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Journal articles on the topic 'Beliefs about deception'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 25 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Sarzano, Melanie. "COSTLY FALSE BELIEFS: WHAT SELF-DECEPTION AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT CAN TELL US ABOUT THE RATIONALITY OF BELIEFS." Dossier: On Self-Deception 13, no. 2 (May 7, 2019): 95–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1059501ar.

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In this paper, I compare cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment and argue that confronting these cases generates a dilemma about rationality. This dilemma turns on the idea that subjects are motivated to avoid costly false beliefs, and that both cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment are caused by an interest to avoid forming costly false beliefs. Even though both types of cases can be explained by the same belief-formation mechanism, only self-deceptive beliefs are irrational: the subjects depicted in high-stakes cases typically used in debates on pragmatic encroachment are, on the contrary, rational. If we find ourselves drawn to this dilemma, we are forced either to accept—against most views presented in the literature—that self-deception is rational or to accept that pragmatic encroachment is irrational. Assuming that both conclusions are undesirable, I argue that this dilemma can be solved. In order to solve this dilemma, I suggest and review several hypotheses aimed at explaining the difference in rationality between the two types of cases, the result of which being that the irrationality of self-deceptive beliefs does not entirely depend on their being formed via a motivationally biased process.

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Granhag, Pär Anders, Lars O. Andersson, Leif A. Strömwall, and Maria Hartwig. "Imprisoned knowledge: Criminals' beliefs about deception." Legal and Criminological Psychology 9, no. 1 (February 2004): 103–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/135532504322776889.

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3

van Loon, Marie. "RESPONSIBILITY FOR SELF-DECEPTION." Dossier: On Self-Deception 13, no. 2 (May 7, 2019): 119–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1059502ar.

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In this paper, I argue that Alfred Mele’s conception of self-deception is such that it always fulfils the reasons-responsiveness condition for doxastic responsibility. This is because self-deceptive mechanisms of belief formation are such that the kind of beliefs they bring about are the kind of beliefs that fulfil the criteria for doxastic responsibility from epistemic reasons responsiveness. I explain why in this paper. Mele describes the relation of the subject to the evidence as a biased relation. The subject does not simply believe on the basis of evidence, but on the basis of manipulated evidence. Mele puts forward four ways in which the subject does this. The subject could misinterpret positively or negatively, selectively focus, or gather evidence. Through these ways of manipulation, the evidence is framed such that the final product constitutes evidence on the basis of which the subject may believe a proposition that fits that subject’s desire that P. Whichever form of manipulation the subject uses, the evidence against P must be neutralized in one way or another. Successful neutralization of the evidence requires the ability to recognize what the evidence supports and the ability to react to it. These abilities consist precisely in the two parts of the reasons-responsiveness condition, reasons receptivity and reasons reactivity. In that sense, self-deceptive beliefs always fulfil the reasons-responsiveness condition for doxastic responsibility. However, given that reasons responsiveness is only a necessary condition for doxastic responsibility, this does not mean that self-deceived subjects are always responsible for their belief.

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Al-Simadi, Fayez A. "JORDANIAN STUDENTS' BELIEFS ABOUT NONVERBAL BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH DECEPTION IN JORDAN." Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 28, no. 5 (January 1, 2000): 437–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2000.28.5.437.

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Are cues to deception similar from culture to culture? The present study identifies some of those cues in previous studies in the United States, and tests Jordanian beliefs about cues associated with deception. Jordanian college students were asked to indicate their beliefs about cues associated with deception on a 20-item Likert type scale. Results showed that Jordanian students identified ten behaviors to be significantly related to their beliefs about liars. These cues are discussed in terms of cultural differences from the United States and cultural values in Jordan.

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5

Sato, Taku, and Yoshiaki Nihei. "Sex Differences in Beliefs about Cues to Deception." Psychological Reports 104, no. 3 (June 2009): 759–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.104.3.759-769.

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Sex differences in beliefs among Japanese students about cues to deception were explored. 171 participants (91 women, 80 men) read a scenario in which a protagonist caused a fatal traffic accident and told a lie to avoid responsibility. Then participants rated how the protagonist's behaviors would change when lying. Women participants believed significantly more than men that a liar shows body cues (e.g., body touching, biting lips) associated with anxiety, and that a liar has unsuccessful impression management (e.g., fewer smiles, fewer facial expressions). Furthermore, the women's scores also indicated that a liar would increase the amount of information (e.g., longer response length, gestures) and show more nonfluent speech (e.g., speech disturbances, inconsistency of speech contents).

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6

Vrij, Aldert, and Gün R. Semin. "Lie experts' beliefs about nonverbal indicators of deception." Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 20, no. 1 (March 1996): 65–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02248715.

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7

Lee, Dorothy E. "The Self-Deception of the Self-Destructive." Perceptual and Motor Skills 65, no. 3 (December 1987): 975–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pms.1987.65.3.975.

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317 college students as respondents were measured for suicide proneness and self-destructive behaviors and were also asked questions about self-attitudes, value for life, beliefs about suicide and self-destruction, religiosity and dogmatism. Those who score high on suicide proneness and self-destructiveness do not tend to be the same people, and they differ from one another. Correlations and factor analyses suggest the Suicide Prone are aware of their tendencies and are influenced by their value for life and beliefs about suicide and self-destruction. The Self-destructive are tied to negative self-evaluations, are less aware of their self-destructive tendencies, and score significantly higher than the Suicide Prone on dogmatism. Belief structure of the highly dogmatic person may allow those who are self-destructive to deny negative self-attitudes and to be unaware of self-destructive behaviors which are inconsistent with their beliefs.

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8

Strom, JaNon, and David F. Barone. "Self-Deception, Self-Esteem, and Control over Drinking at Different Stages of Alcohol Involvement." Journal of Drug Issues 23, no. 4 (October 1993): 705–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002204269302300409.

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With two studies, the authors sought to clarify how alcoholism relates to beliefs about drinking control and self-esteem by varying the stage of alcohol involvement. The stages were active abuser, commitment to change, early recovery, and late recovery. As hypothesized inStudy 1, long-term recovering abstainers had greater drinking-related internal locus of control, self-efficacy about abstaining, and self-esteem than those in detoxification. Unexpectedly, active abusers did not differ from the long-term recovering abstainers. Study 2 successfully discriminated these extreme groups with a measure of self-deception. Active abusers' positive beliefs about drinking control and self-esteem were associated with high self-deception. Self-beliefs at commitment to change were negative, but self-deception was still high. Early and late recovery was associated with positive self-beliefs and significantly lower self-deception.

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9

Villar, Gina, Joanne Arciuli, and Helen Paterson. "Vocal Pitch Production during Lying: Beliefs about Deception Matter." Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 20, no. 1 (February 2013): 123–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2011.633320.

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10

Delmas, Hugues, Benjamin Elissalde, Nicolas Rochat, Samuel Demarchi, Charles Tijus, and Isabel Urdapilleta. "Policemen’s and Civilians’ Beliefs About Facial Cues of Deception." Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 43, no. 1 (October 8, 2018): 59–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10919-018-0285-4.

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11

Toma, Catalina L., L. Crystal Jiang, and Jeffrey T. Hancock. "Lies in the Eye of the Beholder: Asymmetric Beliefs about One’s Own and Others’ Deceptiveness in Mediated and Face-to-Face Communication." Communication Research 45, no. 8 (February 27, 2016): 1167–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0093650216631094.

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This article examines how people’s beliefs about deception in text-based media (i.e., email, instant messenger) and face-to-face communication are distorted by two biases: (a) a self-other asymmetry, whereby people believe themselves to be more honest than their peers across communication contexts; and (b) a media intensification effect, whereby the perceived gap between one’s own and others’ deceptiveness is increased in text-based media, whose affordances (e.g., reduced nonverbal cues) are believed to facilitate deception. We argue that these biases stem from a desire for self-enhancement, or for seeing oneself as good, moral, capable, and impervious to negative media influence. Support for these propositions emerged across a college student sample (Study 1) and a national sample of U.S. adults (Study 2). The results offer a theoretical framework for the distortions in people’s beliefs about mediated deception, and have important practical implications.

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Laparidis, Konstantinos, Athanasios Papaioannou, Varvara Vretakou, and Aggeliki Morou. "Motivational Climate, Beliefs about the Bases of Success, and Sportsmanship Behaviors of Professional Basketball Athletes." Perceptual and Motor Skills 96, no. 3_suppl (June 2003): 1141–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pms.2003.96.3c.1141.

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Professional basketball players ( n = 76 men and n = 41 women) completed the Perceived Motivational Climate in Sport Questionnaire, an early version of the Multidimensional Sportsmanship Orientations Scale, and a measure of beliefs about the bases for success. The perception of mastery-oriented climate scales were positively associated with the belief that success is due to hard work and to reports of sportsmanship behaviors. The perception of performance-oriented climate scales were positively linked with the beliefs that success is caused by deception and high ability. Most relationships reflected individual differences in perceived motivational climate of athletes within each team.

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13

Mele, Alfred R. "Real self-deception." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20, no. 1 (March 1997): 91–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x97000034.

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Self-deception is made unnecessarily puzzling by the assumption that it is an intrapersonal analog of ordinary interpersonal deception. In paradigmatic cases, interpersonal deception is intentional and involves some time at which the deceiver disbelieves what the deceived believes. The assumption that self-deception is intentional and that the self-deceiver believes that some proposition is true while also believing that it is false produces interesting conceptual puzzles, but it also produces a fundamentally mistaken view of the dynamics of self-deception. This target article challenges the assumption and presents an alternative view of the nature and etiology of self-deception. Drawing upon empirical studies of cognitive biases, it resolves familiar “paradoxes” about the dynamics of self- deception and the condition of being self-deceived. Conceptually sufficient conditions for self-deception are offered and putative empirical demonstrations of a kind of self-deception in which a subject believes that a proposition is true while also believing that it is false are criticized. Self-deception is neither irresolvably paradoxical nor mysterious, and it is explicable without the assistance of mental exotica. The key to understanding its dynamics is a proper appreciation of our capacity for acquiring and retaining motivationally biased beliefs.

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14

Dickens, Chelsea R., and Drew A. Curtis. "Lies within the Law: Therapist’ Beliefs and Attitudes about Deception." Journal of Forensic Psychology Research and Practice 19, no. 5 (September 14, 2019): 359–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/24732850.2019.1666604.

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15

Granhag, Pär Anders, Leif A. Strömwall, and Maria Hartwig. "Granting asylum or not? Migration board personnel's beliefs about deception." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 1 (January 2005): 29–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183042000305672.

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16

Wright, Clea, and Jacqueline M. Wheatcroft. "Police officers' beliefs about, and use of, cues to deception." Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling 14, no. 3 (March 26, 2017): 307–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jip.1478.

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17

Bogaard, Glynis, and Ewout H. Meijer. "Self-Reported Beliefs About Verbal Cues Correlate with Deception-Detection Performance." Applied Cognitive Psychology 32, no. 1 (October 26, 2017): 129–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.3378.

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18

Ofen, Noa, Susan Whitfield-Gabrieli, Xiaoqian J. Chai, Rebecca F. Schwarzlose, and John D. E. Gabrieli. "Neural correlates of deception: lying about past events and personal beliefs." Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 12, no. 1 (October 19, 2016): 116–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsw151.

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19

Booth, Anthony R. "Doxastic voluntarism and self-deception." Disputatio 2, no. 22 (May 1, 2007): 115–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2007-0003.

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Abstract Direct Doxastic Voluntarism — the notion that we have direct (un-mediated) voluntary control over our beliefs — has widely been held to be false. There are, however, two ways to interpret the impossibility of our having doxastic control: as either a conceptual/ logical/metaphysical impossibility or as a psychological impossibility. In this paper I analyse the arguments for (Williams 1973; Scott-Kakures 1993; Adler 2002) and against (Bennett 1990; Radcliffe 1997) both types of claim and, in particular, evaluate the bearing that putative cases of self-deception have on the arguments in defence of voluntarism about belief. For it would seem that if it is the case that self-induced cases of self-deception are indeed possible, then voluntarism about belief could be true after all. Bennett claims that Williams’ argument for the impossibility case proves too much in that if it is successful in ruling out direct doxastic voluntarism, it is also successful in ruling out cases of indirect doxastic voluntarism. If cases of self-deception can also be cases of indirect doxastic voluntarism, then such cases support the argument against the impossibility case. I argue that Bennett is right in claiming that Williams’ argument proves too much, that cases of self-deception are indeed also sometimes cases of indirect self-deception and so that they cause genuine trouble for the conceptual impossibility case. However, I also argue that this is the only genuine worry for Williams’ argument. I end, while considering whether cases of self-deception can tell us anything about the psychological possibility of direct doxastic control, by suggesting a way of establishing the conceptual impossibility of direct doxastic control that circumvents Bennett’s counter-argument.

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20

Elaad, Eitan. "Lie-Detection Biases among Male Police Interrogators, Prisoners, and Laypersons." Psychological Reports 105, no. 3_suppl (December 2009): 1047–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.105.f.1047-1056.

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Beliefs of 28 male police interrogators, 30 male prisoners, and 30 male laypersons about their skill in detecting lies and truths told by others, and in telling lies and truths convincingly themselves, were compared. As predicted, police interrogators overestimated their lie-detection skills. In fact, they were affected by stereotypical beliefs about verbal and nonverbal cues to deception. Prisoners were similarly affected by stereotypical misconceptions about deceptive behaviors but were able to identify that lying is related to pupil dilation. They assessed their lie-detection skill as similar to that of laypersons, but less than that of police interrogators. In contrast to interrogators, prisoners tended to rate lower their lie-telling skill than did the other groups. Results were explained in terms of anchoring and self-assessment bias. Practical aspects of the results for criminal interrogation were discussed.

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21

Lakhani, Mital, and Rachel Taylor. "BELIEFS ABOUT THE CUES TO DECEPTION IN HIGH- AND LOW-STAKE SITUATIONS." Psychology, Crime & Law 9, no. 4 (December 2003): 357–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1068316031000093441.

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22

Ulatowska, Joanna. "Teachers’ beliefs about cues to deception and the ability to detect deceit." Educational Psychology 37, no. 3 (September 13, 2016): 251–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01443410.2016.1231297.

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23

Leach, Amy‐May, Cayla S. Da Silva, Christina J. Connors, Michael R. T. Vrantsidis, Christian A. Meissner, and Saul M. Kassin. "Looks like a liar? Beliefs about native and non‐native speakers' deception." Applied Cognitive Psychology 34, no. 2 (December 30, 2019): 387–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.3624.

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24

Taylor, Rachel, and Carol Hill-davies. "Parents’ and non-parents’ beliefs about the cues to deception in children." Psychology, Crime & Law 10, no. 4 (December 2004): 455–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16683160310001634322.

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25

Standley, Jeff. "The Santa Claus deception: The ethics of educator involvement." Theory and Research in Education 18, no. 2 (July 2020): 174–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477878520947042.

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For centuries, Santa Claus has proved to be a pervasive, persistent and influential mythic figure who dominates children’s lives for several weeks each year. But unlike most other fantasy figures, Santa Claus is presented as a real entity, a feat achieved through the widespread deception of children. This deception primarily involves a child’s family, but is also encouraged and maintained by wider society and its institutions. That educators could involve themselves in such a deception seems particularly controversial. Given their role as providers of epistemic goods, it appears like a dereliction of duty for them to seemingly encourage credulity and to deceive their students to maintain their false beliefs. However, I argue that there are epistemic benefits that can reaped by children through their experience of believing in Santa Claus and the process of independently disabusing themselves of these beliefs. For these benefits to be attained, educators must reluctantly engage in low-level paternalistic deception to keep their students in the dark about the truth, before then actively helping them to learn important epistemic lessons and foster key intellectual virtues as a result of their experiences. This justifies educators’ modest involvement in the Santa Claus deception.

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Masip, Jaume, Timothy R. Levine, Sandra Somastre, and Carmen Herrero. "Teaching Students About Sender and Receiver Variability in Lie Detection." Teaching of Psychology 47, no. 1 (November 20, 2019): 84–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0098628319888116.

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Deception detection is a topic covered in many psychology and communication courses. We designed and implemented an engaging class activity to facilitate the students’ learning of several key concepts related to sender and receiver variability in lie detection. The pedagogical effectiveness of the activity was measured. In line with previous research, the students had difficulty acknowledging and correcting their own biases. However, the teaching activity was successful in correcting their general beliefs and facilitating learning.

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Masip, Jaume, and Carmen Herrero. "Police Detection of Deception: Beliefs About Behavioral Cues to Deception Are Strong Even Though Contextual Evidence Is More Useful." Journal of Communication 65, no. 1 (December 5, 2014): 125–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12135.

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Steiner, Eric T., Young-Jae Cha, and Sojung Baek. "American and Korean Perceptions of Sex Differences in Deception." Evolutionary Psychology 18, no. 2 (April 1, 2020): 147470492091645. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474704920916455.

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Beliefs about which sex lies more or is better at lying can have subtle but widespread effects on human interactions, yet little is known about such beliefs. In Study 1, an American sample of participants ( N = 407, ages 18–64) completed a 12-item survey on perceptions of sex differences in deception. In Study 2, a Korean sample ( N = 197, ages 19–58) completed the same survey. Men from both cultures and Korean women perceived no difference regarding which sex tells more white (i.e., relatively harmless or low-stakes) lies. American women perceived that women tell more white lies. Women from both cultures and American men perceived that men tell a greater number of serious (i.e., nonwhite or high-stakes) lies. Korean men perceived no difference regarding which sex tells a greater number of serious lies. Both sexes from both countries reported a perception that (1) men are more likely to lie about height, income, and sexual infidelity, (2) women are more likely to lie about weight and age, and (3) women are better at lying. The findings were mixed regarding perceptions about emotional infidelity. Results are interpreted in light of sex-different challenges to mating and parenting.

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Vrij, Aldert, Maria Hartwig, and Pär Anders Granhag. "Reading Lies: Nonverbal Communication and Deception." Annual Review of Psychology 70, no. 1 (January 4, 2019): 295–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010418-103135.

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The relationship between nonverbal communication and deception continues to attract much interest, but there are many misconceptions about it. In this review, we present a scientific view on this relationship. We describe theories explaining why liars would behave differently from truth tellers, followed by research on how liars actually behave and individuals’ ability to detect lies. We show that the nonverbal cues to deceit discovered to date are faint and unreliable and that people are mediocre lie catchers when they pay attention to behavior. We also discuss why individuals hold misbeliefs about the relationship between nonverbal behavior and deception—beliefs that appear very hard to debunk. We further discuss the ways in which researchers could improve the state of affairs by examining nonverbal behaviors in different ways and in different settings than they currently do.

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Ulatowska, Joanna, Iga Nowatkiewicz, and Sylwia Rajdaszka. "Lie detection accuracy and beliefs about cues to deception in adult children of alcoholics." Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 27, no. 3 (March 10, 2020): 465–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2020.1733697.

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Elster, Jon. "Alchemies of the Mind:Transmutation and Misrepresentation." Legal Theory 3, no. 2 (June 1997): 133–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325200000707.

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At least since the French moralists—Montaigne, Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyère—it has been a commonplace that people can fool themselves as well as others about their beliefs and motivations. In this article, I consider some mechanisms oftransmutation(deceiving oneself) andmisrepresentation(deceiving others), and their impact on behavior. (I refer to these collectively astransformations.) I argue that deception and self-deception are not merely ex post rationalizations of behavior whose real motive and explanation are found elsewhere, but that they have independent causal and explanatory power. If people, that is, did not fool themselves or others about why they do what they do they would act differently. The reason is that deception and self-deception take place underconstraintsthat prevent us from offering totally opportunistic or self-serving rationalizations of what we do. There is aconsistency constraintthat is induced by the costs of being seen (by oneself or others) as offering inconsistent justifications for one's behavior, and animperfection constraintdiat is induced by the costs of being seen (by oneself or others) as offering justifications that are too blatantly self-serving.

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Kessler, Judd B., Corinne Low, and Colin D. Sullivan. "Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception." American Economic Review 109, no. 11 (November 1, 2019): 3713–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181714.

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We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called incentivized resume rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood that candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology. (JEL D83, I26, J23, J24, M51)

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Bogaard, Glynis, Ewout H. Meijer, Aldert Vrij, and Harald Merckelbach. "Strong, but Wrong: Lay People’s and Police Officers’ Beliefs about Verbal and Nonverbal Cues to Deception." PLOS ONE 11, no. 6 (June 3, 2016): e0156615. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0156615.

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Vrij, Aldert, Lucy Akehurst, and Sarah Knight. "Police officers', social workers', teachers' and the general public's beliefs about deception in children, adolescents and adults." Legal and Criminological Psychology 11, no. 2 (September 2006): 297–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/135532505x60816.

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35

Fugate, Sunny, and Kimberly Ferguson-Walter. "Artificial Intelligence and Game Theory Models for Defending Critical Networks with Cyber Deception." AI Magazine 40, no. 1 (March 28, 2019): 49–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v40i1.2849.

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Traditional cyber security techniques have led to an asymmetric disadvantage for defenders. The defender must detect all possible threats at all times from all attackers and defend all systems against all possible exploitation. In contrast, an attacker needs only to find a single path to the defender’s critical information. In this article, we discuss how this asymmetry can be rebalanced using cyber deception to change the attacker’s perception of the network environment, and lead attackers to false beliefs about which systems contain critical information or are critical to a defender’s computing infrastructure. We introduce game theory concepts and models to represent and reason over the use of cyber deception by the defender and the effect it has on attacker perception. Finally, we discuss techniques for combining artificial intelligence algorithms with game theory models to estimate hidden states of the attacker using feedback through payoffs to learn how best to defend the system using cyber deception. It is our opinion that adaptive cyber deception is a necessary component of future information systems and networks. The techniques we present can simultaneously decrease the risks and impacts suffered by defenders and dramatically increase the costs and risks of detection for attackers. Such techniques are likely to play a pivotal role in defending national and international security concerns.

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Melehin, A. I. "Specificity of Understanding of Deception at Presenile and Senile Age." Psychology and Law 9, no. 4 (2019): 187–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.17759/psylaw.2019090414.

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The article shows that since the age of 61-74, partial changes are observed in the understanding of deception with a predominance of an emotional-egocentric shift. There are no difficulties in understanding the social situation and the ability to draw conclusions about the false beliefs of only one person (“first-order” representations). At presenile (61-74 years) and senile (75-90 years) age, there is a shortage of representations of the "second" order of the mental model. The phenomenon of denial of socio-cognitive changes or specific cognitive anosognosia (i.e. most people at senile age do not notice a change in understanding of fraud) is described. General predictors of the deception understanding are highlighted: socio-demographic (level of education) and psychological (symptoms of depression, solitude, satisfaction with the quality of life, subjective age) as well was age-specific predictors: changes in family, work status, cognitive functioning and polymorbidity.

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Tsoi, Lily, J. Kiley Hamlin, Adam Waytz, Andrew Scott Baron, and Liane Lee Young. "A Cooperation Advantage for Theory of Mind in Children and Adults." Social Cognition 39, no. 1 (February 2021): 19–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.2021.39.1.19.

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Three studies test whether people engage in mental state reasoning or theory of mind (ToM) differently across two fundamental social contexts: cooperation and competition. Study 1 examines how children with an emerging understanding of false beliefs deploy ToM across these contexts. We find that young preschool children are better able to plant false beliefs in others' minds in a cooperative versus competitive context; this difference does not emerge for other cognitive capacities tested (e.g., executive functioning, memory). Studies 2a and 2b reveal the same systematic difference in adults' ToM for cooperation and competition, even after accounting for relevant predictors (e.g., preference for a task condition, feelings about deception). Together, these findings provide initial evidence for enhanced ToM for cooperation versus competition in early development and also adulthood.

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Marksteiner, Tamara, Marc-André Reinhard, Oliver Dickhäuser, and Siegfried Ludwig Sporer. "How do teachers perceive cheating students? Beliefs about cues to deception and detection accuracy in the educational field." European Journal of Psychology of Education 27, no. 3 (August 24, 2011): 329–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10212-011-0074-5.

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Atran, Scott, and Ara Norenzayan. "Religion's evolutionary landscape: Counterintuition, commitment, compassion, communion." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 6 (December 2004): 713–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x04000172.

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Religion is not an evolutionary adaptation per se, but a recurring cultural by-product of the complex evolutionary landscape that sets cognitive, emotional, and material conditions for ordinary human interactions. Religion exploits only ordinary cognitive processes to passionately display costly devotion to counterintuitive worlds governed by supernatural agents. The conceptual foundations of religion are intuitively given by task-specific panhuman cognitive domains, including folkmechanics, folkbiology, and folkpsychology. Core religious beliefs minimally violate ordinary notions about how the world is, with all of its inescapable problems, thus enabling people to imagine minimally impossible supernatural worlds that solve existential problems, including death and deception. Here the focus is on folkpsychology and agency. A key feature of the supernatural agent concepts common to all religions is the triggering of an “Innate Releasing Mechanism,” or “agency detector,” whose proper (naturally selected) domain encompasses animate objects relevant to hominid survival – such as predators, protectors, and prey – but which actually extends to moving dots on computer screens, voices in wind, and faces on clouds. Folkpsychology also crucially involves metarepresentation, which makes deception possible and threatens any social order. However, these same metacognitive capacities provide the hope and promise of open-ended solutions through representations of counterfactual supernatural worlds that cannot be logically or empirically verified or falsified. Because religious beliefs cannot be deductively or inductively validated, validation occurs only by ritually addressing the very emotions motivating religion. Cross-cultural experimental evidence encourages these claims.

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Lynch, Tony. "Temperance, Temptation, and Silence." Philosophy 76, no. 2 (April 2001): 251–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819101000262.

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Often a concern for truthfulness becomes the celebration of radical truthfulness, where this involves both the utter refusal of deception and that all moral and political beliefs be fit to survive publicity. An unfortunate consequence of this is that it has blinded us to a fair and accurate understanding of the nature and role of an important technique of virtue—temperance. Temperance implies a strategy of renunciation and withdrawal from the full content of our psychological lives. It involves us in pursuing and sustaining a practice of deliberative silence about those purposes and ends which, as we see things, threaten us with corruption and the world with evil.

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Denault, Vincent, Norah E. Dunbar, and Pierrich Plusquellec. "The detection of deception during trials: Ignoring the nonverbal communication of witnesses is not the solution—A response to Vrij and Turgeon (2018)." International Journal of Evidence & Proof 24, no. 1 (May 29, 2019): 3–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1365712719851133.

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In their paper ‘Evaluating credibility of witnesses—Are we instructing jurors on invalid factors?’, Vrij and Turgeon (2018) argue that jurors should be advised not to consider demeanour when trying to evaluate if witnesses are honest or dishonest because of ‘overwhelming scientific evidence’. However, in this response, we contend that substantial empirical scientific studies on nonverbal communication alongside the limitations of deception detection research, as cited by Vrij and Turgeon (2018), undermine their overall argument. While jurors should be warned about erroneous beliefs and dubious concepts on human communication, jurors should also be advised to consider demeanour as a way of enriching their overall understanding of witnesses and their verbal testimony.

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Mercer, Jonathan. "Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War." International Organization 67, no. 2 (April 2013): 221–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818313000015.

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AbstractWhat makes a diplomatic or military signal credible? In strategic settings where deception is possible, rational actors' interpretations rely on their beliefs, intuition, and imagination—they rely on emotion. Two properties of emotion—as an assimilation mechanism and its use as evidence—are key to addressing four strategic problems. First, emotion explains why actors worry needlessly about their reputations. Second, emotion is important to understanding costly signals. Third, emotion explains radical changes in preferences. Fourth, emotion sharpens understanding of strategic problems without being self-invalidating: common knowledge of emotion's effects do not always change those effects. Understanding how rational actors think requires turning to emotion. Evidence from the Korean War captures strengths and weaknesses of competing perspectives.

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Bimber, Bruce, and Homero Gil de Zúñiga. "The unedited public sphere." New Media & Society 22, no. 4 (April 2020): 700–715. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461444819893980.

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The health of democratic public spheres is challenged by the circulation of falsehoods. These epistemic problems are connected to social media and they raise a classic problem of how to understand the role of technology in political developments. We discuss three sets of technological affordances of social media that facilitate the spread of false beliefs: obscuring the provenance of information, facilitating deception about authorship, and providing for manipulation of social signals. We argue that these do not make social media a “cause” of problems with falsehoods, but explanations of epistemic problems should account for social media to understand the timing and widespread occurrence of epistemic problems. We argue that “the marketplace of ideas” cannot be adequate as a remedy for these problems, which require epistemic editing by the press.

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Marzana, Daniela, María L. Vecina, and Sara Alfieri. "The Morality of Men Convicted of Domestic Violence: How It Supports the Maintenance of the Moral Self-Concept." Violence and Victims 31, no. 6 (2016): 1155–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.vv-d-15-00143.

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The phenomenon of abuse toward women is a prevalent social problem in most societies. In the present work, we take into consideration the abusive man’s point of view with particular reference to the sphere of their morality and set as aims: (a) to show that high levels of self-deception are mediating between an extreme moral worldview, called moral absolutism, and a functional high moral self-concept, (b) to analyze the relation of the five moral foundations (Harm, Fairness, Ingroup, Authority, and Purity) with this moral absolutism, and (c) to test a comprehensive model of the relationships between the individuated variables in the preceding hypotheses.Participants are 264 men convicted of domestic violence offenses, who, having begun court-mandated psychological treatment lasting 12 weeks, have filled out a self-report questionnaire during the second meeting.The results reveal that (a) self-deception is as a full mediator between moral absolutism and moral self-concept in men convicted of domestic violence and in such a way that the more they felt right about their moral beliefs, the more they deceived themselves, and the more they felt good about themselves, (b) the moral foundations could be explaining moral absolutism understood as a rigid moral vision of the world, and (c) the tested model produces satisfying fit indices.Finally, we discuss the applied implications, for example, a key role can be played by the family and the school: Moral socialization begins within the family and there finds the first push that will accompany it the rest of life.

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Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf. "Ist der Naturalismus eine Ideologie?" Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68, no. 1 (April 7, 2020): 51–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2020-0003.

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AbstractNaturalism is the current orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Naturalism is the conjunction of the (ontological) claim that all that truly exists are the entities countenanced by the natural sciences and the (epistemological) claim that the only true knowledge is natural-scientific knowledge. Drawing on some recent work in Critical Theory, this article argues that naturalism qualifies as an ideology. This is the case because naturalism meets three key aspects shared by paradigmatic cases of ideology: (i) naturalism has practical consequences and implications of a specific kind, (ii) those endorsing naturalism fall prey to a dual deception: having false meta-level beliefs about naturalism as being without alternative, and (iii) naturalism has a tendency towards self-immunisation. The article ends by suggesting we pull naturalism out of our collective cognitive backgrounds onto the main stage of critical discourse, making it a proper topic for philosophical critique again.

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Scholl, Juliann C., and Dan O'Hair. "Uncovering Beliefs about Deceptive Communication." Communication Quarterly 53, no. 3 (August 2005): 377–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01463370500101352.

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MASCARO, OLIVIER, OLIVIER MORIN, and DAN SPERBER. "Optimistic expectations about communication explain children's difficulties in hiding, lying, and mistrusting liars." Journal of Child Language 44, no. 5 (October 17, 2016): 1041–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000916000350.

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AbstractWe suggest that preschoolers’ frequent obliviousness to the risks and opportunities of deception comes from a trusting stance supporting verbal communication. Three studies (N = 125) confirm this hypothesis. Three-year-olds can hide information from others (Study 1) and they can lie (Study 2) in simple settings. Yet when one introduces the possibility of informing others in the very same settings, three-year-olds tend to be honest (Studies 1 and 2). Similarly, four-year-olds, though capable of treating assertions as false, trust deceptive informants (Study 3). We suggest that children's reduced sensitivity to the opportunities of lying, and to the risks of being lied to might help explain their difficulties on standard false belief tasks.

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Mohsen, Majed Abdul Amir, and Ahmad Abdul Reda Enad. "The Effect of Marketing Deceptive Practices on the Organizational Mental Image from Customer Viewpoint (Analytical Study of the Insurance Industry)." JOURNAL OF UNIVERSITY OF BABYLON for Pure and Applied Sciences 27, no. 2 (March 31, 2019): 44–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.29196/jubpas.v27i2.2056.

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This study aimed to address the concept of deceptive marketing in the most important activity of companies, i.e., marketing, which is the lifeline on which companies depend on the process of financing and product selling. Additionally, through marketing, companies can communicate directly with customers, and this activity includes marketing practices that are deceptive or misleading. The study dealt with the presentation of the components of the marketing mix, and how each component can include deceptive or misleading practices. Marketers practice customer manipulation with the intention of changing customers' behavior and attitudes towards achieving the greatest possible profit in lesser time. With the spread of marketing deception and marketing fraud in various areas, the phenomenon is growing not only in product marketing but also in service marketing, especially insurance services, as many marketers and sales representatives believe that success and profit-making are associated with those practices. The study addressed many factors facilitating these practices, as well as the ways in which marketing deception is practiced and the impact of such practice on the perceptions that form in the minds of customers about companies. One of the most important objectives of the study was to substantiate the relationship between the dimensions of marketing deception and the dimensions of the mental image of the organization by relying on the statistical analysis of the initial data of the study, which was collected through questionnaire that was prepared for this purpose and distributed to a random sample of 225 customers of insurance companies operating in the insurance market in Iraq. The most important findings of the study show that deceptive marketing practiced through the service marketing mix, among other dimensions, affects the mental image that the customers hold towards the organization in negative and varying ways. This study presents a number of recommendations, the foremost of which is the necessity of educating marketers and companies about the negativity of deceptive practices on the company in the long term, as well as paying attention to the mental image held by customers towards the insurance companies because of its impact on the formation of positive impressions towards the company, and thus increasing market share of the company through its reputation in the insurance market .

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Newton, Maria, and Joan L. Duda. "Elite Adolescent Athletes' Achievement Goals and Beliefs Concerning Success in Tennis." Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology 15, no. 4 (December 1993): 437–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/jsep.15.4.437.

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The present study examined the perceived causes of success among elite adolescent tennis players and investigated the function of gender in the interdependence of goal orientation and beliefs concerning tennis achievement. Male and female adolescents (N = 121) completed the Task and Ego Orientation in Sport Questionnaire (TEOSQ) specific to tennis and a questionnaire tapping beliefs about success in this sport. Factor analyses revealed two conceptually coherent personal goal-belief dimensions for the females. The first was comprised of ego orientation and the beliefs that ability and maintaining a positive impression were the primary causes of success. The second consisted of a task orientation coupled with the belief that effort and a de-emphasis on external factors and deceptive tactics would lead to tennis accomplishment. In the case of males, an ego goal-belief dimension emerged. The motivational implications of assuming these differing goal-beliefs in youth sport is discussed.

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Jordan, Maiya. "Literal self-deception." Analysis 80, no. 2 (September 16, 2019): 248–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz053.

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Abstract It is widely assumed that a literal understanding of someone’s self-deception that p yields the following contradiction. Qua self-deceiver, she does not believe that p, yet – qua self-deceived – she does believe that p. I argue that this assumption is ill-founded. Literalism about self-deception – the view that self-deceivers literally self-deceive – is not committed to this contradiction. On the contrary, properly understood, literalism (non-trivially) excludes it.

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