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1
KODITSCHEK, THEODORE. "CHAINS OF CONNECTION: RETHINKING THE BOURGEOISIE." Modern Intellectual History 15, no. 1 (July 11, 2017): 285–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244317000257.
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Since his first year in graduate school, Jerrold Seigel has puzzled over the relationship between modernity and the bourgeoisie. Willing to acknowledge the salience of this class in the making of the modern, he grew increasingly troubled by the failure of every effort to give a clear account of its distinctive historical role. To define the bourgeoisie as simply the group(s) in the middle, “all those who are neither peasants nor workers on the one side, nor aristocrats by birth on the other,” might be empirically accurate, he reasoned, but this provided no analytical insight into the processes of history. The Marxist alternative avoids this vacuity, but only by creating a mythology of the ascendant bourgeoisie—a class that by mere dint of its privileged relation to capital is deemed to be capable of entirely transforming the realms of culture, politics, and the material world. Dissatisfied with these conventional approaches, Seigel introduced a fundamentally new way of thinking in his seminal synthesisModernity and Bourgeois Life, which sought to replace the “traditional nominative formulation [of the bourgeoisie's role] with ones that are more adjectival and historical.” Considering “‘bourgeois’, not in terms of the rise of a class,” he has reconceptualized this term to denote “the emergence and elaboration of a certain ‘form of life’.” It is in connection with this project that Seigel developed the two key concepts that will be considered in this essay, “chains of connection” and “networks of means” (MBL, ix, 6, 25).
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COLE, SARAH ROSE. "The Aristocrat in the Mirror: Male Vanity and Bourgeois Desire in William Makepeace Thackeray's Vanity Fair." Nineteenth-Century Literature 61, no. 2 (September 1, 2006): 137–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ncl.2006.61.2.137.
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39 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old R´´gime and the French Revolution, trans. Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Doubleday, 1955), pp. 88-89.Taking their cue from Thomas Carlyle's Sartor Resartus (1833-34), scholars of Regency and early-Victorian dandyism have focused on a supposed opposition between the dandyism of a declining aristocracy and the moral earnestness of a rising bourgeoisie. This historical model obscures the full complexity of relations between the nineteenthcentury British bourgeoisie and aristocracy, a complexity that can be illuminated by a closer examination of William Makepeace Thackeray's works. Thackeray's novels and sketches, which are surprisingly filled with middle-class dandies (such as Vanity Fair's George Osborne and Jos Sedley) and vigorous, hypermasculine aristocrats (such as Vanity Fair's Rawdon Crawley), reverse the Victorian literary stereotypes of effete aristocrats and manly bourgeoisie. Focusing particularly on Vanity Fair (1847- 48) and on Thackeray's sketch journalism, I seek to understand why Thackeray repeatedly depicts bourgeois men who are feminized both by their vanity and by their homosocial-even homoerotic-desire for more powerful aristocratic men. My essay places Thackeray's works within recent historiographical models that emphasize the fusion of, rather than the opposition between, the nineteenth-century British bourgeoisie and aristocracy. Protesting against this fusion in the name of bourgeois independence, Thackeray indicts the British middle classes for their obsession with aristocratic concepts of gentility,a phenomenon that he was the first to label "snobbism." For Thackeray, I argue, the comic trope of bourgeois male vanity becomes an especially powerful device for critiquing"snobbism." By calling upon the scandalous figure of the mirror-gazing man,Thackeray attempts to shock his middle-class readers into acknowledging the artificial and performative nature of their own class personae.
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Yurasov, Igor A., Maria A. Tanina, Vera A. Yudina, and Elena V. Kuznetsova. "The formation of philistinism as a stratum of the middle class in the Russian class society." Izvestiya of Saratov University. Sociology. Politology 22, no. 1 (February 21, 2022): 73–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1818-9601-2022-22-1-73-78.
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The article considers the problems of changes in the social structure of society as a result of the development of the Russian Federation according to the Western capitalist models. It is noted that market capitalism has brought to the Russian soil, along with some modernization processes and phenomena old archaic social practices, which were expressed in feudalization and class transformation of the Russian society. The formation of the archaic petty bourgeoisie as a form of middle class existence within some modern Russian estates, such as the shadow selfemployed workers estate, teachers estate, scientific and teaching estate, medical doctors and information (bloggers, ticktockers) is considered. It is shown that this social group, despite some differences, forms a common class and professional identity, a special specific lifestyle, style of consumption, a special bourgeois understanding of social prestige, a special class culture. The conclusion is formulated that modern Russian petty bourgeoisie as a specific type of urban dweller, as a form of middle class existence of some estates is a stabilizing stratum, strengthening the stability of Russian society, on the one hand, and a source of archaic socio-economic practices, on the other.
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ΡΑΠΤΗΣ, ΚΩΣΤΑΣ. "ΑΣΤΙΚΕΣ ΤΑΞΕΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΣΤΙΚΟΤΗΤΑ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΗ, 1789-1914: ΠΡΟΣΑΝΑΤΟΛΙΣΜΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΣΥΓΧΡΟΝΗΣ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΑΣ." Μνήμων 20 (January 1, 1998): 211. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/mnimon.675.
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<p>Kostas Raptis, Middle classes and middle class culture in Europe, 1789-1914: approaches in modern historiography</p><p>The history of the european middle classes from the late 18th to theearly 20th century is a very wide topic and relates to economic, social,political, gender and culture history. This essay gives a brief overviewof the main subjects regarding it. It draws mainly on (pioneer) germanspeaking,but also on english and french literature. Following the currentdebate, it points to the different social and economic groups making upthe so called ((Bürgertum», to their common characteristics, as well astheir specific culture, the ((Bürgerlichkeit)).More specifically this paper is concerned with the followin subjects:— the composition of the «Bürgertum» and the features of its maingroups (professionals, bourgeois of money and bourgeois of knowledge)— the relevant terminology in german, french and english language— the comparison between upper middle class and nobility— the social position and role of the lowermiddle classes— the relation of the bourgeoisie to liberalism and nationalism— the study of the history of the middle classes in the specific contextof a town or a city (as an urban phenomenon)— the position and role of middle class women in a bourgeois society— the middle class family— the bourgeois way of life and culture in general</p>
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Tini, Dwi Listia Rika, and Nur Inna Alfiyah. "ANALISIS FENOMENA SOSIAL KUASA ELIT DI DUSUN JAMBU SLEMAN YOGYAKARTA." AS-SIYASAH: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik 7, no. 1 (May 17, 2022): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.31602/as.v7i1.5810.
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This research is to find out the basis of the power possessed so that the actors in sand mining are called elites. Besides that, it is also to find out the capacity of the elites and the relationship patterns that are run by these elites. The method used is an approach to collect data and analyze data, in the form of data collection through observation and interviews. While the data analysis uses the Miles and Huberman model, using phases, data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification. The results showed the elite stratification in sand mining in Jambu Hamlet, namely The Big Bourgeoisie/Upper Class consisting of land owners and equipment owners and local government at the highest level (provincial), The Petty Bourgeoise/ Middle Class consisting of Operators, Helpers, Managers, The foreman, the land owner community, the head of the coker group, the local government, the working class/lower class consisting of the coker and the community. However, judging from the capacity of the ruling elite, the existence of elite rulers is in the classification of the petty bourgeois ruling class or the middle class because managers as elite determinants and management decision making are extensions of entrepreneurs who have business interests. So that the pattern relationship shows the regularity of sand mining management which develops intensive communication between entrepreneurs and managers so that there is no visible conflict about results.
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Popa, Bogdan. "The Bourgeoisie. Social Reality and Theoretical Necessity in 19th Century Romania." Revista Istorică 34, no. 4-6 (November 21, 2023): 215–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.59277/ri.2023.4-6.34.01.
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During the 19th Century, the bourgeoisie as a ‘middle-class’ was both a social reality as well as a political desiderate for the Romania cultural and political elite.In this article, I argue that a history of the concept is necessary in order to deepen the study of the professional categories usually defined as bourgeois, such as capitalist entrepreneurs, intellectuals, or state clerks. I suggest that, by looking at the definitions given by authors of different social and political backgrounds, one gains a better insight in the meaning of the term bourgeoisie. The main thesis of my article is that, by understanding the concept itself, one has a better understanding of the actual structure of the Romanian society during its modern era.
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Alam, Lukis. "Popular Piety and the Muslim Middle Class Bourgeoisie in Indonesia." Al-Albab 7, no. 2 (December 1, 2018): 237. http://dx.doi.org/10.24260/alalbab.v7i2.1039.
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This paper discusses the passion of Islamization of the New Order, at the same time the mainstream of this power is based on economic development that provides opportunities for the growth of the Muslim middle class. Patronage model used by the New Order gives an indication that the power built by this regime wants to instill a strong influence in society. At the same time, the New Order is depoliticizing the political attitudes of Muslims. This has implications for the marginalization of the interests of Muslims on the national stage. In this study will also be affirmed the influence of the New Order's power on the presence of the Muslim middle class. On the one hand their birth was the result of the economic development that the New Order echoed. On a different aspect, the presence of the middle class gives strong legitimacy that they are part of the dominating class structure in a country. Also will be reviewed about middle-class interference with the trend of Islamic populism that actually occurred in the era of the 80s, but re-spread after post-reform. Popular Islamic culture becomes a trend that spread through various media such as, internet, magazines, newspapers and so forth. This has received considerable response from middle-class Muslims and led to commodification. Religion facilitates to interact with modernity. Materialistic and hedonistic interests intersect with obedience in the practice of religion. On the one hand, the mode of consumption of the Muslim middle class changes with the adaptation of piety values in the public sphere.
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LANKINA, TOMILA V., and ALEXANDER LIBMAN. "The Two-Pronged Middle Class: The Old Bourgeoisie, New State-Engineered Middle Class, and Democratic Development." American Political Science Review 115, no. 3 (April 20, 2021): 948–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000305542100023x.
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We contribute to research on the democratic role of middle classes. Our paper distinguishes between middle classes emerging autonomously during gradual capitalist development and those fabricated rapidly as part of state-led modernization. To make the case for a conceptual distinction between these groups within one national setting, we employ author-assembled historical district data, survey, and archival materials for pre-Revolutionary Russia and its feudal estates. Our analysis reveals that the bourgeois estate of meshchane covaries with post-communist democratic competitiveness and media freedoms, our proxies of regional democratic variations. We propose two causal pathways explaining the puzzling persistence of social structure despite the Bolsheviks’ leveling ideology and post-communist autocratic consolidation: (a) processes at the juncture of familial channels of human capital transmission and the revolutionaries’ modernization drive and (b) entrepreneurial value transmission outside of state policy. Our findings help refine recent work on political regime orientations of public-sector-dependent societies subjected to authoritarian modernization.
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Waterbury, John. "Twilight of the State Bourgeoisie?" International Journal of Middle East Studies 23, no. 1 (February 1991): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800034528.
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For many years the class category of the state bourgeoisie has had considerable currency in the analysis of states and societies in the Middle East and in the developing world in general. In part, resort to this category has been driven by the remarkable expansion of the economic roles of these states, an expansion that has required that we try to understand the managers of the process. In that respect what is undertaken here fits into a broader and older effort to make sense, in class terms, of the owners of intellectual or technical capital—white-collar workers, civil servants, public-sector managers, and those in the service sector. These are awkward strata in that they neither own (much) capital nor do they provide labor to the owners of capital in the same manner as peasants and the proletariat. They are frequently portrayed as “intermediate” and “in transition.” They are situated between capital and labor, and, in Marxist analysis, are seen as the witting or unwitting agents of the dominant class as it emerges or as it consolidates its grip on the economy and the state apparatus.
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Hosgood, Christopher P. "“Mercantile Monasteries”: Shops, Shop Assistants, and Shop Life in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain." Journal of British Studies 38, no. 3 (July 1999): 322–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/386197.
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It is now over twenty years since Geoffrey Crossick first urged historians to investigate the English lower middle class. On that occasion he suggested that small business interests and white-collar employees be designated the two wings of a residual lower middle class. Historians speculated that the members of this class were bound together by their marginality to the social, cultural, and economic world of the middle class and by their pathetic attempts to ape the gentility of their superiors. Such an analysis confirmed the unheroic nature of the lower-middle-classmentalitéand explains Crossick's conclusion that this group “claimed no vital social role.” Crossick's more recent work, in collaboration with Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, offers a reevaluation of this earlier position and concludes that white-collar and small business interests should not be considered to occupy the same social station. Crossick and Haupt's work is significant because both authors make it clear that they now credit the petite bourgeoisie of small business families in Europe with a greater spirit of independence than they had earlier acknowledged. They argue convincingly that the petite bourgeoisie created their own social and cultural world, centered on the interrelationship between enterprise and family life, which enabled them to react more purposefully to outside social forces and agencies.By hiving off these small business interests from the old lower middle class, we are left with a rump of white-collar workers who collectively formed a lower middle class that shared many common experiences and hence is attractive to historians as a potentially more cohesive social body.
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Southall, Roger. "Flight and fortitude: the decline of the middle class in Zimbabwe." Africa 90, no. 3 (May 2020): 529–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0001972020000078.
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AbstractThis article focuses on the impact of the policies of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government on Zimbabwe's black middle class. It does so by exploring three propositions emerging from the academic literature. The first is that during the early years of independence, the middle class transformed into a party-aligned bourgeoisie. The second is that, to the extent that the middle class has not left the country as a result of the economic plunge from the 1990s, it played a formative role in opposition to ZANU-PF and the political elite. The third is that, in the face of ZANU-PF's authoritarianism and economic hardship, the middle class has largely withdrawn from the political arena.
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Harris, Cherise A., and Keisha Edwards Tassie. "The Cinematic Incarnation of Frazier's Black Bourgeoisie: Tyler Perry's Black Middle-Class." Journal of African American Studies 16, no. 2 (July 29, 2011): 321–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12111-011-9188-8.
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Cheeseman, Nic. "“No Bourgeoisie, No Democracy”? The Political Attitudes of the Kenyan Middle Class." Journal of International Development 27, no. 5 (July 2015): 647–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jid.3057.
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Felski, Rita. "Nothing to Declare: Identity, Shame, and the Lower Middle Class." PMLA/Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 115, no. 1 (January 2000): 33–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/463229.
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In contemporary literary and cultural studies, little attention has been paid to the lower middle class, described by one scholar as “the social class with the lowest reputation in the entire history of class theory.” This article discusses the representation of the lower middle class in literature and scholarly writing. George Orwell's novels of the 1930s and Hanif Kureishi's The Buddha of Suburbia offer some illuminating perspectives on the British lower middle class, though Orwell's novels also reveal a conspicuous disdain for their subject. This disdain is echoed in much of the scholarly writing on the lower middle class. Decried for its reactionary attitudes by Marxists, the “petite bourgeoisie” also poses problems for a contemporary cultural politics based on the idealization of transgression and on the romance of marginality. Rather than embody an outmoded or anachronistic class formation, however, the lower middle class may offer an important key to the contemporary meaning of class.
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Freedman, Craig. "The Collapse of the Riskless, Middle-Class Economy." Economic and Labour Relations Review 13, no. 2 (December 2002): 288–325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/103530460201300208.
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The very basis of Japan's post-war economic growth was time and place specific. A fundamental failure to recognise the temporary nature of Japan's success led the Japanese to make ad hoc changes, which served largely to prop up the prevailing status quo. Inevitably, Japan's ability to sustain the level of growth required to maintain its economic system periodically faltered, before collapsing in the nineties. Since capitalist enterprise, by its very achievements, tends to automatize progress, we conclude that it tends to make itself superfluous — to break to pieces under the pressure of its own success. The perfectly bureaucratized giant industrial unit not only ousts the small or medium-sized firm and ‘expropriates’ its owners, but in the end it also ousts the entrepreneur and expropriates the bourgeoisie as a class which in the process stands to lose not only its income but also what is infinitely more important, its function (Schumpeter 1950: 134).
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Morris, Jonathan. "Mobilization and Identity among the Milanese Petite Bourgeoisie." Social Science History 19, no. 2 (1995): 261–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0145553200017338.
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The analysis here focuses on mobilization and identity among a significant section of the Milanese petite bourgeoisie, rather than on the formation of a single identity that encompassed all the members of the city's lower middle classes. One has to recognize that these intermediate strata possess many different and, at times, conflicting interests. Most recent historians prefer to use the term petite bourgeoisie to indicate individuals who control their own capital, as opposed to the “new” lower middle classes of salaried employees (Bechhofer 1976: 76–79; Crossick 1984: 6–10). Yet even this more strictly denned grouping of shopkeepers and master artisans embraces both the self-employed and small employers, manufacturers and retailers, and “skilled” and “unskilled” trades. One cannot portray these strata as a class in itself, let alone for itself.
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Cruz, Jesus. "Building Liberal Identities in 19th Century Madrid: The Role of Middle Class Material Culture." Americas 60, no. 3 (January 2004): 391–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tam.2004.0007.
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In recent years, most historians have abandoned the idea that the revolutions that shook the Atlantic world between 1776 and 1848 were the work of a single social class. A number of studies on the social composition of the groups that ignited and propelled the different revolutionary processes demonstrate the diversity of conditions and social backgrounds of the revolutionaries. However, this revisionism is posing new questions as to why these contingencies in Europe and the Americas decided to mobilize, to construct new liberal national states, and how they carried it out.Spain is a good sample case for this historiographical inquiry. At present, few historians accept the idea that the series of upheavals that brought about a new liberal state during the 19th century resulted from the exclusive pressure of a national bourgeoisie. Recent scholarship has revisited the classic bourgeois revolution paradigm by presenting liberalism as an ideology that captivated the imagination of Spaniards of a variety of social ranks, with special impact among urban middle and popular groups. But if Spanish scholars are providing better explanations regarding who embraced liberal ideas and facilitated their spread, the answers for the “why” and “how” this process occurred are, in my opinion, less convincing.
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Lertchoosakul, Kanokrat. "The Paradox of the Thai Middle Class in Democratisation." TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia 9, no. 1 (January 13, 2021): 65–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/trn.2020.16.
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AbstractThe relationship of the bourgeoisie and democratisation has been inconsistent across the history of democracy. This work offers an alternative explanation taking the example of the Thai middle class, which had promoted democracy, turned against it. From the democratic transition of 1973 until the present day, the Thai middle class has played contradictory roles in the democratisation of the country. This work investigates the effects of democratic institution-building after regime change and the efforts to consolidate democracy in the middle class. This work proposes two major observations. The first is the failure of the middle class to establish themselves in democratic institutions and processes in either the legislature/executive, political parties, local government or structured interest groups. They have learned of the uncertainty of free elections and how the elected executives have benefitted other classes but not them. The second regards the missing prerequisite of democracy. Insufficient understanding of majority rules and two-turnover elections, caused the middle class who were disappointed with the outcome of democratic regimes and systems to easily turn away from democracy.
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Weig, Heidi. "Amateur Theatricals and the Dramatic Marketplace: Lacy’s and French’s Acting Editions of Plays." Nineteenth Century Theatre and Film 44, no. 2 (November 2017): 173–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748372717742305.
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Historically an exclusive, upper-class entertainment, private theatricals became a widespread, primarily middle-class pastime in the course of the nineteenth century. To the emerging bourgeoisie, play-acting represented an important way to negotiate class identity by emulating the habits of social elites. The foremost raw materials for private stagings of drama were the acting editions of plays published most prolifically in the second half of the century by T. H. Lacy and Samuel French, consecutively. This paper examines Lacy’s and French’s publication and marketing strategies by placing side by side guide literature and play series issued by them, to illuminate the impact these strategies had on the dramatic marketplace, and the way that Lacy, in particular, engaged social anxieties about the theatre in establishing his business concept. It then traces the changing composition of Lacy’s and French’s Acting Editions to highlight a significant increase in plays by women from the 1880s onwards. I argue that this increase expresses the evolution of amateur theatricals into a distinctly middle-class social practice because the female dramatists that French’s favoured, produced work congruent with bourgeois interest in morally sound, domestic topics and educational value, and recommended themselves through the respectable public personas they created for themselves.
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Iheduru, Okechukwu C. "Black economic power and nation-building in post-apartheid South Africa." Journal of Modern African Studies 42, no. 1 (March 2004): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x03004452.
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This paper evaluates the evolution and the implementation of the ANC government's commitment to fostering a black capitalist class or black economic empowerment (BEE) as a non-racial nation-building strategy. A substantial black bourgeois i.e. and other middle classes begun to emerge over the last decade, contrary to popular perceptions. The legitimating role assigned to the emergent black bourgeoisie by the ANC and the government is, however, threatens to turn the strategy into a nepotistic accumulation. This development is paradoxically threatening to re-racialise the country, widening black inequality gaps, and precluding the rise of a black bourgeoisie with a nurture capitalist agenda. Other equally powerful social groups have begun to challenge the prevailing strategy, compelling the government to explore a more accommodating strategy exemplified by the recent introduction by the government of ‘broad-based economic empowerment’. Should a less patrimonial, less racially and ethnically divisive BEE strategy emerge from this quasi-pluralist power play, such a change holds prospects for the creation of a ‘growth coalition’ capable of sustainable capitalist development and true empowerment of the black majority. That would be a positive development in terms of establishing and consolidating democracy in South Africa.
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Li, Wenhua, and Jiaxin Xiao. "Advertising in pervasive computing age: Understanding the lifestyles of the new middle class in emerging markets." Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems 40, no. 4 (April 12, 2021): 8613–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/jifs-189680.
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Computing and Artificial Intelligent technology has changed the ecosystem of advertising industry and social economy. Observations on social changes can help enterprises and advertisers better adapting to this pervasive computing age. This study aims to examine the lifestyles of the new urban middle class in emerging market and their attitudes towards advertising. We carried out an investigation in four Tier-1 cities in China and identified six comprehensive lifestyle factors: trendy and success-driven, “Western is best,” petty bourgeoisie lifestyle, money conscious, lifestyle of health and sustainability, and pragmatic struggling lifestyle; and further segmented new urban middle-class consumers into four groups: experiencers, strivers, trendy achievers, and pragmatists. The attitudes of four lifestyle segments towards advertising have been examined. The study provides precise user portraits of the growing middle-class consumers and intra-class differences in the emerging market.
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Jephson, Valerie L., and Bruce Thomas Boehrer. "Mythologizing the Middle Class: 'Tis Pity She's a Whore and the Urban Bourgeoisie." Renaissance and Reformation 30, no. 3 (January 21, 2009): 5–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.33137/rr.v30i3.11504.
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This paper examines the strategies through which John Ford's play validates an image of the rising urban middle class as constitutionally confused and therefore destructive to the social fabric of seventeenth-century London. The portrayal of the middle class as struggling to inhabit signifiers of gentility while simultaneously undermining their value as indicators of adherence to any particular social code constructs the urban bourgeois as an object deserving of enmity and punishment; such sentiments are in turn mobilized in the service of humorous entertainment for an implicitly elite audience via a set of historical discourses associating political egalitarianism with incest, and class mobility with a self-interested disregard for traditional cultural practices.
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MARK, JAMES. "DISCRIMINATION, OPPORTUNITY, AND MIDDLE-CLASS SUCCESS IN EARLY COMMUNIST HUNGARY." Historical Journal 48, no. 2 (May 27, 2005): 499–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x05004486.
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This article explores the middle-class response to life under the early Communist state in Hungary. It is based on an oral history of the Budapest bourgeoisie, and challenges some of the dominant indigenous representations of the central European middle class as persecuted victims who were forced into ‘internal exile’ by the Stalinist state. Despite being officially discriminated against as ‘former exploiters’, large numbers achieved educational and professional success. Their skills were increasingly needed in the rapid modernization of the 1950s, and the state provided them with semi-official opportunities to remake themselves into acceptable Communist citizens. Middle-class testimony revealed how individuals constructed politically appropriate public personas to ensure their own upward mobility; they hid aspects of their pasts, created ‘class conscious’ autobiographies, and learnt how to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty. The ways in which individuals dealt with integrating into a system which officially sought to exclude them and which many disliked ideologically is then examined. In order to ‘cope with success’, respondents in this project invented new stories about themselves to justify the compromises they had made to ensure their achievements. These narratives are analysed as evidence of specifically Communist middle-class identities.
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Carpenter, Dave. "The estate origins of democracy in Russia: from imperial bourgeoisie to post-communist middle class." International Affairs 98, no. 3 (May 2022): 1102–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac069.
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Karataşlı, Şahan Savaş. "The Origins of Turkey’s “Heterodox” Transition to Neoliberalism: The Özal Decade and Beyond." Journal of World-Systems Research 21, no. 2 (August 31, 2015): 387–416. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2015.8.
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This article examines the origins of Turkey’s neoliberal transformation in world-historical perspective by highlighting interactions between the crisis of U.S. hegemony, social and political movements in Turkey, and Turgut Özal's political career as the architect of the country’s neoliberal reforms. I argue that Turkey’s neoliberal transition during the “Özal Decade (1980-1989/1993)” was not primarily related to resolving the profitability crisis of the existing national bourgeoisie (Istanbul-based industrial bourgeoisie) or reconstituting class power in favor of this segment of capital. The Turkish neoliberal project was more concerned with establishing a stable political-economic environment that would help Turkey's political society reassert its hegemony over civil society and allow for the penetration of the changing interests of the world-hegemonic power in the region. Because of these social and geopolitical concerns, Turkey's neoliberal reforms (1) contributed to the development of an alternative/rival segment of national bourgeoisie which had the potential to co-opt radicalized Islamic movements, (2) aimed at creating a large middle class society (instead of shrinking it), (3) utilized populist attempts at redistribution to lower segments of society to co-opt the grievances and anger of the masses. As a paradoxical consequence of these dynamics, income inequality decreased during Turkey’s transition to neoliberalism. Neoliberal reforms in the post-Özal period – with similar “heterodox” features – resurrected and further deepened during “the Erdoğan decade” (2002-present) although Erdoğan did not share a single aspect of Özal’s professional career as a neoliberal technocrat.
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Sheild Johansson, Miranda. "From ‘beasts of burden’ to ‘backbone of society’: The fiscal forging of a new Bolivian middle class." Critique of Anthropology 42, no. 4 (November 21, 2022): 381–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0308275x221139154.
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The recently re-branded and highly digitalised Bolivian Tax Office, Servicio de Impuestos Nacionales (SIN), works to consolidate various socio-economic groups, such as the Aymara bourgeoisie (wealthy traders who identify as all or part indigenous), into a new middle class. SIN’s motivations to do so are bound up in broader international financial logics where the development of an archetypal European middle class – the so-called backbone of society – is considered key to a healthy tax profile. The efforts to forge a new middle class involves the deliberate projection of SIN as an accountable, effective, and ‘modern’ organisation, with the aim of promoting a broader fiscal culture that embodies these same characteristics; targeted education of the populace about taxpaying as an ethical act in line with highland indigenous values; and, policy-making that encourages income tax over VAT (value-added tax). However, these new middle classes experience the temporality and individualising effects of SIN’s system as incompatible with the money flows and values of their own economic lives. Specific areas of contention include the rhythms of incomes and the ethics of risk- and profit-sharing. In exploring this incompatibility, I argue that fiscal systems are key to the production and imaginations of middle-classness, both as they succeed and fail.
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Mazaheri, Nimah, and Steve L. Monroe. "No Arab Bourgeoisie, No Democracy? The Entrepreneurial Middle Class and Democratic Attitudes since the Arab Spring." Comparative Politics 50, no. 4 (July 1, 2018): 523–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5129/001041518823565641.
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Horwitz, Henry. "‘The mess of the middle class’ revisited: the case of the ‘big bourgeoisie’ of Augustan London." Continuity and Change 2, no. 2 (August 1987): 263–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026841600000059x.
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Les profils de deux ‘exemples’ d'hommes d'affaires renommés londoniens à partir des premières décennies de la ‘Révolution financière’ et un compte-rendu des voies suivies par leurs progénitures représentent les bases de cette étude des changements sociaux intervenus entre les niveaux élevés de la communauté des affaires dans la métropole et la société terrienne à la fin du dix-septième siécle. Les conclusions tirées sont que (1) les échevins ne peuvent pas être considéréd comme mandataires acceptables pour le cercle croissant des hommes d'affaires fortunés de Londres; et que (2) bien que la continuité des carrières de père en fils soit en hausse, le statut foncier continuait d'exercer une influence considerable au début du dix-huitième siècle.
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Boito, Armando, and Alfredo Saad-Filho. "State, State Institutions, and Political Power in Brazil." Latin American Perspectives 43, no. 2 (January 19, 2016): 190–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0094582x15616120.
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The political conflicts during the Workers’ Party administrations led by Luís Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff have been driven by disputes between two fractions of the country’s bourgeoisie: the internal and the internationalized bourgeoisie. Their ideologies, policies, institutions, and forms of political representation have determined government policies and outcomes. These processes have unfolded within an authoritarian democracy whose structures have not been challenged by the party. The party’s limited power and continuing timidity have produced an aggressive reaction by the internationalized bourgeoisie and the upper middle class, leading to a severe crisis in the administration of President Dilma Rousseff. Durante os dois governos do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), chefiados por Luís Inácio Lula da Silva e por Dilma Rousseff, os conflitos políticos têm sido conflagrados por disputas entre duas facções burguesas do país: a burguesia interna e a burguesia internacionalizada. Suas respectivas formas de representações políticas, ideologias, programas, bem como instituições têm determinado políticas governamentais e seus resultados. Esses processos evoluíram em uma democracia autoritária, cujas estruturas não foram contestadas pelo PT. A timidez contínua e o poder limitado do partido têm produzido uma reação agressiva por parte da burguesia internacionalizada e da classe média alta, levando a uma crise severa na administração da Presidente Dilma Rousseff.
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Reckwitz, Andreas. "The Society of Singularities: Reply to Four Critics." Analyse & Kritik 45, no. 1 (May 1, 2023): 177–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2023-2002.
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Abstract In this article, Andreas Reckwitz replies to the four critical commentaries of Patrick Baert, Andreas Pettenkofer, Austin Harrington and Sally Haslanger on his book The Society of Singularities. In this context, he discusses the general position of this book within the landscape of contemporary social theory and the question of what a ‘social logic of the unique’ means. He enters the question in how far his analysis of the new middle class differs from Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of the new petty bourgeoisie, emphasizing the combination of an orientation towards inner experience and social prestige in his account of the new middle class. He discusses the question of whether neoliberalism is responsible for the proneness to disappointment which the late-modern culture of self-actualization implies. Finally, he works out the differences between the type of critical analytics which his book implies and normative critical theory.
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Marks, Gary, Heather A. D. Mbaye, and Hyung Min Kim. "Radicalism or Reformism? Socialist Parties before World War I." American Sociological Review 74, no. 4 (August 2009): 615–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000312240907400406.
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This article builds on social movement theory to explain ideological variation among socialist, social democratic, and labor parties across 18 countries in the early twentieth century. We propose a causal argument connecting (1) the political emergence of the bourgeoisie and its middle-class allies to (2) the political space for labor unions and working-class parties, which (3) provided a setting for internal pressures and external opportunities that shaped socialist party ideology. Combining quantitative analysis and case studies, we find that the timing of civil liberties and the strength of socialist links with labor unions were decisive for reformism or radicalism. Refining Lipset's prior analysis, we qualify his claim that male suffrage provides a key to socialist orientation.
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Spencer, Elaine Glovka. "Regimenting Revelry: Rhenish Carnival in the Early Nineteenth Century." Central European History 28, no. 4 (December 1995): 457–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938900012279.
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Oneconsequence of the lively debates in the 1970s and 1980s centering on the concept of a peculiar German path (Sonderweg) to the twentieth century has been a reexamination of the nineteenth-centuryBürgertum, the closest Central European counterpart to the French bourgeoisie and the English and American middle and upper middle classes. The study of the educated and propertied urban dwellers who became the core constituents and leading spokesmen of theBürgertumhas flourished, as historians have attempted to identify the consequences for German national development of bourgeois successes and failures.1Neither an estate (as determined by legal privileges) nor an economic class (as defined by common market position), the nineteenth-centuryBürgertumshared at least modest economic security along with overlapping clusters of values, attitudes, and goals and a sense—highly mutable and often ill-defined, to be sure—of who they were. Using moral and behavioral as much as social and economic criteria, a mélange of career and property-owning-groups set itself apart from the aristocracy, the peasantry, urban laborers, and—more belatedly and less clearly—from artisans, tradesmen, and other elements of theMittelstandand claimed in the process an enhanced social and political role as advocates of a transformed society based upon individual achievement.2
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Thorbergsson, Magnus Thor. "Being European." Nordic Theatre Studies 25, no. 1 (November 15, 2018): 22–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/nts.v25i1.110895.
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During the campaign for Iceland’s independence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, theatre was considered an important site for the representation of the nation. Emphasis was placed on producing and staging local plays dealing with the nation’s folklore, myths and history, thereby strengthening a sense of the roots of national identity. The article examines the longing for a representation of the nation in late nineteenth-century theatre as well as the attempts of the Reykjavik Theatre Company to stage the nation during theso-called ‘Icelandic Period’ (1907-20), before analyzing the distinctive changes in the company’s repertoire following the decision of the Icelandic parliament to build a national theatre in 1923. The staging of the nation, which had been dominated by nineteenth-century cultural nationalism, took a turn in the late 1920s towards representing the nation as a member of European metropolitan culture through an increased focus on international contemporary drama, bourgeois bedroom farce and classical drama. The image of the modern Icelanders, as represented on the stage in the 1920s, was that of the middle-class bourgeoisie.
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Thorbergsson, Magnus Thor. "Being European." Nordic Theatre Studies 25, no. 1 (November 15, 2018): 22–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/nts.v25i1.110895.
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During the campaign for Iceland’s independence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, theatre was considered an important site for the representation of the nation. Emphasis was placed on producing and staging local plays dealing with the nation’s folklore, myths and history, thereby strengthening a sense of the roots of national identity. The article examines the longing for a representation of the nation in late nineteenth-century theatre as well as the attempts of the Reykjavik Theatre Company to stage the nation during theso-called ‘Icelandic Period’ (1907-20), before analyzing the distinctive changes in the company’s repertoire following the decision of the Icelandic parliament to build a national theatre in 1923. The staging of the nation, which had been dominated by nineteenth-century cultural nationalism, took a turn in the late 1920s towards representing the nation as a member of European metropolitan culture through an increased focus on international contemporary drama, bourgeois bedroom farce and classical drama. The image of the modern Icelanders, as represented on the stage in the 1920s, was that of the middle-class bourgeoisie.
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Zarycki, Tomasz. "Punkty za inteligenckość. Agaty Zysiak rekonstrukcja historii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego a rola PRL w umocnieniu inteligenckiej hegemonii." Kultura i Społeczeństwo 62, no. 1 (March 26, 2018): 231–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.35757/kis.2018.62.1.10.
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The departure point for the author’s reflections is Agata Zysiak’s book entitled Punkty za pochodzenie. Powojenna modernizacja i uniwersytet w robotniczym mieście [Points for Class Origin: Post-War Modernization and the University in a Working-Class City] (2016). He develops his earlier ideas on the role of the intelligentsia in Poland’s social hierarchy, particularly in connection with the world elite, which, after Bourdieu, he calls the “field of power.” Zysiak’s analyses provide him with arguments for the statement that the period of the Polish People’s Republic can be treated, in multiple dimensions, as having strengthened the position of the intelligentsia and especially of selected milieus within it. Zysiak’s proposed description of the “university in a workers’ city” produces a picture of the triumph of the intelligentsia-elite, whom the new institution of higher learning effectively forms into a successive tool for the strengthening of its privileged status. It also, in the author’s opinion, a factor in the failure of the “new bourgeoisie,” that is, the parts of the middle class that after the periods of modernization reforms had large hopes of maintaining both their status and financial privileges. At the same time, in opposition to the traditional intelligentsia, the new bourgeoisie overlooked the classic distinction games of the elite and believed in the compensatory strength of the manifestation their — usually recently — acquired material resources. The author also reflects on the current picture of Polish scholarship.
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Paškauskas, Juozapas. "Laisvalaikio problema XIX a. pabaigoje – XX a. pradžioje: Lietuvos darbininkų iššūkis likusiems miestiečiams." Lietuvos istorijos metraštis 2020/2 (December 2, 2020): 61–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.33918/25386549-202002003.
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THE PROBLEM OF LEISURE TIME IN LATE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH-CENTURY LITHUANIA: THE WORKING CLASS CHALLENGE TO THE MIDDLE CLASS In the late 19th century, leisure time became an important and publicly discussed topic in modernising Lithuanian society. This article examines how the topic of leisure time was discussed from a wide range of political positions, and how the factor of leisure time became increasingly important when considering the future scenarios of society. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the topic of leisure time, its meaningful activities, and appropriate leisure time-related issues were intertwined with discussions about the development of civilisation, new cultural standards, and challenges to the most important principles of social cohesion. The reason for the debate at that time was inseparable from the main features of modernisation: rapid economic growth, industrialisation and urbanisation, changes in the social structure, apparent features of individualisation, secularism, and the burgeoning of consumer culture. In this article, the author focuses on singling out the most important features of modernising leisure time, when work and leisure become binary categories. From this perspective, the conflict between two important social groups, namely the working class and the bourgeoisie, is highlighted. The article demonstrates how these two groups sought to establish themselves ideologically, not only by showing their right to leisure time, but also by shaping what that leisure time should be. The first group consisted of the defenders of workers’ rights (and in rare cases, workers themselves) presenting leisure time as a precondition for a better life. This assessment was seen as an instrument incorporating workers’ daily life into the rest of modern society. However, with leisure time becoming a universal human value and norm, many leisure practices that workers in the late 19th and early 20th century opted for were problematic for members of another prominent group, the bourgeoisie. In this article, the bourgeoisie, or the middle class, is defined by means of Peter Stearn’s observation that it is useful to include cultural experience, not ‘just change in political or economic structure’. Thus, emphasising the cultural rather than the economic aspect of this social group, it can be stated that, for members of the middle class, ideas of ‘decent leisure’ and ‘appropriate use of time’ were based on the values and skills of self-discipline, order and efficient organisation. In this case, leisure time was recognised as a means of the partial reform of society and national consolidation. Consequently, the issue of leisure time in late 19th-century Lithuania became an intersection where two major social groups, opinions and practices met. On one hand, the question of leisure time is indistinguishable from a utopian, sometimes paternalistic, harmonious vision of the working class and their leisure; other ways, cultural and political attitudes about the dangers of the working class (and, of course, it is most dangerous after finishing work), arose from seeing how many late 19th-century workers chose meaningless, harmful and violent leisure activities. In both cases, the culture of leisure time in late 19th and early 20th-century Lithuania could be seen not as a routine or a temporary escape from social norms, but rather as a process for modern culture to appear in everyday life, contributing to the emergence of new social and cultural identities.
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Scott, Stephen Kingsley. "Through the diameter of respectability: the politics of historical representation in postemancipation colonial Trinidad." New West Indian Guide / Nieuwe West-Indische Gids 76, no. 3-4 (January 1, 2002): 271–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/13822373-90002537.
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Examines the concepts of "respectability" and "reputation" and their emergent functions in the colonial politics immediately following emancipation in Trinidad. Author explains how these concepts presupposed and entailed a different representation and valuation of local historical processes, and how the "diameter" of respectability relates to the emergence of an educated colored and black "petite bourgeoisie" as Trinidad's plantation complex developed into a class-based Creole society. He first discusses how after 1838 British education imposed British ideas of respectability in Trinidad, which in the last half of the 19th c. were adapted by an emerging local black middle class to be operative for their social mobility. He then juxtaposes the burgeoning of a large urban black underclass in the same period, and the revival by the underclass of the island's Carnival, where a set of values opposed to the norms of respectability were conjured.
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Mangan, J. A., and C. Loughlan. "Fashion and fealty: the glaswegian bourgeoisie, middle‐class schools and the games‐ethic in the Victorian and Edwardian eras." International Journal of the History of Sport 5, no. 1 (May 1988): 133–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09523368808713650.
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Yuna, Melin Levent. "A Neoliberal Semi-Public Space in the Era of the JDP: Tango in Istanbul." Dance Research 39, no. 2 (November 2021): 158–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/drs.2021.0341.
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How has Argentine tango dance, that appears to represent publicly an erotic relationship between the female and the male, found the space to expand in Turkey pioneered by urban Istanbul despite the conservative JDP regime? While the tango dance shifted to a global entertainment and culture industry in the 21st century providing global belongingness, it locally became one neoliberal semi-public space of secular upper and middle class Turkish Muslims to reflect and reproduce their self-identity by distinguishing themselves from new Islamic bourgeoisie as well as lower social classes. This character provided the grounds for its spread even under the conservative government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and it is still on practice despite such a conservative rule, even existing online during the Covid-19 Pandemic.
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Kreačič, Goranka. "Fux family from Metlika." Kronika 71, no. 1 (February 6, 2023): 143–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.56420/kronika.71.1.08.
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The Fux family from Metlika held a hundred-years hereditary lease on the town’s post house, a relay station between Karlovac and Ljubljana. Between the end of the eighteenth century and the end of the nineteenth century, maintaining a successful and lucrative business made it one of the most distinguished middle-class families in Metlika and White Carniola. The family’s standing was further raised and fortified through equally successful strategies of forming marriage alliances, above all with the Croatian petty nobility along the Kolpa River. Studies of these interesting marriage ties shed light on the lively social mobility among White Carniolan bourgeoisie and the surrounding Croatian petty nobility as well as on the cultural-historical and cross-border social ties established during the period of national awakening.
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Dennison, Tracy K. "The Estate Origins of Democracy in Russia: From Imperial Bourgeoisie to Post-Communist Middle Class by Tomila Lankina." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 53, no. 4 (2023): 652–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jinh_r_01918.
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Dixon-Fyle, Mac. "The Saro in the political life of early Port Harcourt, 1913–49." Journal of African History 30, no. 1 (March 1989): 125–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021853700030917.
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The western-educated Krio population of Sierra Leone participated in British imperial activity along the West African coast in the nineteenth century. Facing a far more complex ethnic configuration than their counterparts in Yorubaland, the Sierra Leoneans (Saro) in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, acquired much influence through the manipulation of class and ethnic relations. Though most Saro here had a modest education and were working-class, a few came to form the cream of the petty-bourgeoisie and were active in economic life and city administration. Potts-Johnson, arguably their most famous member, developed a flair for operating in his middle-class world, and also in the cultural orbit of the local and immigrant working-class. I. B. Johnson, another prominent Saro, lacked this quality. Though presenting a homogenous ethnic front, celebrated in the Sierra Leone Union and in church activity, Saro society was sharply polarized on class lines, a weakness not to be lost on the numerically superior and ambitious indigenous population. Faced with a choice, the indigenes opted for the avuncular Potts-Johnson, for whom they felt a greater social affinity than for the more distant I. B. Johnson. After Potts-Johnson, however, no Saro was to be allowed scope to develop a similar appeal.
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Azharghany, Rojabi, Hotman Siahaan, and Akh Muzakki. "Alliance of Ummah in Rural Areas: A New Perspective on Islamic Populism in Indonesia." Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama dan Lintas Budaya 4, no. 4 (December 31, 2020): 239–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.15575/rjsalb.v4i4.10476.
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Islamic populism in Indonesia is perceived as an alliance of the people on behalf of the ummah in urban areas, against the ruling elites who enjoy the promises of peace and prosperity more than capitalism, modernism and democracy. This paper though intends to disclose the Islamic populism in rural areas through the power of capital and symbols as part of the cultural heterogenity between alliances in rural areas and large cities that simply focuses on political power. This research embraces the socio-cultural approach by applying the theory of generative structuralism penned by Pierre Bourdieu in order to analyze the resistance of cultural heterogenity by invigorating the cultural reproduction and symbols dominance to thwart the ummah alliance in urban areas. The results of this research show that the Islamic populism in rural areas upholds the belief in salvation, peace and unity, by reinforcing the cultural heterogenity among the congregations on various bases. In spite of domestication process in Islamic populism by the ruling elite, the ummah alliance in rural areas cannot be triggered due to their firm belief in salvation, which differs from the Islamic populism in large cities where a symbol of injustice of the bourgeoisie and the ruling elites prevails. The Islamic populism in rural areas has caused the failure of Islamic populism in large cities since their main discourse solely considers the middle class, in contrast to the Islamic populism in rural areas that might may welcome both the middle class and the lower class.
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Artyomov, Vladimir N. "The theory of a just state in the philosophical concept of the institutional person." Izvestiya of Saratov University. Philosophy. Psychology. Pedagogy 21, no. 4 (December 16, 2021): 362–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1819-7671-2021-21-4-362-366.
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The antagonisms in the development of modern social relations make working out the idea of creating comfortable life conditions for a person in society topical again. This circumstance suggests reconsidering the theory of a just state within the context of the philosophical conception of the institutional person with a substantial comprehension of the institutional organization of society comparing it with the variability of the tasks of modern democracy. The philosophical concept of the institutional person concerning a just state as a rational concept-construct for a human life and the organization of society continues a series of scientific articles on the concept of the institutional person: the ontological and value foundations which reveal its new possibilities for the analysis of social being. When considering the problem of the formation of a social state as a rational concept-construct for a human life and the organization of society through the prism of the philosophical concept of the institutional person, the principles and mechanisms of its solution are revealed. The paper draws attention to the natural processes of the formation of the middle class and the development of value consciousness which, while maintaining functional differentiation in society, form its social and class homogeneity defining the common tasks of modern democracy aimed at aligning the private interests of the domestic bourgeoisie with the national and regional interests of the country’s development and the personal interests of a human being, and to the painless transformation of domestic oligarchs into aristocrats, into allies of the middle class.
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Campbell, Bruce. "Autobiographies of Violence: The SA in its Own Words." Central European History 46, no. 2 (June 2013): 217–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938913000599.
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What was the moral horizon of ordinary SA men? What did they think, what did they believe, and what were their ideals? These are hard questions to answer even when they concern people still alive and events still going on. To pose them some eighty years after the fact is to admit that no answer can be definitive. Yet a fresh look at some well-known contemporary sources can at least allow some tentative, suggestive answers. They demonstrate, above all, an emphasis on frenetic activism, combined with a sense of personal suffering and sacrifice. They stress key National Socialist values, such as antisemitism, criticism of the bourgeoisie, and a commitment to an idealized national community, or Volksgemeinschaft. And yet, they also reflect, to a certain extent, pre-Nazi middle-class values. Beyond this, they show men trying desperately to rewrite themselves as ideal SA men and Nazis.
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Michie, Elsie B. "DRESSING UP: HARDY’S TESS OF THE D’URBERVILLES AND OLIPHANT’S PHOEBE JUNIOR." Victorian Literature and Culture 30, no. 1 (March 2002): 305–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1060150302301153.
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THE ANXIETY ABOUT BEING ill- or well-dressed that Margaret Oliphant evokes so vividly in this passage was particularly acute in the last half of the nineteenth century when changes in the clothes people wore reflected increasing class mobility. With the growth of a ready-to-wear clothing industry that made it more and more difficult to distinguish the bourgeoisie from the lower echelons of society, “dress became,” as Charles Blanc argued in 1872, “an image of the rapid movement that carries away the world” (qtd. in Benjamin 74). Alongside and as a result of this democratization of dress, a backlash occurred in which subtleties of dress became a means of reinforcing the very class distinctions that seemed to be vanishing in the late nineteenth century. As Rudolph von Jhering argued in 1869, “Fashion is the barrier — continually raised anew because continually torn down — by which the fashionable world seeks to segregate itself from the middle region of society” (qtd. in Benjamin 74). In Tess of the d’Urbervilles and Phoebe Junior, Thomas Hardy and Oliphant use fashion to explore the freedoms and limitations of late nineteenth- century class mobility by telling the story of heroines who are able, in part through education, to separate themselves from their lower-class roots, a separation that is marked in each case by a change in attire.
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Rosenberg, Arthur. "Fascism as a Mass-Movement (1934)." Historical Materialism 20, no. 1 (2012): 144–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156920612x634898.
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Abstract Arthur Rosenberg’s remarkable essay, first published in 1934, was probably the most incisive historical analysis of the origins of fascism to emerge from the revolutionary Left in the interwar years. In contrast to the official Comintern line that fascism embodied the power of finance-capital, Rosenberg saw fascism as a descendant of the reactionary mass-movements of the late-nineteenth century. Those movements encompassed a new breed of nationalism that was ultra-patriotic, racist and violently opposed to the Left, and prefigured fascism in all these ways. What was distinctive about the fascists in Italy and Germany was not so much their ideology (a pastiche of motifs that drew on those earlier traditions of the conservative and radical Right) as the use of stormtroopers to wage the struggle against democracy in more decisive and lethal ways. After the broad historical sweep of its first part, the essay looks at the factors that were peculiar to the Italian and German situations respectively, highlighting both the rôle of the existing authorities in encouraging the fascists and the wider class-appeal of the fascist parties themselves, beyond any supposed restriction to the middle-class or ‘petty bourgeoisie’.
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Abrams, Lynn, David Blackbourn, and Richard J. Evans. "The German Bourgeoisie: Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century." Economic History Review 45, no. 3 (August 1992): 625. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2598067.
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Pierenkemper, Toni, David Blackbourn, and Richard J. Evans. "The German Bourgeoisie: Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century." Business History Review 67, no. 3 (1993): 519. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3117396.
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Kohler, Eric D., David Blackbourn, and Richard J. Evans. "The German Bourgeoisie: Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century." German Studies Review 16, no. 1 (February 1993): 136. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1430258.
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