Academic literature on the topic 'Bulgaria – Foreign economic relations – Germany'

Relevance of research topic. In conditions of globalization, the economic development of a country depends a lot on its relations with the rest of the world. When using economic indicators, including the "foreign trade balance" one, their correct interpretation is of particular importance. Formulation of the problem. The research interest should be focused not only on the volume of exports and imports in monetary terms, but also on its structure. It is a question of what production (goods and services) the Bulgarian economy exports (respectively imports), as well as where it exports (from where the Bulgarian economy imports). Setting the task, the purpose of the study. This report aims to present the Bulgarian economy in its role of producer and supplier of intermediate products for the countries of the European Union. Method or methodology for conducting research. The study is based on the use of the input-output model and in particular the symmetric input-output tables provided by the World Input-Output Database. Presentation of the main material (results of work). This report presents the results of the study of volume and structure of exports of the Bulgarian economy as a producer and supplier of intermediate goods, directed to the countries of the European Union. The interactions with the following countries were analyzed: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Romania. Some of the member states of the European Union are not included. The reason for this is the lack of interactions between them and the Bulgarian economy, based on the provision of intermediate products. Conclusions according to the article. The study presents only one aspect of the foreign economic relations that take place between Bulgaria and the European Union. For the most part, the relations between Bulgaria and the other economies in the European Union are based mainly on industries related to the supply of resources. Services and products with a final degree of readiness are provided to a much lesser extent.

Bulgarian–West German relations played a crucial role in Bulgarian foreign policy in Europe from the time the FRG became a leading West European political and economic power and a key member of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Economic Community. The normalization of official relations between Bulgaria and the FRG was significantly influenced by two major factors: the policy of closer coordination and multilateral interaction within the Warsaw Pact and the somewhat slower, though increasing, process of East-West détente and security negotiations in Europe through CSCE and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks. This case study of the establishment of diplomatic relations between a powerful European state and a smaller one with opposite political orientation amid the East-West détente in the 1970s contributes to scholars’ understanding of the complex nature of international relations in Europe during the Cold War.

В статье анализируется экономический кризис в сумгаитской химической промышленности в результате распада СССР и разрыва традиционных экономических связей с бывшими советскими республиками после обретения Азербайджаном независимости и меры, предпринятые для выхода из этого кризиса. Кроме того, рассмотрены установление экономических связей и обмен опытом в химической промышленности с экономически развитыми странами: Германией, США, Турцией, Японией, Великобританией, Кореей, Италией, Болгарией и Испанией, замена физически и морально устаревшего оснащения сумгаитских химических предприятий новым и разработка новых проектов по увеличению производственных мощностей заводов, а также инвестиции этих стран в сумгаитскую химическую промышленность и совместная работа с группой экспертов ЕС по устранению экологической проблемы. The article analyzes the economic crisis in the Sumgait chemical industry as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the severance of traditional economic ties with the former Soviet republics after the independence of Azerbaijan and the measures taken to overcome this crisis. In addition, the establishment of economic relations and exchange of experience in the chemical industry with economically developed countries in the chemical industry: Germany, USA, Turkey, Japan, Great Britain, Korea, Italy, Bulgaria and Spain, replacement of physically and morally obsolete equipment at Sumgait chemical enterprises with new ones and develop new projects to increase the production capacity of factories, as well as the investment of these countries in the Sumgait chemical industry and joint work with a group of EU experts to eliminate the environmental problem were also searched.

International trade is an important component of the national economy of any country in the world, as well as a leading form of international economic relations. Changes in the main indicators of foreign trade, such as exports, imports, trade balance, can cause significant imbalances in the parameters of economic growth of the subjects of such relations.The article proposes an approach to analyzing the intensity of dynamic changes in international trade in goods on the example of EU countries during 2004-2021 with using such methodological approaches as grouping, comparison, calculation and analysis of absolute and relative characteristics of dynamics. For this purpose, two groups of countries where distinguished: countries that were members of the EU before 2004 (Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Germany, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, Greece, Portugal, Sweden and Finland) and countries that became members of the EU after 2004 (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Cyprus. Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia). In carrying out the study, the cost indicators of trade transactions of the EU countries were used. With the help of such indicators as specific weight, chain and basic growth rates, coefficients of advance, the intensity of export and import dynamics in terms of selected groups where analyzed. The main trends and determinants of the development of export import activities, under the influence of which there were certain changes in the international trade of the EU countries during the period under study, were identified. These determinants include EU enlargement in 2004, the 2009 financial crisis and the COVID 2019 pandemic. Three periods of development of foreign trade of the member countries of this integration group are distinguished. The 5 largest exporter and importer countries, as well as the largest net exporters and net importers in terms of allocated groups, were identified. The results of the analysis also indicate that the countries that joined the EU after 2004 actively used their membership in the context of the development of foreign economic activity: they rapidly increased the volume of merchandise exports and imports. It has been proved that the proposed approach is effective for analyzing the nature of dynamic changes in international trade of any international organizations, integration associations, etc.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the sanctions policy of the Russian Empire towards the countries that were its opponents in the First World War. Such states included Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, which joined forces in the military bloc of the Central Powers to fight the Allies. The victories of the member states of the Entente bloc were forged not only on the fronts, but also achieved through the partial or complete abolition of trade, financial and economic relations with the countries of the Fourth Bloc. The aim of this paper is to study and comprehend the experience of imposing sanctions by the Russian Empire against states that participated in the war against it during the war of 1914-1918. , which is waging a long-running hybrid war with Ukraine. The article demonstrates an example of an adequate response of state institutions to encroachment on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. It has been proved that immediately after the start of hostilities, measures were taken against the subjects of the states fighting against Russia to limit their legal capacity and legal capacity. They could be deported both outside the country and outside its individual localities. These people were allowed to enter Russia only with the permission of the relevant authorities. Merchant ships of countries fighting against Russia, seized in Russian ports, were detained. Merchant ships built for foreign countries were confiscated and converted for military purposes. Investment policy has also been revised. This is confirmed by the approval by the Russian emperor in 1915 of the Regulations on the Liquidation of Trade Enterprises Belonging to Enemy Citizens, which referred to the liquidation of enterprises and joint-stock companies that co-owned with Russian nationals. It is noteworthy that only those enterprises that operated at the expense of German, Austrian, Hungarian or Turkish investments were subject to liquidation. Other normative legal acts abolished the right of ownership of land of the same group of foreign citizens. The result of the scientific article was the conclusion that by applying the emergency legislation, the Russian government did everything possible to prevent national security from financing the citizens of those countries that were at war with it.

The article analyzes the Bulgarian-Turkish relations from the late 2000’s to the early 2020’s. The author insists on the presence of patterns, specific to this stage of bilateral relations. Sofia's readiness to act as a «lobbyist» for Ankara’s interests in the EU is noted. The significant influence of internal political processes in Bulgaria on the nature of its relations with Turkey is emphasized. In particular, the paper indicates a decrease in the level of Bulgarian-Turkish contacts after the end of the period of rule of the party «Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria» (CEDB) in 2021. The important role of the Turkish diaspora in Bulgaria and Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin living in Turkey in the relations between Ankara and Sofia is also recorded. Attention is drawn to the attempts of the Turkish authorities to use these social groups to promote their own goals. The emphasis is placed on the independent behavior of the political elite of the Bulgarian Turks and on their ability to resist the desires of the leadership of the neighboring country, despite the existence of close economic and cultural ties. It is also stated, that there is a causal link between the struggle of the leaders of the Turkish ethnic minority in Bulgaria for their independence from Ankara’s policies and the crisis of Bulgarian-Turkish relations in 2015–2016.

Foreign direct investments (FDI), which are very important in the economic development of countries, prefer regions with free trade. Since the share of international trade in the world economy is constantly increasing, trade openness and foreign direct investments have become more important for countries. However, the increase in trade and FDI entries can have negative effects on the environment. Although many different variables are included in the literature as determinants of carbon emission, foreign direct investments are mostly taken as an explanatory variable with the effect of the economic globalization process. The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between FDI, trade openness and CO2 emission for the 1995-2019 period in 24 EU countries. The relationship between variables was estimated by applying panel AMG estimator and Emirmahmutoglu and Kose causality tests to series with cross-sectional dependency. Empirical results for the overall panel show that there is unidirectional causality from carbon emission to trade openness and FDI. There is a directional causality from FDI to trade openness for the general panel has been determined. When analyzed on a country basis, there is unidirectional causality from carbon emission to trade openness for Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia. Likewise, for Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland, there is unidirectional causality from carbon emission to FDI. In addition, when analyzed on a country basis, there is a one-way causality relationship from foreign direct investments to trade openness for Bulgaria, Italia, Latvia, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia. For Bulgaria, Finland and Germany, there is a one-way causality from trade openness to foreign direct investment. The importance of this study derives from the emphasis on the need for environmentally protective FDIs to reduce carbon emissions.

The purpose of this article is to examine Bulgarian-Russian relations. The author provided a detailed analysis of some economic areas of bilateral cooperation, taking into account transformations in the international system, European sanctions, and scientific prerequisites for further development. The material presents a brief analysis of the course of the recent mutual meetings of the heads of state, as well as their representatives. The author also considers the prerequisites for the formation of diplomatic relations between Russia and Bulgaria. The author expresses the opinion that there exists a positive vector of development of political dialogue with regards to the analysis of the leading parties in Bulgaria and cultural similarity of countries. The author paid particular attention to trade and economic cooperation, using official statistics of the Federal Customs Service of Russia are given (based on the report on foreign trade between Russia and Bulgaria in 2018: trade, exports, imports, structure, goods, dynamic). Russia ranked sixth in the number of foreign tourists visiting Bulgaria. Therefore, the sphere of tourism in bilateral relations needs more detailed review. The decline for 2018 can only be attributed to the World Cup in Russia, intense competition from other areas, as well as the fluctuation of the exchange rate of ruble. The author considered business forums such as, for example, “Bulgarian Business Day in Russia: Bulgaria — a bridge to the European Union” and cooperation in the field of education and science, with Financial University as the leading partner of the Bulgarian universities. The author discussed some issues of regional cooperation within the framework of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) as the platform for dialogue between the countries. The material is dedicated to the celebration of 140 years of diplomatic relations between Russia and Bulgaria.

The article addresses the priorities of US relations with Germany. The victory of Joseph Biden and Democratic Party on the elections of 2020 signified quite radical twist in US foreign policy. The election slogan «America is back» which won the White House for the Democratic Party and Congress, means restoration of transatlantic relationship, damaged by the previous administration. Germany has a special place in this process. Elections in Germany in 2021 resulted in a victory of a Social Democratic Party. Decision making in Washington on Relations with Germany are influenced by many factors, including those related to domestic policies and international relations. Domestically there have appeared contradictions between Democratic and Republican parties on a number of priority issues on the bilateral agenda. In particular, the main differences were related to the Nord Stream 2 project. The situation in Afghanistan remains an urgent problem for both sides. It is noteworthy that following the results of the last elections in the United States, the German Caucus again became active in Congress, including both democratic and republican politicians. It is clear that Biden’s administration pursues the developing of economic ties with Germany.

Germany updated its Arctic strategy in 2019. It is determined that in the context of achieving global climate goals this region for Germany to be one of the key ones. It is emphasized that the interests of Germany are in the sustainable supply of natural resources from the Arctic. The long-term Germany`s policy is formed by the informing the world community about the risks of further economic development of the macroregion for global climatic and environmental reasons, which is carried out within the framework of national policies by the Arctic countries. Russia is one of the key Arctic countries with which Germany closely cooperates in the region in the economic and scientific spheres. Based on the assessment of Germany's position on Russia’s Arctic strategy (2020), the paper analyzes the ambivalent relationship between the two countries in the Arctic macro-region with elements of confrontation and cooperation. The author concludes that Russia and Germany can productively cooperate in the Arctic at the level of regions and economic entities, using it at the same time as an implicit field for discussing the current complex agenda of bilateral relations

This thesis explores the political, economic and theoretical underpinnings of the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR’s) development policies towards the Third World between c.1960 and 1990. Particular attention is paid to Africa. Case studies of assistance to SWAPO and the ANC further focus the attention of the reader on southern Africa in particular. Aspects of both military and civilian aid are considered, including both development initiatives overseas in Africa, and development training for Africans within the GDR itself. Since German “reunification”, the GDR’s history has been explored largely from a West German perspective. The present work attempts to provide a more balanced view of successes and shortcomings of the GDR’s policies towards, and interaction with, African countries and liberation movements. It also aims to bring to the attention of English-speaking readers German archival sources, other primary sources and published works which they would otherwise have been unlikely to encounter. From its formation, the GDR made strenuous efforts to develop relations with countries which were either free from colonial dependency or were struggling for freedom. Over the course of thirty years, it followed a number of different approaches, and developed diverse objectives. These were shaped in the wider context of the cold war, the Hallstein doctrine (which established that the FRG – and, in effect, its allies - would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognised the GDR), the relationships between the GDR and partner socialist states, and the economic difficulties faced by the GDR. Arising from this complex situation, from time to time, both internally in the GDR and in terms of its foreign affairs, tensions and discrepancies arose between theoretical objectives and political and economic reality. Despite these severe constraints, during the period under review, the volume and range of the GDR’s relationships with developing countries increased dramatically. For example, between 1970 and 1987, the number of developing countries with which the GDR had foreign economic relations on the basis of international agreements grew from 23 to 64. Viewed within its economic context, the state was arguably far more committed to development aid than the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, there is a great deal of evidence that “solidarity” with developing nations and the oppressed enjoyed a considerable degree of popular support.

Many studies concerning multinational corporations {MNCs) are replete with theoretical models and case studies that treat MNCs as stand-alone entities. Very little time and effort is given to understanding the context in which MNCs operate. This context includes not only the fact that MNCs transcend national boundaries (political as well as geographical), but also the meaning of work and being part of a multinational work force for those employed within MNCs. This thesis is an effort to elucidate how the political/societal/cultural contexts of different host countries affect the attitudes of those workers most directly involved with foreign-owned MNCs. By shifting the focus from the MNC to the political/societal/cultural environment of host countries, foreign-owned MNCs can be compared across national boundaries (foreign-owned MNC workers from three different countries are compared in this thesis -- Canada, Brazil, and West Germany). Finally, by grounding the workers' attitudes within social identity theory, divergent attitudes between the workers from the different countries are not only explained, but expected as well.

Slated as an economic outlet for Germany, the Baghdad Railway was designed to funnel political influence into the strategically viable regions of the Near East. The Railway was also designed to enrich Germany's coffers with natural resources with natural resources and trade with the Ottomans, their subjects, and their port cities... Over time, the Railway became the only significant route for Germany to reach its "place in the sun," and what began as an international enterprise escalated into a bid for diplomatic influence in the waning Ottoman Empire.

This is a study of the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR as they pertain to its war-readiness, as well as the degree to which these policies presumably opened the door to the European conflagration and, in 1941, to the Nazi-Soviet war. Topics to be discussed include: (1) the crash industrialization of the Soviet Union and industrial war preparations from 1928--41; (2) the development of Soviet military doctrine before and after 12 June 1937; (3) a critical re-examination of the popularly accepted reasons for the devolution of the Soviet armed forces; and (4) Soviet foreign policy from 1937--41. The chronological end of the paper (1941) is followed by a brief epilogue discussing the evident success of the Soviet industrialization program by reference to Soviet industrial performance during the Nazi-Soviet war. Furthermore, the epilogue will challenge the popular depiction of the German invasion as an effortless, seamless advance into the Soviet heartland.

Defence date: 29 April 2005
Examining Board: Prof. Dr. Peter Bartl, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München ; Prof. Dr. Peter Becker, European University Institute ; Prof. Dr. Georgi Markov, Bălgarska Akademia na Naukite, Sofia ; Prof. Alan S. Milward, Cabinet Office London (Supervisor)
First made available online 7 December 2016

Defence date: 17 October 2016
Examining Board: Professor Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute (Supervisor) ; Professor Ulrich Krotz, European University Institute / RSCAS (Co-Supervisor) ; Professor Amy Verdun, University of Victoria ; Professor Lucia Quaglia, University of York
Why and how do composite actors such as states or international institutions emerge as political leaders? Moreover, once in charge, how do they influence policy or institutional change? What are the conditions for successful leadership? These questions become particularly relevant in times of crisis. However, there is no political science theory that explains the emergence and the impact of leadership when exercised by composite actors. In the context of the Eurozone crisis, we observe that neither Germany, which is the actor most frequently called upon to assume leadership, nor any of the EU’s institutional actors have emerged as leader under all circumstances. Instead, we find three different outcomes: no leadership, failed leadership, and successful leadership. This thesis develops a theoretical model to explain this variation and to address the stated gap in the literature. Building on rational-institutionalist assumptions, it argues that leaders can help a group to enhance collective action when there are no, or only incomplete, institutional rules to do so. Thus, especially in times of crisis, leaders can act as drivers of policy or institutional change. However, they emerge only if the expected benefits of leading exceed the costs of it, and if the potential followers suffer high status quo costs. A leader’s impact on the outcomes, by contrast, depends on its power resources, the distribution of preferences, and the institutional constraint. The model is applied to Germany’s role in the first financial assistance to Greece, the proposal to establish a so-called ‘super-commissioner’, and the shaping of the Fiscal Compact. Moreover, the attitude of the European Commission and the European Parliament towards the issue of Eurobonds as well as the European Central Bank’s launch of the Outright Monetary Transactions are analysed on the basis of congruence tests and rigorous process-tracing. These within-case analyses are complemented by a cross-case comparison in order to enhance the external validity of the results. The analysis draws on 35 semi-structured élite interviews conducted at the German Ministry of Finance, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, and two Permanent Representations in Brussels.

Abstract Migration patterns in Germany have changed considerably during the post-war period. The active recruitment of “guest workers” stopped during the 1970s and was replaced by family reunification. Two big crisis-driven immigration waves swept Germany, following the collapse of Yugoslavia and the crises in the countries from Syria to Afghanistan. These immigration waves triggered legislation aimed at reducing immigration incentives, especially in the asylum law. From the early 2000s on, German policy turned more liberal following the EU Directives on freedom of movement and for highly qualified persons from non-EEA countries. Migration patterns changed dramatically, with EEA countries becoming the leading source of German immigration. EEA countries replaced the Anglo-Saxon immigration countries as the leading sources and destinations of migration. It is reassuring for economic policy that EU migrants, notably from Bulgaria and Romania, display high levels of employment and have boosted German employment, while unemployment rates reached historic lows. During the past decades, migration obstacles for EEA citizens have been lowered or abolished. Main obstacles to immigration of non-EEA citizens persist due to the restrictive law on residence permits. As a result, student visas, academic credentials, or family reunification are the main legal pathways to Germany. Given the difficulty to proof the equivalence of a foreign non-academic degree, it is far more promising for persons from third countries to apply for asylum with the chance to get a permanent residence permit after several years as a tolerated migrant.

AbstractThis chapter presents and analyses various official statements, 2021 election programmes and party manifestos, media reports as well as public hearings with regard to the changing view of China in the German public discourse. While the importance of economic interests is still the overarching topic in German-Chinese relations (China has been Germany`s most important trading partner since 2015), there has been a shift towards a more critical stance with regard to human rights issues in recent years. Germany was also the driving force behind the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China, which the EU signed in December 2020 under Germany’s presidency of the EU Council but so far never ratified.After the formation of a new SPD led government under chancellor Olaf Scholz, the two smaller coalition partners, the Alliance 90/The Greens, and the FDP, are said to have a much more critical view of China’s human rights issues. In particular, the new German foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock has publicly vowed to change Germany’s China policy. While Germany has remained within the hedging zone a shift from “economic pragmatism” to “soft balancing” can be observed, most noticeably in political terms: in particular, the new foreign minister Annalena Baerbock stresses the necessity for a closer cooperation both with the United States, but also a common policy of the EU towards China. Thus Germany, and the EU in general, seems to have shifted from “economic pragmatism” to “dominance denial” since the new government came into power, and the war in Ukraine has led to an even closer alliance of Germany, with the EU and the United States.

Public relations education in Bulgaria, England, Germany, Spain, and Italy, is considered together with a university that provides public relations education in Turkey. The conditions of undergraduate or graduate admission, objectives, and curricula of Public Relations Education in universities are discussed. Anadolu University in Turkey, St. Sofia in Bulgaria, Kliment Ohridski University, Birmingham City University in the England, Ludwig Maximilian University in Germany, Sevilla University in Spain, and Iulm Milan University in Italy are the subjects of Public Relations training. Finally, the universities were compared and evaluated with an interpretive perspective of their similarities and differences.

Turkey is an important country both in terms of population and geographical location. In terms of population, Turkey is the second largest country in Europe after Germany. Geographically, Turkey serves as a bridge between Europe and Asia. This features enables Turkey to develop economic relations with a lot of countries and regions. However, Turkey has experienced negative results in the field of economics as in many areas because of political uncertainty and government structure based on coalition and could not make full use of its potential for many years. After living one of the worst economic crisis in history in the 2001 year, the people in Turkey has decided to a government of one party than government based on coalitions. With the political stability, Turkey became a center of attraction in direct foreign investment and portfolio investment for both countries in the region and developed countries. Despite these positive developments, the greatest difficulty encountered in the economy in this period is the current account deficit problem.

Just days after the Slovak state was created, it signed with Nazi Germany a ‘treaty of protection’ and a protocol on co-operation in financial and economic matters. As a result of these measures, Slovakia would be labelled a German vassal state and the government a puppet regime. This chapter examines the nature of the wartime Slovak state and reconsiders the concept of a puppet regime and a native version of fascism (so-called ‘clerical fascism’). It examines the ways in which Germany tried to influence the Slovak government, who the German protagonists were, and how and according to what guidelines Slovak politicians reacted to these manoeuvres. It first outlines how Slovak nationalists demanded autonomy during the later years of the First Czechoslovak Republic, and then assesses the Slovak-German relations from March 1939 to the summer of 1940. By this time, the German minister of foreign affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, had labelled the Slovak case an example of ‘revolutionary foreign politics’.

Across European and Western liberal market democracies, China’s rise exposes friction between economic interests and political values and challenge common foreign and security policy in the European Union. From positions of economic weakness, Greece, Hungary, and Portugal have blocked or watered down common security, human rights, and economic positions in the regional body. Beijing’s formation of a formal group with Central and Eastern European countries, the so-called 17+1, is similarly seen in Brussels as a “divide and rule” tactic. Yet while European governments receive ample criticism for neglecting their political values in order to advance economic relations with China, the economic importance of China to the EU is rarely scrutinized. For large member states like Germany and France, and smaller ones such as Denmark and Norway, trade and investment with China does not produce a relationship of economic dependency for the EU as commonly perceived, particularly as China’s state capitalist system produces new competition for European companies. Beijing’s infringements on European democratic values and competitive economic pressures are changing the public discourse on China, but without a collective response, economic relations with China will only become more asymmetric than they are today.

During the early 1930s faith in a utopian form of wireless internationalism was shaken by the world economic crisis, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and the Nazi revolution in Germany. Radio still seemed a potential means to encourage international understanding and peace, but increasingly it also appeared to be a powerful tool of propaganda that might serve aggressive nationalist ends. As Europe’s broadcasting infrastructure became more formidable, broadcasters continued to work through the International Broadcasting Union to regulate the airwaves and combat interference and hostile propaganda. These measures were only partially effective and were ignored by a powerful new station broadcasting commercial programmes across Europe in several languages, Radio Luxembourg. The League of Nations also began to study the disruptive impact of radio on international affairs, and established its own broadcasting station, Radio Nations. Relay work continued, linking up the broadcasters of Europe and forging new connections across the Atlantic. The number of short-wave broadcasters increased significantly during this period, and the BBC established its own short-wave Empire Service, designed to reach out to white expatriate listeners in Britain’s colonies, and to English speakers in the ‘dominions’. Many in the US could also tune in, and British civil servants, notably at the Foreign Office, worried about the impact on Anglo-American relations.

This paper presents the regional economic relations between Turkey and Black See Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC). The Heads of State and Government of eleven countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine signed the Summit Declaration and the Bosphorus Statement giving birth to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation on 25 June 1992, in Istanbul. On 5 June 1998, the Heads of State or Government signed the BSEC Charter, came into force on 1 May 1999 BSEC has evolved into an international regional organization for economic cooperation. The organization has 12 members since Serbia joining the organization in 2004. It came into existence as a unique and promising model of multilateral political and economic initiative aimed at fostering interaction and harmony among the Member States, as well as to ensure peace, stability and prosperity encouraging friendly and good-neighbourly relations in the Black Sea region. Countries bordering the Black Sea, Balkan and Caucasus formed the BSEC countries cover an area of approximately 20 million square kilometer and represent more than 350 million people. The region with the foreign trade volume of U.S. $ 300 billion per year draws attention to the rich natural resources; and is the main European energy and transport corridor transfer. The Black Sea region is a contested neighbourhood and the subject of intense debates and conflicts in the globe. Also, this reflects the changing dynamics of the Black Sea region, its complex realities, the interests of outsiders and the region’s relations with the rest of the globe. Moreover, its strategic position, linking north to south and east to west, as well as its oil, gas, transport and trade routes are all important reasons for its increasing relevance. Turkey's foreign trade volume with BSEC member countries is steadily increasing as per the findings over the period of 1996-2012.

In modern conditions of global information space and comprehensive expansion of foreign economic relations shaped society demand for lawyers with skills of applying the conflict rules of private international law and practices in foreign countries. Buying legal services in a foreign country significantly expands the composition of the legal means of advocacy and provides access to local infrastructure and communication. Mastering the skills of applying the conflict rules of national and international law entails: 1) conduct advocacy at a high level; 2) expansion of the market of legal services; 3) the development of new legal technologies. 4) full participation in international cooperation networks of advocates; 5) professional development. The author of this article refers to the number of lawyers authorised to practice law in Germany and in Russia, so many suggestions are based on my own experience of the author.

Over the recent decades, the changes in the paradigm of international trade have been observed. As the result of decreasing of trade barriers as well as the reduction in trade costs allowed companies to divide their production into stages and to locate it in different countries according to their competitive advantage. Eventually, the production process has become more fragmented, both geographically and vertically. It means that intermediate products are shipped across boarders many times and every exporting economy provides some value added according to its competitive advantage. As a result, global value chains have become one of the most important feature of international trade. Following (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011), in this study global value chains are defined as “the full range of activities that firms and workers do to bring a product from its conception to its end use”. Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) pointed out four types of upgrading in global value chains: product, process, functional and chain. Product and process upgrading involve companies retaining their positions in global value chains by enhancing productivity gains through adopting new product processes or “new configurations of product mix”. Thus, functional upgrading involves a slicing up the global value chains into new activity which generates higher value added, e.g. own brand manufacturing. In turn, chain upgrading involves a going up to new activity, which needs higher skills and capital and value added. Milberg and Winkler (2013) offered similar classifications of upgrading. Production fragmentation has caused a rapid increase in trade in intermediate goods as often companies offshore an intermediate stage of production process. Offshoring production has been typical to manufacturing (Timmer, et al., 2012), however, services have been often overlooked, but play a major role, especially in supporting global value chains (Kommerskollegium 2013). In turn, Digital Silk Road, announced in 2015, has become a significant part of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative strategy. China has implemented this strategy as a part of its long-term technological plan, under which China provides support to its exporters, including many well-known technology companies and builds a network of cooperation with selected countries in the field of technology, including ICT infrastructure, services, 5G networks, e-commerce, etc. China's rapid technological changes must not go unnoticed by trading partners, including analysed European countries, which, to maintain international competitiveness, are increasing the technological advancement and enhancing market protection against Chinese technology. Until recently, the value added from China to European countries was concentrated mainly on medium technology industries and value added from Europe to China focused more on advanced goods and services. Nowadays, there is a redirection of Chinese value added to high-tech activities (including service activities), which reflects China's ambition to build an economy that leads to innovation and industry 4.0. The transition of the CEE states’ economic and political systems initiated in the early 1990s, earned them the EU membership in 2004. The accession to the EU’s structures meant that these countries achieved the free-market economy status and they should be treated as the full member of the global business networks. Moreover, the decline in trade costs (transport and transaction), greater openness of their market and the removal of trade barriers have all helped the CEE states to join global value chains. Hence, the CEE economies are going to be more heavily involved in global production linkages. Many empirical studies have presented the close and dynamic integration of these countries with the EU market (especially the EU-15) and in a more limited scope with the whole global economy as well (Behar and Freund 2011). Generally, democratisation, the strengthening of political and economic relations (particularly with the EU), and the modernisation of many sectors (including financial sector, more advanced industries), were common elements of the CEE countries long-term development policies. One of their priorities was the redirection of foreign trade towards the EU and joining the global production linkages where China has become the core producer. Recently, the role of the economy in global value chains is more determined by the advancement of value added that it offers. Companies move toward services and innovations in the business model (Nenenen & Storbacka, 2010) and introduce industry 4.0 (Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung, 2016). A symptom of these novelty is a concept of servicification of manufacturing (Neely et al. 2011) and cross-sectoral connections, which have reconstructed traditional global value chains (Naude et al. 2019) and, together with Industry 4.0, is expected to change the landscape of global manufacturing. As a result of facilitation of manufacturing, economies placed in the downstream market can improve their role in global value chains. In Europe, this can be an opportunity for most Central and Eastern European countries. Analyzing changes in CEE’s role in technological global value chains, we should take into account its two most important value-added suppliers: China and Germany, as well as their most important value-added buyer - Germany. These three economies established a sort of value added flows triangle. The regional supply chains built by Germany in the CEE allowed it to maintain a comparative advantage in sectors important for the economy, while helping the CEE countries join global value chains, positively influencing economic growth, but also reducing them to entities operating in less advanced stages of production (Jacoby, 2010; Fortwengel, 2011). Today, Germany also cooperates strongly with China (as a result of Digital Silk Road), and the CEE economies (especially the Visegrad Group) are increasingly dependent on Chinese value added, still linked to German value added. The most visible connections can be found in automotive and electronics. Hence, the question is: how strong are these links in servicification of manufacturing and whether there are visible trends in value-added flows in between this triangle in the era of industry 4.0 and Chinese Digital Silk Road. The research question seems to be relevant, thus in the subject literature, little is known about the mentioned relations (Roland Berger, 2021). The research method based on the analysis of data from the OECD Trade in Value Added databases, containing the world input-output tables for the period 2005–2018. The system of balance equations in the input-output model for one economy has been adopted to a multi-economy model. The model is described in more detail in (Koopman et al. 2013 or Hummels et al, 2001) and is based on the decomposition of gross exports. The method includes not only estimates of total value added in global value chains, but also calculations at both the mezoeconomic level and cross-sectoral flows of value added (including servicification of manufacturing). The results of analysis showed that most relations between economies continued to deepen the imbalance in flows of value added. The CEE economies are making their manufacturing increasingly dependent on advanced services (both from Germany and China). On the other hand, the share of CEE services to Chinese and German manufacturing is decreasing or remains steady. However, some trends could be observed in the last years, especially between Germany and China. German manufacturing is starting to rely more on Chinese value added (information and communication technologies services and the subgroup computer programming, consultancy and information services activities in manufacturing, information and communication technologies services' value added in transport equipment), although previously Germany provided more of these services to China. In telecommunications in manufacturing between CEE and Germany, the trend has turned against CEE. However, there was no direct compensation between pairs of economies, but the decrease in German value-added flows to China resulted in a much larger increase in value-added from China in German manufacturing. If the presented changes in flows were to reflect the effectiveness of Chinese industry 4.0 and Digital Silk Road. These strategies serve their purposes and increases not only the advancement of Chinese value-added exports, but also makes important economies dependent on this added value. On the contrary, the industry 4.0 strategy in CEE has not improved its position in the triad. Germany has still a strong position as a provider of value added, but its dependence on foreign value added is high, which derives from the links with CEE.

Geographically Mongolia has two neighbors. Mongolia’s existence today depends largely on mutually friendly relationships with two big neighbors. The main pillars of Mongolia’s new international strategy were incorporated in Mongolia’s National Security Concept adopted on June 30, 1994. This document, approved by the Mongolian Parliament, emphasizes a balanced policy towards the country’s two giant neighbors, underlines the importance of economic security in protecting Mongolia’s national integrity, and warns about too much dependence on any one country for trade. In today’s world of globalization and interdependence, Mongolia has to engage with other countries beyond these two neighbors, Russia and China. This is fundamental thing of the Mongolia’s searching third neighbor. Mongolia needs more friends to ensure its national security interests and achieve economic prosperity its ‘Third Neighbor Policy’1 is a policy of extending its friends all around the world. Two immediate neighbors of Mongolia, Russia and China, remain the foreign policy priority and this priority is not contradictory to the policy of having more friends. Mongolia is becoming an arena of clashes of economic interests of developed countries, multinational corporations due its rich mining deposits. Mongolia's Third Neighbor Policy is aimed to leverage the influence of neighboring countries in the national security issues of Mongolia. In contrast with other satellite states of the former Soviet Union, Mongolia concurrently instituted a democratic political system, a market-driven economy, and a foreign policy based on balancing relations with Russia and China while expanding relations with the West and East. Mongolia is now pursuing a foreign policy that will facilitate global engagement, allow the nation to maintain its sovereignty, and provide diplomatic freedom of maneuver through a “third neighbor” policy. 2 This policy is very much alive today but there is no reason to claim that its implementation is satisfactory. Mongolia has major investors from the US, Japan, Germany and France from the EU, for example. There are many universal conventions related to landlocked country. For Mongolia, access to sea via our two neighbors, means promoting economic ties with the third neighbors, as an important factor conducive to reinforcing the material foundations of Mongolia’s third neighbor policy.

The UK’s 2021 Integrated Review of security, defence, development and foreign policy describes Russia as ‘the most acute direct threat to [the UK’s] security’ in the 2020s. Relations did not get this bad overnight: the trend has been negative for nearly two decades. The bilateral political relationship is now broken. Russian policymakers regard the UK as hostile, but also as weaker than Russia: a junior partner of the US and less important than Germany within Europe. The consensus among Russian observers is that Brexit has reduced the UK’s international influence, to Russia’s benefit. The history of UK–Russia relations offers four lessons. First, because the two lack shared values and interests, their relationship is fragile and volatile. Second, adversarial relations are the historical norm. Third, each party exaggerates its importance on the world stage. Fourth, external trends beyond the UK’s control regularly buffet the relationship. These wider trends include the weakening of the Western-centric international order; the rise of populism and opposition to economic globalization; and the global spread of authoritarian forms of governance. A coherent Russia strategy should focus on the protection of UK territory, citizens and institutions; security in the Euro-Atlantic space; international issues such as non-proliferation; economic relations; and people-to-people contacts. The UK should pursue its objectives with the tools of state power, through soft power instruments and through its international partnerships. Despite Brexit, the EU remains an essential security partner for the UK. In advancing its Russia-related interests, the UK should have four operational priorities: rebuilding domestic resilience; concentrating resources on the Euro-Atlantic space; being a trusted ally and partner; and augmenting its soft power. UK decision-makers should be guided by four propositions. In the first place, policy must be based on clear, hard-headed thinking about Russia. Secondly, an adversarial relationship is not in itself contrary to UK interests. Next, Brexit makes it harder for the UK and the EU to deal with Russia. And finally, an effective Russia policy demands a realistic assessment of UK power and influence. The UK is not a ‘pocket superpower’. It is an important but middling power in relative decline. After Brexit, it needs to repair its external reputation and maximize its utility to allies and partners, starting with its European neighbours.