Journal articles: 'Bargaining success'

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O'Brien, Kevin J. "Bargaining Success of Chinese Factories." China Quarterly 132 (December 1992): 1086–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000045549.

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Many scholars have analysed bargaining between supervisory bureaucracies and Chinese large and medium-sized factories. Walder identified a web of informal, semi-bureaucratic relationships that structures negotiations over revenues, payments and subsidies. Granick and Tidrick pointed out that divided bureaucratic control increases the parties to bargaining, while conflicting interests present opportunities to play supervisors off against each other. Huang found collusive behaviour that occurs when local government agencies and firms rob the state treasury by increasing central subsidies and reducing central exactions in exchange for fees that go directly to local coffers. Numerous authors have noted that the focus of bargaining has shifted from material to financial transfers and have used (or questioned using) Kornai's “soft budget constraint” to explain the persistence of bargaining since the onset of reform.

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Bailer, Stefanie. "Bargaining Success in the European Union." European Union Politics 5, no. 1 (March 2004): 99–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116504040447.

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Lundgren, Magnus, Stefanie Bailer, Lisa M. Dellmuth, Jonas Tallberg, and Silvana Târlea. "Bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone." European Union Politics 20, no. 1 (November 27, 2018): 65–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116518811073.

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This article provides a systematic assessment of bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone 2010 to 2015. Theoretically, we develop an argument about preferences and institutions as determinants of bargaining success and contrast this argument with an alternative account privileging states’ power resources. Empirically, we conduct a statistical analysis of new data covering all key reform proposals. Our findings are three-fold. First, contrary to a conventional narrative of German dominance, the negotiations produced no clear winners and losers. Second, while power resources were of limited importance, holding preferences that were centrist or close to the European Commission favored bargaining success—particularly when adoption only required the support of a qualified majority. Third, these descriptive and explanatory results reflect dynamics of compromise and reciprocity.

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Fuller, Jack W. "Collective Communications: A Model for Bargaining Success." Community College Review 15, no. 1 (July 1987): 54–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009155218701500108.

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Arregui, Javier, and Robert Thomson. "States' bargaining success in the European Union." Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 5 (August 2009): 655–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760902983168.

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Butler, Michael J. "Learning from Success and Failure." International Negotiation 24, no. 3 (August 6, 2019): 523–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718069-24031206.

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Abstract The various contributions to this special issue reveal three overarching insights with respect to negotiation and mediation in the hard(est) cases: one, the discrepancy between securing negotiated or mediated agreements and actual solutions; two, the conditioning effects of structural and contextual considerations on the bargaining process; and three, the divergent ends to which negotiation and mediation can be (and are) directed. Ultimately, the preceding analyses suggest that, when it comes to the hard(est) cases, negotiation and mediation are best thought of as tools within a larger toolkit, which have a markedly better chance of succeeding when they are employed in an environment amenable to them. On their own, negotiation and mediation cannot be effective in cultivating ripeness in such cases. Rather, the challenge at hand is to employ other means to transform the context enveloping the bargaining environment in ways that are conducive to negotiated and mediated solutions.

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Putthiwanit, Chutinon, and Shu-Hsun Ho. "BUYER SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN BARGAINING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES." Australian Journal of Business and Management Research 01, no. 05 (December 17, 2011): 83–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.52283/nswrca.ajbmr.20110105a10.

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This study aims to investigate the process of buyers’ subsequent attitudes and subsequent actions and their relationships depended on the bargaining outcomes. Depth interviews were employed in order to explore the success, the failure, and the consequent actions in dyadic bargaining under the condition of one buyer and one seller. Ten international respondents were invited to be interviewed. Approximately one hour of each interview is taken, while English is the medium of the interviews. After the interviews, respondents were given five USD as an incentive. The results show that successful bargainers tended to be younger people and easterner, compared to unsuccessful bargainers who tended to be older people and westerner. When buying product in computer and vehicle category, it might provide higher chance in getting the discount, while buying product in garment category gave the partial tendency to win the bargain. Since garment seems to have fewer profit margins when compared to the other category like computer or vehicle, it thus is obligatory for the seller to avoid discounting this kind of product. During the interviews, author found that confident interviewees shared their successful bargaining experiences; whereas, interviewees with very calm and quiet attitude seemed to express about their unsuccessful bargaining stories. This research also provides insights of buyer as bargainer profoundly. It therefore helps the seller, especially in computer, garment, and vehicle industry, knows how to balance mutual-interest and maintain the strong relationship with customer.

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Mariano, Nathan, and Christina J. Schneider. "Euroscepticism and bargaining success in the European Union." Journal of European Public Policy 29, no. 1 (November 3, 2021): 61–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1991985.

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Haag, Maximilian. "Bargaining power in informal trilogues: Intra-institutional preference cohesion and inter-institutional bargaining success." European Union Politics 23, no. 2 (December 19, 2021): 330–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/14651165211064485.

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Informal trilogue meetings are the main legislative bargaining forum in the European Union, yet their dynamics remain largely understudied in a quantitative context. This article builds on the assumption that the negotiating delegations of the European Parliament and the Council play a two-level game whereby these actors can use their intra-institutional constraint to extract inter-institutional bargaining success. Negotiators can credibly claim that their hands are tied if the members of their parent institutions hold similar preferences and do not accept alternative proposals or if their institution is divided and negotiators need to defend a fragile compromise. Employing a measure of document similarity (minimum edit distance) between an institution's negotiation mandate and the trilogue outcome to measure bargaining success, the analysis supports the hypothesis for the European Parliament, but not for the Council.

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Bade, Marco. "Bargaining over crowdfunding benefits." Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy 7, no. 2 (July 9, 2018): 166–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jepp-d-18-00009.

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Purpose Crowdfunding creates multifaceted benefits for different agents who all desire to extract some of these benefits. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the allocation of crowdfunding benefits among crowdfunders, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists. Design/methodology/approach The present paper develops a multi-stage bargaining model with a double-sided moral hazard. Findings It is demonstrated that higher entrepreneurial bargaining power vis-à-vis the crowd may not always be beneficial for the venture. Most importantly, this is due to the reduced success probability of crowdfunding resulting from higher bargaining power of the entrepreneur. Bargaining power and the value of outside options determine the equilibrium allocation of crowdfunding benefits, expected venture value, and thus expected wealth of all agents. Practical implications Entrepreneurs face a tradeoff between venture quality gains and worse outcomes from crowdfunding campaigns. Crowdfunding success and thus venture quality gains are the ultimate goal of policy makers if they aim to enhance the overall social welfare. Originality/value This paper is the first to investigate how multifaceted crowdfunding benefits are allocated between the crowd, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists. The paper furthers the development of an appropriate regulatory framework for crowdfunding by depicting new and original effects related to crowdfunding.

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Bagwell, Kyle, Robert W. Staiger, and Ali Yurukoglu. "Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 12, no. 3 (July 1, 2020): 72–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20170574.

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This paper empirically examines recently declassified tariff bargaining data from the GATT/WTO. Focusing on the Torquay Round (1950–1951), we document stylized facts about these interconnected high-stakes international negotiations that suggest a lack of strategic behavior among the participating governments and an important multilateral element to the bilateral bargains. We suggest that these features can be understood as emerging from a tariff bargaining forum that emphasizes the GATT pillars of MFN and multilateral reciprocity, and we offer evidence that the relaxation of strict bilateral reciprocity facilitated by the GATT multilateral bargaining forum was important to the success of the GATT approach. (JEL C78, F13)

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Weiler, Florian. "Determinants of bargaining success in the climate change negotiations." Climate Policy 12, no. 5 (September 2012): 552–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2012.691225.

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RANJAN, Ram. "BARGAINING AMONG FARMERS, GOODWILL, AND THE SUCCESS OF COOPERATIVES." Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 88, no. 4 (May 4, 2017): 589–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/apce.12172.

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WEDDERBURN, L. "Consultation and Collective Bargaining in Europe: Success or Ideology?" Industrial Law Journal 26, no. 1 (March 1, 1997): 1–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ilj/26.1.1.

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Charles, Lawrence M., and Edward H. Humphreys. "Bargaining to Achieve Teacher Control in Ontario." Articles 40, no. 3 (April 12, 2005): 495–511. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/050157ar.

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Teachers' aspirations to professionalism are manifested in a desire to control educational decision-making. This research investigates success in achieving control of decision-making under formal bargaining, as defined by The School Boards andTeachers' Collective Negotiations Act, compared to non-formal bargaining used prior to 1975.

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Jensen, Thomas, and Andreas Madum. "Partisan optimism and political bargaining." Journal of Theoretical Politics 29, no. 2 (June 23, 2016): 191–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629816630435.

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Partisan voters are optimistic about electoral outcomes: their estimates of the probability of electoral success for their party are substantially higher than the average among the electorate. This has large potential implications for political bargaining. Optimistic electoral expectations make costly bargaining delay look more favourable, which may induce partisans to punish their party for agreeing to a compromise rather than waiting, for example by not turning out to vote. Party decision makers should take this into account when bargaining. We set up and analyse a simple game theoretic model to explore the implications of partisan optimism for political bargaining. We show that increased optimism among a partisan group leads to a stronger bargaining position for their party, but may hurt its electoral prospects. Another main finding is that even high levels of partisan optimism do not in themselves cause inefficient bargaining delay.

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Backus, Matthew, Thomas Blake, Brad Larsen, and Steven Tadelis. "Sequential Bargaining in the Field: Evidence from Millions of Online Bargaining Interactions*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 135, no. 3 (February 3, 2020): 1319–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa003.

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Abstract We study patterns of behavior in bilateral bargaining situations using a rich new data set describing back-and-forth sequential bargaining occurring in over 25 million listings from eBay’s Best Offer platform. We compare observed behavior to predictions from the large theoretical bargaining literature. One-third of bargaining interactions end in immediate agreement, as predicted by complete-information models. The majority of sequences play out differently, ending in disagreement or delayed agreement, which have been rationalized by incomplete information models. We find that stronger bargaining power and better outside options improve agents’ outcomes. Robust empirical findings that existing models cannot rationalize include reciprocal (and gradual) concession behavior and delayed disagreement. Another robust pattern at odds with existing theory is that players exhibit a preference for making and accepting offers that split the difference between the two most recent offers. These observations suggest that behavioral norms, which are neither incorporated nor explained by existing theories, play an important role in the success of bargaining outcomes.

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Recendes, Tessa, Federico Aime, Aaron Hill, and Oleg V. Petrenko. "Bargaining your Way to Success: Machiavellian CEOs and organizational performance." Academy of Management Proceedings 2018, no. 1 (August 2018): 18378. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2018.288.

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Bailer, Stefanie. "What factors determine bargaining power and success in EU negotiations?" Journal of European Public Policy 17, no. 5 (August 2010): 743–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501761003748765.

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Agius, Maria F. "Strategies and Success in Litigation and Negotiation in the WTO." International Negotiation 17, no. 1 (2012): 139–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157180612x630965.

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AbstractThis article analyzes linkages between litigation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and negotiation in multilateral trade rounds and develops a typology of links that can occur between the two processes. These include creating conditions where bargaining is informed by law, influencing the agenda-setting and creating momentum for negotiation on key issues, and affecting thestatus quofrom which negotiations proceed by influencing interpretation of trade rules in the DSB. The purpose is to test whether poor and inexperienced states that are disadvantaged in negotiations can improve their bargaining power in negotiation rounds by pursuing legal proceedings, to see whether links can be exploited for strategy-making to promote the interests of these states, and to discuss how the WTO as an international organization benefits from their empowerment. The strategies suggested in this article could improve the commitment and active participation of relatively non-influential member states. This could be conducive to perceptions of the WTO as a legitimate organization and to a more constructive climate for effective negotiations.

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Kinnucan, Henry W. "Price Bargaining Without Supply Control." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 24, no. 1 (April 1995): 119–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500003671.

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Primary food producers are permitted to bargain as a group for higher prices. Supply response, however, is critical to the long-run success of producer cartels. This article presents a model that elucidates that role of supply response in agricultural price bargaining when no overt action is taken to limit quantity and participation in the cartel is voluntary. Free-riding, for example, is seen as having a dual nature: it undermines the cartel's influence at the negotiating table but it enhances the cartel's ability to sustain a negotiated price increase by attenuating supply response. That price bargaining can result in significant transfers from processors to producers when demand is inelastic and supply is uncontrolled is highlighted in the empirical application.

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Young, Oran R. "The politics of international regime formation: managing natural resources and the environment." International Organization 43, no. 3 (1989): 349–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300032963.

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Why do actors in international society succeed in forming institutional arrangements or regimes to cope with some transboundary problems but fail to do so in connection with other, seemingly similar, problems? This article employs a threefold strategy to make progress toward answering this question. The first section prepares the ground by identifying and critiquing the principal models embedded in the existing literature on regime formation, and the second section articulates an alternative model, called institutional bargaining. The third section employs this alternative model to derive some hypotheses about the determinants of success in institutional bargaining and uses these hypotheses, in a preliminary way, to illuminate the process of regime formation in international society. To lend empirical content to the argument, the article focuses throughout on problems relating to natural resources and the environment.

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Rimmer, Malcolm, and Lee Watts. "Enterprise Bargaining: The Truth Revealed at Last." Economic and Labour Relations Review 5, no. 1 (June 1994): 62–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/103530469400500108.

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This paper is a selective review of recent Australian research upon enterprise bargaining and workplace industrial relations. It begins with a discussion of data collection methods, pointing out some strengths and weaknesses of survey, case study, and agreement text analysis methods. It then focusses upon two substantive issues to test the success of research. The first concerns the infrastructure for enterprise bargaining. Our conclusion is that research illuminates this topic, and reveals general unreadiness. The second issue is productivity performance and enterprise bargaining. We are far more sceptical that research has proved a relation between the two. We conclude with the observation that researchers may be on the wrong track if they try to quantify the effects of enterprise bargaining on productivity performance. The paper recommends that greater attention be given to change management programmes designed to increase competitiveness, and to the outcomes sought from these, rather than to productivity.

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A. DILTS, YAR M. EBADI, AND HEDAYEH, DAVID. "THE EFFECT OF TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION ON PROJECT SUCCESS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING." Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector 20, no. 3 (September 1, 1991): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/9t51-ac0g-42tv-0mya.

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Galinsky, Adam D., Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Gerardo A. Okhuysen, and Thomas Mussweiler. "Regulatory Focus at the Bargaining Table: Promoting Distributive and Integrative Success." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31, no. 8 (August 2005): 1087–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167205276429.

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Kirpsza, Adam. "Better together? Explaining Poland’s and Germany’s bargaining success in EU lawmaking." Comparative European Politics 18, no. 5 (April 27, 2020): 729–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41295-020-00206-5.

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Wasserfallen, Fabio, Dirk Leuffen, Zdenek Kudrna, and Hanno Degner. "Analysing European Union decision-making during the Eurozone crisis with new data." European Union Politics 20, no. 1 (December 16, 2018): 3–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116518814954.

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The collection of articles in this special issue provides a comprehensive analysis of European Union decision-making during the Eurozone crisis. We investigate national preference formation and interstate bargaining related to major reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union. The analyses rely on the new ‘EMU Positions’ dataset. This dataset includes information about the preferences and saliences of all 28 EU member states and key EU institutions, regarding 47 contested issues negotiated between 2010 and 2015. In this introductory article, we first articulate the motivation behind this special issue and outline its collective contribution. We then briefly summarise each article within this collection; the articles analyse agenda setting, preference formation, coalition building, bargaining dynamics, and bargaining success. Finally, we present and discuss the ‘EMU Positions’ dataset.

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Bapat, Navin A., and Bo Ram Kwon. "When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework." International Organization 69, no. 1 (November 20, 2014): 131–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818314000290.

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AbstractAlthough a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful, few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms. Using a game theoretic model, we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders. We demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies, given that the restriction on economic transactions with targeted states may undermine their firms' competitiveness. The model indicates that sanctions are more likely to succeed when the sender's firm retains a moderate share of the target's market relative to its foreign competitors. However, the model also demonstrates that sanctions are likely to be imposed only when the conditions do not favor their success. The empirical implications of the model are tested using the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set.

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Lueke, Stephen. "The Boeing blueprint for dealing with organized labor." Human Resource Management International Digest 22, no. 6 (August 5, 2014): 3–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/hrmid-08-2014-0111.

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Purpose – The purpose of this article is to examine changing employer strategies in dealing with organized labor through Boeing’s negotiations with its local Puget Sound, Washington-based District 751 of the International Association of Machinists and the district’s international parent. Design/methodology/approach – Considers factors including leveraging the slow growth of the US economy and the resulting job-security issues among US workers generally and Boeing workers in particular, along with the divided age composition of Boeing’s workforce to achieve market-share competitiveness with Boeing’s chief global rival, Europe-based Airbus Industries. Findings – Advises that there is no substitute for early strategic analysis of bargaining goals and strategies, particularly with respect to economic bargaining. Practical implications – Advances the view that a well-defined bargaining plan is the most likely key to success in any set of union collective bargaining agreement negotiations. Social implications – Considers the tensions that may exist between younger members of the workforce, whose priority is likely to be job security, and older members, who may be more concerned about their pensions. Originality/value – Presents the ongoing story of collective bargaining agreement negotiations at Boeing.

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Sechser, Todd S. "Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining." Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 2 (June 7, 2016): 318–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002716652687.

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When do states defend their reputations? States sometimes pay high costs to protect their reputations, but other times willingly tarnish them. What accounts for the difference? This article investigates reputation building in the context of coercive diplomacy. In coercive bargaining, giving in to a challenge can harm one’s reputation. I argue, however, that states value their reputations less—and therefore are more willing to capitulate to coercive threats—when they do not expect future challenges. Using a data set of more than 200 coercive threats, empirical tests find support for this logic. Coercers that are constrained in their ability to initiate future challenges exhibit higher rates of coercive success in the status quo. The results shed light on the causes of reputation-building behavior and add an important element to our understanding of the dynamics of coercive diplomacy.

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Blavoukos, Spyros, and Dimitris Bourantonis. "Issue Salience and Controversy: Any Effect on Chair’s Autonomy in Multilateral Negotiations?" International Negotiation 20, no. 2 (April 27, 2015): 199–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341305.

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High issue salience and controversy negatively affect the probability of success of multilateral negotiations. In such a context, Chairpersons acquire an important role in agenda management and brokerage among the bargaining partners. If they perform these functions neutrally and impartially, Chairs increase their effectiveness and emerge as key determinants of negotiation success. However, Chairs as agents often seek some degree of autonomy to pursue their own interests. We expect high issue salience and controversy to create a non-conducive environment for Chairs to follow their own agenda, due to greater principals’ sensitivity, thus leading any such autonomy-seeking attempt to failure. We discuss four case studies of negotiations taken from theunsetting, in which Chairs sought autonomy in a highly polarized and controversial bargaining environment. Whereas in the first two cases, the Chairs’ attempts ended in failure confirming our basic hypothesis, in the latter two cases the Chairs were successful.

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Trötschel, Roman, Silke Bündgens, Joachim Hüffmeier, and David D. Loschelder. "Promoting prevention success at the bargaining table: Regulatory focus in distributive negotiations." Journal of Economic Psychology 38 (October 2013): 26–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2012.03.006.

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Vachon, Todd E., and Josef Kuo-Hsun Ma. "Bargaining for Success: Examining the Relationship Between Teacher Unions and Student Achievement." Sociological Forum 30, no. 2 (June 2015): 391–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/socf.12168.

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Rasmussen, Anne, and Christine Reh. "The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success." Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 7 (August 2013): 1006–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.795391.

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LaMar, Casey. "The Importance of Power Balance in Nuclear Arms Negotiations: An Addendum." International Negotiation 22, no. 1 (February 20, 2017): 162–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341351.

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Theorists debate whether symmetry or asymmetry of the power balance can help bring about bargaining success. Arbitration is difficult because the ‘Symmetry Theory’ accepts Structuralist theoretical conventions, while the ‘Asymmetry Theory’ rejects such conventions. This article employs a ‘Nuclear Weapons Addendum’ to strengthen the Asymmetry Theory by allowing it to explain bargaining results in symmetric and asymmetric cases without dismissing Structuralist assumptions. We analyze comparative case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to argue that this modified Asymmetry Theory provides a more convincing narrative that should be considered in Structuralist discussions of international negotiation.

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Fowler, Tim. "Does fighting back still matter? The Canadian autoworkers, capitalist crisis and confrontation." Capital & Class 36, no. 3 (October 2012): 493–513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0309816812460750.

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This article examines the round of collective bargaining that took place between the Canadian Autoworkers (CAW), Canada’s largest private-sector union, and the ‘Big Three’ auto manufacturers (Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors) during the most recent crisis of capitalism (sometimes popularly referred to as the ‘Great Recession’). During this round of bargaining, the union made concessions in order to secure production; the article argues what while this may have represented a short-term success, in the long run the union has implicitly bought into the logics of neoliberalism, which will have disastrous consequences for both the union and the larger labour movement.

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Kumar, Pradeep, and Lynn Acri. "Unions' Collective Bargaining Agenda on Women's Issues: The Ontario Experience." Articles 47, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 623–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/050808ar.

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This paper examines the bargaining agenda of major Canadian unions in Ontario with respect to women's issues, and evaluates their efforts towards incorporating specific clauses pertaining to these issues into their collective agreements. The study reveals that union efforts to achieve a better deal for women have had mixed success.

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Kim, Sungwook. "New Bargaining Game Model for Collaborative Vehicular Network Services." Mobile Information Systems 2019 (March 7, 2019): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/6269475.

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The wireless industry’s evolution from fourth generation (4G) to fifth generation (5G) will lead to extensive progress in new vehicular network environments, such as crowdsensing, cloud computing, and routing. Vehicular crowdsensing exploits the mobility of vehicles to provide location-based services, whereas vehicular cloud computing is a new hybrid technology that instantly uses vehicular network resources, such as computing, storage, and Internet for decision-making. In this study, novel crowdsensing, cloud computing, and routing algorithms are developed for a next-generation vehicular network, and they are combined into a hybrid scheme. To provide an effective solution toward an appropriate interactive vehicular network process, we focus on the paradigm of learning algorithms and game theory. Based on individual cooperation, our proposed scheme is designed as a triple-plane game model to adapt to the dynamics of a vehicular network system. The primary advantage of our game-based approach is to provide self-adaptability and responsiveness to current network environments. The performance of our hybrid scheme is evaluated and analyzed using simulation experiments in terms of the cloud service success ratio, normalized dissemination throughput, and crowdsensing success probability.

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Post, Abigail. "Flying to Fail: Costly Signals and Air Power in Crisis Bargaining." Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 4 (June 21, 2018): 869–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002718777043.

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Theories of crisis bargaining suggest that military mobilizations act as costly signals of resolve, increasing the credibility of coercive threats. In this article, I argue that air mobilizations, as a subset of military signals, demonstrate a lack of resolve during coercive bargaining for four reasons: they cost less in terms of human and financial resources (sunk costs), generate lower political costs (hand-tying), do not raise the risks of engagement (manipulation of risk), and do not significantly shift the balance of power—all compared with other military signals. Using new data that disaggregates military demonstrations into air, naval, and land signals during 210 cases of compellence, this article presents systematic evidence that air signals decrease the probability of coercive threat success compared with the alternatives. This finding holds important implications for theoretical and policy debates regarding the role of costly signals in international bargaining.

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Hastuti, Sri Wahyuni Mega, and Bayu Surindra. "Analysis of Business Plan Preparation Applications as an Effort to Achieve Business Success for Entrepreneurs of Kediri." International Journal of Research and Review 8, no. 7 (July 14, 2021): 117–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.52403/ijrr.20210716.

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The research, entitled Analysis of Business Plan Preparation Applications as an Effort to Achieve Business Success for Kediri City Entrepreneurs is a descriptive research, this study examines efforts to achieve business success through the preparation of a business plan. The application for the preparation of a business plan prepared by entrepreneurs Kediri city includes aspects of customer segments, customer relations, bargaining value, promotions, main resources, main activities, relationships with partners and sources of income for entrepreneurs. The population that became the respondents in this study was obtained from the results of the competition for the leading entrepreneur in Kediri city were 100 respondents. The purpose of this study was to determine: (1) the types of businesses found in Kediri city in terms of the results of the preparation of business plans for business practitioner in Kediri city, (2) the market segment that became the customer service orientation of the business practitioners in Kediri city, (3) the types of business promotions carried out by Kediri City entrepreneurs, (4) The way Kediri business practitioner in fostering relationships with customers, (5) Types of advantages/bargaining power provided by Kediri City entrepreneurs to consumers/customers, (6) Sources needed by business practitioners in Kediri city, (7) business partners for business practitioners in the city of Kediri, (8) sources of income from whatever is obtained from business practitioners Kediri city. Data analysis technique is qualitative descriptive analysis. The results of the study indicate that: (1) The types of businesses in the City of Kediri are in the fields of food, beverages, accessories, souvenirs, educational institution services, beauty services, batik, weaving, tailoring, Muslim clothing, t-shirt producing; (2) The market segments as costumer service orientation of the leading business practitioners in Kediri City are mostly adult and adolescent consumers; (3) the most business promotions are exhibitions, online media, social media, banners, business cards, brochures and direct selling; (4) Planning to build relationships with customers through intensive communication with customers, after-sales service and making membership cards (members); (5) The most advantage/bargaining power is to provide excellent service, affordable prices, quality products; (6) the most resource requirements planned are capital, labour, raw materials and equipment; (7) Most Business Partners are Government Agencies and supported by other partners; and (8) The source of income is from the sale of products and from several other sources of income as addition. Keywords: Business plan, customer segment, promotion, bargaining value, business partner.

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41

Azar, Ofer H. "What affects customer success when bargaining for a new car? Some empirical evidence." Journal of Socio-Economics 41, no. 1 (January 2012): 26–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2011.10.007.

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Chopard, Bertrand, Thomas Cortade, and Andreea Cosnita-Langlais. "Success and failure of bargaining in merger control: The case of asset divestitures." Economic Modelling 49 (September 2015): 254–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2015.04.013.

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Gray, Alastair, and James Buchan. "Pay in the British NHS: A Local Solution for a National Service?" Journal of Health Services Research & Policy 3, no. 2 (April 1998): 113–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/135581969800300210.

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An important component of the reforms of the British National Health Service (NHS) has been devolution of a previously highly centralised pay bargaining system to the local provider level. As the wage bill is by far the single largest item of health care expenditure, the implications of this change may be far-reaching. This article surveys the available theory and evidence from an economic perspective. It reviews the development of pay determination mechanisms in the NHS and the extent to which local pay has been adopted since the reforms were introduced. It then considers the theory of local pay and general evidence on local pay variations in the UK, before turning to the available evidence on local labour markets in the health care sectors of the UK and USA. It concludes with a discussion of the policy and research implications of current developments on local pay bargaining in the NHS. In particular, it suggests that judgements over the success or failure of local pay bargaining will concern: first, whether the weakened monopsony position of the NHS at national level results in higher pay for the more powerful employee groups; second, whether fragmentation of bargaining weakens the negotiating and lobbying power of national trade unions and professional organisations; third, whether competition between providers leads to higher or lower costs; and fourth, whether any efficiency gains from local bargaining outweigh the higher transaction costs involved.

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Kronberger, Thomas, and Leonidas Papakonstantinidis. "“The Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model”: Bargaining Possibilities When there are Three Involved Parties on a Labour Market and two of them are Active Decision-Makers – Cases Greece-Germany." INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 4, no. 6 (2019): 68–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.18775/ijied.1849-7551-7020.2015.46.2005.

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That’s a summary of our research in Greece and Germany as it concerns with their “labor market”. We examine the 3-polar system in the labor market, State-Company-Citizen. The aim of this paper is to show the bargaining possibilities when there are three involved parties on a labor market and two of them are active decision-makers. The third one is stakeholder who does not directly take part in the decision-making process. We will show possible solutions for increasing the benefit for all three parties. As an introduction, basic statistical data from Greece and Germany will be presented and structured. After this, the different behaviors of the parties in both countries will be regarded and their bargaining success will be illustrated.

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Simms, Melanie, Dennis Eversberg, Camille Dupuy, and Lena Hipp. "Organizing Young Workers Under Precarious Conditions: What Hinders or Facilitates Union Success." Work and Occupations 45, no. 4 (July 4, 2018): 420–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0730888418785947.

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Under what conditions do young precarious workers join unions? Based on case studies from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the authors identify targeted campaigns, coalition building, membership activism, and training activities as innovative organizing approaches. In addition to traditional issues such as wages and training quality, these approaches also featured issues specific to precarious workers, including skills training, demands for minimum working hours, and specific support in insecure employment situations. Organizing success is influenced by bargaining structures, occupational identity, labor market conditions, and support by union leaders and members. Innovative organizing tends to happen when unions combine new approaches with existing structures.

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Li, Pengsheng, and Yanying Chen. "The Influence of Enterprises’ Bargaining Power on the Green Total Factor Productivity Effect of Environmental Regulation—Evidence from China." Sustainability 11, no. 18 (September 9, 2019): 4910. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11184910.

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In response to the ecological and environmental problems caused by high energy consumption and pollution, Chinese governments have raised their concerns and tighten the regulations. Even though local governments have achieved certain degree of success during policy implementation, it is still far from realizing the ultimate goal. Our study fills the gap in the existing literature by exploring the dynamic effects of environmental regulations on enterprises’ green total factor productivity (GTFP) from the perspective of enterprise bargaining power. With data obtained from the industrial pollution database and the Chinese industrial enterprise database, we calculated the GTFP at enterprise level using the Luenberger productivity index. The results from balanced panel data models show that environmental regulations would have negative impacts on enterprise’s GTFP in the short run. However, in the long run, the implementation of environmental policies would achieve the win-win goal in terms of enterprises competitiveness and environmental protection. In addition, indicated by industrial output, tax revenue and number of employees, enterprise bargaining power could weaken the dynamic effects of environmental regulations. Moreover, state ownership, local official changes and weak political constraints would enhance enterprise’s bargaining power and thus reduce the dynamic effects. By focusing on the enterprise’s bargaining power and its heterogeneous factors during policy implementation, our study provides implications for mitigating distortions and improving GTFP.

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Levenstein, Margaret C., and Valerie Y. Suslow. "What Determines Cartel Success?" Journal of Economic Literature 44, no. 1 (February 1, 2006): 43–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/002205106776162681.

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Following George Stigler (1964), many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts b firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output. But the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well. Theory cannot tell us, a priori, which effect will dominate: whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question. We examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions: (1) Can cartels succeed? (2) If so, for how long? (3) What impact do cartels have? (4) What causes cartels to break up? We conclude that many cartels do survive, and that the distribution of duration is bimodal. While the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years, many cartels break up very quickly (i.e., in less than a year). But there are many others that last between five and ten years, and some that last decades. Limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits, to varying degrees. Cartels can also affect other non-price variables, including advertising, innovation, investment, barriers to entry, and concentration. Cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring, but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions. Cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive. Price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances. Sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry.

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Duvander, Ann-Zofie, Eleonora Mussino, and Jussi Tervola. "Similar Negotiations over Childcare? A Comparative Study of Fathers’ Parental Leave Use in Finland and Sweden." Societies 11, no. 3 (June 24, 2021): 67. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/soc11030067.

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Fathers’ leave use is promoted in many countries, but so far with different success. Major explanations of different usage revolve around economic bargaining between parents and economic constraints in the household. By using extensive register data from 1999–2009 in Finland and Sweden, this study asks whether fathers’ use of parental leave in the two countries is determined by the same socioeconomic characteristics on the individual and the household level once we control for sociodemographic factors. Striking similarities in what influences fathers’ use of leave in the two contexts are found, even though leave is used at very different levels and the policy design differs remarkably. Generally, fathers with a similar income level to the mother use leave the most, but in high-income households the mother’s higher income leads to the highest propensity of fathers’ leave take-up. The results indicate that equal bargaining positions are associated with fathers’ leave use but also that mothers’ stronger position often facilitates fathers’ leave. We conclude that the role of gendered bargaining positions should be studied in interaction with the level of resources in the household.

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Rafferty, Felicity. "Equal Pay: The Evolutionary Process 1984-1994." Journal of Industrial Relations 36, no. 4 (December 1994): 451–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002218569403600401.

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Equal pay in Australia has been implemented with varying degrees of success since the first historic equal pay decision was handed down in 1969. The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of the equal pay process in the federal industrial relations sphere, with major emphasis on the period from the mid-1980s to the recent legislation that provides for equal remuneration for work of equal value as a legislative right. The mechanisms for processing equal pay are exam ined, drawing on the experience gained from various cases in which implementa tion of equal pay was the goal. Emphasis is given to recent experience in the Family Court Counsellors Case to illustrate the impact of enterprise bargaining on the equal pay process. The paper concludes that the equal pay process has developed greater objectivity over time, thereby enhancing the flexibility of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission's work value principle for the pur poses of evaluating work in feminized occupations. The conclusion is also reached that enterprise bargaining, which is known to disadvantage women, has also been the catalystfor equal pay as a legislative right—although the value of that right in an enterprise bargaining environment is questioned.

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Koch-Baumgarten, Sigrid. "Vom Mythos internationaler Solidarität." PROKLA. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft 27, no. 107 (June 1, 1997): 263–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.32387/prokla.v27i107.882.

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The article analyses the attempts of trade unions organized in the International Transportworkers' Federation (ITF) to establish a system of multinational industrial relations and collective bargaining in the flags-ofconvenience shipping. Although based on egoistic national special interests and without formal restrictions on national souvereignity the co-operation leads to an international regime. lt regulates the rights to organize and represent crews in industrial relations, minimum standards for working conditions and incomes, and procedures for the multinational decisionmaking process and management of conflicts. The trade unions, regulating about 20% of flags-of-convenience shipping, suceeded in establishing a multinational control of national collective bargaining. This success is based on an imbalance of power between trade unions of industrialised and developing countries within the ITF and on specific conditions in transport industry, and therefore not transferable to other industries.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Bargaining success'

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