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1
Ricks, Jacob I. "AGENTS, PRINCIPALS, OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN? BUREAUCRATS AND POLICY CONTROL IN THAILAND." Journal of East Asian Studies 18, no. 3 (July 18, 2018): 321–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jea.2018.17.
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AbstractIn the aftermath of the 2006 and 2014 Thai coups, observers declared the resurrection of the bureaucratic polity. Bureaucrats, though, remained influential even during the period of 1992–2006, when elected politicians were thought to command the Thai state. Bureaucratic involvement in politics poses a challenge for dominant political science theories of politician–bureaucrat relationships, which draw heavily from principal–agent frameworks. I apply agency theory to Thailand, testing three different hypotheses derived from the theory. Examining legislative productivity and control over bureaucratic career trajectories, I find that elected politicians increasingly acted as principals of the Thai state from 1992 through 2006, and to a lesser degree from 2008 to 2013. Thai bureaucrats, though, have frequently engaged in the political sphere, blunting political oversight and expanding their independence vis-à-vis politicians. This suggests that the principal–agent model overlooks the range of resources that bureaucracies can bring to bear in developing countries, granting them greater autonomy than anticipated. As such, theories of the politician–bureaucrat relationship in developing states need to better account for the mechanisms through which bureaucrats exercise policy discretion and political influence.
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Bendor, Jonathan, Serge Taylor, and Roland Van Gaalen. "Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design." American Political Science Review 81, no. 3 (September 1987): 873–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962681.
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Empirical studies suggest that mission-oriented bureaucrats bias their design of program alternatives to increase the odds that a superior will choose the kind of program the officials want. However, political executives may anticipate this manipulation and try to reassert control. These struggles are examined in three models. In Model 1 a senior bureaucrat is interested only in missions; the bureaucrat's political superior controls him or her by rejecting inferior proposals and entertaining new options from other policy specialists. Model 2 is a principal-agent analysis. Here the official is interested only in budgets; the official's superior reduces search bias by creating an ex ante incentive scheme. In Model 3 the bureaucrat cares about both budgets and programs; the superior uses both his or her final review authority and ex ante incentives to reduce agenda manipulation. The models' contrasting implications for the political control of bureaucracy are examined.
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HUBER, JOHN D., and NOLAN McCARTY. "Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform." American Political Science Review 98, no. 3 (August 2004): 481–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055404001297.
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We analyze a model of delegation and policymaking in polities where bureaucratic capacity is low. Our analysis suggests that low bureaucratic capacity diminishes incentives for bureaucrats to comply with legislation, making it more difficult for politicians to induce bureaucrats to take actions that politicians desire. Consequently, when bureaucratic capacity is low, standard principles in the theoretical literature on delegation no longer hold. We also use the model to examine the issue of political reform in polities with low bureaucratic capacity. The model indicates that politicians in such polities will be trapped in a situation whereby they have little incentive to undertake reforms of either the bureaucracy or other institutions (such as courts) that are crucial for successful policymaking.
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TING, MICHAEL M. "Legislatures, Bureaucracies, and Distributive Spending." American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (May 2012): 367–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000081.
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This article develops a theory of bureaucratic influence on distributive politics. Although there exists a rich literature on the effects of institutions such as presidents, electoral systems, and bicameralism on government spending, the role of professional bureaucrats has yet to receive formal scrutiny. In the model, legislators bargain over the allocation of distributive benefits across districts. The legislature may either “politicize” a program by bargaining directly over pork and bypassing bureaucratic scrutiny, or “professionalize” it by letting a bureaucrat approve or reject project funding in each district according to an underlying quality standard. The model predicts that the legislature will professionalize when the expected program quality is high. However, politicization becomes more likely as the number of high-quality projects increases and under divided government. Further, more competent bureaucrats can encourage politicization if the expected program quality is low. Finally, politicized programs are larger than professionalized programs.
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Dinarjo Soehari, Tjiptogoro, and Iffah Budiningsih. "Model of Bureaucratic Corruption Prevention." International Journal of Asian Social Science 10, no. 10 (2020): 638–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.18488/journal.1.2020.1010.638.646.
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Silaban., Himsar. "BUREAUCRATIC REFORM IN INDONESIA: LESSON LEARNED FROM BUREAUCRATIC REFORM MODEL IN JAPAN." International Journal of Advanced Research 5, no. 1 (January 31, 2017): 2096–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.21474/ijar01/2983.
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Bendor, Jonathan, and Terry M. Moe. "An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics." American Political Science Review 79, no. 3 (September 1985): 755–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1956842.
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In this article we outline a new framework for the formal analysis of bureaucratic politics. It departs from standard neoclassical approaches, notably those of Niskanen (1971) and Peltzman (1976), in several important respects. First our approach explicitly models a system of three-way interaction among bureaus, politicians, and interest groups. Second, it allows for institutional features of each type of participant. Third, it is a model of dynamic process. Fourth, participants make choices adoptively rather than optimizing. Fifth, participants are only minimally informed.The result is a dynamic model of adaptive behavior, very much in the spirit of Simon's (1947) behavioral tradition, that offers a new perspective on political control, bureaucratic power, and the “intelligence of democracy.”
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Greaves Siew, Jochelle. "Attempts of Fully Controlling Bureaucracy: Quae Merito?" Journal of Public Administration and Governance 11, no. 1 (January 15, 2021): 53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/jpag.v11i1.18008.
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The performance of government bureaucrats profoundly impacts the daily lives of citizens, with their unseen decisions affecting, inter alia, the safety of society, public education standards, and working conditions. Still, scholars dispute the power of bureaucrats, and whether and how it should be controlled. Some contend that bureaucratic activity must be firmly controlled since bureaucrats are expected to shirk their responsibilities. Contrarily, others postulate that a trust-based system would be better-suited as bureaucrats subscribe to values related to public interest, professional norms, and organisational loyalty. This article conducts a review of relevant literature on ‘top-down’ and ‘trust-based’ control mechanisms in order to recommend suitable approaches for controlling bureaucratic activity, considering the factors which affect the nature of their work. It is shown that a trust-based model is appropriate as it results in an equilibrium being achieved, with discretion utilised as a tool for implementation, whilst bureaucratic activity is monitored and controlled in a less intrusive and demotivating manner. While command-and-control methods produce better results in cases where short-term cost control and productivity are in question, this approach is unsustainable in the long-run due to inherently faulty assumptions about bureaucratic motivation. This article also recognises that multiple mechanisms of control might be necessary, depending on what is appropriate according to political judgements on contexts and organisational goals. Bureaucrats are accountable in different ways, at several levels and to varying degrees, so the mechanisms used to monitor and control them should reflect this reality.
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Smith, Kevin B., and Jayme L. N. Renfro. "Darwin’s bureaucrat." Politics and the Life Sciences 38, no. 2 (2019): 168–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/pls.2019.17.
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AbstractThe study of bureaucratic behavior—focusing on control, decision-making, and institutional arrangements—has historically leaned heavily on theories of rational choice and bounded rationality. Notably absent from this research, however, is attention to the growing literature on biological and especially evolutionary human behavior. This article addresses this gap by closely examining the extant economic and psychological frameworks—which we refer to as “Adam Smith’s bureaucrat” and “Herbert Simon’s bureaucrat”—for their shortcomings in terms of explanatory and predictive theory, and by positing a different framework, which we call “Charles Darwin’s bureaucrat.” This model incorporates new insights from an expanding multidisciplinary research framework and has the potential to address some of the long-noted weaknesses of classic theories of bureaucratic behavior.
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Murphy, David S., and Scott Yetmar. "Petty Corruption in a Multi-Person, Multi-Stage Bureaucratic Process: Formal Models and an Experimental Assessment." Research in Economics and Management 4, no. 1 (January 23, 2019): 69. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/rem.v4n1p69.
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<p><em>This paper examines the case where a citizen faces a sequence of bureaucrats in a transaction approval process. Each bureaucrat has the authority to disapprove an application and all of the bureaucrats must approve an application for it to be accepted. Each bureaucrat also has the ability to request a facilitating payment during the review process. Models are developed to explain bureaucrat behavior when there are no sanctions present to moderate the requests for facilitating payments, and where another government official with the authority to impose penalties on corrupt behavior is included in the process. Model I demonstrated that there is no economically rational reason for a bureaucrat to forgo requesting a facilitating payment. Model II showed that relatively low sanction multipliers are required to induce a bureaucrat to forgo the opportunity to request a bribe if the bureaucrat is in the early steps in a multi-step approval process. The predictions made by Model II were then tested using students as surrogates for bureaucrats. The results indicate that wide dissemination of information about sanctions that have been imposed could have a preventive or at least moderating effect on bribe behavior by public sector employees. </em></p>
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Simsek, Esra. "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism." Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science 24 (September 1, 2014): 141–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.22151/politikon.24.9.
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This article provides an application of O’Donnell’s bureaucratic-authoritarianism theory in Turkish context though a survey of political unrest of 1970s and 1980 military coup. The theory is reappropriated through formal modelling in order to amend its previous weakness. Although BA theory is strong in explaining the destabilizing effect of modernity in late-developers, it lacks an actor level analysis. Thus, this paper takes political parties as active agents which instrumentalizes political violence and considers military as an institution bearing private interests. The formal design constitutes a break from traditional BA model and yields a “paralysis” equilibrium which is supported by historical account. Thus, the convergences and divergences between Turkish and Latin American context, reveals the need of recontextualization and reappropriation of BA theory, especially through inclusion of an agency-level analysis.
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Kusuma, Hendra. "Flypaper Effect: Fiscal Illusion and Bureaucratic Model." Jurnal Ekonomi dan Ekonomi Studi Pembangunan 9, no. 1 (March 5, 2017): 27–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.17977/um002v9i12017p027.
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Wibawa, Samodra, Eny Boedi Orbawati, Koentjoro, Arnanda Yusliwidaka, and Fadlurrahman. "Implementation of the Alternative Model of Bureaucratic Reform in the Magelang City." Proceeding International Conference on Science and Engineering 3 (April 30, 2020): 731–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/icse.v3.593.
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Bureaucratic reform has entered the second wave based on Peraturan Presiden No. 81 Tahun 2019 about Grand Design Reformasi Birokrasi for the period 2010 – 2025. Based on that regulation, every government institution must improve itself through programs related to the grand design and road map of bureaucratic reform. This study is the third of three studies cunducted in the last three years. In the first study has succeeded in identifying the obstacles experienced by Magelang government in the carrying out bureaucratic reform. Then in the second study, team focused on developing alternative model of bureaucratic reform to address the problems found in the first study. Whereas in the third study, alternative model of bureaucratic reform was implemented for eight months in collaboration with several government institutions in Magelang city. The finding of this study is alternative model of bureaucratic reform was successfully implemented, but the results have not yet reached what was expected. Internally, the commitment of employee is still weak, and externally the lack of public participation.
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d'Iribarne, Philippe. "The Honour Principle in the 'Bureaucratic Phenomenon'." Organization Studies 15, no. 1 (January 1994): 81–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/017084069401500104.
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The aim of the paper is to confront two models of the French pattern of action: the well-known 'bureaucratic' model, depicted by Michel Crozier, and a model which emphasizes the persistence within modern French organizations of what Montesquieu called the honour principle. This model is tested successfully against the ethnographical material presented in The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. In addi tion, the paper explains, using a semiotic approach to culture, how a mode of functioning said to be archaic can persist in the long run.
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Juliani, Henny. "Perubahan Perilaku Aparatur sebagai Model dalam Mewujudkan Reformasi Birokrasi yang Berkualitas." Administrative Law and Governance Journal 2, no. 1 (June 11, 2019): 113–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/alj.v2i1.113-125.
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Abstract This research was conducted to find out changes of Public Servants mental and behavior as a model in creating qualified bureaucracy reformation as a consequence of negative issues on Public Servants professionalism, particularly on their quality and performance. This research used a normative juridical method by using an analytical descriptive approach. The Government took strategic action in developing human resources of Public Servant through bureaucracy reformation policy focused on changing Public Servants mental and behavior. The change is intended not only for Public Servants but also for all related system. The focus of the change of bureaucratic is expected will create clean and accountable, effective, efficient bureaucratic and able to provide qualified public service as well. Keywords: the behavior of Public Servants, bureaucratic reformation Abstrak Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk mengetahui perubahan mental/perilaku aparatur sebagai model dalam mewujudkan reformasi birokrasi yang berkualitas sebagai akibat dari isu negatif terhadap profesionalisme khususnya pada aspek kualitas dan kinerja ASN. Metode pendekatan yang digunakan adalah yuridis empiris, spesifikasi penelitian yang digunakan adalah deskriptif analitis. Pemerintah mengambil langkah strategis membangun SDM aparatur melalui kebijakan reformasi birokrasi dengan inti perubahan pada mental/perilaku aparatur. Perubahan tersebut selain ditujukan langsung kepada aparatur, juga harus ditujukan kepada seluruh sistem yang melingkup aparatur. Fokus perubahan reformasi birokrasi tersebut diharapkan dapat menciptakan birokrasi yang bersih dan akuntabel, efektif, efisien, serta mampu memberikan pelayanan publik yang berkualitas. Kata kunci: Mental/perilaku aparatur, reformasi birokrasi
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Hardiyansyah, Hardiyansyah, and Rahmad Effendi. "Model Implementasi Kebijakan Publik dalam Pengelolaan Sampah dan Kebersihan Kota Palembang." MIMBAR, Jurnal Sosial dan Pembangunan 30, no. 1 (June 1, 2014): 108. http://dx.doi.org/10.29313/mimbar.v30i1.572.
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The purpose of this study is to examine and discuss a model of public policy implementation in waste management and health in Palembang. This research uses descriptive qualitative research methods with techniques of collecting data through observation and in-depth interviews. The conclusion that can be drawn are as follows: (1) a model of policy implementation in hygiene and waste management in the city of Palembang lead to models of policy implementation Edwards III that includes factors of communication, executive attitudes, resources, and bureaucratic structures; (2) reality show that communication factor, executor attitude, resources, and bureaucratic structures proposed by Edwards III needs to be coupled with other factors, namely "leadership commitment." In the study it was found that the commitment of the leadership (mayor) apparently helped complete four factors ; (3) models of policy implementation Edwards III consists of four factors, as reconstructed into five factors, namely: communication, executive attitudes, resources, bureaucratic structures, and leadership commitment.
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Et al., Sholihin. "“EXPLORING MODEL OF LEADERSHIP STYLE ON TEACHER PERFORMANCEIN EARLY CHILDHOOD SCHOOLS.”." Psychology and Education Journal 58, no. 1 (January 20, 2021): 5077–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.17762/pae.v58i1.1730.
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This study analyzes the impact of leadership style on Indonesian Early Childhood Teachers Performance. The focus is on six main leadership styles namely transformation, transactional, autocratic, charismatic, bureaucratic and democratic. This research has provided in-depth insights on democratic, transformational, bureaucratic and autocratic leadership styles that have a positive impact on the performance of, in this study using analysis Primary data and data were obtained from an online survey stationary of 200 respondents from 15Early Childhood Teachers in Jakarta . The method of selecting respondents using a snowball sampling system, analysis using quantitative approaches and questionnaire data was processed using SPSS. The results of this study are suggesting a charismatic, bureaucratic and transactional leadership style has a negative relationship with manufacturing performance. Transformational, autocratic, and democratic leadership styles, in contrast, have a positive relationship on Early Childhood Teachers Performance
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Angkasah, Lalu, Huala Adolf, and Gatot Dwi Hendro Wibowo. "Bureaucratic Reform in the Perspective of State Administration Law." Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 8, no. 5-1 (July 1, 2017): 35–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/mjss-2018-0094.
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Abstract This study aims to (1) analyze the development of bureaucratic reform regulation in Indonesia; (2) analyze the aspects of State Administration Law within the Government Bureaucracy; (3) examine obstacles in the implementation of bureaucratic reform in Indonesia; and (4) find bureaucratic reform model in Indonesia in the future. The ideal model of bureaucratic reform in Indonesia in the future can only be realized by improving the quality of the implementation of responsive and pro-service public services. For that reason, it takes the role of government bureaucracy in improving the quality of service through various innovative policy strategies by utilizing the application of various systems of information technology and administration.
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Суханова, Gulshat Sukhanova, Титов, and Vladimir Titov. "HUMAN FACTOR IN BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS." Management of the Personnel and Intellectual Resources in Russia 5, no. 6 (December 25, 2016): 5–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/24099.
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This article is the attempt to trace the evolution of attitudes to bureaucracy and bureaucratic organization in the works of classical and contemporary economic theory and sociology, as well as to answer the question about the mutual influence of the human factor and the properties of bureaucratic organization. The article pays attention to the emergence and development of the term “bureaucracy” and to the features of models of effective bureaucratic organizations of various authors. We invite your attention to the results of some field studies that demonstrate the discrepancies between the ideal model of bureaucracy and functioning organizations. However, the authors conclude that the bureaucratic structure is able not only to restrict individual freedoms, but to protect its interests and provide opportunities for self-realization.
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Gains, Francesca, Peter John, and Gerry Stoker. "When Do Bureaucrats Prefer Strong Political Principals? Institutional Reform and Bureaucratic Preferences in English Local Government." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10, no. 4 (November 2008): 649–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2008.00339.x.
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This article seeks to explain the attitudes of bureaucrats to the redesign of their bureaus by their elected principals. The starting point is a puzzle that a constitutional change in English local government, which was designed to enhance the influence and role of leading local politicians, resulted with bureaucrats as its most enthusiastic champions. The article explores explanations of this response, drawing on the deliberate discretion or policy conflict model of Huber and Shipan and on the bureau-shaping model of Dunleavy. By finding support for the bureau-shaping model, as well as the objectives of implementation efficiency and career advancement, we argue that bureaucrats may regard the increase in political power as a way of realising other objectives they value.
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Andhika, Lesmana Rian. "Inovasi Birokrasi : Perspektif Analisis Hybrid Teori." Jurnal Borneo Administrator 14, no. 2 (July 25, 2018): 151–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.24258/jba.v14i2.349.
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This research attempts to illustrate, identify and disclose some relevant scientific literature findings to construct a theoretical conceptual concept of bureaucratic innovation; How conceptual theorists of other sciences can build the concept of bureaucratic innovation to achieve an understanding of bureaucratic innovation more holistically with hybrid models. The meta-theory method (the analysis of theory) is used, the literature and documents nationally and internationally are traced deductively. Results of this study reveals that hybrid theory allows the possibility that bureaucratic innovation can be elaborated from various disciplines of science. Hybrid theory model can explain various assumption that exist in bureaucracy. however, hybrid concept needs to be tested with empirical approach in order to be more coherent and constructive. Therefore, this research can be a source of limited theoretical conceptual knowledge of bureaucratic innovation outlined from some of the existing scientific literature.
Keywords: bureaucracy, innovation, hybrid model
AbstrakPenelitian ini lebih berupaya untuk mengambarkan, mengidentifikasi dan mengungkapkan beberapa temuan literatur ilmiah yang relevan untuk membangun konseptual teoritik inovasi birokrasi. Bagaimana konseptual teoretik dari ilmu pengetahuan lain dapat membangun konsep inovasi birokrasi agar mencapai pemahaman tentang inovasi birokrasi lebih holistik dengan model hybrid. Metode meta-theory (the analysis of theory) digunakan, literatur dan dokumen secara nasional dan internasional ditelusuri secara deduktif. Hasil penelitian ini mengungkapkan, inovasi birokrasi bisa dielaborasi dari berbagai disiplin ilmu pengetahuan. Model hybrid theory memungkinkan untuk itu, model ini dapat menerangkan berbagai asumsi yang ada dalam birokrasi, lebih lanjut konsep hybrid perlu diuji dengan pendekatan empiris agar lebih koheren dan konstruktif. Oleh sebab itu penelitian ini dapat menjadi sumber pengetahuan tentang konseptual teoritis inovasi birokrasi yang terbatas diuraikan dari beberapa literatur ilmiah yang ada.
Kata kunci: birokrasi, inovasi, hibrid model
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Saghir, Rabia, Muhammad Arshad Khan, and Nazima Ellahi. "Bureaucratic Efficiency as Determinant of Trade Openness in SAARC Countries." Global Social Sciences Review IV, no. III (September 30, 2019): 31–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2019(iv-iii).05.
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The study explores how bureaucratic efficiency effects international trade in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Srilanka. A composite indicator of government effectiveness is used to measure bureaucratic efficiency and model is estimated by using the SYS-GMM. It is well recognized that bureaucratic efficiency is vital to the enhancement of trade, whereas the result shows that a negative relationship exists between bureaucratic efficiency and trade openness. Similarly, encouraging link exists between government size and international trade as the government provides different services to enhance the trade at the international market.
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Wang, Gang. "Bureaucratic Corruption, Democracy and Judicial Independence." Asian Business Research 1, no. 1 (February 25, 2016): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.20849/abr.v1i1.11.
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<p>The theoretical literature in economics and political science has made numerous efforts in understanding the determinants of corruption and stressed the importance of political institutions in shaping the patterns of government corruption. Nevertheless, very few researches focus on the role of judicial system. Employing a formal model with empirical analyses, I incorporate economic factors with political constraints to investigate the different roles of democracy and judicial independence in determining the level of bureaucrats’ corruption across countries. Empirically, the instrumental variable (IV) approach is applied to resolve the endogeneity problems. The evidence indicates that different levels of corruption across countries are significantly influenced by the degrees of judicial independence. To fight corruption successfully, I contend that the judiciary, as a hard institutional constraint to resist bureaucratic corruption, has to be independent from the government. </p>
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Rhodes, Edward. "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the U.S. Navy." World Politics 47, no. 1 (October 1994): 1–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2950678.
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Allison's Model III (governmental or bureaucratic politics) suggests that state policies reflect the parochial concerns of intragovernmental “players in positions” and the relative power of these players. This article offers a critical test. It examines a policy area—U.S. decisions on the composition of naval forces—in which we would, a priori, expect bureaucratic politics to have a maximum effect and which participants, observers, and scholars have routinely described as critically influenced by bureaucratic politics. This article employs statistical methods to assess whether outcomes have indeed been affected by the parochial priorities and perceptions of individuals who, because of their relative power and the rules of the game, have dominated the relevant bureaucratic action-channels. Contrary to the expectations of the bureaucratic politics literature—indeed, contrary to the reports of firsthand observers and the actors involved—bureaucratic politics do not seem to have mattered: knowledge of bureaucratic interests and power does not permit us to predict outcomes. The article then proceeds to suggest an alternative model of state behavior thatdoesprovide significant explanatory power: the article demonstrates that shifts in force posture can be modeled as a function ofideasandimagesrather than ofinterests. This gives rise to speculation that in explaining American foreign and security policy the name of the game is not, as Allison suggests, politics, but the competition of ideas for intellectual hegemony.
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Hodder, Rupert. "Towards a Model of Philippine Bureaucracy." Asian Journal of Social Science 38, no. 1 (2010): 107–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156848410x12604385959560.
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AbstractThe Philippine civil service has attracted comparatively little scholarly attention, and such analyses as have been conducted are strongly influenced by the view that both the polity and bureaucracy lie at some distance from Weber’s bureaucratic ideals. The model of an emotional bureaucracy sketched in this paper collapses a number of dichotomies (such as the impersonal versus human and social, the emotional versus rational, and the formal versus informal) in Weberian analysis. In drawing attention to, and in attempting to accommodate, the bureaucracy’s emotional qualities and its dimensionality, the model may also encourage a broader and more intense debate on the Philippine civil service. The model comprises three interlocking cycles: instrumentalism and authoritarianism within organisations; a deepening affective sphere outside organisations and growing technical and emotional professionalism within organisations; and Puritanism and instrumentalism. These cycles do not describe stages of development, and they are not peculiar either to bureaucratic organisations or to the Philippines.
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Wood, B. Dan. "Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements." American Political Science Review 82, no. 1 (March 1988): 213–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1958066.
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A principal-agent perspective has been employed in recent studies to rediscover the importance of democratic hierarchies in shaping public bureaucratic outputs. I test the robustness of the hierarchy model for explaining outputs from an agency that has often been cast in the image of bureaucratic independence, the Environmental Protection Agency. Examining the effect of the Reagan presidency on EPA outputs for clean air, Box-Tiao models are constructed to explain shifts in the vigor of air pollution enforcements between 1977 and 1985. The analysis shows that the influence of elected institutions is limited when an agency has substantial bureaucratic resources and a zeal for their use. Moreover, under these conditions, bureaucracy can even move outputs in directions completely opposite from what a model of hierarchy would predict. The implication is that for some agencies it is necessary to give greater consideration to the agent in explaining implementation outcomes through time.
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Indrady, Andry. "HONG KONG SAR IMMIGRATION IN THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICS, POLICY AND INSTITUTION." Jurnal Ilmiah Kajian Keimigrasian 1, no. 2 (November 24, 2018): 69–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.52617/jikk.v1i2.22.
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The Bureaucratic System of the Immigration Department of Hong Kong SAR is one of the legacies from British Colonial Government seen from legal and also immigration bureaucratic perspectives reflect the executive power domination over immigration policymaking. This is understandable since Hong Kong SAR adopts “Administrative State Model” which means Immigration Officer as a bureaucrat holds significant roles at both stages of policymaking and also its implementation. This research looks at transition period of the Immigration Department and its policies since the period of handover of Hong Kong SAR from the British Government to the Government of China especially throughout the concern from the public including academics about the future of immigration policies made by the Department that arguably from colonial to current being used as political and control tools to safeguard the interest of the Ruler. This situation ultimately will question the existence of Hong Kong SAR as one of the International Hub in the Era of Millennium.
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Uhl-Bien, Mary, and Russ Marion. "Complexity leadership in bureaucratic forms of organizing: A meso model." Leadership Quarterly 20, no. 4 (August 2009): 631–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2009.04.007.
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정연택. "An analytic Study of Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: focused on O’Donnell’s model." Journal of Association for Korean Public Administration History ll, no. 26 (June 2010): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.15856/jakpah.2010..26.1.
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Sulistiyani, A. T., Sutarno, P. Setyono, and R. D. Wahyuningsih. "Bureaucratic role in green village innovation model at Yogyakarta, Indonesia." IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 423 (January 16, 2020): 012035. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/423/1/012035.
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Choi, Eun Kyong. "“Delegation and Then Intervention”: The 2009 Decision to Create the New Rural Pension." China Quarterly 233 (November 10, 2017): 64–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741017001424.
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AbstractThis article reviews the decision-making process behind the creation of a new rural pension between the early 2000s and 2009. It finds that although policymaking was initially delegated to the bureaucratic level and hence involved a protracted bureaucratic struggle, the issue was resolved by a fiat imposed by top leaders rather than by bureaucratic compromise as a bureaucratic politics model would suggest. I call this policymaking process “delegation and then intervention.” Although the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS) persistently argued in favour of creating the new rural pension, the Ministry of Finance obstinately objected to it. This study finds that when bureaucratic organizations are in conflict because of their core beliefs, rather than resource allocation, they are less likely to reach a consensus. Faced with a prolonged bureaucratic deadlock, top leaders decided in favour of the MOLSS policy initiative, thereby adopting a progressive measure that would provide a completely subsidized basic pension for the rural elderly.
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., Azhari. "The Relationship Established Between Indonesian Political and Bureaucratic Official." International Journal of Engineering & Technology 7, no. 2.29 (May 22, 2018): 692. http://dx.doi.org/10.14419/ijet.v7i2.29.13999.
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The overlapping responsibility between the political and bureaucratic officials seems not to be avoidable due to the weaknesses of personnel management system. This condition, of course, leads to a clutter in some aspects such as recruitments, promotions, and political structures. This research aims to investigate the relationship between the political and bureaucratic officials in terms of authority which is applied by the officials and the factors that caused the overlapping authority. To do so, a descriptive qualitative analysis was applied in this research since the researcher would like to report the result in what looked like. The saturated data was collected by conducting an in-depth interview and documentations and it was analyzed qualitatively. The findings of the current research showed two models of relationship namely executive assendency and model of Party State Bureaucracy begun from the New-Era to Post New-era. Neither New-Era nor Post New-era are appropriate to be applied in the Southeast Sulawesi. Therefore this research suggested a more appropriate model of bureaucratic management, especially regional governance in Southeast Sulawesi namely the External Model of Executive Assendency or Personal Excecutive Assendency.
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Jarkasih, Aceng. "The Influence of Bureaucracy Apparatus' Behaviour to Service Quality of Land Certificate (Study at the Land Office of Majalengka, West Java)." Budapest International Research and Critics Institute (BIRCI-Journal): Humanities and Social Sciences 4, no. 2 (May 5, 2021): 2286–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.33258/birci.v4i2.1927.
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This study aims to show the bureaucratic apparatus's behavior towards the quality of land certificate services and find new concepts about the bureaucratic apparatus's behavior. The methodology used in this research is the explanatory survey method, following the study's objectives, which will explain the relationship between variables, namely the behavior of bureaucratic officials to the quality of land certificate services. Based on the results of research and discussion of the influence of the behavior of bureaucratic officials on the quality of service certificates at the Land Office of Majalengka Regency, the following can be disclosed: 1) The behavior of bureaucratic officials is oriented towards the dimensions of justice, empathy, discipline, sensitivity, and responsibility. Significantly affects the quality of land certificate services; 2) The height bureaucratic behavior towards the quality of land certificate services is determined by the dimensions of Fairness, empathy, discipline, sensitivity, and responsibility. and 3) Furthermore, from the results of this research, it can be found and developed a new model that "Kharimah behavior" are words for the dimension of caring in providing public services.
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Marsh, Kevin P. "The Intersection of War and Politics." Armed Forces & Society 38, no. 3 (August 4, 2011): 413–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x11415492.
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This study examines the decision-making process of the George W. Bush administration which led to the decision in late 2006 to order the Iraq troop surge. The study analyzes whether the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making can accurately explain the events of the case. The study seeks to further test the explanatory power and descriptive accuracy of the bureaucratic politics model, while also attaining a more textured, academic understanding of the decision-making process leading to the Iraq troop surge. The decision to order the troop surge in Iraq is one of the more important decisions in post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy and continues to impact U.S. strategy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and overall military doctrine. Finally, the author endeavors to contribute to the further development and refinement of the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making.
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Juhari, Imam Bonjol. "re- Rekonstruksi Model Pemberdayaan Pengungsi Syiah Sampang di Sidoarjo." Islamika Inside: Jurnal Keislaman dan Humaniora 5, no. 2 (February 11, 2021): 174–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.35719/islamikainside.v5i2.117.
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Abstract: This article builds a community empowerment model based on theoretical foundations and empirical data on the refugees from the Syiah Sampang community in Rusun Puspa Agro Jemundo Sidoarjo. The focus of the refugee empowerment construction consists of several elements so that the empowerment program becomes optimal, namely; first, there is a synergy between the bureaucratic apparatus, related agencies, NGOs, and active participation of target groups in planning, decision making, and program evaluation. Second, effective communication and cooperation between bureaucratic officials, related agencies and NGOs, in guiding program implementation. Third, the element of effective monitoring from the bureaucracy, related agencies, NGOs by involving the participation of the program target group. The empowerment of Syiah Sampang refugees, which has been carried out so far, does not pay attention to these elements so that the process and final goal of the empowerment program to improve the welfare of refugees are not optimal.
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Denning, Stephen. "Post-bureaucratic management goes global." Strategy & Leadership 47, no. 2 (March 18, 2019): 19–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/sl-01-2019-0009.
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Purpose The article reports on anti-hierarchical approaches to managing work outside the U.S. and independent of software development as evidenced in presentations at the November Drucker Forum by the French group, Vinci and the Chinese group, Haier. Design/methodology/approach The article looks at how radical innovations in organization structure, management processes and mindsets are being adopted by companies seeking the rapid-paced, customer-focused continuous innovation needed to survive in today’s dynamic marketplaces. These approaches are spreading throughout many established organizations. For traditionally managed hierarchical organizations, the transformation often involves radical shifts in power, attitudes, values, mindsets, ways of thinking and ways of interacting with stakeholders—customers, employee talent, shareholders and partners. Findings The Vinci Group is organized with 3,500 business units, so that there are in effect 3,500 entrepreneurs, all intent on developing good ideas. The Haier Groups has transformed its organization into a flat platform with thousands of micro-enterprises. There are no more than eight people in each one. Practical implications The Haier platform enables the microenterprises to interact closely and intensively with users, allowing them to participate in the development and production process. The goal is to align Haier’s people and the value they can create for customer users. The need is to unleash people’s potential so as to maximize value to users. Originality/value The article reveals that when companies disrupt the traditional “efficiency-based” organizational structure the do so in unique ways. Typical of the homegrown approach to post-bureaucratic organizations, Zhang Ruimin, CEO of Haier, pioneered a management model called “Rendanheyl,” which entails three disruptions: disrupting employees, disrupting organizational structures and disrupting compensation structures.
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Siverson, Rolf I. "From Chimera's Womb: The Manchukuo Bureaucracy and Its Legacy in East Asia." International Journal of Asian Studies 17, no. 1 (January 2020): 39–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479591420000133.
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AbstractWithin the Japanese Empire, the Manchukuo bureaucracy was unique for its high level of centralization and standardization. This study argues that Manchukuo's bureaucratic recruitment and training processes molded civil officials into a paramilitary force, dedicated to developmentalism and a radical belief in the transformative power of the state. It approaches the institutional and cultural development of the Manchukuo bureaucracy as an evolutionary process. As pan-Asian radicals, military officials, and reform bureaucrats competed for control of Japan's imperial project, their ideas and agendas merged into a hybrid system of bureaucratic management that served as a model for the wartime empire. Looking past the temporal juncture of August 1945, this study also foregrounds the legacy of the Manchukuo bureaucracy on postwar East Asia. Manchukuo's government institutions recruited and indoctrinated not just Japanese but Korean, Taiwanese, and other imperial subjects in the name of ethnic harmony. Back in their homelands, these men adapted to their experience and training into the foundations of developmental nationalism and authoritarian state structures during the Cold War.
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Hartati, Sri. "PENERAPAN MODEL NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (NPM) DALAM REFORMASI BIROKRASI DI INDONESIA." Jurnal MSDA (Manajemen Sumber Daya Aparatur) 8, no. 2 (December 30, 2020): 65–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.33701/jmsda.v8i2.1293.
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ABSTRAK
Reformasi politik dan pemerintahan tahun 1998 yang diharapkan sejalan dengan reformasi birokrasi pemerintahan belum terwujud, diindikasikan dengan pelayanan publik (public service) belum optimal, kinerja ASN masih rendah, kasus Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme (KKN) masih menjadi penyakit kronis baik dikalangan eksekutif maupun legislatif bahkan sudah merambah sampai ke level pemerintahan terdepan yakni desa. Berdasarkan data Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) tahun 2020, Indeks Persepsi Korupsi Indonesia menempati posisi 85 dari 180 Negara, Sementara di tingkat ASEAN, posisi Indonesia menempati posisi keempat, masih dibawah Singapura, Brunei Darussalam dan Malaysia. Kondisi ini menunjukkan birokrasi di Indonesia belum dapat menciptakan tata kelola pemerintahan yang baik. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mendeskripsikan paradigma birokrasi, pelaksanaan reformasi birokrasi dan bagaimana upaya penerapan New Public Management (NPM) dalam reformasi birokrasi di Indonesia.
Penelitian ini menggunakan metode deskriptif kualitatif dengan pendekatan fenomenologi. Penelitian ini menganalisis bagaimana paradigama birokrasi, pelaksanaan agenda Reformasi Birokrasi dan penerapan NPM di di Indonesia. Data penelitian dikumpulkan dengan menggunakan teknik studi dokumentasi dan observasi.Teknik analisis data dilakukan dengan reduksi data, penyajian data dan penarikan kesimpulan.
Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa dari perjalanan sejarah birokrasi di Indonesia mulai zaman kerajaan, masa kolonial, “Orde Lama dan Orde Baru, tidak dirancang untuk memberikan pelayanan kepada masyarakat,akan tetapi sepenuhnya mengabdi pada kepentingan kekuasaan” pada masanya. Meskipun berbagai regulasi Reformasi Birokrasi diterbitkan, akan tetapi samapi fase ketiga good governance belum terwujud. Penerapan konsep NPM di Indonesia belum dapat diterapkan oleh seluruh lembaga/Instansi Pemerintah. Berbagai kendala yang dihadapi antara lain: perekonomian didominasi perusahaan asing,privatisasi terkendala kondisi market yang belum cukup stabil, korupsi meningkat, sistem kontrak memicu korupsi dan politisasi dan struktur kelembagaan pemerintah yang miskin fungsi kaya struktur.
Kata Kunci :New Public Management, Birokrasi, Reformasi Birokrasi
ABSTRACT
Political and government reforms in 1998 which are expected to be in line with government bureaucratic reforms have not yet been realized, it is indicated that public service is not optimal, ASN performance is still low, cases of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) are still a chronic disease both among the executive and legislative branches. it has even penetrated to the foremost level of government, namely the village. Based on data from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2020, Indonesia's Corruption Perception Index ranks 85 out of 180 countries, while at the ASEAN level, Indonesia's position is in fourth position, still below Singapore, Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia. This condition shows that the bureaucracy in Indonesia has not been able to create good governance. This study aims to describe the bureaucratic paradigm, the implementation of bureaucratic reform and how the efforts to implement New Public Management (NPM) in bureaucratic reform in Indonesia. This study used a qualitative descriptive method with a phenomenological approach. This research analyzes how the bureaucratic paradigm, the implementation of the Bureaucratic Reform agenda and the application of NPM in Indonesia. The research data were collected using documentation and observation study techniques. Data analysis techniques were carried out by data reduction, data presentation and drawing conclusions. The results show that from the history of the bureaucracy in Indonesia, starting from the kingdom era, colonial period, the Old Order and the New Order, it was never designed to provide services to the community, but the bureaucracy fully served the interests of power in its time. Even though various regulations on Bureaucratic Reform were issued, but until the third phase of good governance has not been realized. The application of the NPM concept in Indonesia has not been implemented by all government agencies / agencies. Various obstacles faced include: the economy is dominated by foreign companies, privatization is constrained by unstable market conditions, increased corruption, the contract system has triggered corruption and politicization and the government institutional structure is poor in structure-rich functions.
Keywords: New Public Management, Bureaucracy, Bureaucracy Reform
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Jilke, Sebastian, and Lars Tummers. "Which Clients are Deserving of Help? A Theoretical Model and Experimental Test." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 28, no. 2 (January 29, 2018): 226–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muy002.
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Abstract Street-level bureaucrats have to cope with high workloads, role conflicts, and limited resources. An important way in which they cope with this is by prioritizing some clients, while disregarding others. When deciding on whom to prioritize, street-level bureaucrats often assess whether a client is deserving of help. However, to date the notion of the deserving client is in a black box as it is largely unclear which client attributes activate the prevailing social/professional category of deservingness. This article, therefore, proposes a theoretical model of three deservingness cues that street-level bureaucrats employ to determine whom to help: earned deservingness (i.e., the client is deserving because (s)he earned it: “the hardworking client”), needed deservingness (i.e., the client is deserving because (s)he needs help: “the needy client”), and resource deservingness (i.e., the client is deserving as (s)he is probably successful according to bureaucratic success criteria: “the successful client”). We test the effectiveness of these deservingness cues via an experimental conjoint design among a nationwide sample of US teachers. Our results suggest that needed deservingness is the most effective cue in determining which students to help, as teachers especially intend to prioritize students with low academic performance and members of minority groups. Earned deservingness was also an effective cue, but to a lesser extent. Resource deservingness, in contrast, did not affect teachers’ decisions whom to help. The theoretical and practical implications of our findings for discretionary biases in citizen-state interactions are discussed.
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Palerm-Viqueira, Jacinta. "Self-Management of Irrigation Systems, a Typology: The Mexican Case." Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 22, no. 2 (January 1, 2006): 361–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/msem.2006.22.2.361.
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In this paper, we suggest a typology for distinct types of self-management, based on who carries out the administration and operation of the irrigation system: specialized staff (bureaucratic) or the irrigators themselves (non-bureaucratic). We argue that a specialized staff for irrigation administration and operation characterizes all large systems, but that both small and medium-sized systems may be administered and operated by the irrigators themselves. Both types of organization are described, and special attention is given to the problems posed by bureaucratic organization. The effectiveness of bureaucratic or non-bureaucratic organization is treated from the analytical framework of industry, where issues of efficiency and a preferred cultural model have been framed. Finally, we propose that smallholding and non-bureaucratic self-management of irrigation are linked. Proponemos una tipologíía de autogestióón, basada en quiéén realiza la administracióón y operacióón en el sistema hidrááulico: personal especializado (burocráático) o los mismos regantes (no burocráático). Argumentamos que el uso de personal especializado para la administracióón y operacióón caracteriza a todos los grandes sistemas de riego, pero que los pequeñños y medianos sistemas de riego pueden ser administrados y operados por los mismos regantes. Se describe a ambos tipos de organizacióón, y se da particular atencióón a los problemas peculiares que derivan de una organizacióón burocráática. La eficacia de la organizacióón burocráática o no burocráática es tratada desde el marco analíítico de la industria, donde las cuestiones de la eficiencia y el modelo cultural preferido han sido consideradas. Finalmente, se propone que hay una relacióón causal entre minifundismo y administracióón no burocráática.
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Ulsperger, Jason S., J. David Knottnerus, and Kristen Ulsperger. "Bureaucratic Rituals in Nursing Homes: The “CARE Model” and Culture Change." International Journal of Aging and Society 3, no. 3 (2014): 21–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.18848/2160-1909/cgp/v03i03/35248.
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Kong, Dong-sung, and Ki Woong. "A Model for Legal/Bureaucratic Governance: A Result of Meta-Analysis." Korean Association of Governance Studies 28, no. 2 (June 11, 2018): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.26847/mspa.2018.28.2.1.
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Bogason, Peter. "Changes in the Scandinavian Model. From Bureaucratic Command to Interorganizational Negotiation." Public Administration 76, no. 2 (January 1998): 335–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9299.00104.
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Kim, Iljoong, and Inbae Kim. "Endogenous changes in the exchange rate regime: A bureaucratic incentive model." Public Choice 125, no. 3-4 (December 2005): 339–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-4601-2.
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Ahn, Mun Suk. "North Korea's Nuclear Policy towards the U.S.: The Bureaucratic Politics Model." North Korean Review 6, no. 2 (September 1, 2010): 100–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.3172/nkr.6.2.100.
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Simon, Stephanie, and Marieke de Goede. "Cybersecurity, Bureaucratic Vitalism and European Emergency." Theory, Culture & Society 32, no. 2 (January 14, 2015): 79–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276414560415.
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Securing the internet has arguably become paradigmatic for modern security practice, not only because modern life is considered to be impossible or valueless if disconnected, but also because emergent cyber-relations and their complex interconnections are refashioning traditional security logics. This paper analyses European modes of governing geared toward securing vital, emergent cyber-systems in the face of the interconnected emergency. It develops the concept of ‘bureaucratic vitalism’ to get at the tension between the hierarchical organization and reductive knowledge frames of security apparatuses on the one hand, and the increasing desire for building ‘resilient’, dispersed, and flexible security assemblages on the other. The bureaucratic/vital juxtaposition seeks to capture the way in which cybersecurity governance takes emergent, complex systems as object and model without fully replicating this ideal in practice. Thus, we are concerned with the question of what happens when security apparatuses appropriate and translate vitalist concepts into practice. Our case renders visible the banal bureaucratic manoeuvres that seek to operate upon security emergencies by fostering connectivities, producing agencies, and staging exercises.
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Yulianto, Yulianto, Nana Mulyana, and Simon Sumanjoyo Hutagalung. "Adoption of Local Values for Bureaucratic Reform in Lampung Province." MIMBAR : Jurnal Sosial dan Pembangunan 34, no. 1 (June 19, 2018): 24–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.29313/mimbar.v34i1.2854.
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Bureaucratic reform is not only dealing with structural aspects but also cultures that are difficult to change. However, it can be done by adopting the values embedded in the cultural identity of the community. This study aims to identify the local values that can be adopted to reform the bureaucracy in Lampung Province and develop those model values. Qualitative approaches are used with data collection techniques of interviews, documentation, and focus group discussions. The research location is in Lampung Province and involves research informants consist of traditional and bureaucratic leaders. Data analysis techniques used is interactive data analysis model. The research results identify 4 (four) local values, namely Piil Pesengiri (Principle of Success), Nemu Nyimah (Principle of Choice), Nengah Nyappur (Principle of Equality) and Sakai Sambayan (Principles of Cooperation). The adoption model of local values can be developed through a conciliation approach strategy. This approach is chosen because it provides guidance to change bureaucratic culture into a better effectiveness and could minimize the conflicts that may happen.
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Brezis, Elise S., and Joël Cariolle. "The revolving door, state connections, and inequality of influence in the financial sector." Journal of Institutional Economics 15, no. 4 (January 18, 2019): 595–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137418000498.
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AbstractThis paper shows that the revolving door generates inequality of influence between financial firms and creates economic distortions. We first develop a theoretical model, introducing the notion of “bureaucratic capital” and stressing how the revolving door generates inequality in bureaucratic capital leading to inequality in profits. Then this prediction is tested, using a new database that tracks the revolving door process involving the 20 biggest US “diversified banks.” We show that regulators who supply a large stock of bureaucratic capital are more likely to be hired by the top five banks. We also develop indices of the inequality of influence between banks. We show that banks in the top revenue quintile concentrate around 80% of revolving door movements. Goldman Sachs appears as the prime beneficiary of this process, capturing approximately 30% of the total stock of bureaucratic capital.
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Oktaviani, Ririn Sri, Lina Aryani, and Dewi Noor Azijah. "ANALISIS MODEL PERUBAHAN BIROKRASI DALAM PENYELENGGARAAN PELAYANAN PUBLIK KOTA BEKASI DI MASA PANDEMI COVID-19." Jurnal Pendidikan Sosiologi dan Humaniora 13, no. 1 (February 22, 2022): 80. http://dx.doi.org/10.26418/j-psh.v13i1.52568.
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This pandemic period provides a new perspective on bureaucratic management. Bureaucracy in any situation must continue to meet the needs of customers (society) because it is related to public services. So even though there is limited space for movement due to following health protocols during the current pandemic, people are still given their rights as citizens to be served by adjusting the situation, one of which is through electronic services. The Covid-19 pandemic is a condition that makes the bureaucracy adapt to changes in service models from habits in serving the community with normal conditions to the new normal. In this study, the author uses a qualitative descriptive method, with the type of library research (library research). The results of the survey indicate that bureaucratic changes occur in the dimensions of the organization and the measurements of the new work system. In the organizational size, there has been a change in the bureaucratic model which was initially run usually, then a disturbance; in this case, Covid-19 requires the organization to make changes to the continuing to new normal, while in the work system dimension, there are two choices, namely working at home and work at home. Office but still comply with health protocols.
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Johnson, Tana, and Johannes Urpelainen. "International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot." International Organization 68, no. 1 (January 2014): 177–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818313000349.
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AbstractBureaucrats working in international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) regularly help states design new IGOs. Sometimes international bureaucrats possess limited discretion in institutional design; sometimes, they enjoy broad discretion. In fact, they gain discretion even when they openly oppose state preferences. This contravenes conventional thinking about delegation: discretion should decrease as preference divergence between states and international bureaucrats increases. We develop a principal-agent theory of how much discretion states grant to international bureaucrats in the design of new IGOs. This is novel: while principal-agent theories of international delegation are common, scholars have not analyzed principal-agent relationships in the creation of new IGOs. We argue that even an international bureaucracy that disagrees with states' design preferences may enjoy substantial design leeway, because of states' need for bureaucratic expertise. In developing this argument, we employ a formal principal-agent model, case studies, and an original data set.