Academic literature on the topic 'Capital market (China)'

This study aims to analyze the level of capital market integration ASEAN and China. Analysis tool used is Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). The results showed that capital markets of Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and China have a positive effect on Indonesian capital markets, but the Indonesian capital market does not affect the capital markets of other countries. Singapore capital market has a positive effect on capital markets of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and China, except for the Philippines. China's capital market only affects the capital market in Singapore. Singapore capital market and China have complete integration because both affect each other. Philippine capital market only affects Indonesian capital market. Indonesian capital market is easily influenced by the fluctuation in capital markets in the ASEAN region and China. Singapore capital market is in a strong position. While the Philippine capital market are relatively more segmented.

AbstractSituated in an agricultural township in northern China, this study examines the rise of produce markets in rural China in the face of a chronic shortage of financial capital. Drawing on theoretical ideas in economic sociology, we explicate the mechanisms of gift exchange and credit taking and the conditions under which these mechanisms are used to mobilize financial capital and to facilitate market transactions in the absence of financial capital. We illustrate these issues and ideas using our fieldwork research on different produce markets and entrepreneurial activities.

AbstractExisting literature suggests a strong relationship between a vibrant venture capital market and an active stock market: venture capital flourishes when venture capitalists can readily exit from successful portfolio companies through IPOs, and IPOs are in turn facilitated by active and efficient stock markets. This article uses China as a case study to explore the connection between the stock market and venture capital market. Through empirical studies, this article confirms the existing literature by demonstrating a close connection between the stock market and venture capital market in China. It also refines the existing literature by finding that, for venture capital availability, laws and policies also matter in China. Strong and sustained law reforms and government policies aimed at improving the institutional structure and regulatory environment of the stock market can facilitate venture capital-backed exits, which in turn lead to an increase in new venture capital availability in China. Nonetheless, numerous IPO closures have led to freeze-ups in China’s venture capital market. Also, there remain a multiplicity of institutional impediments to the efficient operation of the stock market and the effective implementation of IPO reforms in China. These may in turn hinder the development of the Chinese venture capital industry.

There are two main factors that influence the rise and fall of the index, namely internal factors and external factors. The external factor currently experiencing volatility in the stock market is the coronavirus outbreak. Where the presence of the Coronavirus on this earth has caused panic in various parts of the world. The epidemic attacks various levels of society, especially for those who have congenital diseases. This study aims to analyze the resilience of the capital markets in the United States, China and Indonesia in the 60 days before and after the positive confirmation of COVID-19 in each country. The variable of capital market resilience in the United States is used as a proxy for the DJI index, while the resilience of the capital market in China is used as a proxy for the SSEC index, while the resilience of the capital market in Indonesia is used as a proxy for the IDX index. The paper tries to determine whether there are differences in the resilience of the capital market before and before the covid outbreak in the American, Chinese and Indonesian capital markets. The results of the study prove that the Covid outbreak has had a very bad impact on the stock markets of Indonesia and the United States. The tool on the test used to prove that there is a difference in resilience in the capital markets in Indonesia and the United States in the 60 days before and after being confirmed positive for Covid. Meanwhile, in the capital market in China, it was found that there was no difference in the resilience of the capital market in the 60 days before and before being confirmed positive for Covid. This condition proves the country's success in handling and controlling the covid outbreak.

Capital market integration can be influenced by various variables, such as the volatility of gold and oil prices. The purpose of this study is to analyze the volatility of gold and oil prices on the integration of the Indonesian capital market with the Asian capital market. This study uses secondary data on daily closing prices of gold and oil (West Texas Intermediate and Brent North Sea) along with the Indonesian capital markets (JKSE), Hong Kong (HSI), South Korea (KOSPI), India (NIFTY 50), China (SSEC), Singapore (STI) during the period January 2019 to October 2020. This study uses the DCC-GARCH method to see the dynamic correlation between the capital market, and the GARCH method to analyze the volatility of gold and oil prices on the integration of the Indonesian capital market with the Asian capital market. The results of the study show that there is a positive and negative dynamic correlation between the capital markets, thus proving that the movement of the Indonesian market with other markets tends to vary. The results show that only the volatility of Brent oil has a negative effect on the integration of the Indonesian capital market with the Asian capital market

This is the first article that analyzes Professor Ronald Gilson’s theory of “simultaneity” in engineering a venture capital market in the context of China. Based on both quantitative and qualitative data collected by the author, this article analyzes how China has created the fastest developing and the largest engineered venture capital market in the world within three decades. It concludes that the rise of venture capital in China is attributable to (1) increasing capital supply through various governmental programs, easing regulatory barriers towards institutional and foreign investors, providing tax incentives and improving exit environment; (2) enhancing the availability of financial intermediaries by introducing the limited partnership that creates an efficient relationship between venture capitalists and investors; and (3) encouraging entrepreneurship by improving the regulatory environment for small businesses. Through these measures, China has facilitated the simultaneous availability of capital with the appetite for high-risk, long-term investments and the emergence of a class of entrepreneurs with the skills and incentives to put that capital to work. One key factor to the rapid development of the Chinese market has been its increased reliance on market forces in allocating capital. On the other hand, a residual degree of bureaucratic allocation prevents the Chinese regime from being fully efficient. China serves as an (imperfect) model for other governments seeking to engineer a venture capital market where enfettered market forces have failed to do so.

The Stock Connect scheme launched on 17 November 2014 was the first mutual market access between mainland China and Hong Kong stock markets. It is the biggest move ever in the opening up of the capital market. Experiences accumulated will be of great value to mainland regulators who will decide on how these experiences could be utilised for China’s future opening up of its capital markets and for accelerating renminbi internationalisation.

Due to the increasing linkage of China and the US stock markets today, we constructed a TVP-VAR model to study the dynamic spillover effects between the US stock volatility and China’s stock market crash risk. We found dynamic spillover effects are constantly strengthening between US stock volatility and China’s stock market crash risk: when the US stock volatility increases, China’s stock market crash risk increases. In addition, the gradual improvement of financial market openness in China, the short-term capital outflow from China, and the depreciation of the RMB exchange rate will increase China’s stock market crash risk. And, the impacts of short-term capital outflow from China are more significant. Further, the increase in China’s stock market crash risk will lead to the decline of the US stock volatility, which may be due to the flight to quality.

This study used normalized revealed sectoral comparative advantage, import demand share, growth identification and facilitation framework to identify market opportunities for Nigeria in the Chinese markets over the period 1988-2017. Our findings revealed that Nigeria has a steady and long-term comparative advantage in few commodities and there is limited scope for Nigeria to improve on its balance of trade due to limited export potentials. Furthermore, sixteen market opportunities were identified, out of which fourteen are stable and growing markets. Our findings also revealed that these market opportunities can't all be meet by Nigeria, as these commodities were not exportable due to poor competitive position and highly capital-intensive nature of the commodities. These findings are not only relevant to academics but also for policy making.

This thesis considers China’s rural financial system and its impact on rural economy.  It explores three specific aspects, i.e. the relationship between agricultural growth and finance; agricultural banking efficiency and financial reforms; and the impact of lack of access to credit on production. The results of the general finance-growth relationship over 1992 to 2003 indicate no evidence of a positive relationship between state finance and agricultural or overall growth, although, perhaps as a result of the reforms, this negative impact seemed to disappear when the later sub-period was considered.  The results also suggest that the impact of the lagged state credit variable on growth is positive.  There is also weak evidence that agriculture growth was less negatively affected by state lending than in the economy overall.  There is also some indication that the changes which occurred after the 1993 financial reform were less in agriculture than for the wider economy. Examination on the performance of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) over the period 1979 to 1992 and 2002 to 2005 show that ABCs’ performance fluctuated over years.  However, the overall comparison between the beginning and end of the period indicates an improvement in banking performance in the long-term.

Over the past three decades, economic reforms have brought about dramatic changes in China. The wave of structural and economic reforms regarding the State-owned Sector (SOS), and the surge of the Non-State-owned Sector (NSOS), have influenced returns in the labor market, such as the returns concerning human capital and political capital in urban China. Presumably, the NSOS would be more marketed-oriented compared to the SOS, and it would have different returns concerning political capital, as represented by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership. This is likely because the NSOS would not value Party membership as much as the SOS does. The question of how Party membership is rewarded in the two sectors might also change with the development of the two ownership sectors, as more time passes since the establishment of the economic reforms. I examine whether CCP members display any earnings advantage in these two sectors, and I also explore how such an advantage might have changed over time. Unlike most of the previous studies that have focused on earnings in urban China, I treat Party membership affiliation and ownership sector selection as being endogeneous. I apply the Mlogit -OLS two-stage selection correction estimation proposed by Lee (1983) and discover evidence which suggests that Party membership serves as a proxy for both political and productive skills. A flat Party premium in the SOS and a decreasing Party premium in the NSOS suggest that the Party card served a similar function in the payment scheme present in the SOS during this three year span, whereas the NSOS valued political capital by a decreasing amount over time. The evidence presented in my dissertation indicates that economic reforms tend to mitigate the earning advantage of Party members that occurs as a result of unequal treatment based on Party membership. This evidence suggests that CCP membership is losing its earning power, at least in the NSOS. In addition, the CCP members sacrifice the benefits previously possessed in the adaptation to the transformed economic environment in urban China. However, the rewards to other forms of human capital have increased over time.

The effect of social capital on labor market outcomes is a key concern in sociological studies. Even though there are extensive studies on this topic, with the worldwide expansion of higher education, insufficient scholarly efforts have so far been devoted to understanding access to social capital in the educational setting and labor market impact of social capital for well-educated individuals. Moreover, studies on social capital and migration tend to focus on the role played by social capital on migration decisions and outcomes, contingency impact of social capital on migrants' labor market outcomes are not well understood. To fill the knowledge gap, this research is to examine undergraduates' social capital accumulation and mobilization on campus, and the associated outcomes for their job seeking, with the particular focus on 1) the impact of macro institutions on migrant students' social capital accumulation and mobilization; 2) contingency impact of social capital on labor market outcomes. Combining primary data from in-depth interviews in Tianjin and secondary data collected in Nanjing, China, I examine the different processes of social capital accumulation and mobilization between local and migrant students on campus, and associated labor market outcomes between local and returned migrant students. Findings of this study suggest that university provides an important context for undergraduates to establish social ties and accumulate social capital. By attending higher education institutions, especially elite ones, students gain opportunities to build exclusive social connections on campus. However, opportunities to accumulate social capital on campus are highly structured between local and migrant students because of the household registration system. Moreover, data from in-depth interviews have demonstrated that migrant students suffer disadvantaged capacities to mobilize social capital compared to their local counterparts. The household registration system deprives migrant populations of access to some local employment opportunities, such as government and government-affiliated organizations, migrant students suffer from weaker job information and influence when mobilizing their social capital. Further, by analyzing survey data from Nanjing, it has verified the institutional contingency impact of social capital upon the household registration system between local and returned migrant students. Both total and university-based social capital increases local students' chance to get a desirable job but does not do so for returned migrant students. The central argument of the study is that institutional constraints, such as the household registration system, could lead to different capacities for the accessibility and mobilization of social capital among local students, migrant students, and returned migrant students, finally leading to differential labor market outcomes in Chinese cities.

This paper uses an event study in combination with Granger causality tests to analyze the effects of capital control liberalizations in China. The AH Premium between the Shenzhen and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges and the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges in addition to the total returns of the Shanghai Composite are all used to measure the effect of each event. The results are most significant in the Shenzhen-Hong Kong AH premium, but the overall market reaction to each liberalization event was minimal. The Granger causality tests studied relationships between the Shanghai Composite, the S&P 500, the FTSE 100, the Hang Seng, and the All-Ordinaries Index. Results showed the strongest Granger causal relationships between Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Australia. Overall, the Granger causality results are inconsistent with the theory that increased currency liberalization in China causes increased integration with other major global markets.

This paper aims to test efficiency, in its weak form, in the capi­tal markets of the Philippines (PSEi), South Korea (KOSPI), Indonesia (JKSE), Thailand (SET), Malaysia (KLCI), China (SSEC) and Hong Kong (HSI) over the period from January 2, 2017, to February 17, 2022. The return series shows signs of deviation from the normality hypothesis, given the skewness and kurtosis coefficients. The results, therefore, support the conclusion that the random walk hypothesis is not supported by the indices, the values of the variance ratios are in all cases less than unity, implying that the returns are autocorrelated over time and there is mean reversion in all indices. The re­sults obtained allow for the rejection of the random walk hypothesis and the informational efficiency hypothesis of financial markets. These findings also open room for market regulators to pursue measures to ensure better infor­mation in these regional markets.

U.S. policymakers are increasingly concerned about the national security implications of U.S. investments in China, and some are considering a new regime for reviewing outbound investment security. The authors identify the main U.S. investors active in the Chinese artificial intelligence market and the set of AI companies in China that have benefitted from U.S. capital. They also recommend next steps for U.S. policymakers to better address the concerns over capital flowing into the Chinese AI ecosystem.

The textile and apparel industry is a highly globalized, multi-trillion-dollar sector. Today, production networks are dominated by low-cost Asian countries with very large labor-pools, which has made it increasingly difficult for other producers around the world to compete, including those in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). While the region has participated in the industry, there are currently no LAC countries amongst the leading ten exporters. The COVID-19 pandemic, together with rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China, however, has disrupted this well-established business model over the past two to three years. This creates the most significant opportunity of the past decade to reconfigure the geography of the supply chain; as a small, but long-term supplier, with proximity to the worlds largest single market, Central America is well-positioned to benefit from these changes. Nonetheless, the region needs to upgrade various aspects of their GVC participation in order to become a serious contender in the reconfiguration of the industry. Key policies should focus on developing human capital through industry-specific training initiatives; intensifying investment attraction efforts; and aggressively investing in both hard and soft infrastructure to reduce barriers to trade and enhance lead time responsiveness.

The textile and apparel industry is a highly globalized, multi-trillion-dollar sector. Today, production networks are dominated by low-cost Asian countries with very large labor-pools, which has made it increasingly difficult for other producers around the world to compete, including those in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). While the region has participated in the industry, there are currently no LAC countries amongst the leading ten exporters. The COVID-19 pandemic, together with rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China, however, has disrupted this well-established business model over the past two to three years. This creates the most significant opportunity of the past decade to reconfigure the geography of the supply chain; as a small, but long-term supplier, with proximity to the worlds largest single market, Central America is well-positioned to benefit from these changes. Nonetheless, the region needs to upgrade various aspects of their GVC participation in order to become a serious contender in the reconfiguration of the industry. Key policies should focus on developing human capital through industry-specific training initiatives; intensifying investment attraction efforts; and aggressively investing in both hard and soft infrastructure to reduce barriers to trade and enhance lead time responsiveness.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

Macroeconomic summary Several factors contributed to an increase in projected inflation on the forecast horizon, keeping it above the target rate. These included inflation in December that surpassed expectations (5.62%), indexation to higher inflation rates for various baskets in the consumer price index (CPI), a significant real increase in the legal minimum wage, persistent external and domestic inflationary supply shocks, and heightened exchange rate pressures. The CPI for foods was affected by the persistence of external and domestic supply shocks and was the most significant contributor to unexpectedly high inflation in the fourth quarter. Price adjustments for fuels and certain utilities can explain the acceleration in inflation for regulated items, which was more significant than anticipated. Prices in the CPI for goods excluding food and regulated items also rose more than expected. This was partly due to a smaller effect on prices from the national government’s VAT-free day than anticipated by the technical staff and more persistent external pressures, including via peso depreciation. By contrast, the CPI for services excluding food and regulated items accelerated less than expected, partly reflecting strong competition in the communications sector. This was the only major CPI basket for which prices increased below the target inflation rate. The technical staff revised its inflation forecast upward in response to certain external shocks (prices, costs, and depreciation) and domestic shocks (e.g., on meat products) that were stronger and more persistent than anticipated in the previous report. Observed inflation and a real increase in the legal minimum wage also exceeded expectations, which would boost inflation by affecting price indexation, labor costs, and inflation expectations. The technical staff now expects year-end headline inflation of 4.3% in 2022 and 3.4% in 2023; core inflation is projected to be 4.5% and 3.6%, respectively. These forecasts consider the lapse of certain price relief measures associated with the COVID-19 health emergency, which would contribute to temporarily keeping inflation above the target on the forecast horizon. It is important to note that these estimates continue to contain a significant degree of uncertainty, mainly related to the development of external and domestic supply shocks and their ultimate effects on prices. Other contributing factors include high price volatility and measurement uncertainty related to the extension of Colombia’s health emergency and tax relief measures (such as the VAT-free days) associated with the Social Investment Law (Ley de Inversión Social). The as-yet uncertain magnitude of the effects of a recent real increase in the legal minimum wage (that was high by historical standards) and high observed and expected inflation, are additional factors weighing on the overall uncertainty of the estimates in this report. The size of excess productive capacity remaining in the economy and the degree to which it is closing are also uncertain, as the evolution of the pandemic continues to represent a significant forecast risk. margin, could be less dynamic than expected. And the normalization of monetary policy in the United States could come more quickly than projected in this report, which could negatively affect international financing costs. Finally, there remains a significant degree of uncertainty related to the duration of supply chocks and the degree to which macroeconomic and political conditions could negatively affect the recovery in investment. The technical staff revised its GDP growth projection for 2022 from 4.7% to 4.3% (Graph 1.3). This revision accounts for the likelihood that a larger portion of the recent positive dynamic in private consumption would be transitory than previously expected. This estimate also contemplates less dynamic investment behavior than forecast in the previous report amid less favorable financial conditions and a highly uncertain investment environment. Third-quarter GDP growth (12.9%), which was similar to projections from the October report, and the fourth-quarter growth forecast (8.7%) reflect a positive consumption trend, which has been revised upward. This dynamic has been driven by both public and private spending. Investment growth, meanwhile, has been weaker than forecast. Available fourth-quarter data suggest that consumption spending for the period would have exceeded estimates from October, thanks to three consecutive months that included VAT-free days, a relatively low COVID-19 caseload, and mobility indicators similar to their pre-pandemic levels. By contrast, the most recently available figures on new housing developments and machinery and equipment imports suggest that investment, while continuing to rise, is growing at a slower rate than anticipated in the previous report. The trade deficit is expected to have widened, as imports would have grown at a high level and outpaced exports. Given the above, the technical staff now expects fourth-quarter economic growth of 8.7%, with overall growth for 2021 of 9.9%. Several factors should continue to contribute to output recovery in 2022, though some of these may be less significant than previously forecast. International financial conditions are expected to be less favorable, though external demand should continue to recover and terms of trade continue to increase amid higher projected oil prices. Lower unemployment rates and subsequent positive effects on household income, despite increased inflation, would also boost output recovery, as would progress in the national vaccination campaign. The technical staff expects that the conditions that have favored recent high levels of consumption would be, in large part, transitory. Consumption spending is expected to grow at a slower rate in 2022. Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) would continue to recover, approaching its pre-pandemic level, though at a slower rate than anticipated in the previous report. This would be due to lower observed GFCF levels and the potential impact of political and fiscal uncertainty. Meanwhile, the policy interest rate would be less expansionary as the process of monetary policy normalization continues. Given the above, growth in 2022 is forecast to decelerate to 4.3% (previously 4.7%). In 2023, that figure (3.1%) is projected to converge to levels closer to the potential growth rate. In this case, excess productive capacity would be expected to tighten at a similar rate as projected in the previous report. The trade deficit would tighten more than previously projected on the forecast horizon, due to expectations of an improved export dynamic and moderation in imports. The growth forecast for 2022 considers a low basis of comparison from the first half of 2021. However, there remain significant downside risks to this forecast. The current projection does not, for example, account for any additional effects on economic activity resulting from further waves of COVID-19. High private consumption levels, which have already surpassed pre-pandemic levels by a large margin, could be less dynamic than expected. And the normalization of monetary policy in the United States could come more quickly than projected in this report, which could negatively affect international financing costs. Finally, there remains a significant degree of uncertainty related to the duration of supply chocks and the degree to which macroeconomic and political conditions could negatively affect the recovery in investment. External demand for Colombian goods and services should continue to recover amid significant global inflation pressures, high oil prices, and less favorable international financial conditions than those estimated in October. Economic activity among Colombia’s major trade partners recovered in 2021 amid countries reopening and ample international liquidity. However, that growth has been somewhat restricted by global supply chain disruptions and new outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff has revised its growth forecast for Colombia’s main trade partners from 6.3% to 6.9% for 2021, and from 3.4% to 3.3% for 2022; trade partner economies are expected to grow 2.6% in 2023. Colombia’s annual terms of trade increased in 2021, largely on higher oil, coffee, and coal prices. This improvement came despite increased prices for goods and services imports. The expected oil price trajectory has been revised upward, partly to supply restrictions and lagging investment in the sector that would offset reduced growth forecasts in some major economies. Elevated freight and raw materials costs and supply chain disruptions continue to affect global goods production, and have led to increases in global prices. Coupled with the recovery in global demand, this has put upward pressure on external inflation. Several emerging market economies have continued to normalize monetary policy in this context. Meanwhile, in the United States, the Federal Reserve has anticipated an end to its asset buying program. U.S. inflation in December (7.0%) was again surprisingly high and market average inflation forecasts for 2022 have increased. The Fed is expected to increase its policy rate during the first quarter of 2022, with quarterly increases anticipated over the rest of the year. For its part, Colombia’s sovereign risk premium has increased and is forecast to remain on a higher path, to levels above the 15-year-average, on the forecast horizon. This would be partly due to the effects of a less expansionary monetary policy in the United States and the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in Colombia. Given the above, international financial conditions are projected to be less favorable than anticipated in the October report. The increase in Colombia’s external financing costs could be more significant if upward pressures on inflation in the United States persist and monetary policy is normalized more quickly than contemplated in this report. As detailed in Section 2.3, uncertainty surrounding international financial conditions continues to be unusually high. Along with other considerations, recent concerns over the potential effects of new COVID-19 variants, the persistence of global supply chain disruptions, energy crises in certain countries, growing geopolitical tensions, and a more significant deceleration in China are all factors underlying this uncertainty. The changing macroeconomic environment toward greater inflation and unanchoring risks on inflation expectations imply a reduction in the space available for monetary policy stimulus. Recovery in domestic demand and a reduction in excess productive capacity have come in line with the technical staff’s expectations from the October report. Some upside risks to inflation have materialized, while medium-term inflation expectations have increased and are above the 3% target. Monetary policy remains expansionary. Significant global inflationary pressures and the unexpected increase in the CPI in December point to more persistent effects from recent supply shocks. Core inflation is trending upward, but remains below the 3% target. Headline and core inflation projections have increased on the forecast horizon and are above the target rate through the end of 2023. Meanwhile, the expected dynamism of domestic demand would be in line with low levels of excess productive capacity. An accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in Colombia and the increased likelihood of a faster normalization of monetary policy in the United States would put upward pressure on sovereign risk perceptions in a more persistent manner, with implications for the exchange rate and the natural rate of interest. Persistent disruptions to international supply chains, a high real increase in the legal minimum wage, and the indexation of various baskets in the CPI to higher inflation rates could affect price expectations and push inflation above the target more persistently. These factors suggest that the space to maintain monetary stimulus has continued to diminish, though monetary policy remains expansionary. 1.2 Monetary policy decision Banco de la República’s board of directors (BDBR) in its meetings in December 2021 and January 2022 voted to continue normalizing monetary policy. The BDBR voted by a majority in these two meetings to increase the benchmark interest rate by 50 and 100 basis points, respectively, bringing the policy rate to 4.0%.