Academic literature on the topic 'Beliefs about deception'
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Journal articles on the topic "Beliefs about deception"
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Sarzano, Melanie. "COSTLY FALSE BELIEFS: WHAT SELF-DECEPTION AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT CAN TELL US ABOUT THE RATIONALITY OF BELIEFS." Dossier: On Self-Deception 13, no. 2 (May 7, 2019): 95–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1059501ar.
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In this paper, I compare cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment and argue that confronting these cases generates a dilemma about rationality. This dilemma turns on the idea that subjects are motivated to avoid costly false beliefs, and that both cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment are caused by an interest to avoid forming costly false beliefs. Even though both types of cases can be explained by the same belief-formation mechanism, only self-deceptive beliefs are irrational: the subjects depicted in high-stakes cases typically used in debates on pragmatic encroachment are, on the contrary, rational. If we find ourselves drawn to this dilemma, we are forced either to accept—against most views presented in the literature—that self-deception is rational or to accept that pragmatic encroachment is irrational. Assuming that both conclusions are undesirable, I argue that this dilemma can be solved. In order to solve this dilemma, I suggest and review several hypotheses aimed at explaining the difference in rationality between the two types of cases, the result of which being that the irrationality of self-deceptive beliefs does not entirely depend on their being formed via a motivationally biased process.
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Granhag, Pär Anders, Lars O. Andersson, Leif A. Strömwall, and Maria Hartwig. "Imprisoned knowledge: Criminals' beliefs about deception." Legal and Criminological Psychology 9, no. 1 (February 2004): 103–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/135532504322776889.
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van Loon, Marie. "RESPONSIBILITY FOR SELF-DECEPTION." Dossier: On Self-Deception 13, no. 2 (May 7, 2019): 119–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1059502ar.
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In this paper, I argue that Alfred Mele’s conception of self-deception is such that it always fulfils the reasons-responsiveness condition for doxastic responsibility. This is because self-deceptive mechanisms of belief formation are such that the kind of beliefs they bring about are the kind of beliefs that fulfil the criteria for doxastic responsibility from epistemic reasons responsiveness. I explain why in this paper. Mele describes the relation of the subject to the evidence as a biased relation. The subject does not simply believe on the basis of evidence, but on the basis of manipulated evidence. Mele puts forward four ways in which the subject does this. The subject could misinterpret positively or negatively, selectively focus, or gather evidence. Through these ways of manipulation, the evidence is framed such that the final product constitutes evidence on the basis of which the subject may believe a proposition that fits that subject’s desire that P. Whichever form of manipulation the subject uses, the evidence against P must be neutralized in one way or another. Successful neutralization of the evidence requires the ability to recognize what the evidence supports and the ability to react to it. These abilities consist precisely in the two parts of the reasons-responsiveness condition, reasons receptivity and reasons reactivity. In that sense, self-deceptive beliefs always fulfil the reasons-responsiveness condition for doxastic responsibility. However, given that reasons responsiveness is only a necessary condition for doxastic responsibility, this does not mean that self-deceived subjects are always responsible for their belief.
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Al-Simadi, Fayez A. "JORDANIAN STUDENTS' BELIEFS ABOUT NONVERBAL BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH DECEPTION IN JORDAN." Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 28, no. 5 (January 1, 2000): 437–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2000.28.5.437.
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Are cues to deception similar from culture to culture? The present study identifies some of those cues in previous studies in the United States, and tests Jordanian beliefs about cues associated with deception. Jordanian college students were asked to indicate their beliefs about cues associated with deception on a 20-item Likert type scale. Results showed that Jordanian students identified ten behaviors to be significantly related to their beliefs about liars. These cues are discussed in terms of cultural differences from the United States and cultural values in Jordan.
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Sato, Taku, and Yoshiaki Nihei. "Sex Differences in Beliefs about Cues to Deception." Psychological Reports 104, no. 3 (June 2009): 759–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.104.3.759-769.
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Sex differences in beliefs among Japanese students about cues to deception were explored. 171 participants (91 women, 80 men) read a scenario in which a protagonist caused a fatal traffic accident and told a lie to avoid responsibility. Then participants rated how the protagonist's behaviors would change when lying. Women participants believed significantly more than men that a liar shows body cues (e.g., body touching, biting lips) associated with anxiety, and that a liar has unsuccessful impression management (e.g., fewer smiles, fewer facial expressions). Furthermore, the women's scores also indicated that a liar would increase the amount of information (e.g., longer response length, gestures) and show more nonfluent speech (e.g., speech disturbances, inconsistency of speech contents).
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Vrij, Aldert, and Gün R. Semin. "Lie experts' beliefs about nonverbal indicators of deception." Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 20, no. 1 (March 1996): 65–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02248715.
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Lee, Dorothy E. "The Self-Deception of the Self-Destructive." Perceptual and Motor Skills 65, no. 3 (December 1987): 975–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pms.1987.65.3.975.
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317 college students as respondents were measured for suicide proneness and self-destructive behaviors and were also asked questions about self-attitudes, value for life, beliefs about suicide and self-destruction, religiosity and dogmatism. Those who score high on suicide proneness and self-destructiveness do not tend to be the same people, and they differ from one another. Correlations and factor analyses suggest the Suicide Prone are aware of their tendencies and are influenced by their value for life and beliefs about suicide and self-destruction. The Self-destructive are tied to negative self-evaluations, are less aware of their self-destructive tendencies, and score significantly higher than the Suicide Prone on dogmatism. Belief structure of the highly dogmatic person may allow those who are self-destructive to deny negative self-attitudes and to be unaware of self-destructive behaviors which are inconsistent with their beliefs.
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Strom, JaNon, and David F. Barone. "Self-Deception, Self-Esteem, and Control over Drinking at Different Stages of Alcohol Involvement." Journal of Drug Issues 23, no. 4 (October 1993): 705–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002204269302300409.
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With two studies, the authors sought to clarify how alcoholism relates to beliefs about drinking control and self-esteem by varying the stage of alcohol involvement. The stages were active abuser, commitment to change, early recovery, and late recovery. As hypothesized inStudy 1, long-term recovering abstainers had greater drinking-related internal locus of control, self-efficacy about abstaining, and self-esteem than those in detoxification. Unexpectedly, active abusers did not differ from the long-term recovering abstainers. Study 2 successfully discriminated these extreme groups with a measure of self-deception. Active abusers' positive beliefs about drinking control and self-esteem were associated with high self-deception. Self-beliefs at commitment to change were negative, but self-deception was still high. Early and late recovery was associated with positive self-beliefs and significantly lower self-deception.
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Villar, Gina, Joanne Arciuli, and Helen Paterson. "Vocal Pitch Production during Lying: Beliefs about Deception Matter." Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 20, no. 1 (February 2013): 123–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2011.633320.
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Delmas, Hugues, Benjamin Elissalde, Nicolas Rochat, Samuel Demarchi, Charles Tijus, and Isabel Urdapilleta. "Policemen’s and Civilians’ Beliefs About Facial Cues of Deception." Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 43, no. 1 (October 8, 2018): 59–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10919-018-0285-4.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Beliefs about deception"
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Malmgren, Daniel. "Police officers’ and police students’ beliefs about deception in the framework of the Truth-Default Theory." Thesis, Högskolan Kristianstad, Fakulteten för hälsovetenskap, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hkr:diva-22085.
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The ability to detect deception is of critical value in criminal and investigative contexts. This study has investigated beliefs about deception detection held by police officers (N = 63) and police students (N = 130). The results show that there are inconsistencies when comparing the beliefs to empirical research findings. One example is the belief that liars avert their gaze. The results are discussed and contrasted with the Truth-Default Theory. Instead of a focus on cues that are probabilisticallyassociated with deception, the Truth-Default Theory focuses on contextualized communication content. The theory recognizes that people are truth biased. Truth-Default Theory proposes that reliance on cues pushes the accuracy of deception detection to the level of chance.
Books on the topic "Beliefs about deception"
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Shuy, Roger W. Deceptive Ambiguity by Police and Prosecutors. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190669898.001.0001.
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Much is written about how criminal suspects, defendants, and undercover targets use ambiguous language in their interactions with police, prosecutors, and undercover agents. This book examines the other side of the coin, describing fifteen criminal investigations demonstrating how police, prosecutors, undercover agents, and complainants use deceptive ambiguity with their subjects, which leads to misrepresentations of the speech events, schemas, agendas, speech acts, lexicon, and grammar. These misrepresentations affect the perceptions of judges and juries about the subjects’ motives, predispositions, intentions, and voluntariness. Deception is commonly considered intentional while ambiguity is often excused as unintentional performance errors. Although perhaps overreliance on Grice’s maxim of sincerity leads some to believe this, interactions of suspects, defendants, and targets with representatives of law are adversarial, non-cooperative events that enable participants to ignore or violate the cooperative principle. One effective way the government does this is to use ambiguity deceptively. Later listeners to the recordings of such conversations may not recognize this ambiguity and react in ways that the subjects may not have intended. Deceptive ambiguity is clearly intentional in undercover operations and the case examples illustrate that the practice also is alive and well in police interviews and prosecutorial questioning. The book concludes with a summary of how the deceptive ambiguity used by representatives of the government affected the perception of the subjects’ predisposition, intentionality and voluntariness, followed by a comparison of the relative frequency of deceptive ambiguity used by the government in its representations of speech events, schemas, agendas, speech acts, lexicon, and grammar.
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Fallis, Don. What Is Deceptive Lying? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0002.
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According to the traditional philosophical analysis of lying, you lie when you say what you believe to be false and intend your audience to believe what you say. Even though there may be lies that are not intended to deceive, the most epistemologically and ethically problematic lies are those that are intended to deceive. This chapter argues that the traditional analysis fails to capture this concept of deceptive lying. First, it does not count as lies cases where you only intend to deceive your audience about your believing what you say. Second, the traditional analysis handles inconsistently cases where you say something because you know that your audience does not trust you and will likely conclude that you believe something else. The chapter proposes two ways of modifying the traditional analysis of lying so that it handles such cases of doxastic misdirection and double bluffing correctly.
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Kraut, Richard. Experientialism and the Experience Machine. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198828846.003.0003.
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Nozick’s thought experiment makes many assumptions about the experience machine that require re-examination. It raises questions about whether illusion and self-deception are inherently bad; about what it is to be active rather than passive; about what it is to be free; about the value of physical embodiment and causal interaction with the material world; about the value of fiction and beauty; and about solipsism. Would one’s life be bad, if there are no other minds? Posthumous harms and benefits are also thought to pose a problem for an experientialist conception of well-being. Aristotle wrongly believes that there are such harms and benefits, but his error is negligible, because he assigns them minor importance.
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Jeske, Diane. Moral Evasion. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190685379.003.0006.
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The case studies of Albert Speer, Charles Colcock Jones, and Franz Stangl illustrate ways in which people can engage in moral evasion. Moral evasion comes in many forms, such as self-deception, wishful thinking, and rationalization. Stangl refused to engage with the full horror of what he was doing by refusing to use his imagination in thinking about hypothetical scenarios, using a highly rule-bound conception of duty, and compartmentalizing his thought. All of Stangl’s strategies are mirrored in those we often use in thinking about our treatment of nonhuman animals. Speer engaged in belief avoidance: by focusing on the demands of his job, he was able to avoid knowing what he could easily have come to know. Jones engaged in wishful compromise: he convinced himself that by becoming a missionary to the slaves he was taking the best route that he could within the confines of an evil institution.
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Woody, William Douglas, Krista D. Forrest, and Edie Greene. Understanding Police Interrogation. NYU Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479860371.001.0001.
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What drives suspects to confess during police interrogation? In particular, why do some people falsely confess to serious crimes, despite both the likelihood of severe negative consequences and their actual innocence? Too often, observers endorse the mistaken belief that only people with severe mental illnesses or cognitive disabilities would confess falsely. This common but erroneous belief overlooks the risks that result from additional factors that can influence the nature of an interrogation and may conduce to a false confession, including investigators’ biases, cultural views about race and crime, the powerful effects of police deception on suspects, and characteristics of the suspect and of the circumstances that can increase the suspect’s vulnerability. This book examines numerous cases of false confession to clarify the totality of the circumstances surrounding interrogation and confession, including the interactions of many psychological, legal, cultural, personal, and other factors that lead to greater likelihood of confessions, including coerced or false confessions. It presents recommendations for reforming police interrogation in order to produce accurate, detailed confessions from factually guilty suspects, confessions that stand up under rigorous legal review, are admissible at trial, and lead to guilty verdicts.
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Young, Phoebe S. K. Camping Grounds. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195372410.001.0001.
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Camping appears to be a simple proposition, a time-honored way of getting away from it all. Yet as this book demonstrates, the simplicity of camping is deceptive, its history and meanings far from obvious. Why do some Americans find pleasure in sleeping outside, particularly when so many others, past and present, have had to do so for reasons other than recreation? A closer look at the history of camping since the Civil War reveals unexpected connections between its various forms and its deeper significance as an American tradition linked to core beliefs about nature and national belonging. Never only a vacation choice, camping has been something people do out of dire necessity and as a tactic of political protest. Still, the dominance of recreational camping as a modern ideal and natural idyll has obscured other forms from our collective memory. Camping Grounds rediscovers these unexpected and interwoven histories of sleeping outside. It uses extensive research to trace surprising links between such varied campers as veterans, tramps, John Muir, newly freed African Americans, and early leisure campers in the nineteenth century; federal campground designers, Depression-era transients, family car campers, backpacking enthusiasts, countercultural youth, and political activists in the twentieth century; the crisis of the unsheltered and the tent-based Occupy movement in the twenty-first. These entwined stories show how Americans camp to claim a place in the republic and why public spaces of nature are critical to how we relate to nature, the nation, and each other.
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Hordern, Joshua. Compassion in Healthcare. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198790860.001.0001.
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This book gives an account of the nature and content of compassion and its role in healthcare. The argument considers how and why contested beliefs about political life, suffering, the human condition, time, and responsibility make a difference to ‘compassion’. While compassion appears to be a straightforward aspect of life and practice, the appearance is deceptive. Compassion is plagued by both conceptual and practical ills and needs some quite specific kinds of therapy. The first step therefore is to diagnose precisely what is wrong with ‘compassion’ including its debilitating political entanglements, the vagueness of its meaning and the risk of burn-out it threatens. With diagnosis in hand, three therapies are prescribed for compassion’s ills: (i) an understanding of patients and healthcare workers as those who pass through the life-course, encountering each other as wayfarers and pilgrims; (ii) a grasp of the nature of compassion in healthcare; and (iii) an embedding of healthcare within the realities of civic life. With this therapy applied, the argument shows how compassionate relationships acquire their content in healthcare practice. First, the form that compassion takes is shown to depend on how different doctrines of time, tragedy, salvation, responsibility, fault, and theodicy set the terms of people’s lives and relationships. Second, how such compassion matters to practice and policy is worked out in the detail of healthcare professionalism, marketisation, and technology, drawing on the author’s collaborations. Covering everything from conception to old age, and from machine learning to religious diversity, this book draws on philosophy, theology, and everyday experience to stretch the imagination of what compassion might mean in healthcare practice.
Book chapters on the topic "Beliefs about deception"
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Hartwig, Maria, and Pär Anders Granhag. "Exploring the Nature and Origin of Beliefs about Deception." In Detecting Deception, 123–54. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118510001.ch6.
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Strömwall, Leif A., Pär Anders Granhag, and Maria Hartwig. "Practitioners' beliefs about deception." In The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts, 229–50. Cambridge University Press, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511490071.010.
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"Police Officers' Beliefs About Cues Associated With Deception in Rape Cases." In Psychology and Law, 234–39. De Gruyter, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110879773.234.
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Ruse, Michael. "Are there Good Reasons to Believe?" In Atheism. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wentk/9780199334599.003.0009.
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Why Should We Believe? Turn next to the reasons for belief. What about faith? The nonbeliever is faced with an option. It is genuine, or it is self-deception. I’ll leave out options along the lines that no one really believes any of this stuff,...
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Marcus, Eric. "The Self-Consciousness of Belief." In Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind, 39–61. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0003.
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I argue that to believe that p is to know that you believe that p and to know it simply by believing it. The following three premises entail the inseparability of belief from knowledge of belief: (i) S believes that p only if S is able to honestly assert that p; (ii) S is able to honestly assert that p only if S is able to avow the belief that p; and (iii) S is able to avow the belief that p only if S knows that she believes that p. I defend each premise from objections, paying special attention to the phenomenon of self-deception. I show that one can hold both that belief is essentially self-conscious and that people are sometimes wrong about what they believe. Ultimately, I use the theory of belief developed in chapter one to account for doxastic self-consciousness.
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Bergmann, Michael. "Inferential Anti-skepticism about Perception." In Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition, 35–56. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0003.
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This chapter examines multiple kinds of deductive and nondeductive anti-skeptical arguments from our sensory experience to the likely truth of our perceptual beliefs based on that evidence and finds them all wanting. In the first two sections, it briefly considers deductive anti-skeptical arguments (of the theological and transcendental variety), inductive anti-skeptical arguments from past correlations of sensory experience with true perceptual beliefs based on it, and anti-skeptical arguments based on a priori knowledge of probabilistic principles saying that our sensory evidence for our perceptual beliefs makes probable the truth of those beliefs. In the final three sections, the focus turns to abductive or inference to the best explanation (IBE) arguments, which are currently the most popular anti-skeptical arguments. IBE anti-skeptical arguments conclude that our sensory experience, or some feature of it, is best explained by the truth of our perceptual beliefs. These three sections argue that we lack good reasons for thinking that our sensory experience is better explained by a Standard Hypothesis (saying that the world is approximately as it seems) than by a skeptical hypothesis, such as the hypothesis that a deceptive demon wants to mislead us into falsely believing the world is as it seems.
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Green, Stuart P. "Rape by Deceit." In Criminalizing Sex, 101–16. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197507483.003.0007.
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This chapter considers the offense of rape by deceit. Unlike rape as nonconsensual sex, consent here is communicated but is found to be defective by virtue of the complainant’s false belief, typically induced by the defendant’s deceit. Should it be rape if a defendant falsely represents himself as being free of STDs? What if he obtains communicative consent by falsely claiming to be single? The common law was extremely limited in what it recognized as impermissible deceit. With the reconceptualization of rape as nonconsent-focused, reformers have begun considering the possibility of broadening the definition of rape by deceit. But how broad is too broad? The problem is that almost everyone, at some point, has engaged in or been the target of some form of deception in the context of sex, and any of these deceptions could serve as a “but for” cause of another’s consenting to sex. The question is how to sort out those deceptions that should count for purposes of rape (or another, lesser offense) and those that should not. The particular focus here is on cases in which a defendant obtains invalid communicative consent through fraudulent medical procedures, impersonation, or lying about matters related to STDs.
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Peterson, Michael L. "Salvation and Persons Outside the Faith." In C. S. Lewis and the Christian Worldview, 139–49. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190201111.003.0011.
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Besides the problem of suffering and evil, and the problem of scientism, Lewis knew that the problem of religious diversity is another seemingly negative factor in the formulation of a coherent Christian worldview. Simply stated, the problem concerns how an omnipotent, wholly good God could have created a world in which many different religions arise and vie for the allegiance of countless millions of people. Is it rational to think that only one of these religions is completely true? It is fascinating how Lewis navigated this issue. Rejecting his early belief that all religions are myths in the sense of being falsehoods, deceptions, and frauds, Lewis explains that all religions are expressions of the God-implanted search for the divine. In fact, the pervasive pattern of the repetitively dying-and-rising god (annually in ahistorical fertility religions) becomes a kind of foreshadowing of the singular event of Jesus as the God-man dying in the midst of human history. Lewis’s analysis of salvation in light of world religions is based on the implicit argument that God’s perfect wisdom, justice, and love are fulfilled in God’s ability to discern and judge each person’s heart, desire, and life trajectory, regardless of mistaken beliefs about God himself.
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Olberding, Amy. "Temptations to Incivility." In The Wrong of Rudeness, 12–29. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190880965.003.0002.
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This chapter considers why incivility can be very appealing and seeks to reduce its appeal. It discusses the more raw pleasures of incivility, such as our enjoyment at disrespecting opponents, but focuses most on those incivilities we want to count as righteous or morally important. Incivility can seem most tempting precisely when we believe it to serve higher moral purposes—summoning attention to social ills or manifesting important moral views in our conduct. Despite this, the chapter argues, we have strong reasons for self-distrust when we want to be righteously uncivil, for our motivations will rarely be merely righteous. Tribalism, lack of humility, and popular rhetoric that encourages us to see incivility as heroic can encourage self-deception about the righteousness of our motivations.
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Ware, Owen. "Evil." In Fichte's Moral Philosophy, 119–43. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190086596.003.0006.
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Even if the new interpretation of Fichte’s theory of conscience presented in Chapter 5 is correct, it remains unclear why he believes we all have a tendency to render our conscience obscure. This brings us to his theory of evil in §16 and the appendix to §16 in the System of Ethics. The aim of the present chapter is to show that Fichte’s effort to link evil and ‘laziness’ (Trägheit) does not run the risk of rendering immoral action unfree. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that Fichte understood laziness as a form of culpable self-deception, whereby we avoid the demands that morality places upon us. A secondary aim of this chapter is to show that Fichte’s remarks about the dominion of the I over the not-I, or of our striving for independence from nature, give voice to an incomplete (and ultimately pathological) step in the dialectic of agency.