Relevant bibliographies by topics / Bidding

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Bidding'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 29 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Bidding"

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Ekwonwune, Emmanuel Nwabueze, Duru Ngozi A., and Uka Kanayo K. "Design of a web – based online Contract Administrative System platform of an Engineering firm." International Journal of Engineering and Computer Science 8, no. 05 (May 12, 2019): 24612–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.18535/ijecs/v8i05.4285.

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This paper is aimed at designing a dynamic web – based Contract Bidding Information System that will be used to register details online to enable bidding for advertised contracts. It was motivated by the growing recognition of the need to modify bidding operation previously done manually. The Structured System Analysis and Design Methodology (SSADM) was used to develop a contract bidding system. A web – based application will be developed to enable bidders register and submit their biddings online.
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Li, Yu Hui. "Chinese Enterprises in the Competition in the International Project Bidding Analysis." Advanced Materials Research 1079-1080 (December 2014): 1111–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.1079-1080.1111.

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The biddingat home and abroad was reviewed and compared with the bidding,pre-qualification, project environment differences, similarities anddifferences of contract conditions, etc.International project tender offersstrategy including binding decision-making strategy, in-depth hinterlandstrategy and combined strategy. Transnational project bidding quotation hasexpanded the unit price, opens the mouth to upgrade offer, more quotation, noprofit, joint offer insurance mark, and other skills. Through these analyses,put forward reasonable suggestions to our country in the international projectbidding work.
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Zhu, Xiao Bo. "Strategic Learning in Multiple Equilibria for Double Bargaining Mechanism by PSO." Applied Mechanics and Materials 571-572 (June 2014): 258–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.571-572.258.

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The learning behaviours of buyers and sellers with the assumption of bounded rationality were studied in the double sealed-bid bargaining mechanism. A multi-agent simulation trading system was constructed to observe the process of equilibrium approach when exist the multiple equilibria. The bidding choices of the agents were modelled by particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm. In our proposed model, two populations of buyers and sellers were randomly matched to deal repeatedly until the iteration stop, and each agent would update his bidding strategy in each round by imitating the successful member in his population and by private experience. Results show that the final biddings of the agents in both populations commonly approach a Nash equilibrium which is reasonable for the market principle.
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Thompson, A. G., and V. W. C. Lok. "OFFSHORE PETROLEUM EXPLORATION IN AUSTRALIA ACREAGE BIDDING SYSTEMS: WORK BIDDING OR CASH BIDDING?" APPEA Journal 43, no. 1 (2003): 677. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/aj02039.

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The design and efficiency of offshore petroleum acreage bidding systems bear directly on the risk and cost for participants investing in exploration and development projects offshore Australia.Companies, financiers and investors who are interested in investing in petroleum exploration and development activities will find a mixed regime of State and Federal legislation governs such activities in Australia.While the concept of the work program bidding system appears to be sound, the administration of it by the Joint Authorities and Designated Authorities and delegated officers potentially creates many uncertainties for permittees.The approval process is generally a costly and time consuming one under the work program bidding system and its administrative cost diverts funds that otherwise may have been directed to exploration activities.Work program permits are also susceptible to uncertainty and dispute as to whether or not the required work program has been met. Issues of proper or improper exercise of discretionary powers can arise, particularly when wide statutory discretionary powers are in practice circumscribed by Administrative Guidelines.The existence of statutory and administrative discretion requires, in the interests of natural justice, that there be appropriate avenues of appeal for aggrieved permittees. All of the foregoing regulation and cost is removed with cash bid permits. Cash bid permits not only reduce costs for Government but also for industry.The authors are of the view that offering permits by way of the cash bidding system should be reintroduced, with modifications to ensure its efficiency.
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Anh, Chu Minh. "Law on Bidding in Capital Construction: Current Status of Regulations, Limitations and Proposed Solutions." Middle East Research Journal of Economics and Management 4, no. 03 (May 7, 2024): 75–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.36348/merjem.2024.v04i03.001.

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Bidding is part of procurement activities between businesses, between businesses and state agencies. This is a form of civilized competition in the market economy, a special transaction method for large-scale transactions that require efficiency and transparency. The nature of bidding is a form of civilized competition in a market economy. Bidding activities are carried out in many fields such as construction, equipment procurement, project implementation, etc. Therefore, all professional businesses, whether Vietnam or foreign, no matter what field, any model, if it has enough capacity, cannot be ignored in bidding. Laws on bidding in the field of capital construction play an important role in managing and regulating bidding activities in the construction industry. Currently, Vietnam law has documents regulating public procurement such as Bidding Law 2013 effective from July 1, 2014, Decree No. 63/2014/ND-CP stipulates detailed implementation of several articles of the Bidding Law on contractor selection, etc. Some issues related to the current status of provisions of Vietnam law on public bidding and procurement activities are the selection of bidding form, bidding process, healthy competition, openness, and transparency in public bidding activities. This study analyzes the regulations and limitations of the law on bidding in the field of capital construction, thereby proposing solutions to improve the law on this issue.
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Tsung, Chen-Kun, Hann-Jang Ho, and Sing-Ling Lee. "Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2013 (2013): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/206386.

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To realize the specific results in the sponsored search auctions, most advertisers submit particular bid prices. The bidding behaviors with specific purposes are called as the strategic bidding. However, some strategic bidding behaviors will result in negative effects, such as the elimination of the equilibrium and the payment increase for some advertisers. The bidding behaviors with negative results are termed as the vindictive bidding. We survey four strategic bidding behaviors which include a rational bidding and three vindictive bidding strategies. In this paper, we study the relationship between the effects resulted by the vindictive bidding and the valuations of the vindictive advertisers. In our experiments, the search engine provider (SEP) is benefited by all vindictive bidding behaviors, and the increment of the SEP's revenue is proportional to the degree of the vindictiveness. Bidding vindictively without sacrificing the own utility improves the advertiser's utility with high probability. Moreover, we observe that the SEP's revenue is improved by the following situations. First, the vindictive advertiser with low valuation in the keywords with high market value results in more SEP's revenue than that in the keywords with low market value. The second case is to raise the bidding competition between advertisers.
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Fu, Heyan. "Construction Project Bidding Agency and Cost Management Strategy in Bidding Stage." Journal of Architectural Research and Development 6, no. 3 (May 31, 2022): 21–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.26689/jard.v6i3.3913.

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In the social development, bidding agency plays an important part, providing services for the development of construction project bidding, and endows the development of construction project bidding with a diversified characteristic. The cost management of a construction project bidding stage has a dynamic characteristic. The bidding agency can provide bidding related business for the construction enterprises to ensure the quality and the effect of the bidding service, leading to the foundation for the sustainable development of the construction enterprises. This paper analyzes the deficiency in the bidding agency, and cost management in the bidding stage of the construction projects, as well provide some effective countermeasures or recommendation, to improve the value, and the role of the bidding agency in managing and controlling the construction project cost within the scope allowed by the law, and regulations, and also to ensure the comprehensive benefits of construction projects for the construction enterprise.
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Chiou, Chin Rung, Jyh Dong Lin, and Guan Jia Huang. "Analyzing Bidding Strategy for Pavement Engineering with Multi-Criteria Decision-Making." Advanced Materials Research 723 (August 2013): 798–804. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.723.798.

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This study analyzes key success factors of bidding results and provides the optimal bidding strategy for the pavement engineering. According to Public construction bidding management system data of Public Construction Commission of Executive Yuan, we found that the optimal bidding strategies in the most studies only focused on bidding prices and winning bid amounts. However, public constructions are usually on a large scale with great investments, it is critical to control budgets under quality and duration considerations. In addition, it is complicated for bidders to implement the optimal bidding strategy under multiple bidding factors. Hence, this study applies statistical analysis to find key success factors of bidding data in Taoyuan pavement engineering from 2008 to 2012 for evaluating the optimal bidding strategy with the multi-criteria decision-making method. Our research results show that bidders can increase the probability of winning bids and enables to allocate their resources with accurate bidding price forecast. In particular, the differences between the award amounts and base prices after applying the optimal bidding strategy are also provided.
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Nguyen, Hoang Phuoc. "Factors affecting the reduction range in biddings in Ca Mau province." Science & Technology Development Journal - Economics - Law and Management 1, Q3 (December 31, 2017): 24–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.32508/stdjelm.v1iq3.454.

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The objective of this paper is to examine factors affecting the price reduction range in biddings in Ca Mau province by bidding organizers. Based on theory of asymmetric information by Acerola (1970), we employed multiple regression model on data of 500 bid packages in Ca Mau from 2009 to 2016 to test hypotheses. The results indicate the number of participating bidders (N), funds allocated for bid packages (C), owner (O), and the total investment (TI) are positively related to the reduction range (RR). In addition, bid decider (D)and contracting time (CT) are negatively related to the reduction range (RR) while type of project (GP) has no impact. The paper offers some policy implications to improve the efficiency of the bidding activities and suggestions to authorities concerning legal framework on public investment so as to better manage public investment.
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Nie, Dong. "The Prediction Study of Bidding Control Price Based on GM Model." Applied Mechanics and Materials 409-410 (September 2013): 1524–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.409-410.1524.

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The bidding control price is the highest price of the project bidding price which is set beforehand. The appropriately bidding control price which tenders compile can embody the excellent enterprise`s competitiveness, improve the efficiency of bidding and reduce the project cost. So how to forecast the bidding control price accurately and rapidly has important significance for the bidding work. In this paper, based on the gray system theory and taking the interaction between main variables of the bidding control price into due consideration, the gray prediction model is established to forecast the bidding control price. The building, calculation, error precision of the model is explained in details. Finally, the result is verified by real projects.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Bidding"

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Peng, Tengshun. "Bidding strategy and empirical analysis of bidding in electrical power market." Online access for everyone, 2006. http://www.dissertations.wsu.edu/Dissertations/Spring2006/t%5Fpeng%5F011406.pdf.

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Wilenius, Jim. "Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala universitet, Avdelningen för datalogi, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-102960.

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This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of computer science, optimization and economics. A combinatorial auction is an auction where many items are sold simultaneously and where bidders may submit indivisible combinatorial bids on groups of items. It is commonly believed that good solutions to the allocation problem can be achieved by allowing combinatorial bidding. Determining who wins in a combinatorial auction is fundamentally different from a traditional single-item auction because we are faced with a hard and potentially intractable optimization problem. Also, unless we are limited to truthful mechanisms, game theoretic analysis of the strategic behavior of bidders is still an open problem. We have chosen primarily to study the first-price combinatorial auction, a natural auction widely used in practice. Theoretical analysis of this type of auction is difficult and little has been done previously. In this thesis we investigate and discuss three fundamental questions with significant practical implications for combinatorial auctions. First, because the number of possible bids grows exponentially with the number of items, limitations on the number of bids are typically required. This gives rise to a problem since bidders are unlikely to choose the "correct" bids that make up the globally optimal solution. We provide evidence that an expressive and compact bidding language can be more important than finding the optimal solution. Second, given a first-price (sealed-bid) combinatorial auction, the question of equilibrium bidding strategies remains an open problem. We propose a heuristic for finding such strategies and also present feasible strategies. And finally, is a first-price combinatorial auction worth pursuing compared to the simpler simultaneous (single-item) auction? We prove, through a model capturing many fundamental properties of multiple items scenarios with synergies, that the first-price combinatorial auction produces higher revenue than simultaneous single-item auctions. We provide bounds on revenue, given a significantly more general model, in contrast to previous work.
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Gao, Feng. "Optimal GENCO bidding strategy." [Ames, Iowa : Iowa State University], 2007.

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Tang, Wing-hung, and 鄧永雄. "Bidding strategy: the consultants' perspective." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2004. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B29611428.

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Woolever, Jason R. (Jason Richard) 1978. "Evolving a bridge bidding system." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/86753.

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Thesis (M.Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2001.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-62).
by Jason R. Woolever.
M.Eng.
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Fioriti, Andrés. "Essays on bidding with securities." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2016. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/87910/.

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Chapter 1 partially surveys auctions with contingent contracts, i.e., contracts in which payments are allowed to depend on an ex-post verifiable variable, such as revenues. The review starts with the seminal paper of DeMarzo et al. (2005) and partially departs from Skrzypacz (2013) by analyzing on externalities and risk aversion concerns. A partial ranking of auction revenues for auctions that differ in terms of contract forms, pricing rules and seller commitment are described. Models incorporating adverse selection, moral hazard, competition between auctioneers, externalities and risk aversion are discussed. In Chapter 2 we study second price auctions, where buyers compete for the allocation of a project, by bidding securities over project's realized value. In addition, we allow for negative externalities, which are suffered by the losers in case the winner implements the project. Under this environment, we introduce two payment instruments: the Fixed-Equity Hybrid -which embeds cash- and the Fixed-Cash Hybrid -which embeds equity. As our main result, we rank the instruments in terms of revenue, and show that the fixed-equity hybrid is the best instrument whereas equity is the worst despite being the most sensitive instrument to bidders' true type. Finally, in Chapter 3 second-price auctions, where buyers compete for the allocation of a project, by bidding securities over project's realized value are studied. In addition, bidders are allowed to be asymmetric not only with respect to their underlying distribution of payoffs but also with respect to their risk aversion. Under this environment, it is shown that steeper securities provide higher insurance. As a main result, the instruments are ranked in terms of efficiency, and shows that the steepest security minimizes the efficiency loss when bidders are indeed asymmetric. Moreover, steeper securities are shown to increase revenue for the seller as in DeMarzo et al. (2005).
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Shao, Lusheng. "Competitive Bidding in Supply Chains." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/12925.

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This thesis is primarily concerned with the competition between suppliers for a buyer’s procurement business with consideration of subcontracting, commitment and capacity reservation. Under the circumstance where suppliers face diseconomies of scale, it may be cost effective for a buyer to split an order across different suppliers. Even when the buyer chooses only one supplier, the winning supplier may subcontract part of the work to the others subsequently. Motivated by these observations, Chapter 2 studies a supplier bidding game where a buyer requests quotes from two competing suppliers. We consider two procurement scenarios: (1) Order Splitting where each supplier submits a function bid which specifies different payments for different quantities, and the buyer may split the order; (2) Single-Sourcing Commitment where the buyer commits to purchasing from only one supplier before suppliers submit their bids, and the winning supplier may subsequently subcontract with the losing one. The second and third papers investigate the competitive behaviour of suppliers with capacity reservation. To hedge against financial risks, the suppliers often require a buyer to reserve capacity in advance by paying an upfront fee. In Chapter 3, we consider a discrete version of this problem where competing suppliers each choose a reservation price and an execution price for blocks of capacity, and the buyer needs to decide which blocks to reserve. Chapter 4 studies a continuous version of the problem where we allow general cost functions. The suppliers compete by offering the price functions (for reservation and execution) and the buyer decides how much to reserve from each supplier. This thesis sheds light on how suppliers compete with each other by considering a variety of factors. We believe an in-depth look at the competitive behaviour of suppliers will deepen our understanding of a buyer’s procurement process, and hence helps a buyer make a better sourcing decision.
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Nourah, Bander Taher K. "Development of strategic mark up decision by contractors in Saudi Arabia." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2013. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/development-of-strategic-mark-up-decision-by-contractors-in-saudi-arabia(029325ca-33ac-4fa4-82e3-d12f1bfd7387).html.

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Competitive bidding is a common practice in business. The main aim of this research is to develop a practical bidding model. This includes studying existing bidding models used by organisations and verifying the developed model. Various factors have been identified and analysed in order to identify the weight and ranking order of each factor in terms of its influence on the bid mark up size. Interviews have been conducted to explore the current practical practice in setting mark up size in Saudi Arabia and to identify factors that may influence bid mark up size. In addition, a questionnaire has been used to identify each factor’s level of importance in Saudi Arabia. The findings have been used to establish a ranking order of factors in terms of their influence on bidding decisions based on contractors' size and main client. An important discovery is that the level of importance and rank of factors that influence bid mark up size differ based on contractors' characteristics and main client. The characteristic which has been investigated in this research is the size of the contractor. As a result, a bidding model to determine mark up size based on contractors' size and main clients has been developed. The proposed model has been tested and proved accurate in simulating the contractors’ decisions.
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Sparks, Janet D. "A Methodology for Estimating the Level of Aggressiveness in Competitive Bidding Markets." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/36057.

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Competitive bidding, where the project is awarded to the lowest bidder, is a basic part of the construction industry. This method of project delivery is designed to promote healthy competition in an attempt ensure the lowest price for the project. A contractor knows that lowering a bid price increases his probability of being awarded the project. However, without a clear understanding of the market in which he is competing, he can not know how low he should bid in order to win. One of the most important competitive forces in a competitive bidding market is the how low the contractors are willing bid, i.e., how aggressively they are pursuing the project. Contractors need a simple way to examine the level of aggressiveness in their market.

The purpose of this research is to develop a methodology to enable contractors to better understand this level of aggressiveness. The level of aggressiveness is quantified by the ratio of the low bid to the pack price, where the pack price is defined as the lower of the two bids that are closest together. The examination of two competitive bidding markets--the Virginia Department of Transportation market between 1996 and 1998 and the Tennessee Department of Transportation market from 1996 to 1998--tests the validity of the methodology. The methodology for estimating the level of aggressiveness in a competitive bidding market produces a set of success curves and charts, which can be used by contractors to optimize their competitive bid amounts for future projects.
Master of Science

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Buisman, Jacco. "Game Theory and Bidding for Software Projects An Evaluation of the Bidding Behaviour of Software Engineers." Thesis, Blekinge Tekniska Högskola, Institutionen för programvaruteknik och datavetenskap, 2002. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-5850.

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The conception phase is one of the most important phases of software projects. In this phase it is determined which software development company will perform a software project. To obtain a software project, companies can have several bidding strategies. This thesis investigates if and how game theory can be a helpful tool to evaluate bidding for software projects. This thesis can be divided into two different parts: a theoretical and a practical. The theoretical part investigates the applicable parts of game theory in this thesis, explains what software projects are, explains the difference between costing and bidding and provides results of a literature survey about bidding behaviour. The practical part introduces a study to investigate strategies and bidding behaviour of software engineers, explains the experimental design that found the study, provides the results of the performed study and a discussion of the results. This thesis concludes that game theory contains some concepts that make it possible to evaluate bidding for software projects.
Jacco Buisman Bonairestraat 32 9715 SE Groningen The Netherlands
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Books on the topic "Bidding"

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Zia, Mahmood, ed. Bidding. London: CollinsWillow, 1994.

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Shows, George A. Slam bidding. San Fernando, Calif: G.A. Shows, 1987.

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Abebe, Ngiste, Mary Trina Bolton, Maggie Pavelka, and Morgan Pierstorff. Bidding for Development. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-8912-2.

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Wakeman, Robert. Modern bidding techniques. [Livingston, N.J.?]: Powell Enterprises, 2002.

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Shnitzer, Paul A. Government contract bidding. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C. (1120 20th St., N.W., Washington 20036): Federal Publications, 1987.

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Redeker, Kent. The bidding war. New York: Simon Spotlight, 2001.

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1931-, Cushman Robert Frank, and Doyle William J. 1931-, eds. Construction bidding law. New York: Wiley Law Publications, 1990.

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Dunlop, Barbara. The Billionaire's Bidding. Toronto, Ontario: Silhouette, 2007.

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Michael, Klein. Bidding for concessions. Washington, DC: World Bank, Privst [sic] Sector Development Department, Private Participation in Infrastructure Division, 1998.

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North, Freddie. Conventional bidding explained. London: Batsford, 1994.

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Book chapters on the topic "Bidding"

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Wilson, Robert. "Bidding." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 934–41. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_603.

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Wilson, Robert. "Bidding." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–8. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_603-1.

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Wilson, Robert. "Bidding." In Allocation, Information and Markets, 54–63. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_5.

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Short, John Rennie. "Bidding." In Hosting the Olympic Games, 28–43. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018.: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351000352-4.

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Gass, Saul I., and Carl M. Harris. "bidding model." In Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science, 385. New York, NY: Springer US, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-0611-x_449.

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Smith, Adrian J. "Bidding Strategies." In Estimating, Tendering and Bidding for Construction, 173–90. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-13630-8_13.

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Shiralkar, Shreekant W. "Bidding Game." In IT Through Experiential Learning, 17–26. Berkeley, CA: Apress, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-2421-2_3.

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Surahyo, Akhtar. "Bidding Procedures." In Understanding Construction Contracts, 79–96. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66685-3_8.

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Mallen, Cheryl. "Event bidding." In Event Management in Sport, Recreation and Tourism, 223–38. 4th ed. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003391098-10.

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Asker, John. "Bidding Rings." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 941–43. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2925.

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Conference papers on the topic "Bidding"

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Leyton-Brown, Kevin, Yoav Shoham, and Moshe Tennenholtz. "Bidding clubs." In the 2nd ACM conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/352871.352899.

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Wang, Jun, and Shuai Yuan. "Real-Time Bidding." In WSDM 2015: Eighth ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2684822.2697041.

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Zhang, Chong-rui, and E. Zhang. "Optimized bidding algorithm of real time bidding in online ads auction." In 2014 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2014.6930205.

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Lou, Yongli. "Study on Bidding Evaluation Method and Bidding Strategy of Construction Project." In 2016 2nd Workshop on Advanced Research and Technology in Industry Applications (WARTIA-16). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/wartia-16.2016.236.

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Chowdhury, Moinul Morshed Porag, Christopher Kiekintveld, Son Tran, and William Yeoh. "Bidding in Periodic Double Auctions Using Heuristics and Dynamic Monte Carlo Tree Search." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/23.

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In a Periodic Double Auction (PDA), there are multiple discrete trading periods for a single type of good. PDAs are commonly used in real-world energy markets to trade energy in specific time slots to balance demand on the power grid. Strategically, bidding in a PDA is complicated because the bidder must predict and plan for future auctions that may influence the bidding strategy for the current auction. We present a general bidding strategy for PDAs based on forecasting clearing prices and using Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to plan a bidding strategy across multiple time periods. In addition, we present a fast heuristic strategy that can be used either as a standalone method or as an initial set of bids to seed the MCTS policy. We evaluate our bidding strategies using a PDA simulator based on the wholesale market implemented in the Power Trading Agent Competition (PowerTAC) competition. We demonstrate that our strategies outperform state-of-the-art bidding strategies designed for that competition.
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Trevathan, Jarrod, and Wayne Read. "Detecting Collusive Shill Bidding." In Fourth International Conference on Information Technology (ITNG'07). IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/itng.2007.74.

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Cui, Dong-hong, and Xi-yan Zhang. "Bidding Price Game Model." In 2009 International Conference on Information and Multimedia Technology. IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icimt.2009.41.

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Sun, Ron, and Chad Sessions. "Bidding in reinforcement learning." In the third annual conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/301136.301226.

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Ping, Jiang. "Bidding Strategy in Takeover." In 2011 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS 2011). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2011.5998440.

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Shah, Shail K., Anitha H.M., and P. Jayarekha. "Bidding System using Blockchain." In 2020 International Conference on Mainstreaming Block Chain Implementation (ICOMBI). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/icombi48604.2020.9203438.

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Reports on the topic "Bidding"

1

Hopenhayn, Hugo, and Maryam Saeedi. Bidding Dynamics in Auctions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22716.

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Spahn, Andrew. Demand Side Bidding. Final Report. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), December 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/821147.

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Vine, E. Local government and demand-side bidding. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), December 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/5903783.

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Snyder, Christopher M., Robert P. Trost, and R. D. Trunkey. Bidding Behavior in DoD's Commercial Activities Competitions. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada362386.

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Cary, Matthew, Aparna Das, Benjamin Edelman, Ioannis Giotis, Kurtis Heimerl, Anna Karlin, Claire Mathieu, and Michael Schwarz. On Best-Response Bidding in GSP Auctions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13788.

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DeMarzo, Peter, Ilan Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz. Bidding With Securities: Auctions and Security Design. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10891.

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Bajari, Patrick, Stephanie Houghton, and Steve Tadelis. Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12051.

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Porter, Robert, and J. Douglas Zona. Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6037.

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Goldman, C. A., J. F. Busch, E. P. Kahn, S. S. Stoft, and S. Cohen. Review of integrated resource bidding at Niagara Mohawk. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), May 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/7001368.

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McCoy, Gilbert A., and R. Gordon Bloomquist. Meeting the Northwest's Energy Needs Through Competitive Bidding. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), July 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/6581468.

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