Journal articles: 'Berkeley'

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Cowan, Steven B. "Or Abstractum." Philosophia Christi 23, no. 1 (2021): 175–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc202123114.

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George Berkeley is famous for the metaphysical principle esse is percipi or percipere (“to be is to be perceived or to be a perceiver”). Many Berkeleyan idealists take this principle to be incompatible with Platonic realism about abstract objects, and thus opt either for nominalism or divine conceptualism on which they are construed as divine ideas. In this paper, I argue that Berkeleyan idealism is consistent with a Platonic realism in which abstracta exist outside the divine mind. This allows the Berkeleyan to expand Berkeley’s principle to read: esse is percipi or percipere or abstractum.

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López, Alberto Luis. "Ontología y mundo externo en Berkeley [Berkeley’s Ontology and External World]." LOGOS Revista de Filosofía 135, no. 135 (July 21, 2020): 11–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.26457/lrf.v135i135.2713.

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Es habitual que algunos lectores confundan la postura de Berkeley al creer que niega la existencia del mundo externo y que su filosofía lleva inevitablemente al solipsismo. Frente a estas lecturas, analizo en este artículo el tema de la relación entre ontología y mundo externo en Berkeley, con el propósito de aclarar algunos desaciertos interpretativos sobre el asunto y mostrar con ello tres cosas: 1) que se trata de un error creer que su filosofía elimina el mundo externo y lleva al solipsismo, 2) que en la propia ontología está la clave para entender la constitución del mundo externo, y 3) que Dios le da el sentido último a ese mundo. Palabras clave Berkeley, mundo externo, ontología, Dios, solipsismo Referencias Berkeley, G., Philosophical Commentaries, en: The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Luce, A. A. (ed.). London: Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1948-57, 9 vols. Vol. I, 1948. ___________, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge; Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, en: The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Jessop, T. E. (ed.). London: Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1948-57, 9 vols. Vol. II, 1949. ___________, Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher, en: The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Jessop, T. E. (ed.). London: Nelson & Sons Ltd. 9 vols. 1948-57, 9 vols. Vol. III, 1950. ___________, Comentarios filosóficos. Introducción Manuscrita a los Principios del conocimiento humano. Correspondencia con Johnson. J. A. Robles (trad.). México: IIF’s-UNAM, 1989. Bettcher, Talia Mae. Berkeley. A Guide for the Perplexed. Londres: Continuum, 2008. Cassirer, Ernst. La Filosofía de las formas simbólicas. 3 vols. México: FCE, 1976. Hight, M.A. (ed.). The Correspondence of George Berkeley. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Liébana Martínez, Ismael, “Conocimiento y mundo externo en Berkeley”. Diálogo Filosófico nº 46 (enero/abril, 2000): 69-76. Luis López, Alberto, “Berkeley: sobre el conocimiento nocional de la mente”, Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía 22, núm. 1, mayo (2017): 137-154. ___________, “Sobre la ontología inmaterialista: el concepto de idea en Berkeley”, Areté. Revista de Filosofía 31, núm. 2 (2019): 427-449. Muehlmann, Robert G. “The Substance of Berkeley’s Philosophy”. En Berkeley´s Metaphysics: Structural, Interpretive, and Critical Essays, edit. Muehlmann, Robert, 89-105. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004. Nols, Carmen. Zeichenhafte Wirklichkeit. Realität als Ausdruck der kommunikativen Präsenz Gottes in der Theologie George Berkeleys. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011. Roberts, John Russell. A Metaphysics for the Mob. The Philosophy of George Berkeley. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Robles, José Antonio. “Inteligibilidad y cualidades sensibles: de Descartes a Berkeley o de la resurrección de las cualidades secundarias”. Diánoia XLIV, núm 44 (1998): 33-62.

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Migely, Genevieve. "Berkeley’s Cartesian Account of Volitional Causation." MANUSYA 12, no. 1 (2009): 11–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/26659077-01201002.

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Although the heart of Berkeley’s philosophy is active substance, some argue that Berkeley’s notion of causation precludes human agency, an undesirable result for Berkeley. In the hope of securing the ontological status of finite substance in Berkeley’s metaphysics, this paper seeks to offer a rather different take on the Cartesian influence supporting Berkeley’s views on the causal efficacy of human spirits. After demonstrating the possibility of a Malebranchian occasionalism in light of Berkeley’s views on necessary connection, a close examination of Berkeley’s works reveals his real stance on what type of connection counts as causal. Employing Descartes’s divinely-established natural connection between a finite will and its effects, Berkeley is able to offer a coherent account of finite causation in the natural world that can accommodate free will. This naturalistic interpretation is able to situate Berkeley as one who is influenced by a Cartesian version of causation (though not the one scholars often attribute to him), but is able to legitimately resist the fall into Hume’s metaphysically empty position on causation as nothing but constant conjunction.

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Matthiessen, Hannes Ole. "A Reiding of Berkeley's Theory of Vision." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20, no. 1 (March 2022): 19–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0318.

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George Berkeley argues that vision is a language of God, that the immediate objects of vision are arbitrary signs for tactile objects and that there is no necessary connection between what we see and what we touch. Thomas Reid, on the other hand, aims to establish a geometrical connection between visible and tactile figures. Consequently, although Reid and Berkeley's theories of vision share important elements, Reid explicitly rejects Berkeley's idea that visible figures are merely arbitrary signs for tangible bodies. But is he right in doing so? I show that many passages in Berkeley's work on vision suggest that he acknowledges a geometrical connection between visibles and tangibles. So the opposition between the arbitrariness Berkeley defends and a geometrical connection cannot be as universal as Reid thinks. This paper seeks to offer a plausible reading of Berkeley's theory of vision in this regard and an explanation of why Reid interprets Berkeley differently.

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Falkenstein, Lorne. "Reid's Critique of Berkely's Position on the Inverted Image." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16, no. 2 (June 2018): 175–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2018.0196.

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Reid and Berkeley disagreed over whether we directly perceive objects located outside of us in a surrounding space, commonly revealed by both vision and touch. Berkeley considered a successful account of erect vision to be crucial for deciding this dispute, at one point calling it ‘the principal point in the whole optic theory.’ Reid's critique of Berkeley's position on this topic is very brief, and appears to miss Berkeley's point. I argue that there is more to Reid's response to Berkeley than at first meets the eye. Reid's rival account of erect vision draws on evidence that makes a compelling case for the position that we see the same space that we touch.

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Hight, Marc, and Walter Ott. "The New Berkeley." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34, no. 1 (March 2004): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2004.10716557.

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Throughout his mature writings, Berkeley speaks of minds as substances that underlie or support ideas. After initially flirting with a Humean account, according to which minds are nothing but ‘congeries of Perceptions’ (PC 580), Berkeley went on to claim that a mind is a ‘perceiving, active being … entirely distinct’ from its ideas (P 2). Despite his immaterialism, Berkeley retains the traditional category of substance and gives it pride of place in his ontology. Ideas, by contrast, are ‘fleeting and dependent beings’ (P 89) that must be supported by a mental substance. There is no doubt that Berkeley's conception of the relationship between minds and ideas is non-traditional, but that fact does not undercut his commitment to the traditional conception of substance.

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Kroiz, Lauren. "Relocating Romare Bearden’s Berkeley." Boom 6, no. 3 (2016): 50–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/boom.2016.6.3.50.

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In 1972, the black artist and writer Romare Bearden traveled from his home in New York to spend ten days in the capital of counterculture in Berkeley, California. He visited on an official commission from the city of Berkeley to create a new artwork for its City Council Chambers. The result was the monumental work Berkeley—The City and its People, which hung for decades until extensive seismic trouble plaguing City Hall forced its removal and relocation to a storage facility. Berkeley has changed dramatically since Bearden’s visit. The percentage of Berkeley’s black population has dropped from almost 25 percent in 1970 to less than 10 percent in 2010. Perhaps this demographic shift, coupled with the full mural’s removal from public view, has made it difficult to remember that Bearden’s Berkeley originated in a moment of racially charged civic conflict. Bearden’s Berkeley envisions how the California city is built from and on shifting histories of encounter and settlement by many groups with different backgrounds, interests, and beliefs, all needed to work together to build a better future.

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Jankowiak, Tim. "Kantian Phenomenalism Without Berkeleyan Idealism." Kantian Review 22, no. 2 (May 5, 2017): 205–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415417000024.

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AbstractPhenomenalist interpretations of Kant are out of fashion. The most common complaint from anti-phenomenalist critics is that a phenomenalist reading of Kant would collapse Kantian idealism into Berkeleyan idealism. This would be unacceptable because Berkeleyan idealism is incompatible with core elements of Kant’s empirical realism. In this paper, I argue that not all phenomenalist readings threaten empirical realism. First, I distinguish several variants of phenomenalism, and then show that Berkeley’s idealism is characterized by his commitment to most of them. I then make the case that two forms of phenomenalism are consistent with Kant’s empirical realism. The comparison between Kant and Berkeley runs throughout the paper, with special emphasis on the significance of their theories of intentionality.

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Huggler, Jørgen. "The Response to George Berkeley’s Philosophy in Twentieth-Century Danish Experimental Psychology: Edgar Rubin and Edgar Tranekjær Rasmussen." Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 51, no. 1 (December 12, 2018): 47–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24689300-05101001.

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The purpose of this paper is to explore the reception of George Berkeley in a particular corner of 20th-century Danish psychology and philosophy. In contrast to philosophers, such as Peter Zinkernagel and David Favrholdt, Danish experimental psychologists, including Edgar Rubin and Edgar Tranekjær Rasmussen, made highly appreciative reference to the methodology and experimental observations of Berkeley and David Hume. This paper focuses on these psychologists’ interest in Berkeley’s ideas. I will first present Rubin’s path from a mosaic-like understanding of psychological phenomena (elemental psychology) to a holistic view, detailing what he termed adspective psychology and its method. I then turn to Rubin’s embrace of certain experimental observations made by Berkeley and, in particular, by Hume concerning the minima visibilia. The second part of the paper deals with Tranekjær Rasmussen’s interpretation of Berkeley’s work, and in particular of his immaterialism, his notion of God, and his critique of abstract ideas.

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Hošman, Mirek Tobiáš. "George Berkeley’s Tar-water Medicine." Early Science and Medicine 25, no. 2 (July 29, 2020): 173–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15733823-00252p04.

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Abstract In his last major book, Siris (1744), the philosopher George Berkeley proposed tar-water as a universal medicine, suggesting that he had found a panacea. Shortly after its publication, Siris became immensely popular and tar-water spread all around Europe and even reached America. The aim of this article is to present Berkeley’s ideas about tar-water as a medicine with a particular focus on the origins of tar-water in Berkeley’s thinking and its alleged medical effects. Berkeley conceived of tar-water as at one end of a chain, with God at the other end. I reconstruct this chain, excluding from the examination the last parts, related to metaphysics and theology. Furthermore, relying on eighteenth-century letters, books and pamphlets, I briefly introduce the conditions leading Berkeley to start experimenting with tar-water as well as the context and the so called “pamphlet war” following the publication of Siris.

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Townsend, Chris. "Nature and the Language of the Sense: Berkeley's Thought in Coleridge and Wordsworth." Romanticism 25, no. 2 (July 2019): 129–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/rom.2019.0414.

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Though George Berkeley's name appears in a number of studies of British Romantic poetry, sustained readings of his influence on poets of the period are scarce. This is in large part because our modern understanding of Berkeley as an idealist philosopher often precludes us from seeing the role that his theory of nature as a divine language played in poetic conceptions of the relations between mind, world, and God. In this essay I explore the writings of Coleridge and Wordsworth from the 1790s, sketching as complete a picture as possible of their knowledge of Berkeley, and offering readings of Berkeleian moments in their poetry. These moments, which draw Berkeley's ideas into a complex dialogue with philosophical materialism, centre around a rhetoric of semblance – in which the world can ‘seem’ less gross than bodily. I offer this reading as a step towards a fuller understanding of the Romantic understanding of Berkeley.

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Nichols, Roger. "Berkeley Conducts Berkeley." Musical Times 134, no. 1805 (July 1993): 412. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1003114.

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BROOK, RICHARD J. "Berkeley and Proof in Geometry." Dialogue 51, no. 3 (September 2012): 419–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217312000686.

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Berkeley in his Introduction to the Principles of Human knowledge uses geometrical examples to illustrate a way of generating “universal ideas,” which allegedly account for the existence of general terms. In doing proofs we might, for example, selectively attend to the triangular shape of a diagram. Presumably what we prove using just that property applies to all triangles.I contend, rather, that given Berkeley’s view of extension, no Euclidean triangles exist to attend to. Rather proof, as Berkeley would normally assume, requires idealizing diagrams; treating them as if they obeyed Euclidean constraints. This convention solves the problem of representative generalization.

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Smith, Frederik N. "BECKETT AND BERKELEY: A Reconsideration." Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd'hui 7, no. 1 (December 8, 1998): 331–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18757405-90000104.

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No one doubts that Beckett was influenced by the skepticism of the eighteenth-century Irish philosopher George Berkeley; what is not appreciated, however, is the influence of the form of Berkeley's less well-known writings. Of particular importance are his youthful Philosophical Commentaries (kept in 1707-08), and his late, apparently incomplete Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water (published in 1744). Beckett knew both of these works and in them seems to have discovered formal models for the personal, tentative, philosophical fiction of the 'trilogy' and How It Is. In Beckett as in Berkeley, language and writing become not only the means but also the greatest impediment to understanding.

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West, Peter. "Reid and Berkeley on Scepticism, Representationalism, and Ideas." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 17, no. 3 (September 2019): 191–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2019.0242.

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Both Reid and Berkeley reject ‘representationalism’, an epistemological position whereby we (mediately) perceive things in the world indirectly via ideas in our mind, on the grounds of anti-scepticism and common sense. My aim in this paper is to draw out the similarities between Reid and Berkeley's ‘anti-representationalist’ arguments, whilst also identifying the root of their disagreements on certain fundamental metaphysical issues. Reid famously rejects Berkeley's idealism, in which all that exists are ideas and minds, because it undermines the dictates of common sense. Reid also charges Berkeley with not only accepting but furthering the progress of ‘the Way of Ideas’, a longstanding tradition which has drawn philosophy away from true science and common sense. From Berkeley's perspective, Reid is a ‘materialist’; that is, he dogmatically accepts that mind-independent things exist. I argue that these important differences can be explained by both thinkers’ construal of certain ‘philosophical prejudices’. Finally, I conclude that despite these differences, both ought to be characterised as ‘anti-representationalists’ in light of their shared epistemological concerns.

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Alves, Pedro MS. "A Percepção Da Extensão. Exame das teses de Berkeley." Phainomenon 18-19, no. 1 (October 1, 2009): 71–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2009-0005.

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Abstract In this paper I discuss Berkeley’s theories about vision, perception of distance, and the foundations of Geometry. I start with Locke’s answer to Molineaux’s problem and the criticisms Berkeley addressed to it. I explain the fundamentais of Berkeley’s theory about our cognitive shaping of the visual field and the type of connections that visual data establishes with data from the haptic field. I show how interesting are Berkeley’s conceptions for a phenomenology of perception, and, eventually, I carried some phenomenological evidence against Berkeley’s too much strict location of the idea of distance in the haptic field alone.

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Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. "Anthropologist as Court Jester." Boom 6, no. 4 (2016): 80–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/boom.2016.6.4.80.

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This autobiopic piece chronicles Scheper-Hughes’s early voluntary service with the Peace Corp in Brazil, followed by her early academic career and coming to Berkeley, and then her ongoing engagement and activism in standing up for, and standing with, others. This welled up into community activism and advocacy for the homeless together with Berkeley Catholic Workers, eventually resulting in a café inside of Berkeley’s People’s Park in 1989, providing rationale for Scheper-Hughes’s own well-known applied anthropology and activism, which has made her famous as one of today’s leading anthropologists.

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Fasko, Manuel, and Peter West. "The Irish Context of Berkeley's ‘Resemblance Thesis’." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 88 (October 2020): 7–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246120000089.

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AbstractIn this paper, we focus on Berkeley's reasons for accepting the ‘resemblance thesis’ which entails that for one thing to represent another those two things must resemble one another. The resemblance thesis is a crucial premise in Berkeley's argument from the ‘likeness principle’ in §8 of the Principles. Yet, like the ‘likeness principle’, the resemblance thesis remains unargued for and is never explicitly defended. This has led several commentators to provide explanations as to why Berkeley accepts the resemblance thesis and why he also takes his opponents to do so too. We provide a contextual answer to this question, focusing on epistemological discussions concerning resemblance and representation in Early Modern Irish Philosophy. We argue that the resemblance thesis is implicit in early responses to William Molyneux's famous example of the ‘man born blind made to see’ and trace the ‘Molyneux man’ thought experiment as it is employed by Irish thinkers such as William King and Berkeley himself. Ultimately, we conclude that Berkeley's acceptance of the resemblance thesis can be explained by the Irish intellectual climate in which he was writing.

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Freitas, Vinícius França. "O Ceticismo de George Berkeley na Leitura de Thomas Reid." Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 29, no. 57 (2021): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philosophica202128571.

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The paper advances two hypotheses concerning Thomas Reid’s reading of George Berkeley’s immaterialist system. First, it is argued that, on Reid’s view, Berkeley is skeptic about the existence of the objects of the material world, not in virtue of a doubt about the senses but for his adoption of the principle that ideas are the immediate objects of the operations of mind. On Reid’s view, that principle is a skeptical principle by its own nature. Secondly, it is argued that Berkeley really accepts in his system the notion of ‘idea’ such as Reid understands it, namely, as an entity distinct from mind and its operations.

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Lowe, E. J. "Identity, Individuality, and Unity." Philosophy 78, no. 3 (July 2003): 321–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819103000329.

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Locke notoriously included number amongst the primary qualities of bodies and was roundly criticized for doing so by Berkeley. Frege echoed some of Berkeley's criticisms in attacking the idea that ‘Number is a property of external things’, while defending his own view that number is a property of concepts. In the present paper, Locke's view is defended against the objections of Berkeley and Frege, and Frege's alternative view of number is criticized. More precisely, it is argued that numbers are assignable to pluralities of individuals. However, it is also argued that Locke went too far in asserting that ‘Number applies itself to ... everything that either doth exist, or can be imagined’.

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Belfrage, Bertil. "Berkeley." International Studies in Philosophy 20, no. 1 (1988): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil198820157.

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Kline, A. David, and R. J. Van Iten. "Berkeley." International Studies in Philosophy 21, no. 3 (1989): 116–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil198921324.

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Bracken, Harry M. "Berkeley." Idealistic Studies 15, no. 2 (1985): 176–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies198515237.

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Winkler, Kenneth P. "Berkeley." Idealistic Studies 22, no. 3 (1992): 300–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies199222378.

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Ackoff, Russel L. "Berkeley." Systems Practice 5, no. 6 (December 1992): 583–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01083612.

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Faaborg, Robert. "Berkeley." Teaching Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1989): 87–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil198912129.

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Welker, David. "Berkeley." Teaching Philosophy 13, no. 3 (1990): 284–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil199013339.

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Jakapi, Roomet. "Loomislugu filosoofias: hr Berkeley vastus Lady Percivalile." Mäetagused 81 (December 2021): 151–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.7592/mt2021.81.jakapi.

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The paper discusses George Berkeley’s metaphysical account of the Creation in his work Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713). As we know from Berkeley’s correspondence, his detailed attempt to show that his immaterialist philosophy is compatible with the Mosaic description of the Creation was occasioned by an objection from the wife of his friend Sir John Percival. According to Berkeley’s philosophy, only minds and ideas exist. Physical things such as books and trees are mere collections of ideas in human minds. No thing can exist unless there is a mind to perceive it. Yet the Mosaic story states that many things were created and existed before humans came into being. Lady Percival pointed out that Berkeley’s view makes it hard to understand how things could be created if there were no human beings around to perceive them. In response, Berkeley offered a sophisticated metaphysical construct in which the creation of the physical world is interpreted as God’s decree to produce certain kinds of ideas in potential perceivers. The paper aims to show how Berkeley’s response to Lady Percival’s objection reflects the complicated relationship between philosophy and revealed religion in the early 18th century. Berkeley’s commitment to biblical truth sets significant limits to his philosophical speculation.

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Grzeliński, Adam. "Siris and Berkeley’s Late Social Philosophy." Idea. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych 30, no. 1 (2018): 199–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.15290/idea.2018.30.1.15.

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In the present article, I aim at showing a shift in Berkeley’s understanding of society in the late Siris (1744). Although the work is primarily devoted to the curative qualities of tar-water and on the speculative level develops a new neoplatonic metaphysic of light, it should also be seen as a work in which Berkeley’s mature philosophy is expressed as a whole. Together with the fact that since the thirties Berkeley thought was more inclined towards practical, i.e. economic and social, issues, this might be a premise for interpreting the Siris as a work in which a vision of society is presented. The parallelism of nature and society, of macrocosm and microcosm, and the claim that nature is not perfect, but is a dynamic, developing whole, makes it possible to treat society as an imperfect whole developed and perfected by human activity. If such a reading is correct it evidences the fact that in his Siris Berkeley abandoned the religious radicalism typical for his early works.

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Laguna García, Rogelio. "Berkeley vs. Berkeley y la cuestión de Dios en los Principios Berkeley versus Berkeley. On God in the Treatise." LOGOS Revista de Filosofía 135, no. 135 (July 21, 2020): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.26457/lrf.v135i135.2716.

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En este artículo nos interesa hacer una revisión de la cuestión de Dios en el Tratado de Berkeley sobre los principios del conocimiento humano. Para ello realizamos una exposición de las ideas centrales de esta obra, después ofrecemos una revisión crítica de los postulados, de acuerdo a las críticas establecidas por el propio Berkeley en el Tratado. Finalmente ponemos a discusión si el propio concepto de Dios tiene que reconsiderarse y si esto tendría implicaciones en la doctrina de la inmaterialidad del mundo. Palabras clave Modernidad, materia, filosofía natural, racionalismo Referencias Berkeley, George. Principios del conocimiento humano. Barcelona:Folio, 1999. Consiglio, Francesco. “Introducción al concepto de idea en la filosofía de George Berkeley”. Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 5:6 (2016): 283–296. Sobrevilla, David, “El idealismo de Berkeley”. Areté. Revista de filosofía VII: 2, (1995): 331-352. Defez, Antoni, “Inmaterialismo y realismo en Berkeley”. Pensamiento 71:68 (2015), pp. 897-908.

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Ortolani, S., E. Bica, B. Barbuy, and M. Zoccali. "The old open clusters Berkeley 36, Berkeley 73 and Biurakan 13 (Berkeley 34)." Astronomy & Astrophysics 429, no. 2 (December 17, 2004): 607–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/0004-6361:20041458.

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Ortolani, S., E. Bica, B. Barbuy, and M. Zoccali. "The old open clusters Berkeley 36, Berkeley 73 and Biurakan 13 (Berkeley 34)." Astronomy & Astrophysics 439, no. 3 (August 12, 2005): 1135. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/0004-6361:20041458e.

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Rickless, Samuel C. "Berkeley's Criticisms of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 88 (October 2020): 97–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246120000119.

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AbstractIn this paper, I attempt to clarify the nature and purpose of Berkeley's criticisms of Shaftesbury's and Hutcheson's ethical systems in the third chapter of Alciphron, explaining the extent to which those criticisms rely on the truth of idealism and considering whether Berkeley or his philosophical opponents have the better of the arguments. In the end, I conclude that some of Berkeley's criticisms are based on confusion and misunderstanding, others are likely contradicted by the empirical evidence, and yet others are unconvincing. At the same time, the criticisms reveal that Berkeley's metaphysical and ethical views are, perhaps surprisingly, significantly intertwined.

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MATSUSHIMA, Toshiyasu. "Berkeley Report." IEICE ESS FUNDAMENTALS REVIEW 5, no. 3 (2012): 281–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1587/essfr.5.281.

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Walmsley, Jonathan. "George Berkeley." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 8 (1999): 30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm1999814.

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Zwiebach, Michael. "Berkeley Festival." Early Music XXVIII, no. 3 (August 2000): 505–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/earlyj/xxviii.3.505.

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Anderson, Douglas R. "George Berkeley." Idealistic Studies 22, no. 3 (1992): 218–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies199222319.

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Dicker, Georges. "Anti-Berkeley." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16, no. 2 (May 2008): 335–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608780801969134.

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Bevan, P. Gilroy. "Berkeley Moynihan." Journal of Medical Biography 1, no. 2 (May 1993): 76–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/096777209300100202.

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The surgical career of Berkeley George Andrew Moynihan (Figure 1) spanned the last decade of the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century. He gained an international reputation, establishing an especial bond of friendship with the leading American surgeons of his day, and became known as a champion of provincial surgery in Britain. There were many facets to his character, and in view of his multiple interests he could fairly be described as the Renaissance man of British surgery of his time.

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Howe, Jerry J. "Berkeley Quarry." Rocks & Minerals 62, no. 4 (July 1987): 240–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00357529.1987.11762663.

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Mordka, Cezary. "Realistyczna interpretacja domniemanego idealizmu G. Berkeleya." Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, sectio I – Philosophia-Sociologia 43, no. 2 (June 10, 2019): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/i.2018.43.2.93-105.

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W artykule przedstawiam próbę wskazania na to, iż dokonania Berkeleya, mimo rzekomego konsensusu, nie dają się umiejscowić w obszarze idealizmu subiektywnego. Niezależnie od sformułowań samego Berkeleya, który nie pozostawał klarowny semantycznie, daje się utrzymać tezę, iż świat nie utracił dla niego pozycji bytu realnego, tyle że realność tego świata całkowicie była uzależniona od aktywności bytu boskiego. Filozof słusznie zwrócił uwagę na nieodzowność podmiotowych ujęć w kwestii dostępu do świata. Nie mając odpowiedniej ontologii dla idei, Berkeley nie był w stanie „oderwać” idei od umysłu, lecz znaczyło to u niego „bycie dla umysłu”.

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Dierig, Simon. "Berkeleys Idealismus." Philosophisches Jahrbuch 121, no. 1 (2014): 76–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0031-8183-2014-1-76.

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Abstract. According to a widespread interpretation of Berkeley’s philosophy, advocated, for example, by Kant and Reid, Berkeley’s main claim in the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge is that there are no material, but only mental entities. In the following essay, it is argued that this reading of Berkeley’s idealism is mistaken. Berkeley does not hold ontological idealism, that is, the view that there is not a material world, to be true, but only counterfactual idealism, that is, the claim that material entities counterfactually depend upon mental substances for their existence. While defending this interpretation of Berkeley’s philosophy, I examine in some detail his theory of ideas and his account of corporeal substances. I conclude by discussing several objections to the reading of Berkeley’s idealism advanced in this essay.

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Carraro, G., D. Geisler, A. Moitinho, G. Baume, and R. A. Vázquez. "A photometric study of the old open clusters Berkeley 73, Berkeley 75 and Berkeley 25." Astronomy & Astrophysics 442, no. 3 (October 14, 2005): 917–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/0004-6361:20053089.

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Fields, Keota. "BERKELEY ON PERCEPTUAL DISCRIMINATION OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS." History of Philosophy Quarterly 37, no. 2 (April 1, 2020): 163–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/48614940.

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Abstract Commentators are divided over whether Berkeley holds that physical objects are immediately perceived by sense. As I read Berkeley, discrimination is necessary for perceiving physical objects by sense. He says that discrimination requires a perception of motion. Since motions can only be mediately perceived, according to Berkeley, physical objects can be perceived by sense only mediately. I defend this reading against three objections. I also propose a new objection to the claim that physical objects are immediately perceived for Berkeley. I argue that immediate perception is neither necessary nor sufficient to perceive an object by sense, according to Berkeley.

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Flage, Daniel E. "Berkeley's Epistemic Ontology: The Principles." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34, no. 1 (March 2004): 25–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2004.10716558.

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Since the Mind, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own Ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident, that our Knowledge is only conversant about them. (Locke, Essay 4.1.1)Berkeley's Principles is a curious work. The nominal topic is epistemic. The actual topic is ontological. And it is not uncommon to suggest that ‘Berkeley's System presents us with unique puzzles, particularly at its foundation.’If, as many commentators suggest, Berkeley's principal arguments for idealism are weak, this might suggest that we are approaching his works from a set of assumptions Berkeley did not share. In this paper I explore such a possibility.

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Huggler, Jørgen. "Peter Zinkernagel and David Favrholdt: A Response to George Berkeley in Twentieth-Century Danish Philosophy." Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 53, no. 1 (November 26, 2020): 33–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10006.

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Abstract Berkeley’s criticism of Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a challenge to epistemologists. Do we experience a mind-independent reality, even though we do it with the help of senses bound to give us subjective experiences? Berkeley – or a straw man by that name (i.e. Berkeley without God) – played an important part as sparring partner for an influential development of Danish theoretical philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. The protagonists here are Peter Zinkernagel (1921–2003) and David Favrholdt (1931–2012). Zinkernagel held an extraordinary appointment as research fellow at the University of Copenhagen. Favrholdt was the founding father of the Philosophical Institute at Odense University (today: University of Southern Denmark). This essay focuses on the constructive moments in Zinkernagel’s alternative to immaterialism, being based on a distinction between perception and action, and on Favrholdt’s development of a reconstruction of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

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Yontan, Talar. "An Investigation of Open Clusters Berkeley 68 and Stock 20 Using CCD UBV and Gaia DR3 Data." Astronomical Journal 165, no. 3 (February 1, 2023): 79. http://dx.doi.org/10.3847/1538-3881/aca6f0.

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Abstract We performed detailed photometric and astrometric analyses of the open star clusters Berkeley 68 and Stock 20. This was based on ground-based CCD UBV photometric data complemented by space-based Gaia Data Release 3 (DR3) photometry and astrometry. A total of 198 and 51 stars were identified as likely cluster members for Berkeley 68 and Stock 20, respectively. Two-color diagrams were used to derive the reddening and photometric metallicity for each cluster. The reddening for Berkeley 68 and Stock 20 is E(B − V) = 0.520 ± 0.032 mag and 0.400 ± 0.048 mag, respectively. Photometric metallicity [Fe/H] is −0.13 ± 0.08 dex for Berkeley 68 and −0.01 ± 0.06 dex for Stock 20. Keeping as constant reddening and metallicity, we determined the distance moduli and ages of the clusters through fitting isochrones to the UBV and Gaia-based color–magnitude diagrams. Photometric distances are d = 3003 ± 165 pc for Berkeley 68 and 2911 ± 216 pc for Stock 20. The cluster ages are 2.4 ± 0.2 Gyr and 50 ± 10 Myr for Berkeley 68 and Stock 20, respectively. Present-day mass function slopes were found to be Γ = 1.38 ± 0.71 and Γ = 1.53 ± 0.39 for Berkeley 68 and Stock 20, respectively. These values are compatible with the value of Salpeter. The relaxation times were estimated as 32.55 and 23.17 Myr for Berkeley 68 and Stock 20, respectively. These times are less than the estimated cluster ages, indicating that both clusters are dynamically relaxed. Orbit integration was carried out only for Berkeley 68 since radial velocity data were not available for Stock 20. Analysis indicated that Berkeley 68 was born outside the solar circle and belongs to the thin-disk component of the Milky Way.

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Proffitt, Dennis R., Jeanine Stefanucci, Tom Banton, and William Epstein. "The Role of Effort in Perceiving Distance." Psychological Science 14, no. 2 (March 2003): 106–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.t01-1-01427.

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Berkeley proposed that space is perceived in terms of effort. Consistent with his proposal, the present studies show that perceived egocentric distance increases when people are encumbered by wearing a heavy backpack or have completed a visual-motor adaptation that reduces the anticipated optic flow coinciding with walking effort. In accord with Berkeley's proposal and Gibson's theory of affordances, these studies show that the perception of spatial layout is influenced by locomotor effort.

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Grubba, Leilane. "O Imaterialismo Epistemológico Frente ao Materialismo da Dignidade Humana." Journal of Law and Sustainable Development 3, no. 2 (October 22, 2015): 139–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.37497/sdgs.v3i2.146.

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Este artigo analisa a epistemologia empirista metafísica e imaterialista de George Berkeley. Nesse sentido, objetivou-se investigar a crítica de Berkeley à abstração das ideias e a sua concepção imaterialista em frente ao desafio dos direitos humanos, ou seja, da vida digna. O artigo problematizou epistemologicamente o pensamento imaterialista de Berkeley e a necessidade da epistemologia materialista dos direitos humanos. Diante disso, em primeiro lugar, foi apresentada a teoria de George Berkeley e a sua crítica à abstração das ideias – para ele, as ideias abstratas não podem ser concebidas. Sequencialmente, foi analisada a concepção imaterialista de Berkeley, para quem o mundo material não existe e o homem conhece apenas as suas sensações. Por fim, foi apresentada a ideia da materialidade como fundamento da vida digna, enquanto contraposição ao pensamento imaterialista de Berkeley. Considerou-se que os direitos humanos devem ser entendidos contextualmente, de modo a garantir a dignidade imanente e à satisfação das necessidades.

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Robles, José Antonio. "Berkeley y Benacerraf la aritmética es sólo un sistema de signos." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 23, no. 68 (December 13, 1991): 105–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1991.806.

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In this paper I point out that besides having made a proposal -with respect to arithmetic (and algebra)- which makes Berkeley an antecesor of Hartry Field -something which I do not elaborate more in this paper-, he also puts forth a nominalistic view which, in substantial points, is closely related to Benacerraf's in his "What Numbers Could Not Be". What I hold is that Berkeley's view, two hundred years before Benacerraf's, fullfils the latter's claim for numerical expressions to be meaningful and to make them useful in human practices. I interpret sorne proposals by Berkeley which would ground the construction of a mathematical structure in which no use is made of sets or any type of entities -besides the structure itself, of which I give an example-, to give meaning to the expressions which constitute it. Such expressions get their meaning from the proposition they have in the said structure. I take it that a nominalistic position, at least at the level of elementary mathematics, avoids many theoretical problems which arise if we adopt a less econornical ontological position.

Journal articles on the topic 'Berkeley'

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