Academic literature on the topic 'Cable-less communication in gas pipes'

The world’s oil and gas is transported using a network of steel pipelines most of which lie underground. The length of this network in the US/Canada alone is 3.5 million kilometers. Keeping track of pipes in such a network for pipeline-health monitoring, maintenance, and logistics is an acute problem faced by pipeline-operators. Recently, radio-frequency-identification tags (RFIDs) have been proposed for tracking pipelines and even for monitoring pipeline health with additional built-in sensors. Low-cost RFID tags are wirelessly powered and battery-less. However, RFIDs do not function optimally in the presence of magnetic carbon steel pipes that are prevalent in the industry. High-frequency wireless signals also attenuate rapidly through wet soils. In this research, the use of passive RFID sensor platforms for interrogating buried pipes up to 1.25 m deep in the LF bands is proposed. Using magnetic-induction-based communication, a test-comparison between conventional full/half duplex (FDX/HDX) and sequential (SEQ) RFID schemes is detailed. Wireless measurements in the presence of an industry-standard ASTM A-53 carbon-steel pipe show a SEQ RFID offering better immunity against magnetic proximity effects of the pipe’s wall with an 8.3 dB (x6.8) improvement over a FDX/HDX RFID operating under similar conditions over a distance of 80–125 cm at which pipes are typically buried.

This paper presents a new solution for inspecting and repairing defects in live gas pipelines. The proposed approach is the development of a modular and semi-autonomous vehicle system. The robotic system has a drive mechanism, capable of navigating and adjusting its orientation in various configurations of pipelines. Other features of the system are cable-free communications, semi-autonomous motion control as well as integration of sensory devices. The robotic system is designed to traverse in 150–300 mm diameter pipes through straight and curved sections, junctions and reducers. The vehicle control and navigation technique is implemented using a two-mode controller consisting of a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) and fuzzy logic control. Unlike other available systems, the vehicle employs proprioceptive sensors to monitor its own states. The fuzzy logic controller is used to evaluate the sensor outputs such as speed, climbing angle and rate of change of climbing angle. This control technique allows the vehicle to drive and adapt in a partially observable gas pipe system. Laboratory experiment results are presented. The paper also describes a cable-free communication method for the system. A brief account of typical pipe environments and currently available inspection tools is presented as background information.

Wireless data communication and telemetry during drilling deep oil and gas wells are important enablers for safe and timely drilling operations. The transmission of information through drill strings and pipes using sound waves is a useful and practical approach. However, given the limited available bandwidth, transmission rates are typically smaller than what is needed. In this paper, a new method and system are proposed to increase the transmission rate over the same bandwidth, by deploying more than one actuator. Upon using multiple actuators, several data streams can be transmitted simultaneously. This increases the data rate without the need for additional bandwidth. The experimental results of a testbed with two actuators are presented, where the transmission rate is doubled with no bandwidth increase. A strain sensor receiver and accelerometer receivers are used to separate and demodulate the two data streams. It is demonstrated that it is possible to recover the data in the new faster system benefiting from two actuators, while having about the same bit error probability performance as a one-actuator system. Various combinations of strain and acceleration sensors are considered at the receive side. Due to some properties of strain channels (e.g., smaller delay spreads and their less-frequency-selective behavior) presented in this paper, it appears that a strain sensor receiver and an accelerometer receiver together can offer a good performance when separating and demodulating the two actuators’ data in the testbed. Overall, the experimental results from the proposed system suggest that upon using more than one actuator, it is feasible to increase the data rate over the limited bandwidth of pipes and drill strings.

Summary For the purpose of exploration and extraction, the drilling process in the mining and oil and gas industries is very complicated because of the obvious invisibility of the operation of the drill bit. Acoustic/vibrational telemetry has been of keen interest because it is so far the only method that allows a high data transfer rate as well as less data loss, over other methods. The method certainly depends on the use of the right communication tools and efficient communication schemes to achieve the highest data transfer rate. Although the acoustic method provides a very high data transmission rate, it also has its limitations. However, limitations can be overcome through certain approaches and the use of technologies. The proper use of a communication device with the steel pipe is the most important factor to consider so that the transducer works as the right actuator for the pipeline. The type of sensor that is used to pick up the data also plays a major role because signals are most likely to attenuate, and a sensitive sensor is necessary to collect these attenuated signals. This research demonstrates the use of a transducer as a communication device and oil and gas pipe as the medium of data transmission. The transducer can be used both as an actuator driver and as a receiver sensor. A new piezoelectric transducer was manufactured for this research, which was used with a test setup of a total 184 ft length of six oil and gas pipes. The test setup performed well and data were sent through this setup successfully. A communication scheme is developed using novel theories to achieve the highest data transfer rate. The scheme is tested with the transfer function data obtained from the experimental system. The communication scheme developed outputs a signal, which is a type of binary phase-shift keying signal data along with an equalizer filter. Then the signals developed from the scheme are used in the actual experimental setup to test the speed of the transmission and bit error rate (BER). For the six oil and gas pipes setup, the scheme provides a data transmission of 153 bits/sec (bps) with zero error percentage, which is high enough to use in any oil and gas industry.

The gas pipeline requires regular inspection since the leakage brings damage to the stable gas supply. Compared to current detection methods such as destructive inspection, using pipeline robots has advantages including low cost and high efficiency. However, they have a limited inspection range in the complex pipe owing to restrictions by the cable friction or wireless signal attenuation. In our former study, to extend the inspection range, we proposed a robot chain system based on wireless relay communication (WRC). However, some drawbacks still remain such as imprecision of evaluation based on received signal strength indication (RSSI), large data error ratio, and loss of signals. In this article, we thus propose a new approach based on visible light relay communication (VLRC) and illuminance assessment. This method enables robots to communicate by the ‘light signal relay’, which has advantages in good communication quality, less attenuation, and high precision in the pipe. To ensure the stability of VLRC, the illuminance-based evaluation method is adopted due to higher stability than the wireless-based approach. As a preliminary evaluation, several tests about signal waveform, communication quality, and coordinated movement were conducted. The results indicate that the proposed system can extend the inspection range with less data error ratio and more stable communication.

Deep beams are used in wide construction fields such as water tanks, foundations, and girders in multi-story buildings to provide certain areas free of columns. In practice it is quite often occurring to create web opening in deep beams to supply convenient passage of ventilation ducts, cable channels, gas and water pipes. Experimental studies of ten 10 deep beams were carried out, where two of them are control specimens without openings and eight with large web openings in the shear spans. The variables that have been adopted are the ratio of the shear span to the overall depth of the member cross-section, location and dimensions of the opening. Test results showed that there was a decrease in the load carrying capacity of deep beams with openings compared to the control deep beams. This reduction may reach 66% in particular cases. It is clear that, the position of opening in shear span has less effect on the performance of structural concrete deep beams at different serviceability stages. Only 11% increase in load capacity at failure was observed in specimens with openings adjacent to the interior edges of shear spans in comparison with specimens with openings at the center of shear span because the discontinuity of the load path is less. Also the midspan deflection at service load level of the reference beam in specimens with openings adjacent to interior edge of shear spans was less than the midspan deflection of reference specimens by 10% - 33%. Evaluating all these advantages facilitates to recommend, if it is very required, the creation of openings at the interior edges of shear spans of the structural concrete deep beams.

Photograph by Gonzalo Echeverria (2010)Declaring War Soon after Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the Bush Administration described its new grand strategy: the “Global War on Terror”. This underpinned the subsequent counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and the United States invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Media pundits quickly applied the Global War on Terror label to the Madrid, Bali and London bombings, to convey how Al Qaeda’s terrorism had gone transnational. Meanwhile, international relations scholars debated the extent to which September 11 had changed the international system (Brenner; Mann 303). American intellectuals adopted several variations of the Global War on Terror in what initially felt like a transitional period of US foreign policy (Burns). Walter Laqueur suggested Al Qaeda was engaged in a “cosmological” and perpetual war. Paul Berman likened Al Qaeda and militant Islam to the past ideological battles against communism and fascism (Heilbrunn 248). In a widely cited article, neoconservative thinker Norman Podhoretz suggested the United States faced “World War IV”, which had three interlocking drivers: Al Qaeda and trans-national terrorism; political Islam as the West’s existential enemy; and nuclear proliferation to ‘rogue’ countries and non-state actors (Friedman 3). Podhoretz’s tone reflected a revival of his earlier Cold War politics and critique of the New Left (Friedman 148-149; Halper and Clarke 56; Heilbrunn 210). These stances attracted widespread support. For instance, the United States Marine Corp recalibrated its mission to fight a long war against “World War IV-like” enemies. Yet these stances left the United States unprepared as the combat situations in Afghanistan and Iraq worsened (Ricks; Ferguson; Filkins). Neoconservative ideals for Iraq “regime change” to transform the Middle East failed to deal with other security problems such as Pakistan’s Musharraf regime (Dorrien 110; Halper and Clarke 210-211; Friedman 121, 223; Heilbrunn 252). The Manichean and open-ended framing became a self-fulfilling prophecy for insurgents, jihadists, and militias. The Bush Administration quietly abandoned the Global War on Terror in July 2005. Widespread support had given way to policymaker doubt. Why did so many intellectuals and strategists embrace the Global War on Terror as the best possible “grand strategy” perspective of a post-September 11 world? Why was there so little doubt of this worldview? This is a debate with roots as old as the Sceptics versus the Sophists. Explanations usually focus on the Bush Administration’s “Vulcans” war cabinet: Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who later became Secretary of State (Mann xv-xvi). The “Vulcans” were named after the Roman god Vulcan because Rice’s hometown Birmingham, Alabama, had “a mammoth fifty-six foot statue . . . [in] homage to the city’s steel industry” (Mann x) and the name stuck. Alternatively, explanations focus on how neoconservative thinkers shaped the intellectual climate after September 11, in a receptive media climate. Biographers suggest that “neoconservatism had become an echo chamber” (Heilbrunn 242) with its own media outlets, pundits, and think-tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute and Project for a New America. Neoconservatism briefly flourished in Washington DC until Iraq’s sectarian violence discredited the “Vulcans” and neoconservative strategists like Paul Wolfowitz (Friedman; Ferguson). The neoconservatives' combination of September 11’s aftermath with strongly argued historical analogies was initially convincing. They conferred with scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Samuel P. Huntington and Victor Davis Hanson to construct classicist historical narratives and to explain cultural differences. However, the history of the decade after September 11 also contains mis-steps and mistakes which make it a series of contingent decisions (Ferguson; Bergen). One way to analyse these contingent decisions is to pose “what if?” counterfactuals, or feasible alternatives to historical events (Lebow). For instance, what if September 11 had been a chemical and biological weapons attack? (Mann 317). Appendix 1 includes a range of alternative possibilities and “minimal rewrites” or slight variations on the historical events which occurred. Collectively, these counterfactuals suggest the role of agency, chance, luck, and the juxtaposition of better and worse outcomes. They pose challenges to the classicist interpretation adopted soon after September 11 to justify “World War IV” (Podhoretz). A ‘Two-Track’ Process for ‘World War IV’ After the September 11 attacks, I think an overlapping two-track process occurred with the “Vulcans” cabinet, neoconservative advisers, and two “echo chambers”: neoconservative think-tanks and the post-September 11 media. Crucially, Bush’s “Vulcans” war cabinet succeeded in gaining civilian control of the United States war decision process. Although successful in initiating the 2003 Iraq War this civilian control created a deeper crisis in US civil-military relations (Stevenson; Morgan). The “Vulcans” relied on “politicised” intelligence such as a United Kingdom intelligence report on Iraq’s weapons development program. The report enabled “a climate of undifferentiated fear to arise” because its public version did not distinguish between chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons (Halper and Clarke, 210). The cautious 2003 National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) report on Iraq was only released in a strongly edited form. For instance, the US Department of Energy had expressed doubts about claims that Iraq had approached Niger for uranium, and was using aluminium tubes for biological and chemical weapons development. Meanwhile, the post-September 11 media had become a second “echo chamber” (Halper and Clarke 194-196) which amplified neoconservative arguments. Berman, Laqueur, Podhoretz and others who framed the intellectual climate were “risk entrepreneurs” (Mueller 41-43) that supported the “World War IV” vision. The media also engaged in aggressive “flak” campaigns (Herman and Chomsky 26-28; Mueller 39-42) designed to limit debate and to stress foreign policy stances and themes which supported the Bush Administration. When former Central Intelligence Agency director James Woolsey’s claimed that Al Qaeda had close connections to Iraqi intelligence, this was promoted in several books, including Michael Ledeen’s War Against The Terror Masters, Stephen Hayes’ The Connection, and Laurie Mylroie’s Bush v. The Beltway; and in partisan media such as Fox News, NewsMax, and The Weekly Standard who each attacked the US State Department and the CIA (Dorrien 183; Hayes; Ledeen; Mylroie; Heilbrunn 237, 243-244; Mann 310). This was the media “echo chamber” at work. The group Accuracy in Media also campaigned successfully to ensure that US cable providers did not give Al Jazeera English access to US audiences (Barker). Cosmopolitan ideals seemed incompatible with what the “flak” groups desired. The two-track process converged on two now infamous speeches. US President Bush’s State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002, and US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation to the United Nations on 5 February 2003. Bush’s speech included a line from neoconservative David Frumm about North Korea, Iraq and Iran as an “Axis of Evil” (Dorrien 158; Halper and Clarke 139-140; Mann 242, 317-321). Powell’s presentation to the United Nations included now-debunked threat assessments. In fact, Powell had altered the speech’s original draft by I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, who was Cheney’s chief of staff (Dorrien 183-184). Powell claimed that Iraq had mobile biological weapons facilities, linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Mohamed El-Baradei, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the Institute for Science and International Security all strongly doubted this claim, as did international observers (Dorrien 184; Halper and Clarke 212-213; Mann 353-354). Yet this information was suppressed: attacked by “flak” or given little visible media coverage. Powell’s agenda included trying to rebuild an international coalition and to head off weather changes that would affect military operations in the Middle East (Mann 351). Both speeches used politicised variants of “weapons of mass destruction”, taken from the counterterrorism literature (Stern; Laqueur). Bush’s speech created an inflated geopolitical threat whilst Powell relied on flawed intelligence and scientific visuals to communicate a non-existent threat (Vogel). However, they had the intended effect on decision makers. US Under-Secretary of Defense, the neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz, later revealed to Vanity Fair that “weapons of mass destruction” was selected as an issue that all potential stakeholders could agree on (Wilkie 69). Perhaps the only remaining outlet was satire: Armando Iannucci’s 2009 film In The Loop parodied the diplomatic politics surrounding Powell’s speech and the civil-military tensions on the Iraq War’s eve. In the short term the two track process worked in heading off doubt. The “Vulcans” blocked important information on pre-war Iraq intelligence from reaching the media and the general public (Prados). Alternatively, they ignored area specialists and other experts, such as when Coalition Provisional Authority’s L. Paul Bremer ignored the US State Department’s fifteen volume ‘Future of Iraq’ project (Ferguson). Public “flak” and “risk entrepreneurs” mobilised a range of motivations from grief and revenge to historical memory and identity politics. This combination of private and public processes meant that although doubts were expressed, they could be contained through the dual echo chambers of neoconservative policymaking and the post-September 11 media. These factors enabled the “Vulcans” to proceed with their “regime change” plans despite strong public opposition from anti-war protestors. Expressing DoubtsMany experts and institutions expressed doubt about specific claims the Bush Administration made to support the 2003 Iraq War. This doubt came from three different and sometimes overlapping groups. Subject matter experts such as the IAEA’s Mohamed El-Baradei and weapons development scientists countered the UK intelligence report and Powell’s UN speech. However, they did not get the media coverage warranted due to “flak” and “echo chamber” dynamics. Others could challenge misleading historical analogies between insurgent Iraq and Nazi Germany, and yet not change the broader outcomes (Benjamin). Independent journalists one group who gained new information during the 1990-91 Gulf War: some entered Iraq from Kuwait and documented a more humanitarian side of the war to journalists embedded with US military units (Uyarra). Finally, there were dissenters from bureaucratic and institutional processes. In some cases, all three overlapped. In their separate analyses of the post-September 11 debate on intelligence “failure”, Zegart and Jervis point to a range of analytic misperceptions and institutional problems. However, the intelligence community is separated from policymakers such as the “Vulcans”. Compartmentalisation due to the “need to know” principle also means that doubting analysts can be blocked from releasing information. Andrew Wilkie discovered this when he resigned from Australia’s Office for National Assessments (ONA) as a transnational issues analyst. Wilkie questioned the pre-war assessments in Powell’s United Nations speech that were used to justify the 2003 Iraq War. Wilkie was then attacked publicly by Australian Prime Minister John Howard. This overshadowed a more important fact: both Howard and Wilkie knew that due to Australian legislation, Wilkie could not publicly comment on ONA intelligence, despite the invitation to do so. This barrier also prevented other intelligence analysts from responding to the “Vulcans”, and to “flak” and “echo chamber” dynamics in the media and neoconservative think-tanks. Many analysts knew that the excerpts released from the 2003 NIE on Iraq was highly edited (Prados). For example, Australian agencies such as the ONA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Department of Defence knew this (Wilkie 98). However, analysts are trained not to interfere with policymakers, even when there are significant civil-military irregularities. Military officials who spoke out about pre-war planning against the “Vulcans” and their neoconservative supporters were silenced (Ricks; Ferguson). Greenlight Capital’s hedge fund manager David Einhorn illustrates in a different context what might happen if analysts did comment. Einhorn gave a speech to the Ira Sohn Conference on 15 May 2002 debunking the management of Allied Capital. Einhorn’s “short-selling” led to retaliation from Allied Capital, a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, and growing evidence of potential fraud. If analysts adopted Einhorn’s tactics—combining rigorous analysis with targeted, public denunciation that is widely reported—then this may have short-circuited the “flak” and “echo chamber” effects prior to the 2003 Iraq War. The intelligence community usually tries to pre-empt such outcomes via contestation exercises and similar processes. This was the goal of the 2003 NIE on Iraq, despite the fact that the US Department of Energy which had the expertise was overruled by other agencies who expressed opinions not necessarily based on rigorous scientific and technical analysis (Prados; Vogel). In counterterrorism circles, similar disinformation arose about Aum Shinrikyo’s biological weapons research after its sarin gas attack on Tokyo’s subway system on 20 March 1995 (Leitenberg). Disinformation also arose regarding nuclear weapons proliferation to non-state actors in the 1990s (Stern). Interestingly, several of the “Vulcans” and neoconservatives had been involved in an earlier controversial contestation exercise: Team B in 1976. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assembled three Team B groups in order to evaluate and forecast Soviet military capabilities. One group headed by historian Richard Pipes gave highly “alarmist” forecasts and then attacked a CIA NIE about the Soviets (Dorrien 50-56; Mueller 81). The neoconservatives adopted these same tactics to reframe the 2003 NIE from its position of caution, expressed by several intelligence agencies and experts, to belief that Iraq possessed a current, covert program to develop weapons of mass destruction (Prados). Alternatively, information may be leaked to the media to express doubt. “Non-attributable” background interviews to establishment journalists like Seymour Hersh and Bob Woodward achieved this. Wikileaks publisher Julian Assange has recently achieved notoriety due to US diplomatic cables from the SIPRNet network released from 28 November 2010 onwards. Supporters have favourably compared Assange to Daniel Ellsberg, the RAND researcher who leaked the Pentagon Papers (Ellsberg; Ehrlich and Goldsmith). Whilst Elsberg succeeded because a network of US national papers continued to print excerpts from the Pentagon Papers despite lawsuit threats, Assange relied in part on favourable coverage from the UK’s Guardian newspaper. However, suspected sources such as US Army soldier Bradley Manning are not protected whilst media outlets are relatively free to publish their scoops (Walt, ‘Woodward’). Assange’s publication of SIPRNet’s diplomatic cables will also likely mean greater restrictions on diplomatic and military intelligence (Walt, ‘Don’t Write’). Beyond ‘Doubt’ Iraq’s worsening security discredited many of the factors that had given the neoconservatives credibility. The post-September 11 media became increasingly more critical of the US military in Iraq (Ferguson) and cautious about the “echo chamber” of think-tanks and media outlets. Internet sites for Al Jazeera English, Al-Arabiya and other networks have enabled people to bypass “flak” and directly access these different viewpoints. Most damagingly, the non-discovery of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction discredited both the 2003 NIE on Iraq and Colin Powell’s United Nations presentation (Wilkie 104). Likewise, “risk entrepreneurs” who foresaw “World War IV” in 2002 and 2003 have now distanced themselves from these apocalyptic forecasts due to a series of mis-steps and mistakes by the Bush Administration and Al Qaeda’s over-calculation (Bergen). The emergence of sites such as Wikileaks, and networks like Al Jazeera English and Al-Arabiya, are a response to the politics of the past decade. They attempt to short-circuit past “echo chambers” through providing access to different sources and leaked data. The Global War on Terror framed the Bush Administration’s response to September 11 as a war (Kirk; Mueller 59). Whilst this prematurely closed off other possibilities, it has also unleashed a series of dynamics which have undermined the neoconservative agenda. The “classicist” history and historical analogies constructed to justify the “World War IV” scenario are just one of several potential frameworks. “Flak” organisations and media “echo chambers” are now challenged by well-financed and strategic alternatives such as Al Jazeera English and Al-Arabiya. Doubt is one defence against “risk entrepreneurs” who seek to promote a particular idea: doubt guards against uncritical adoption. Perhaps the enduring lesson of the post-September 11 debates, though, is that doubt alone is not enough. What is needed are individuals and institutions that understand the strategies which the neoconservatives and others have used, and who also have the soft power skills during crises to influence critical decision-makers to choose alternatives. Appendix 1: Counterfactuals Richard Ned Lebow uses “what if?” counterfactuals to examine alternative possibilities and “minimal rewrites” or slight variations on the historical events that occurred. The following counterfactuals suggest that the Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror could have evolved very differently . . . or not occurred at all. Fact: The 2003 Iraq War and 2001 Afghanistan counterinsurgency shaped the Bush Administration’s post-September 11 grand strategy. Counterfactual #1: Al Gore decisively wins the 2000 U.S. election. Bush v. Gore never occurs. After the September 11 attacks, Gore focuses on international alliance-building and gains widespread diplomatic support rather than a neoconservative agenda. He authorises Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and works closely with the Musharraf regime in Pakistan to target Al Qaeda’s muhajideen. He ‘contains’ Saddam Hussein’s Iraq through measurement and signature, technical intelligence, and more stringent monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Minimal Rewrite: United 93 crashes in Washington DC, killing senior members of the Gore Administration. Fact: U.S. Special Operations Forces failed to kill Osama bin Laden in late November and early December 2001 at Tora Bora. Counterfactual #2: U.S. Special Operations Forces kill Osama bin Laden in early December 2001 during skirmishes at Tora Bora. Ayman al-Zawahiri is critically wounded, captured, and imprisoned. The rest of Al Qaeda is scattered. Minimal Rewrite: Osama bin Laden’s death turns him into a self-mythologised hero for decades. Fact: The UK Blair Government supplied a 50-page intelligence dossier on Iraq’s weapons development program which the Bush Administration used to support its pre-war planning. Counterfactual #3: Rogue intelligence analysts debunk the UK Blair Government’s claims through a series of ‘targeted’ leaks to establishment news sources. Minimal Rewrite: The 50-page intelligence dossier is later discovered to be correct about Iraq’s weapons development program. Fact: The Bush Administration used the 2003 National Intelligence Estimate to “build its case” for “regime change” in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Counterfactual #4: A joint investigation by The New York Times and The Washington Post rebuts U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United National Security Council, delivered on 5 February 2003. Minimal Rewrite: The Central Intelligence Agency’s whitepaper “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs” (October 2002) more accurately reflects the 2003 NIE’s cautious assessments. Fact: The Bush Administration relied on Ahmed Chalabi for its postwar estimates about Iraq’s reconstruction. Counterfactual #5: The Bush Administration ignores Chalabi’s advice and relies instead on the U.S. State Department’s 15 volume report “The Future of Iraq”. Minimal Rewrite: The Coalition Provisional Authority appoints Ahmed Chalabi to head an interim Iraqi government. Fact: L. Paul Bremer signed orders to disband Iraq’s Army and to De-Ba’athify Iraq’s new government. Counterfactual #6: Bremer keeps Iraq’s Army intact and uses it to impose security in Baghdad to prevent looting and to thwart insurgents. Rather than a De-Ba’athification policy, Bremer uses former Baath Party members to gather situational intelligence. Minimal Rewrite: Iraq’s Army refuses to disband and the De-Ba’athification policy uncovers several conspiracies to undermine the Coalition Provisional Authority. AcknowledgmentsThanks to Stephen McGrail for advice on science and technology analysis.References Barker, Greg. “War of Ideas”. PBS Frontline. Boston, MA: 2007. ‹http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/newswar/video1.html› Benjamin, Daniel. “Condi’s Phony History.” Slate 29 Aug. 2003. ‹http://www.slate.com/id/2087768/pagenum/all/›. Bergen, Peter L. The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al Qaeda. New York: The Free Press, 2011. Berman, Paul. Terror and Liberalism. 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Abstract The proposed technology provides subsea autonomous solutions using artificial intelligence and communication software. These integrate wirelessly between Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs). This is a significant improvement on the current pre-programmed mode of AUVs and the subsea communications and operation of autonomous robotics. Furthermore, the technology allows underwater wireless communication between autonomous subsea robotics and introduces new operational opportunities using simultaneous multi-robotic subsea arrays. Underwater vehicles are used for a wide variety of operations that include – but are not limited to inspection/identification, oceanography, survey missions or samples picking. Underwater vehicles may be manned or unmanned. Among the unmanned vehicles, there are ROVs and AUVs. An Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) is a robot that travels underwater without requiring input from an operator. AUVs constitute part of a larger group of undersea systems known as unmanned underwater vehicles, a classification that includes the mentioned non-autonomous Remotely Operated underwater Vehicles (ROVs) – controlled and powered from the surface by an operator/pilot via an umbilical or using remote control. ROVs are unmanned underwater vehicles connected to a base station, which may be a ship. As mentioned ROVs are connected to the ship by means of cables; this implies that the maximum achievable distance between the ROV and the base station is limited by the length of the cable. AUVs are unmanned underwater vehicles, which are connected to a docking station by means of a wireless communication. Typically, AUVs are propelled through the energy stored in batteries housed in their body. This means that the operative range of an AUV is limited by the capacity of the battery. This type of underwater vehicles has recently become an attractive alternative for underwater search and exploration since they are cheaper than manned vehicles. Over the past years, there have been abundant attempts to develop underwater vehicles to meet the challenge of exploration and extraction programs in the oceans. Recently, researchers have focused on the development of AUVs for long-term data collection in oceanography and coastal management. The oil and gas industry uses AUVs to make detailed maps of the seafloor before they start building subsea infrastructure; pipelines and sub-sea completions can be installed in the most cost effective manner with minimum disruption to the environment. In addition, post-lay pipe surveys are now possible, which includes pipeline inspection. The use of AUVs for pipeline inspection and inspection of underwater man-made structures is becoming more common. With the adoption of AUV technology becoming more widespread, the limitations of the 5 technology are being explored and addressed. The average AUV charge lasts about 24- hours on an underwater AUV, but sometimes it is necessary to deploy them for the kinds of several day missions that some unmanned systems are equipped to undertake. Like most robots, the unmanned mechanisms contain batteries that require regular recharging. Docking stations that communicate directly with underwater vehicles, guiding them to where they can recharge and transfer data have been developed. Any data the AUV has gathered, such as images of the seabed, could be uploaded to the docking station and transmitted to home base, which could direct new instructions to the robot any underwater vehicle requiring the need of a wireless communication with the docking station faces at least the problem of the limitations for wireless communications in water

Prior to the introduction of plastic pipe many gas utilities used cast iron to build their gas distribution network. Currently, there is approximately forty thousand kilometres of cast iron pipe in service in North America and a further two hundred thousand kilometres in Europe. Mostly found in dense urban locations, the cost of replacing these systems can be significantly high, such that extending the life of these systems is now a common strategy. The main problem has been leakage from bell and spigot joints caused by road vibration, freeze/thaw cycles of the ground, and the swelling and drying of clay soils. Repair technologies have evolved from mechanical joint clamps, to elastomeric seals, to shrink sleeves, to encapsulants and finally to anaerobics. The most advanced of these technologies involve the use of anaerobic sealants which are injected into the jute packing by drilling into the pipe bells. These sealants have been studied at Cornell University for longevity, and are predicted to withstand many years of service. The use of anaerobics has been adapted to work with robotics that allows the injection to take place from the inside of the pipeline while the gas main is in operation. This technology allows 24 joints to be sealed from a single excavation. The robot is a tethered electro-mechanical device that allows visual location of the joint, internal drilling into the jute packing, and injection of the sealant. A semi-rigid umbilical cable contains the electrical, hydraulic, and communication lines, and a unique drive mechanism that allows for remote operation and positioning. The development of this prototype technology was conducted by Engineering Services Inc. (ESI) of Toronto at the request of Enbridge Consumers Gas and was co-funded by Consolidated Edison of New York. Over 2000 joints have been successfully sealed in the last two years and the system is expected to be commercially available within the next year. Internal robotic repair of live mains is an industry first and has the potential to significantly reduce both costs and disruption of road excavations in urban areas.

Recent developments in the fields of electronics, computer systems and communication technology have enabled the use of many new concepts within inspection and monitoring. ULTRAMONIT is one such example where we try to extend the use of ultrasonic measurements in terms of accuracy and what we can measure. In this concept, an array of ultrasonic sensors is placed permanently onto the pipe. The location of these sensors will typically be in a field joint directly at, or close to a weld, and the objective will be to monitor for corrosion attacks and cracks. Permanently installed sensors are advantageous as exact position, orientation and acoustic coupling are maintained between surveys. Compared to conventional ultrasonic inspection, this means significantly improved possibilities for high-resolution trend analysis of the data. Under good conditions, UT wall-thickness can be measured with a resolution in the order of 0.01 mm. Using fixed sensors; such very high resolution could be made available for monitoring purposes. Two versions of this system are developed, one for use on subsea pipelines, and one for use topside or on land facilities. ULTRAMONIT Subsea is implemented as an instrumented pipeline clamp, where the required electronics and sensors are placed and protected in a rugged steel structure. Reliability has been a key objective for this concept, and has been addressed by keeping the permanently installed electronics as simple as possible, while making the more complicated parts of the instrumentation accessible in an ROV carried unit. This ROV is used for interrogation with the sensors by use of a specially developed inductive coupler, which provides power, analog signal for the ultrasonic transducers, and digital communication for the signal multiplexer. This unit is controlled digitally and the number of channels is only limited by signal degradation due to total spanned length of analog cable, as the channel count gets very high. Our prototype has 48 channels in one row of sensors around the circumference of a 10” pipe, but both HW and SW is ready for any practical number of channels. ULTRAMONIT Subsea will be lab-tested at the Statoil R&D center in Trondheim, and a topside/land facilities version of this same system is being installed on a 12” pipe at the Ka˚rsto̸ gas processing plant. Both tests will commence in December 2003, and continue through 2004. Results from these tests will be presented at the conference.

There are several methods for pressure isolating pipelines. Along with hot tapping and stopple and freeze plugging, there is another common method known as remote controlled (tether-less) pipeline plugging, whose use is increasing — both offshore and onshore. This paper will review piggable tether-less plugging technology, provided by TDW Offshore Services using the SmartPlug™, and case histories whereby a bi-directionally piggable, remotely actuated (tether-less) plug is deployed to allow pipeline operators to perform repair work, modifications, or tie-ins on pipeline systems without interrupting production in the remaining part of the pipeline system, i.e., while operating live and at production pressure. Specifically this paper will address two new technologies: First, allowing high pressure isolation of thin wall pipe, and second, of spiral wound pipe, both without welding, tapping or leaving any trace of the fact that an isolation occurred. Some advantages of tether-less plugging technology are: • Plugging tools have higher pressure containment capacity than other plugging methods, typically up to 3,000 psi. • Bi-directionally piggable, able to negotiate as small as 1.5D bends, operated and monitored entirely via remote control (tether-less through-wall control and communication system). • Compared to hot tapping, welding a fitting on the pipeline is not required, and no need to hot tap (drill) into the pipeline, no future leak path and no issues regarding cuttings or coupon. This latest frontier of pressure isolation allows for plugging tools that are fail-safe (the higher the differential pressure the harder they set) with zero leakage tolerance. They can be configured for job specific requirements such as double or single block, and can allow for hydrotesting the completed work. The most important advantage is that they eliminate the time needed and lost production cost of displacing pipeline product, flaring, depressurizing, emptying the line, and re-commissioning the line. In addition, specifically this paper will address the latest technology advances allowing high pressure isolation of thin wall (8mm/0.32 inch) spiral wound pipe using external pressure reinforcement clamps over the pressure isolation tool during an onshore project on a 24″ methane gas pipeline. During the isolation, a portion of the upstream pipeline was removed and replaced while the entire pipeline downstream of the pressure isolation remained under full operating pressure, thus requiring no loss of production from downstream assets during the repair. Once complete the tools were released and pigged from the line, leaving no holes, no welds, no future leak path and no trace that any event occurred on the pipeline in that location.