Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Bounded and Ecological Rationality'
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Persson, Magnus. "Bounded Rationality and Exemplar Models." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Psychology, 2003. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-3572.
Bounded rationality is the study of how human cognition with limited capacity is adapted to handle the complex information structures in the environment. This thesis argues that in order to understand the bounded rationality of decision processes, it is necessary to develop decision theories that are computational process models based upon basic cognitive and perceptual mechanisms. The main goal of this thesis is to show that models of perceptual categorization based on the storage of exemplars and retrieval of similar exemplars whenever a new object is encountered (D. L. Medin & M. M. Schaffer, 1978), can be an important contribution to theories of decision making. Study I proposed, PROBEX (PROBabilities from Exemplars), a model for inferences from generic knowledge. It is a “lazy” algorithm that presumes no pre-computed abstractions. In a computer simulation it was found to be a powerful decision strategy, and it was possible to fit the model to human data in a psychologically plausible way. Study II was a theoretical investigation that found that PROBEX was very robust in conditions where the decision maker has very little information, and that it worked well even under the worst circumstances. Study III empirically tested if humans can learn to use exemplar based or one reason decision making strategies (G. Gigerenzer, P. Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999) where it is appropriate in a two-alternative choice task. Experiment 1 used cue structure and presentation format as independent variables, and participants easily used one reason strategies if the decision task presented the information as normal text. The participants were only able to use exemplars if they were presented as short strings of letters. Experiment 2 failed to accelerate learning of exemplar use during the decision phase, by prior exposure to exemplars in a similar task. In conclusion, this thesis supports that there are at least two modes of decision making, which are boundedly rational if they are used in the appropriate context. Exemplar strategies may, contrary to study II, only be used late in learning, and the conditions for learning need to be investigated further.
Feufel, Markus Alexander. "Bounded Rationality in the Emergency Department." Wright State University / OhioLINK, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1249241698.
Kim, Dong-Gook. "An Analysis of Ecological and Social Rationality: When are Lexicographic Heuristics Preferred?" unrestricted, 2008. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-08182008-212550/.
Title from file title page. Thomas Whalen, committee chair; Julian Diaz III, C. S. Thachenkary, Rodney Schultz, committee members. Electronic text (168 p. : ill. (some col.)) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed November 3, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 164-168).
Fleischhut, Nadine. "Moral judgment and decision making under uncertainty." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät II, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/16820.
In this dissertation I investigate how people make judgments and decisions in moral situations under uncertainty. Theoretically, behavior in moral situations is analyzed from the perspective of bounded and ecological rationality, which emphasizes the interplay between cognition and the structure of the environment. Empirically, the goal is to investigate moral judgment and behavior under epistemic conditions people encounter in the real world. The first project discusses from the perspective of ecological rationality how the interaction of heuristics and the environment helps explaining moral behavior that appears inconsistent from accounts referring to characteristics of the individual. This view also emphasizes the importance of studying social environments, as judgment and behavior in moral situations under uncertainty may often not result from specifically moral rules but instead from morally neutral social heuristics which serve the coherence of social groups. The second project empirically examines decisions in social dilemmas. The key question was how cooperation is shaped by different levels of risk and by the way information about risk is acquired (from description or from experience), compared to nonsocial situations with equivalent risks. Cooperation systematically varied with different levels of risk, yet the way in which information was acquired only mattered in nonsocial situations. Process data and self-reports indicated that this discrepancy may have resulted from decision processes that are more sensitive to expectations about others’ behavior and the size of rewards than to reward probabilities. The third project compared judgments in moral dilemmas when the course of events is still uncertain (foresight) with situations when it was already certain whether negative side-effects did or did not occur (hindsight). Results showed a hindsight effect for moral judgments, as well as for probability estimates of negative side-effects. As moral judgments differed under certainty and uncertainty, this raises concerns about generalizing empirical results from commonly investigated moral dilemmas, such as the “trolley” cases, in which everything is certain.
Kaur, Surinder. "Culturally bounded rationality." Thesis, Henley Business School, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.294508.
Östling, Robert. "Bounded rationality and endogenous preferences." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S), 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-454.
Vinokur, Leon. "Environmental policy and bounded rationality." Thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2010. http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/1708.
Köhler, Jonathan Hugh. "Bounded rationality in savings decisions." Thesis, University of York, 1996. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/10878/.
Zhang, Luyao. "Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design." The Ohio State University, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1532692312980569.
Wu, Yiping. "Bounded rationality for BitTorrent networks." Diss., Columbia, Mo. : University of Missouri-Columbia, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/6681.
The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on August 19, 2009) Includes bibliographical references.
Salehnejad, Mohammad Reza. "From micro to macro : essays on rationality, bounded rationality, and microfoundations." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2005. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1845/.
Mirestean, Alin Tavi. "Decision making under uncertainty and bounded rationality." College Park, Md. : University of Maryland, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/2946.
Thesis research directed by: Economics. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.
Cao, Cung Economics Australian School of Business UNSW. "Asymmetric and imperfect knowledge: a proposal to replace unbounded rationality with bounded rationality." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. School of Economics, 2007. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/27025.
Wills, Jules A., and n/a. "Strategic planning in Commonwealth departments: beyond magaerialism: from bounded rationality to bounded uncertainty." University of Canberra. Administrative Studies, 1991. http://erl.canberra.edu.au./public/adt-AUC20060426.154713.
Manrique, Chaparro Olga Lucía. "Three essays on bounded rationality and strategic behavior." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/96260.
The thesis consists of three papers, the first entitled Some Strategic Aspects of Private Information: An Experimental Analysis, the second entitled Comportamiento Estratégico y Manipulabilidad en los Métodos de Preferencias Declaradas para la Valoración de Bienes sin Mercado. Tres Experimentos de Laboratorio, and the third entitled Mistakes and Reciprocity Promote Cooperation in Public Good Games: An agent-based Approach. The main objective of the thesis is to test, using experimental and simulation tools, the assumptions of perfect rationality and strategic behavior in three different contexts. In the first study we are concerned with informational aspects of repeated games with incomplete information. The theoretical framework is relatively simple, a 2x2 game with incomplete information that is infinitely repeated. We asked if players with private information, in practice, take advantage of it (strategic behavior), and if the uninformed players can guess the game they are playing when had been revealed important information, such as the theory predicts. In the second context, we want to test the assumption of manipulability (strategy proffness) in stated preference methods for valuing non-market goods. We designed three laboratory experiments for different formats of stated preferences: a pure referendum, a contingent valuation method and choice set with three alternatives. The third is a context in which we propose an evolution of cooperation model in public goods, in environments in which agents have different degrees of cooperation conditional and act strategically to deciding whether to cooperate or not. Unlike other studies where the interest is to understand how emerging altruism or reciprocity, we am interested in study why cooperation can survive in such environments.
Reina, Livia. "From Subjective Expected Utility Theory to Bounded Rationality." Doctoral thesis, Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden, 2006. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:swb:14-1140624885934-50567.
Dindo, Pietro Dino Enrico. "Bounded rationality and heterogeneity in economic dynamic models." [Amsterdam] : Amsterdam : Thela Thesis ; Universiteit van Amsterdam [Host], 2007. http://dare.uva.nl/document/44334.
Kneeland, Terri. "Bounded rationality in games : theory, experiments, and applications." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/44573.
Louvet, Anne-Claire Alice. "The bounded rationality constraint : experimental and analytical results." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14755.
Jones, Matthew Thomas. "Essays on Bounded Rationality in Applied Game Theory." The Ohio State University, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1337782631.
Bhattacharya, Shilpi <1982>. "Competition Law and the Bounded Rationality of Firms." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2016. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/7693/1/Bhattacharya_Shilpi_tesi.pdf.
DINDO, Pietro Dino Enrico. "Bounded rationality and heterogeneity in economic dynamic models." Doctoral thesis, THELA THESIS, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3673678.
Surucu, Oktay <1979>. "Three essays on economic interactions under bounded rationality." Doctoral thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/1052.
Ogni capitolo di questo lavoro di ricerca considera diversi temi concernenti interazioni economiche in presenza di razionalit a limitata. Il primo capitolo propone il contratto ottimale di un monopolio ordinario il quale massimizza il suo profitto in un contesto in cui gli agenti sono caratterizzati da diversa razionalit a limitata. Il secondo capitolo analizza l'interazione tra agenti con razionalit a piena e quelli con razionalit a limitata nel caso in cui i loro interessi siano perfettamente allineati. In ne, il terzo capitolo analizza un modello in cui un gruppo di agenti con limitata capacit a di risolvere problemi a ronta un compito disgiuntivo su uno spazio di soluzione di grandi dimensioni.
Sandei, Laura <1990>. ""Bounded Rationality: la razionalità nelle scelte di investimento"." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/9461.
Perez, Fabien. "Bounded Rationality and Noise : Theory, Methods and Experiments." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Institut polytechnique de Paris, 2021. http://www.theses.fr/2021IPPAG008.
Economists aim at understanding how agents make decisions in economic situations. The standard approach in the economic literature is to assume that agents are perfectly rational. However, the perfect rationality assumption is highly restrictive and does not perfectly capture how agents behave. Studying how bounded is the rationality of economic agents is thus a matter of prime importance. The present dissertation contributes to this research question in behavioral and experimental economics with a particular focus on behaviors in strategic environments and on noisy (rather than purely deterministic) decisions.The dissertation is composed of four chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 address behaviors in strategic interactions with different angles. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the issue of noise in experimental tasks.Chapter 1 offers insight into how self-selection could promote rationality in strategic environments. Self-selection has seldom been studied under the scope of bounded rationality. In most experiments, once seated in the lab, subjects are forced to participate in all the tasks they faced. On the contrary, in many economic situations in the field (e.g. auctions, financial markets) agents can choose whether they want to participate. In this regard, understanding the consequences of self-selection is valuable. We assess the evolution of strategies when a self-selection stage is added in experimental games and study the potential drivers of self-selection into games. Chapter 2 proposes and tests a new model in behavioral game theory. The model assumes the existence of two types of players: confused players who do not form any beliefs and thus play randomly or naively, and strategic players who best respond to noisy beliefs regarding the probability of facing a confused or a strategic player. The model has interesting theoretical properties and fits experimental data with a single parameter. Chapter 3 calibrates measurement error in four risk-aversion tasks using a large set of existing test-retest experiments. Since measurement error can have a dramatic impact on statistical analysis, quantifying the noise in experimental measures is of particular importance. We also discuss the consequences of measurement error coupled with discrete approximations and small samples when performing linear regressions. Chapter 4 focuses on tasks aiming at eliciting trust. Using a test-retest experiment, we calibrate measurement error in standard trust measures, namely the behavior in a trust game and survey questions. We then discuss how cognitive skills and attention can drive noise in experimental tasks
Barkoczi, Daniel. "Ecological rationality of social learning." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Lebenswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/17468.
How people learn from others and when it is adaptive to rely on social learning have been major questions in several disciplines including psychology, biology, anthropology and economics. Despite the shared interest of these diverse fields, many of the results remain isolated and are often incomparable, in part because the study of social learning still lacks a general theoretical framework that would make results comparable or explain why different strategies perform well in different contexts. In this thesis I propose such a framework that is grounded in the study of ecological rationality. I use this frame- work to explore three primary questions: i) how can social learning strategies be modeled as cognitively plausible strategies composed of simple building blocks (search, stopping and decision rules), ii) what are key characteristics of social and task environments in which social learning takes place, and iii) how do social learning strategies composed of different building blocks interact with the structure of the environment to produce different levels of success. Through addressing these three questions I map out the conditions under which different strategies are adaptive and explain how the building blocks of different strategies contribute to their performance in certain environments. The thesis focuses on three representative classes of social learning strategies, namely, frequency-dependent, payoff-biased, and unbiased copying. Different chapters focus on important everyday social learning settings, identify key environmental characteristics defining the setting and demonstrate how the building blocks of social learning strategies interact with these environmental structures to produce different outcomes.
Li, Yiran. "Is Rationality Bounded？ An Interpretation on Equity Premium Puzzle." Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Ekonomihögskolan, ELNU, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-12215.
Smith, Justin N. "Computational complexity, bounded rationality and the theory of games." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.365642.
Lieder, Falk. "Beyond Bounded Rationality| Reverse-Engineering and Enhancing Human Intelligence." Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2018. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10817569.
Bad decisions can have devastating consequences, and there is a vast body of literature suggesting that human judgment and decision-making are riddled with numerous systematic violations of the rules of logic, probability theory, and expected utility theory. The discovery of these cognitive biases in the 1970s challenged the concept of Homo sapiens as the rational animal and has profoundly shaken the foundations of economics and rational models in the cognitive, neural, and social sciences. Four decades later, these disciplines still lack a rigorous theoretical foundation that can account for people’s cognitive biases. Furthermore, designing effective interventions to remedy cognitive biases and improve human judgment and decision-making is still an art rather than a science. I address these two fundamental problems in the first and the second part of my thesis respectively.
To develop a theoretical framework that can account for cognitive biases, I start from the assumption that human cognition is fundamentally constrained by limited time and the human brain’s finite computational resources. Based on this assumption, I redefine human rationality as reasoning and deciding according to cognitive strategies that make the best possible use of the mind’s limited resources. I draw on the bounded optimality framework developed in the artificial intelligence literature to translate this definition into a mathematically precise theory of bounded rationality called resource-rationality and a new paradigm for cognitive modeling called resource-rational analysis. Applying this methodology allowed me to derive resource-rational models of judgment and decisionmaking that accurately capture a wide range of cognitive biases, including the anchoring bias and the numerous availability biases in memory recall, judgment, and decision-making. By showing that these phenomena and the heuristics that generate them are consistent with the rational use of limited resources, my analysis provides a rational reinterpretation of cognitive biases that were once interpreted as hallmarks of human irrationality. This suggests that it is time to revisit the debate about human rationality with the more realistic normative standard of resource-rationality. To enable a systematic assessment of the extent to which human cognition is resource- rational, I present an automatic method for deriving resource-rational heuristics from a mathematical specification of their function and the mind’s computational constraints. Applying this method to multi-alternative risky-choice led to the discovery of a previously unknown heuristic that people appear to use very frequently. Evaluating human decision-making against resource-rational heuristics suggested that, on average, human decision-making is at most 88% as resource-rational as it could be.
Since people are equipped with multiple heuristics, a complete normative theory of bounded rationality also has to answer the question of when each of these heuristics should be used. I address this question with a rational theory of strategy selection. According to this theory, people gradually learn to select the heuristic with the best possible speed-accuracy trade-off by building a predictive model of its performance. Experiments testing this model confirmed that people gradually learn to make increasingly more rational use of their finite time and bounded cognitive resources through a metacognitive reinforcement learning mechanism.
Overall, these findings suggest that—contrary to the bleak picture painted by previous research on heuristics and biases—human cognition is not fundamentally irrational, and can be understood as making rational use of bounded cognitive resources. By reconciling rationality with cognitive biases and bounded resources, this line of research addresses fundamental problems of previous rational modeling frameworks, such as expected utility theory, logic, and probability theory. Resource-rationality might thus come to replace classical notions of rationality as a theoretical foundation for modeling human judgment and decision-making in economics, psychology, neuroscience, and other cognitive and social sciences.
In the second part of my dissertation, I apply the principle of resource-rationality to develop tools and interventions for improving the human mind. Early interventions educated people about cognitive biases and taught them the normative principles of logic, probability theory, and expected utility theory. The practical benefits of such interventions are limited because the computational demands of applying them to the complex problems people face in everyday life far exceed individuals’ cognitive capacities. Instead, the principle of resource-rationality suggests that people should rely on simple, computationally efficient heuristics that are well adapted to the structure of their environments. Building on this idea, I leverage the automatic strategy discovery method and insights into metacognitive learning from the first part of my dissertation to develop intelligent systems that teach people resource-rational cognitive strategies. I illustrate this approach by developing and evaluating a cognitive tutor that trains people to plan resource-rationally. My results show that practicing with the cognitive tutor improves people’s planning strategies significantly more than does practicing without feedback. (Abstract shortened by ProQuest.)
Modarres-Mousavi, Shabnam. "Methodological Foundations for Bounded Rationality as a Primary Framework." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/30225.
Ph. D.
Petri, Castro Mikel. "Essays on nominal rigidities, bounded rationality, and macroeconomic policy." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129012.
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 139-144).
This thesis consists of three chapters about macroeconomic policy. In the first chapter, I study the empirical relationship between nominal rigidities and the real effects of monetary policy. Nominal rigidities lie at the core of macroeconomics. The empirical evidence suggests that prices and wages adjust sluggishly to aggregate shocks, while theoretical models justify why and to what extent these rigidities imply monetary non-neutrality. However, direct evidence on nominal rigidities being the actual channel for the transmission of these shocks is relatively scarce. I construct a highly disaggregated measure of regional price stickiness for the U.S. and use it to provide evidence of this channel. My results are in line with sticky price models, indicating that employment in more rigid industries and commuting zones tend to have stronger reactions to monetary policy shocks.
In the second chapter, joint with Emmanuel Farhi and Iván Werning, we document the extreme sensitivity of New Keynesian models to fiscal policy announcements during a liquidity trap--a phenomenon we call the "fiscal multiplier puzzle". The response of current output to government spending grows exponentially in the horizon of the stimulus. Surprisingly, the introduction of rule-of-thumb hand-to-mouth agents, combined with deficit-financed stimulus, can easily generate negative multipliers that are equally explosive. This intuition translates to incomplete markets heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian models, leading to large negative multipliers when taxes are backloaded. We construct a belief-augmented New Keynesian framework to understand the role played by expectations in shaping the fiscal multiplier puzzle. The key element behind this result is the extreme coordination of the demand and supply blocks under rational expectations.
Common knowledge between these two blocks induces an inflation-spending feedback loop. Government spending boosts aggregate demand and drives up inflation, which in turn leads to lower real rates and higher spending by households, increasing aggregate demand again. We break this strategic complementarity by introducing bounded rationality in the form of level-k thinking. In contrast to rational expectations, level-k multipliers are bounded and tend to zero over infinite horizons for all finite k. Moreover, level-k interacts strongly with incomplete markets in two different ways. First, the attenuation of the multipliers increases for any level of k on the degree of market incompleteness, especially in the future. Second, in contrast to complete markets, incomplete markets increase the magnitude of the multipliers for low levels of k when taxes are backloaded, making deficits more effective at stimulating the economy.
In the third chapter, I explore the implications of downward nominal wage rigidities for fiscal policy and inflation in a liquidity trap. The standard Phillips Curve predicts big declines in economic activity should be accompanied by big deflation episodes. I study whether downward nominal wage rigidity can explain the missing deflation during the Great Recession. To do so, I introduce wage rigidity in a standard cash-in-advance liquidity trap model. My results show that nominal wage rigidities are consistent with mild deflationary episodes only when the trap is expected to be very short-lived. Away from this case, the model predicts large deflations and drops in output as in standard New Keynesian models. I also study the impact of fiscal policy in my setup, finding large multipliers that increase with the degree of wage rigidity. The main reason behind the effectiveness of government spending is its persistent effects on economic activity.
Wage rigidity generates unemployment persistence due to pent-up wage deflation. Fiscal spending boosts aggregate demand and decreases deflationary pressures today. This increases output today and in the future by relaxing the downward wage rigidity constraint in all subsequent periods. Keywords: nominal rigidities, price stickiness, monetary policy, regional, bounded rationality, incomplete markets, level-k, fiscal policy, downward nominal wage rigidity. JEL Classification: E52, E62, E7.
by Mikel Petri Castro.
Ph. D.
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics
Soerensen, Jens Peter. "Bounded rationality, heterogeneous beliefs and the evolution of the economy." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/26952.
Georgiou, Phokion 'Ion' Sotirios. "Dogmatism and bounded rationality : a systemic epistemology for system theory." Thesis, Lancaster University, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.420564.
Newholm, Terry. "Understanding the ethical consumer : employing a frame of bounded rationality." Thesis, Open University, 2000. http://oro.open.ac.uk/58071/.
Lorkowski, Joseph A. "Bounded rationality in decision making under uncertainty| Towards optimal granularity." Thesis, The University of Texas at El Paso, 2016. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10000752.
Starting from well-known studies by Kahmenan and Tversky, researchers have found many examples when our decision making seems to be irrational. We show that this seemingly irrational decision making can be explained if we take into account that human abilities to process information are limited. As a result, instead of the exact values of different quantities, we operate with granules that contain these values. On several examples, we show that optimization under such granularity restriction indeed leads to observed human decision making. Thus, granularity helps explain seemingly irrational human decision making.
Similar arguments can be used to explain the success of heuristic techniques in expert decision making. We use these explanations to predict the quality of the resulting decisions. Finally, we explain how we can improve on the existing heuristic techniques by formulating and solving the corresponding optimization problems.
Newholm, Terry. "Understanding the ethical consumer : employing a frame of bounded rationality." n.p, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/.
Caton, Jacob N. "Models of Knowledge for Resource Bounded Agents." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/223361.
Whitehead, Duncan. "Three essays on bounded rationality and individual learning in repeated games." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/29422.
Quilter, Tom. "Essays on the evolution of social co-ordination and bounded rationality." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/4462.
Li, Li, and 李利. "Judicial discretion within adjudicative committee proceedings inChina: a bounded rationality analysis." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2010. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B46967412.
Poulsen, Lauge N. Skovgaard. "Sacrificing sovereignty by chance : investment treaties, developing countries, and bounded rationality." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2011. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/141/.
Dombeck, Brian. "The Effects of News Shocks and Bounded Rationality on Macroeconomic Volatility." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22636.
McComb, Greg. "A contingent valuation study of Winnipeg municipal water quality using bounded rationality." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape3/PQDD_0019/MQ56139.pdf.
Dudebout, Nicolas. "Empirical-evidence equilibria in stochastic games." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/52205.
GALLASSI, GINEVRA. "Essays on Monetary Policy, Stock Market and Heterogeneous Expectations." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10281/241075.
This dissertation investigates the relationship among heterogeneous expectations, stock prices and monetary policy. In particular, we attempt to answer the question on whether or not central banks should respond to stock prices other than to inflation and output gap. The first chapter presents a perpetual youth model à la Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965) following Nisticò (2012). This type of model generates a financial wealth channel through which stock prices fluctuations affect the dynamics of the aggregate consumption, and thus the equilibrium solution. We model expectations as in Brock and Hommes (1997) and De Grauwe (2011). Agents are boundedly rational, they adopt simple rules to make forecasts and evaluate their past performances using a fitness measure. The model generates endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism due to the correlation among beliefs. Moreover, the presence of this heterogeneity removes the classic trade-off between output gap and inflation typical of Rational Expectations models. We also show that, contrary to the Bernanke and Gertler’s (1999) prescription, central banks should respond to stock prices fluctuations. However, to be beneficial, this “leaning against the wind” strategy in the stock market has to be moderate. In the second chapter, we adopt the same baseline model of the first part. We build on Nisticò (2012) and allow for the inclusion of diverse beliefs following the Rational Beliefs theory by Kurz (1997). With respect to the previous work, beliefs are modeled at a micro-level and enter in the equilibrium solution. Although agents do not observe the true dynamics of the economy, they are still rational in the sense that their beliefs are compatible with the observable empirical distribution of past data. In this framework, stock prices fluctuations affect real economy through two different channels: the financial wealth channel and the expectational channel. We simulate the model under both Rational Expectations and Rational Beliefs. Contrary to Bernanke and Gertler’s (1999) prescription, we find that a mild “leaning against the wind” strategy in the stock market is beneficial for both output gap and inflation stabilization. Moreover, all results under Rational Beliefs exhibit a higher volatility and the magnitude of responses to shock is amplified by beliefs dynamics. Widespread optimism boosts inflation as well as output gap and can generate a bubble in stock prices. However, the effect on the real economy of such exuberance might be reduced by a more “aggressive” policy.
Buckenmaier, Johannes [Verfasser], Carlos [Gutachter] Alós-Ferrer, and Larbi [Gutachter] Alaoui. "Evolution, Bounded Rationality and Institutions / Johannes Buckenmaier ; Gutachter: Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Larbi Alaoui." Köln : Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln, 2017. http://d-nb.info/1152004859/34.
CRISTOFARO, MATTEO. "Bounded rationality in managerial decision making: addressing the what, why and how questions." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Roma "Tor Vergata", 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2108/202661.
Ho, Ngoc Duc. "Resource-Bounded Reasoning about Knowledge." Doctoral thesis, Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, 2004. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-36935.
One of the principal goals of agent theories is to describe realistic, implementable agents, that is, those which have actually been constructed or are at least in principle implementable. That goal cannot be reached if the inherent resource-boundedness of agents is not treated correctly. Since the modal approach to epistemic logic is not suited to formalize resource-bounded reasoning, the issue of resource-boundedness remains one of the main foundational problems of any agent theory that is developed on the basis of modal epistemic logic. My work is an attempt to provide theories of agency with a more adequate epistemic foundation. It aims at developing theories of mental concepts that make much more realistic assumptions about agents than other theories. The guiding principle of my theory is that the capacities attributed to agents must be empirically verifiable, that is, it must be possible to construct artificial agents which satisfy the specifications determined by the theory. As a consequence, the unrealistic assumption that agents have unlimited reasoning capacities must be rejected. To achieve the goal of describing resource-bounded agents accurately, the cost of reasoning must be taken seriously. In the thesis I have developed a framework for modeling the relationship between knowledge, reasoning, and the availability of resources. I have argued that the correct form of an axiom for epistemic logic should be: if an agent knows all premises of a valid inference rule and if he performs the right reasoning, then he will know the conclusion as well. Because reasoning requires resources, it cannot be safely assumed that the agent can compute his knowledge if he does not have enough resources to perform the required reasoning. I have demonstrated that on the basis of that idea, the problems of traditional approaches can be avoided and rich epistemic logics can be developed which can account adequately for our intuitions about knowledge
Lee, Penagos Luis Alejandro. "Understanding behaviour through the lens of bounded rationality : experiments with human and artificial agents." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2017. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/42418/.
Mitzkewitz, Michael [Verfasser]. "Theories of bounded and unbounded rationality in games of conflict and coordination / Michael Mitzkewitz." Magdeburg : Universitätsbibliothek, 2018. http://d-nb.info/1159954879/34.