Academic literature on the topic 'Censorship – Government policy – China'

We develop a theory of how an authoritarian regime interactively uses information manipulation, such as propaganda or censorship, and policy improvement to maintain social stability. The government can depict the status quo policy more popularly supported than it actually is, while at the same time please citizens directly by enacting a costly reform. We show that the government’s ability of making policy concessions reduces its incentive to manipulate information and improves its credibility. Anticipating a higher chance of policy concessions and less information manipulation, citizens are more likely to believe the government-provided information and support the regime. Our model provides an explanation for the puzzling fact that reform coexists with selective information disclosure in authoritarian countries like China.

This study analyzes the news coverage of Covid-19 between 23rd Jan. to 29th Feb. in 2020 on The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. Based on theories of news framing theory, this study employs the method of news discourse analysis to examine the virus news. The results of discourse analysis show that these two newspapers emphasize the criticism on China's political system and related policy through a western perspective of liberalism and democracy, rather than the epidemic itself. The major themes include the criticism on China's medical system, the Chinese government's media censorship, and the description of China as a threat to the world which could be seen as the macro-proposition behind all the other themes.During the one-month research period, there are very few coverage on the Chinese government's policy against the epidemic such as the official subsidy on virus test and treatment, nation-wide medical support to Wuhan, community isolation policy, or the mobile cabin hospitals. Furthermore, we seldom see the reporting of the cooperation between China and the World Health Organization. The exclusion of these themes in the reporting narrowly and negatively presents the country of China and further strengthens the negative image of the Chinese government as a dictator and global threat.

This article examines the basis of legal regulation and Internet censorship in China. The genesis, development and relevant regulatory basis of legal regulation of Internet in China is examined. The author comes to the conclusion that on the one hand, Internet in China is subject to tight control due to the rapid development of technologies of observation and increase of police access to user data. Currently, China is one of the leaders in engineering and export of automated instruments for monitoring social networks. The citizens face restrictions based on the control of login accounts that give access to the Internet; blockchain apps and their developers are also subject to control and must provide registration of real names of the users; international corporations, such as Apple, Microsoft, Linkedin, are forced to bend to the demands of Chinese authorities and help to determine and punish the users who do not adhere to the censorship requirements in China. On the other hand, Chinese government makes everything possible for the large scale implementation of information technologies into socioeconomic life of the country, namely industrial and commercial sectors. Usage of internet in the sphere of sociopolitical life restricted, since China justifiably sees a threat to political stability and social security of the country.

The conduct of traditional public diplomacy was merely concerned on the engagement of state actors. Not to mention, diplomatic communication is only occurred between the government officials by intention to earned political changes in targeted countries. Recently, public diplomacy is mainly focused on the positive reputation building in the other country and is conducted through political and economic cooperation among two countries or more, by involving the non-state actors also. Starting from its economic reforms initiative, China is engaged in international trade and successfully became one of global economic powers. By its rapid raise, China is feared to be a national threat to other countries, be it politically, economically, or even for the national security. Even more, the Western media often portrays China’s image in a negative light. Hence, in improving its global image, China expands its global outreach by establishing cooperation with the United States film industry, Hollywood, that strengthen by the 2012’s Memorandum of Understanding upon film industry, also by implementing Chinese censorship policy, where negative portrayals of China is prohibited. The conduct of censorship itself would be supervised under state-ruled agency, the SAPPRFT, and is supported by the involvement of Chinese multinational companies investors. Through this research study, the effort of China’s public diplomacy on the utilization of Hollywood as the United States film industry would be proven through new public diplomacy theory. Further, the role of multinational corporations will be assessed due to its essential contribution in enhancing Chinese censorship in Hollywood films for its global release.

Purpose The paper aims to reveal how the Chinese government has tried to regulate transnational cultural flows by applying cultural policies. Design/methodology/approach The paper compares the dissemination of different foreign television programmes in China since the 1980s. The documents of cultural policy released since 1990s, news reports and the statistics of imported dramas since 2000s will be analyzed. Findings The research finds that the Chinese government has treated cultural products from different countries in unequal ways. Political-diplomatic relationships and the need for ideological control, influence the making of cultural policy. Restricting the quota of imported dramas, censorship and propaganda are measures taken by the Chinese government to regulate transnational cultural flows. Research limitations/implications The paper mainly focuses on platforms such as state-owned television stations and internet. The role of pay-cable channel in disseminating imported dramas should be taken into consideration in the future research. Practical implications The paper provides a systematic understanding on the development of Chinese cultural policy. Originality/value The paper offers an alternative approach to explore the policy-oriented dissemination of transnational cultural flows other than market-oriented dissemination.

The Chinese government has long been suspected of hiring as many as 2 million people to surreptitiously insert huge numbers of pseudonymous and other deceptive writings into the stream of real social media posts, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary people. Many academics, and most journalists and activists, claim that these so-called 50c party posts vociferously argue for the government’s side in political and policy debates. As we show, this is also true of most posts openly accused on social media of being 50c. Yet almost no systematic empirical evidence exists for this claim or, more importantly, for the Chinese regime’s strategic objective in pursuing this activity. In the first large-scale empirical analysis of this operation, we show how to identify the secretive authors of these posts, the posts written by them, and their content. We estimate that the government fabricates and posts about 448 million social media comments a year. In contrast to prior claims, we show that the Chinese regime’s strategy is to avoid arguing with skeptics of the party and the government, and to not even discuss controversial issues. We show that the goal of this massive secretive operation is instead to distract the public and change the subject, as most of these posts involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results fit with what is known about the Chinese censorship program and suggest how they may change our broader theoretical understanding of “common knowledge” and information control in authoritarian regimes.

This study explores the relationship between China’s rise and media censorship around the world, in light of recent suggestions in the Western press and among China experts that Beijing is advancing a global censorship agenda. I argue that the Chinese government occasionally promotes censorship in foreign countries, because it wishes to reduce negative media coverage of China or to silence certain groups abroad (e.g. Falun Gong). More often, China’s relative apathy about speech and press freedoms in foreign countries facilitates censorship in countries that can rely on trade with Beijing. Countries that cannot rely on China are less willing to risk alienating Western powers by violating press freedoms at home. Regime type is an important determinant as to whether censorship is facilitated through intensive economic integration with China, as democracies may respond to China’s rise differently than authoritarian countries. Analysis of country-level panel data shows higher rates of media censorship in democratic countries that trade intensively with China.

We offer the first large scale, multiple source analysis of the outcome of what may be the most extensive effort to selectively censor human expression ever implemented. To do this, we have devised a system to locate, download, and analyze the content of millions of social media posts originating from nearly 1,400 different social media services all over China before the Chinese government is able to find, evaluate, and censor (i.e., remove from the Internet) the subset they deem objectionable. Using modern computer-assisted text analytic methods that we adapt to and validate in the Chinese language, we compare the substantive content of posts censored to those not censored over time in each of 85 topic areas. Contrary to previous understandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely to be censored. Instead, we show that the censorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content. Censorship is oriented toward attempting to forestall collective activities that are occurring now or may occur in the future—and, as such, seem to clearly expose government intent.

AbstractAs the Australian government has legislated for a ‘News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code’ to compel Google and Facebook to pay for news content, platform regulation in Australia has prompted a heated discussion worldwide. Questionable business practices have incited issues such as anti-competition behaviour, online harms, disinformation, algorithmic advertising, trade of data, privacy breaches and so on. Consequently, these technology tycoons are reinscribing industries and societies alike, posing a threat to digital democracy. This chapter examines how Facebook and WeChat are (or should be) regulated in Australia, the current regulatory frameworks, and the overall effectiveness of self-regulation. Through the lenses of comparative research, this study is focused on infrastructuralisation, techno-nationalism (censorship), and civil society (media diversity), to identify distinct features and common themes in platform regulation and explore possible solutions to regulating global platforms in Australia.

Chinese-sponsored Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones offer African countries opportunities for new sources of investment, employment, skills transfer and technology transfer that promote industrialisation. For more than 15 years, these economic zones have provided a window into the complexities of transforming African aspirations for industrialisation into realities. Through policy frameworks and incentives, Chinese firms have been encouraged to link with local economies. Despite varied outcomes, African support for industrial parks remains strong. To be sustainable, African Special Economic Zones need constructive partnerships and strong African governance, backed by high-quality data to inform both Chinese and African government decisions.

This paper attempts to understand and provide policy recommendations on the development and performance of the emerging elderly care system in the People’s Republic of China. The three-tiered elderly system in the country consists of home-based care as the core support, community-based care as necessary support, and residential care as supplementary support. The main policies and progress of the system are explained, including insights on how the government encourages private sector involvement. A key recommendation of this paper is the need for better integration of residential and home- and community-based care as part of the elderly care system.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

This SIPRI Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of China’s attitudes to and policies on Afghanistan since the August 2021 Taliban takeover. It examines the scope of China’s security, economic and humanitarian interests, and the depth of its engagement so far. It finds that China’s footprint has been minimal not only due to China’s non-interference policy but also to a range of broader challenges: the militant extremist groups that continue to operate on Afghan soil, the risks of investing in a country where the government remains unrecognized by any member of the international community and a fragile stability that is far from conducive to long-term planning. While there may be prospects and opportunities for China to contribute to Afghan stability and development, particularly from a broader regional perspective, current realities mean that China’s overall approach to Afghanistan will remain cautious, pragmatic and limited.

The internet and digital technologies are upending global trade. Industries and supply chains are being transformed, and the movement of data across borders is now central to the operation of the global economy. Provisions in trade agreements address many aspects of the digital economy – from cross-border data flows, to the protection of citizens’ personal data, and the regulation of the internet and new technologies like artificial intelligence and algorithmic decision-making. The UK government has identified digital trade as a priority in its Global Britain strategy and one of the main sources of economic growth to recover from the pandemic. It wants the UK to play a leading role in setting the international standards and regulations that govern the global digital economy. The regulation of digital trade is a fast-evolving and contentious issue, and the US, European Union (EU), and China have adopted different approaches. Now that the UK has left the EU, it will need to navigate across multiple and often conflicting digital realms. The UK needs to decide which policy objectives it will prioritise, how to regulate the digital economy domestically, and how best to achieve its priorities when negotiating international trade agreements. There is an urgent need to develop a robust, evidence-based approach to the UK’s digital trade strategy that takes into account the perspectives of businesses, workers, and citizens, as well as the approaches of other countries in the global economy. This working paper aims to inform UK policy debates by assessing the state of play in digital trade globally. The authors present a detailed analysis of five policy areas that are central to discussions on digital trade for the UK: cross-border data flows and privacy; internet access and content regulation; intellectual property and innovation; e-commerce (including trade facilitation and consumer protection); and taxation (customs duties on e-commerce and digital services taxes). In each of these areas the authors compare and contrast the approaches taken by the US, EU and China, discuss the public policy implications, and examine the choices facing the UK.

In recent years, mission-oriented approaches have received growing interest in science, technology and innovation (STI) policies against the background of two developments. First, while so-called “horizontal” or “generic” approaches to research, technology and innovation policies have largely been successful in improving the general innovation performance or the rate of innovation, there are perceived limitations in terms of insufficiently addressing the direction of technological change and innovation. Second, “grand societal challenges” emerged on policy agendas, such as climate change, security, food and energy supply or ageing populations, which call for thematic orientation and the targeting of research and innovation efforts. In addition, the apparent success of some mission-oriented initiatives in countries like China, South Korea, and the United States in boosting technological development for purposes of strengthening competitiveness contributed to boosting the interest in targeted and directional government interventions in STI. Against the backdrop of this renewed interest in mission-oriented STI policy, the OECD has addressed the growing importance of this topic and launched a project looking into current experiences with Mission-Oriented Innovation Policy (MOIP). The present study on MOIP in Austria was commissioned by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Climate Action, Energy, Mobility, Environment, Innovation and Technologiy (BMK) and comprises the Austrian contributions to this OECD project. The study aims at contributing Austrian experiences to the international debate and to stimulate a national debate on MOIP.

Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in particular, on the role of religious populism in digital space as a catalyst for undemocratic politics in the five Asian countries we have selected as our case studies. The focus on the West Asian and South Asian cases is an opportunity to examine authoritarian religious populists in power, whereas the East Asian countries showcase powerful authoritarian religious populist forces outside parliament. This report compares internet governance in each of these countries under three categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. These are the digital toolkits that authorities use to govern digital space. Our case selection and research focus have allowed us to undertake a comparative analysis of different types of online restrictions in these countries that constrain space foropposition and democratic voices while simultaneously making room for authoritarian religious populist narratives to arise and flourish. The report finds that surveillance, censorship, disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks—along with targeted arrests and violence spreading from digital space—are common features of digital authoritarianism. In each case, it is also found that religious populist forces co-opt political actors in their control of cyberspace. The situational analysis from five countries indicates that religion’s role in digital authoritarianism is quite evident, adding to the layer of nationalism. Most of the leaders in power use religious justifications for curbs on the internet. Religious leaders support these laws as a means to restrict “moral ills” such as blasphemy, pornography, and the like. This evident “religious populism” seems to be a major driver of policy changes that are limiting civil liberties in the name of “the people.” In the end, the reasons for restricting digital space are not purely religious but draw on religious themes with populist language in a mixed and hybrid fashion. Some common themes found in all the case studies shed light on the role of digital space in shaping politics and society offline and vice versa. The key findings of our survey are as follows: The future of (especially) fragile democracies is highly intertwined with digital space. There is an undeniable nexus between faith and populism which offers an insight into how cyberspace and politics offline have become highly intertwined. Religion and politics have merged in these five countries to shape cyber governance. The cyber governance policies of populist rulers mirror their undemocratic, repressive, populist, and authoritarian policies offline. As a result, populist authoritarianism in the non-digital world has increasingly come to colonize cyberspace, and events online are more and more playing a role in shaping politics offline. “Morality” is a common theme used to justify the need for increasingly draconian digital laws and the active monopolization of cyberspace by government actors. Islamist and Hindutva trolls feel an unprecedented sense of cyber empowerment, hurling abuse without physically seeing the consequences or experiencing the emotional and psychological damage inflicted on their victims.

Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in particular, on the role of religious populism in digital space as a catalyst for undemocratic politics in the five Asian countries we have selected as our case studies. The focus on the West Asian and South Asian cases is an opportunity to examine authoritarian religious populists in power, whereas the East Asian countries showcase powerful authoritarian religious populist forces outside parliament. This report compares internet governance in each of these countries under three categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. These are the digital toolkits that authorities use to govern digital space. Our case selection and research focus have allowed us to undertake a comparative analysis of different types of online restrictions in these countries that constrain space foropposition and democratic voices while simultaneously making room for authoritarian religious populist narratives to arise and flourish. The report finds that surveillance, censorship, disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks—along with targeted arrests and violence spreading from digital space—are common features of digital authoritarianism. In each case, it is also found that religious populist forces co-opt political actors in their control of cyberspace. The situational analysis from five countries indicates that religion’s role in digital authoritarianism is quite evident, adding to the layer of nationalism. Most of the leaders in power use religious justifications for curbs on the internet. Religious leaders support these laws as a means to restrict “moral ills” such as blasphemy, pornography, and the like. This evident “religious populism” seems to be a major driver of policy changes that are limiting civil liberties in the name of “the people.” In the end, the reasons for restricting digital space are not purely religious but draw on religious themes with populist language in a mixed and hybrid fashion. Some common themes found in all the case studies shed light on the role of digital space in shaping politics and society offline and vice versa. The key findings of our survey are as follows: The future of (especially) fragile democracies is highly intertwined with digital space. There is an undeniable nexus between faith and populism which offers an insight into how cyberspace and politics offline have become highly intertwined. Religion and politics have merged in these five countries to shape cyber governance. The cyber governance policies of populist rulers mirror their undemocratic, repressive, populist, and authoritarian policies offline. As a result, populist authoritarianism in the non-digital world has increasingly come to colonize cyberspace, and events online are more and more playing a role in shaping politics offline. “Morality” is a common theme used to justify the need for increasingly draconian digital laws and the active monopolization of cyberspace by government actors. Islamist and Hindutva trolls feel an unprecedented sense of cyber empowerment, hurling abuse without physically seeing the consequences or experiencing the emotional and psychological damage inflicted on their victims.

We believe the climate crisis will be resolved in cities. Today, while cities occupy only 2% of the Earth's surface, 57% of the world's population lives in cities, and by 2050, it will jump to 68% (UN, 2018). Currently, cities consume over 75% of natural resources, accumulate 50% of the global waste and emit up to 80% of greenhouse gases (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2017). Cities generate 70% of the global gross domestic product and are significant drivers of economic growth (UN-Habitat III, 2016). At the same time, cities sit on the frontline of natural disasters such as floods, storms and droughts (De Sherbinin et al., 2007; Major et al., 2011; Rockström et al., 2021). One of the sustainability pathways to reduce the environmental consequences of the current extract-make-dispose model (or the "linear economy") is a circular economy (CE) model. A CE is defined as "an economic system that is based on business models which replace the 'end-of-life' concept with reducing, alternatively reusing, recycling and recovering materials in production/distribution and consumption processes" (Kirchherr et al., 2017, p. 224). By redesigning production processes and thereby extending the lifespan of goods and materials, researchers suggest that CE approaches reduce waste and increase employment and resource security while sustaining business competitiveness (Korhonen et al., 2018; Niskanen et al., 2020; Stahel, 2012; Winans et al., 2017). Organizations such as the Ellen MacArthur Foundation and Circle Economy help steer businesses toward CE strategies. The CE is also a political priority in countries and municipalities globally. For instance, the CE Action Plan, launched by the European Commission in 2015 and reconfirmed in 2020, is a central pillar of the European Green Deal (European Commission, 2015, 2020). Additionally, more governments are implementing national CE strategies in China (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2018), Colombia (Government of the Republic of Colombia, 2019), Finland (Sitra, 2016), Sweden (Government Offices of Sweden, 2020) and the US (Metabolic, 2018, 2019), to name a few. Meanwhile, more cities worldwide are adopting CE models to achieve more resource-efficient urban management systems, thereby advancing their environmental ambitions (Petit-Boix & Leipold, 2018; Turcu & Gillie, 2020; Vanhuyse, Haddaway, et al., 2021). Cities with CE ambitions include, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Paris, Toronto, Peterborough (England) and Umeå (Sweden) (OECD, 2020a). In Europe, over 60 cities signed the European Circular Cities Declaration (2020) to harmonize the transition towards a CE in the region. In this policy brief, we provide insights into common challenges local governments face in implementing their CE plans and suggest recommendations for overcoming these. It aims to answer the question: How can the CE agenda be governed in cities? It is based on the results of the Urban Circularity Assessment Framework (UCAF) project, building on findings from 25 interviews, focus group discussions and workshops held with different stakeholder groups in Umeå, as well as research on Stockholm's urban circularity potential, including findings from 11 expert interviews (Rezaie, 2021). Our findings were complemented by the Circular Economy Lab project (Rezaie et al., 2022) and experiences from working with municipal governments in Sweden, Belgium, France and the UK, on CE and environmental and social sustainability.