Journal articles: 'Belief-disagreement'

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Kelly, Thomas. "Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization." Journal of Philosophy 105, no. 10 (2008): 611–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20081051024.

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Palmira, Michele. "Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief." Ratio 31, no. 2 (March 22, 2017): 179–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rati.12163.

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RIEPPEL, MICHAEL. "STOIC DISAGREEMENT AND BELIEF RETENTION." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92, no. 2 (May 11, 2011): 243–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01396.x.

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Verdejo, Víctor M. "Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24, no. 2 (January 11, 2016): 183–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2015.1126339.

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Dreier, Jamie. "Truth and Disagreement in Impassioned Belief." Analysis 75, no. 3 (July 2015): 450–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv025.

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Skipper, Mattias, and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen. "Group disagreement: a belief aggregation perspective." Synthese 196, no. 10 (November 27, 2017): 4033–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1636-0.

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Moore, Michael S., and Heidi M. Hurd. "Moral Combat: Disagreement in Action, Not Belief." Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 1, no. 14 (August 5, 2020): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iij.24487937e.2020.14.14903.

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Cuando los filósofos discuten los desacuerdos morales, normalmente tienen en mente desacuerdos entre creencias, actitudes o emociones de diferentes personas. Aquí reexaminamos la posibilidad de que existan desacuerdos entre lo que para una persona es correcto hacer y lo que para otra es correcto impedir que se haga, lo que denominamos “combate moral”.

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Thune, Michael. "Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Disagreement." Philosophy Compass 5, no. 8 (July 20, 2010): 712–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00314.x.

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Chen, Jia, and Tianqun Pan. "Logics for Moderate Belief-Disagreement Between Agents." Studia Logica 107, no. 3 (March 17, 2018): 559–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-018-9790-z.

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Cevolani, Gustavo. "Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement." Synthese 191, no. 11 (May 20, 2014): 2383–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0486-2.

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Duchin, Ran, and Moshe Levy. "Disagreement, Portfolio Optimization, and Excess Volatility." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 45, no. 3 (March 31, 2010): 623–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109010000189.

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AbstractDisagreement, a key factor inducing trading, has been receiving ever increasing attention in recent years. Most research has focused on disagreement about the expected returns. Several authors have shown that if the average belief coincides with the true expected return, in the portfolio context prices are unaffected by disagreement. In this paper we study the pricing effects of disagreement about return variances. We show that i) disagreement about variances has systematic and significant pricing effects—more disagreement leads to higher prices, and ii) prices are very sensitive to the degree of disagreement: Even if the average belief about the variance is constant, tiny fluctuations in the disagreement about the variance lead to substantial price fluctuations. This second result may offer an explanation for the excess volatility puzzle: When small changes in the degree of disagreement occur, they induce relatively large price changes. Yet, the changes in disagreement may be hard to directly detect empirically, leading to apparent “excess volatility.”

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P\'erez-Navarr, Eduardo, V\'ictor Fern\'and Castro, Javier Gonz\'ale Prado, and Manuel Heras-Escribano. "Not Expressivist Enough: Normative Disagreement about Belief Attribution." Res Philosophica 96, no. 4 (2019): 409–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1794.

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Everett, Theodore J. "Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rational Belief." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93, no. 2 (October 10, 2014): 273–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.968176.

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Chen, Jia, and Tianqun Pan. "Logic for Describing Strong Belief-Disagreement Between Agents." Studia Logica 106, no. 1 (May 5, 2017): 35–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-017-9724-1.

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Bergmann, Michael. "Religious Disagreement and Epistemic Intuitions." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 (October 2017): 19–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246117000224.

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AbstractReligious disagreement is, quite understandably, viewed as a problem for religious belief. In this paper, I consider why religious disagreement is a problem—why it is a potential defeater for religious belief—and I propose a way of dealing with this sort of potential defeater. I begin by focusing elsewhere—on arguments for radical skepticism. In section 1, I consider skeptical arguments proposed as potential defeaters for all of our perceptual and memory beliefs and explain what I think the rational response is to such potential defeaters, emphasizing the way epistemic intuitions are involved in both the skeptical arguments and my recommended response. In section 2, I discuss the way in which peer disagreement—on any topic—is a potential defeater for our beliefs, highlighting the conditions under which recognized disagreement is a successful defeater and those under which it isn't. In the third section, I consider how to use a section-1 type of response to deal with a section-2 type of defeater for religious belief.

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He, Hongshun, Deqiang Han, and Jean Dezert. "Disagreement based semi-supervised learning approaches with belief functions." Knowledge-Based Systems 193 (April 2020): 105426. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.knosys.2019.105426.

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Löffler, Winfried. "Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution." Philosophia Christi 20, no. 1 (2018): 306–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc201820130.

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Ye, Mengbin, Ji Liu, Lili Wang, Brian D. O. Anderson, and Ming Cao. "Consensus and Disagreement of Heterogeneous Belief Systems in Influence Networks." IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 65, no. 11 (November 2020): 4679–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tac.2019.2961998.

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Coliva, Annalisa. "DISAGREEING WITH MYSELF: DOXASTIC COMMITMENTS AND INTRAPERSONAL DISAGREEMENT." American Philosophical Quarterly 56, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/45128639.

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Abstract This paper explores the idea of disagreement with oneself, in both its diachronic and synchronie forms. A puzzling case of synchronie intrapersonal disagreement is presented and the paper considers its implications. One is that belief is a genus that comes in two species: as disposition and as commitment. Another is that self-deception consists in a conflict between one’s beliefs as dispositions and one’s beliefs as commitments. Synchronie intrapersonal disagreement also has implications for the condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to have genuine disagreement tout court, and for the different ways in which it can be satisfied.

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BEX-PRIESTLEY, GRAHAM, and YONATAN SHEMMER. "A Normative Theory of Disagreement." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3, no. 2 (2017): 189–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2017.17.

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ABSTRACT:Expressivists have trouble accounting for disagreement. If ethical or other normative judgments are desire-like rather than belief-like, it is puzzling why we think people often disagree in those domains. While previous expressivists have proposed only straightforwardly descriptive conditions under which disagreement occurs, we argue that disagreement itself should be understood normatively: two or more people disagree just in case their diverging attitudes imply, given a common project of theirs, that at least one of them has reason to change his or her mind.

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Weber, Marc Andree. "Conciliatory Views on Peer Disagreement and the Order of Evidence Acquisition." KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 36, no. 1 (September 29, 2021): 33–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0023.

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Abstract The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities.

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MACDONALD, PAUL A. "In defence of a realist interpretation of theology." Religious Studies 44, no. 1 (January 11, 2008): 23–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412507009146.

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AbstractIn this essay, I defend theology against a recent argument made by Peter Byrne. According to Byrne, any discipline of thought that can be interpreted realistically shows the accumulation of reliable or widespread belief about the reality it investigates. I challenge this claim, first, by showing how theology, so construed as an exercise of ‘faith seeking understanding’, can and should be interpreted realistically, even if it does not show the accumulation of reliable or widespread belief about divine reality. Second, I give a plausible account of why theology is beset by internal disagreement and division, even if the goal of theological enquiry is to overcome such disagreement and division.

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Martin, N. Gabriel. "What Is the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement?" Logos & Episteme 10, no. 3 (2019): 283–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910326.

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Over the past decade, attention to epistemically significant disagreement has centered on the question of whose disagreement qualifies as significant, but ignored another fundamental question: what is the epistemic significance of disagreement? While epistemologists have assumed that disagreement is only significant when it indicates a determinate likelihood that one’s own belief is false, and therefore that only disagreements with epistemic peers are significant at all, they have ignored a more subtle and more basic significance that belongs to all disagreements, regardless of who they are with—that the opposing party is wrong. It is important to recognize the basic significance of disagreement since it is what explains all manners of rational responses to disagreement, including assessing possible epistemic peers and arguing against opponents regardless of their epistemic fitness.

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Hazlett, Allan. "ENTITLEMENT AND MUTUALLY RECOGNIZED REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT." Episteme 11, no. 1 (November 4, 2013): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.46.

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AbstractMost people not only think that it is possible for reasonable people to disagree, but that it is possible for people to recognize that they are parties to a reasonable disagreement. The aim of this paper is to explain how such mutually recognized reasonable disagreements are possible. I appeal to an “entitlement claim” which implies a form of relativism about reasonable belief, based on the idea that whether a belief is reasonable for a person can depend on the fact that she has inherited a particular worldview from her community.

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KRAFT, JAMES. "Religious disagreement, externalism, and the epistemology of disagreement: listening to our grandmothers." Religious Studies 43, no. 4 (November 7, 2007): 417–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441250700916x.

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AbstractA new emphasis in epistemology is burgeoning, known by the phrase ‘the epistemology of disagreement’. The object of investigation is the situation where the two combatants of a disagreement are equally well situated epistemologically. Central questions include whether peer epistemic conflict reduces the support one has for one's belief, whether the reduction should be understood on internalist or externalist lines, and how often such peer conflict happens. The main objective in the first two sections will be to provide background by bringing key points of contention to the surface in the recent epistemologies of disagreement both in mainstream epistemology and in religious epistemology. A final section asserts that epistemic externalism in religious epistemology doesn't easily escape the challenge of epistemic, peer, religious disagreement.

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Kim, Jeong Ho (John), and Byung-Cheol Kim. "A welfare criterion with endogenous welfare weights for belief disagreement models." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 191 (November 2021): 312–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.006.

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Loh, Isaac, and Gregory Phelan. "DIMENSIONALITY AND DISAGREEMENT: ASYMPTOTIC BELIEF DIVERGENCE IN RESPONSE TO COMMON INFORMATION." International Economic Review 60, no. 4 (May 13, 2019): 1861–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12406.

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28

Lam, B. "On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement." Philosophical Review 120, no. 2 (January 1, 2011): 207–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2010-028.

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Eva, Benjamin. "The Logic of Conditional Belief." Philosophical Quarterly 70, no. 281 (April 20, 2020): 759–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa008.

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Abstract The logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms—the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief—are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is a real sense in which Stalnaker’s semantics for the indicative did succeed in capturing the logic of the Ramseyan indicative conditional.

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Cramer, Duncan. "Effect of the Destructive Disagreement Belief on Satisfaction With One's Closest Friend." Journal of Psychology 139, no. 1 (January 2005): 57–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.3200/jrlp.139.1.57-66.

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Han, Bing, Lei Lu, and Yi Zhou. "Two Trees with Heterogeneous Beliefs: Spillover Effect of Disagreement." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 54, no. 4 (October 8, 2018): 1791–819. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109018001266.

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In a model where investors disagree about the fundamentals of two stocks, the state-price density depends on investor disagreements for both stocks, especially the larger stock. This implies that disagreement among investors in a large firm has a spillover effect on the pricing of other stocks owned by these investors. The pricing effects of investor disagreements crucially depend on the average belief biases. Empirical findings support the novel model prediction of a disagreement spillover effect and help reconcile some mixed evidence in the literature.

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Zhu Hua, Wei, and Diana Boxer. "Strong disagreement in Mandarin and ELFP." Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict 1, no. 2 (November 18, 2013): 194–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jlac.1.2.04zhu.

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This paper calls for the integration of first order and second order approaches in (im)politeness studies. Most previous research on the (im)politeness of Chinese speech behavior has been based on researchers’ interpretations and second order investigations. However, this study included a first order approach by examining Chinese participants’ lay conceptualizations of the appropriateness of the strong disagreement behavior that appeared in spontaneous mundane conversations. A close analysis of both the participants’ responses to strong disagreement in ongoing conversations and follow-up interviews revealed that the participants’ strong disagreement was perceived as politic and acceptable within their communities of practice. This challenges the general belief of strong disagreement as impolite and that of Chinese native speakers being indirect in communication. The finding indicates the importance of embracing first order investigation of the conventional views/norms that might cause communication misunderstanding in cross-cultural contact.

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Kostina, Alina O. "Epistemology of Belief." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 57, no. 2 (2020): 231–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202057233.

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The following article discovers current trends of contemporary epistemology, related to epistemic agent and his/her activities. A number of issues raised here describe internal experience of the agent, such as (in)voluntary nature of belief formation, trust in one’s faculties of perception, correspondence of formed beliefs to evidence, demarcation between purely epistemic and pragmatic rationality. Another part of the issues is related to external experiences of the agent. The most crucial among them are: blameworthiness of the agent’s belief system, limited intake of testimonial knowledge as a result of social bias; epistemic disagreement and “epistemic peers” as the sources of knowledge or additional pressure from the environment. The author considers virtue epistemology as a new way of performing normativity.

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Pouivet, Roger. "Worst Friends or Best Enemies?" European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7, no. 1 (March 21, 2015): 105–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v7i1.132.

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This article examines the question of whether the atheist and the believer can understand each other, to the point of being friends intellectually. The answer is no. The atheist and the believer can be best enemies, but their epistemic disagreement is definitely radical. For it is not a disagreement on religious belief itself, but about what allows the believer to believe. The article examines some aspects of John Greco’s concept of ‘friendly theism’, the discussion of conciliationism and anti-conciliatonism, and the epistemic role of the Holy Spirit.

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Moon, Andrew. "INDEPENDENCE AND NEW WAYS TO REMAIN STEADFAST IN THE FACE OF DISAGREEMENT." Episteme 15, no. 1 (December 15, 2016): 65–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.42.

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ABSTRACTAn important principle in the epistemology of disagreement is Independence, which states, “In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another's expressed belief about P, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own belief about P, I should do so in a way that doesn't rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief about P” (Christensen 2011: 1–2). I present a series of new counterexamples to both Independence and also a revised, more widely applicable, version of it. I then formulate and endorse a third version of Independence that avoids those counterexamples. Lastly, I show how this third version of Independence reveals two new ways one may remain steadfast in the face of two real life disagreements: one about God's existence and one about moral realism.

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Fanselow, Ryan. "Self-Evidence and Disagreement in Ethics." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5, no. 3 (June 5, 2017): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v5i3.56.

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Moral epistemology, like general epistemology, faces a regress problem. Suppose someone demands to know why I am justified in holding a moral belief. In a typical case, I will respond by citing a further moral belief that justifies it. A regress arises because, in order for this further belief to justify anything, it too must be justified. According to a traditional position in moral epistemology, moral foundationalism, the regress comes to an end with some moral beliefs. Moral foundationalism is an attractive position because it promises to answer the regress problem. However, it inherits the burden of explaining why some moral beliefs have a particular privileged epistemic position – that is, why these beliefs are justified without requiring inferential support from other beliefs. The standard answer to this question is to insist that some moral beliefs have as their content propositions that are self-evident. A common way of resisting moral foundationalism is to argue from the fact of moral disagreement to the claim that no moral proposition is self-evident. I argue that while a simple version of this argument fails, this argument can be developed in such a way that it poses serious difficulties for moral foundationalism. I develop this argument by drawing on recent work in epistemology on the nature of our epistemic burdens in the face of peer disagreement. I then suggest that even if this argument does show that moral foundationalism fails, it need not have skeptical implications so long as coherentism remains a viable option in moral epistemology. Finally, I claim that this argument has implications for normative ethics. Namely, it rules out a position advocated by Peter Singer in his early work and indirectly supports the method of reflective equilibrium.

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Gregory, Ian. "Education, Democracy and Living With Disagreement." Philosophical Inquiry in Education 26, no. 2 (September 14, 2020): 156–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1071438ar.

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This paper will revisit issues to do with the roles of education and an ostensibly liberal democracy in a world rife with disagreement. It seems certain that the outcome of the revisiting will be an insistence that to be true to themselves, the provision of education at both the individual and societal level must cling hard to the key notions of truth, objectivity, and rational justification in a world that perhaps more than any other time is inclined to doubt whether in any final sense these notions have much going for them. Disagreement is the challenge and spur to the reaffirming of our belief in the importance of rational debate in both the private and public spheres.

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Halberstam, Joshua. "Epistemic Disagreement and ’Elu We’Elu." Studia Humana 6, no. 2 (June 1, 2017): 7–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sh-2017-0008.

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Abstract A lively exchange in recent epistemology considers the problem of epistemic disagreement between peers: disagreement between those who share evidence and have equal cognitive abilities. Two main views have emerged about how to proceed in such circumstances: be steadfast in maintaining one’s own view or conciliate, and suspend or reduce one’s confidence in one’s belief. Talmudic debates do seem to promote steadfastness, as the disputants are not called on to conciliate purely because they confront a disagreeing peer. But why? Third party judgments are even more problematic, for what epistemic warrant is there for choosing between a disagreement of superiors? A common explanation for Talmudic steadfastness is the notion ’elu w’elu divrey ’Elohim kayim – both sides of Talmudic (or, more generally, halakhic) disputes have ‘heavenly’ legitimacy. But a closer look at this oft-quoted dictum and its various interpretations does not, in fact, reveal such support for steadfastness. Other explanations for Talmudic steadfastness are, therefore, required.

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PAPAFRAGOU, ANNA, SARAH FAIRCHILD, MATTHEW L. COHEN, and CARLYN FRIEDBERG. "Learning words from speakers with false beliefs." Journal of Child Language 44, no. 4 (June 21, 2016): 905–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000916000301.

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AbstractDuring communication, hearers try to infer the speaker's intentions to be able to understand what the speaker means. Nevertheless, whether (and how early) preschoolers track their interlocutors' mental states is still a matter of debate. Furthermore, there is disagreement about how children's ability to consult a speaker's belief in communicative contexts relates to their ability to track someone's belief in non-communicative contexts. Here, we study young children's ability to successfully acquire a word from a speaker with a false belief; we also assess the same children's success on a traditional false belief attribution task. We show that the ability to consult the epistemic state of a speaker during word learning develops between the ages of three and five. We also show that false belief understanding in word-learning contexts proceeds similarly to standard belief-attribution contexts when the tasks are equated. Our data offer evidence for the development of mind-reading abilities during language acquisition.

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Ranalli, Chris. "Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology." Synthese 197, no. 11 (October 6, 2018): 4975–5007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01956-2.

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Abstract This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that the answer to this question depends on what hinge commitments are and what our epistemic relation to them is supposed to be. I argue for two core claims. First, that non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments provide adequate support for pessimism. Nevertheless, such theories have highly implausible consequences in the context of deep disagreement. Secondly, at least one epistemic theory of hinge commitments, the entitlement theory, permits optimism about such disagreements. As such, while hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, it doesn’t have to be.

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Senor, Thomas D. "Common Core/Diversity Dilemma, Agatheism and the Epistemology of Religious Belief." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8, no. 4 (December 22, 2016): 213–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v8i4.1764.

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The essay “The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean Thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief” is a bold argument for the irrationality of “first-order” religious belief (that is, the belief that adherents to particular religions have). However, unlike those associated with “New Atheism,” the paper’s authors Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican claim both that there are prospects for rational “second-order” religious belief (a religion-neutral belief in a designer of some sort) and that religious belief and practice can play a positive role in human life. In response to Thornhill-Miller and Millican, Janusz Salamon has argued that first- order religious belief can be rational, although not via the methods that philosophers who have typically defended the reasonability of faith have appealed to. Both papers are fascinating discussions of the epistemology of religious belief in general, and of the rationality of such commitment in light of modern science and religious disagreement in particular. In this paper, I’ll object to a few points made in each essay and argue that neither paper provides good reason to be dubious about the religious belief being rational along traditional lines.

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Peter, Fabienne. "Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism." Journal of Moral Philosophy 10, no. 5 (2013): 598–620. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681033.

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At the core of political liberalism is the claim that political institutions must be publicly justified or justifiable to be legitimate. What explains the significance of public justification? The main argument that defenders of political liberalism present is an argument from disagreement: the irreducible pluralism that is characteristic of democratic societies requires a mode of justification that lies in between a narrowly political solution based on actual acceptance and a traditional moral solution based on justification from the third-person perspective. But why should we take disagreements seriously? This—epistemic question—has not received the attention it deserves so far. I argue that the significance of public justification can be explained through the possibility of reasonable disagreement. In a reasonable disagreement, the parties hold mutually incompatible beliefs, but each is justified to hold the belief they do. I shall use the notion of a reasonable disagreement to explain the possibility of an irreducible pluralism of moral and religious doctrines and, on that basis, why the justification of political institutions has to be public.

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Voracek, Martin, Lisa Mariella Loibl, and David Lester. "Lay Theories of Suicide Among Austrian Psychology Undergraduates." Crisis 28, no. 4 (July 2007): 204–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/0227-5910.28.4.204.

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Lester and Bean's (1992) Attribution of Causes to Suicide Scale gauges lay theories of suicide including intrapsychic problems, interpersonal conflicts, and societal forces as causes. Results obtained with its German form (n = 165 Austrian psychology undergraduates) showed no sex differences and no social-desirability effects. Intriguingly, all three subscales were moderately intercorrelated, thereby indicating respondents' general agreement (or disagreement) with all three theories. Thus, the critical dimension of lay theories of suicide appears to be the belief that suicide has definite causes (regardless of type) versus that it is without causes (unpredictable). In addition, religiosity was positively associated (and overall knowledge about suicide negatively associated) with belief in intrapsychic causes, whereas liberal political views were negatively associated with belief in interpersonal causes.

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Rivers, Julian. "The Question of Freedom of Religion or Belief and Defamation." Religion & Human Rights 2, no. 3 (2007): 113–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187103107x252364.

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AbstractThis note criticises the growing use of the term, 'defamation of religions' in human rights contexts on account of its quasi-legal character, its failure to identify the relevant positive state obligations under human rights instruments, and its tendency to eliminate disagreement about religious matters. Instead, it is suggested that the correct starting point for the engagement of human rights with religion is by way of freedom of religion or belief.

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O’Donovan, Oliver. "Moral Disagreement in Anglican – Roman Catholic Relations." Ecclesiology 17, no. 2 (July 12, 2021): 177–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455316-17020002.

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Abstract The belief that the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches were divided by moral disagreements came to prominence in the early 1980s and affected the direction of ecumenical dialogue. But no moral disagreements go back to the Reformation era, and the perception of moral difference has undergone many changes since that time, especially reflecting differences of social and political setting. A moral agreement or disagreement is difficult to chart with precision. It is not embodied in a formulation of moral doctrine, since moral reason functions on two planes, that of evaluative description and that of deliberation and decision. Disagreement is phenomenologically present as offence, which has its own dynamic of expansion. Addressing offence, a task involving lay, theological and episcopal contributions, is the primary way in which moral agreement has to be sought and defended.

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Audi, Robert. "The Ethics of Belief and the Morality of Action: Intellectual Responsibility and Rational Disagreement." Philosophy 86, no. 1 (December 21, 2010): 5–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819110000586.

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AbstractThe contemporary explosion of information makes intellectual responsibility more needed than ever. The uncritical tend to believe too much that is unsubstantiated; the overcritical tend to believe too little that is true. A central problem for this paper is to formulate standards to guide an intellectually rigorous search for a mean between excessive credulity and indiscriminate skepticism. A related problem is to distinguish intellectual responsibility for what we believe from moral responsibility for what we do. A third problem is how to square intellectual responsibility in retaining our views with the realization that peers we respect disagree with us. Much of the paper is directed to articulating principles for dealing with such disagreements.

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C. B. McLeish, Tom. "Remembering John Polkinghorne: a vision of one world, and one culture." Theology 124, no. 5 (September 2021): 324–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0040571x211043170.

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A personal recollection of gratitude reports on the way that the writings of John Polkinghorne inspired and guided the author’s own thinking in science and theology since meeting him as a graduate student. Themes of both agreement and disagreement are selected from the many to be found in Polkinghorne’s corpus. Closer attention is paid to two of his books, Science and Christian Belief and Faith, Science and Understanding. A running theme is the creative tension of a ‘bottom-up thinker’, one of whose salient and influential arguments was that of ‘top-down causation’. Although there is disagreement over Polkinghorne’s exegesis of divine character in Job, thinking the argument through did bear fruit.

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Dunnington, Kent. "Intellectual Humility and Incentivized Belief." Journal of Psychology and Theology 46, no. 4 (October 28, 2018): 268–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0091647118807173.

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Despite disagreement about what is fundamental or necessary to intellectual humility, there is broad agreement that intellectual humility will bear on the higher-order epistemic attitudes one takes towards one’s beliefs (and other doxastic attitudes). Intellectually humble people tend not to under- or overstate the epistemic strength of their doxastic attitudes. This article shows how incentivized beliefs—beliefs that are held partly for pragmatic reasons—present a test case for intellectual humility. Intellectually humble persons will adopt ambivalent higher-order epistemic attitudes towards their incentivized beliefs. This is important for institutions that incentivize belief with material or social rewards, such as religious institutions that require orthodoxy for membership. The article argues that such institutions cannot simultaneously incentivize orthodox belief and enjoin conviction about such beliefs, unless they are willing to reject intellectual humility as a virtue.

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BALLANTYNE, NATHAN. "Debunking Biased Thinkers (Including Ourselves)." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1, no. 1 (2015): 141–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2014.17.

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ABSTRACT:Most of what we believe comes to us from the word of others, but we do not always believe what we are told. We often reject thinkers’ reports by attributing biases to them. We may call this debunking. In this essay, I consider how debunking might work and then examine whether, and how often, it can help to preserve rational belief in the face of disagreement.

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de Donato Rodríguez, Xavier, and Jesús Zamora Bonilla. "Scientific Controversies and the Ethics of Arguing and Belief in the Face of Rational Disagreement." Argumentation 28, no. 1 (August 6, 2013): 39–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10503-013-9300-4.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Belief-disagreement'

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