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Kohnz, Simone. "Bargaining Impasse." Diss., lmu, 2006. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-49705.
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Muthoo, Abhinay. "Bargaining theory." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.257214.
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Wu, Hanji. "Finite Bargaining Problems." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/econ_diss/32.
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Bargaining is a process to decide how to divide shared resources between two or more players. And axiomatic bargaining specifies desirable and simple properties the outcome of the bargaining should satisfy and identifies the solution that produces this outcome. This approach was first developed by John Nash in his seminal work(Nash 1950). Since then, numerous studies have been done on bargaining problems with convex feasible set or with non-convex but comprehensive feasible set. There is, however, little work on finite bargaining problems. In this dissertation, we study finite bargaining problems systematically by extending the standard bargaining model to the one consisting of all finite bargaining problems. For our bargaining problems, we first propose the Nash, Maximin, Leximin, Maxiproportionalmin, Lexiproportianlmin solutions, which are the counterparts of those that have been studied extensively in both convex and non-convex but comprehensive problems. We then axiomatically characterize these solutions in our context. We next introduce two new solutions, the maximin-utilitarian solution and the utilitarian-maximin solution, each of which combines the maximin solution and utilitarian solution in different ways. The maximin-utilitarian solution selects the alternatives from the maximin solution that have the greatest sum of individuals’ utilities, and the utilitarian-maximin solution selects the maximin alternatives from the utilitarian solution. These two solutions attempt to combine two important but very different ethical principles to produce compromised solutions to bargaining problems. Finally, we discuss several variants of the egalitarian solution. The egalitarian solution in finite bargaining problems is more complicated than its counterpart in either convex or non-convex but comprehensive bargaining problems. Given its complexity in our context, we start our inquiry by investigating two-person, finite bargaining problems, and then extend some of the analysis to n-person, finite bargaining problems. Our analysis of finite bargaining problems and axiomatic characterizations of the extensions of various standard solutions of convex/non-convex but comprehensive bargaining problems to finite bargaining problems will shed new light on the behavior of these solutions. Our new solutions will expand our understanding of the bargaining theory and distributive justice from a different perspective.
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Nabarro, Joseph Jonathan Nunes. "Good faith in bargaining." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.304397.
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Christiansen, Nels Peter. "Essays on Legislative Bargaining." The Ohio State University, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1243969494.
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Ozkardas, Ahmet. "Essays on wage bargaining." Thesis, Paris 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA010079.
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Cette dissertation de doctorat développe des contributions importantes à la littérature sur la négociation salariale. Nous introduisons des taux d’actualisation variant dans le temps pour les modèles de négociation salariale afin de modéliser des situations réelles d’une manière plus précise. Dans le Chapitre 1, nous présentons les objectifs principaux de cette dissertation. Dans le Chapitre 2, nous offrons un bref aperçu de la littérature sur les modèles de négociation, plus précisément des modèles de négociation salariale. Nous rappelons les approches axiomatiques et stratégiques des modèles de négociation et étudions en détail l’approche stratégique des modèles de négociation salariale. Dans le Chapitre 3, nous étudions le modèle de négociation salariale avec des préférences qui varient dans le temps. Tout d’abord, nous analysons les équilibres en sous-jeu parfait dans le modèle, d’autre part, nous déterminons les gains d’équilibre en sous-jeux parfaits des parties. Par ailleurs, nous étudions les équilibres inefficaces dans le modèle. Dans le Chapitre 4, nous étudions quelques extensions du modèle de négociation salariale généralisé. Premièrement, nous analysons les négociations salariales avec les actions de “go-slow” et étudions les gains d’équilibre en sous-jeux parfaits. Par ailleurs, nous étudions un modèle de négociation salariale où la firme a l’option de “lockouts”. Dans le Chapitre 5, nous appliquons les modèles de négociation de salaires généralisés aux problèmes de la vie réelle, comme les négociations de prix. Dans le Chapitre 6, nous présentons les conclusions et donnons de nouvelles perspectives à nos recherches futuresThis Ph.D. dissertation develops important contributions to the literature on wage bargaining. We introduce discount rates varying in time to the wage bargaining models in order to model real life situations in a more accurate way. In Chapter 1, we state the main objectives of this dissertation. In Chapter 2, we deliver a brief literature overview of bargaining models, more precisely wage bargaining models. We recall axiomatic and strategic approaches to bargaining and then describe in details strategic approach to wage bargaining models. In Chapter 3, we investigate the wage bargaining model with preferences varying in time. First, we analyze subgame perfect equilibria in the model and then determine the subgame perfect equilibria payoffs of the parties. Furthermore, we study the inefficient equilibria in the model. In Chapter 4, we investigate some extensions of the generalized wage bargaining model. First, we analyze wage bargaining with the go-slow actions of the union and study the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. Next, we investigate a wage bargaining model where the firm has the lockout option. In Chapter 5, we apply the generalized wage bargaining models to real life problems, such as price negotiations. In Chapter 6, we present conclusions and give new insights to our future research
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Gómez, Natalia González. "Three essays on bargaining : On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution; On inter- and intra-party politics; A bargaining model with strategic generosity." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2012. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/56815/.
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This dissertation is a collection of three essays that share one common feature: all three of them relate to the literature on Bargaining. The first and second essay are joint work with my supervisor, Professor Andrés Carvajal. In our first essay we investigate the testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution. We develop polynomial tests of the NBS under different hypothesis about the default levels. For instance, with, and without observation from the outside econometrician of the levels of utility that the individuals would have obtained outside the negotiation. We use the Tarski-Seindenberg algorithm to characterize rationalizable data as those that satisfy a finite system of polynomial inequalities. In our second essay we introduce a new equilibrium concept for games of political competition. We model electoral competition within each party, assuming inner-party members have somewhat conflicting preferences. By using the bargaining protocol à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989) we explicitly model party members’ strategic interactions, their incentives and their decision of whom to elect. Our equilibrium concept attempts to model each member’s decision as if each player were uncertain about, (i) the faction that will eventually dominate the decision made by the other party and (ii) the faction that will dominate in the party’s nomination. In the last essay I focus on one of the classical problems in bargaining: the divide the dollar problem. In our framework we assume players’ utility functions mirror selfish and Rawlsian preferences. We derive the set of subgame perfect equilibria for different arrangements of player types and study why strategic generosity emerges under the bargaining protocol we assume.
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Sung, Hankyoung. "Essays on veto bargaining games." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1149696640.
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Segendorff, Björn. "Essays on bargaining and delegation." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S), 1998. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-666.
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This dissertation consists of three essays. Essay 1: Delegation and Threat in Bargaining.Two principals ("nations") appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. Here authority means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of the principals deciding on the provisions simultaneously (autarchy). The high-authority equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the low-authority equilibrium and it may even be dominated by autarchy. Essay 2: Delegation of Bargaining and Power.Two principals simultaneously appoint one agent each and decide how much power to give to their agents. The agents' task is to bargain over the provision of a public good. Power here means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals delegate to agents that are relatively disinterested in the public good and give them all power. The fact that both principals have the possibility to delegate is, in equilibrium, harmful to at least one of them. The equilibrium may even be Pareto dominated by the outcome under autarchy. Essay 3: Labor- and Product-Market Structure and Excess Labour.This study analyzes under what labor- and product-market structures a firm may hire more labor than needed to produce its profit maximizing output. Three labor-market structures are studied: (1) decentralized (firm-specific unions), (2) one-sided centralization (central union and several firms), and (3) centralized (central union and employers' association). Excess labor is explained by the risk-sharing motive that in the model exists between the risk-averse workers and the risk-neutral firm owner. Labor may be excessively hired in any of the labor-market structures and under a wide range of product-market structures; duopoly, oligopoly etc.Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1998
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Pichler, Eva. "Union Wage Bargaining and Status." Inst. für Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 1991. http://epub.wu.ac.at/6281/1/WP_8.pdf.
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The paper investigates the nexus between the structure of union wage bargaining and workers' preferences for status, which is measured by relative wages. For two types of workers it is shown that due to externalities on the other group's status wages of both types of workers will be lower if an encompassing union negotiates for the whole workforce than if different groups of workers are unionized separately. Moreover, unemployment will be reduced by the central union relative to separate negotiations even if unions are not concerned with employment effects of wage negotiations at all.Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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Andersson, Ola. "Bargaining and communication in games /." Lund: Univ., Dep. of Economics, 2008. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/56139136X.pdf.
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Outram, Q. "A model of wage bargaining." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.383842.
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Alaste, T. (Tomi). "Models of two-person bargaining." Master's thesis, University of Oulu, 2017. http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-201706062590.
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The purpose of the thesis is to present some theoretical studies on bargaining situations. The thesis concentrates on existing research on the subject, and we do not present any new results. A central aim of the thesis is in describing how different factors present in real life bargaining situations can be taken into account in theoretical models of bargaining. It is our intention to use these models to obtain some information about effects of these factors in bargaining situations. In addition, another central element of the thesis is in describing relationships between different models. The studied models are kept deliberately elementary to provide clear analyses.
We use axiomatic and strategic models to study bargaining situations. Axiomatic method is very general as it does not deal with any particular bargaining process. Instead, these models concentrate solely on the outcome of a bargaining situation. A weakness with axiomatic models is that it might be difficult to evaluate how accurately the assumptions made describe some particular bargaining process. In the thesis, we concentrate mostly on Nash bargaining solution and its properties. Strategic models studied in the thesis include the game of alternating offers and several variations of this game. The main purpose of these variations is to describe what kind of effects different factors present in bargaining situations have on bargaining. The models studied deal with such factors as uncertainty, inside options, outside options, commitment tactics, and incomplete information. We determine the subgame perfect equilibria of models of complete information and sequential equilibria of models of incomplete information.
The most important results of the work are Nash bargaining solution and Rubinstein’s solution to an infinite horizon model of alternating offers. Nash bargaining solution has been extremely important for the development of theoretical research on bargaining, since it is the first systematic study of bargaining situations and has had a significant impact on all later research. This solution is also closely connected to strategic models, as certain limits of solutions of several strategic models are given by Nash solution. This interplay between strategic and axiomatic models is of considerable importance: these models provide information about applicability and limitations of different models and one methods helps to understand the other. Another key result in the thesis is deriving Rubinstein’s solution to an infinite horizon model of the game of alternating offers. This result is also of considerable importance, since this proof involves first determination of subgame perfect equilibrium of an infinite horizon model. Similar arguments have been applied to solve a large number of different models, some of which we also consider in the thesis.
The thesis concentrates on theoretical models of bargaining. We have chosen to deal with elementary models, with an intention to provide clear analysis of these models, instead of general or complex models. In particular, we have chosen the models such that each one of them illustrates some particular element in bargaining situations. This means that all the models treated in the thesis can be generalized, and many interesting models can be generated by combining elements from the models studied. We present some applications of bargaining situations in economics, but the studied models can be applied to a much larger variety of economics problems.
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Even, Jozef Harmen. "Transnational Collective Bargaining in Europe." [S.l.] : Rotterdam : [De Auteur] ; Erasmus University Rotterdam [Host], 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13755.
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Aceves, Gabriela. "An analysis of plea bargaining." CSUSB ScholarWorks, 1992. https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/744.
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Skipton, Susan Margaret. "Collective bargaining and pay equity : a study of pay equity bargaining in two Canadian provinces." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1995. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/4190/.
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The aim of this study was to explore the interrelationship between collective bargaining and pay equity. A qualitative case study methodology was used. Eighty-six interviews were conducted with union and management pay equity negotiators, labour lawyers, Pay Equity Commission Review Officers, and other informants. A collection of documentary evidence supplemented these interviews. The empirical work focused on explaining issues of structure, style and power in pay equity bargaining and the complex intertwinings of the structural properties of gender and class were considered crucial to an explanation of these. The key structural dynamic in the negotiation of pay equity was found to be the degree and effectiveness of a labour-feminist politic combined with employer/state commitment, which are themselves interconnected and represent the transformative face of gender and class power relations. The thesis, in providing a theoretically informed discussion of detailed case study material, contributes towards the debate on the effectiveness of collective bargaining as a vehicle for implementing equal pay policy. It also informs the debate on labour-management cooperation in labour relations, especially in public sector collective bargaining. Because legislated pay equity is bargained within a new set of legal parameters, the study may also aid our understanding of the relationship between collective bargaining and the law. Finally, the thesis attempts to unravel the interwoven complexities of gender and class power relations in the collective bargaining process.
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Even, J. H. "Transnational Collective Bargaining in Europe : a proposal for a European regulation on transnational collective bargaining /." Rotterdam : Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13755.
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Spence, Alan Robert. "Collective bargaining in Washington community colleges /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/7772.
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Grgurevic, Ana. "Plea bargaining in Montenegro : an examination of the workings of the current system of plea bargaining." Thesis, University of Portsmouth, 2017. https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/plea-bargaining-in-montenegro(440631e6-3e29-4009-8ad1-f1ac0717aea0).html.
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The present criminal justice systems face challenges in the modern world characterized by the development of new technologies, fast communication, and the interconnection of different and distant parts of the world; in simple terms the challenges of the Earth becoming “a global village.” This causes crime to be more complex and to grow, and consequently criminal justice systems are being burdened with new types of problems. In this context, systems are forced to try to deal with criminal cases in a more efficient and faster way, to define priorities and look for alternatives to the classical trial which requires significant time, effort and resources. One of these alternative ways is plea agreements, or as is more commonly said plea bargaining. This legal instrument is present in its different forms in a number of national legal systems, as well as in international law. This work deals with its development, application and potential future in Montenegro. First, the key features and principles of plea bargaining as a legal institution are presented in this work, demonstrating its strongest and most complex presence in the United States as the country of its origin, but also in other countries and in international law. After that, the thesis deals with the development, regulation, as well as the extent of the presence of plea bargaining practices in Montenegro, at the same time providing a comparison with two neighboring counties, Serbia and Croatia. Furthermore, through a number of interviews conducted with Montenegrin prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges as the main actors in this process, the thesis focuses on discovering how the practice functions in reality, and what hides behind the relatively simple legal provisions that regulate this issue. After identifying the key, very interesting, issues that emerge from practical experience, the thesis presents the relevant implications for the future, and a number of related conclusions and recommendations.
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Conti, Barbara A. "A comparative analysis of four model states in teachers' negotiations : Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut /." Access Digital Full Text version, 1994. http://pocketknowledge.tc.columbia.edu/home.php/bybib/11624395.
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Thesis (Ed.D.)--Teachers College, Columbia University, 1994.Includes tables and appendices. Typescript; issued also on microfilm. Sponsor: Jonathan T. Hughes. Dissertation Committee: Margaret Terry Orr. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 159-163).
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Adamuz, Peña Mercedes. "Essays on Bargaining with Outside Options." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/4059.
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Los modelos de negociación con opciones exteriores normalmente suponen que los pagos de estas opciones son independientes de las acciones que los negociadores toman durante el proceso negociador. Sin embargo, en muchos contextos, la opción exterior depende de lo que las partes hagan durante la fase negociadora. Uno de estos contextos es el de aquellas negociaciones que se llevan a cabo en presencia de un árbitro. Esta tesis realiza algunas contribuciones a la teoría de la negociación con opciones exteriores, enfatizando aquellas situaciones donde las opciones exteriores aparecen por la intervención de árbitros.En el capítulo 2 analizo los efectos del arbitraje en las negociaciones cuando su uso es voluntario. Considero un modelo de negociación por concesiones donde las partes tienen la posibilidad de llamar a un árbitro con el consentimiento del oponente. Demuestro que la introducción del arbitraje distorsiona el resultado de la negociación. Esta distorsión depende de los costes relativos de implementar una partición mediante un proceso negociador versus un proceso arbitral. Si los costes del arbitraje son pequeños en relación a los costes de la negociación, entonces la partición negociada se aproxima a la propuesta por el árbitro, y en casos extremos el arbitraje es utilizado en equilibrio. Sin embargo, los jugadores no eligen siempre el método más eficiente de resolver su disputa: a veces negocian cuando es más eficiente acudir al arbitraje.
En el capítulo 3 estudio los efectos de diferentes procedimientos arbitrales en el resultado de una negociación, en un modelo donde los jugadores realizan demandas no crecientes y el árbitro es llamado solo cuando las negociaciones se declaran rotas. Dos procedimientos arbitrales son analizados: el arbitraje convencional, donde el árbitro es libre de elegir su acuerdo y el arbitraje de oferta final, donde el árbitro está obligado a elegir una de las últimas ofertas de los jugadores. Demuestro que si los jugadores son suficientemente pacientes y el árbitro sigue un procedimiento de oferta final, en equilibrio, los jugadores negocian una partición pero toma algún tiempo llegar a ella. Sin embargo, si el árbitro sigue un procedimiento convencional, en equilibrio los jugadores utilizarán esta institución para resolver su disputa.
Finalmente, en el capítulo 4 discuto el papel que juegan las opciones exteriores inciertas en las negociaciones cuando existe información incompleta acerca de su existencia. Examino una guerra de desgaste donde los jugadores disfrutan de información privada acerca de sus posibilidades de dejar la mesa de negociación para tomar una opción exterior. Hay dos tipos de jugadores: los tipos débiles, que no tienen opciones exteriores y prefieren conceder que salirse del juego, y los tipos fuertes que tienen opciones exteriores tales que prefieren salirse que conceder. El principal mensaje que surge del análisis de este juego es que la incertidumbre acerca de la posibilidad de que el oponente se vaya, mejora la eficiencia porque incrementa la probabilidad de concesión. Más precisamente, si la probabilidad de que el oponente sea fuerte es relativamente alta, la negociación acaba con una concesión segura. En el otro extremo, si la probabilidad de que el oponente sea débil es alta, los tipos fuertes dejarán en algún momento el juego con probabilidad igual a 1, dejando a los débiles jugando, desde ese momente en adelante el ineficiente equilibrio de la guerra de desgaste clásica. Incluso en este caso, la probabilidad de concesión a lo largo de la fase de incertidumbre del juego se incrementa.
Models of bargaining with outside options usually assume that the payoffs resulting from the outside options are independent of the actions taken by bargainers during the negotiation process. However, in many negotiation contexts, the outside option does depend on what the parties have done during the negotiation phase. One such context is that of negotiations in presence of a third party, an arbitrator. This thesis makes several contributions to the theory of bargaining with outside options, emphasizing situations in which outside options arise by the intervention of arbitrators.
Chapter 2, analyzes the effects of arbitration in negotiations when the use of this institution is voluntary. We consider a bargaining by concessions model where the parties have the possibility of calling an arbitrator with the consent of the other party. I show that introducing arbitration distorts the negotiated outcome. This distortion depends on the relative costs of implementation of the partition obtained by negotiating and the one obtained by arbitrating. If the arbitration cost is small relative to the cost of negotiation then the negotiated partition approximates the one proposed by the arbitrator, and in extreme cases arbitration is used in equilibrium. However players do not always choose the most efficient method to solve their dispute: sometimes they negotiate when it would be more efficient to use arbitration.
Chapter 3 studies the effects of different arbitration procedures on the bargaining outcome and its efficiency, in a bargaining model where players make non-increasing demands and an arbitrator is called if and only if negotiations are declared broken. Two arbitration procedures are analyzed: the conventional arbitration (CA) where the arbitrator is free to choose a settlement and the final-offer arbitration (FOA) where the arbitrator is constrained to pick one of the players' last offers. I show that, if players are sufficiently patient and the arbitrator follows a Final-Offer Arbitration procedure, the equilibrium negotiated outcome may involve some delay. But if he follows a Conventional Arbitration procedure, in equilibrium, players always use the arbitrator to solve the dispute.
Finally, chapter 4 discusses the role played by the outside options in negotiations when there is incomplete information about their existence. I examine a War of Attrition where players enjoy private information about their possibility of leaving the negotiation to take an outside option. There are two types of players: a weak type who has a valueless outside option-she always prefers conceding rather than opting out- and a strong type who has a valuable outside option that she prefers to take rather than conceding. The main message that emerges from the analysis of this game is that uncertainty about the possibility that the opponent opts out improves efficiency, since it increases the equilibrium probability of concession. More precisely, if the probability that the opponent is strong is relatively high, in equilibrium, the negotiation eventually ends with a sure concession. On the other extreme, if the likelihood of a weak opponent is high, strong types will eventually leave the negotiation and opt out with probability 1 leaving weak types to play from that time on the inefficient symmetric equilibrium of the classical War of Attrition. Even in this case, the probability of concession along the uncertainty phase of the equilibrium play increases.
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Jimenez-Martin, Sergi. "Bargaining about wages: evidence from Spain." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7358.
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Throughout all the chapters we have considered some union variables (particularly the proportion of workers representatives belonging to a given union) to capture any difference in bargaining power amongst unions.Concerning wage increases, we have not found any systematic difference amongst them in chapter 4 and we have found that regional unions obtain lower increases in chapter 5. Concerning wage levels (chapter 3) we have found that the variable representing the UGT union is associated with lower wage and higher employment levels. Jointly, they seem to suggest that the CCOO union adds more pressure to the bargaining process than other unionsThe effect of the strike variables on wage outcomes have been considered throughout chapters 3 (on wage levels) and 5 (on wage increases).In both chapters the set of strike variables have been found relevant (being the services wage equation an exception). However, whilst for services theestimated effect is of the same sign, for the manufacturing evidence is contradictory. In particular, for the latter sector, wage increase analysis suggests a negative relationship among wage increases and strike length. Onthe contrary, wage levels analysis suggests a positive relationship. Our suggestion for further work is to consider more carefully the specification of the set of strike variables, specially strike costs.As major conclusions on the wage setting process in Spain we would like to stress the implicit sequential bargaining structure and the extreme importance of aggregate setting. The first step of the implicit sequence is the wage increase setting, closely linked to aggregate setting (industry orupper) and to the achievement of the indexation clause. The second step, in which there is the bargaining over wage complements and the compensation for the expected productivity increase, is more closely related to the performance of the firm.Finally, we would like to remark that aggregate factors have a much greater influence in wage setting than the specific conditions of the firm.This structure can have several consequences. For instance, in an economy with null or small labour force mobility (as in Spain) the pressure of unit labour cost will squeeze out of the market, sooner or later, a significant number of firms.
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Kunimoto, Takashi. "Essays on bargaining, contracts, and implementation /." View online version; access limited to Brown University users, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3174630.
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Sanner, Helge. "Bargaining structure and regional unemployment insurance." Universität Potsdam, 2001. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2007/1370/.
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We examine the effects of regionalising the budget of unemployment insurance (UI) on wages, employment, and on UI parameters, which, for their part, determine the agents’ preferences concerning such a reform. A numerical example shows that, under reasonable assumptions, the intuition that the reform would enhance efficiency and improve the economic situation of agents from the low- unemployment region to the disadvantage of agents from the high- unemployment region is not valid in general.
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Torstensson, Pär. "Essays on bargaining and social choice /." Lund: Univ., Dep. of Economics, 2004. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/539443395.pdf.
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Weiss, Nicholas. "Dynamic Bargaining Agreements Between Three Players." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1018.
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This paper modifies the two-player Rubinstein bargaining game to include a third player. Analyzing the game through a dynamic model provides parametric changes that cause a longer negotiation period and fewer concessions from each player’s initial demand upon an agreement. The introduction of a free rider problem and limited computational abilities cause these consequences with the addition of a third player. The free rider problem discourages players from conceding their demands and since players have limited strategic abilities, the additional player requires more effort for players to understand the game and thus more time to understand the environment enough to reach an agreement.
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Flamini, Francesca. "Three essays on sequential bargaining theory." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.246388.
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Poulsen, Anders Udo. "Essays on evolutionary models of bargaining." Thesis, University of Essex, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.343583.
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Bartolini, David. "Essays on externalities and multilateral bargaining." Thesis, University of Essex, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.435556.
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Tsoy, Anton. "Essays in bargaining and auction theory." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/101517.
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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2015.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
This dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 studies an infinite-horizon bilateral bargaining model with alternating offers and private correlated values. I characterize frequent-offer limits of common screening equilibria in which both parties make offers to screen the opponent's type, and all types of either party follow the same path of offers. Even in the limit when the correlation of values is nearly perfect, common screening equilibria exhibit two-sided screening dynamics and involve inefficient delay in contrast to the unique equilibrium outcome of the complete-information bargaining game. Segmentation equilibria, in which types partially separate themselves into segments by the initial offer, are also constructed. Most of the types in the segments trade in the first rounds, while types near the boundaries of the segments delay trade to convince the opponent that they belong to a segment with more favorable terms of trade. Segmentation equilibria are efficient in the limit as the correlation of values becomes nearly perfect, and establish the connection between the limit outcome of nearly perfect correlation and the complete information outcome. The model sheds light on the relative importance of various sources of inefficiency for different levels of correlation, the role of public and private information in bargaining, and the robustness of the complete information bargaining model to higher-order uncertainty about values. In Chapter 2, I analyze two frictions that are central to determine prices, liquidity, and efficiency in over-the-counter markets: the search friction reflected in how long it takes to find a trading opportunity and the bargaining friction reflected in how promptly gains from trade are realized once the opportunity is identified. Chapter 2 captures both frictions by introducing an asset-specific trade delay into a standard search-and-bargaining model. For both exogenous and endogenous specifications of delay, the set of traded assets and the dependence of asset prices and spreads on default risk, liquidity, and market conditions are determined in equilibrium. The proposed model with endogenous delay has several implications. First, it offers a novel testable prediction: for assets within the same credit rating class, the liquidity is U-shaped in quality. Assets closer to the extremes of the quality range are more liquid, while assets in the middle of the quality range may be not traded at all. This is in contrast with a monotone relation in models with asymmetric information. Second, this model shows that the reduction in search and bargaining frictions may have opposite effects on market liquidity which is reflected in the range of traded assets. Finally, it establishes a connection between market uncertainty about the asset payoff and market liquidity. This link sheds light on the role of transparency in over-the-counter markets and explains the occurrence of dried-up liquidity and flights-to-quality during periods of increased market uncertainty. Chapter 3 studies efficient and optimal auction design where bidders do not know their values and solicit advice from informed but biased advisors via a cheap-talk game. When advisors are biased toward overbidding, we characterize efficient equilibria of static auctions and equilibria of the English auction under the NITS condition (Chen, Kartik and Sobel (2008)). In static auctions, advisors transmit a coarsening of their information and a version of the revenue equivalence holds. In contrast, in the English auction, information is transmitted perfectly from types in the bottom of the distribution, and pooling happens only at the top. Under NITS, any equilibrium of the English auction dominates any efficient equilibrium of any static auction in terms of both efficiency and the seller's revenue. The distinguishing feature of the English auction is that information can be transmitted over time and bidders cannot submit bids below the current price of the auction. This results in a higher efficiency due to better information transmission and allows the seller to extract additional profits from the overbidding bias of advisors. When advisors are biased toward underbdding; there is an equilibrium of Dutch auction that is more efficient than any efficient equilibrium of any static auction, however, it can bring lower expected revenue.
by Anton Tsoy.
Ph. D.
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Cuellar, Tapia Pablo Francisco. "Bargaining and the hold-up problem." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2014. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/131305.
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Magíster en Economía AplicadaIngeniero Civil Industrial
En este trabajo se estudia un modelo de negociación secuencial entre dos agentes a la Rubinstein. La principal innovación presentada es la endogenización del protocolo de negociación y del monto a repartir en cada ronda. En el modelo, al principio de cada periodo, los jugadores pueden esforzarse para incrementar el monto disponible, lo que si bien es privadamente costoso, aumenta la probabilidad de manejar la agenda de negociación en el periodo. Este trabajo caracteriza la dinámica de la negociación y las ineficiencias en equilibrio perfecto en subjuegos. Los principales resultados son los siguientes. Primero, se caracteriza la dinámica de la creación de los beneficios del proyecto. Se muestra que esta consiste de una fase de construcción pura del monto a repartir, en la cual los jugadores se esfuerzan aun cuando la negociación no llegará a su fin, y de una fase de repartición, en la cual los jugadores llegarán a acuerdo y el juego termina. Los agentes ejercen esfuerzo a pesar de que la negociación no terminará porque prefieren hacerlo crecer hasta un monto mayor para luego dividirlo y obtener una ganancia más grande. Segundo, conforme avanza la negociación, los jugadores van ejerciendo un esfuerzo mayor hasta llegar al máximo posible. Hay dos efectos que motivan la realización de esfuerzo, el primero es que no es rentable tener periodos en que no haya crecimiento del monto a repartir porque esto implica una ineficiencia causada por el costo temporal, la cual es mayor a medida que el monto a repartir es más grande. El segundo es la posibilidad de manejar la agenda de negociación, lo que entrega un beneficio mayor al hacerlo, el cual se va incrementando a medida que crece el monto a repartir. En los primeros periodos en que se llega a acuerdo domina el primer efecto porque el beneficio extra por manejar la agenda no es tan grande en comparación con el costo del esfuerzo, no obstante a medida que el monto a repartir aumenta, el beneficio de ser quién controla la negociación también se incrementa, lo que lleva a que el segundo efecto sea mayor. Por último, el tercer resultado es que el monto final que se reparte es menor que el deseable socialmente. La intuición es que el jugador que maneja la agenda sabe que en periodos futuros enfrentará competencia, lo que significa que para volver a ser quien controla la negociación tendrá que incurrir nuevamente en un costo. Además existe un problema de Hold-Up debido a que el jugador que maneja la agenda no puede asegurar que los beneficios por el esfuerzo realizado le pertenezcan en futuras rondas. Esto genera que el agente prefiera asegurar su pago periodos antes de lo socialmente deseable, decidiendo llegar a acuerdo.
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Yea, Sangjun. "Essays in Information Economics and Bargaining." The Ohio State University, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1555650435996658.
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Yu, Zhixian. "Bargaining and contribution games with deadlines." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50610/.
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This thesis considers play in bargaining games subject to Endogenous Commitment and in contribution games with a sunk cost. In bargaining games, Endogenous Commitment (EC) describes a common feature in negotiation: once an offer is made, neither would the proposer offer nor would the respondent accept anything worse. Similarly, in contribution games, the notion of sunk cost implies an irrevocability similar to EC: it is impossible for either contributor to reduce his or her contribution, so far as the cost is sunk. Another similarity between the bargaining and contribution games in our thesis is that we assume (most of) them to be finite, meaning that there is a deadline effect: when approaching the deadline, the final negotiator/contributor has a stronger incentive to reach an agreement/complete the project. The deadline effect puts the final negotiator/contributor in a relatively weaker position. With these two similarities, the bargaining and contribution games in our thesis share some similar features. In the first chapter, we conduct a literature review. In the second chapter, we study two player alternating finite/infinite bargaining games with Endogenous Commitment. In both cases, the outcomes are affected by the assumption of EC. In the third chapter, we apply Endogenous Commitment in bargaining games with protocols involving uncertainty. The settlement timings then exhibit a U-shaped pattern: players reach an agreement at the first or the last stage of the game. In the fourth chapter, we turn to contribution games with sunk cost and heterogeneous valuations. We show that a minor difference in valuation could affect the total welfare significantly. In our thesis, we adopt several settings in all chapters. As all models include two players, we refer to player 1 as male and to player 2 as female for convenience. When no specific player is referred to, we use i and j to indicate the two players, assuming i to be male and j to be female. When player 1 makes an offer (in bargaining games) or makes a contribution (in contribution games) in stage t (t\in[1,2,...T], T is the length of the game), we denote it as x_{t}; and when player 2 does so, we denote it as y_{t}. Similarly, we denote player i's and player j's choice as m_{t} and n_{t}.
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Wolitzky, Alexander. "Essays on bargaining and repeated games." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/65496.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2011.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 194-202).
The thesis consists of four essays on bargaining and repeated games. The first essay studies whether allowing players to sign binding contracts governing future play leads to reputation effects in repeated games with long-run players. Given any prior over behavioral types, a modified prior is constructed with the same total weight on behavioral types and a larger support under which almost all efficient, feasible, and individually rational payoffs are attainable in perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Thus, whether reputation effects emerge in repeated games with contracts depends on details of the prior distribution over behavioral types other than its support. The second essay studies reputational bargaining under the assumption of first-order knowledge of rationality. The share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself is determined, as is the bargaining posture that she must announce in order to guarantee herself this much. It is shown that this maxmin share of the surplus is large relative to the player's initial reputation, and that the corresponding bargaining posture simply demands this share plus compensation for any delay in reaching agreement. The third essay studies the maximum level of cooperation that can be sustained in sequential equilibrium in repeated games with network monitoring. The foundational result is that the maximum level of cooperation can be sustained in grim trigger strategies. Comparative statics on the maximum level of cooperation are shown to be highly tractable. For the case of fixed monitoring networks, a new notion of network centrality is introduced, which characterizes which players have greater capacities for cooperation and which networks can support more cooperation. The fourth essay studies the price-setting problem of a monopoly that in each time period has the option of failing to deliver its good after receiving payment. Optimal equilibrium pricing and profits are characterized. For durable goods, a lower bound on optimal profit for any discount factor is provided. The bound converges to the optimal static monopoly profit as the discount factor converges to one, in contrast to the Coase conjecture.
by Alexander G. Wolitzky.
Ph.D.
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Wells, Dominic. "From Collective Bargaining to Collective Begging: State Expansion and Restriction of Collective Bargaining Rights in the Public Sector." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1522790947706508.
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Chan, Yin-chiu. "The absence of collective bargaining legislation in Hong Kong : an examination of its impact on public sector employees /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1999. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B21038193.
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Qotoyi, Thanduxolo. "Dismissals within the context of collective bargaining." Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/1039.
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Competitive forces in the market force employers to change the way they operate their businesses. The changes that employers have to make often demand an alteration of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. By law employers are not permitted to unilaterally effect changes to the employee’s terms and conditions of employment. They have to obtain the consent of the affected employees. This is where collective bargaining fits in. The employer has to negotiate with the employees. One way in which through the process of collective bargaining an employer can exert pressure on the employees to accept the changes is to effect a lock-out. Under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 within the context of a lock-out, an employer was permitted to use conditional dismissal as a bargaining weapon. This conditional dismissal had to be coupled with an offer of reemployment should the employees accept an employer’s demand. In essence, the lock-out had a bite in the form of the conditional dismissal. This made the lock-out quite effective. The 1995 Labour Relations Act prohibits in no uncertain terms the use of a dismissal as a means of compelling employees to accept an employer’s demand in any matter of mutual interest. Within the collective bargaining context, dismissal is not a legitimate option. The employer only has the lock-out as a tool of compulsion. The definition of a lock-out in terms of this Act does not accommodate the use of dismissal. This makes the lock-out option to be less potent than it was under the 1956 Labour Relations Act. However, employers are permitted to dismiss on operational grounds, provided that they follow a fair procedure. Terms and conditions of employment greatly feature in the operational requirements of a business. If the employees’ terms and conditions of employment are not responsive to the operational requirements of the business and they are unwilling to accept changes to those terms, the employer has the right to dismiss them. The employer will not be dismissing the employees as a way of inducing them to accept the changes. He will instead be dismissing them on the basis of operational requirements. iv The question that then arises is how should a dismissal that is intended to compel employees to accept an employers demand (falling within section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 Labour Relations Act be distinguished from a dismissal that is genuinely based on operational requirements as contemplated by section 188(1)(a)(ii). Doesn’t the fact that section 187(1)(c) explicitly prohibits the use of dismissal within the context of collective bargaining give rise to some tension with section 188(1)(a)(ii) which categorically gives employers the right to dismiss on operational grounds. The decision of the Labour Appeal Court in Fry’s Metals v NUMSA has stated that there is no tension whatsoever between the two sections. The court has also ruled that the dismissals that are hit by section 187(1)(c) are those dismissals that are accompanied by an offer of reemployment. According to the court, this offer is indicative of the real purpose of the employer, namely to compel employees to accept his demand. Dismissals not accompanied by an offer of re-employment are on the other hand a true reflection of the fact that the employer is indeed dismissing the employees for operational requirements. This literal interpretation of the meaning and scope of section 187(1)(c) has the potential of opening the floodgates. Instead of resorting to the use of the lock-out to secure the agreement of employees in the collective bargaining process, employers now have a potent tool in the form of a dismissal. As long as the employer makes it abundantly clear that the dismissal is final and irrevocable, he is free from the claws of section 187(1)(c). Given the fact that the lock-out option is not always effective, employers may find it hard to resist the temptation to use the threat of permanent dismissal as a bargaining chip. It is an option that is emasculated by the fact that in an employer initiated lock-out the use of replacement labour is prohibited. The threat of not just a conditional dismissal but a permanent one may force employees to capitulate to the employer’s demand during negotiations. This would effectively render negotiations about changes to terms and conditions of employment a farce. The employer would have an upper hand. The implications of this narrow interpretation are quite far-reaching. The long held view that dismissal is not a legitimate weapon of coercion in the collective bargaining process is under serious challenge. Only conditional dismissals are illegitimate in the collective bargaining v arena. Permanent dismissals are permitted. This negates the very purpose of the collective bargaining process. This study seeks to examine the anomalies that flow from this interpretation of the meaning of section 187(1)(c). The study further investigates if this interpretation is not at odds with what the legislation really intended to achieve by enacting this clause. The study also explores ways in which the sanctity of collective bargaining could be restored. Recommendations are made to that effect.
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Colebrook, Peter. "Collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/32244.
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This study examines collective bargaining in 14 unionized community colleges in British Columbia. It provides a broad overview of bargaining in the colleges and insights into the tensions commonly associated with collective bargaining. The study combines qualitative data and quantitative data through the use of interviews, contractual analysis and two questionnaires. One survey examined the opinions of board members, senior administrators and faculty leaders on various aspects of collective bargaining. The latter included the competitive characteristics of distributive bargaining, governance, the scope of the collective agreements and a number of proposed modifications aimed at improving bargaining in the colleges. The study is significant as it fills a void in the research related to the above issues in British Columbia's colleges.
The literature review encompassed a wide range of research. This included material related to the evolution of collective bargaining in higher education; factors that influence opinions of bargaining; constructive conflict, destructive conflict and dysfunctional competition; conflict resolution techniques associated with bargaining; and integrative bargaining.
The study revealed a competitive collective bargaining climate in the colleges, characterized by such factors as a
lack of trust and respect, inexperienced faculty negotiators, contractual constraints and a lack of bargaining priorities. The competitive climate was aggravated by a number of external factors (government policies); internal factors (the management style of a president); the composition of the faculty associations (combined vocational and academic faculty associations); and personal factors (age and political preferences). In terms of governance issues, the scope of the collective agreements and their political orientation, the board members and the senior administrators are essentially from the same population. The faculty leaders come from a different population. The respondents favour modifications that would enhance communications, training, and equal access to information, as well as the resolution of labour matters at the local level rather than at the provincial level.
Distributive bargaining will likely remain the cornerstone of negotiations in British Columbia's colleges. Although it does not have to be as competitive as it is, the distributive model appears to be best suited to the resolution of Level I issues, e.g. salaries, benefits. Given the collegial traditions of higher education, the varying professional needs of the faculty, the issue of management rights and the intrinsic values of the parties involved, a more collaborative model of bargaining is necessary to accommodate Level II issues. The latter include faculty participation in college governance, peer evaluation, and the selection of other
faculty. The study contributed to the research literature and produced a number of recommendations for practice.Education, Faculty of
Graduate
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Archibald, Thomas. "Improving Patient Safety Through Nurse Collective Bargaining." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/36169.
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Nursing workload and time worked are two key working conditions tied to the risk of adverse events and medical error. In Canada at the provincial level, these issues, which I call “patient safety issues”, are raised, negotiated and ultimately resolved within collective bargaining structures that are based on traditional “Wagnerist” labour law theory. I reviewed the results of decisions on patient safety issues within fifteen years of nurse collective bargaining in six of the thirteen provinces/territories. My findings are that patient safety issues of workload are inadequately addressed in nurse collective agreements, but at the same time these agreements contained strong patient safety-driven protections relating to time-worked issues of scheduling, hours of work and overtime. I further conclude that these limitations can be attributed to a series of trends in the process of nurse collective bargaining that tended to limit the ability of nurses’ unions to push for patient safety protections and more generally to marginalize patient safety issues in the bargaining process in favour of more traditional economic issues. To overcome these problems, I propose that patient safety issues in nursing be decided instead in locally-based “patient safety committees” instead of in the current traditional labour law model.
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Kasirye, Ibrahim. "Intrahousehold bargaining and welfare outcomes in Uganda." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2011. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/intrahousehold-bargaining-and-welfare-outcomes-in-uganda(32a3fd52-7ed1-4a21-b66b-856f4d7fd6c1).html.
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This thesis investigates the impacts and determinants of unequal gender relations within households in Uganda. The first topic addressed is the impacts of intrahousehold bargaining power on female agricultural labour supply in Uganda. There have been relatively few studies in Africa and Uganda in particular on this very important issue—mainly due to lack of appropriate data. I have accessed and used a unique merged cross-section dataset that combines individual women’s information and household level indicators of agricultural production. The 2005/06 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) and Uganda Demographic and Health Survey (UDHS) merged cross-sectional dataset for the first time captured indicators of women’s status within households and at the same time captured detailed agricultural data—especially relating to: labour allocation, types of agricultural activities, and nature of crop production—whether cash crops or food crops. Our results indicate that women with greater bargaining power contribute more to agricultural production and any continued gender discriminations is bound to affect agricultural production negatively. With regard to coffee production—Uganda’s leading cash crop, we find that increasing household coffee crop activities are also associated with reducing female labour allocation to agricultural production. The second topic adopts an ordinary least squares and marginal probit approaches in examining the impacts of female bargaining power on multi dimensional indicators of household health in the context of a country with very poor indicators of health status like Uganda. We use a sample of 6,600 children aged less than 5 years and 4,700 married women from two cross sectional surveys in 2000/1 and 2006 to examine how female bargaining power impacts on children’s anthropometric outcomes; children’s use of vaccination services; a woman’s nutritional status; and woman’s use of reproductive health services. We find that bargaining power as measured by an index for a couple’s relational indicators has minimal impacts on either children’s or women’s health status. Instead, it is mainly indicators of household welfare status that matter most—despite the presence of free public health care in Uganda. The third topic of the thesis examines female empowerment, as captured by participation in decision-making in the context of a country with strong patriarchal gender norms, such as Uganda. We use a sample of 9,800 married women from two cross-sectional surveys in 2000/1 and 2006, who were asked, “Who has the final say?” with respect to four major household decisions: the woman’s own health; large household purchases; and daily household purchases; and visiting family or relatives. These data allow us to shed light on whether the characteristics for empowerment are similar across different domains of decision-making and the extent to which cultural norms, as captured by ethnicity, constrain female empowerment in Uganda. We find that graduating from secondary school and ethnicity proxies are significantly related to empowerment in different domains. Furthermore, our results are a robust to choice of empowerment indicator used.
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Scarpa, Carlo. "Industry regulation when firms have bargaining power." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.305013.
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Hawkins, A. J. O. "Bargain justice : plea bargaining and negotiated punishment." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.603865.
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Plea bargaining is frequently regarded as a deeply troublesome phenomenon. A negative view of plea bargaining is widely held, yet seems often to be little more than received knowledge. With this in mind, this dissertation reassesses plea bargaining to ask whether in some circumstances, the process might in fact be justifiable, or at least preferable to the traditional model of trial which it subverts; and if so, under what conditions. It also examines the dynamics of the bargaining process, and how these are shaped, in order to ask whether there are any aspects of plea bargaining as negotiation which could be developed to make this form of criminal case resolution more just and acceptable. Part One provides a theoretical picture of the plea bargain. An introductory chapter suggests two useful outlooks on plea bargaining as an instance of dispute handling, and as a negotiated process. Chapter Two takes an external perspective, locating negotiation within the ecology of disputing processes more generally. Chapter Three moves to an internal perspective, in order to examine the actual dynamics of plea bargaining decision-making. Part Two turns to the outcome, process, and organisational values of plea bargaining. Amongst other things, the discussion addresses various pervasive critiques of the practice, such as that it results in like cases being treated differently; that it is coercive; and that it is a mere vehicle of efficiency. A third and final part (Chapter Eight) draws some conclusions about plea bargaining. I suggest that plea bargaining may in fact be justifiable in some circumstances, and offer some prescriptions for the satisfactory running of systems of negotiated justice (many of which are pertinent whether plea bargaining is officially favoured or not). I also comment on themes emerging from the thesis which are larger than the particular issue of plea bargaining, such as informality and discretion within criminal justice systems, and the need for theoretical synthesis of existing empirical research relevant to a given phenomenon.
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Onaran, Özlem. "Distribution and globalization. A wage bargaining model." Inst. für Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2005. http://epub.wu.ac.at/1054/1/document.pdf.
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This paper develops a model of distribution to analyze the effects of neoliberal globalization on labor in the developing countries. Distribution is determined via wage bargaining by workers, price setting by firms, and improvements in productivity. The full model has the nature of a Post-Keynesian conflicting claims model for an open economy under the pressure of globalization. The conflict inflation is extended to an open economy case with imported inputs, where the pass through effect of the depreciation of the local currency also becomes important. The variables that reflect the macroeconomic effects of globalization are modeled as parameters that affect the bargaining power of labor on two levels: the first group is related with the interaction with the global economy, i.e. international trade, and FDI. The second is about the domestic fiscal and monetary policy variables, which are particularly related to the specific form that globalization takes in the era of neoliberalism, i.e. government expenditures, and the interest rate. Then the model is solved for distribution of income, i.e. the wage share, thus a reduced form of the model is obtained, which is estimated in a companion paper to test whether the change in the international and domestic macroeconomic environment has affected the decline the labor's share. (author's abstract)Series: Working Papers Series "Growth and Employment in Europe: Sustainability and Competitiveness"
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Grandner, Thomas. "A note on franchising and wage bargaining." Inst. für Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2004. http://epub.wu.ac.at/840/1/document.pdf.
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A franchise contract relocates distributable rent between franchisor and franchisee. With decentralized wage bargaining this modifies the position of the union in wage bargaining. If the rent is relocated to the franchisor completely, then even a strong union is not able to raise the wage above reservation level in the franchisee's firm. If franchisor and franchisee negotiate on rent division, there is an incentive to increase franchise fee with the consequence that franchisee's wage is pushed down. Therefore the overall rent assigned to labor depends on the differences of labor intensity in the franchisor's and franchisee's firm. Firm owners may be able to transfer distributable rents from a firm with a strong union to one with a weak union. Additional a franchising contract shows up a first mover advantage. The franchising contract is placed before wage bargaining, benefiting the franchisor. (author's abstract)Series: Working Papers Series "Growth and Employment in Europe: Sustainability and Competitiveness"
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Horn, Carlos Henrique Vasconcellos. "Collective bargaining in Brazilian manufacturing, 1978-95." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.406088.
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Delgado, Maria Jose Herrero. "A strategic bargaining approach to market institutions." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.241655.
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Breccia, Adriana. "Essays on bargaining, valuation and strategic behaviour." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.413412.
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Jary, Stephen John. "Trade union organisation and new technology bargaining." Thesis, University of Southampton, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.280960.
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Kerscher, Martin. "Plea bargaining in South Africa and Germany." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/80257.
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Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2013.Bibliography
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Plea bargaining describes the act of negotiating and concluding agreements in the criminal procedure. Usually the prosecutor and the accused agree that the accused will plead guilty to the charge brought against him in exchange for some concession from the prosecution. The bargain is not limited to the presented subject. Agreements can contain the non-prosecution or reduction of charges, specific terms of punishment, conditions of probation and much more. In many countries the vast majority of criminal cases are disposed by way of bargaining. Plea bargaining breaches with the concept of a conventional trial and consequently clashes with well-known fundamental principles of the criminal procedure. Moreover, bargaining before criminal trials strongly implicates the constitutionally secured rights of the accused as well as of the public interest. Although plea bargaining is broadly criticized for its implications on essential rules and principles, the use of the practice is widespread. There are clear benefits to the participant, such as to avoid a lengthy trial with an uncertain outcome. South Africa, as a legal system with roots in the common law, adopted the procedure in 2001 with the implementation of s 105A into the Criminal Procedure Act. The German legislature in 2009 decided to regulate what until then had been informal practice by inserting several rules into the German criminal procedure, amongst which s 257c contains the main provisions. The implementation of bargains into the German law has produced tensions particularly due to the inquisitorial basis of the criminal procedure that stands in civil law tradition. This thesis evaluates how South African and German provisions on plea bargaining differ, i.e., on which different backgrounds they are based on, how the bargain procedures are construed and to what extent statutory plea bargaining in both legal systems displaces informal traditional agreements. The comparison is enriching under the aspect that both countries implemented the bargain procedure but had to place them on fundamentally different grounds. Having presented the grounds that motivated the research (Chapter I.), the origins of plea bargaining in general as well as the legal development toward the present statutory provisions in both countries are examined (Chapter II.). The bargain procedures are compared in detail (Chapter IV.). A large part focuses on particular problem areas and how both legal systems cope with them (Chapter V.). The result of the research is summarized in a conclusion (Chapter VI.).
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Pleitonderhandeling kan beskryf word as die proses van onderhandel en die aangaan van ooreenkomste in die strafproses. Die vervolging en die verdediging sal gewoonlik ooreenkom dat die beskuldigde skuldig sal pleit in ruil vir een of meer toegewings deur die vervolging. Ooreenkomste kan insluit die nie-vervolging of vermindering van klagte, spesifieke aspekte van vonnis, voorwaardes van parool en talle meer. In ‘n hele aantal lande word die oorgrote meerderheid van sake afgehandel by wyse van pleitooreenkomste. Dit is egter duidelik dat pleitooreenkomste in konflik is met die konsep van ‘n gewone verhoor en is gevolglik ook in konflik met van die grondbeginsels van die strafprosesreg. Dit raak ook die grondwetlike regte van beskuldigdes en die belange van die samelewing. Ten spyte van hierdie kritiek en meer, is die praktyk van pleitonderhandeling wydverspreid. Daar blyk besliste voordeel te wees vir die deelnemende partye, byvoorbeeld die vermyding van lang verhore met onsekere beslissings. Suid-Afrika (met ‘n sterk gemeenregtelike tradisie) het die praktyk van pleitonderhandeling formeel en per statuut in 2001 aanvaar, met die aanvaarding en invoeging van artikel 105A in die Strafproseswet, 1977. Die wetgewer in Duitsland het in 2009 besluit om die informele praktyk van pleitonderhandeling te formaliseer met die invoeging van sekere bepalings in die Duitse strafproseskode. Hierdie invoeging het sekere spanning veroorsaak in die Duitse strafproses, veral weens die inkwisitoriese tradisie in daardie jurisdiksie. Hierdie tesis evalueer die Suid-Afrikaanse en Duitse benaderings tot pleitonderhandelinge, hoe dit verskil, die verskillende regskulturele kontekste waarbinne dit plaasvind, en die mate waartoe pleitonderhandeling in beide sisteme informele ooreenkomste vervang het. Die vergelykende ondersoek bevind dat beide stelsels die pleitooreenkoms ingestel het, maar dit moes doen mvn fundamenteel verskillende gronde. Hoofstuk I (die motivering vir die studie), word gevolg deur ‘n historiese ondersoek (Hoofstuk II). Die verdere hoofstukke fokus op die regsvergelykende aspekte en die gevolgtrekkings word in Hoofstuk VI uiteengesit.
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Carvalho, Luís. "Three essays on game theory and bargaining." Doctoral thesis, NSBE - UNL, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11851.
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A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and EconomicsEquilibrium Outcomes of Repeated Two-Person Zero-Sum Games - We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games. We show that even when players have different discount factors (in which case the repeated game is not a zero-sum game), an outcome is subgame perfect if and only if all of its components are Nash equilibria of the stage game. This implies that in all subgame perfect equilibria, each player's payoff is equal to his minmax payoff. In conclusion, the competitive nature of two-player zero-sum games is not altered when the game is repeated.
A Constructive Proof of the Nash Bargaining Solution - We consider the classical axiomatic Nash bargaining framework and propose a constructive proof of its solution. On the first part of this paper we prove Nash’s solution is the result of a maximization problem; on the second part, through the properties of maximand’s indifference curves we derive that it must be equal to xy.
Equilibria and Outcomes in Multiplayer Bargaining - Multiplayer bargaining is a game in which all possible divisions are equilibrium outcomes. This paper presents the classical subgame perfect equilibria strategies and analyses their weak robustness, namely the use of weakly dominated strategies. The paper then develops a refined equilibrium concept, based on trembling hand perfection, in order to overcome such weakness. Concluding that none of the classical equilibrium strategies survives the imposition of the extra robustness and, albeit using more complex strategies, the equilibrium outcomes don't change.