Journal articles: 'Brain in a Vat'

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Reiheld, Alison, and Rory Kraft. "Brain in the Vat." Questions: Philosophy for Young People 8 (2008): 4. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/questions2008816.

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Werbeloff, Jason, and Mark Oppenheimer. "Brain in a Vat Podcast." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 93 (2021): 121–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20219352.

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Gere, Cathy, and Charlie Gere. "THE BRAIN IN A VAT." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35, no. 2 (June 2004): iii—iv. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2004.03.001.

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Gere, Cathy. "The brain in a vat." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35, no. 2 (June 2004): 219–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2004.03.002.

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Davies, David. "Putnam's Brain-Teaser." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 2 (June 1995): 203–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1995.10717413.

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1. Metaphysical Realists have traditionally relied upon the skeptic to give substance to the idea that truth is, in the words of Hilary Putnam, 'radically non-episternic,’ forever outstripping, in principle at least, the reach of justification. What better model of truth so conceived, after all, than the skeptic's contention that even our firmest convictions might be mistaken in that we might be the victims of demonic deception or the machinations of an evil scientist? But the availability of this favorite model of Realist truth, encapsulated in the claim that we might be ‘brains in a vat,’ has been called into question by Putnam in the opening chapter of Reason, Truth, and History. Putnam contends that, if we grant the Realist notion of truth, as referentially mediated correspondence to THE WORLD, then, given certain plausible constraints on reference, we can know that we are not brains in a vat (or, more accurately, ‘brains in a vat' of a particular kind, as we shall see).

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BRUECKNER, ANTHONY. "If I Am a Brain in a Vat, Then I Am Not a Brain in a Vat." Mind 101, no. 401 (1992): 123–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/101.401.123.

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Jackman, Henry. "Semantic Pragmatism and A Priori Knawledge (or ‘Yes we could all be brains in a vat’)." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31, no. 4 (December 2001): 455–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2001.10717576.

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Hilary Putnam has famously argued that we can know that we are not brains in a vat because the hypothesis that we are is self-refuting. While Putnam's argument has generated interest primarily as a novel response to skepticism, he originally introduced his brain in a vat scenario to help illustrate a point about the ‘mind/world relationship.’ In particular, he intended it to be part of an argument against the coherence of metaphysical realism, and thus to be part of a defense of his conception of truth as idealized rational acceptability. Putnam's discussion has already inspired a substantial body of criticism, but it will be argued here that these criticisms fail to capture the central problem with his argument. Indeed, it will be shown that, rather than simply following from his semantic externalism, Putnam's conclusions about the self-refuting character of the brain in a vat hypothesis are actually out of line with central and plausible aspects of his own account of the relationship between our minds and the world.

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Baumann, Peter. "BRAINS IN VATS? DON'T BOTHER!" Episteme 16, no. 2 (August 24, 2017): 186–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2017.34.

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ABSTRACTContemporary discussions of epistemological skepticism – the view that we do not and cannot know anything about the world around us – focus very much on a certain kind of skeptical argument involving a skeptical scenario (a situation familiar from Descartes' First Meditation). According to the argument, knowing some ordinary proposition about the world (one we usually take ourselves to know) requires knowing we are not in some such skeptical scenario SK; however, since we cannot know that we are not in SK we also cannot know any ordinary proposition. One of the most prominent skeptical scenarios is the brain-in-the-vat-scenario: An evil scientist has operated on an unsuspecting subject, removed the subject's brain and put it in a vat where it is kept functioning and is connected to some computer which feeds the brain the illusion that everything is “normal”. This paper looks at one aspect of this scenario after another – envatment, disembodiment, weird cognitive processes, lack of the right kind of epistemic standing, and systematic deception. The conclusion is that none of these aspects (in isolation or in combination) is of any relevance for a would-be skeptical argument; the brain-in-the-vat-scenario is irrelevant to and useless for skeptical purposes. Given that related scenarios (e.g., involving evil demons) share the defects of the brain-in-the-vat-scenario, the skeptic should not put any hopes on Cartesian topoi.

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Kim, Shin, Hyon-Ah Yi, Kyoung Sook Won, Ji Soo Lee, and Hae Won Kim. "Association between Visceral Adipose Tissue Metabolism and Alzheimer’s Disease Pathology." Metabolites 12, no. 3 (March 17, 2022): 258. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/metabo12030258.

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The visceral adipose tissue (VAT) has been recognized as an endocrine organ, and VAT dysfunction could be a risk factor for Alzheimer’s disease (AD). We aimed to evaluate the association of VAT metabolism with AD pathology. This cross-sectional study included 54 older subjects with cognitive impairment who underwent 2-deoxy-2-[fluorine-18]-fluoro-D-glucose (18F-FDG) torso positron emission tomography (PET) and 18F-florbetaben brain PET. 18F-FDG uptake in VAT on 18F-FDG PET images was used as a marker of VAT metabolism, and subjects were classified into high and low VAT metabolism groups. A voxel-based analysis revealed that the high VAT metabolism group exhibited a significantly higher cerebral amyloid-β (Aβ) burden than the low VAT metabolism group. In the volume-of-interest analysis, multiple linear regression analyses with adjustment for age, sex, and white matter hyperintensity volume revealed that 18F-FDG uptake in VAT was significantly associated with the cerebral Aβ burden (β = 0.359, p = 0.007). In conclusion, VAT metabolism was associated with AD pathology in older subjects. Our findings suggest that VAT dysfunction could contribute to AD development.

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Prayoga, Aryadiva, Hermien Nugraheni, and Diyah Fatmasari. "Sequence application of Brain mri with orthodontic bracket." Jurnal Riset Kesehatan 9, no. 1 (May 1, 2020): 48–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.31983/jrk.v9i1.5690.

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Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) examination of the brain at high resolution will be able to detect abnormalities in the brain that are not detected before. The MRI machine is equipped with a very strong magnetic force, therefore metal objects can interfere with the workings of the machine . Some patients, there may be a magnet in the body unnoticed, for example: orthodontic bracket. The purpose of this study was to analyze the effectiveness of sequences to reduce metal artifacts due to the installation of the Orthodontic Bracket. This type of research is a quantitative analytic with a quasi-experimental research design. The research design used was a one group pretest-posttest design to determine the optimization of the application of the Slice Encoding Metal Artifact Correction (SEMAC) and View Angle Tilting (VAT) sequences on Brain MRI with Orthodontic Bracket. The results showed that the SEMAC sequence combined with T2 TSE was able to reduce metal artifacts well. VAT sequences combined with T2 TSE were able to reduce metal artifacts quite well. A more optimal sequence to reduce metal artifacts is T2 TSE SEMAC, where the sequence is able to reveal thin structures that are not visible in the T2 TSE or T2 TSE VAT sequences.

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Goldman, A. H. "The underdetermination argument for brain-in-the-vat scepticism." Analysis 67, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 32–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/67.1.32.

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Black, T. "A Moorean Response to Brain-in-a-Vat Scepticism." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80, no. 2 (June 2002): 148–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/724051028.

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Goldman, Alan H. "The underdetermination argument for brain-in-the-vat scepticism." Analysis 67, no. 293 (January 2007): 32–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00645.x.

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14

Collier, John D. "Could i conceive being a brain in a vat?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 4 (December 1990): 413–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409012344411.

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Lazović, Živan. "Is Putnam's 'brain in a VAT' hypothesis self-refuting?" Belgrade Philosophical Annual, no. 33 (2020): 73–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/bpa2033073l.

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Huemer, Michael. "Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, no. 2 (September 2000): 397. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2653657.

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Han, Xiaoqiang. "A Butterfly Dream in a Brain in a Vat." Philosophia 38, no. 1 (April 8, 2009): 157–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9188-2.

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Boersma, Gretha, Emil Johansson, Maria Pereira, Kerstin Heurling, Stanko Skrtic, Joey Lau, Petros Katsogiannos, et al. "Altered Glucose Uptake in Muscle, Visceral Adipose Tissue, and Brain Predict Whole-Body Insulin Resistance and may Contribute to the Development of Type 2 Diabetes: A Combined PET/MR Study." Hormone and Metabolic Research 50, no. 08 (July 12, 2018): 627–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1055/a-0643-4739.

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AbstractWe assessed glucose uptake in different tissues in type 2 diabetes (T2D), prediabetes, and control subjects to elucidate its impact in the development of whole-body insulin resistance and T2D. Thirteen T2D, 12 prediabetes, and 10 control subjects, matched for age and BMI, underwent OGTT and abdominal subcutaneous adipose tissue (SAT) biopsies. Integrated whole-body 18F-FDG PET and MRI were performed during a hyperinsulinemic euglycemic clamp to asses glucose uptake rate (MRglu) in several tissues. MRglu in skeletal muscle, SAT, visceral adipose tissue (VAT), and liver was significantly reduced in T2D subjects and correlated positively with M-values (r=0.884, r=0.574, r=0.707 and r=0.403, respectively). Brain MRglu was significantly higher in T2D and prediabetes subjects and had a significant inverse correlation with M-values (r=–0.616). Myocardial MRglu did not differ between groups and did not correlate with the M-values. A multivariate model including skeletal muscle, brain and VAT MRglu best predicted the M-values (adjusted r2=0.85). In addition, SAT MRglu correlated with SAT glucose uptake ex vivo (r=0.491). In different stages of the development of T2D, glucose uptake during hyperinsulinemia is elevated in the brain in parallel with an impairment in peripheral organs. Impaired glucose uptake in skeletal muscle and VAT together with elevated glucose uptake in brain were independently associated with whole-body insulin resistance, and these tissue-specific alterations may contribute to T2D development.

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Zalabardo, José L. "How I Know I'm Not a Brain in a Vat." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64 (May 27, 2009): 65–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246109000071.

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Boult, Cameron. "The Brain in a Vat, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9, no. 1 (March 5, 2019): 75–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20181343.

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Zhang, R., D. Tomasi, E. Shokri-Kojori, C. E. Wiers, G. Wang, and N. D. Volkow. "0166 Sleep Inconsistency Related Changes in Brain Function During Task and Rest." Sleep 43, Supplement_1 (April 2020): A66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/sleep/zsaa056.164.

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Abstract Introduction Sleep deprivation and circadian disruptions impair brain function and cognitive performance, but few studies have examined the effect of sleep inconsistency. Here we investigated how inconsistent sleep duration and sleep timing between weekend (WE) and weekdays (WD) affected behavior and brain function during task and at rest in 56 (30 female) healthy human subjects. Methods WE-WD differences in sleep duration and sleep midpoint were calculated using one-week actigraphy data. All subjects underwent 3Tesla BOLD-fMRI to measure brain activity during a visual attention task (VAT) and in resting-state condition. Results We found that WE-WD inconsistency of sleep duration and sleep midpoint were uncorrelated with each other (r=.08, p=.58) and influenced behavior and brain function differently. Our healthy subjects showed relatively small WE-WD differences (WE-WD: 0.59 hours) and benefited from longer WE catch-up sleep, which was associated with better attentional performance (3-ball: β=.30, t=2.35, p = .023; 4-ball: β=.30, t=2.21, p =.032) and greater deactivation of the default mode network (DMN) during VAT (p < .05, cluster-corrected) and greater resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) between anterior DMN and occipital cortex (p < .01, cluster-corrected). In contrast, inconsistent WE-WD sleep midpoint (WE-WD: 1.11 hours) was associated with worse performance (4-ball: β=-.33, t=-2.42, p = .020) and with lower occipital activation during VAT and lower RSFC within the DMN. Conclusion Our results document the importance of consistent sleep timing for brain function in particular of the DMN, and provide evidence of the benefits of WE catch-up sleep in healthy adults. Support This work was supported by NIAAA IRP (Y01AA3009). R.Z. received research fellowship from German research foundation (DFG).

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Brueckner, Anthony L. "Brains in a Vat." Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 3 (March 1986): 148. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2026572.

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Kwon, Hyung-Min, Jong-Ho Park, Jin Ho Park, Han-Yeong Jeong, Jae-Sung Lim, Han-Gil Jeong, Dong Wook Shin, Jae Moon Yun, and Hyejin Lee. "Visceral Fat Is an Independent Predictor of Cerebral Microbleeds in Neurologically Healthy People." Cerebrovascular Diseases 42, no. 1-2 (2016): 90–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000445300.

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Background: Obesity has a significant contribution to the risk of intracerebral hemorrhage (ICH). However, little is known about the association between central obesity and the presence of cerebral microbleeds (CMBs), a precursor of ICH. We sought to assess whether visceral adipose tissue (VAT) and subcutaneous adipose tissue (SAT) are associated with the presence of CMB. Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional study of 1,737 neurologically healthy people (mean age 55.9 ± 9.1; 790 men), who underwent brain MRI and abdominal CT. Risk factors, anthropometric parameters and clinical information were obtained. CMBs were evaluated through T2*-weighted gradient-recalled echo MRI. The cross-sectional surface areas of the abdominal fat compartments were calculated. Study subjects were stratified into quartiles according to the distribution of VAT/SAT ratio. Results: A total of 75 (4.3%) subjects were found to have CMBs. Subjects with a greater quartile of VAT/SAT ratio were more likely to have higher numbers of CMBs (0 to ≥2; p = 0.001). In multivariable analysis, age and history of hypertension were associated with the presence of CMB (OR 1.09, 95% CI 1.06-1.13, p < 0.001; OR 1.70, 95% CI 1.01-2.84, p = 0.046, respectively). A dose-response relationship was observed between the extent of VAT/SAT quartile and CMB: compared to the lowest VAT/SAT quartile, OR 2.14 (95% CI 0.86-5.35) for second VAT/SAT quartile; OR 2.26 (95% CI 0.86-5.92) for third VAT/SAT quartile; and OR 2.91 (95% CI 1.04-8.12) for the highest VAT/SAT quartile (p for trend 0.03). Conclusion: In our study, higher VAT/SAT ratios were found to be independent predictors of CMBs in neurologically healthy people. This finding strengthens previous data, suggesting that visceral fat distribution is an important contributor to cerebral small vessel disease.

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McBride, James. "“Where, O Death, Is Your Sting?”: The Resurrected Body, Its Cyborgnetic Future and the Advent of Christian Transhumanism." Journal of Posthumanism 2, no. 1 (February 28, 2022): 37–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.33182/joph.v2i1.1788.

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The 21st century’s robotic revolution will have massive effects on human societies. Neuroscientists have experimented with the idea of preserving the brain after death through vitrifixation in the hopes of uploading the minds of individuals into the cloud or cyborgnetic bodies. However, the likelihood of duplicating the 86 billion neurons in the human connectome is remote. Yet neuroscientists have had some success in connecting brain cells to robots, which echoes the philosophical question of “Brains in a Vat.” This article addresses the consequences of such a development for Christianity. Since Christianity is predicated on resurrection and life everlasting, the transhumanist vision of connecting the human brain to cyborgnetic bodies, particularly if it becomes popular, poses a serious challenge. This article suggests a way in which Christianity may be able to incorporate that vision into Christian theology, leading to the advent of Christian transhumanism.

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Smart, J. J. C. "The brain in the vat and the question of metaphysical realism." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35, no. 2 (June 2004): 237–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2004.03.003.

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Jackson, Alexander. "How you know you are not a brain in a vat." Philosophical Studies 172, no. 10 (January 29, 2015): 2799–822. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0445-x.

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Vasamsetti, Sathish Babu, Emilie Coppin, Xinyi Zhang, Jonathan Florentin, Sasha Koul, Matthias Götberg, Andrew S. Clugston, et al. "Apoptosis of hematopoietic progenitor-derived adipose tissue–resident macrophages contributes to insulin resistance after myocardial infarction." Science Translational Medicine 12, no. 553 (July 22, 2020): eaaw0638. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/scitranslmed.aaw0638.

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Patients with insulin resistance have high risk of cardiovascular disease such as myocardial infarction (MI). However, it is not known whether MI can initiate or aggravate insulin resistance. We observed that patients with ST-elevation MI and mice with MI had de novo hyperglycemia and features of insulin resistance, respectively. In mouse models of both myocardial and skeletal muscle injury, we observed that the number of visceral adipose tissue (VAT)–resident macrophages decreased because of apoptosis after these distant organ injuries. Patients displayed a similar decrease in VAT-resident macrophage numbers and developed systemic insulin resistance after ST-elevation MI. Loss of VAT-resident macrophages after MI injury led to systemic insulin resistance in non-diabetic mice. Danger signaling–associated protein high mobility group box 1 was released by the dead myocardium after MI in rodents and triggered macrophage apoptosis via Toll-like receptor 4. The VAT-resident macrophage population in the steady state in mice was transcriptomically distinct from macrophages in the brain, skin, kidney, bone marrow, lungs, and liver and was derived from hematopoietic progenitor cells just after birth. Mechanistically, VAT-resident macrophage apoptosis and de novo insulin resistance in mouse models of MI were linked to diminished concentrations of macrophage colony-stimulating factor and adiponectin. Collectively, these findings demonstrate a previously unappreciated role of adipose tissue–resident macrophages in sensing remote organ injury and promoting MI pathogenesis.

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Schönbaumsfeld, Genia. "McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism?" International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3, no. 3 (2012): 202–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-02021082.

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In a series of recent articles, Duncan Pritchard argues for a “neo-Moorean” interpretation of John McDowell’s anti-sceptical strategy. Pritchard introduces a distinction between “favouring” and “discriminating” epistemic grounds in order to show that, within the radical sceptical context, an absence of “discriminating” epistemic grounds allowing one to distinguish brain-in-a-vat from non-brain-in-a-vat scenarios does not preclude possessing knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses. I argue that Pritchard’s account fails. First, the distinction between “favouring” and “discriminating” epistemic grounds only works for “mules-disguised-as zebras” examples, but breaks down in the radical sceptical case. Second, McDowellian disjunctivism neutralizes the radical sceptical threat, but does not refute it. Third, the “highest common factor” conception is itself responsible for generating the sceptical problem and once this is undermined by McDowellian disjunctivism, scepticism no longer stands in need of direct refutation. I conclude by showing that one can either be a McDowellian disjunctivist or a neo-Moorean, but not both.

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David, Marian. "Neither Mentioning 'Brains in a Vat' nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove that We Are Not Brains in a Vat." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51, no. 4 (December 1991): 891. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2108187.

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Hetherington, Stephen. "Re: Brains in a Vat." Dialectica 54, no. 4 (June 23, 2005): 307–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2000.tb00287.x.

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Janssens, Nicolien. "We Don't Know We Have Hands and it's Fine." Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal 13, no. 1 (April 14, 2020): 106–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/s.13.1.106-117.

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Based on the brain in a vat thought experiment, skeptics argue that we cannot have certain knowledge. At the same time, we do have the intuition that we know some things with certainty. A way to justify this intuition is given by semantic contextualists who argue that the word “knows” is context sensitive. However, many have objected to the intelligibility of this claim. In response, another approach called “moderate pragmatic contextualism” was invoked, which claims that “knows” itself is not context sensitive, but knowledge assertions are. I show, however, that to refute skepticism, moderate pragmatic contextualism rests on unjustified and implausible assumptions as well. Since no form of contextualism works as a response to skepticism, I argue that we should simply accept skepticism. However, I argue that skepticism is not a problem because skeptic pragmatic contextualism can offer a plausible explanation of why we have the intuition that our ordinary knowledge claims are true, even though they are not. I conclude that skeptic pragmatic contextualism offers the most plausible response to the brain in a vat thought experiment.

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Janssens, Nicolien. "We Don’t Know We Have Hands and It’s Fine." Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal 13 (2020): 106–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/stance2020139.

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Based on the brain in a vat thought experiment, skeptics argue that we cannot have certain knowledge. At the same time, we do have the intuition that we know some things with certainty. A way to justify this intuition is given by semantic contextualists who argue that the word “knows” is context sensitive. However, many have objected to the intelligibility of this claim. In response, another approach called “moderate pragmatic contextualism” was invoked, which claims that “knows” itself is not context sensitive, but knowledge assertions are. I show, however, that to refute skepticism, moderate pragmatic contextualism rests on unjustified and implausible assumptions as well. Since no form of contextualism works as a response to skepticism, I argue that we should simply accept skepticism. However, I argue that skepticism is not a problem because skeptic pragmatic contextualism can offer a plausible explanation of why we have the intuition that our ordinary knowledge claims are true, even though they are not. I conclude that skeptic pragmatic contextualism offers the most plausible response to the brain in a vat thought experiment.

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Markosian, Ned. "Do You Know That You Are Not a Brain in a Vat?" Logos & Episteme 5, no. 2 (2014): 161–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20145214.

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Davies, D. "Why One Shouldn't Make an Example of a Brain in a Vat." Analysis 57, no. 1 (January 1, 1997): 51–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/57.1.51.

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Cavallaro, Dani. "The brain in a vat in cyberpunk: the persistence of the flesh." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35, no. 2 (June 2004): 287–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2004.03.005.

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Albiński, Tomasz. "Mózgi w naczyniu." Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna 1, no. 1 (July 15, 2018): 81–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/fped.2012.1.1.6.

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Although there is a disagreement about how Putnam’s argument should be understood, it is possible to point to several elements of this argument which are common for many different reconstructions. In this paper I have tried to show that not all of them are unquestionable. And I want to propose a new way in which self-refutation of statement „I am a brain in a vat” may be understood. A form of this reconstruction is neutral for controversy about metaphysical realism or skepticism – it differs from the argument suggested by Putnam’s text. But I think that a story about envatted brains is simply a story about a language.

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Steinitz, Yuval. "Brains in a Vat: Different Perspectives." Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 175 (April 1994): 213. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219742.

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Sprevak, Mark, and Christina McLeish. "Magic, semantics, and Putnam’s vat brains." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35, no. 2 (June 2004): 227–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2004.03.007.

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Tichý, Pavel. "Putnam on brains in a vat." Philosophia 16, no. 2 (August 1986): 137–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02380260.

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Gau, A. S. "Referential Characteristics of Statements in H. Putnam’s «Brain in a Vat» Theoretical Model." Siberian Journal of Philosophy 15, no. 3 (2017): 31–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2017-15-3-31-38.

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BAK, Jechul. "A Critique of Putnam’s Arguments of the Brain in a Vat - The Three Dimensions." Modern Philosophy 20 (October 31, 2022): 393–423. http://dx.doi.org/10.52677/mph.2022.10.20.393.

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Casati, R., and J. Dokic. "Brains in a vat, language and metalanguage." Analysis 51, no. 2 (March 1, 1991): 91–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/51.2.91.

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McCullogh, Gregory. "Let the Vat-Brains Speak for Themselves." Ratio 14, no. 4 (December 2001): 318–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9329.00167.

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Dr. Sujata Bamane, Dr Sujata Bamane. "Study of ‘Brain in Vat’ or ‘Brain in Fluid’? Scenario in Nayomi Munaweera’s What Lies Between Us, A Different Perspective." International Journal of English and Literature 9, no. 5 (2019): 17–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.24247/ijeloct20193.

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Thompson, Evan, and Diego Cosmelli. "Brain in a Vat or Body in a World? Brainbound versus Enactive Views of Experience." Philosophical Topics 39, no. 1 (2011): 163–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics201139119.

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Huemer, Michael. "Serious theories and skeptical theories: Why you are probably not a brain in a vat." Philosophical Studies 173, no. 4 (August 22, 2015): 1031–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0539-5.

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Avecillas-Chasin, Josue M., Fernando Alonso-Frech, Cristina Nombela, Clara Villanueva, and Juan A. Barcia. "Stimulation of the Tractography-Defined Subthalamic Nucleus Regions Correlates With Clinical Outcomes." Neurosurgery 85, no. 2 (January 23, 2019): E294—E303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/neuros/nyy633.

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Abstract BACKGROUND Although deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the dorsolateral subthalamic nucleus (STN) is a well-established surgical treatment for patients with Parkinson disease (PD), there is still controversy about the relationship between the functional segregation of the STN and clinical outcomes. OBJECTIVE To correlate motor and neuropsychological (NPS) outcomes with the overlap between the volume of activated tissue (VAT) and the tractography-defined regions within the STN. METHODS Retrospective study evaluating 13 patients with PD treated with STN-DBS. With the aid of tractography, the STN was segmented into 4 regions: smaSTN (supplementary motor area STN), m1STN (primary motor area STN), mSTN (the sum of the m1STN and the smaSTN segments), and nmSTN (non-motor STN). We computed the overlap coefficients between these STN regions and the patient-specific VAT. The VAT outside of the STN was also calculated. These coefficients were then correlated with motor (Unified Parkinson's Disease Rating Scale, UPDRS III) and NPS outcomes. RESULTS Stimulation of the mSTN segment was significantly correlated with UPDRS III and bradykinesia improvement. Stimulation of the smaSTN segment, but not the m1STN one, had a positive correlation with bradykinesia improvement. Stimulation of the nmSTN segment was negatively correlated with the improvement in rigidity. Stimulation outside of the STN was correlated with some beneficial NPS effects. CONCLUSION Stimulation of the tractography-defined motor STN, mainly the smaSTN segment, is positively correlated with motor outcomes, whereas stimulation of the nmSTN is correlated with poor motor outcomes. Further validation of these results might help individualize and optimize targets prior to STN-DBS.

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Forbes, Graeme. "Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited." Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 4 (1995): 205–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2940923.

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Shirley, Edward S. "PUTNAM’S BRAINS IN A VAT AND BOUWSMA’S FLOWERS." Southwest Philosophy Review 4, no. 1 (1988): 121–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview19884113.

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Zilio, Federico. "A Ghost in the Shell or an Anatomically Constrained Phenomenon? Consciousness through the Spatiotemporal Body." Phenomenology & Mind 22 (2022): 104. http://dx.doi.org/10.17454/pam-2208.

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Intuitively, we can conceive of the existence of a conscious state as a pure activity that does not necessarily require a body (or even a brain). This idea has found new support in certain recent theories that present the possibility of a totally disconnected and disembodied consciousness. Against this hypothesis, I argue that human experience is intrinsically embodied and embedded, though in a specific way. Using Sartre’s phenomenology of the body, I first analyze the concept of consciousness as intentionality and a world-disclosing activity, thus explaining how conscious activity can only be expressed through a body that is spatiotemporally related to the world. Then, I argue that bodily consciousness does not necessarily imply the actual presence of an anatomical body but, rather, a process of spatialization and temporalization (hodological space and temporal synthesis) through the “spatiotemporal body”. Finally, I test my thesis by critiquing some cases of apparent disembodied/disconnected consciousness, i.e., dreams, out-of-body experiences, and the brain-in-a-vat scenario.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Brain in a Vat'

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