Kuprysyuk, I. Savysyuk, and R. Zaremba. "(CeO)4Ga2S5." In Structure Types. Part 10: Space Groups (140) I4/mcm – (136) P42/mnm, 312. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19662-1_246.

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Devers, Cynthia E., and W. Gerard Sanders. "CEO Compensation." In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 220–24. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-00772-8_30.

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Clark, Cynthia E. "Ceo Succession." In Giving Voice to Values in the Boardroom, 61–74. First Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2021. | Series: Giving voice to values: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429058547-5.

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Clark, Cynthia E. "Ceo Compensation." In Giving Voice to Values in the Boardroom, 75–89. First Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2021. | Series: Giving voice to values: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429058547-6.

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Devers, Cynthia E., and W. Gerard Sanders. "CEO Compensation." In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 1–5. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_30-1.

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Fehrenbach, Franz. "CEO Bosch." In Innovating at the Top, 103–16. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230595248_7.

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Cikaliuk, Monique, Ljiljana Eraković, Brad Jackson, Chris Noonan, and Susan Watson. "CEO Succession." In Responsible Leadership in Corporate Governance, 182–205. New York: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003054191-7.

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Gottschalk, Petter. "CEO Blame Games." In CEOs and White-Collar Crime, 121–51. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55935-3_7.

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Larcker, David F., and Brian Tayan. "CEO Succession Planning." In The Handbook of Board Governance, 141–58. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119245445.ch7.

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Conference papers on the topic "CEO"

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Lytle, Nicholas, Veronica Cateté, Yihuan Dong, Danielle Boulden, Bita Akram, Jennifer Houchins, Tiffany Barnes, and Eric Wiebe. "CEO." In CompEd '19: ACM Global Computing Education Conference 2019. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3300115.3309527.

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Yilmaz, Neslihan. "CEO overconfidence." In 2010 International Conference on Financial Theory and Engineering (ICFTE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icfte.2010.5499429.

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Tatlı, Hasan Sadık, Melih Sefa Yavuz, Gökten Öngel, and Gözde Bozkurt. "Board Structure and CEO Characteristics as Determinants of Firm Performance: An Analysis on BIST 100 Firms." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c15.02859.

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Today, the Upper Echelon and Power theories are widely used to explain firm performance. These theories relate the size of top management and the power of managers (especially the CEO) to firm performance. However, no research has been found in the Turkish literature examining how senior management structure and CEO power affect firm performance. The aim of the study was determined as "detection of the effect of the structure of the board of directors and the characteristics of the CEO on the financial performance of the companies". In the research, a data set was created by considering the tenure of CEOs (7 years and above) in companies traded in the Borsa Istanbul 100 Index. The research data set includes 16 companies covering the period between 2016-2022, and the variables were obtained from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database. The dependent variables of the research are ROA, ROE and Tobin's Q, and the independent variables are CEO age, CEO duality, number of CEO titles, board size and board independence. Data were analyzed by the panel data analysis method. According to the research findings, CEO duality Tobin's Q, CEO age has a negative effect on ROA. Board size and CEO age have a positive effect on ROE. The number of titles held by the CEO and the board of directors' independence does not significantly affect firm performance. Research findings are important in showing the effect of board structure and CEO characteristics on firm performance.

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"Message from the CEO." In Patient Safety Forum 2019, Conference Proceedings, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of National Guard Health Affairs. British Medical Journal Publishing Group, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjoq-2019-psf.ceo.

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Kosut, Oliver, and Lang Tong. "The Byzantine CEO Problem." In 2008 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - ISIT. IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isit.2008.4594945.

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Lavrencic Stangar, Urska, Boris Orel, I. Grabec, and B. Ogorvec. "Optical and electrochemical properties of CeO 2 and CeO 2 -TiO 2 coatings." In Optical Materials Technology for Energy Efficiency and Solar Energy, edited by Anne Hugot-Le Goff, Claes-Goeran Granqvist, and Carl M. Lampert. SPIE, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.130553.

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Vempaty, Aditya, and Lav R. Varshney. "CEO problem for belief sharing." In 2015 IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/itw.2015.7133076.

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Beauchamp, Yves. "A Word from the CEO." In 2006 IEEE International Symposium on Industrial Electronics. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isie.2006.296020.

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Segers, Roxane, Tommaso Caselli, and Piek Vossen. "The Circumstantial Event Ontology (CEO)." In Proceedings of the Events and Stories in the News Workshop. Stroudsburg, PA, USA: Association for Computational Linguistics, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.18653/v1/w17-2706.

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Zhang, Long, and Lijun Liu. "The Relationship between CEO-Executive Demographic Dissimilarity and Non-CEO Executive Turnover: The Chinese Case." In 2010 International Conference on E-Product E-Service and E-Entertainment (ICEEE 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iceee.2010.5660773.

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Reports on the topic "CEO"

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Frydman, Carola, and Dirk Jenter. CEO Compensation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w16585.

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Bebchuk, Lucian, Martijn Cremers, and Urs Peyer. CEO Centrality. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13701.

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Ahmmed, Bulbul, and Andrew Noy. CEO Conversations. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), December 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1906019.

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Graham, John, Hyunseob Kim, and Mark Leary. CEO-Board Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26004.

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Pan, Yihui, Tracy Yue Wang, and Michael Weisbach. CEO Investment Cycles. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19330.

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Jenter, Dirk, and Katharina Lewellen. CEO Preferences and Acquisitions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17663.

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Galasso, Alberto, and Timothy Simcoe. CEO Overconfidence and Innovation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w16041.

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Gow, Ian, Steven Kaplan, David Larcker, and Anastasia Zakolyukina. CEO Personality and Firm Policies. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22435.

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Bandiera, Oriana, Stephen Hansen, Andrea Prat, and Raffaella Sadun. CEO Behavior and Firm Performance. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23248.

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Seybold, Patricia. Priorities for Microsoft’s New CEO. Boston, MA: Patricia Seybold Group, February 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1571/vs02-13-14cc.

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