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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Bidding'
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Peng, Tengshun. "Bidding strategy and empirical analysis of bidding in electrical power market." Online access for everyone, 2006. http://www.dissertations.wsu.edu/Dissertations/Spring2006/t%5Fpeng%5F011406.pdf.
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Wilenius, Jim. "Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala universitet, Avdelningen för datalogi, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-102960.
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This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of computer science, optimization and economics. A combinatorial auction is an auction where many items are sold simultaneously and where bidders may submit indivisible combinatorial bids on groups of items. It is commonly believed that good solutions to the allocation problem can be achieved by allowing combinatorial bidding. Determining who wins in a combinatorial auction is fundamentally different from a traditional single-item auction because we are faced with a hard and potentially intractable optimization problem. Also, unless we are limited to truthful mechanisms, game theoretic analysis of the strategic behavior of bidders is still an open problem. We have chosen primarily to study the first-price combinatorial auction, a natural auction widely used in practice. Theoretical analysis of this type of auction is difficult and little has been done previously. In this thesis we investigate and discuss three fundamental questions with significant practical implications for combinatorial auctions. First, because the number of possible bids grows exponentially with the number of items, limitations on the number of bids are typically required. This gives rise to a problem since bidders are unlikely to choose the "correct" bids that make up the globally optimal solution. We provide evidence that an expressive and compact bidding language can be more important than finding the optimal solution. Second, given a first-price (sealed-bid) combinatorial auction, the question of equilibrium bidding strategies remains an open problem. We propose a heuristic for finding such strategies and also present feasible strategies. And finally, is a first-price combinatorial auction worth pursuing compared to the simpler simultaneous (single-item) auction? We prove, through a model capturing many fundamental properties of multiple items scenarios with synergies, that the first-price combinatorial auction produces higher revenue than simultaneous single-item auctions. We provide bounds on revenue, given a significantly more general model, in contrast to previous work.
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Gao, Feng. "Optimal GENCO bidding strategy." [Ames, Iowa : Iowa State University], 2007.
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Tang, Wing-hung, and 鄧永雄. "Bidding strategy: the consultants' perspective." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2004. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B29611428.
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Woolever, Jason R. (Jason Richard) 1978. "Evolving a bridge bidding system." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/86753.
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Thesis (M.Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2001.Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-62).
by Jason R. Woolever.
M.Eng.
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Fioriti, Andrés. "Essays on bidding with securities." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2016. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/87910/.
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Chapter 1 partially surveys auctions with contingent contracts, i.e., contracts in which payments are allowed to depend on an ex-post verifiable variable, such as revenues. The review starts with the seminal paper of DeMarzo et al. (2005) and partially departs from Skrzypacz (2013) by analyzing on externalities and risk aversion concerns. A partial ranking of auction revenues for auctions that differ in terms of contract forms, pricing rules and seller commitment are described. Models incorporating adverse selection, moral hazard, competition between auctioneers, externalities and risk aversion are discussed. In Chapter 2 we study second price auctions, where buyers compete for the allocation of a project, by bidding securities over project's realized value. In addition, we allow for negative externalities, which are suffered by the losers in case the winner implements the project. Under this environment, we introduce two payment instruments: the Fixed-Equity Hybrid -which embeds cash- and the Fixed-Cash Hybrid -which embeds equity. As our main result, we rank the instruments in terms of revenue, and show that the fixed-equity hybrid is the best instrument whereas equity is the worst despite being the most sensitive instrument to bidders' true type. Finally, in Chapter 3 second-price auctions, where buyers compete for the allocation of a project, by bidding securities over project's realized value are studied. In addition, bidders are allowed to be asymmetric not only with respect to their underlying distribution of payoffs but also with respect to their risk aversion. Under this environment, it is shown that steeper securities provide higher insurance. As a main result, the instruments are ranked in terms of efficiency, and shows that the steepest security minimizes the efficiency loss when bidders are indeed asymmetric. Moreover, steeper securities are shown to increase revenue for the seller as in DeMarzo et al. (2005).
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Shao, Lusheng. "Competitive Bidding in Supply Chains." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/12925.
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This thesis is primarily concerned with the competition between suppliers for a buyer’s procurement business with consideration of subcontracting, commitment and capacity reservation. Under the circumstance where suppliers face diseconomies of scale, it may be cost effective for a buyer to split an order across different suppliers. Even when the buyer chooses only one supplier, the winning supplier may subcontract part of the work to the others subsequently. Motivated by these observations, Chapter 2 studies a supplier bidding game where a buyer requests quotes from two competing suppliers. We consider two procurement scenarios: (1) Order Splitting where each supplier submits a function bid which specifies different payments for different quantities, and the buyer may split the order; (2) Single-Sourcing Commitment where the buyer commits to purchasing from only one supplier before suppliers submit their bids, and the winning supplier may subsequently subcontract with the losing one. The second and third papers investigate the competitive behaviour of suppliers with capacity reservation. To hedge against financial risks, the suppliers often require a buyer to reserve capacity in advance by paying an upfront fee. In Chapter 3, we consider a discrete version of this problem where competing suppliers each choose a reservation price and an execution price for blocks of capacity, and the buyer needs to decide which blocks to reserve. Chapter 4 studies a continuous version of the problem where we allow general cost functions. The suppliers compete by offering the price functions (for reservation and execution) and the buyer decides how much to reserve from each supplier. This thesis sheds light on how suppliers compete with each other by considering a variety of factors. We believe an in-depth look at the competitive behaviour of suppliers will deepen our understanding of a buyer’s procurement process, and hence helps a buyer make a better sourcing decision.
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Nourah, Bander Taher K. "Development of strategic mark up decision by contractors in Saudi Arabia." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2013. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/development-of-strategic-mark-up-decision-by-contractors-in-saudi-arabia(029325ca-33ac-4fa4-82e3-d12f1bfd7387).html.
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Competitive bidding is a common practice in business. The main aim of this research is to develop a practical bidding model. This includes studying existing bidding models used by organisations and verifying the developed model. Various factors have been identified and analysed in order to identify the weight and ranking order of each factor in terms of its influence on the bid mark up size. Interviews have been conducted to explore the current practical practice in setting mark up size in Saudi Arabia and to identify factors that may influence bid mark up size. In addition, a questionnaire has been used to identify each factor’s level of importance in Saudi Arabia. The findings have been used to establish a ranking order of factors in terms of their influence on bidding decisions based on contractors' size and main client. An important discovery is that the level of importance and rank of factors that influence bid mark up size differ based on contractors' characteristics and main client. The characteristic which has been investigated in this research is the size of the contractor. As a result, a bidding model to determine mark up size based on contractors' size and main clients has been developed. The proposed model has been tested and proved accurate in simulating the contractors’ decisions.
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Sparks, Janet D. "A Methodology for Estimating the Level of Aggressiveness in Competitive Bidding Markets." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/36057.
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Competitive bidding, where the project is awarded to the lowest bidder, is a basic part of the construction industry. This method of project delivery is designed to promote healthy competition in an attempt ensure the lowest price for the project. A contractor knows that lowering a bid price increases his probability of being awarded the project. However, without a clear understanding of the market in which he is competing, he can not know how low he should bid in order to win. One of the most important competitive forces in a competitive bidding market is the how low the contractors are willing bid, i.e., how aggressively they are pursuing the project. Contractors need a simple way to examine the level of aggressiveness in their market.
The purpose of this research is to develop a methodology to enable contractors to better understand this level of aggressiveness. The level of aggressiveness is quantified by the ratio of the low bid to the pack price, where the pack price is defined as the lower of the two bids that are closest together. The examination of two competitive bidding markets--the Virginia Department of Transportation market between 1996 and 1998 and the Tennessee Department of Transportation market from 1996 to 1998--tests the validity of the methodology. The methodology for estimating the level of aggressiveness in a competitive bidding market produces a set of success curves and charts, which can be used by contractors to optimize their competitive bid amounts for future projects.
Master of Science
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Buisman, Jacco. "Game Theory and Bidding for Software Projects An Evaluation of the Bidding Behaviour of Software Engineers." Thesis, Blekinge Tekniska Högskola, Institutionen för programvaruteknik och datavetenskap, 2002. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-5850.
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The conception phase is one of the most important phases of software projects. In this phase it is determined which software development company will perform a software project. To obtain a software project, companies can have several bidding strategies. This thesis investigates if and how game theory can be a helpful tool to evaluate bidding for software projects. This thesis can be divided into two different parts: a theoretical and a practical. The theoretical part investigates the applicable parts of game theory in this thesis, explains what software projects are, explains the difference between costing and bidding and provides results of a literature survey about bidding behaviour. The practical part introduces a study to investigate strategies and bidding behaviour of software engineers, explains the experimental design that found the study, provides the results of the performed study and a discussion of the results. This thesis concludes that game theory contains some concepts that make it possible to evaluate bidding for software projects.Jacco Buisman Bonairestraat 32 9715 SE Groningen The Netherlands
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Braathen, Jørgen, and Anders Lund Eriksrud. "Hydropower Bidding Using Linear Decision Rules." Thesis, Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Institutt for industriell økonomi og teknologiledelse, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:no:ntnu:diva-24844.
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This thesis investigates the Linear Decision Rule (LDR) approach applied to the bidding problem of a Nordic hydropower producer with reservoir capacity. A stochastic programming model with piecewise LDR in the spot prices is developed. A comprehensive case study with uncertain spot prices conducted for the fall of 2012 shows that the LDR model performs equally well as a scenario based model on expectation, yet with a smaller standard deviation in the profits. The runtime of the LDR model is substantially longer than the runtime of the scenario based model. Therefore, promising techniques to reduce the runtime are developed and presented.
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Vadovic, Rado. "Bidding Behavior in Internet Auction Markets." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/195016.
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In this dissertation I study bidding behavior in Internet Auction Markets. I focus on practice called "multiple bidding" which occurs when a single bidder places numerous bids throughout the same auction. Multiple bidding appears frequently in the data but the incentives that motivate it are not well understood. In the first chapter I develop a theoretical model in which multiple bidding is an equilibrium behavior by rational bidders. The model has a dynamic auction with two bidders who can search for outside prices while bidding in the auction. Each bidder has a search cost which is her private information. When outside prices are private (independently drawn and identically distributed), then, there is an equilibrium in which bidders with the lower search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with higher search costs bid both early and late and search as if they coordinated their search decisions, i.e., the bidder with the lower search cost searches and the other bidder does not. This equilibrium by itself provides an explanation of two frequently occurring bidding patterns (late and multiple bidding). In the second chapter I study experimentally the effect of early bids in dynamic auctions on how bidders search for outside prices. The design has two bidders participating in an ascending clock-auction during which any one of the bidders can pause the auction clock. This I interpret as placing an early bid. Once the auction is paused both bidders can simultaneously search for an alternative outside price. Results indicate that pausing decisions by subjects impact their subsequent searching for outside prices, i.e., whether a subject decides to search or not depends on whether she has paused the auction or not. Subjects behave as if they coordinated their searching decisions: the bidder who pauses the auction also searches with high frequency and the other bidder does not. Because this type of behavior increases both the efficiency and the profitability of the auction we favor the use of policies that promote early bidding in practice, such as, longer auctions and lower public reserve prices.
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Engman, Kristofer. "Bidding models for bond market auctions." Thesis, KTH, Matematisk statistik, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-252346.
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In this study, we explore models for optimal bidding in auctions on the bond market using data gathered from the Bloomberg Fixed Income Trading platform and MIFID II reporting. We define models that aim to fulfill two purposes. The first is to hit the best competitor price, such that a dealer can win the trade with the lowest possible margin. This model should also take into account the phenomenon of the Winner's Curse, which states that the winner of a common value auction tends to be the bidder who overestimated the value. We want to avoid this since setting a too aggressive bid could be unprofitable even when the dealer wins. The second aim is to define a model that estimates a quote that allows the dealer to win a certain target ratio of trades. We define three novel models for these purposes that are based on the best competitor prices for each trade, modeled by a Skew Exponential Power distribution. Further, we define a proxy for the Winner's Curse, represented by the distance of the estimated price from a reference price for the trade calculated by Bloomberg which is available when the request for quote (RFQ) arrives. Relevant covariates for the trades are also included in the models to increase the specificity for each trade. The novel models are compared to a linear regression and a random forest regression method using the same covariates. When trying to hit the best competitor price, the regression models have approximately equal performance to the expected price method defined in the study. However, when incorporating the Winner's Curse proxy, our Winner's Curse adjusted models are able to reduce the effect of the Winner's Curse as we define it, which the regression methods cannot. The results of the models for hitting a target ratio show that the actual hit ratio falls within an interval of 5% of the desired target ratio when running the model on the test data. The inclusion of covariates in the models does not impact the results as much as expected, but still provide improvements with respect to some measures. In summary, the novel methods show promise as a first step towards building algorithmic trading for bonds, but more research is needed and should incorporate more of the growing data set of RFQs and MIFID II recorded transaction prices.I denna studie utforskar vi modeller för optimal budgivning för auktioner på obligationsmarknaden med hjälp av data som samlats in från plattformen Bloomberg Fixed Income Trading och MIFID II-rapportering. Vi definierar modeller som ämnar att uppfylla två syften. Det första är att träffa det bästa konkurrentpriset så att en handlare kan vinna auktionen med minsta möjliga marginal. Denna modell bör också ta hänsyn till fenomenet Winner's Curse, som innebär att vinnaren av en så kallad common value auction tenderar att vara den budgivare som överskattat värdet. Vi vill undvika detta eftersom det kan vara olönsamt att skicka ett alltför aggressivt bud även om handlaren vinner. Det andra syftet är att definiera en modell som uppskattar ett pris som gör det möjligt för handlaren att vinna en viss andel av sina obligationsaffärer. Vi definierar tre nya modeller för dessa ändamål som bygger på de bästa konkurrentpriserna för varje transaktion vi har data på. Dessa modelleras av en Skew Exponential Power-fördelning. Vidare definierar vi en variabel som indirekt mäter fenomenet Winner's Curse, representerad av budprisets avstånd från ett referenspris för transaktionen beräknad av Bloomberg som är tillgänglig när en request for quote (RFQ) anländer. Relevanta kovariat för transaktionen implementeras också i modellerna för att öka specificiteten för varje transaktion. De nya modellerna jämförs med en linjärregression och en random forest-regression som använder samma kovariat. När målet är att träffa det bästa konkurrentpriset ger regressionsmodellerna ungefär samma resultat som expected price-modellen som definieras i denna studie. När man däremot integrerar effekten av Winner's Curse med den definierade indirekta variablen kan vår Winner's Curse-justerade modell minska effekten av Winner's Curse, vilket regressionsmetoderna inte kan. Resultaten av modellerna som ämnar vinna en förbestämd andel av transaktionerna visar att den faktiska andelen transaktioner som man vinner faller inom ett intervall på 5% kring den önskade andelen när modellen körs på testdata. Att inkludera kovariat i modellerna påverkar inte resultaten till den grad som uppskattades, men ger mindre förbättringar med avseende på vissa mättal. Sammanfattningsvis visar de nya metoderna potential som ett första steg mot att bygga algoritmisk handel för obligationer, men mer forskning behövs och bör utnyttja mer av den växande datamängden av RFQs och MIFID II-rapporterade transaktionspriser.
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McCann, M. "The role of the bidding process in the corporate governance of bidding firms : the case of abandoned acquisitions." Thesis, Nottingham Trent University, 2013. http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/224/.
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This thesis is structured around an empirical investigation of the experience of bidding firms in abandoned acquisitions. Existing research suggests that, in certain circumstances, abandoned acquisitions may play a governance role, disciplining bidder managers for proposing acquisitions which reduce shareholder wealth. However, there has been little work analysing how, and in what circumstances, abandoned acquisitions perform this governance role. This research addresses this gap, by investigating the causal mechanisms of abandoned acquisitions and their aftermath. The thesis develops an innovative, multi-dimensional conceptual framework, blending existing theories of acquisitions and corporate governance. This framework guides the empirical investigation, which uses the causal process tracing (CPT) method, not previously adopted in this field. The work builds cumulatively, to analyse the causal mechanisms, in cases of abandoned acquisitions, involving UK bidding firms. To enhance the identification of the nature of the impact of abandonment on bidding firms; disciplinary or otherwise, a different conceptualisation of the post-abandonment experience of bidding firms is adopted. The research builds on this, by selecting distinctive cases; firms with disciplinary experiences and firms with non-disciplinary experiences. CPT is employed to analyse primary and secondary data, revealing the causal mechanisms present in these distinctive cases. As a result, meta-causal mechanisms are proposed. These are particular contingent generalisations, which apply to particular groups of cases. These fine-tune existing theoretical explanations, identifying how, and in what circumstances, variables interact. Disciplinary processes after abandoned acquisitions can be traced to causal mechanisms characterised by strategic uncertainty, raised by information revealed during the bidding process. Conversely, non-disciplinary processes after abandoned acquisitions cannot be traced to the causal mechanisms of abandonment. In these cases, the causal pathology of abandonment is localised. The bidder‟s offer price is too low and acquisitions are abandoned to avoid over-paying. The research implies that more effort should be made to enhance the flow of information in the bidding process. In addition, active monitoring is more nuanced than anticipated. This active monitoring should have a positive effect on acquisition decisions, producing enhanced shareholder wealth.
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Hertig, Donald L. "Second price sealed bidding in government contracting." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1994. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA297105.
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Thesis (M.S. in Management) Naval Postgraduate School, December 1994."December 1994." Thesis advisor(s): Katsuaki L. Terasawa, Mark W. Stone. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.
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SANTOS, BRUNO FANZERES DOS. "ROBUST STRATEGIC BIDDING IN AUCTION-BASED MARKETS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2017. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=36790@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROCOORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
PROGRAMA DE DOUTORADO SANDUÍCHE NO EXTERIOR
Nesta de tese de doutorado é proposta uma metodologia alternativa para obter estratégias ótimas de oferta sob incerteza que maximizam o lucro de um agente em mercados dotados de um leilão de preço uniforme e envelope fechado com multiplos produtos divisíveis. A estratégia ótima de um agente price maker depende amplamente da informação conhecida dos agentes rivais. Reconhecendo que a oferta dos agentes rivais pode desviar do equilíbrio de mercado e é de difícil caracterização probabilística, nós propomos um modelo de otimização robusta dois estágios com restrições de equilíbrio para obter estratégias de oferta ótimas avessas a risco. O modelo proposto é um modelo de otimização de três níveis passível de ser reescrito como uma instância particular de um programa binível com restrições de equilíbrio. Um conjunto de procedimentos é proposto a fim de construir uma formulação equivalente de de nível único adequado para aplicação de algoritmos de Geração de Coluna e Restrição (GCC). Diferentemente de trabalhos publicados anteriormente em modelos de otimização dois estágios, nossa metodologia de solução não aplica o método de GCC para iterativamente identificar os cenários mais violados dos fatores de incerteza, variáveis que são identificadas através de variáveis contínuas. Na metodologia de solução proposta, o algoritmo GCC é aplicado para identificar um pequeno subconjunto de condições de otimalidade para o modelo de terceiro nível capaz de representar as restrições de equilíbrio do leilão na solução ótima do problema master (problema de oferta). Um estudo de caso numérico baseado em mercados de energia de curto prazo é apresentado para ilustrar a aplicabilidade do modelo robusto proposto. Resultados indicam que mesmo em um caso em que é observada uma imprecisão de 1 porcento na oferta de equilíbrio de Nash dos agentes rivais, a solução robusta provê uma redução significativa de risco em uma análise fora da amostra.
We propose an alternative methodology to devise prot-maximizing strategic bids under uncertainty in markets endowed with a sealed-bid uniformprice auction with multiple divisible products. The optimal strategic bid of a price maker agent largely depends on the knowledge (information) of the rivals bidding strategy. By recognizing that the bid of rival competitors may deviate from the equilibrium and are of difficult probabilistic characterization, we proposed a two-stage robust optimization model with equilibrium constraints to devise an risk-averse strategic bid in the auction. The proposed model is a trilevel optimization problem that can be recast as a particular instance of a bilevel program with equilibrium constraints. Reformulation procedures are proposed to construct a single-level-equivalent formulation suitable for column and constraint generation (CCG) algorithm. Differently from previously reported works on two-stage robust optimization, our solution methodology does not employ the CCG algorithm to iteratively identify violated scenarios for the uncertain factors, which in this thesis are obtained through continuous variables. In the proposed solution methodology, the CCG is applied to identify a small subset of optimality conditions for the third-level model capable of representing the auction equilibrium constraints at the optimum solution of the master (bidding) problem. A numerical case study based on short-term electricity markets is presented to illustrate the applicability of the proposed robust model. Results show that even for the case where an impression of 1 percent on the rivals offer at the Nash equilibrium is observed, the robust solution provides a non-negligible risk reduction in out-of-sample analysis.
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Zhang, W. "Optimal real-time bidding for display advertising." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2016. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1496878/.
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Real-Time Bidding (RTB) is revolutionising display advertising by facilitating a real-time auction for each ad impression. As they are able to use impression-level data, such as user cookies and context information, advertisers can adaptively bid for each ad impression. Therefore, it is important that an advertiser designs an effective bidding strategy which can be abstracted as a function - mapping from the information of a specific ad impression to the bid price. Exactly how this bidding function should be designed is a non-trivial problem. It is a problem which involves multiple factors, such as the campaign-specific key performance indicator (KPI), the campaign lifetime auction volume and the budget. This thesis is focused on the design of automatic solutions to this problem of creating optimised bidding strategies for RTB auctions: strategies which are optimal, that is, from the perspective of an advertiser agent - to maximise the campaign's KPI in relation to the constraints of the auction volume and the budget. The problem is mathematically formulated as a functional optimisation framework where the optimal bidding function can be derived without any functional form restriction. Beyond single-campaign bid optimisation, the proposed framework can be extended to multi-campaign cases, where a portfolio-optimisation solution of auction volume reallocation is performed to maximise the overall profit with a controlled risk. On the model learning side, an unbiased learning scheme is proposed to address the data bias problem resulting from the ad auction selection, where we derive a "bid-aware'' gradient descent algorithm to train unbiased models. Moreover, the robustness of achieving the expected KPIs in a dynamic RTB market is solved with a feedback control mechanism for bid adjustment. To support the theoretic derivations, extensive experiments are carried out based on large-scale real-world data. The proposed solutions have been deployed in three commercial RTB systems in China and the United States. The online A/B tests have demonstrated substantial improvement of the proposed solutions over strong baselines.
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He, Minghua. "Designing bidding strategies for autonomous trading agents." Thesis, University of Southampton, 2004. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/259999/.
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Increasingly many systems are being conceptualised, designed and implemented as marketplaces in which autonomous software entities (agents) trade services. These services can be commodities in e-commerce applications or data and knowledge services in information economies. In such systems, dynamic pricing through some form of negotiation or auction protocol is becoming the norm for many goods and customers. Thus, negotiation capabilities for software agents are a central concern. Specifically, agents need to be able to prepare bids for and evaluate offers on behalf of the parties they represent with the aim of obtaining the maximum benefit for their users. They do this according to some negotiation strategies. However, in many cases, determining which strategy to employ is a complex decision making task because of the inherent uncertainty and dynamics of the situation. To this end, this thesis is concerned with developing bidding strategies for a range of auction contexts. In this thesis, we focus on a number of agent mediated e-commerce settings. In particular, we design novel strategies for the continuous double auctions, for the international trading agent competition that involves multiple interrelated auctions, and for multiple overlapping English auctions. All these strategies have been empirically benchmarked against the main other models that have been proposed in the literature and, in all cases, our strategies have been shown to be superior in a wide range of circumstances. Moreover all our models exploit soft computing methods, in particular fuzzy logic and neuro-fuzzy techniques. Such methods are used to cope with the significant degrees of uncertainty that exist in on-line auctions and we show they are a practical solution method for this class of applications. In developing such strategies we believe this work represents an important step towards realising the full potential of bidding agents in e-commerce scenarios.
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Anthony, Patricia. "Bidding agents for multiple heterogeneous online auctions." Thesis, University of Southampton, 2003. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/257838/.
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Due to the proliferation of online auctions, there is an increasing need to monitor and bid in multiple auctions in order to procure the best deal for the desired good. To this end, this thesis reports on the development of a heuristic decision making framework that an autonomous agent can exploit to tackle the problem of bidding across multiple auctions with varying start and end times and with varying protocols (including English, Dutch and Vickrey). The framework is flexible, configurable, and enables the agent to adopt varying tactics and strategies that attempt to ensure that the desired item is delivered in a manner consistent with the user's preferences. Given this large space of possibilities, a genetic algorithm is employed to search (offline) for effective strategies in common classes of environment. The strategies that emerge from this evolution are then codified into the agent's reasoning behaviour so that it can select the most appropriate strategy to employ in its prevailing circumstances. The proposed framework has been implemented in a simulated marketplace environment and its effectiveness has been empirically demonstrated.
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Kian, Ashkan Rahimi. "Bidding strategies in dynamic energy multi-markets /." The Ohio State University, 2001. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1486399451959148.
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Bryan, Kevin. "Generalized Second Price Auctions with Hierarchical Bidding." VCU Scholars Compass, 2008. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/1608.
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The sale of text advertisements on search engines using an auction format called Generalized Second Price (GSP) has become increasingly common. GSP is unique in that it allows bidders to revise their bid if they are unhappy with the result of the auction, and because the auction sells multiple units of a related good simultaneously. We model this sale as a hierarchical game with complete information, allowing one potential bidder to bid in each stage. The hierarchical game has an entirely different set of equilibria from the simultaneous bid game studied in earlier research on this auction. Under hierarchical bidding, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves guarantees higher auctioneer revenue than any equilibrium in GSP.
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Norling, Malin, and Sofia Hjulfors. "Bidding strategies in the Swedish housing market." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för matematik och matematisk statistik, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-134399.
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This report focuses on an introduction of game theoretical models and how they can be applied in the Swedish housing market. Game theory is a study of mathematical models of human conflicts and cooperation between rational decision makers within a competitive situation. There are several different strategies that a player can use. In this thesis each strategy is assigned to one player. So how will the players behave in a game, and what strategy is the most successful? By using the software MatLab, the authors creates a game where the strategies assigned to each player gets randomly distributed budgets and are randomly selected to place bids during the game. The game is then played 1 000 000 times to see what strategy is the most successful. It is also tested to see what strategy is the most successful if the players have the same budgets. The authors conclude that in practice it is the size of the budget that determines who will win the bidding, hence there are minor differences between the different strategies in how much they pay on average to win.Denna rapport fokuserar på en introduktion av spelteoretiska mo-deller och hur de kan som kopplas till den svenska bostadsmarknaden. Spelteori är en studie om matematiska modeller för mänskliga konflikter och samarbete mellan rationella beslutstagare i en konkurrensut- satt marknad. Det finns flera olika strategier en spelare kan använda sig av. I denna rapport blir varje spelare tilldelad en strategi. Så frågan ställs hur spelarna kommer att bete sig och vilken av strategierna som är den mest framgångsrika. Genom att använda programvaran Matlab, skapar författarna ett program där varje strategi är tilldelad varje spelare och som helt slumpmässigt får en budget och även blir slumpmässigt valda att spela, d.v.s lägga bud under spelets gång. Spelet spelas därefter 1 000 000 gånger för att se vilken av strategierna som är mest framgångsrik. Det är även testat att se vilken strategi som får bäst resultat om de alla har samma budget. Författarna drar slutsatsen att i praktiken är det storleken på budgeten som bestämmer vem som vinner budgivningen, dock att det även finns mindre skillnader mellan strategierna som bestämmer hur mycket de i genomsnitt får betala när de vinner.
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Yucekaya, Ahmet D. Valenzuela Jorge F. "Electric power bidding models for competitive markets." Auburn, Ala, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10415/1478.
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Qian, Cheng. "Multidimensional bidding and negotiation in supplier selection." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/13125.
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This thesis focuses on supplier selection problems where the supplier is selected based on multiple attributes rather than price only, and at least one side (buyer or supplier) has some private information that the other side does not know. Several different situations of supplier selection are modelled, equilibrium behaviors in each situation are characterized, and the effects of private information on decision making and firm profitability are examined. The first situation (presented in Chapter 3) is when a set of suppliers with asymmetric costs bid on price and non-price attributes (e.g., quality variables) in a scoring auction to win an indivisible contract from the buyer. Only one supplier will be selected. Two types of uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty on scores and uncertainty on weights) are modelled from the suppliers' perspective. The equilibrium decisions of the buyer and the suppliers are characterized, and the effect of uncertainty on the equilibrium outcome is also examined. The investigation of this situation contributes to an understanding of how the suppliers should compete on multiple attributes under uncertainty about the buyer's preferences, as well as how much information the buyer should reveal under different types of supply market (i.e., more homogeneous or heterogeneous).The second situation (presented in Chapter 4) occurs when a buyer and a supplier negotiate over the price and the quality of an object. Only the supplier makes offers, and the buyer decides whether to accept or reject. Two-sided private information is modelled, and the equilibrium behaviour is characterized. On the supplier side, the supplier has private cost information; on the buyer side, the buyer either has private information about the value of an offer to the buyer, or has private information about how important quality (i.e., the weight given to quality) is to the buyer. The equilibrium behaviors are also compared with those in a situation where only price is negotiated over. The findings shed light on the role of private information as well as the supplier's signalling behaviors. The third situation (presented in Chapter 5) relates to an A+B+I/D bidding process where a set of pre-qualified contractors compete on price and construction duration to win a construction contract from the buyer/owner. The A and B components are the price and construction duration, respectively, based on which the buyer selects the winning contractor. The I/D component represents the incentive for early completion or penalty for delay, which occurs in the end when the actual construction time is compared with the bid of construction duration. From the contractors' perspective, they not only have uncertainty about how the buyer evaluates them (i.e., score or weight), but they also have uncertainty about the actual cost of construction. The equilibrium behaviors are characterized, and the way in which the buyer should set the penalty and incentives is also examined.
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Souza, Clara Costellini de. "Profit-share bidding auctions: a theoretical approach." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/14219.
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In this paper, we study by means of a theoretical approach the Brazilian production sharing regime for oil exploration approved in Law No 12.351. We develop a model for production sharing to capture certain aspects of the Brazilian sharing model as compulsory participation of Petrobras, asymmetric information, and the presence of strategic participants. Using numerical solutions, we discuss the bidders’ strategies and their expected gains. Furthermore, we developed a model with heterogeneous costs to study the local content rules.
Neste trabalho, estudamos o regime de partilha de produção brasileiro, instituí do pela Lei No 12.351, para exploração de petróleo através de uma abordagem te orica. Desenvolvemos um modelo de partilha de produção a fim de capturar algumas características do modelo de partilha brasileiro como, por exemplo, a participação obrigatória da Petrobras, assimetria de informação e a presença de participantes estratégicos. Através de solução numérica, fazemos uma análise das estratégias dos participantes e dos ganhos esperados. Além disso, desenvolvemos um modelo de custos heterogêneos para estudar as regras de conteúdo local.
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Shah, Harshit. "Identifying Bidding Strategies on eBay: A Feasibility Study." NCSU, 2002. http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/theses/available/etd-05162002-150031/.
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Millions of people participate in online auctions on websites such as eBay. The data available in these public markets offer interesting opportunities to study internet auctions. The main purpose of this research is to identify common bidding patterns that appear on eBay. We examine data from eBay videogame console auctions. A new way of interpreting bidding behaviors is proposed. The analysis reveals that there are certain bidding behaviors that appear frequently in the data. We identify the behaviors and infer bidder?s strategy that might lead to such behaviors.
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Vollmecke, Kirk F. "Finding best value in two-step sealed bidding." Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/23902.
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AGUIAR, ALEXANDRE STREET DE. "STRATEGIC BIDDING FOR GENERATORS IN ENERGY CONTRACT AUCTIONS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2004. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=6447@1.
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COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIORO objetivo desta tese é desenvolver uma metodologia para estratégia de oferta de geradoras em leilões de contratos de energia elétrica, que determine a quantidade ótima que deve ser ofertada de cada contrato para cada nível de preço de leilão, levando em conta os perfis de risco de cada agente e os riscos associados à contratação. Em particular a incerteza quanto ao montante de energia produzida e ao seu preço no mercado de curto prazo (preço spot), também conhecida como incerteza de quantidade e preço. Desta forma, são realizadas aplicações desta metodologia para dois tipos de leilões de energia existente, mono e multi-produto. Neste segundo caso (multi-produto) é realizado um estudo de caso para o Leilão de Transição que ocorrerá em dezembro de 2004, onde serão leiloados 75% da eletricidade disponível hoje no país (55 mil MW), segundo as diretrizes do novo modelo do setor elétrico brasileiro.
The objective of this work is to develop a methodology for bidding strategies in multi-unit auctions for long-term electricity power purchase agreements (PPA). Considering a descending price auction design, the objective of a generating agent is to determine the optimal amount of energy to be offered in each contract for the actual auction prices at each round that maximizes the revenues of the agent given their risk profiles and the contract risks involved. The main risk treated in this work is the so-called price- quantity risk, related to the negative correlation between energy produced and the short term prices (spot price). The modeling of the risk profile for each agent is done using utility functions. This methodology is then applied on two types of auctions: singleproduct (only one contract being auctioned) and multi-product (more than one product is simultaneously auctioned). Case studies are presented with data from the Brazilian system. In particular, on the second type (multivariated auction) the case study is realized for the transition auction that will occur on December 2004, where 75% of the generation market of the whole country (about 55GW) will be negotiated under the guidelines of the new Brazilian electrical sector model.
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BEZERRA, BERNARDO VIEIRA. "BIDDING STRATEGIES IN AUCTIONS FOR ENERGY CALL OPTIONS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2006. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=9138@1.
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CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICODiversos países vêm utilizando leilões de contratos como mecanismos para induzir à expansão da oferta do sistema elétrico. Em sua grande maioria, o tipo de contrato licitado é um contrato financeiro do tipo forward. Mais recentemente, o uso de contratos de opção vem sendo utilizado. No caso do Brasil, os contratos de opção de compra de energia elétrica, também conhecidos como contratos por disponibilidade, vêm sendo licitados pelas distribuidoras. Nestes leilões, o vendedor (gerador) participante realiza ofertas simultâneas do prêmio da opção e de seu strike price. Dessa forma, um primeiro desafio é a comparação entre opções com distintos strikes e prêmios. Para um gerador termoelétrico, o desafio subseqüente é como realizar estratégias de ofertas nestes leilões que maximize o retorno do agente, que o torne competitivo e que satisfaça seu perfil de risco. O objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é desenvolver uma metodologia para determinar a estratégia de oferta de termelétricas em leilões de venda de contratos de opção de compra de energia elétrica. Inicialmente, será apresentado o critério de comparação das opções com distintas características. Em seguida, será estudado o problema de determinar o binômio prêmio de risco e o preço de exercício que devem ser ofertados, visando maximizar a competitividade do projeto no leilão. Adicionalmente, serão analisadas a influência de incerteza no fornecimento de combustível (que introduz incerteza no custo variável de produção) e o perfil de aversão a risco do gerador. Exemplos e estudos de caso serão ilustrados para uma termelétrica bicombustível com incerteza na disponibilidade de gás natural.
The use of a contract auction scheme to induce the electricity system expansion is been carried out worldwide. In most of the cases, the auctioned contract is a financial forward contract. More recently, option contracts are been implemented. In Brazil, energy call options, also known as availability contracts, are offered to distribution companies in an auction scheme. On these auctions, the seller (generator) bids both the strike price and the option premium. Consequently, the first challenge is how to compare call options with different strikes and premium. From a thermo electrical generator point of view, the second challenge is how to develop a bidding strategy which maximizes its revenue, competitiveness and taking into account the risk-averse behavior. The objective of this thesis is to develop a methodology for bidding strategies for a thermal plant in auctions for long-term electricity call options. Initially, the problem of comparing call options with different strikes, quantities and premium will be addressed and the solution adopted will be described. We then analyze the optimum bidding strategy, which determinates the premium and strike bids that maximizes the generator competitiveness, taking into account the risk aversion of the generator. Additionally, the cost uncertainty influence will be analyzed (which introduces variable cost uncertainty). Examples and case studies are presented with data from the Brazilian system for a dual-fuel generator with natural gas availability uncertainty.
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Kreye, Melanie E. "Uncertainty analysis in competitive bidding for service contracts." Thesis, University of Bath, 2011. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.548104.
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Sustainable production and consumption have become more important internationally, which has led to the transformation of market structures and competitive situations into the direction of servitisation. This means that manufacturing companies are forced to compete through the supply of services as opposed to products. Particularly the suppliers of long-life products such as submarines and airplanes no longer simply sell these products but provide their capability or availability. Companies such as Rolls-Royce Engines achieve 60% of their revenue through selling a service rather than the engine itself. For a manufacturing company, the shift towards being a service provider means that they usually have to bid for service contracts, sometimes competitively. In the context of competitive bidding, the decision makers face various uncertainties that influence their decision. Ignoring these uncertainties or their influences can result in problems such as the generation of too little profit or even a loss or the exposure to financial risks. Raising the decision maker’s awareness of the uncertainties in the form of e.g. a decision matrix, expressing the trade-off between the probability of winning the contract and the probability of making a profit, aims at integrating these factors in the decision process. The outcome is to enable the bidding company to make a more informed decision. This was the focus of the research presented in this thesis. The aim of this research was to support the pricing decision by defining a process for modelling the influencing uncertainties and including them in a decision matrix depicting the trade-off between the probability of winning the contract and the probability of making a profit. Three empirical studies are described and the associated decision process and influencing uncertainties are discussed. Based on these studies, a conceptual framework was defined which depicts the influencing factors on a pricing decision at the bidding stage and the uncertainties within these. The framework was validated with a case study in contract bidding where the uncertainties were modelled and included in a decision matrix depicting the probability of winning the contract and the probability of making a profit. The main contributions of this research are the identification of the uncertainties influencing a pricing decision, the depiction of these in a conceptual framework, a method for ascertaining how to model these uncertainties and assessing the use of such an approach via an industrial case study.
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Pikovsky, Alexander. "Pricing and bidding strategies in iterative combinatorial auctions." kostenfrei, 2008. http://mediatum2.ub.tum.de/doc/645668/645668.pdf.
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Babayiǧit, Cihan. "Equilibrium bidding in joint transmission and energy markets." [Tampa, Fla.] : University of South Florida, 2007. http://purl.fcla.edu/usf/dc/et/SFE0002253.
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Babayigit, Cihan. "Equilibrium Bidding in Joint Transmission and Energy Markets." Scholar Commons, 2007. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/610.
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Participants in deregulated electric power markets compete for financial transmission rights (FTRs) to hedge against losses due to transmission congestion by submitting bids to the independent system operator (ISO). The ISO obtains an FTR allocation, that maximizes sales revenue while satisfying simultaneous feasibility. This FTR allocation remains in place for a length of time during which the participants compete in the energy market to maximize their total payoff from both FTR and energy markets. Energy markets (bi-lateral, day ahead, real time) continue until the the end of the current FTR period, at which time the participants can choose to modify their FTR holdings for the next FTR period. As in any noncooperative game, finding Nash equilibrium bidding strategies is of critical importance to the participants in both FTR and energy markets. In this research, a two-tier matrix game theoretic modeling approach is developed that can be used to obtain equilibrium bidding behavior of the participants in both FTR and energy markets considering the total payoff from FTR and energy. The matrix game model presents a significant deviation from the bilevel optimization approach commonly used to model FTR and energy allocation problems. A reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm is also developed which uses a simulation model and a value maximization approach to obtain the equilibrium bidding strategies in each market. The model and the RL based solution approach allow consideration of multi-dimensional bids (for both FTR and energy markets), network contingencies, varying demands, and many participants.
The value iteration based RL algorithm obtains pure strategy Nash equilibrium for FTR and energy allocation. A sample network with three buses and four participants is considered for demonstrating the viability of the game theoretic model for FTR market. A PJM network example with five buses, five generators and three loads is also considered to analyze equilibrium bidding behavior in joint FTR and energy markets. Several numerical experiments on the sample networks are conducted using the approach of statistical design of experiments (DOE) to assess impacts of variations of bid and network parameters on the market outcomes like participant payoffs and equilibrium strategies.
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Olsson, Magnus. "Optimal regulating power market bidding strategies in hydropower systems." Licentiate thesis, Stockholm :, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-596.
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Leathers, Edward K. J. "Bidding Wars and the Efficiency of Market Announcement Effects." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1030.
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Many studies have been performed on the short- and long-run abnormal returns to acquirers in acquisition attempts, but the topic of bidding wars is relatively unexplored. This piece performs an in-depth analysis of daily returns to both the public winners and losers in bidding war situations. It provides a counterargument to earlier findings that found that winners in bidding wars performed poorly compared to losers. I also fill in the gap in the analysis of short-term returns to paired winners and losers during and surrounding the bidding war. I find that winners perform significantly better than losers during certain critical periods in the bidding war, and this appears to signal the increased likelihood of the winner’s success. However, in the short-term, the market consistently misjudges the direction of the long-run benefits of the acquisition to the winner.
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GONZALES, JAVIER LINKOLK LOPEZ. "ENERGY PRICE SIMULATION IN BRAZIL THROUGH DEMAND SIDE BIDDING." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2015. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=26422@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROCOORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO
A Eficiência Energética (EE) pode ser considerada sinônimo de preservação ambiental, pois a energia economizada evita a construção de novas plantas de geração e de linhas de transmissão. O Leilão de Eficiência Energética (LEE) poderia representar uma alternativa muito interessante para a dinamização e promoção de práticas de EE no Brasil. Porém, é importante mencionar que isso pressupõe uma confiança na quantidade de energia reduzida, o que só pode se tornar realidade com a implantação e desenvolvimento de um sistema de Medição e Verificação (M&V) dos consumos de energia. Neste contexto, tem-se como objetivo principal simular os preços de energia do Leilão de Eficiência Energética no ambiente regulado para conhecer se a viabilidade no Brasil poderia se concretizar. A metodologia utilizada para realizar as simulações foi a de Monte Carlo, ademais, antes se utilizou o método do Kernel com a finalidade de conseguir ajustar os dados a uma curva através de polinômios. Uma vez conseguida a curva melhor ajustada se realizou a análise de cada cenário (nas diferentes rodadas) com cada amostra (500, 1000, 5000 e 10000) para encontrar a probabilidade dos preços ficarem entre o intervalo de 110 reais e 140 reais (preços ótimos propostos no LEE). Finalmente, os resultados apresentam que a probabilidade de o preço ficar no intervalo de 110 reais e 140 reais na amostra de 500 dados é de 28,20 por cento, na amostra de 1000 é de 33,00 por cento, na amostra de 5000 é de 29,96 por cento e de 10000 é de 32,36 por cento.
The Energy Efficiency (EE) is considered a synonymous of environmental preservation, because the energy saved prevents the construction of new generating plants and transmission lines. The Demand-Side Bidding (DSB) could represent a very interesting alternative for the revitalization and promotion of EE practices in Brazil. However, it is important to note that this presupposes a confidence on the amount of reduced energy, which can only take reality with the implementation and development of a measurement system and verification (M&V) the energy consumption. In this context, the main objective is to simulate of the prices of the demand-side bidding in the regulated environment to meet the viability in Brazil that could become a reality. The methodology used to perform the simulations was the Monte Carlo addition, prior to the Kernel method was used in order to be able to adjust the data to a curve, using polynomials. Once achieved the best-fitted curve was carried out through an analysis of each scenario (in different rounds) with each sample (500, 1000, 5000 and 10000) to find the probability of the price falling between the 110 real range and 140 real (great prices proposed by the DSB). Finally, the results showed that the probability of staying in the price range from 110 real nd 140 real data 500 in the sample is 28.20 percent, the sample 1000 is 33.00 percent, the sample 5000 is 29.96 percent and 10000 is 32.36 percent.
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Collins, Julia M. (Julia Marie), and R. Ryan Quinlan. "The impact of bidding aggregation levels on truckload rates." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/60833.
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Thesis (M. Eng. in Logistics)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 2010.Cataloged from student submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-80).
The objective of this thesis was to determine if line-haul rates are impacted by bid type, and if aggregation of bidding lanes can reduce costs for both shippers and carriers. Using regression analysis, we developed a model to isolate and test the cost effects that influence line-haul rate for long-haul shipments. We have determined that aggregation of low-volume lanes from point-to-point lanes to aggregated lanes can provide costs savings when lanes with origins and destinations in close proximity to each other can be bundled. In addition, bidding out region-to-region lanes can supplement point-to-point lanes by reducing the need to turn to the spot market. The model shows that bundling lanes can provide significant cost savings to a shipper because contract lanes of any type are on average less costly than spot moves. This thesis provides guidelines and suggestions for aggregation when creating bids during the first stage of the truckload procurement process.
by Julia M. Collins and R. Ryan Quinlan.
M.Eng.in Logistics
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Bedekar, Shreyas Vinayak. "Reverse Auction Bidding: Bidding Strategy Pattern of First Time Bidders." Thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2010-12-8953.
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The advancement of computer technology is playing an important role in almost all fields in the construction industry in the current era. It has become a tool for exchanging legal contract information, including bid data. In the traditional closed bidding system, the bidders were unaware of their competitors' bid quotes and had no opportunity available to make a counter an offer to the bid at a different level. However, in reverse auction bidding (RAB), contractors can track their competitors' bids and take the given opportunity to re-bid the projects at lower rates. Unlike traditional auctions, where buyers raise their purchasing prices to outbid competitors, reverse auctions permit buyers to purchase goods and services from suppliers who are encouraged to sell them at the lowest price. The benefit of the reverse auction bidding is either that the vendors are able to re-bid, or lower their bid multiple times. This is an example of transparent economic information. Van Vleet initiated the ongoing Reverse Auction Bidding study at Texas A&M University. Van Vleet had created a Microsoft Access database system and ASP web based user interface for RAB study. The methodology developed by van Vleet is still being used today, and this study has been extended into analyzing different personality types and the impact on the bidding system. In the previous studies conducted by different researchers in TAMU, the performance of participants in the RAB process along with their behavior are being observed with respect to their personality. Personality of each player is tested using the Keirsey Temperament Sorter (KTS) test. The previous study states that there appears to be a strong correlation between personality type and game performance. The first case study conducted by van Vleet involved five participants who had no prior experience in Reverse Auction Bidding. The number of participants has varied from three to ten participants.
This research has been conducted on graduate students of the Construction Science Department of TAMU who have no prior experience in RAB. In continuation with the previous studies held in TAMU, the results show that there is an observable pattern in the bidding strategy of first time bidders while taking part in Reverse Auction Bidding.
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cheng, cheng hsu, and 鄭旭成. "bidding for underwriting." Thesis, 1996. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/44104599678799177392.
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"Regressive bidding agents." Thesis, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10210/294.
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The aim of this dissertation is to develop a suitable bidding strategy for an internet bidding agent that allows the agent to obtain the lowest possible price for a desired product at an internet auction. The bidding strategy is obtained under the constraint of limited information available about the strategies of the opponents. The agent will operate in an internet auction environment. Therefore classic auction theory is researched and explained. Auctions are widely used to bring buyers and sellers of products together and to create a market to buy and sell goods. The buyer wants to pay the lowest possible price and the seller wants to receive the highest possible price. However, the seller has no influence on the final selling price of the product. Instead the price is determined by the buyers. The agent will place bids on the auction site on behalf of the human instructor. The bidding agent will make use of the theory behind auctions to influence the other bidders on the auction to make the lowest possible bids. The model suggested in this dissertation, the regressive bidding agent model (RBA model), will incorporate auction theory to create a suitable agent. The agent will predict the future bids of opponents on the auction, basing its predictions on a regressive function. The agent will base its own bids placed at the auction on the bidding time remaining at the auction together with the bids placed by other bidders on the auction.Prof. E.M. Ehlers
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"Bidding on technology." Tulane University, 2015.
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LI, YI-HSIANG, and 李伊翔. "The Influence of Bidding Timing and Members' Interaction on Community Bidding." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/275heh.
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碩士國立屏東大學
資訊管理學系碩士班
106
Bidding behavior increases rapidly in recent years. The aim of this study is to explore the social network structure of bidders by observing the bidding timing, bidding price and related interactions among bidders. Data are collected from the community of "bidding shoes!" of Facebook. Totally, 300 bidding transaction records are collected. The results of the study show that bidders have preferred timings for bids, and they will vary depending on the price group of the product. Furthermore, in the interactive state of bidders, the study is divided into simple bidding structure, sequential bidding structure, multi-bid structure, complex multi-bid structure and intervention bidding structure according to their characteristics. The most involved social network scale is the intervention bidding structure. And a further study is then explored to identify characteristics of the intervention bidding structure. Results are expected as a reference for sellers and community managers to find appropriate auction opportunities and prices.
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Lin, Chih-Hsien, and 林志憲. "The Study of Bidding Making-Decision based on Integrated Bidding Strategy Model (IBSM)." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29786613234976025058.
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碩士國立成功大學
建築學系碩士在職專班
102
Government agencies and private sector clients typically use competitive bidding in order to award a contract to the lowest price qualified bidder. To survive in such a bidding situation by a rush and price-cutting decision makes contractors not only give up their reasonable profit but also risk losing money. Two critical decisions faced by bidders in competitive bidding are 1) whether or not to submit a bid and, when a decision is taken to submit, 2) what bid price to set in order to optimize both profit and likelihood of winning the bid. Bid price usually includes cost of construction and a markup, the scale of which is typically determined as a percentage of construction costs. Bidding strategy influences markup scale significantly and impacts contractor profit and the probability of winning the competitive contract. Primary decision-makers typically decide markup size and factor anticipated project risk and the risk preferences of competitor bidders into their final price determination. Many variables affect contractor decisions regarding markup scale, which complicate the bidding decision process. Thus, developing a model to set up the model of bidding price considered various risk is necessary. The Integrated Bidding Strategy Model (IBSM) as a calculating model, based on the theories of statistic method and the engineering economic for analysis evaluation with the concept of difference bidding combinations to low down the level of the risk and also objectively use the economic analysis of financial management and subjectively evaluate the utility function to analysis the best of the bidding price. Further, to find out the best choice for the contractor by cost-balancing oriented screening. Due to the economic environment variables (Costs shared equally, interest rates, return on investment and the rate of inflation), the duration variables, payment terms variables, the correlation coefficient between variables in the engineering case, the utility function variables and confidence intervals for variables change bound to affect the decision-making involved in the bid for the project, IBSM quickly assist to apply the lowest bid-cost ratio (the estimated lowest ratio of bid price and direct costs in bidding project, LBC) under effective markup and bidding probability by statistics and economic theory, considering to bid for new work and implementations in progress with no cost-lossing and cost-balancing probability in a series of bidding strategies and further estimate optimum markup scale (OMS) and then feedback calculate the cost of the project to bidding price to find out which one is the best choice for the contractor. However, the assessment process will require a lot of repetitive mathematics calculation and matrix data, to consider the application for popular use in future, Excel-VBA in Microsoft Window system is designed as module program to perform IBSM computing tasks in this study.
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Bertsimas, Dimitris J., Jeff Hawkins, and Georgia Perakis. "Optimal Bidding in Online Auctions." 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/4006.
Full textAbstract:
Online auctions are arguably one of the most important and distinctly new applications of the internet. The predominant player in online auctions, eBay, has over 18.9 milllion users, and it was the host of over $5 billion worth of goods sold in the year 2000. Using methods from approximate dynamic programming and integer programming, we design algorithms for optimally bidding for a single item online auction, and simultaneous or overlapping multiple online auctions. We report computational evidence using data from eBay's web site from 1772 completed auctions for personal digital assistants and from 4208 completed auctions for stamp collections that show that (a) the optimal dynamic strategy outperforms simple but widely used static heuristic rules for a single auction, and (b) a new approach combining the value functions of single auctions found by dynamic programming using an integer programming framework produces high quality solutions fast and reliably.Singapore-MIT Alliance (SMA)
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Ho, Chun-Yen, and 何君彥. "Contract Bridge Bidding by Learning." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/59579451628060745229.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
資訊工程學研究所
102
Contract bridge is an example of an incomplete information game for which computers typically do not perform better than expert human bridge players. In particular, the typical bidding decisions of human bridge players are difficult to mimic with a computer program, and thus automatic bridge bidding remains to be a challenging research problem. Currently, the possibility of automatic bidding without mimicking human players has not been fully studied. In this work, we take an initiative to study such possibility for the specific problem of bidding without competition. We propose a novel learning framework to let a computer program learn its own bidding decisions. The framework transforms the bidding problem into a learning problem, and then solves the problem with a carefully designed model that consists of costsensitive classifiers and upper-confidence-bound algorithms. We validate the proposed model and find that it performs competitively to the champion computer bridge program that mimics human bidding decisions.
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Chang, Chia-Hao, and 張家豪. "Bidding Game for Construction Projects." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/50068402099103221332.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立交通大學
土木工程系所
94
The bidding field is concerned about many kinds of knowledge just like bidding process, construction cost, schedule controlling, and decision making etc. Because students often lack the experience of participating in bidding of the true construction projects, it is so hard to imagine the situation and understand the knowledge about bidding. IT is used in education field of civil engineering recently, and the benefit is obvious. This research focus on Computer-Assisted Instruction system (CAI) and find that the past bidding instruction games have some defects. This research builds up the Bidding Game for Construction Projects by the situation simulation method, and it is based on Government Procurement Act and the knowledge about bidding. The game steps refer to the bidding procedure of public construction. This research refers to the factors of cost, schedule, and manpower to design random variables, assumption parameters, and formulas. This research improves the defects of the past bidding instruction games, and uses the lively teaching method to make students participate the class positively.
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PEZANIS-CHRISTOU, Paul. "Three essays in competitive bidding." Doctoral thesis, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/5040.
Full textAbstract:
Defence date: 23 June 1997Examining board: Prof. Louis-André Gérard-Varet, GREQAM, Marseille ; Prof. Ronald Harstad, Rutgers University, New Brunswick ; Prof. Alan Kirman, GREQAM, Marseille, Supervisor ; Prof. Louis Phlips, EUI
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017
-- Sequential auctions with supply uncertainty -- Sequential auctions with heterogenous buyers : an empirical study -- On the impact of low balling : experimental results in asymmetric auctions
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SU, YI-YUN, and 蘇宜芸. "Online Bidding Behavior Using Social Network Analysis - A Case of Basketball Shoes Bidding in Virtual Community." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/7ej72x.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立屏東大學
資訊管理學系碩士班
105
In recent years, auctions or biddings in the virtual community grow rapidly. In this study, 600 pieces of shoes bid sample are collected from a virtual community Facebook "shoes trading" community so as to explore the bidding behavior by observing social network relationships. The method is social network analysis which explores the network structures of biddings at the prior three hours and post three hours. The network relationship of bidding at prior three hours between the author and the bidder is classified into sequential bidding structure, mutual bidding structure, simple cluster structure and complex cluster structure. And the bidding relationship at post three hours is classified into the winning structure of the sequential, the winning structure of the intervention bidding and the winning structure of the mutual bidding structure. Furthermore, the mean index will be changed by different cluster. And the centrality will be decline slower when bidders increase.
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Zhou, Xun. "Reverse Auction Bidding - Multiple Group Study." Thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2012-08-11498.
Full textAbstract:
Reverse Auction Bidding is a recently developed auction method. In this form of bidding process, the roles of the bidders and the owner are interchanged in terms of the form of the economic transaction. The owner's objective is to drive the unit rates down and the bidder's objective is to maintain an acceptable profit level. A study into Reverse Auction Bidding commenced at Texas A&M University in 2004 and continues to this time, with this the eighteenth study in the series. This study is the second multi-group study in the research. In this study, a multiple group comparison was made between different numbers of bidders, with Games One, Two and Three having three, four and ten bidders respectively. All participants were faculty and students from the Department of Construction Science. The critical requirement for the participants is that they should have no prior experience using the Reverse Auction Bidding system. The eighteen studies have concentrated on new players, with future studies planned for repeat participants. A number of the recent case studies have shown personality has an impact on the performance of the bidders. However, this work was not controlled for personality, as the research objective was to determine the impact of a different number of bidders in a game. The Keirsey Temperament Sorter test was completed by all participants so that the results could be understood in terms of personality impact on the level of return to each participant. The results showed the number of bidders has a significant impact on the individual returns confirming the earlier work on varying the number of bidders. An increase in the number of bidders was shown to lead to a more competitive economic environment, which given usual economic circumstances lead to a reduction in the number of firms interested in bidding, for the self-evident economic reasons. This work points to the need to investigate a bidding group size of five or six, which is likely to be the self-constrained upper limit in a real economic system. Some interesting observations on the personality types suggest that further work is required in this area.
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Yuan, Shu. "Reverse Auction Bidding - Bid Arrivals Analysis." Thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/151385.
Full textAbstract:
Reverse Auction Bidding (RAB) is a recently developed procurement method that can be used by the construction industry. The technique is different from a traditional auction system, since RAB system uses a bidding activity method that is completed anonymously by pre-qualified bidders during a fixed auction time. The basic premise for the auction is that the current best auction price is available for viewing during the whole auction process by both bidders and owner. The apparent incentive is for noncompetitive bidders to lower the price. There are however controlling factor beyond the reach of owners, such as market demand, lending restrictions, stakeholder expectations and risk tolerance levels, that impact on price levels. However, owners continue to attempt to drive down prices using this technique.
A study into the mechanics of RAB was launched at Texas A&M University in 2004. This ongoing study of RAB continues to this time with eighteen case studies. This nineteenth study looks at the time series bid data from some of the prior work. Nine case studies were selected from the previous case studies. These nine studies provided untainted data with 6674 RAB bid arrivals by prior investigator actions. This study concerns the statistical process of bid arrivals with time.
The hypothesis to be tested is that the RAB bid arrivals timing can be modeled with a statistical process. The analysis reviewed the fit for several types of distribution, including Gaussian and Poissionian. The best fit was modeled by non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). The first conclusion from the analysis is that RAB bid arrivals follows a Poisson process, termed non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). The second conclusion is that the controlling Poissionian process has a square root factor. The NHPP model for RAB provides a tool for future studies of RAB in real time. Future work is suggested on the inter-time periods for the bidding.