Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Campaign of Russia'

During the 2008 South Ossetia war, Georgia and Russia fought what the English-language media called "a public relations war“. This was an interesting example of modern information warfare where governments allied with public relations agencies battled for symbolic power on the media field. This study investigates the information campaign that the Georgian government launched to promote their framing of the conflict in the English-language media. First-hand information about the campaign strategies and techniques is gathered by interviewing the people who worked as PR consultants for the Georgian government during the war in 2008. The eventual PR output is mapped and press release texts are compared with articles from The New York Times and The Washington Post in a framing analysis. The results indicate that Georgia won the PR war as the coverage in the U.S. newspapers clearly supported Georgia's framing. This outcome is attributed to the Georgian side's media management activities that skillfully anticipated the needs of the foreign correspondents covering the conflict. However, the study points out that the supportive coverage was not the result of Georgia's information campaign only. Other factors have to be taken into account, most notably the U.S. administration's strong backing of the Georgian leadership that shaped the tone of the articles written about the war. Future research should look at how the war was covered in countries with less explicit political support for Georgia, as well as investigate the PR efforts on the Russian side during and after the war.

La présente thèse propose une analyse et une systématisation de l’utilisation des réseaux sociaux en période électorale tant au niveau national que local. Ainsi seront étudiées les techniques numériques utilisées, les formes et les méthodes de communication politique « en ligne » au cours des campagnes présidentielles de 2012 en France et en Russie et les campagnes municipales à Bordeaux et à Moscou en 2014 et 2013. Seront donc comparés les ressorts utilisés dans deux pays différents et qui ont permis de transformer les grands réseaux sociaux tels que Facebook, Twitter, Instagram et VKontakte en outils de rassemblement politique attirant de nombreux jeunes à participer activement au processus de campagne.Des entretiens réalisés avec des responsables des mouvements politiques français de Gironde tels ceux des Jeunes socialistes, des Jeunes Populaires et ceux du Front National, il ressort que l’activité numérique en France relève d’un caractère constructif. Ils servent à attirer et mobiliser la jeunesse de moins de 30 ans autours des candidats et de leurs partis grâce à un support en ligne mais s’accompagnent d’un militantisme de terrain, dans la vie réelle.En revanche, il apparaît qu’en Russie, le niveau élevé et l’influence de ces jeunes sur Internet fournit un soutien pour les nouvelles institutions de la société civile. Le succès de la mobilisation des jeunes appartenant à la classe moyenne urbaine relève d’une combinaison de « citoyenneté » et de « massification » de la protestation sur le réseau.En 2013, la volonté et mobilisation active des jeunes dans le projet politique à permis l’émergence de l’opposant Alekseï Navalny, qui a réuni 27% des suffrages et atteint la seconde place aux élections municipales de Moscou. La quasi intégralité de sa campagne a été effectuée sur les réseaux sociaux. Si le fait est courant pour nombre de ses homologues occidentaux, il convient de relever que ce n’est pas habituel pour les politiciens russes. Cette campagne « révolutionnaire » d’A. Navalny a été rendue possible par le fort soutien des jeunes Moscovites qu’il a pu mobiliser sur le plus grand réseau russe : VKontakte. L’organisation de la campagne s’est presque entièrement fondée sur l’utilisation des réseaux sociaux, tant pour la distribution de tracts dans les rues, que la sensibilisation et les collectes de dons
This thesis will focus on the analysis and systematization of the use of social networks in the presidential campaigns, both in France and in Russia in 2012, as well as in the municipal campaigns in Bordeaux and Moscow, in 2014 and 2013 respectively. The development of this thesis will also include the basic use of technologies, as well as the forms and methods of political online communication at the actual stage of their development.In this thesis, the examination of the political mechanisms used in France and Russia will be carried out in order to assess how social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and VKontakte have developed into a powerful tool, with their main aim being to attract more and more young people to actively participate in the election campaigns as well as the voting process in general.Through the conduction of interviews with the chiefs of French Youth Movements, such as the Young Socialists (Gironde), the People’s Young (Gironde), and the Young of National Front (Gironde), we have found that these movements tend to have an overall peaceful nature in France. They aim to attract and mobilize young people (of up to 30 years old) to provide support both online and in the real world, for candidates of the major French political parties, namely the UMP, the Socialist Party and the National Front.In comparison, in Russia, the high level presence and influence of Youth Movements on the Internet provides support for new institutions forming in civil society. The success of the youth mobilization from the urban middle class can be explained by the combination of “civic consciousness” and “massive involvement”.In 2013, young Russians mobilized for active participation in the political life of Alexei Navalny, one of the leaders of the Russian opposition, who managed to obtain 27% of the votes in the municipal elections of Moscow, the equivalent to second place. His «revolutionary” electoral campaign was predominantly transmitted through social networks, notably through the use of VKontakte (the largest social network in Russia), in order to gain a large amount of support from young Moscovites. This action is deemed to be very uncommon among Russian politicians, and is more likely to be seen among Western homologues. Consequently, this led to the distribution of leaflets in the streets, in the subway, going door-to-door, as well as organizing the collection of donations for the campaign across networks

This thesis deals with the Soviet Union’s Peace Campaign during the first decade of the Cold War as it sought to establish the Iron Curtain. The thesis focuses on the primary institutions engaged in the Peace Campaign: the World Peace Council and the Soviet Peace Committee. Chapter 1 outlines the domestic and international context which fostered the peace movement (provisional title) and endeavours to construct a narrative of the political and social situation which the Soviet Union found itself in after World War II (as a superpower and an empire leading the Socialist Bloc) in order to put forward the argument that the motivations for undertaking the project of the 'peace movement', above all, were of an international-political nature, rather than of an internal and domestic nature. Chapter 2 starts off with the Soviet project of establishing an international peace movement, including firstly the World Peace Congress, which simultaneously convened in Paris and Prague, and then proceeds with the institutional, political and social development of the Campaign up to the dissolution of the Cominform in 1956. The task of this chapter is not merely to chronicle the history of the Soviet Peace Campaign, but to extract from the narrative underlying themes and organise them accordingly. Finally, Chapter 3 deals with internal Soviet Peace Campaign. The task here is to construct a historical account of the Soviet anti-war movement from 1949 to 1956 through the institutional history of the Soviet Peace Committee. Furthermore, the aim is to demonstrate the relationship between the Soviet Peace Committee and party and state institutions and its dependency on and implications for political decision-making processes within the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Finally, this chapter will also examine the role of the Soviet Peace Committee and its affiliated institutions in the advancement of Cold War propaganda through the media (i.e. press, journalism, etc.), literature (i.e. novels, poems, etc.), film and political art (i.e. posters, caricature, etc.).

In both the 1936 and 1977 USSR Constitutions conscientious labour in socially useful activity was decreed to be a "duty and matter of honour" for every Soviet citizen. This study examines the various approaches adopted by successive Soviet leaderships in their determined efforts to reinforce that ethos. It focuses, in particular, on the so-called "anti-parasite" laws dating back to 1957, when as a part of Khrushchev's attempt to revive popular justice, several smaller republics experimented with enactments that permitted peer justice institutions in the form of amorphous social assemblies to exile "parasites" via a procedure which bypassed the existing court system. Special attention is devoted to the criticism lodged against the laws (during their adoption and spread to the other union republics in 1961) by members of the legal profession, who complained that the wide punitive given to the extra-judicial bodies and the attitudes and behaviour encouraged in them would erode the respect for "socialist legality" which they had been charged with enhancing in the minds of the mass public. Although as a result of such criticism, the Khrushchev regime modified the peer justice institutions in the early 1960's, and even though his populism was absorbed by or subordinated to the normative sector of social control in Brezhnev's legal policy, the study highlights the fact that complaints of abuses and inconsistencies in anti-parasite proceedings continued to be levelled against the prosecution process. This, it is contended, was due in large part to the extreme vagueness of the notion of social parasitism itself, although the lack of a precise and consistent definition of this peculiar offence (and of the key elements which were deemed to constitute it) was actually seen as necessary and even desirable since it allowed the authorities to use the anti-parasite legislation as a weapon of suppression against a broad spectrum of socially, politically, and economically inconvenient groups within Soviet society.

This article proceeds from the observation that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin—two politicians frequently correlated and compared since Trump’s bid for the Presidency—have been remarkably successful in mobilizing support for their politics and in seemingly immunizing their rhetorics against vernacular critique. To work toward an understanding of this phenomenon, we propose to look at how political communication by and around the two politicians draws on forms and venues of popular culture. Both contexts, we will argue, have developed new strategies for the instrumentalization of popular culture, strategies that, while actualized differently in the two settings, revolve around an ‘invective turn’ in political communication—a radicalization of the familiar nationalist rhetoric of ‘us versus them’ that seems specifically fueled by pop-cultural forms. To explore this traffic between pop and politics, this article puts into conversation two case studies: On the one hand, of Trump’s campaign speeches which, we contend, symbolically organize around the logic of agôn—of the competitive game—as it has coagulated in the reality-tv genre of the gamedoc. On the other hand, we look at (state-controlled) pop music in the Russian genre of Ėstrada which, thus our argument, advertises a distinct form of patriotism through the principle of ‘glamour.’ Glamour, in Putin’s Russia, operates simultaneously as a style and as an ideology of self-glorification. The article will outline how reality tv’s logic of agôn and patriotic pop music’s aesthetics of glamour each fuel a qualitatively new orientation of political discourse toward the aesthetically charged, affect-saturated denigration of others and valorization of self.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2008.
The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on September 8, 2008) Includes bibliographical references.

The Crimean War was fought far outside its namesake peninsula in the Black Sea Region. Between 1854 and 1856, Anglo-French naval forces attacked the Russian Empire in the Baltic, White Sea, and Pacific. These campaigns receive little attention from modern historians, and much of the work that does exist relies on a limited number of English-language sources. This dissertation, on the other hand, is a comprehensive examination of these campaigns built on a foundation of primary documents written in English, French, and Russian. It also synthesizes relevant secondary scholarship in order to provide a comprehensive background for the three major European belligerents and to consider the perspectives of the other polities impacted by the conflict, specifically Sweden-Norway, Denmark, China, and Japan. This work's approach yields a more complete understanding of the worldwide context in which the Crimean War occurred. Ultimately, the wide-ranging imperial conflict that emerges starkly contrasts with customary depictions of the conflict as a petty, regionalized example noteworthy only as a cautionary tale of failed diplomacy and generalship or as a venue for advances is battlefield medicine, journalism, and photography.
La Guerre de Crimée se déroula aussi hors de sa péninsule éponyme dans la région de la Mer Noire. Entre 1854 et 1856, des forces franco-britanniques attaquèrent l'Empire Russe dans la Mer Baltique, la Mer Blanche, ainsi que dans l'Océan Pacifique. Ces campagnes ont reçu peu d'attention de la part des historiens des temps modernes, et la majorité de ces effort se basent seulement sur des sources anglaises. Au contraire, ce mémoire contient une analyse exhaustive de ces campagnes se basant sur des documents originaux anglais, français et russes. Il synthétise les études modernes dans le but d'offrir un arrière-plan complet pour les trois grandes puissances européennes, ainsi que dans le but de considérer les perspectives des autres puissances impactées par le conflit, en particulier la Suède-Norvège, le Danemark, la Chine et le Japon. L'approche de cette étude offre une compréhension exhaustive du contexte mondial dans lequel la Guerre de Crimée se déroula. Finalement, le conflit impérial de grande envergure qui émerge s'oppose aux présentations usuelles du conflit comme étant un insignifiant exemple régional de note seulement comme un avertissement d'une diplomatie et d'une stratégie échouée, ou simplement comme une avenue pour des progrès dans la médecine de guerre, le journalisme ainsi que la photographie.

This thesis explores to what extent Multinomial Naive Bayes (MNB) and Support Vector Machines (SVM) classifiers can be used to determine the polarity of news, specifically the news coverage of Sweden by the Russian state-funded news outlets RT and Sputnik. Three experiments are conducted.  In the first experiment, an MNB and an SVM classifier are trained with the Large Movie Review Dataset (Maas et al., 2011) with a varying number of samples to determine how training data size affects classifier performance.  In the second experiment, the classifiers are trained with 300 positive, negative, and neutral news articles (Agarwal et al., 2019) and tested on 95 RT and Sputnik news articles about Sweden (Bengtsson, 2019) to determine if the domain specificity of the training data outweighs its limited size.  In the third experiment, the movie-trained classifiers are put up against the domain-specific classifiers to determine if well-trained classifiers from another domain perform better than relatively untrained, domain-specific classifiers.  Four different types of feature sets (unigrams, unigrams without stop words removal, bigrams, trigrams) were used in the experiments. Some of the model parameters (TF-IDF vs. feature count and SVM’s C parameter) were optimized with 10-fold cross-validation.  Other than the superior performance of SVM, the results highlight the need for comprehensive and domain-specific training data when conducting machine learning tasks, as well as the benefits of feature engineering, and to a limited extent, the removal of stop words. Interestingly, the classifiers performed the best on the negative news articles, which made up most of the test set (and possibly of Russian news coverage of Sweden in general).

La campagne de Crimée fut le principal théâtre d’opération de ce qui fut appelée par ses contemporains la Guerre d’Orient. Premier grand conflit européen depuis la fin des guerres napoléoniennes et dernier affrontement militaire entre la France et la Russie, la guerre de Crimée a été étudiée et appréciée de manière très différente par les historiens des différentes nations qui y participèrent : l’historiographie russe de ce conflit est ainsi très développée tandis qu’en France les universitaires et historiens amateurs ne s’intéressèrent guère à cette première victoire du Second Empire. Dénominateur commun de toutes ces études sur la guerre de Crimée, les témoignages des combattants français et russes seront au cœur de notre démarche. Héritiers des vétérans des guerres napoléoniennes, pétris de culture romantique, ces hommes vécurent aussi les débuts d’une révolution militaire qui transforma durablement l’art de la guerre en Europe. De part et d’autre du No Man’s Land au pied des murs de Sébastopol, ces hommes racontèrent leur campagne de Crimée faite de combats, de gloire, de camaraderie et d’échanges entre ennemis, mais aussi de maladie, de souffrance et de mort. C’est aussi la question même de la représentation de cette guerre qui put alors être parfois questionnée, entre quête d’aventure, devoir patriotique ou religieux et désillusions face à une guerre de siège imprévue
The Crimean campaign was the main theatre of operations in what used to be called the Eastern War. First major European conflict since the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the last military confrontation between France and Russia, the Crimean War has been studied and appreciated in very different ways by historians of the different nations that took part in it: the Russian historiography of this conflict is thus highly developed, whereas in France, academics and amateur historians have barely studied this first victory of the Second Empire. Testimonies from French and Russian combatants are the common denominator of those studies, therefore, they will be at the heart of our study. Heirs of veterans of the Napoleonic Wars and steeped in romantic culture, these men also experienced the beginnings of a military revolution that lastingly transformed the art of war in Europe. On both sides of Sevastopol walls No Man’s land, these men told the story of their campaign in Crimea, a campaign of fighting, glory, comradeship and exchanges between enemies, but also of disease, suffering and death. It is also the very representation of this war that could sometimes be questioned, between the quest for adventure, patriotic or religious duty and disillusionment in the face of an unforeseen siege war

This study seeks to explore the role of peasant women in resistance to the antireligious campaigns during collectivization and analyze how the interplay of the state and resistors formed a new culture of religion in the countryside. I argue that while the state’s succeeded in controlling most of the public sphere, peasant women, engaging in subversive activities and exploiting the state’s ideology, succeeded in preserving a strong peasant adherence to religion prior to World War II. It was peasant women’s determination and adaptation that thwarted the party’s goal of nation-wide atheism.

Les jardins collectifs de l’Île-de-France et de la région de Kazan offrent l’exemple d’une des plus anciennes formes de jardinage urbain en Europe qui se positionne à l’interface entre le monde de la ville et celui de la campagne. À l’échelle locale, si les jardins sont d’abord des espaces domestiques, de l’ordre de l’intime, ils renvoient aussi à la construction d’une communauté qui se fonde sur le travail agricole et des relations de voisinage fortes, faisant écho à une communauté paysanne idéalisée. Ces communautés se structurent autour de jeux de normalisations complexes non sans tensions entre différentes générations de jardiniers. À l’échelle métropolitaine, les jardins collectifs affirment une agrarisation de la ville tout d’abord à travers la construction de modes d’habiter agri-urbains qui promeuvent un desserrement du tissu urbain et de nouveaux modes d’alimentation. Ensuite, ils servent de passerelles entre acteurs urbains et acteurs des périphéries rurales. Enfin, la mise en tension entre agrarisation et urbanisation souligne le rôle des jardins dans la fabrique de la ville, notamment leur participation dans le maintien d’un foncier agricole dans la ville en dépit de l’étalement et de la densification. Dans cette approche, la mise en regard franco-russe soutient tout particulièrement une réflexion sur l’hybridation entre urbanisation et agrarisation avec l’affirmation d’un droit à la terre en regard du droit à la ville
Collective gardens of Île-de-France and the Kazan region are examples of one of the oldest forms of urban gardening in Europe and they are at the interface between the city and the countryside. At the local level, despite their domestic and private roles, gardens also referring to a community structured around complex norms and tensions between different generations of gardeners. These communities are based on agricultural work, strong neighborhood relations which is why they can be analysed through the concept of idealized peasant community. At the metropolitan level, collective gardens affirm an agrarisation of the city because they build an agri-urban way of live, promoting a low urban density and new eating habits. Moreover, they make connections between urban and rural actors. Finally, tension between agrarization and urbanization highlights the role of gardens in the city’s construction, as they maintain agricultural land in a context of urban spreading and densification. In this approach, the franco-russian comparison particularly supports a reflection on the hybridization of agrarization and urbanization with the affirmation of a right to land in resonance with the right to the city
Коллективные сады из Иль-де-Франс и Казаны являются одной из древнейших форм городского садоводства в Европе, которая находятся между городским и сельским миром. На местном уровне, несмотря на их домашнюю и частную роль, сады строят сообщества, структурированные вокруг сложных норм и напряженности между разными поколениями садоводов. Эти сообщества - основаны на сельскохозяйственной работе и крепких соседских отношениях, поэтому их можно проанализировать с помощью концепции идеализированного крестьянского сообщества. На уровне метрополии, коллективные сады утверждают аграризацию города и создают сельско-городской образ жизни, способствуя созданию менее плотного городского пространства и новых привычек питания. Кроме того, они устанавливают связи между городскими и сельскими населением. Наконец, напряженность между аграризацией и урбанизацией подчеркивает роль садов в строительстве города, поскольку они сохраняют сельскохозяйственные земли в условиях распространения и уплотнения городов. При таком подходе, франко-российское сравнение особенно подчеркивает гибридизацию аграризации и урбанизации с подтверждением права на землю и права на город

Nikita Khrouchtchev est surtout connu en Occident comme étant celui qui a permis le relatif soulagement de la déstalinisation. Cette image est d’ailleurs aussi persistante dans les anciens pays de l’URSS. Lorsque Khrouchtchev accède au pouvoir, il aspire en effet à des modifications ambitieuses dans des domaines extrêmement variés. La dénonciation des crimes de Staline lors du XXème Congrès du PCUS ouvre la voie à l’expression d’un certain pluralisme intellectuel et artistique qualifié de « dégel » dont les effets seront irréversibles pour la société soviétique dans son ensemble. Le volontarisme du premier secrétaire conduit à une politique de réformes économiques et politiques aussi impromptues que déstabilisatrices. Cependant la déstalinisation sera pour les peuples soviétiques (tout spécialement pour les ukrainiens) une ère de déceptions autant que d’espoirs. En effet, l’Ukraine, un des plus solides bastions de la vie religieuse en Union soviétique, tiendra une place particulière dans cette campagne. Entre autres, les régions de l’ouest de l’Ukraine avaient échappées à la répression des années trente et constituaient un phénomène singulier avec leur vie religieuse vivace et leur refus de rejoindre l’orthodoxie. Ainsi la campagne antireligieuse de Khrouchtchev est une facette méconnue de la politique du successeur de Staline. Le comportement du nouveau premier secrétaire va ainsi être encore plus dur que celui de Staline l’ancien séminariste à l’égard de la religion. Ce dernier avait fait des concessions aux Eglises après 1943, alors que dès 1958, quelques années après l’accession au pouvoir de Khrouchtchev, la propagande antireligieuse redevient virulente
Nikita Khrushchev is mainly known in the western countries as the one who has allowed a relative relief of the dictatorship thanks to the destalinization process. This opinion is also persistent in the former countries of the USSR. Indeed when Khrushchev seizes power, he wishes to proceed with many ambitious reforms in various areas. Nevertheless, he remains a convinced communist who tries this way to give a new start to the soviet ideological adventure. The denunciation of the crimes of Stalin during the XXth Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party (SUCP) opens path to some intellectual and artistic pluralism often called « unfreezing ». Furthermore, the wills of the first secretary will lead to a policy of unexpected and unbalancing politic and economic reforms. But in fact the destalinization times will also be times of disappointments, especially for the Ukrainians. Indeed Ukraine will have a special place in the antireligious campaign, as one of the healthiest strongholds of the religious life of the Soviet Union. Since the western regions had not suffered the repression of the thirties, they were a singular phenomenon in the Soviet Union with their vivid religious life and their refusal to become uniformly orthodox. Thus the antireligious campaign of Khrushchev is one of the poorly known sides of the policy of Stalin’s successor. The behaviour of the new first secretary as regards the religions will be indeed even harsher than the one of Stalin (the former were-be priest). Stalin had made concessions to the churches after 1943; but as soon as 1958, few years after Khrushchev’s rise to power, the antireligious propaganda becomes strong and efficient again

L’esercito italiano e la conquista della Catalogna (1808-1811) Uno studio di Military Effectiveness nell’Europa napoleonica Settori scientifico-disciplinari SPS/03 – M-STO/02 La ricerca ha lo scopo di ricostruire e valutare l’effettività militare dell’esercito italiano al servizio di Napoleone I. In primo luogo attraverso un’analisi statistica e strategica della costruzione, e del successivo impiego, dell’istituzione militare del Regno d’Italia durante gli anni della sua esistenza (1805-14); successivamente, è stato scelto un caso di studi particolarmente significativo, come la campagna di Catalogna (1808-11, nel contesto della guerra di Indipendenza spagnola), per poter valutare il contributo operazionale e tattico dei corpi inviati dal governo di Milano e la loro integrazione con l’apparato militare complessivo del Primo Impero. La tesi ha voluto rispondere alla mancanza di studi sul comportamento in guerra dell’esercito italiano e, allo stesso tempo, introdurre nella storiografia militare italiana la metodologia di studi, d’origine anglosassone e ormai di tradizione trentennale, di Military Effectiveness. La ricerca si è primariamente basata, oltre che sulla copiosa memorialistica a stampa italiana e francese, sulla documentazione d’archivio della Secrétairerie d’état impériale (Archives Nationales di Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Parigi), del Ministère de la Guerre francese (Service historique de la Défence, di Vincennes, Parigi) e del Ministero della Guerra del Regno d’Italia (Archivio di Stato di Milano). Dal punto di vista dei risultati è stato possibile verificare come l’esercito italiano abbia rappresentato, per Bonaparte, uno strumento duttile e di facile impiego, pur in un contesto di sostanziale marginalità numerica complessiva di fronte alle altre (e cospicue) forze messe in campo da parte dell’Impero e dei suoi altri Stati satellite e alleati. Per quanto riguarda la campagna di conquista della Catalogna è stato invece possibile appurare il fondamentale contributo dato dal contingente italiano, sotto i punti di vista operazionale e tattico, per la buona riuscita dell’invasione; questo primariamente grazie alle elevate caratteristiche generali mostrate dallo stesso, ma anche per peculiarità disciplinari e organizzative che resero i corpi italiani adatti a operazioni particolarmente aggressive.
The Italian Army and the Conquest of Catalonia (1808-1811) A Study of Military Effectiveness in Napoleonic Europe Academic Fields and Disciplines SPS/03 – M-STO/02 The research has the purpose of reconstruct and evaluate the military effectiveness of the Italian Army existed under the reign of Napoleon I. Firstly through a statistic and strategic analysis of the development, and the following deployment, of the military institution of the Kingdom of Italy in the years of its existence (1805-14). Afterwards, a particularly significant case study was chosen, as the campaign of Catalonia (1808-11, in the context of the Peninsular War), in order to assess the operational and tactical contribution of the regiments sent by the Government of Milan and their integration in the overall military apparatus of the First Empire. The thesis wanted to respond to the lack of studies on the Italian army’s behavior in war and, at the same time, to introduce the methodology of the Military Effectiveness Studies (of British and American origin and, by now, enriched by a thirty-year old tradition) in the Italian historiography. The research is primarily based, besides the numerous memoirs of the Italian and French veterans, on the archive documentation of the Secrétairerie d’état impériale (Archives Nationales of Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris), of the French Ministère de la Guerre (Service historique de la Défence, of Vincennes, Paris) and of the Italian Ministero della Guerra (Archivio di Stato di Milano). About the results, it has been verified how the Italian army has become a flexible and suitable instrument for Bonaparte, albeit in a context of substantial overall numerical marginality in comparison to the heterogeneous forces available to the Empire and its others satellites and allied states. Regarding the campaign of Catalonia, instead, it was possible to ascertain the fundamental contribution of the Italian regiments, in an operational and tactical perspective, for the success of the invasion. This was primarily due to the excellent general characteristics shown by the expeditionary force, but also to disciplinary and organizational peculiarities that have made the Italian corps suitable for particularly aggressive operations.

Officier de cavalerie originaire de la noblesse picarde, Armand de Caulaincourt (1773-1827) gravit rapidement tous les échelons de la cour consulaire puis impériale, devenant en 1804 grand-écuyer de l’Empire. Mais, malgré l’importance de ses fonctions curiales, Napoléon le destine à une carrière de diplomate. Après différentes missions, il le nomme ambassadeur de France en Russie, à la fin de l’année 1807. Fervent partisan de l’alliance de Tilsit, Caulaincourt participe à toutes les grandes négociations franco-russes mais doit assister à la lente dégradation des relations entre les deux empires. À son retour à Paris en 1811, son bilan politique est maigre. Sa défense opiniâtre du tsar Alexandre, mais surtout son opposition à la campagne militaire qui se prépare, irritent Napoléon. Elles lui permettent toutefois d’acquérir une nouvelle stature après le désastre de Russie : pour ses contemporains Caulaincourt devient l’« homme de la paix ». Une image que Napoléon réutilise lorsqu’il le charge de le représenter aux congrès de Prague (1813) et de Châtillon (1814). Le duc de Vicence, devenu ministre des Relations extérieures, ne parvient pas à faire accepter la paix ; il lui faut finalement négocier l’abdication de Napoléon et renoncer, après les Cent-Jours, à toute carrière politique. Cette étude, qui s’appuie sur les archives personnelles de Caulaincourt et ses célèbres Mémoires, entend redonner toute son importance à cette figure majeure du Premier Empire, en insistant sur son action et sa pensée dans le domaine de la diplomatie. L’exemple de ce parcours devant permettre de contribuer à reconsidérer et réévaluer le rôle du personnel diplomatique napoléonien
A cavalry officer born into Picardy's landed gentry, Armand de Caulaincourt rose rapidly through the ranks of the consular, and later the imperial court, to become in 1804 Grand Squire of the Empire. However, notwithstanding the importance of his curial functions, Napoleon destined him to a diplomatic career. After several missions, he was appointed as Ambassador of France to Russia (1807). Caulaincourt took part in all the major negotiations between France and Russia, but was forced to witness a slow breakdown in relations between the two Empires. At the time of his return to Paris in 1811, his political accomplishments were unimpressive. His stalwart defense of Tsar Alexander, and especially his opposition to the upcoming military campaign, were an irritation to Napoleon. Nevertheless, these stances allowed him to gain new stature after the disaster in Russia : in the eyes of his contemporaries, he became the “Peacemaker”, an image Napoleon used to his advantage by appointing him his representative at the congresses in Prague (1813) and in Châtillon (1814). The Duke of Vicenza, now Minister for Foreign Affairs, could not, however, broker an agreement in favour of peace : he was forced to negotiate Napoleon's abdication and to give up any hope of political career after the Hundred Days. This study, based on Caulaincourt's personal records and famous Memoirs, aims at restoring a major figure of the First French Empire to his due importance, while focusing on his action and thought in the field of diplomacy. The exemplary value of his career should also allow historians to reconsider and reevaluate the role of Napoleon's diplomatic personnel

碩士
南華大學
歐洲研究所
102
Hitler attacked the Soviet Union often considered to be the largest of Nazi Germany's grand strategy and military strategic errors during world war II. The grand strategy, Nazi Germany did not make the United Kingdom surrender, On led his army to attack has a lot of land and people and the army of the Russian. Although initially won a brilliant victory, But eventually not escape both sides of the war dilemma, Which led to defeated perish. In the military strategy, Germany focused on encircle annihilation Russian military, Delayed the attack Moscow time, Making the only chance of success in Germany was shattered. However, This paper attempts to refute these two common view. Through geographical situation, Resources, Compared with military power. The paper argues, In fact, Germany enough to attack Russia, But not enough to attack the United Kingdom; By analyzing the recorded history of war, The paper argues , Germany surrounded annihilate Russian strategic No error. This means that Germany attacked Russia on grand strategy and the military strategy is correct.

Questa tesi è dedicata alla ricostruzione e all’analisi della riflessione svoltasi all’interno del gruppo dirigente bolscevico tra il 1924 e il 1929 sulla questione contadina russa, tema che aveva dominato il dibattito culturale e politico in Russia fin dall’inizio del XIX secolo e che vide alla fine degli anni Venti una drammatica risoluzione con la collettivizzazione forzata delle campagne e la dekulakizzazione. L’obiettivo della ricerca è quello di porre l’attenzione sulla dimensione culturale della collettivizzazione come fattore che contribuisce e concorre a spiegare il fenomeno. In particolare, si cercano di ricostruire i caratteri fondamentali della rappresentazione della classe contadina da parte della leadership bolscevica durante la fase di crisi della Nep, di inquadrarli all’interno dell’ambito politico ed economico di riferimento e di porli in relazione al discorso sulla campagna russa prevalente tra l’intellighentsia prerivoluzionaria, e di evidenziare cioè l’importanza di quella che per l’élite urbana era “l’immagine della campagna”. Per far questo, ci si serve di alcuni strumenti metodologici degli studi culturali e degli studi sulla rappresentazione dell’altro. Tra questi, un contributo teorico importante è dato dal concetto di colonialismo interno, che consente di concentrare l’attenzione sulla dimensione sociale e geografica della distribuzione del potere imperiale in Russia, che diversamente da altri contesti più etnocentrici vede storicamente nella divisione tra città e campagna l’antinomia fondamentale della società russa. La ricerca è stata condotta prevalentemente su fonti documentarie edite e sulle fonti a stampa in lingua originale, in quanto esse costituiscono le voci classiche dell’analisi del discorso pubblico (articoli, pamphlet, report di conferenze e congressi). Dalla ricerca emerge che alla base dei dibattiti politici ed economici durante la Nep esisteva un’immagine della campagna, e del suo rapporto con la città, condivisa unanimemente da tutta la leadership bolscevica a prescindere dalle correnti. La dinamica della separazione politico-culturale è lampante e il discorso alla base è un discorso di subalternità congenita dovuta all’inerente passività e arretratezza del contadino russo. Con l’aumentare dell’ostilità nei villaggi dovute alle politiche di requisizione del grano, gradualmente il discorso sul contadino passerà dal tema fiducioso della passività, dell’ignoranza e della trasformazione a quello distruttivo del contadino come tipo socioculturale intrinsecamente borghese, antitetico al socialismo, ostile e irriformabile. Sulla base del confronto della ricerca con studi simili sul periodo zarista, si conclude che questa rappresentazione non è altro che la versione bolscevica di un confronto secolare della società colta urbana russa con la popolazione contadina, individuando un parallelismo che collega la cultura prerivoluzionaria con quella sovietica sul tema dell’antinomia tra città e campagna. Infine, alcuni elementi di questa immagine sembrano coincidere con quella dei popoli colonizzati nel discorso coloniale classico.

W połowie XVIII w. rozpoczął się proces modernizacji wojsk Rzeczpospolitej. Sformowane zostały pierwsze oddziały inżynieryjne i Korpus Inżynierów, a w 1765 r. powstała Szkoła Rycerska – uczelnia wojskowa kształcąca inżynierów wojskowych. Wojska inżynieryjne odrodziły się w okresie napoleońskim, w powstałej wówczas armii Księstwa Warszawskiego. Wojska te były zorganizowane na wzór francuski i cały czas rozbudowywane. Największą liczebność osiągnęły przed kampanią rosyjską w 1812 r. W tym okresie Korpus Inżynierów realizował wiele prac na zlecenie Napoleona, m. in. budował twierdzę w Modlinie i prowadził szczegółowe prace kartograficzne. W 1809 r. powołano Szkołę Aplikacyjnę Artylerii i Inżynierów wzorowaną na paryskiej École polytechnique. Jej uczniami było wielu wybitnych inżynierów jak gen. I. Prądzyński i F. Pancer.W okresie 1815-1830 r. Królestwo Polskie było zależne od Rosji, co spowodowało, że jego armia była wzorowana była na rosyjskiej. Powołanie w tym czasie do życia Kwatermistrzostwa Generalnego sprawiło, że przejęło ono wiele obowiązków i najzdolniejszych oficerów Korpusu Inżynierów.Podczas Powstania (1830-31) wojska inżynieryjne odegrały znaczną rolę, budując wiele mostów polowych i fortyfikacji. Najtrudniejszym zadaniem było w tym czasie ufortyfikowanie Warszawy, niestety nie udało się tego skutecznie wykonać. Po upadku Powstania i likwidacji armii w tym również wojsk inżynieryjnych, wielu żołnierzy i oficerów udało się na emigrację ale większość pozostała w Kraju stanowiąc zaczątek polskiej inteligencji technicznej.
In mid-1700s, the armed forces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth entered a process of modernisation. The first engineering units and the Corps of Engineers were organised and the year 1765 marked the establishment of the School of Chivalry - a military university training military engineers. The engineering corps was recreated with the formation of the army of the Duchy of Warsaw during the Napoleonic era. The Corps was organised based on the French model and continually developed, reaching its highest numbers in 1812. During that time, the Corps of Engineers carried out a number of projects commissioned by Napoleon, such as detailed mapping or the construction of the Modlin fortress. The Artillery and Engineering School, established in 1809 and designed after the French École polytechnique in Paris, trained many prominent engineers, such as General Ignacy Prądzyński and Feliks Pancer.During the era of the Russian-dominated Congress Kingdom of Poland (1815-1830), the Polish armed forces followed the organisation of the Russian Army. The General Logistics Department set up during that time, took over many of the responsibilities and most talented officers from the Corps of Engineers.The engineering corps played a key role in the November Uprising of 1830, constructing a number of field bridges and fortifications. Unfortunately, the most difficult task at the time, the fortification of Warsaw, was never completed. After the fall of the Uprising and the disbandment of the army, including the engineering corps, many soldiers and officers went into exile; still most remained in the Country and those who did became the nucleus of the Polish technology intelligentsia.