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Journal articles on the topic 'Bargaining'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 22 June 2024

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1

Heumann, Milton. "Back to the Future: The Centrality of Plea Bargaining in the Criminal Justice System." Canadian journal of law and society 18, no. 2 (August 2003): 133–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0829320100007754.

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Using Professor George Fisher's wonderful new book, Plea Bargaining's Triumph as a springboard and roadmap for a journey into plea bargaining's past and present status, this brief essay will attempt to build a theory accounting for the centrality of plea bargaining in today's—and tomorrow's—criminal justice system. By looking back, Fisher illuminates the present, and suggests a future for plea bargaining in the disposition of the cases. His analysis ends with “plea bargaining's triumph;” with its emergence as the single most important (and powerful) factor in the disposition of criminal cases. I will applaud, but qualify his arguments and speculate about “plea bargaining's future.” His looking back, led him to conclude that plea bargaining coopted or caused most criminal justice innovations of the past two decades, and that almost anthropomorphically, it emerged victorious. His understanding of the “causes” of plea bargaining's centrality deserves applause along with qualification; his painting of a picture of plea bargaining “victory” is correct, and is fruitfully linked to a future informed by his understanding of a past.First, some general ground rules for what I will and will not do in this essay. I will not systematically or exhaustively summarize Fisher's arguments, nor will I referee the disagreements he surfaced with the respect to the work of many major studies of plea bargaining and its history. Suffice it to say that this is a very careful historical study of the origins of plea bargaining, and that it primarily relies on a very detailed and very, very careful analysis of the court records of Middlesex County, Mass., mostly for cases disposed of in the 19th century. Based on these data, and secondary analyses of data from studies of plea bargaining in other jurisdictions, Fisher builds a theory of the growth of plea bargaining that is sometimes original, always engaging, and inevitably provocative. Though I take issue with some of his arguments, he must be lauded for the care and clarity of his presentation, and for the enormous literature he uses to develop and support his case.

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2

Toit, Pierre Du. "Bargaining about Bargaining." Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 2 (June 1989): 210–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002789033002002.

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3

Philips, Paul. "Theoretical Problems of Public Interest Sector Industrial Relations." Relations industrielles 31, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 566–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/028743ar.

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This paper develops a simple industry bargaing model with explicit consideration of the determinants of the bargaining range and the narrowing of that range over time as a function of perceived bargaining power and costs of settlement. The model is then applied to the public-interest sector under altered assumptions of costs of settlement and the introduction of political influences in the determination of bargaining paths. The impact of third party intervention is considered in both the industry and public-interest sector cases.

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4

Serrano, Roberto, and Rajiv Vohra. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets." Games and Economic Behavior 39, no. 2 (May 2002): 292–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0895.

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5

Forrest, Anne. "Bargaining Units and Bargaining Power." Discussion 41, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 840–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/050264ar.

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6

Majumder, Boivob. "Plea Bargaining — A Comparative Study of India with Foreign Countries." Theory and Practice of Forensic Science and Criminalistics 29, no. 4 (April 18, 2023): 47–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.32353/khrife.4.2022.03.

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Plea bargaining has become more popular as a means of settling court issues all around the world. Plea bargaining’s application, scope, and operation change significantly between common law and civil law regimes. To analyze these differences in regard to different jurisdictions, a comparison between India and the USA (their plea bargaining) has been done in this study. The relative benefits and drawbacks of plea bargaining are up for debate. This is because it is argued that plea bargaining calls into question the primary goals of a trial, which are to establish the truth and uphold justice. It is without dispute that India needs a framework for speedy justice administration. Indian courts are being battered by the rise in criminal cases. Prisons are now overflowing with inmates who are being held without a trial due to the ongoing delays in case resolution. India has developed plea bargaining (as a response to this sad status of the judicial system), which was acknowledged as a trustworthy strategy for concluding open cases and accelerating the criminal justice system. According to the then-Chief Justice of India, Y. K. Sabharwal (2005-2007), the introduction of plea bargaining in India would not only expedite the criminal justice system but also serve as a restorative form of justice where victims would be equal stakeholders and receive sufficient compensation. However, despite years of conceptualization, the Indian criminal justice system has yet to adopt plea bargaining. The paper attempts to research whether plea bargaining in India in its present form and structure is adequate to achieve that goal by weighing its advantages and disadvantages in the context of the Indian judicial system. Given the above, it is proposed to introduce changes to this contemporary dispute resolution mechanism.

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7

Busch, Lutz-Alexander, and Ignatius J. Horstmann. "Bargaining Frictions, Bargaining Procedures and Implied Costs in Multiple-Issue Bargaining." Economica 64, no. 256 (November 1997): 669–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00105.

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8

Johnson, Danette Ifert. "Bargaining simulation: applying bargaining plans and strategies." Communication Teacher 18, no. 2 (April 2004): 57–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1740462042000191937.

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9

Eraslan, Hülya, and Kirill S. Evdokimov. "Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining." Annual Review of Economics 11, no. 1 (August 2, 2019): 443–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025633.

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This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.

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10

Schwarz, Joshua L., Neil W. Chamberlain, and James W. Kuhn. "Collective Bargaining." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40, no. 3 (April 1987): 444. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2523501.

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11

Emerson, Robert M., and Douglas W. Maynard. "Plea Bargaining." Contemporary Sociology 17, no. 1 (January 1988): 64. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2069433.

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12

Krishna, Vijay, and Roberto Serrano. "Multilateral Bargaining." Review of Economic Studies 63, no. 1 (January 1996): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2298115.

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13

Conde, Judith S. "Spanish Bargaining." Hispania 68, no. 3 (September 1985): 690. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/342507.

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14

Dick, Jeffrey C., Carlos A. Guanche, John A. Steubs, Kristin J. Brazier, Sandra J. Hokanson, and Terri J. Wurscher. "Collective Bargaining." Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery-American Volume 82, no. 6 (June 2000): 902. http://dx.doi.org/10.2106/00004623-200006000-00028.

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15

McCollough, Newton C. "Collective Bargaining." Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery-American Volume 82, no. 6 (June 2000): 902. http://dx.doi.org/10.2106/00004623-200006000-00029.

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16

Bronfenbrenner, Kate. "Hard Bargaining." Labour / Le Travail 52 (2003): 361. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25149437.

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17

Gramm, Cynthia, and Charles Craypo. "Collective Bargaining." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40, no. 2 (January 1987): 288. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2523295.

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18

Pennell, Joan. "Consensual Bargaining." Journal of Progressive Human Services 1, no. 1 (January 1990): 59–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/j059v01n01_06.

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19

Marshall, Robert C., and Antonio Merlo. "Pattern Bargaining*." International Economic Review 45, no. 1 (February 2004): 239–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00124.x.

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20

Goldreich, David, and Łukasz Pomorski. "“Initiating Bargaining”." Review of Economic Studies 78, no. 4 (June 9, 2011): 1299–328. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdr009.

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21

Chetrit, Sami Shalom. "Bargaining Chips." Journal of Palestine Studies 38, no. 4 (2009): 117–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2009.38.4.117.

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22

Yildiz, Muhamet. "Walrasian bargaining." Games and Economic Behavior 45, no. 2 (November 2003): 465–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00154-4.

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23

SARGIS, NANCY M. "Collective Bargaining." Nursing Management (Springhouse) 16, no. 2 (February 1985): 30A. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00006247-198502000-00004.

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24

Sutton, John. "Bargaining experiments." European Economic Review 31, no. 1-2 (February 1987): 272–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(87)90040-7.

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25

Raskovich, Alexander. "Ordered bargaining." International Journal of Industrial Organization 25, no. 5 (October 2007): 1126–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.006.

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26

Alberti, Federica, Sven Fischer, Werner Güth, and Kei Tsutsui. "Concession Bargaining." Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 9 (July 31, 2017): 2017–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002717720753.

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We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bargaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely reveal that so far no agreement has been reached, and in the static protocol, no feedback information is given about earlier trials. We find that neither conflict rate nor efficiency or inequality of agreements differs across protocols. Comparing different numbers of maximal trials shows that more trials render conflict more likely due to less concessions.

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27

Lovejoy, William S. "Bargaining Chains." Management Science 56, no. 12 (December 2010): 2282–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1251.

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28

Usher, Dan. "Bargaining unexplained." Public Choice 151, no. 1-2 (November 3, 2010): 23–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9732-4.

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29

Bae, Hyung. "Multitrade bargaining." Journal of Economic Theory 55, no. 1 (October 1991): 213–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90068-f.

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30

Harris, Richard F. "Hard bargaining." Current Biology 18, no. 2 (January 2008): R44—R45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2007.12.032.

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31

Frankel, David M. "Creative Bargaining." Games and Economic Behavior 23, no. 1 (April 1998): 43–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0620.

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32

Shudra, Tamar. "Collective Bargaining." Journal of Contemporary Law 1, no. 1 (November 10, 2019): 139–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.31578/jcl.v1i1.39.

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The Association Agreement concluded in 2014 by and between the European Union and theEuropean Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, on the one part, and Georgia onthe other part, obliges Georgian Government to respect, promote and realize in its law andpractice the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. The research aims atemphasizing the main aspects promoting the effective recognition of the right to collectivebargaining.The research highlights the necessity of establishing the notion of “extension” of a collectiveagreement and stating the mandatory and voluntary issues of collective bargaining on thestatutory level, as an effective means for protecting employees’ interests. Additionally, theresearch considers the mechanism of collective bargaining as a token of the commonwealth andthe economic stability of the country and evaluates its impact on the prevention and settlement ofcollective disputes. Consequently, it is aimed at detecting the shortcomings of the presentGeorgian law and to propose possible ways of improvement

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33

Sohail, Mahreen. "Plea Bargaining." Pleiades: Literature in Context 43, no. 2 (September 2023): 167. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/plc.2023.a913052.

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34

Feng, Zhongwei, Fangning Li, and Chunqiao Tan. "Alternating-Offers Bargaining with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns." Behavioral Sciences 13, no. 2 (February 1, 2023): 124. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/bs13020124.

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The Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game is reconsidered, where players show fairness concerns and their fairness references are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution. The objective of this paper is to explore the impact of fairness concerns in the alternating-offer bargaining game. Alternating-offer bargaining with fairness concerns is developed. We construct a subgame perfect equilibrium and show its uniqueness. Then, it is shown that players’ payoffs in the subgame perfect equilibrium are positively related to their own fairness concern coefficient and bargaining power and negatively to the opponents’ fairness concern coefficient. Moreover, it is shown that the limited equilibrium partition depends on the ratio of discount rates of the two players when the time lapse between two offers goes to zero. Finally, the proposed model is applied to the bilateral monopoly market of professional basketball players, and some properties of equilibrium price are shown. Our result provides the implication that players should carefully weigh their own fairness concerns, bargaining power and fairness concerns of their opponents, and then make proposals, rather than simply follow the suggestion that the proposal at the current stage is higher than that at the past stages.

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35

Xiao, Jun. "Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game." Games and Economic Behavior 107 (January 2018): 364–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.001.

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36

Jacobsen, John G. "Plea Bargaining's Triumph: A History of Plea Bargaining in America." History: Reviews of New Books 31, no. 4 (January 2003): 143–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.2003.10527475.

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37

Vivoda, Vlado. "Bargaining Model for the International Oil Industry." Business and Politics 13, no. 4 (December 2011): 1–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1384.

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This paper establishes a model for analyzing the dynamics of the host state-international oil company (IOC) bargaining relationship. Theoretically, the model advances our ability to investigate bargaining dynamics between host states, oil companies and other stakeholders in the oil industry. It is a sophisticated mechanism which identifies the complex array of relationships and bargains within which the host state-IOC bargaining relationship is nested. The model builds on and leverages the key contributions of earlier bargaining models. It enables us to integrate relevant ideas from existing scholarship on host state-MNC bargaining while also taking into account other actors and bargains at domestic and international levels that affect bargaining between an IOC and a host state. Practically, the model will help actors choose strategies more systematically, leading to higher relative bargaining power that may translate to preferable bargaining outcomes.

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38

Nakai, Teruhisa. "Bargaining game with asymmetric information about a bargaining power." Journal of Information and Optimization Sciences 25, no. 2 (May 2004): 255–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02522667.2004.10699606.

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39

Suh, Sang-Chul, and Quan Wen. "Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution." Journal of Mathematical Economics 42, no. 1 (February 2006): 61–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.06.001.

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40

Schmitz, Patrick W. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach." Economics Letters 119, no. 1 (April 2013): 28–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.011.

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41

Urbanavičienė, Vita, Artūras Kaklauskas, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas, Jūratė Šliogerienė, Jurga Naimavičienė, and Nikolay Ivanovich Vatin. "FACILITATING THE HOUSING BARGAINING WITH THE HELP OF THE BARGAINING DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM." International Journal of Strategic Property Management 18, no. 3 (September 18, 2014): 213–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/1648715x.2014.933137.

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More than 90 percent home buyers today rely on the Internet as one of their primary research sources and real estate related searches continually grows. Internet helps buyers to find and select bigger number of right homes for sale in a shorter time, so provides more alternatives for bargaining. The bargaining is an inseparable part of the home buying and selling process. However, housing bargaining mostly is conducted face-to face, so there is a growing need for facilitating the housing bargaining and conducting such bargaining on the Web with the help of the systems. The article describes the developed Real-Time Housing Multiple Criteria Bargaining Decision Support System, based on multiple-criteria mathematical methods, which helps to improve the efficiency of bargaining through the following functions: search for housing alternatives; formulation of the initial comparative table of alternatives; multiple criteria analysis of housing alternatives and negotiation tactics; determination of the most useful home option for buying; presentation of recommendations and real-time determination of a home's market value; e-bargaining using templates of bargaining e-mails generated by the system.

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42

Ma, Xiaogang, Chunyu Bao, and Lin Su. "Analysis of Complex Dynamics in Different Bargaining Systems." Complexity 2020 (July 1, 2020): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8406749.

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This paper focuses on the bargaining behavior of supply chain members and studies the stability of the bargaining system. There are two forms of bargaining in the process of negotiation. One is separate bargaining, and the other is that the automobile manufacturers form an alliance and bargain with the supplier collectively. We explore the influence of bargaining power and adjustment speed on the stability of the dynamic system and find that both of the factors need to be small to maintain the stability of the supply chain. After comparing the two forms of bargaining in terms of profits and stable regions, we find that the collective bargaining is a pattern with the existence of risk and benefit simultaneously. In order to control chaos in collective bargaining to lower the risk, we adopt the delay feedback control method. With the introduction of the control factor, the system tends to be stable finally.

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43

Utset, Manuel A. "Time-Inconsistent Bargaining and Cross-Commitments." Games 14, no. 3 (April 28, 2023): 38. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g14030038.

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The paper studies bargaining games involving players with present-biased preferences. The paper shows that the relative timing of bargaining rewards and bargaining costs will determine whether the players’ present-bias will affect bargaining outcomes. In cases where players agree to a bargain in period 1 and experience all bargaining payoffs in period 2, the players will act in a time-consistent fashion. When time-inconsistent players incur immediate bargaining costs to produce delayed rewards, they will have an incentive to procrastinate. On the other hand, when players receive immediate bargaining rewards and incur delayed costs, they will have incentives to agree to bargains too soon and to agree to inefficient bargains. The paper shows that the players’ awareness of their own and the other player’s present-biased preferences will determine whether they engage in repeated time-inconsistent bargaining. A naïve player who engages in time-inconsistent bargaining will suffer welfare losses. We show that time-inconsistent bargaining can also create spillover welfare losses for other players. A time-consistent player who is counterparty-naïve about the other player can suffer spillover welfare losses that can be higher than those incurred by the time-inconsistent player. As a result, counterparty-sophisticated players will have an incentive to use cross-commitment devices to reduce the likelihood of spillover welfare losses. The paper also shows that cross commitment devices that target immediate payoffs dominate cross-commitments that target delayed payoffs. Finally, the paper shows that time-inconsistent bargaining can lead to inefficient delays in agreeing to bargains and in exiting bargaining relationships.

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44

Sloan, Judith. "The Economic Implications of Enterprise Bargaining." Economic and Labour Relations Review 4, no. 1 (June 1993): 27–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/103530469300400102.

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The economic implications of enterprise bargaining depend critically on the precise version of enterprise bargaining being contemplated. One version sees enterprise bargaining as an add-on process, with the existing bank of awards retained, and trade unions playing a central and protected role. Another version sees enterprise bargaining as an holistic process, wherein all terms and conditions of employment can be negotiated subject to some minimum conditions. Trade unions may play some role, but not to the exclusion of other bargaining agents. Add-on enterprise bargaining may have only a small impact on productivity; there is a danger that wage (and price) inflation could increase; and the impact on employment is uncertain. Holistic enterprise bargaining is likely to have a more substantial impact on productivity; is unlikely to lead to inflation; and employment growth should be boosted. However, power-reducing policies and the abolition of awards are necessary correlates of holistic enterprise bargaining.

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45

Li, Jiawei, Tianxiang Cui, and Graham Kendall. "Equilibrium in a Bargaining Game of Two Sellers and Two Buyers." Mathematics 10, no. 15 (July 30, 2022): 2705. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math10152705.

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The uniqueness of equilibrium in bargaining games with three or more players is a problem preventing bargaining theory from general real world applications. We study the uniqueness of bargaining equilibrium in a bargaining game of two sellers and two buyers, which has instances in real-world markets. Each seller (or buyer) wants to reach an agreement with a buyer (or seller) on the division of a pie in the bargaining game. A seller and a buyer will receive their agreed divisions if they can reach an agreement. Otherwise, they receive nothing. The bargaining game includes a finite number of rounds. In each round, a player can propose an offer or accept an offer. Each player has a constant discounting factor. Under the assumption of complete information, we prove that the equilibrium of this bargaining game is the same division of two pies. The ratio of division as a function of the discount factors of all players is also deduced. The result can be extended to a bargaining game of n-sellers and n-buyers, which reveals the relevance of bargaining equilibrium to the general equilibrium of a market.

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46

Gehrig, Thomas, René Levínský, and Werner Güth. "On the Value of Transparency and Information Acquisition in Bargaining*." German Economic Review 17, no. 3 (August 1, 2016): 337–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12101.

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Abstract We analyze how transparency affects information acquisition in a bargaining context where proposers may choose to purchase information about the unknown outside options of their bargaining partners. Although information acquisition is excessive in all scenarios, we find that bargaining outcomes depend crucially on the transparency of the bargaining environment. In transparent games, when responders can observe whether proposers have acquired information, acceptance rates are higher. Accordingly, in transparent bargaining environments, information is more valuable, both individually and socially.

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47

Zhang, D., and Y. Zhang. "An Ordinal Bargaining Solution with Fixed-Point Property." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 33 (November 30, 2008): 433–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.2656.

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Shapley's impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more than two agents, none of the well known bargaining solutions are ordinal. Searching for meaningful ordinal solutions, especially for the bilateral bargaining problem, has been a challenging issue in bargaining theory for more than three decades. This paper proposes a logic-based ordinal solution to the bilateral bargaining problem. We argue that if a bargaining problem is modeled in terms of the logical relation of players' physical negotiation items, a meaningful bargaining solution can be constructed based on the ordinal structure of bargainers' preferences. We represent bargainers' demands in propositional logic and bargainers' preferences over their demands in total preorder. We show that the solution satisfies most desirable logical properties, such as individual rationality (logical version), consistency, collective rationality as well as a few typical game-theoretic properties, such as weak Pareto optimality and contraction invariance. In addition, if all players' demand sets are logically closed, the solution satisfies a fixed-point condition, which says that the outcome of a negotiation is the result of mutual belief revision. Finally, we define various decision problems in relation to our bargaining model and study their computational complexity.

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48

Slinn, Sara, and Mark Rowlinson. "Bargaining Sectoral Standards: Towards Canadian Fair Pay Agreement Legislation." Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 39 (November 7, 2023): 78–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/wyaj.v39.8297.

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In response to the need for more inclusive collective bargaining legislation to combat inequality and improve conditions in the workplace, this paper considers the recently introduced New Zealand Fair Pay Agreement [FPA] sectoral bargaining framework and offers a preliminary series of ideas and proposals setting out how an FPA model for bargaining sectoral standards could work in Canada. It is intended as the beginning of a more detailed discussion on the development of an FPA regime culminating in model legislation that could be adapted to different Canadian jurisdictions. Guided by principles of accountability, integration, and inclusivity, this proposal is intended to apply to all workers in an employment relationship – including dependent contractors and gig and platform workers. The proposed system is to be structured as a new, stand-alone statute, drawing upon existing institutions administering collective bargaining legislation, incorporating some familiar collective bargaining concepts: good faith bargaining, dues check-off, and unfair labour practice protection. It is intended to preserve existing collective bargaining arrangements by excluding specified sectors with existing high union density or existing sectoral bargaining. However, it is also intended to offer a new, sectoral bargaining option based on industry or occupation sectors, producing FPA “sector agreements” containing minimum standards applying to all employees and employers in the sector. This proposed framework would operate in parallel and in conjunction with the existing enterprise-level collective bargaining system.

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49

Keune, Maarten. "Inequality between capital and labour and among wage-earners: the role of collective bargaining and trade unions." Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 27, no. 1 (February 2021): 29–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10242589211000588.

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In the context of rising inequality between capital and labour and among wage-earners in Europe, this state-of-the-art article reviews the literature concerning the relationship between collective bargaining and inequality. It focuses on two main questions: (i) what is the relationship between collective bargaining, union bargaining power and inequality between capital and labour? and (ii) what is the relationship between collective bargaining, union bargaining power and wage inequality among wage-earners? Both questions are discussed in general terms and for single- and multi-employer bargaining systems. It is argued that collective bargaining coverage and union density are negatively related to both types of inequality. These relationships are however qualified by four additional factors: who unions represent, the weight of union objectives other than wages, the statutory minimum wage, and extensions of collective agreements by governments.

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50

Hebdon, Robert, and Maurice Mazerolle. "Regulating Conflict in Public Sector Labour Relations." Articles 58, no. 4 (March 23, 2004): 667–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/007821ar.

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Abstract Using a comprehensive collective bargaining data set, we examine dispute resolution patterns of all bargaining units in the province of Ontario over a 10-year period. A central finding is that bargaining units covered by legislation requiring compulsory interest arbitration arrive at impasse 8.7 percent to 21.7 percent more often than bargaining units in the right to strike sectors. Even after controlling for legislative jurisdiction, union, bargaining unit size, occupation, agreement length, time trend, and part-time status, strong evidence was found that compulsory arbitration has both chilling and dependence effects on the bargaining process. The problem of failure to reach negotiated settlements is particularly acute in the health care sector, especially among hospitals. Our results also call into question the use of interest arbitration in a central bargaining context. The centralized structure appears to exacerbate the negative effects of interest arbitration.

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