Journal articles on the topic 'Belief'
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1
Williams, Peter. "Beliefs supporting belief." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 7 (1999): 56–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm1999768.
2
Lakemeyer, Gerhard. "On Perfect Introspection with Quantifying-In1." Fundamenta Informaticae 17, no. 1-2 (July 1, 1992): 75–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/fi-1992-171-206.
Abstract:
Agents with perfect introspection may have incomplete beliefs about the world, but they possess complete knowledge about their own beliefs. This fact suggests that the beliefs of introspective agents should be completely determined by their objective beliefs, that is, those beliefs that are only about the domain in question and not about other beliefs. Introspection and logical reasoning alone should suffice to reconstruct all other beliefs from the objective ones. While this property has been shown to hold for propositional belief logics, there have so far only been negative results in the case of first-order belief logics with quantifying-in. In this paper we present a logic of belier with quantifying-in, where the beliefs of a perfectly introspective agent are indeed uniquely determined by the objective beliefs. The result is obtained by weakening the notion of belief of an existing logic that does not have this property.
3
Chappell, T. D. J. "Does Protagoras refute himself?" Classical Quarterly 45, no. 2 (December 1995): 333–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800043433.
Abstract:
Protagoras believes that all beliefs are true. Since Protagoras' belief that all beliefs are true is itself a belief, it follows (somewhat trivially, perhaps?) from Protagoras' belief that all beliefs are true that Protagoras' belief is true. But what about the belief that Protagoras' belief is false? Doesn't it follow, by parallel reasoning and not at all trivially, that if all beliefs are true and there is a belief that Protagoras' belief is false, then Protagoras' belief is false?
4
Crane, Tim. "Is Religious Belief a Kind of Belief?" Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 65, no. 4 (November 1, 2023): 414–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2023-0060.
Abstract:
Abstract This paper discusses the familiar question of whether expressions of faith or conviction offered by religious believers really express their beliefs, in the standard sense of ‘belief’ used in philosophy and psychology. Some hold that these expressions do not express genuine beliefs because they do not meet the standards of rationality, coherence and integration which govern beliefs. So they must serve some other function. But this picture of ‘genuine belief’ is inadequate, for reasons independent of the phenomenon of religion. Once we get a better picture of belief, we can see that religious beliefs conform to this picture, and that typical expressions of faith really are expressions of belief in the proper sense.
5
Bach, Kent. "Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78, no. 3 (September 1997): 215–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00036.
6
Yanke, Greg, Mohamed Y. Rady, and Joseph L. Verheijde. "When Brain Death Belies Belief." Journal of Religion and Health 55, no. 6 (August 19, 2016): 2199–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10943-016-0298-4.
7
Wolfe, Michael B., and Todd J. Williams. "Poor metacognitive awareness of belief change." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 71, no. 9 (January 1, 2018): 1898–910. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2017.1363792.
Abstract:
When people change beliefs as a result of reading a text, are they aware of these changes? This question was examined for beliefs about spanking as an effective means of discipline. In two experiments, subjects reported beliefs about spanking effectiveness during a prescreening session. In a subsequent experimental session, subjects read a one-sided text that advocated a belief consistent or inconsistent position on the topic. After reading, subjects reported their current beliefs and attempted to recollect their initial beliefs. Subjects reading a belief inconsistent text were more likely to change their beliefs than those who read a belief consistent text. Recollections of initial beliefs tended to be biased in the direction of subjects’ current beliefs. In addition, the relationship between the belief consistency of the text read and accuracy of belief recollections was mediated by belief change. This belief memory bias was independent of on-line text processing and comprehension measures, and indicates poor metacognitive awareness of belief change.
8
AHMED, ARIF. "Belief and religious ‘belief’." Religious Studies 56, no. 1 (May 6, 2019): 80–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412519000234.
Abstract:
AbstractIs the analysis of religion best conducted in terms of the beliefs of its practitioners? I describe a Wittgenstein-inspired approach to belief on which it is dubious that religious practices satisfy the criteria for the attribution of belief. I defend this more moderate and plausible version of Needham's thesis against two natural reasons to think religious belief widespread.
9
R, Velusamy. "Folklore Elements in Kalittokai." International Research Journal of Tamil 4, S-16 (December 12, 2022): 28–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.34256/irjt224s164.
Abstract:
Kalittokai is a classical Tamil poetic work. In this text the basic beliefs about life have been discussed. These beliefs are strong among the people. Beliefs on nature, birds, trees, astronomy and rain are very common among the people. Belief in blinking the eyes, belief over God, belief related to dreams, lizards horoscope, belief in fasting, belief in crescent prayer, and belief in fanaticism are very common among people. These are followed in their day to day life. Humans from birth to death are tied up in a knot called belief. This article is about the folklore elements in Kalittokai.
10
Grigg, Richard. "The Crucial Disanalogies Between Properly Basic Belief and Belief in God." Religious Studies 26, no. 3 (September 1990): 389–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500020540.
Abstract:
The antifoundationalist defence of belief in God set forth by Alvin Plantinga has been widely discussed in recent years. Classical foundationalism assumes that there are two kinds of beliefs that we are justified in holding: beliefs supported by evidence, and basic beliefs. Our basic beliefs are those bedrock beliefs that need no evidence to support them and upon which our other beliefs must rest. For the foundationalist, the only beliefs that can be properly basic are either self-evident, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses. Belief in God is none of these. Thus, says the foundationalist, belief in God is justified only if there is sufficient evidence to back it up.
11
Fellows, Roger. "Animal Belief." Philosophy 75, no. 4 (October 2000): 587–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100000681.
Abstract:
Non language-using animals cannot have beliefs, because believing entails the ability to distinguish true from false beliefs and also the ability to distinguish changes in belief from changes in the world. For these abilities we need both the fixation of belief and counter-factual thought, for both of which language is necessary. The argument of the paper extends Davidson's argument to the same conclusion (which is found wanting). But denying beliefs to animals has no moral implications.
12
Samraj, Tennyson. "Epistemic Awareness of Doxastic Distinctions: Delineating Types of Beliefs in Belief-Formation." ATHENS JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 1, no. 1 (January 20, 2022): 37–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.30958/ajphil.1-1-3.
Abstract:
Doxastic distinctions help us define the basis and biases in belief–formation. Empirical and extra-empirical justification play an important role in determining doxastic distinctions. When we distinguish the different types of beliefs, we understand (1) that there are basically three kinds of beliefs, namely, verifiable, falsifiable, and unfalsifiable beliefs. Empirical justification provides the basis for establishing the veracity of verifiable and falsifiable beliefs. Extra-empirical justification provides the basis for establishing the veracity of unfalsifiable or irrefutable beliefs. (2) Verifiable or falsifiable beliefs that are reductive require the mandatory acceptance of their truth. However, unfalsifiable beliefs which are non-reductive require the volitional acceptance of their truth. Because there is both empirical and extra-empirical justification in belief-formation, we can accept beliefs with or without, against, or regardless of empirical evidence. Unfalsifiable beliefs do not mean that these beliefs are unjustifiable; it simply means that these beliefs are not empirically justifiable. Understanding the basis and biases of belief-formation is to be aware of how we come to know what we believe. As empirical basis allows us to hold beliefs based on either the principle of confirmation or falsification. Extra-empirical basis, namely phenomenological conjectures, allows us to hold beliefs founded on existential assertions. The intent of this paper is to present doxastic distinctions to help us understand the basis and biases associated with belief-formation. As long as epistemic claims are accepted, and their content is considered believable, the means used to arrive at those beliefs must also be respected. Every doxastic distinction not only provides the basis for belief-formation but also defines the role and limits of both empirical and extra-empirical justification in belief-formation. When we recognize the different types and different ways of justifying beliefs: we understand (1) why we can accept beliefs with or without evidence; against or regardless of empirical justification, and (2) know when to define beliefs as Plato argued as justified true belief and when to define beliefs as justified belief-decisions. Keywords: beliefs, justified true belief; justified belief-decisions, empirical and extra-empirical
13
Cookson, Darel, Daniel Jolley, Robert C. Dempsey, and Rachel Povey. "“If they believe, then so shall I”: Perceived beliefs of the in-group predict conspiracy theory belief." Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 24, no. 5 (August 2021): 759–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430221993907.
Abstract:
Conspiracy beliefs are widespread and can have detrimental consequences. As perceived social norms can exert a powerful influence on individuals, we investigated the relationship between perceived conspiracy belief norms and personal endorsement, and whether others’ conspiracy belief is overestimated. In Study 1, UK university students ( N = 111) completed measures of their personal conspiracy beliefs and estimations of others’ beliefs (an in-group and an out-group they chose, and a prescribed in-group). Perceived in-groups’ belief strongly predicted personal conspiracy belief; perceived out-group’s belief did not. Studies 2 and 3 replicated these findings in a British community sample ( N = 177) and in a UK parent sample ( N = 197), focusing on antivaccine conspiracy theories. All studies demonstrated that people overestimate the conspiracy beliefs of others. This is the first demonstration of the association between perceived in-group conspiracy belief social norms and individuals’ personal conspiracy beliefs. Interventions challenging misperceived norms could be effective in reducing conspiracy beliefs.
14
Asher, Nicholas. "Belief, Acceptance and Belief Reports." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19, no. 3 (September 1989): 327–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1989.10716484.
Abstract:
This essay is about a theory of belief and a theory of belief reports formulated within the framework of DR (Discourse Representation) theory. DR theory’s treatment of definite and indefinite noun phrases leads to a superior treatment of belief reports involving singular terms. But it also provides something of even greater potential benefit to a treatment of belief: a (highly idealized) theory of how recipients recover verbally encoded information and of what form such information must take. The use of this account of verbally encoded information causes a distinctive treatment of belief to emerge. I will focus here on an analysis within this framework of how beliefs arise from the acceptance of verbal information and how the process of belief formation interacts with the process of belief report interpretation.
15
Joven Romero, Marco Antonio. "Belief and pluralistic ignorance." Filosofia Unisinos 21, no. 3 (November 25, 2020): 260–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.03.
Abstract:
Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions and evidence. Here I apply a basic epistemic approach to belief – believers consider their beliefs to be true –, a basic pragmatic approach to belief – beliefs are useful for believers – and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach – believers consider their believes to be true and such considerations are useful – to pluralistic ignorance phenomena. For that, I take the definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014).Keywords: Truth, pragmatism, epistemic belief, pragmatic belief.
16
Williams, Richard N., Carl B. Taylor, and Wayne J. Hintze. "The Influence of Religious Orientation on Belief in Science, Religion, and the Paranormal." Journal of Psychology and Theology 17, no. 4 (December 1989): 350–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009164718901700405.
Abstract:
This study examines the relationships among belief in science and in religion and various paranormal beliefs. Tobacyk and Milford (1983) included religious beliefs in a multidimensional scale of belief in the paranormal, reasoning that religion and the paranormal constitute one end of a bipolar dimension, while belief in science defines the other pole. The present study employed the Tobacyk and Milford scales, the Allport and Ross (1967) Religious Orientation Scale, and newly constructed scales of belief in science and astrology. These scales were administered to a total sample of 260 college undergraduates drawn from both a large church-owned university and from a large state university. It was found that religious orientation influenced reported belief in science, religion, and the paranormal. Traditional religious beliefs were not consistently related to paranormal beliefs. Religion and the paranormal do not seem to define one end of a science/paranormal belief continuum. It is argued that belief in religion, science, and the paranormal are three separate, independent dimensions.
17
Stowers, Deborah A., and Mark W. Durm. "Is Belief in a Just World Rational?" Psychological Reports 83, no. 2 (October 1998): 423–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1998.83.2.423.
Abstract:
To estimate the relationship between the belief in a just world and irrational thinking, 62 undergraduates completed the Jones Irrational Beliefs Test and the Multidimensional Belief in a Just World Scale. It was hypothesized that belief in a just world precluded rational thinking. No significant correlations were found between scores on irrational beliefs and beliefs in a just world; however, post hoc tests indicated a significant relationship between age and scores on irrational belief in women, indicating that perhaps the older women were less prone to irrational beliefs.
18
Burley, Mikel. "Is There Such a Thing as Religious Belief?" Implicit Religion 25, no. 1-2 (November 17, 2023): 33–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/imre.24309.
Abstract:
Whether there is such a thing as religious belief has been queried by philosophers who think the attitudes that get called religious beliefs are radically different from standard types of belief. It is sometimes claimed that so-called religious beliefs are, for example, resistant to experiential evidence in ways that genuine types of belief are not. A recent proponent of this contention, Brian Clack (2016), has argued that the lack of connection between religious attitudes and the world of everyday experience entails that these attitudes should be classified as “belief-like imaginings” rather than as bona fide beliefs. While admitting that contentions such as this prompt useful reflection upon the specificities of religious belief, I argue that the view that what are ordinarily called religious beliefs are not really beliefs amounts to an unwarranted linguistic stipulation. The concept of belief has a diversity of applications rather than being restricted to the narrow subset which dubious empiricist assumptions might lead us to privilege.
19
Schwitzgebel, Eric. "Knowing Your Own Beliefs." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 35 (2009): 41–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2009.10717643.
Abstract:
How do you know your own beliefs? And how well do you know them? The two questions are related. I'll recommend a pluralist answer to the first question. The answer to the second question, I'll suggest, varies depending on features of the case.Self-scanning. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2003) say this: You have in your mind a functionally defined “belief box.” To believe some propositionP is just to have a representation with the content “P” in the belief box. You also have a monitoring mechanism that can scan the contents of the belief box. Normally, you come to know what you believe by deploying that scanner, creating a new belief in the belief box, a belief with the content “I believe thatP.” Self-scanning accounts admit of many possible variations and complications (e.g., Armstrong 1968, 1981, 1999; Lycan 1996; Goldman 2006), but the basic idea is that people have one or more interior monitors or scanners that detect the presence of beliefs and produce, as output, beliefs about those beliefs (or judgments about those beliefs, or representations of those beliefs).
20
Barrett, Jacob. "Allowing Belief." Implicit Religion 25, no. 1-2 (November 17, 2023): 15–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/imre.24339.
Abstract:
Following the events at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021 where a protest led to the later-termed armed insurrection, congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene (R) was removed from her committee assignments for the role she played and her beliefs in QAnon. Greene’s passive language in her apology about being “allowed to believe things that weren’t true” landed, for her critics, as a disingenuous attempt to absolve herself of any blame. From a scholarly standpoint, however, her remarks provide a particularly useful case study for an examination of how the modern discourse on belief works. We normally talk about beliefs not as something one is “allowed” to have, rather as something an individual internally has and then only later expresses. Greene’s comments, though, point toward a rather different understanding of how beliefs—or better, belief claims—function than many might realize. This article uses two specific parts of Greene’s comments to reframe how we understand belief and suggests that we adopt a performative theory of belief, studying belief as a socio-rhetorical tool used to create and maintain a strategically useful but fictive internal space that functions as a mechanism of governance to manage dissent instead of a set of naturally occurring and internal convictions.
21
Tarcov, Nathan. "Belief and Opinion in Machiavelli'sPrince." Review of Politics 75, no. 4 (2013): 573–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670513000594.
Abstract:
AbstractThis article examines the roles of belief and opinion in Machiavelli'sPrince. Political success and failure are effected not only by force and arms but by religious belief in particular, and more generally by the beliefs and opinions of peoples. Princes can also be the beneficiaries or the victims of their own beliefs and opinions. Machiavelli occasionally explicitly states a view as his own belief or opinion such as his belief in cruelty well used or his opinions that a prince should found himself on the people and avoid their hatred. His beliefs and opinions both contrast with common beliefs and opinions and are modified in response to them.
22
Ghufron, M. Nur, Indiyati Eko P, and Berliana Henu Cahyani. "Model Struktural Hubungan Antara Kepercayaan Epistemologis Dengan Konsepsi Tentang Belajar Dan Mengajar Mahasiswa." INFERENSI 11, no. 1 (June 1, 2017): 51. http://dx.doi.org/10.18326/infsl3.v11i1.51-74.
Abstract:
This research aimed to assessing whether epistemological beliefs as measured by belief about knowledge and belief about learning predicted of the constructivist conception of teaching and learning, assessing whether epistemological beliefs as measured by belief about knowledge and belief about learning predicted of the traditional conception of teaching and learning. The population in this research consists of students of Tarbiyah Department of STAIN Kudus, Central Java. The sample was as many as study 242 students, taken through simple random sampling method. The data collection techniques used in this research was questionnaire in the form of scales and checklists. The data were analyzed using Structural Equation Models (SEM). The research resulted that epistemological beliefs as measured by belief about learning was negatively related on the constructivist conception of teaching and learning and) epistemological beliefs as measured by belief about knowledge was positively related on the traditional conception of teaching and learning.
23
Schwind, Nicolas, Katsumi Inoue, Sébastien Konieczny, and Pierre Marquis. "BeliefFlow: A Framework for Logic-Based Belief Diffusion via Iterated Belief Change." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38, no. 9 (March 24, 2024): 10696–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28941.
Abstract:
This paper presents BeliefFlow, a novel framework for representing how logical beliefs spread among interacting agents within a network. In a Belief Flow Network (BFN), agents communicate asynchronously. The agents' beliefs are represented using epistemic states, which encompass their current beliefs and conditional beliefs guiding future changes. When communication occurs between two connected agents, the receiving agent changes its epistemic state using an improvement operator, a well-known type of rational iterated belief change operator that generalizes belief revision operators. We show that BFNs satisfy appealing properties, leading to two significant outcomes. First, in any BFN with strong network connectivity, the beliefs of all agents converge towards a global consensus. Second, within any BFN, we show that it is possible to compute an optimal strategy for influencing the global beliefs. This strategy, which involves controlling the beliefs of a least number of agents through bribery, can be identified from the topology of the network and can be computed in polynomial time.
24
Gäb, Sebastian. "What’s Belief Got to Do With It?" Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 65, no. 4 (November 1, 2023): 430–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2023-0061.
Abstract:
Abstract This paper argues that even Crane’s modified account of belief doesn’t do justice to all varieties of religious belief. Particularly beliefs associated with ritual behavior don’t seem to match the criteria of Crane’s alternative account. So, the question remains whether these beliefs should still be called beliefs, or whether the standard model of belief is even more false than Crane suspects.
25
Battigalli, Pierpaolo, and Giacomo Bonanno. "The Logic of Belief Persistence." Economics and Philosophy 13, no. 1 (April 1997): 39–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100004296.
Abstract:
The principle of belief persistence, or conservativity principle, states that ‘When changing beliefs in response to new evidence, you should continue to believe as many of the old beliefs as possible’ (Harman, 1986, p. 46). In particular, this means that if an individual gets new information, she has to accommodate it in her new belief set (the set of propositions she believes), and, if the new information is not inconsistent with the old belief set, then (1) the individual has to maintain all the beliefs she previously had and (2) the change should be minimal in the sense that every proposition in the new belief set must be deducible from the union of the old belief set and the new information (see, e.g., Gärdenfors, 1988; Stalnaker, 1984). We focus on this minimal notion of belief persistence and characterize it both semantically and syntactically.
26
Romdenh-Romluc, Komarine. "Suppressed Belief." THEORIA 22, no. 1 (December 19, 2009): 17–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.478.
Abstract:
Moran's revised conception of conscious belief requires us to reconceptualise suppressed belief. The work of Merleau-Ponty offers a way to do this. His account of motor-skills allows us to understand suppressed beliefs as pre-reflective ways of dealing with the world.
27
Golman, Russell, George Loewenstein, Karl Ove Moene, and Luca Zarri. "The Preference for Belief Consonance." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30, no. 3 (August 1, 2016): 165–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.3.165.
Abstract:
We consider the determinants and consequences of a source of utility that has received limited attention from economists: people's desire for the beliefs of other people to align with their own. We relate this ‘preference for belief consonance’ to a variety of other constructs that have been explored by economists, including identity, ideology, homophily, and fellow-feeling. We review different possible explanations for why people care about others' beliefs and propose that the preference for belief consonance leads to a range of disparate phenomena, including motivated belief-formation, proselytizing, selective exposure to media, avoidance of conversational minefields, pluralistic ignorance, belief-driven clustering, intergroup belief polarization, and conflict. We also discuss an explanation for why disputes are often so intense between groups whose beliefs are, by external observers' standards, highly similar to one-another.
28
Bond, Frank W., and Windy Dryden. "HOW RATIONAL BELIEFS AND IRRATIONAL BELIEFS AFFECT PEOPLE'S INFERENCES: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION." Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy 28, no. 1 (January 2000): 33–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352465800000047.
Abstract:
Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) hypothesizes that the functionality of inferences is primarily affected by the preferential and demanding nature of rational and irrational beliefs, respectively. It is then, secondarily, influenced by the functional and dysfunctional contents to which rational and irrational beliefs, respectively, refer. This hypothesis was tested by asking 96 participants to imagine themselves holding one of four specific beliefs: a rational belief with a preference and a functional content, an irrational belief with a demand and a dysfunctional content, a rational belief with a functional content and no preference, and an irrational belief with a dysfunctional content and no demand. Participants imagined themselves holding their belief in an imaginary context, whilst rating the extent of their agreement to 14 functional and dysfunctional inferences. Contrary to REBT theory, results indicated that rational and irrational beliefs had the same magnitude of effect on the functionality of inferences, whether they referred to a preference/demand+contents, or only contents. The discussion maintains that preferences and demands may not constitute the principal mechanism through which rational and irrational beliefs affect the functionality of inferences. Instead, consistent with Beck's cognitive therapy, belief contents may constitute this primary mechanism.
29
Wang, Jingying, Mingyue Yang, Beibei Lv, Feixiong Zhang, Yonghe Zheng, and Yihong Sun. "INFLUENCING FACTORS OF 10th GRADE STUDENTS’ SCIENCE CAREER EXPECTATIONS: A STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL." Journal of Baltic Science Education 19, no. 4 (August 10, 2020): 675–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.33225/jbse/20.19.675.
Abstract:
Science career expectations can be affected by personal science beliefs and social supports. Framed in Expectancy-Value Models, this research studied the influence of science beliefs (science interest belief, self-efficacy belief and value belief) and social supports (parents and teachers) on students’ science career expectations by the survey of 798 10th grade students. Based on Structural Equation Model, it was found that: 1) science interest belief, self-efficacy belief, value belief and parents’ support can directly predict students' expectations of science careers; 2) the effect of student’s perception from parents and teachers support on science choice preferences and career engagement are mediated through the effects on students’ interest, self-efficacy and value in science. Therefore, teachers and parents should enhance students’ science beliefs and identity for the improvement of their science career expectations. Keywords: influencing factors, science career expectations, Structural Equation Model, 10th grade students.
30
LIN, YAN, and MAREK J. DRUZDZEL. "RELEVANCE-BASED INCREMENTAL BELIEF UPDATING IN BAYESIAN NETWORKS." International Journal of Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence 13, no. 02 (March 1999): 285–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218001499000161.
Abstract:
Relevance reasoning in Bayesian networks can be used to improve efficiency of belief updating algorithms by identifying and pruning those parts of a network that are irrelevant for computation. Relevance reasoning is based on the graphical property of d-separation and other simple and efficient techniques, the computational complexity of which is usually negligible when compared to the complexity of belief updating in general. This paper describes a belief updating technique based on relevance reasoning that is applicable in practical systems in which observations and model revisions are interleaved with belief updating. Our technique invalidates the posterior beliefs of those nodes that depend probabilistically on the new evidence or the revised part of the model and focuses the subsequent belief updating on the invalidated beliefs rather than on all beliefs. Very often observations and model updating invalidate only a small fraction of the beliefs and our scheme can then lead to sub stantial savings in computation. We report results of empirical tests for incremental belief updating when the evidence gathering is interleaved with reasoning. These tests demonstrate the practical significance of our approach.
31
Williams, Emyr, Leslie Francis, and Christopher A. Lewis. "Introducing the Modified Paranormal Belief Scale: Distinguishing between Classic Paranormal Beliefs, Religious Paranormal Beliefs and Conventional Religiosity among Undergraduates in Northern Ireland and Wales." Archive for the Psychology of Religion 31, no. 3 (September 2009): 345–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/008467209x12499946199605.
Abstract:
Previous empirical studies concerned with the association between paranormal beliefs and conventional religiosity have produced conflicting evidence. Drawing on Rice's (2003) distinction between classic paranormal beliefs and religious paranormal beliefs, the present study proposed a modified form of the Tobacyk Revised Paranormal Belief Scale to produce separate scores for these two forms of paranormal belief, styled ‘religious paranormal beliefs’ and ‘classic paranormal beliefs’. Data provided by a sample of 143 undergraduate students in Northern Ireland and Wales, who completed the Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity alongside the Tobacyk Revised Paranormal Belief Scale, demonstrated that conventional religiosity is positively correlated with religious paranormal beliefs, but independent of classic paranormal beliefs. These findings provide a clear framework within which previous conflicting evidence can be interpreted. It is recommended that future research should distinguish clearly between these two forms of paranormal beliefs and that the Tobacyk Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale should be routinely modified to detach the four religious paranormal belief items from the total scale score.
32
LEE, KANG, DAVID R. OLSON, and NANCY TORRANCE. "Chinese children's understanding of false beliefs: the role of language." Journal of Child Language 26, no. 1 (February 1999): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000998003626.
Abstract:
The present study investigated the universality of the early development of young children's understanding and representation of false beliefs, and specifically, the effect of language on Chinese-speaking children's performance in false belief tasks under three between-subjects conditions. The three conditions differed only in the belief verb that was used in probe questions regarding one's own or another person's beliefs, namely the Chinese verbs, xiang, yiwei, and dang. While the three words are all appropriate to false beliefs, they have different connotations regarding the likelihood of a belief being false, with xiang being more neutral than either yiwei or dang. Experiment i involved thirty-five Chinese-speaking adults who responded to false belief tasks to be used in Experiment 2 in order both to establish an adult comparison and to obtain empirical evidence regarding how Chinese-speaking adults use the three belief verbs to describe different false belief situations. In Experiment 2, 188 three-, four-, and five-year-old Chinese-speaking children participated in three false belief tasks. They were asked to report about an individual's false belief when either xiang, yiwei, or dang was used in the probe question. Results revealed a rapid developmental pattern in Chinese-speaking children's understanding of false belief, which is similar to that found with Western children. In addition, children performed significantly better when yiwei and dang, which connote that the belief referred to may be false, were used in belief questions than when xiang, the more neutral verb, was used. This finding suggests an important role of language in assessing children's understanding of belief and false belief.
33
Grubbs, Jeffrey B. "Helping Pre-Service Art Teachers Confront their Pedagogical Belief Systems." International Journal for Innovation Education and Research 2, no. 10 (October 31, 2014): 8–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.31686/ijier.vol2.iss10.243.
Abstract:
People are behaviorally and psychologically complex to a point that we cannot separate ourselves from our values, beliefs, and assumptions; they affect every part of our lives. In education, beliefs influence what, why, and how something is taught. The many threads of teacher belief literature have deepened our understanding of the teaching phenomenon for many decades. This article suggests that educational quality can be improved if teachers would analyze their own educational belief systems more systematically and comprehensively. The article gives a brief history of teacher belief research and suggests a framework by which teachers could analyze their thinking, beliefs, or assumptions. The article finishes with an example of how one professor integrated teacher belief research into a college course helping pre-service art educators analyze their conflicting belief systems.
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Stingl, Michael, and John Collier. "After the fall: Religious capacities and the error theory of morality." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 6 (December 2004): 751–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x04440175.
Abstract:
The target article proposes an error theory for religious belief. In contrast, moral beliefs are typically not counterintuitive, and some moral cognition and motivation is functional. Error theories for moral belief try to reduce morality to nonmoral psychological capacities because objective moral beliefs seem too fragile in a competitive environment. An error theory for religious belief makes this unnecessary.
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Feyzioğlu, Eylem Yıldız. "SCIENCE TEACHERS’ BELIEFS AS BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSTRUCTIVIST-BASED EDUCATION REFORM." Journal of Baltic Science Education 11, no. 4 (December 5, 2012): 302–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.33225/jbse/12.11.302.
Abstract:
A new Science and Technology program had been applied in Turkey since 2005. Constructivism has been the predominant influence on the program. Accordingly, science teachers are expected to have beliefs that are consistent with constructivism. However, the question of “what are the Turkish science teachers’ beliefs” is important because, the success of the program is dependent upon the teachers’ beliefs. This paper reports on the investigation of the science teachers’ beliefs about teaching science, learning science and managing behavior problems and any relationships among these belief systems. Data were collected through interviews with 18 science teachers. Results indicated that most of the science teachers held transitive beliefs about teaching science, and traditional beliefs about learning science and managing behavior problems. While teachers with 1-10 years experiences held a constructivist belief, this belief gave way to traditional belief as the teaching experience advanced. Beliefs of teachers were both interrelated and nested. Key words: classroom management, constructivism, learning science, teacher beliefs, teaching science.
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Moser, Louise E. "A Nonmonotonic Logic of Belief." Fundamenta Informaticae 12, no. 4 (October 1, 1989): 507–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/fi-1989-12405.
Abstract:
A nonmonotonic logic of belief based on a combined monotonic logic of knowledge and belief is presented. Unlike previous nonmonotonic logics of belief, this logic contains an unless operator by means of which preference for beliefs and refutation of those beliefs can be expressed, thereby providing explicit representation of nonmonotonicity. A decision procedure based on Kripke structures for deciding validity of formulas in the logic is described and proved correct.
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Faria, Domingos. "Group Belief." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 1 (2021): 82–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158111.
Abstract:
Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B even if no member of g has B. My aim in this paper is to consider whether divergence arguments for non-summativism and against summativism about group belief are sound. Such divergence arguments aim to show that there can be a divergence between belief at the group level and the corresponding belief at the individual level. I will argue that these divergence arguments do not decisively defeat a minimal version of summativism. In order to accomplish this goal, I have the following plan: In section 2, I will analyze the structure of two important counterexamples against the summativist view, which are based on divergence arguments. Such counterexamples are based on the idea that a group decides to adopt a particular group belief, even if none of its members holds the belief in question. However, in section 3, I will show that these counterexamples fail, because they can be explained without the need to posit group beliefs. More specifically, I argue that in these apparent counterexamples, we have only a ‘group acceptance’ phenomenon and not a ‘group belief’ phenomenon. For this conclusion, I advance two arguments: in subsection 3.1, I formulate an argument from doxastic involuntarism, and in subsection 3.2, I develop an argument from truth connection. Thus, summativism is not defeated by divergence arguments. Lastly, in section 4, I will conclude with some advantages of summativism.
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Bourdieu, Pierre. "Sociologists Of Belief And Beliefs Of Sociologists." Nordic Journal of Religion and Society 23, no. 01 (February 10, 2017): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.18261/issn1890-7008-2010-01-01.
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Hadjichristidis, Constantinos, Simon J. Handley, Steven A. Sloman, Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over, and Rosemary J. Stevenson. "Iffy beliefs: Conditional thinking and belief change." Memory & Cognition 35, no. 8 (December 2007): 2052–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/bf03192937.
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CORNELISSEN, GEMMA. "Belief-Based Exemptions: Are Religious Beliefs Special?*." Ratio Juris 25, no. 1 (February 22, 2012): 85–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2011.00504.x.
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Király, Ildikó, Katalin Oláh, Gergely Csibra, and Ágnes Melinda Kovács. "Retrospective attribution of false beliefs in 3-year-old children." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 45 (October 15, 2018): 11477–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1803505115.
Abstract:
A current debate in psychology and cognitive science concerns the nature of young children’s ability to attribute and track others’ beliefs. Beliefs can be attributed in at least two different ways: prospectively, during the observation of belief-inducing situations, and in a retrospective manner, based on episodic retrieval of the details of the events that brought about the beliefs. We developed a task in which only retrospective attribution, but not prospective belief tracking, would allow children to correctly infer that someone had a false belief. Eighteen- and 36-month-old children observed a displacement event, which was witnessed by a person wearing sunglasses (Experiment 1). Having later discovered that the sunglasses were opaque, 36-month-olds correctly inferred that the person must have formed a false belief about the location of the objects and used this inference in resolving her referential expressions. They successfully performed retrospective revision in the opposite direction as well, correcting a mistakenly attributed false belief when this was necessary (Experiment 3). Thus, children can compute beliefs retrospectively, based on episodic memories, well before they pass explicit false-belief tasks. Eighteen-month-olds failed in such a task, suggesting that they cannot retrospectively attribute beliefs or revise their initial belief attributions. However, an additional experiment provided evidence for prospective tracking of false beliefs in 18-month-olds (Experiment 2). Beyond identifying two different modes for tracking and updating others’ mental states early in development, these results also provide clear evidence of episodic memory retrieval in young children.
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Yoo, Oksoon. "A Study on the Impact of Writing Beliefs of Older Writers on the Performance of Autobiographical Text Writing." Korean Association for Literacy 14, no. 2 (April 30, 2023): 397–433. http://dx.doi.org/10.37736/kjlr.2023.04.14.2.13.
Abstract:
This study explores the effects of writing beliefs on a writer’s output. For this purpose, examining older patterns of writing beliefs and techniques was necessary. This helps search for positive improvements in writing beliefs through autobiographical text-writing activities of Internet writing cafes.
Following are the results of this study. First, the average writing belief starts to decline around the middle age of an entire life cycle. Second, unlike students, variable measures are required to measure the distribution patterns of transmission and transactional writing beliefs of adult writers. Third, on a 5-point scale, the average writing belief was 3.7, which was higher than average, and the writing belief of citizen writers who authored autobiographies was a high 4.04. Fourth, a solidly positive association was found between writing belief and other writing sub-factors. The writing factor test and citizen writer belief test of the adult writer’s writing belief made the anticipation of a positive change in writing belief in adult writer’s autobiographical text writing performance possible.
The examination of evolving writing beliefs in a person’s life showed that older writers prioritize participating in communication rather than transmitting accurate content. The result necessitates setting up internal and external communication spaces. These spaces can reflect the writing convictions and delivery process of mature writers, prone to being driven into the communication blind spot in social activities or interpersonal relationships after retirement.
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Doshi, P., and P. J. Gmytrasiewicz. "Monte Carlo Sampling Methods for Approximating Interactive POMDPs." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 34 (March 24, 2009): 297–337. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.2630.
Abstract:
Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) provide a principled framework for sequential planning in uncertain single agent settings. An extension of POMDPs to multiagent settings, called interactive POMDPs (I-POMDPs), replaces POMDP belief spaces with interactive hierarchical belief systems which represent an agents belief about the physical world, about beliefs of other agents, and about their beliefs about others beliefs. This modification makes the difficulties of obtaining solutions due to complexity of the belief and policy spaces even more acute. We describe a general method for obtaining approximate solutions of I-POMDPs based on particle filtering (PF). We introduce the interactive PF, which descends the levels of the interactive belief hierarchies and samples and propagates beliefs at each level. The interactive PF is able to mitigate the belief space complexity, but it does not address the policy space complexity. To mitigate the policy space complexity sometimes also called the curse of history we utilize a complementary method based on sampling likely observations while building the look ahead reachability tree. While this approach does not completely address the curse of history, it beats back the curses impact substantially. We provide experimental results and chart future work.
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Zhuang, Yifan, Hongwei Wang, and Xi Chen. "Heterogeneous belief formation method based on BP neural network." MATEC Web of Conferences 232 (2018): 01044. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/201823201044.
Abstract:
The BDI model has always been the focus of subject modeling research, which includes three kinds of thinking states of the rational subject: Belief, Desire and Intention. Belief is the cognition of agent to the world; it is a collection of environmental information, other agent information, and its own information that the agent has; and it is also the basis of the agent's thinking activity. Due to differences in the individual's living environment and experience, the formation of heterogeneous beliefs is an important issue in the BDI model study. This article divides individual belief set into two parts: knowledge belief and achievable belief. This article proposes an overall framework for the formation of individual heterogeneity beliefs: First, the individual's knowledge experience is modeled, and the empirical knowledge is structured and quantified into binary propositions; then the BP neural network learn and memory propositions of different combinations to form heterogeneous beliefs. Experiments show that this method can simulate the heterogeneity of individual beliefs caused by the individual's own experience, and can realize the belief generation mechanism of gradual information flow, limited attention and heterogeneous priors.
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Mercer, Jonathan. "Emotional Beliefs." International Organization 64, no. 1 (January 2010): 1–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818309990221.
Abstract:
AbstractA belief in alien abduction is an emotional belief, but so is a belief that Iran intends to build nuclear weapons, that one's country is good, that a sales tax is unjust, or that French decision makers are irresolute. Revolutionary research in the brain sciences has overturned conventional views of the relationship between emotion, rationality, and beliefs. Because rationality depends on emotion, and because cognition and emotion are nearly indistinguishable in the brain, one can view emotion as constituting and strengthening beliefs such as trust, nationalism, justice or credibility. For example, a belief that another's commitment is credible depends on one's selection (and interpretation) of evidence and one's assessment of risk, both of which rely on emotion. Observing that emotion and cognition co-produce beliefs has policy implications: how one fights terrorism changes if one views credibility as an emotional belief.
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Cohen, Erel, Omer Lev, and Roie Zivan. "Separate but Equal: Equality in Belief Propagation for Single Cycle Graphs." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 37, no. 4 (June 26, 2023): 3924–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i4.25506.
Abstract:
Belief propagation is a widely used incomplete optimization algorithm, whose main theoretical properties hold only under the assumptions that beliefs are not equal. Nevertheless, there is much evidence that equality between beliefs does occur. A method to overcome belief equality by using unary function-nodes is assumed to resolve the problem. We focus on Min-sum, the belief propagation version for solving constraint optimization problems. We prove that on a single cycle graph, belief equality can be avoided only when the algorithm converges to the optimal solution. In any other case, the unary function methods will not prevent equality, rendering some existing results in need of reassessment. We differentiate between belief equality, which includes equal beliefs in a single message, and assignment equality, that prevents a coherent selection of assignments to variables. We show the necessary and satisfying conditions for both.
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Fite, Robert E., Sarah L. Adut, and Joshua C. Magee. "Do you believe in magical thinking? Examining magical thinking as a mediator between obsessive-compulsive belief domains and symptoms." Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy 48, no. 4 (March 17, 2020): 454–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352465820000132.
Abstract:
AbstractBackground:Despite substantial research attention on obsessive beliefs, more research is needed to understand how these beliefs serve as aetiological or maintaining factors for obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms. Magical thinking may allow individuals to gain a sense of control when experiencing intrusive thoughts and corresponding obsessive beliefs, potentially accounting for why OC belief domains are often related to OC symptoms.Aims:This study examines magical thinking as a mediating variable in the relationship between OC belief domains and symptoms.Method:Undergraduate students (n = 284) reported their obsessive beliefs, magical thinking, and OC symptoms.Results:As expected, there were significant indirect effects for the belief domain of inflated responsibility and over-estimation of threat on OC symptoms via magical thinking. There was also an indirect effect for the belief domain of importance and control of thoughts on OC symptoms via magical thinking. Unexpectedly, there was no indirect effect involving the belief domain of perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty.Conclusions:Magical thinking may be one mechanism through which certain OC beliefs lead to OC symptoms. It may be that magical thinking serves as a coping mechanism in response to elevated beliefs. Future studies should extend these findings across time and clinical samples.
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George Phillips, Winfred. "Blanshard's Ethics of Belief and Metaphysical Postulates." Religious Studies 27, no. 2 (June 1991): 139–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500020801.
Abstract:
In Brand Blanshard's major defence of reason in religion, Reason and Belief, he criticizes both Roman Catholics and Protestants for advocating contradictory theological doctrines and for believing beyond what the evidence supports. Claiming belief to be an ethical matter, with one morally responsible for one's religious beliefs, he holds that one is morally obligated in such metaphysical matters to believe only what the evidence warrants. Blanshard finds that religious beliefs typically fail to meet the standard of this ethics of belief, and thus his ethics appears inhospitable to religious belief.
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Cooper, Myra J., Gillian Todd, and Hannah Turner. "The Effects of Using Imagery to Modify Core Emotional Beliefs in Bulimia Nervosa: An Experimental Pilot Study." Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy 21, no. 2 (June 2007): 117–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/088983907780851577.
Abstract:
Imagery modification was administered in a pilot study to patients with bulimia nervosa. The aim was to change patients’ emotionally held negative self-beliefs. Negative self-beliefs were identified and belief ratings obtained. A single session imagery intervention, focused on an early memory associated with these beliefs, was then conducted with the experimental group, while a control group received a control intervention. Significant changes were found in the experimental group, compared to the control group, in belief ratings for emotionally held negative self-belief ratings. Emotional (and rational) self-belief change was associated with mood and behavior change, including decreased urge to binge. The implications and limitations of the study are discussed.
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Garnett, James. "Assimilation, Accommodation and Appropriation: Three attitudes to truth in science and religion." Holiness 5, no. 1 (June 16, 2020): 59–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/holiness-2019-0004.
Abstract:
AbstractThis article addresses the relationship between experience and belief, focusing on the role of science in the debate between secular Humanism and Christianity. It suggests that the possibility of appropriating experience to belief – taking action to bring experience into line with belief – distinguishes spiritual belief from systematic belief (in which the object is independent of beliefs about it); but that the boundary between these two forms of belief is itself a matter of (metaphysical) belief. Understanding science and religion, Humanism and Christianity in relationship to systematic and spiritual belief-structures helps to bring clarity to the debate.