Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Board structure'
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Warren, Robert G. "Citizens' perception of the relationship between school board operating structure and board planning, board goals and board behavior." DigitalCommons@Robert W. Woodruff Library, Atlanta University Center, 1993. http://digitalcommons.auctr.edu/dissertations/998.
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Very little research has been done on the dynamics of school boards. This study was undertaken to examine perceptions of school board behavior. Also the study attempted to determine the relationship of board behavior, board planning and board goals.
Sources of data for the study included questionnaire, formal and informal conversation. The subjects were graduate students enrolled in Clark Atlanta University Education department; other subjects were nongraduate (citizens).
Statistical procedures used was the Pearson correlation analysis. Some findings emerged from data analysis. When respondents see the school board as planning and cooperative in terms of the clients' needs, they also see the board as reaching its student goal. Respondents see dominated and fragmented boards as negative for student achievement goal, cooperative behavior and system planning, while they see 1 positive relationship for board consensus and passive board with cooperation and planning. However, there is no significant relationship among board consensus, passive board and board goals.
The general perception is that school boards should improve public relations. The recommendations were the school board should improve the citizen perception or improve their performance.
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Kolosov, Pavel, and Shageldi Soltanmammedov. "Board Structure in Swedish Mutual Funds Industry." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-45164.
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Mutual funds attracted great attention of both shareholders and academics in last few decades. Mutual funds provide benefits like diversification, professional managements and reduced costs for individual shareholders. Shareholders invest their assets into mutual funds managed by professionals. Managers may have an incentive to use those assets to satisfy their own interests. They can achieve this by charging excessive fees or spending more on the perquisites. These unmatched interests of shareholders and managers create so called principal-agent conflicts. Some researchers argue that market competition in mutual funds industry is strong enough to align interests of both shareholders and managers, thus mitigating principal-agent conflicts. Others believe there is need for internal governance to monitor managers‟ behaviors. Board of directors as an internal governance mechanism is responsible for aligning shareholders and managers interests.We collected data on board characteristics to find if they are related to funds attributes. Our sample of funds consists of 68 fund management companies with total of 603 mutual funds managed by those companies. Board characteristics include board size, age and gender of board members, and presence of CEO on the board. Fund attributes are total expense ratio, rate of return and management fees used as a measure of board effectiveness. We analyzed relationship of board characteristics and fund attributes separately on the company level and fund level.On the company level we found no relationship between board size and board age with expense ratio and rate of returns. We found significant positive relationship between board gender and presence of CEO with expense ratio. These results indicate that with the increase of male members on the board and the presence of CEO on the board there is an increase in total expense ratio. On the fund level analysis we found different relations with various types of funds. This may indicate that depending on the type of the fund the structure of the board that is effective changes.
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ZHOU, Ying. "Ownership structure, board characteristics, and tax aggressiveness." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2011. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/acct_etd/3.
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Tax aggressiveness, as commonly proxied by the effective tax rate (ETR), measures a firm’s effort spent on minimizing its tax payments. It is suggested that more tax aggressive firms have greater incentives to allocate resources to minimize taxes and thus have lower ETRs. Corporate governance has been continuously receiving attention in literature across different fields and can affect a firm’s tax strategy through its control mechanism. This thesis investigates how corporate governance influences a firm’s tax aggressiveness. The main hypothesis of this thesis is whether firms with good corporate governance will have less incentives and opportunities to manage tax aggressively. Specifically, I take advantages of the distinct institutional settings in China to study whether the Chinese firm’s tax aggressiveness is affected by ownership structure and the characteristics of board of directors. Using all non-financial listed companies in the Chinese A-share market during 2003 and 2009 period, I find that firms with state-controlled nature and lower proportion of controlling shares pursue less aggressive tax strategies and maintain higher ETRs. In addition, my finding is consistent with prior literature that a higher percentage of the boards’ shareholdings and dual service duties performed by the board chairman result in lower ETRs. However, I do not find a significant relationship between the percentage of independent directors and tax aggressiveness which may suggest the ineffective role of independent directors in China.
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Lahlou, Ismail. "Corporate board of directors : structure and efficiency." Thesis, Rennes 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014REN1G022.
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Cette thèse a pour objectif principal d’apporter une contribution à la littérature concernant la structure et l’efficacité du conseil d’administration (CA). Elle s’articule autour de quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre est une revue de la littérature, tandis que les trois autres portent sur des questions de recherche distinctes. La première étude présentée dans le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse a pour objectif d'étudier les déterminants de la taille du CA, de l'indépendance de ses membres et de la dualité des fonctions de direction et de présidence du CA. Les principaux apports de cette étude peuvent être résumés comme suit : tout d'abord, nos résultats sont fondés sur l'analyse d'un des plus grands échantillons utilisés dans ce domaine, avec à peu près 16000 observations (entreprises-années) pour près de 2300 entreprises américaines observées de 1997 à 2010. De plus, sur le plan méthodologique, une batterie de tests statistiques a été réalisée afin de vérifier la robustesse de nos résultats, notamment des tests tenant compte des biais d'hétérogénéité et de simultanéité. Enfin, cette étude est probablement la première à démontrer que le passage de la loi SOX a limité la capacité des dirigeants à influencer la composition du CA. La deuxième étude s’attache à analyser les deux principales fonctions du CA, qui sont le conseil au chef d'entreprise et le contrôle de ses activités. Ainsi, comprendre la capacité du CA à remplir ces fonctions est une question fondamentale que nous nous proposons d’approfondir. Cette étude vient enrichir la littérature émergente sur la fonction consultative du CA en fournissant de nouveaux éléments de preuves sur l'importance de cette fonction dans la création de valeur de l'entreprise. Ces résultats apportent également des éclairages sur le conflit potentiel existant entre les deux principales fonctions du CA. Enfin, cette étude s'inscrit dans le courant de pensée qui cherche à évaluer l'impact des caractéristiques des entreprises sur l'efficacité de leurs structures de gouvernance. Le principal objectif de la troisième étude présentée dans le dernier chapitre de cette thèse est de déterminer si la rémunération à base d’actions des administrateurs peut affecter les décisions futures en matière d'acquisition, et le cas échéant, comment. Les résultats de cette étude apportent un nouvel éclairage concernant la rémunération des administrateurs. Cette étude met en exergue l'importance des pratiques de rémunération incitative sous forme d’actions et d’options pour les membres du CA. Par ailleurs, bien que de nombreuses études aient été réalisées afin d'analyser la relation existante entre les mesures incitatives à destination des administrateurs et la performance de l'entreprise, notre étude est l'une des premières à explorer les mécanismes à travers lesquels ces mesures peuvent influencer la valeur de l'entrepriseThis thesis aims at providing contributions to the existing literature on the structure and effectiveness of corporate boards. It comprises three essays that address distinct research questions. The first study examines the trends and determinants of corporate board structure using a panel data sample. This study extends the existing literature on the determinants of board structure in three important ways. First, our results are based on one of the largest samples used in this area, with almost 16,000 firm-year observations for nearly 2,300 firms observed from 1997 to 2010. Second, in terms of methodology, a set of statistical tests was performed in order to check the robustness of our findings, including tests that account for heterogeneity and simultaneity. Finally, this is probably the first study to show that the enactment of SOX has reduced the ability of CEOs in influencing board composition. Specifically, while SOX does not fundamentally alter the economic determinants of board structure, our results show that the documented negative impact of well performing CEOs on board independence in the pre-SOX era is no longer significant post-SOX. In the second study, the principal objective is to investigate the effects of advisory directors' presence on the board and monitoring intensity on the board's overall effectiveness in value creation. This study makes some significant contributions to the literature. First, it complements and extends the growing literature on the board's advisory function by providing strong new evidence on the importance of this board function in value creation. Second, it also provides some evidence on the potential conflict between the two primary functions of corporate boards. Finally, this study adds to the literature that attempts to assess the impact of firm and industry characteristics on the effectiveness of specific governance structures. The last study has as main objective to examine the relation between director compensation structure and shareholder interests in the context of acquisitions. This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the recent but burgeoning literature that deals with the determinants of director compensation. Guided by theoretical work in this area, we show that director compensation is mainly consistent with firm's needs for monitoring and advising. Second, we extend the body of research that highlights the importance of equity-based compensation by providing evidence that the use of incentive-based compensation schemes to reward directors also matters. Finally, although many studies have examined the relation between directors' incentives and firm performance, this work is one of the first to examine the channels through which directors' equity-based pay affects shareholders' value
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Rogers, Meredith Australian Graduate School of Management Australian School of Business UNSW. "Contingent corporate governance: a challenge to universal theories of board structure." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. Australian Graduate School of Management, 2006. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/23024.
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Agency theory proposes that the role of the board of directors is to control management (Fama & Jensen 1983). A structurally independent board, one with a high percentage of non-executive directors and a chairperson who is not the CEO, has been used as a proxy for the control role. Therefore, agency theory predicts a positive relationship between independent board structure and firm performance. These predictions have not been confirmed by meta-analytic reviews (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson 1998; Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy 2000). This thesis applies structural contingency theory to provide an alternative explanation for the relationship between board structure and firm performance. Structural contingency theory (Donaldson 2001) proposes that the relationship between an organization???s structure and its performance is moderated by contingencies. In this study the contingency is the salience of the board???s control role. I argue that structural independence of the board has a beneficial effect on performance only if it is in fit with control salience. For example, a firm with an independently structured board that gives high prominence to the control role will perform well. On the other hand, another firm with a less independently structured board that does not see its main role as controlling management will also prosper. Survey data were analyzed to measure the control salience for 98 Australian listed companies. Archival data provided measures of board structure and firm performance. Consistent with the meta-analytic reviews, there was no association between independent board structure and firm performance. There was some evidence that high control salience resulted in high performance, but this effect was evident chiefly when performance was measured by total shareholder returns. This may indicate that the share market was responding to the symbolism of high control salience. In contrast to the symbolic main effect of control salience, the fit between the control salience and the independent structure of the board caused increased return on equity. This reflects the board???s objective effect on profit when its structure is in fit with control salience.
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Bazzi, Rami. "Board structure and market reaction to corporate divestiture decisions." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ39961.pdf.
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Chen, Huirong. "Board characteristics, ownership structure and executive remuneration in China." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2006. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/54091/.
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This thesis not only contributes to the literature on corporate governance, but also has important implications and recommendations for policy makers and corporate practitioners in transitional economic and political contexts.
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Shivdasani, Anil. "The board of directors, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers." The Ohio State University, 1991. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1259096201.
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Allam, Bahaaeldin Samir Ismail G. "Board characteristics, ownership structure and agency costs : UK evidence." Thesis, Durham University, 2015. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11154/.
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The term “Corporate Governance” always proliferates after large accounting scandals and crises; practitioners claim that governance mechanisms are the cause of these failures, and worldwide reforms take place after each failure; however, these reforms did not succeed in preventing the subsequent falls down. Although corporate governance mechanisms are introduced to monitor and control the managerial opportunistic behaviour in order to reduce the agency costs; most of the prior studies were directed towards investigating the role of governance mechanisms in enhancing firm performance as an indirect proxy of lower agency conflicts, and hence, lower agency costs. This study adds to the debate around the usefulness and the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanisms in controlling the managerial opportunistic behaviour and reducing agency costs. This study contributes to the governance literature by investigating and comparing the impact of a comprehensive set of governance mechanisms reflecting a wide spectrum of board characteristics and ownership structure on agency costs over the period 2005-2011; in addition to providing a comparison of before and after the financial crisis periods using a large sample of firms listed in FTSE All-Share index. In doing so, two different agency costs proxies are utilised; asset utilisation which reflects the managerial efficiency; and the interaction of free cash flow with growth opportunities which reflects investment decisions agency costs. This comparative analysis extends the governance literature that investigated the pre and during the crisis periods by adding the pre and post the 2008 financial crisis comparison. Lastly, this study considers more than one theoretical paradigm; the empirical evidence lends the support to the agency and resource dependence perspectives and provides partial support to the stewardship view. The results clearly show that not all governance mechanisms lead to lower agency costs; thus, one prescribed structure does not fit all. Moreover, the efficiency of the governance mechanisms is directly affected by surrounding economic conditions (e.g., steady and abnormal conditions); in other words, governance mechanisms which help in reducing agency costs during the normal economic condition could turn out to be useless, inefficient and in some cases detrimental to the managerial effectiveness after the financial crisis. Moreover, the reported results support the claim that interrelation between the different governance mechanisms should be considered in future governance studies.
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Alresheedi, Adel Dhaher Alresheedi. "The perception of stakeholders about the relationship between corporate governance and sustainability: Evidence from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2021. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/211245/1/Adel%20Dhaher%20A_Alresheedi_Thesis.pdf.
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This research focused on recent significant changes introduced by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ 2030 Vision, with respect to creating a larger role for the private sector in the economy and placing a new emphasis on social and environmental issues. Particularly this thesis assessed the perception of various corporate stakeholders to the new corporate governance framework as part of the KSA 2030 Vision for publicly listed companies on the three dimensions of sustainability (economy, society, and environment). The findings support the arguments in the literature that board structure and board characteristics have positive impacts on the three dimensions of sustainability.
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Harvey, Henry S. (Henry Stimson). "Development of straw insulation board : fabrication methods, structure, thermal performance." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66784.
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Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Architecture, 1997.Includes bibliographical references (p. 66-69).
Insulation board is being fabricated and tested for use in developing countries. It is made at a low density, in the area of 5 to 10 pounds per cubic foot (80 to 160 kilograms per cubic meter), and has good thermal properties for an air based insulation, meaning R3 to R4 per inch (Btu-in/ hr-ft2-°F)-, or a conductivity of .048 to .036 W/m-K. The initial effort is to produce a straw insulation board suitable for northern Pakistan, where we are studying the needs and construction of schools and houses. Some type of rigid insulation is needed, as opposed to loose fill, because the buildings have solid masonry walls without an air gap. These boards will be suitable for other developing countries as well The initial survey of possible methods included 1) containing the straw in panels with wire and battens, 2) pulping the straw, and 3) binding with adhesive. In this latter category starch, PVA and sodium silicate were tried as adhesive using uncut and shredded straw, with various methods of application such as spraying, foaming, and dipping, at various adhesive loading rates. Small samples were formed at a range of densities to test structural and thermal properties. This survey suggested that all three of these approaches can succeed structurally and thermally, but that competing economically with existing insulation board is difficult. For boards with binder, the adhesive efficiency was poor. In the final phase of the project, a batch of boards was made at ICI Polyurethane's North American research and development facility, using methane di-isocyanate as the binder. The boards, made at a range of densities and resin contents, and using straw with and without the fine particles, were tested thermally and structurally at MIT. Good mechanical properties were obtained at resin contents as low as 2% by weight. At densities of 8 and 10 pounds per cubic foot (pcf), these boards have R values of 3.7 and 3.45 per inch, respectively. The pressure required to compress the 10 pcf boards to 10% of their original thickness is approximately 15 pounds per square inch (psi), and the modulus of rupture in bending is in the range of 50 psi. Removing the fine particles from the straw improved board strength markedly. These boards at a density of 10 pcf and 2 to 4 % resin content have an estimated materials cost of 2 [cents] per insulating unit (R-ft2), substantially less than either the cost of the expanded polystyrene available in Pakistan, or the retail cost of any rigid board insulation sold in North America.
by Henry S. Harvey, Jr.
S.M.
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Hassan, Muhammad. "The impact of corporate governance reforms on board structure and board roles : an empirical study of Pakistani listed firms." Thesis, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10443/2683.
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This study examines the impact of corporate governance reforms (SECP code in Pakistan) on board structural characteristics, board roles and firm performance. Related research questions are: a) how and which board roles mediate the relationship between board structural characteristics and firm performance? b) And what is the influence of corporate governance reforms on this relationship? Based upon the existing literature, a model has been developed that relates board structural characteristics (Proportion of non-executive directors, CEO Duality, Diligence and Independence of Audit Committee) with firm financial performance (ROA, Tobin Q) through intervening variables of dual board roles namely board monitoring role (Frequency of board meetings) and board resource dependence role (Board size) using multi-theoretic lens. This thesis uses an exclusive balanced panel data set of 200 companies listed on Karachi Stock Exchange to examine the impact of SECP code on the model for the two equal time windows. The first panel comprises of the data for the years from 1999-2001 which is the era before the implementation of SECP code and second panel comprises of data for the years from 2003-2005. The data set straddles the year 2002 which is the year when SECP code was enforced. The study contributes to a sparse empirical literature on boards using data from Pakistan via multi-theoretic perspective to advance some understanding that if the boards’ monitoring and resource provision roles are strengthened through board restructuring, the financial performance (Tobin Q) of the organization has shown signs of improvement. However, the main findings of the study indicate that the mediated relationship between board structural variables and firm performance is stronger in the post SECP code era. The study also shows that firm value (Tobin Q) increased in the post SECP code era; however, the implementation of SECP code didn’t reflect any improvement in the profitability of the firm (ROA). This study has significant policy implications. It recommends the constitution of independent nomination committee on the board and envisaging an evaluation criterion for the board members performance. The study concludes that overall companies adopted a box-ticking approach for reporting corporate governance. The study concludes lastly that the SECP code overall proved ground breaking and the corporate governance canvas in the country embraced the global calls for the reforms.
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Yu, Mei. "Board structure and firm performance : empirical evidence from Chinese shareholding companies." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.520271.
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Zeng, Bei. "On Corporate Hedging and Firm Focus and on Bank Board Structure." ScholarWorks@UNO, 2009. http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1107.
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This dissertation consists of two essays: one looks at the relation between firm focus and hedging in the REIT industry, and the other compares bank board structures in China and the US. The first essay presented in Chapter 2 examines the relation between corporate hedging and firm focus in the REIT industry by using a sample of REITs in 2005 and in 2007. We find 46.41% utilization rate in 2005 and 43.41% in 2007. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that, relative to diversified firms, focused firms are more likely to engage in hedging. Focused firms also tend to be involved in greater amount of hedging. We also document a negative relation between hedging and transparency, although the evidence is not overwhelming. Consistent with previous literature, there is a strong firm size effect. The second essay presented in Chapter 3 examines the relation between bank performance and board structure by using a sample of 74 US banks and 53 Chinese banks for the period 2002 to 2006. Indeed, the empirical relation between board structure and performance is virtually non-existing in China. In particular, for the US sample, the board size is found to be significantly and negatively correlated with ROA, but a larger board also tends to be associated with lower costs. For Chinese banks, the evidence indicates that governance variables are not significantly correlated with performances with the exception of block ownership: there is strong evidence that the relation between block ownership and bank performance is negative. Additionally, we find substantial differences in board structure between the two countries; in particular the average board size and the proportion of outside directors for US banks are almost twice of those in China.
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Lee, Wanling. "The determinants of board structure : the impact of corporate governance reform and the role of datukship in Malaysian boards." Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013TOU10041.
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Cette thèse vise à étudier la gouvernance des entreprises en Malaisie. Nous examinons les déterminants de la structure du conseil d'administration, le cadre réglementaire, l'impact de la réforme de la gouvernance d'entreprise et le rôle de Datukship dans les conseils d’administration de Malaisie. Le premier chapitre traite de la littérature appliqué à notre sujet. Le deuxième chapitre examine l'impact des réformes de la gouvernance d'entreprise en Malaisie. Nous étudions les tendances et les déterminants de la structure du conseil d’administration et le niveau de conformité des entreprises avec l'exigence du Code Malaisien de la Gouvernance d'Entreprise (le Code). Nous constatons que l'indépendance du conseil d'administration augmente, que les structures du conseil d'administration sont en corrélation avec le niveau de fonctionnement des entreprises et que le niveau de conformité des entreprises malaisiennes est plus élevé que celui des entreprises britanniques. Le troisième chapitre est une étude d’événement qui mesure les effets de l’annonce de l'adoption du Code. Nos résultats suggèrent que le marché réagit positivement à la réforme. Les entreprises liées au gouvernement (GLCs) réagissent positivement à l'annonce mais l’effet est plus modéré pour les entreprises non-GLCs. Le quatrième chapitre présente une nouvelle approche afin d’étudier le rôle des directeurs Datuk. Datuk, est un titre honorifique accordé par les Rois en Malaisie. L’objectif de ce chapitre est d’étudier si la présence de Datuk dans un conseil d’administration profite à celui-ci et améliore la performance financière de l'entrepriseThis thesis aims to study the corporate governance in Malaysia. We examine the determinants of board structure, regulatory framework and the impact of corporate governance reform in Malaysia, and the role of Datukship in Malaysian boards. This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter discusses in general the literature reviews related to our three articles. The first part of the chapter describes the corporate governance theoretical framework. The second part presents a summary of all relevant empirical literatures to our study and makes a comparison on the findings between the developed and developing countries. The gap between these studies is our research interest. The second chapter examines the impact of the reforms, namely Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance by investigating the trends and determinants of board structures in Malaysia. The Code, derived from the recommendation on corporate governance reform in UK, codified the best practices of good governance and described optimal corporate governance structures. However, due to different context of business practices and nature of business environment in emerging markets, we expect that the determinants for the board structure will be different from the developed markets. We also investigate the compliance level of board of directors with the requirement in the Code. In each analysis the results are used to compare with the findings in developed markets. Furthermore, we extend the study to look into the impacts across different size and different types of firms. Overall, we find that the board independence shows an upward trend throughout the years. The compliancy level is higher than UK firms in general. Our results also suggest that board size and board independence are correlated with the operation level of the firms. Different from most findings in US market, we find no evidence that the measures under monitoring hypothesis are related to board independence. The third chapter is an event study, in which we measure the announcement effects of the adoption the Code. The implementation the Code is the most sweeping governance reform in Malaysia to enhance the corporate governance practices. Using an event study methodology demonstrated by Karafiath (1998), our paper concentrates on the announcement effect of those key dates associated with the rules-making process, until the integration of the Code to the listing requirement use the We group the firms into different industry portfolio and different portfolio of size to test the abnormal returns. We then examine specifically the impact of the reform on government-linked companies (GLCs), which are always been claimed to have influence from government on its corporate governance practices. Our findings suggest that the investors perceived the new implementation as good news and market reacts to the news on the final implementation stage but not the initial planning stage. A further investigation on political connected firms shows that GLCs react less positively to the announcement than non-GLCs portfolio. The results for portfolio by size also show a significant positive response to the announcement of new listing requirements. The forth chapter presents a novel attempt to study the role of Datuk Directors in Malaysia. Datuk, is a honorifics titles granted by the King in Malaysia on their birthday and perceived to be something that elevates a person’s social status. It is expected that directors with titles add reputations to the firm and have better network with the important stakeholders. The presence of Datuk on board is a unique phenomenon in Malaysia that provides us a testing ground to study its impact to the board. The goal of this paper is to gain insight on how the presence of Datuk in the board adds value to the board function and further, improves the firm financial performance
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Obaid, Mona. "Board control, firm ownership structure, and chief executive compensation : an empirical analysis." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/mq40203.pdf.
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Dedman, Elisabeth. "The Cadbury Report : its effects on UK board structure and managerial entrenchment." Thesis, Lancaster University, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.288948.
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Hsieh, Wanchen, and 謝宛真. "Board Structure and Hedging." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54736657481250387613.
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碩士國立暨南國際大學
財務金融學系
100
This paper examines whether risk-shifting behavior exists by reducing the hedging probability and extent of hedging in financially distressed firms and whether board structure can affect hedging decision to mitigate risk-shifting. Using the sample of S&P 500 nonfinancial firms over the period 2004 to 2010, we find that board size, number of audit committee, meeting number of audit committee, audit fees, financial experts in audit committee, and number (Percent) of independent directors have a positive effect on whether to hedge and extent of hedging. Furthermore, the active monitoring of board can enhance non-hedging distressed firms to hedging, which can protect creditors against risk-shifting in financially distressed firms. Lastly, we use a corporate governance index to test the strength of governance on hedging and show that the more strongly governed firms the higher probability and extent of hedging and less to perform risk-shifting. Overall, the results suggest that board structure is a good monitoring mechanism on corporate risk management.
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Lin, Guan-hong, and 林冠宏. "Board Structure, Ownership Structure, and Information Transparency." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/14603893114953350465.
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碩士國立成功大學
會計學系碩博士班
95
Information transparency has been a necessary device in corporate governance. To improve the transparency of corporate information disclosures, the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) and the GreTai Securities Market (GTSM) ask help from the Securities and Futures Institute (SFI) to evaluate firms listed in the TSEC and the GTSM. The sample firms of this study are the TSE and OTC listed firms in Taiwan during the period from 2003 to 2005. By employing logistic regressions, the study analyzes the associations between board structure, ownership structure and information transparency. Empirical results reveal the followings. Average directors compensation and independent directors are significantly positively related to information transparency. The proportion of inside directors’ ownership is significantly negatively related to information transparency. The variables of ownership structure show no significance with information transparency. However, the directions of coefficients are the same as expected.
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Liu, Chia-Yun, and 劉家妘. "ownership structure, board structure, and IPO underpricing." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/06398876304383318480.
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碩士銘傳大學
會計學系碩士班
98
The main purpose of this study is to investigate announcement of the new policy to remove first-five-day price the effect limits of Initial Public Offerings』on March 1, 2005, This paper investigates whether the stock prices of IPO reflect to take new policy efficiently. The sample of this study consists of 207 companies engaging in IPO from March 2005 to December 2009. The empirical results show that (1) there is a significantly negative relation between ownership of directors and supervisors with IPO underpricing. (2) And Institutional ownership is positively and significantly related to IPO underpricings. (3) There is a significantly negative relation between large shareholding ratios with IPO underpricings. (4) Rates of the impact of board size are related to IPO underpricings negatively and not significantly.(5) Rates of independent directors and supervisors are related to IPO underpricings negatively and not significantly.
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CHIU, SHU-PING, and 邱淑平. "Board structure and accounting conservatism." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/t997mq.
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碩士中原大學
會計研究所
99
It has the inseparable relationship with the financial quality, due to the domestic and foreign explodes go off the embezzlement issues. In order to yield the board of directors’ characteristic to operate perfectly, need to impel the company to govern the mechanism, and then it could cause the supervising mechanism to bring positive outcomes. According to previous documents, this research shows that the board of directors’ structure is to promotes the financial quality of credit; moreover it has some degree of influence, the conservative accountant is one of financial reports’ characteristic in the accounting principle, besides regarding loss when recognizes the row, possibly already inquired into this problem originates is, in fact has the surveillance potency. In other words, a healthy governance will not only promote the effect, but also increases the finance and accountant’s credibility. The enterprise’s goal is to cause the board of directors’ structure and the conservative accountant relations of effect result, this research mainly inquires into the relationship between the two and the level of degree. This research aim examined from 2003 to 2009 take Taiwanese listed companies as a sample, used simple least squares law (OLS) to discuss the Board structure and accounting conservatism relations. This research reference studied in the past respectively by the market foundation pattern of Beaver & Ryan (2000) and the accrual basis of model of Ahmed et al. (2002) and Givoly and Hayn (2000) to measure accountant’s lever of conservative degree, at same time to use of the board of directors scale, the exterior listed companies director members, the independent director members, chairman holds a concurrent post of general manager, and legal person owning stocks rate for conduct the substitution variable of the board of directors structure. The research discovered that board of directors scale with the exterior listed companies director members, regardless of uses the market foundation pattern or earn the support from the accrual basis model measure pattern, the overall result showed that the enterprise will still use the conservative accounting policy, it indicates certain effect of existence between board of directors’ structure and accountant conservative.
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Chen, Yan Yu, and 陳彥妤. "Board Structure and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38744297595145889854.
Full textAbstract:
碩士大葉大學
企業管理學系碩士班
99
On the other side, the supervision of the board of directors is regarded as the internal mechanism of corporate government. This thesis intends to investigate how the structure of boards affects firm’s earning management as well as its earnings quality. The evidence shows that the propensity to manage a firm’s earnings is increased with the proportion of family members in the board and decreased with the proportion of independent directors. On the other side, earnings quality improves as the proportions of independent directors and shares collateralized by board of directors increased.
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Chang, Ya-Chi, and 張亞琦. "THE DETERMINANTS OF BOARD STRUCTURE." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67293002323281695720.
Full textAbstract:
碩士大同大學
事業經營學系(所)
99
The purpose of this study is to examine the connection between the firm performance and the board structure of Taiwan listed company. Our research is basing on the previous literatures and using a sample of nearly 700 Taiwan listed companies from 2000 to 2009. We believe that the determinants of board structure have great effect on firm performance so we use the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to estimate our model in a simultaneous equation framework. Based on our empirical results, we find that the board size is not significant related to the firm performance but it is positively related to the firm complexity. Moreover, the structure of corporate board is also related to the firm performance.
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黃寶漳. "An study on the board structure, ownership structure." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/97842907022727284549.
Full textAbstract:
碩士明志技術學院
工程管理研究所
92
Corporate governance has become one of the most interesting topics discussed between industrial experts and government authorities. There were 3 main topics for corporate governance：board structure, behavior, and ownership structure. Corporate governance was also treated as one of the key reasons for a corporation''s success and failure. Due to the asymmetrical information between company''s insiders and outsiders, therefore, recently, the issue about information disclosure has been discussed from researchers and practical business experts. In view of above trend, this research takes a view of Corporate Governance to discuss the following problem: How will companies’ board structures and ownership structures affect their information disclosure level? To answer the above question, this research adopts stratified sampling to select 477 TSEC-listed & OTC-listed companies as research samples. Examining process, industry and company scales were controlled, used hierarchical regression to proceed. The empirical results showed as below：(1)Company’s stocks percentage held by the government was positively related to non-financial information disclosure level; (2) The higher company’s board size was, the higher non-financial information disclosure level was; (3)Stock percentage held by a company’s board members was negatively related to non-financial information disclosure level.
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陳芳玲. "The relationship between board structure and self-interested board of directors." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/21172456598307709016.
Full textAbstract:
碩士逢甲大學
金融碩士在職專班
104
This study investigates the relationship between board structure and directors compensation of fat cat company, this study collected the research samples of self-interest board of directors which is “the company of net loss with increasing board payment” listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2009 until 2014.We divide the research samples into three types:the whole industry, electronics industry and non-electronics industry as comparative analysis.The research total samples is 426 observations.The empirical results of the electronics industry samples show that the higher ratio of shareholding of directors and supervisors, the lower directors compensation ,the lower degree of self-interest directors and supervisors.The higher ratio of independent directors, the higher directors compensation.The empirical results of non- electronics industry samples show that the greater of board size, the higer directors compensation,the higer degree of self-interest directors and supervisors. The higher ratio of the chairman of the firm is also its president, the lower directors compensation,the lower degree of self-interest directors and supervisors.
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Mens, Vic. "Board composition and capital structure choice." Master's thesis, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/73596.
Full textAbstract:
The present study addresses how and the extent to which the composition of the board impacts the capital structure choices made by a firm. In particular, the fraction of independent directors, the degree of gender- and nationality diversity, board size, and CEO duality have been analysed. By using a unique panel dataset, this study shows that firms that have a stronger presence of female directors on the board issue more equity as compared to debt. In particular, the results show that when the presence of female directors in the board is at least 30%, firms (1) hold less internal capital as compared to short-term debt and (2) hold more external equity as compared to long-term debt. The results also provide evidence that firms with a larger fraction of independent directors on the board, a larger board size, or CEO who also holds the position of the chairman, use more risky financing sources in their capital structure. On the contrary, firms that have a more nationality diverse board tend to be less levered, and in particular use less long-term debt. Overall, this study echoes the findings in previous studies that certain board attributes should not be ignored in capital structure models.
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TSAI, JUNG-KUN, and 蔡榮坤. "Bank Board Structure and Income Diversification." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/z7kmmn.
Full textAbstract:
博士逢甲大學
金融博士學位學程
107
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss how the structure of board of directors of the bank will affect the diversification of income. This article used 33 banks in Taiwan as an example, using accounting data from 2007 to 2017 as a base structure, to analyze board of directors of bank’s diversification in the country, the board of directors’ member’s character, the bank income diversification, the relationship between non-interest rate income ratio and net interest income. Studies show that the diversification of the structure of the board of director of the bank have an apparent positive effect on the non-interest income ratio. Independent board of director and board of director having dual positions have an apparent positive effect on income diversification and non-interest income ratio, this shows that diversification of the board of directors of the bank helped income diversification. The result of this research proves that this could be reference for government institutions opening up to new business or setting up related laws, at the same time it could provide reference for banking industry or other companies selecting their board of directors.
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Chia-Hui, Yu, and 余佳惠. "A study in board structure, busy boards and performance: evidence from Taiwan banks." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57301779007443295390.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
企業管理學系管理學碩士在職專班
102
We study whether the board structure and busy boards are related to the banks' performance. Based on a sample of 39 banks, we find that banks with large boards and lower number of meetings are associated with performance. After controlling for the systemic relevance of banks in our sample, we find that board size, busy boards, boards’ sex, educational background, attendance rate is especially important, while there is no evidence for board independence. Overall, our results reveal the specialness of banks corporate governance mechanisms.
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Chang, Ming-Huang, and 張銘煌. "Fund Manager Replacement,Board Structure and Performance." Thesis, 1998. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/45442341068905764539.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
金融研究所
86
Abstract In the U.S. mutual fund market, the board must have 40% independent directors, and the fund investors have rights to approve their members . But, the corporate governance of the boards in Taiwan''s funds do not have the above mechanism. In additions, the tenure of the incumbent of fund managers in Taiwan is lower than that in U.S., because mutual fund industry in Taiwan is growth and there are many new funds management company and funds. Managers could be bid away by other fund companies or relocate to a new fund within the same company. This study analyses the relationship between board structure and the performance of funds management company. Furthermore, this study investigates the relationship between performance and manager replacement, and tests whether the performance will be significant higher after managerial replacement. The sample of this study includes the 19 funds management company and 66 closed-end and open-end mutual funds for the period of March 1995 to February 1998. The empirical results are summarized as followed: (1) In the period of September 1995 to March 1997, there is a negative relationship between the probability of managerial replacement and past fund performance. In the period of March 1997 to February 1998, there is a positive relationship between the probability of managerial replacement and past fund performance. The possible explanation might be that the managers could undertake the excessive portfolio risk to obtain better performance. They can be bid away by other fund companies or relocate to a new and large fund within the same company. (2) The performance of managerial replacement between the precedent one year (half year) and subsequent one year (half year) is not significant different. Besides, those overperforming managers tend to relocate to a new and large within the same company , however that would cause the agency problem between the funds management company and investors.(3) There exists a positive relationship between the percentage of foreign institutions seating on the board and the performance of funds management company. The foreign institutions may play an important role on the board because of the supporting investment consultant and fund managers'' portfolio governance.
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Ku, Chia-Wen, and 古佳雯. "The Relationship between Board structure andEarning Management." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/nh8mnm.
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碩士崑山科技大學
企業管理研究所
93
From the suggestion of the World Bank in 1999, the board structure is the main part of corporate governance, which has show the important role of board composition in corporate governance. Fama (1980) [15]show the board composition is helpful to monitor the activity of manager and reduce the agency problems. According to the study of Fudenberg and Tirole (1995)[16], the manager will use the discretionary accruals to manage the earning under different circumstance. In this study we explore the relationship between the board composition and earning management activities. Our empirical results show the independent members of broad have negative relationship with earning management. Before reached the goal of earnings, the board size has positive relationship with earning management and vice versa. Besides, the members with financial background have no significant relationship with earning management.
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Wu, Shu-Fun, and 吳淑芳. "Board Characteristics, Ownership Structure and Information Disclosure." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/13231608478840506604.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立高雄第一科技大學
財務管理所
97
There have been numbers of scandals and corruption around the world since 1998, and those events have aroused a huge influence in the financial market. The controlling shareholders control the board of directors and dominate the major decisions regarding the operation, management, cash flow and allocation of company resources. Because lack of information transparency leads to the asymmetry problem and makes the interest of minority shareholders damaged. In response to solve the problem, the governments amend the related laws and establish lots of regulations to require the companies should build the internal control mechanism and fully disclose all information of financial and important operation decisions. The information disclosure could provide the investors necessary information to do the right choice of investment and also give the outside shareholders a chance to monitor the management of the company. What determines the level of information disclosure? In this study we examine this question from two dimensions one is the characteristics of the board and another is the ownership structure. We hope that we can find some useful proposal for the authorities and some reference for the investors from this empirical evidence. We use the annual report of the firms listed on the stock market in 2007 and the TEJ database for the testing. Empirical results indicate that: the board size, the ratio of independent directors and auditors and the ownership of institution have a positive relationship with the level of information disclosure. The divergence between voting-rights and cash-flow-rights and the ownership of large shareholders have a negative one
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Cheng, Ching-An, and 鄭清安. "Board Structure, Information Transparency and Financial Crisis." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/85070104597531881750.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立屏東科技大學
企業管理系所
96
In recent years, there have been several corporate scandals both in Taiwan and around the world making the corporate governance a global concern. There are two main factors causing these corporate scandals which damage the business itself and the whole society: insufficient information transparency and immoral behaviors of the corporate management. This research aims at analyzing the relationship between the variables of corporate governance and the corporate financial crisis. In the past, what most research papers probed into were either the relationships between corporate governance and its performance, stock prices, and financial qualities or the influence of a single aspect of corporate governance on corporate financial crisis. Very few mentioned the influence of the two main aspects of corporate governance on corporate financial crisis: Information Transparency and Board Structure. This research will probe into what influence both information transparency and board structure have on corporate financial crisis. It is expected that the findings of the research will determine the potential factors of corporate financial crisis. Through logistic regression analysis, we find that the most significant variable on corporate financial crisis is the independence of the board. The analysis shows a significant negative relationship between the independence of the board and the corporate financial crisis, implying that the more independent the board is, the less the probability of a corporate financial crisis will be. The study also shows that independent directors from the outside are of professional knowledge and are more independent and objective in determining, evaluating and monitoring the full-scale development of a business. Therefore, the establishment of independent board can effectively reduce the probability of financial crisis. In the aspect of information disclosure transparency, a significant influential variable on corporate financial crisis is the ranking of a business’ information disclosure transparency. The research results find that businesses that experienced financial crisis usually had a much lower ranking on information disclosure transparency suggesting that if a business can actively increase its information disclosure transparency, it can effectively reduce the probability of a financial crisis. Through a multiple-regression analysis, taking the two aspects the information disclosure transparency and independent board into consideration and dividing all the variables according to the year into model 1 and model 2, the results are consistent. The findings show that if the independence of a Board is higher, it can reduce the probability of a corporate financial crisis. Thus, by initiating corporate governance into businesses with every effort and establishing independent directors, it can reduce the probability of a corporate financial crisis. In the aspect of information disclosure transparency, all of the listed companies and OTC companies’ information transparency and disclosure’s rankings are evaluated and published by the Securities & Futures Institute. The findings suggest that there is a negative relationship between the rankings and corporate financal crisis, implying that the informantion transparency ranking is of valuable in predicting corporate financial crisis. The results are consistent with the conclusions of multiple-regression analysis. In our correlation analysis, after probing into the relationship between board structure and information disclosure transparency, we come to the conclusion that the larger the scale of the board, the higher the information transparency. It may be the reason that when the scale of the board becomes larger, in order to meet the different demands of board members on information, the business has to inevitably strengthen its information disclosure standards. There is a positive relationship between the independence of the board and the mandated disclosure, indicating that the supervision of the independent directors does help promote business’ information disclosure transparency.
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Hsu, Chin-Ning, and 許晉寧. "Is Stock Synchronization Affected by Board Structure?" Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32579687360801365212.
Full textAbstract:
碩士淡江大學
管理科學學系企業經營碩士在職專班
104
This study employs the constituent stocks of Taiwan 50 from 2010 to 2014 as our samples, and then investigates whether stock price synchronization would be affected by board structure, financial statement, and other controlling variables. In this study, we reveal that manager holding ratio and CEO-duality would positively affect stock price synchronization, but director holding ratio might not affect stock price synchronization. In addition, the stock price synchronization are often shown on the firms falling into banking industry and the firms with higher firm scales; whereas, the stock price synchronization are not revealed on the firms falling into electronic industry.
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Wang, Ting-Li, and 王鼎立. "Board Structure and the Informativeness of Earnings." Thesis, 2002. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93437042331272999033.
Full textAbstract:
碩士東吳大學
會計學系
90
As the operating scale of business expands, the separating degree of the ownership and management becomes more evident. The behavior of the business has lasped from the goal of maximizing the stockholders’ wealth. Undoubtedly, it makes agent problems more critically. We must take effective measures to supervise managers to avoid the conflict between managers and stockholders. Since the society and the industrial technology change swiftly, investors are concerned whether financial information.can help them make economic decision. Because investors’s rely heavily on earnings information, whether such information is relevant or not has become a standard to measure if the board of directors play their proper roles. In view of this, the main purpose of this study is to examine the relation between the board structure and the informativeness of earnings. The informativeness of earnings is examined by the earnings-returns relationship. Using firms listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2000, we collect 479 samples. The primary results as follows: 1. The association between earnings and stock returns is inversely related to the fraction of outside directors serving on the board. 2. The association between earnings and stock returns is positively related to the fraction of corporation directors serving on the board. 3. The association between earnings and stock returns is positively related to board size when the board members are less than 13. But the association between earnings and stock returns is inversely related to board size when the board members are more than 13. 4. The association between earnings and stock returns is inversely related to the fraction of shares holding by the board.
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Lin, Fang-Ju, and 林芳如. "The Impact of Ownership Structure, Board Size and Board Composition on Firm Performance." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/vb2mha.
Full textAbstract:
碩士長榮大學
企業管理學系碩士班
98
This article examines the interrelations among ownership structure, board size, board composition and firm performance in a sample of listed companies in Taiwan for the period from 2004 to 2008. Using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, we present evidence of interdependencies between board composition and board size. These findings suggest that cross-sectional Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions of performance on a single governance mechanism may be misleading. The results from OLS regressions indicate a significantly positive relationship between firm performance and board size or board composition, but a significantly negative relationship between performance and ownership structure. However, when the simultaneous equations framework is applied, we find a significantly negative relationship between performance and board size or ownership structure but no significant result for board composition. To enhance the robustness of results, ROA and ROE are both adopted as alternative performance measures and consistent results are found as that with Tobin’s Q.
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WENG, MAN-PING, and 翁曼萍. "Ownership Structure,Corporate Board Structure, Management Structure and Business Performance:Evidence of Financial Holding Companies." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/q6aj8x.
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碩士國立高雄應用科技大學
財富與稅務管理系
104
Cause a sensation several enterprise happen to embezzle in a raw since the United States in 2001, like Anne Long(Enron), the world communication(Worldcom) and Tai can(Tyco) etc., our country also at several cause enterprise of a great sum of economic loss' embezzling, as the Bo attain, Xun disc case etc., and in 1998 I stateowned more than more than 40 become available in the market cabinet company, take place native type financial crisis(namely land mine), the influence all present companies to manage a rightness of large enterprises, then the influence conducts results. This research examines ownership of a share structure, corporate board structure and management structure for the connection of the management results and the enterprise value. Study the sample as the 3rd seasons of from the 1st season 2008 to 2015 it is 14 funds season data. This research adopts EPS, ROA and ROE to regard as to conduct the measuring of results index sign, with Tobin's Q, stock guerdons lead regard as funds enterprise value of measure the index sign, a little bit differently measure the connection that index sign and company manage the of variable with this. The substantial evidences result shows, the agent holds more high funds EPS will also more high, the assumption H3 acquires support; corporate board structure holds a proportion more high funds EPS will also more high, the assumption H4 acquires support; supervisor holds more many golds control industry ROE will also more many, the assumption H4 acquires support; The agent holds more many golds' control industry ROA will be also more many, the assumption H3 acquires support; Supervisor Tung holds more many golds' control industry ROA will be also more high, therefore the assumption H4 acquires support; The big shareholder holds Tobin of more high funds Tobin’s Q will be also more high, the assumption H1 acquires support; The agent holds Tobin of more high fund Tobin’s Q will be also more high, the past assumption H3 acquires support. Key word: Ownership Structure, Corporate Board Structure, Management Structure, Business Performance, Evidence of Financial Holding Companies.
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CHUANG, MEI-LING, and 莊美玲. "Characteristics of Board, Ownership Structure, and Corporate Performance." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/rng6aw.
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碩士長榮大學
經營管理研究所
105
Using a large sample of firms listed on Taiwan Exchange Stock and Taipei Exchange for the period 2002–2015, this study examines the effects of board characteristics and ownership structure on corporate performance. The empirical results suggest that in the board characteristics the board ownership and seats of independent board are associated positively with corporate performance; in ownership structures the managerial, institutional, and ultimate controlling owners’ shareholdings are positively related to corporate performance. Further, this study consolidate the variables in the two board character and ownership structure into two comprehensive board and ownership index and find the effect of comprehensive ownership index on corporate performance for all samples and electronics industry is greater than the effect of comprehensive board index on corporate performance. After consolidate all variables in board characteristics and ownership structure into unique corporate governance index, this study documents the unique corporate governance index and corporate performance is positively related. Finally, the empirical results show link between corporate governance index and corporate performance is less profound for family firm than the nonfamily firms. Keyword: board characteristics, ownership structure, corporate performance
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Hsu, Mei-chih, and 徐美智. "Ownership Structure, Board Composition and Company Financial Performance." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/vq5935.
Full textAbstract:
碩士東吳大學
國際經營與貿易學系
96
Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the issue of corporate governance and how to reinforce an enterprise’s corporate governance to avoid financial scandals have turned out to be a crucial topic studied by related research institutes and become the global limelight. The study conducts an empirical panel data analysis by using data accumulated from TSEC and OTC-listed banks from 1996 to 2006, and uses multiple regress method to analyze family shareholding, foreign investor shareholding and director as well as supervisor share pledge status in Taiwan’s banking industry, and probes the relationship between the important corporate governance variables regarding the internal and external director and supervisor scales and a bank’s operating performance. In the aspect of operating performance measurement, return of assets (ROA), return of equity (ROE), and non-performance loan ratio (NPL ratio) are used as the performance measurement variables. On top of it, factors including bank scales, bank experience values (the length of establishment), financial holding banks or state-run banks, and year dummies have all been taken into account. The empirical results show that foreign investor shareholding and family shareholding have positive influence on bank’s operation performance, whereas director/supervisor share pledge and supervisor scale result in negative influence on the performance, the seats of directors show a significant level against NPL ratio, and internal as well as external supervisors have negative influence on the performance. Bank’s corporate governance has positive influence on its operating performance, which is consistent with the expected change direction as shown in relevant literature. In terms of control variables, it is also found that, as impacted by the Asian financial storm along with the domestic credit card storm, the profit status in Taiwan’s banking industry had turned worse since 1999. However, the NPL rate had significantly lowered since 2003, which illustrates the success of the first financial reform. Nevertheless, there is no significant variance in the operating performance of financial holding or private/public banks and bank scales. In the conclusion of this study, recommendations are put forth to the banking industry and competent authorities as a reference.
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Yeh, Li-Yu, and 葉麗玉. "Ownership Structure, Board Composition and Illegal Corporate Behavior." Thesis, 2000. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/77434985952988860040.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立雲林科技大學
企業管理技術研究所
88
Recently corporate illegal act has become the focus of public attention, because it may cause serious economic and social problems. The main purpose of the study is to exam the relationship among ownership structure, board composition, and corporate illegal act. The sample used includes the data of 118 companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange, excluding banking and insurance industry. By using the Logit Regression method. The research finds out the empirical evidences as follows: 1. The relationship between managers’ shareholding ratio and the possibility of corporate illegal act is a “non-linear”. 2. The possibility of corporate illegal act will be reduced when boards’ shareholding ratio is increased. 3. The concentration of financial institutions’ and large shareholders’ ownership can reduce the possibility of corporate illegal act. 4. The possibility of illegal act will be increased when families’ shareholding ratio is increased. 5. The seat numbers of outside directors, institutional shareholding (such as government and legal entities), and foreign investor’s shareholding have no significant relation to the possibility of illegal corporate act. 6. The monitoring function will be promoted when the company has the high ratio of debt or the size becomes large.
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FU-MEI, LIANG, and 梁富梅. "RELATIONSIP AMONG BOARD STRUCTURE, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORS AND PERFORMANCE." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/65108358462298117701.
Full textAbstract:
博士國立臺北大學
企業管理學系
95
The primary objective of corporate governance is to reduce agency cost, and furthermore, take the advantage of environmental opportunities and threats through the interlocks of boards by the Resource Dependence Theory. A company’s board of directors is at the core of corporate governance. Although literature on boards and firm performance is quite rich, little of it is concerned with inter-organizational relationship. Therefore, the study aims to examine the relationship between board structure and firm performance, and by the mediating role of interlocking directorates, to realize the direct effect and indirect effects of board structure and firm performance. In the past, the empirical results of relevant studies about board structure and firm performance are quite different. The first reason is ignoring the mediating role, and not splitting the outside directors into affiliated directors and independent directors is the second reason. This study intends to understand the effects of the policy about independent directors promoted by Securities & Futures Institute. So there are three variables about board structure: board size, affiliated directors and independent directors. As for the interlocking directorate, there are two variables: intra-industry interlocks and inter-industry interlocks. This study adopted 2005 data on 277 Taiwanese public electronic firms. The data came from annual reports and TEJ. In order to examine the structure of interlocking directorates in Taiwanese electronic firms, the study used UCINET VI . The hypotheses are tested using multi regression models and structure equation model (Lisrel 8.30). Empirical results are summarized as follow: (1). The board size and affiliated directors are not related to firm performance, but independent directors are positively related to firm performance. Hence, independent directors can effectively monitor managers. What’s more, by the mediating role of board interlocks, independent directors allow the firm access to productive resources and information. (2).As predicted, board structure is an important antecedent to board interlocks, especially affiliated and independent directors. Outside directors have rich social network s and resources. (3). In addition, the results demonstrate that different kinds of interlocks have different impacts to firm performance. Because Taiwanese electronic firms cooperate intensively, intra-industry interlock is significantly and positively related to firm performance, whereas inter-industry interlock is not significantly related to firm performance.
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Lin, Yu-Chi, and 林鈺棋. "The effects of Board Structure on Executive Compensation." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16846385766548150093.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立中興大學
會計學研究所
98
Compensation decisions are generally made by the board of directors in publicly listed firms. Thus, the board characteristics play an important role in linking executive pay to firm performance, and as well aligning the interests of managers with shareholders. However, despite the fact that the firm''s earnings shrank during the global financial crisis, numerous top executives receive what many believe to be unreasonably high salaries and bonuses. As a result, firms have been under a lot of scrutiny for excessive executive compensation. This suggests that the boards fail to effectively monitor and evaluate the managers. To shed light on this issue, the purpose of this study is to examine the association between the board structure and the level of executive compensation by using a sample of listed companies in Taiwan from 2006 to 2008. This study uses a fixed effect model to control for unobserved firm characteristic that might explain cross-sectional variation in executive compensation. In addition, this study also controls for standard economic determination of the level of executive compensation, e.g., proxies for the firm size, performance, firm complexity, growth opportunities, firm risk and executive’s tenure. The results show that no positive association between the board size and executives compensation, partly because the boards of Taiwanese firms are very small and thus boards cannot exert influence on executive compensation. Additionally, board independence is shown to have no significant effects on executive compensation. That is, more independent directors are not associated with a reduction in executive compensation. This study finds that managers who also serve as the directors are positively associated with executive compensation. The evidence suggests that firms with entrenched managers reduce the effectiveness of directors’ monitoring, which could lead to excessive executive compensation.
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Peng, Chi-Yun, and 彭淇筠. "The Relationship between Board Structure and Director Compensation." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/09650116184048177168.
Full textAbstract:
碩士大葉大學
管理學院碩士在職專班
103
The study investigated the relationship between board structure and director compensation. The empirical results conclude that: (1) Higher ratio of independent directors would restrain director compensation (2) CEO duality may lower director compensation. (3) The size of the board is positively related to director compensation. (4) Higher pledge ratio of director shareholdings causes lower director compensation after the establishment of compensation committee. Our findings show that both independent director and compensation committee play the supervision role on director compensation.
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CHIOU, YIN-JI, and 邱瀅之. "The Effect of Board Characteristics on Compensation Structure." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30568545760184086758.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立中央大學
企業管理研究所
99
In 2005, Securities and Futures Bureau in Taiwan announced the amendments about the disclosure guidelines of public companies. The original regulation is that companies should disclose the compensation information of top managers and board directors in detail. In the revision, companies just have to divide the compensation to several levels and disclose the number of executives in each level. In this study, we want to investigate the effect of these amendments on the executives’ compensation level and the sensitivity between compensation and performance. This study chooses the companies in Taiwan electronic industry from 2002 to 2008 as the sample data. The empirical analysis result shows that, after the guidelines have been changed, the compensation level of executives is significantly higher, and the sensitivity between compensation and performance is dropped significantly. Furthermore, we analyze this relationship from the view of board characteristics. The result shows that the stronger the board’s monitoring abilities, the less increase of the executive compensation and the less the reduction of sensitivity between compensation and performance.
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Yang, His-Chun, and 楊錫鈞. "Ownership Structure, Board Composition and Dual Earnings Management." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/25509322191733042297.
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碩士東海大學
會計學系
95
Earnings management is a popular issue recently. There are not only manipulating accounting earning, but also taxable income in companies. It named “dual earnings management”. Corporate governance will not only increase operation performance, but also prevent fraud for companies. In this study, I investigate the effects on dual earnings management for controlling shareholders, independent directors and outside directors of corporations, and test the performance of corporate governance in Taiwan. I find that, if controlling shareholders increase their cash-flow right, company is more likely to manipulate both accounting earning and taxable income; if controlling shareholders’ control rights in excess of their cash flow rights evidently, company is also more likely to manipulate both accounting earning and taxable income; if company install the independent directors, or decrease the number of outside directors, it’s also more likely to manipulate both accounting earning and taxable income. These results reveal that the mechanism of increasing the number of outside directors has obvious effects for decreasing dual earnings management, but increasing the number of independent directors has reverse effect.
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Chang, Wei-Hsien, and 張巍獻. "Board Structure, Core Agency Problem and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/86161574051213179767.
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博士逢甲大學
商學博士學位學程
101
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation of board structure as well as core agency problem on earnings management in Taiwan listed companies during 2002-2011 to investigate. The ownership of listed companies are generally controlled and concentrated by controlling shareholders, core agency problems will be easily formed caused by incentive predatory towards minority shareholders; Moreover, managers will use earnings management behavior to encroach on the rights of minority shareholders while planning to meet the earnings benchmarks. For board structure, a company would recruit more board members or appoint more independent directors in the Board of Directors to help fortify the structure of the board. Thus, this study will discuss about whether the board structure and core agency problem would affect the managers’ behavior on earnings management. This study indicates the managers will reduce the manipulation to accruals earnings management, but they still perform real earnings management to cross the threshold of earnings. From the perspective on the deviation between controlling rights and cash flow rights increases for the controlling shareholders, managers will increase significantly on participating earnings management because the bigger the board size is, the more core agency problems exist. Increased the number of members for the board will improve the fiscal oversight abilities in the Board of Directors, and other shareholders with higher cash flow rights in the same company also prefer to strengthen the same competence for controlling shareholders. Over all, the managers will decrease the behaviors of earnings management. Further, according to aspects of the increasing deviation between controlling seats and cash flow rights for controlling shareholders, managers will reduce significantly on participating earnings management since the stronger board independence is, the lower core agency problems turn out. However, controlling shareholders still have the voting rights to make the list of independent directors; the core agency problem won’t be decreased. After that, the managers will still perform the manipulation to real earnings management because of more independent directors in the Board of Directors. Overall, this research is aimed to provide a line of discussion on how the strengthening of corporate governance depends on the monitoring effect from the board structure. However, the relevant agencies of Taiwan probably need to make more efforts on the independent directors’ abilities to expand the capacity of existing programs and services.
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ERDENETSOGT, MUNKHKHUREL, and 蒙丹. "Board Structure, Corporate Governance and Bank Systematic Risk." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/rtk364.
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碩士南華大學
財務金融學系財務管理碩士班
106
This paper examines the impact of the structure of the board of directors and corporate governance on the systematic risk of banks from the perspective of global listed banks from 2006 to 2016. The empirical results show that the larger the size of the board of directors, the higher the ratio of independent directors and female directors can significantly reduce the bank systemic risk. In addition, the higher the quality of bank management, the more significantly the systematic risk of the bank will be reduced. Our research contributes to promote effective corporate governance by studying and complimenting bank systemic risk.
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HUANG, YU-LING, and 黃郁玲. "Board Characteristics, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance Evaluation." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/rx8t3q.
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碩士國立高雄科技大學
財務管理系
107
What determines the level of corporate governance evaluation? In this study we examine this question from two dimensions one is the characteristics of the board and another is the ownership structure. We hope that we can find some useful proposal for the authorities and some reference for the investors from this empirical evidence. This study investigates listed companies in Taiwan from 2015 to 2017. Empirical results indicate that(1) Board Characteristics: the board size and the ratio of independent directors have a positive relationship with the level of Corporate Governance Evaluation ; CEO duality and directors remuneration have a negative relationship with the level of Corporate Governance Evaluation ; The pledged shares ratio of directors have a positive relationship with the level of Corporate Governance Evaluation but not significant.(2) Ownership Structure: the ratio of large shareholders and the shareholding ratio of corporations and the shareholding ratio of government agencies have a positive relationship with the level of corporate governance evaluation.
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Chen, Yi-Ting, and 陳怡婷. "The Relationship between board structure, ownership structure and environmental pollution information disclosure." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/avv6r2.
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碩士淡江大學
會計學系碩士班
96
This paper aims to examines the impact of board structure and ownership structure on environmental pollution information disclosure. Board structure is characterized by size of the board, the proportion of independent directors, the proportion of family members on the board and dual leadership structure. Ownership structure is characterized by the proportion of shares owned by insiders, the proportion of shares owned by institutional investor and controlling shareholders with the degree of control rights deviating from cash flow rights. Divide the environmental information disclosure into non-voluntary and voluntary environmental disclosure. 2922 samples have been chosen form publicly listed companies. The empirical results show poor condition of Taiwan’s environmental pollution information disclosure, no matter voluntary or non-voluntary. It may due to the companies look environmental pollution information as business secret and the cost of disclosure is higher than the benefit of disclosure. Our results show that board size, the proportion of independent directors and the proportion of family members on the board is positively related to the environmental pollution information disclosure. However, the proportion of shares owned by insiders and by institutional investor is negatively related to the environmental pollution information disclosure. Moreover, controlling shareholders with the degree of control rights deviating from cash flow rights is positively related to the environmental pollution information disclosure. We also find that larger firms, companies with higher environmental pollution industries and having ISO14001 firms is significantly positively related to the environmental pollution information disclosure.
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Hua, Chen Wen, and 陳玟樺. "The effect of capital structure and board structure on CEO compensation-performance sensitivity." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/33159292203261951671.
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碩士中國文化大學
會計研究所
96
The purpose of this paper is how CEO compensation is related to firms’ debt capital and board characteristics. There are two kinds of agency problems: one is shareholder-manager conflict, the other is shareholder-bondholder conflict. Because of convertible debt has both debt and equity fund characteristics, it can mitigate shareholder-bondholder conflicts, debt measures that exclude convertible debt are a more precise proxy for examine the effect of stockholder-bondholder conflicts that could be mitigated through the use of deferent types of debt. A firm’s board characteristics can make different effect on agency problems. If the effectiveness of the board is greater, monitor factor can alignment agency problem between stockholders and manager. Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms, I find that compensation -performance sensitivity decreases in straight debt leverage, but is higher in firms with convertible debt. This results support the prediction that firms exist the trade-off effect through shareholder-manager and shareholder-bondholder conflicts of interest. Moreover, I find that pay-performance sensitivity increases in board size and CEO ownership, but is lower in outside director percentage. This results support the prediction that board characteristic exist significant relationship to CEO compensation-performance
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Liu, Yueh-Lin, and 劉玥麟. "The impact of corporate social responsibility on board structure." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29300088930448910906.
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碩士國立中興大學
會計學研究所
104
The development of Corporate Social Responsibility (hereafter CSR) can be traced back to 1970s. CSR relevant issues have since been the focal point of attention due to the rise of civic consciousness. Developed countries have implemented CSR for years, However, the authorities of Taiwan has delayed the regulations until 2015, which mandates public companies with capital over 10 billion to provide CSR reports. For implementation of company’s policy, the Board plays a vital role in decision-making and supervision. Different Board structures have enormous gap in the viewpoints of CSR policy. In this study, I intend to explore how the Board structures impact on the implementation of CSR policy. The sample is composed of public companies conform to sampling criteria from 2006 to 2014. I use the ‘CRS TOP 50’ companies selected by the Common Wealth Magazine during 2007 and 2015 as my research sample, the final sample are 350 firm-years. I employ Logistic and Tobit regression models to conduct the empirical tests. The results show that Board size and the proportion of independent directors have significant and positive relationship with CSR policy. Female directors of board are significantly and negatively related to CSR policy. The dual roles of Chairman of the Board and CEO hypothesis is not supported. I conjecture that the dual roles has relatively less influence on CSR policy, hence, the empirical result does not gain statistical significance.